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A Busy Eu-Kazakhstan Agenda A BUSY EU-KAZAKHSTAN AGENDA SPECIAL REPORT | MAY 2021 https://eurac.tv/9SXF With the support of A BUSY EU-KAZAKHSTAN AGENDA SPECIAL REPORT https://eurac.tv/9SXF Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, relations between the EU and Kazakhstan have continued to develop, with a milestone in-person EU-Kazakhstan Coopera- tion Council on 10 May expected to draw the lines of cooperation for the 2021-2027 period. Contents EU prioritises climate, connectivity, regional cooperation in its Kazakhstan relations 4 Kazakhstan invests in human capital to a 6 void brain drain Aigul Kuspan: Most MEPs have only a rough idea of 8 Kazakhstan Analyst: Central Asian ‘patient’ is ready for deeper 11 cooperation Oettinger: It’s time to take EU-Kazakhstan relations to a new 13 level 4 SPECIAL REPORT | A BUSY EU-KAZAKHSTAN AGENDA | EURACTIV EU prioritises climate, connectivity, regional cooperation in its Kazakhstan relations By Georgi Gotev | EURACTIV.com The 2017 Expo in Astana was devoted to the future of energy. Its legacy is the Green plan aiming to transform Kazakhstan into a climate-neutral country by 2060. [Georgi Gotev] head of the EU-Kazakhstan including the EU-Kazakhstan business resolution highly critical of the human Cooperation Council on 10 platform. rights situation in Kazakhstan and AMay, EURACTIV spoke to of the way the recent parliamentary an EU official to gather information At the core of the meeting elections were held there. There were about the EU’s expectations for the is the implementation of EPCA, also hints of heavy lobbyism among cooperation with Kazakhstan and with the Enhanced Partnership and MEPs by an organisation with a Central Asia in the years to come. Cooperation Agreement between political agenda. Kazakhstan and the EU, labelled as The Deputy Prime Minister and “unique” and as a model for other Asked if EU diplomats were happy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar countries. The European Commission with such harsh resolutions, the EU Tileuberdi is expected to come to says the EU’s relationship with Central representative, who asked not to be Brussels on Monday to physically Asia in general and Kazakhstan named, appeared to take his distance, co-chair the Cooperation Council in particular “has never been any saying that the European Parliament meeting with EU foreign affairs chief stronger or any better”. was “completely independent and not Josep Borrell. controllable”. HUMAN RIGHTS The visit appears to mark the end “Their motivations are sometimes of a slow period due to the COVID-19 However, the issue of human rights political, their sources of information pandemic, although virtual meetings has been an irritant lately. In February are diverse, the resolution is also the had been held in various formats, the European Parliament passed a result of discussions between different Continued on Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT | A BUSY EU-KAZAKHSTAN AGENDA | EURACTIV 5 Continued from Page 4 groups, between people with different Regarding trade, the EU official within Central Asia, and the EU would agendas and the result is a bit called the meetings of the EU- like to share its expertise,” he said. unpredictable”, the EU representative Kazakhstan business platform a said. “very helpful process”. The latest Visa facilitation is certainly an was chaired by Prime Minister Askar important issue for Kazakhstan, but “This resolution doesn’t represent Mamin and the one will take place in the EU representative made it clear the view of the EU as such. It’s not Brussels on Monday. that nothing new was happening in the view of the EU27”, he made clear, this field. adding that “the only positive aspect The official added that “we I would see in this resolution is that understand that President Tokayev REGIONAL COOPERATION it draws attention to the government would like to visit Brussels when the of Kazakhstan to show progress in the conditions allow. We look forward to Asked about regional issues, and field of human rights”. this visit, although the date is not set some negative developments, such yet”. as the recent clash at the border He said the EU was aware that the between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, resolution was not received well in CONNECTIVITY the diplomat said the EU was looking Nur-Sultan. In his words, the meeting forward to the development of of the Cooperation Council would The EU official said that another cooperation in Central Asia, being provide the opportunity to the Kazakh priority for the EU was the issue of ready to share its own expertise in government to explain what they are connectivity. regional cooperation, by “helping doing in this respect. Central Asia to invent its own way of In contrast with China’s ‘Belt and cooperating at the regional level”. GREEN AGENDA Road’ initiative, the EU promotes the idea of building corridors as a way to The recent clash, he said, “is Another big aspect of the bilateral increase ‘connectivity’ with Asia on damaging the common efforts to agenda, in the EU representative’s the basis of a rules-based approach. project a positive image of Central words, is the Green agenda that In the EU’s view, connectivity is Asia”. the government of Kazakhstan is not only about infrastructure but developing to facilitate a gradual about internal reform, economic The EU side is also interested to transitition of the fossil-rich country modernisation, promoting hear from the Kazakh side about the to green energy. sustainable productivity, digital and plans for a new regional summit. human contacts. Kazakhstan hosted the first summit of “It could be a quite promising this kind in 2018, and the EU official cooperation,” the EU official said. The EU representative said said that this was indeed “a historical Uzbekistan will be hosting in event with a powerful message”. He added there will be “a quite big Tashkent in July a big regional EU-Kazakhstan climate conference” conference on connectivity, for “We really hope that Kazakhstan in Nur-Sultan on 3 June, which would Central Asia and South Asia, which and Uzbekistan will push for a Central prepare COP26 in the context of includes Afghanistan. Asia summit to take place this year, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s with the purpose of sending a message pledge that Kazakhstan would “We would like to boost our that despite the marginal tensions become climate neutral by 2060. cooperation on connectivity with between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, this part of the world,” the EU the region is on a constructive, In December 2020, Tokayev said representative said, adding that the cooperative path,” the EU official said. that as a landlocked and developing Commission is discussing, in the country, Kazakhstan was highly context of the 2021-27 EU budget The EU is also said to be keen vulnerable to climate change. He period, the possibility to launch some to promote cooperation in water acknowledged that the country was projects on digitalisation. management. Projects already exist, still heavily relying on fossil fuels but but the EU ambition is to streamline was strongly determined to phase “We would like to discuss this this process during the 2021-2027 them out, decarbonise the economy with Kazakhstan, because the COVID budgeting period. and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. pandemic has exposed the digital divide at the global level, but also 6 SPECIAL REPORT | A BUSY EU-KAZAKHSTAN AGENDA | EURACTIV Kazakhstan invests in human capital to avoid brain drain By Vlagyiszlav Makszimov | EURACTIV.com shutterstock_1273103506 [Shutterstock/ LightField Studios] azakhstan continues Central Asian Bureau for Analytical indeed key. Of young Kazakhs living to rejuvenate its public Reporting, 366,000 people have left abroad, 51.3% mentioned “corruption, Kadministration in a drive to the 19-million post-Soviet country bureaucracy at all levels, impunity keep talented youth at home and in the past ten years, most of them and irresponsibility of officials, and achieve two major goals: modernising educated professionals. inefficient government” as reasons the Central Asian country and for leaving, while 31.3% said it was avoiding brain drain. The number may appear high, but “professional lack of demand, lack it is much lower than in countries in of prospects for self-realisation and Kazakhstan’s capital Nur-Sultan Eastern Europe such as Bulgaria or career,” according to an online survey prepares for the second round of Romania, which have lost millions of by the International Organisation for selection for the president’s elite people, mostly young and educated. Migration. programme designed to inject fresh talent into public administration as To avoid such trends, Kazakhstan During the first intake back in the country presses on with reforms banks on reforming administration 2019, only 300 of the more than 13,000 despite the pandemic. and getting young talent into decision- citizens who showed interest were making positions, which may alleviate selected, about a third of the people The second intake of the pressure at the root of the migration from the presidential reserve coming Presidential Youth Personnel flows. from the private sector. By the end of Reserve should address Kazakhstan’s 2020, 166 were employed. emigration problem. According to the Reforming the administration is Continued on Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT | A BUSY EU-KAZAKHSTAN AGENDA | EURACTIV 7 Continued from Page 6 Offered employment covers a Central and Eastern Europe to the the introduction of policies such wide range of positions, including West has been a challenge within the as civil servants’ internships in very top public sector jobs, such EU as well and has recently become an international organisations. deputy ministerial and head of stock important feature in the bloc’s policy exchange posts. towards its eastern neighbours. However, commentators such as Daniyar Ashim point out it is too early With an average age of 31, the At home, the EU has also to tell whether the reforms will bear members of the presidential reserve been pushing to provide more fruit.
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