PortugalandAirTransportinthe Early21stCentury

KennethButton AIRTRANSPORT TheNatureofairtransport

1. Airtransportisimportant • Itisabigindustry • Itisvitaltomanyindustriesandregions 2. Itismultifacited • Airlines • Airports • Airtrafficcontrol • Domesticandinternational 3. ItisanetworkIndustry • ispartofEurope(legalfact) • Portugalispartoftheworld(globalization) 4. Itisnotwantedforitsownsake • It“facilitates”anddoesnotcreate 5. Ithasenvironmentalimplications • Noise • Greenhousegasemissions Airtransportasanindustry

• Isabout1%ofWesternEuropeanandUSGDP;3%ofBrazil’s • Carriersover2billionpassengersayear • 3.9millionjobs • Over$260billionannualturnover • 18,000aircraft • 15millionkilometernetwork • 10,000airports • 30milliontonsoffreight • Over130billionrevenuetonkilometers • Importantforkeymodernindustries(hightechmanagementflies60%more thantraditionalindustries) • Carriers40%ofworldtradebyvalue • HalfoftouristsoutsideofEuropetravelbyair AIRTRANSPORTPOLICY Publicpolicyphases

THELEGACY • To1910>gentleassistanceforinnovation • 19101918>militaryimportance • 1920s>nationalintegration(mailservices) • 1930s>internationalism(esp.Empires) • 1940s+>militarydevelopment • Late1940s1970s>economicregulation – Chicagoconvention – domesticprice/marketaccesscontrols

MODERNAGE • 1970s+>“deregulationofoperations” – domesticfromlate1970sinUS – international(OpenSkies,EUpackages,etc) • 1980s+>“deregulationofinfrastructure” • 2000s+>environmentalregulations Majorrecentregulatoryreformsand initiativesinaviation

1977 US Air Cargo Deregulation Act 1978 US Airline Deregulation Act 1979 Term “Open Skies” used 1984 UK-Netherlands liberal ASA bilateral 1987 EU’s “First Package” 1987 UK Airports Act (privatization) 1989 EU’s “Second Package” 1989 Northwest-KLM strategic alliance 1992 EU’s “Third Package” 1996 NAV established 1999 “Single European Skies” initiative 2001 NATS UK established Natureofliberalization

¥ US:ÔBigBangÕ ¥ AirlineDeregulationAct1978 ¥ OpenSkiesPolicyfrom1979 ¥ EU:Phasedliberalization ¥ Addhocreforms(fromearly1980) ¥ Package1(1988) Ğ Openinguptheexistingstructure ¥ Package2(1990) Ğ LiberalizingtheEUinternationalmarket ¥ Package3(1993) Ğ AnopenEuropeanairtransportmarket ¥ Extraterritorialauthority(2003) TheEuropeanbased“OpenSkies” initiatives(passengerservices)

Netherlands In Force 10/14/92 Belgium Provisional 3/1/95 Finland In Force 3/24/95 Denmark In Force 4/26/95 Norway In Force 4/26/95 Sweden In Force 4/26/95 Luxembourg In Force 6/6/95 Austria In Force 6/14/95 Czech Repub. In Force 12/8/95 Germany Provisional 2/29/96 Italy Comity and Reciprocity 11/11/98 Portugal In Force 12/22/99 In Force 10/12/00 Poland In Force 5/31/01 France In Force 10/19/01

PassengerandcargoyieldforEuropean Unionscheduledairlines

Passenger Cargo

100

95

90

85

80

75

70 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Year Airlinelaborphysicalproductivityin Europe(ATKperemployee)

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Year EUUStransatlanticairpassengers

60

50

40

30

Passengers (millions) (millions) Passengers Passengers 20

10

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 THECALLENGESCONFRONTING AIRLINES Operating margins of airlines (1988-2006)

Europe US Global

6

4

2

0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 -2

-4

-6

-8

-10 Economicmarginsintheairtransport sector 35%

30%

25%

20% 30

15% 25

20 10% 15

5% 10 5

0% 0 Global Aircraft Aircraft Airport CateringAirports Airlines Global Aircraft Airports ATS Airlines Distribution Manufacturers DistributionManufacturingLeasingHandling Systems Systems CompaniesServices Industry Industry SUSTAININGAIRTRANSPORT Factorsinfluencingthefutureofair transport

• Macroeconomicgrowth • Financialviability – Natureofscheduledservices – Externalshockstocosts(e.g.oilprice) – Externalshockstodemand(e.g.September11th) • Environmentalcosts – Local(resistancetonewinfrastructure) – Global(greenhousegases) • Infrastructurecapacityconstraints • Ideology – Reregulation Dealingwitha“fixedcost” thecostof offeringascheduledservice

Natureofthemarket Competitivemarket Scheduledservice(i.e.fixedcostsofacommitment) Problems Marketinstability Needforsomedegreeof“monopolypower” Institutionalprotection Loyaltypayments(frequentflyerprograms) “Fortress”hubs Asymmetricinformation Lowcosts Yieldmanagement Costdifferencesbetweenanofrillcarrier andalegacycarrier

Catering GDS Commissions Sales Advertsing CabinCrew CockpitCrew Handling Landing ATC Insurance Fuel Maintenance Aircraft

100

80

60

40

20

0 Nofrills Classic Type of Carrier Growthofnofrillcarriers

Ryanair VirginExpress EasyJet Debonair GO Buzz bmibaby

1050

900

750

600

450

300

150

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Year Lowcostairlines afailedbusiness model? Defunctlowcostcarriers

AirCanadaTango PacificSouthwestAirlines AirSouth PanAm AmericaWestAirlines PearlAir ATAAirlines PEOPLExpress Canada3000 SafeAir Compass Saro EastWest SkybusAirlines EastwindAirlines SkyValue GreyhoundAir Song(Delta) HootersAir SoutheastAirlines ImpulseAirlines TAESA IndependenceAir TowerAir JetGreenAirways UAir KiwiAirlines UnitedShuttle KiwiInternationalAirLines ValuJet LAPA VanguardAirlines MetroJet Vistajet MidwayAirlines WesternPacificAirlines NationalAirlines OasisHongKongAirlines Temporalfaresofferedcurve a monopoly

Porto - Palma : 30 May

250

200

€ 150 Air Berlin

100

50

Apr il May Temporalfaresofferedcurve three carriers

Porto - : 30 May

600

550

500 450 TAP 400 € Air France 350

300 Air Luxor

250

200

150

Apr il May Hubandspokenetworks

Point to Point Network Hub and Spoke Network

10 different routes 4 different routes “Dogbone”internationalhubandspoke network

x a

y b

z A B c j i Someshorttermprotection:TAPSouth AmericanNetwork2001and2004 Someshorttermprotection:TAP EuropeanNetwork2001and2004 Whydopeoplestillinvestinairlines?

• Stillsomeprotection • “LasVegaseffect” • “Cashcowargument” • Airlinesas“Tills” • Airlinesare“Sexy” • Institutionalbaleouts(Chapter11inUS) THESITUATIONINPORTUGAL ThesituationinPortugal

• Small,relativelycompactdomesticmarket • Significanttourismactivity • Limitedairportcapacityatmainhub • Asmalllegacycarrierlinkedintoamajoralliance • Presenceofalargelowcostcarrier • Anumberoflucrativebutprotectedlonghaul markets • PotentialcompetitioninthelongrunfromTGVto Madrid Thepositionoftheairlines

• Thegrowthinairtrafficwillbeslowerthanforecast – Globaleconomicgrowthwillslow – Environmentalconcernswillgrow – Fuelpriceswillstayhigh Mitigatingfactor: – Theincreaseduseofalternativestomineraloilbasedfuels – Morefuelefficientaircraft(1%morefuelefficientayear) • Thelowcostmarketwillcontinuetobeunstableascarriers comeandgo. – Ryanairwillfinditsmarginserodedasotherlowcostcarriersbegin tocompeteonitsroutes • ThepressuresonTAPtomergewillincreasedespiteshortterm financialsuccessinmarketswithrestrictivebilaterals – Thesewillbeliberalized – Themarketswillnotgrowfast – Lowcostcompetitionwillfurtherhurtshorthaulroutes Airports

• Slowerthanprojecteddemandgrowthwilltakes somepressureoffPortela. • IfTAPmergesthenroleofLisbonasahubwill change • OncethenewairportatAlcocheteiscompleteditwill bedifficulttoclosePorteladuetopressurefrom businesstravelers – WitnessexperiencesinWashington,etc