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Responding to Bomb Threats, Bombing Incidents and Suicide

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Responding to Bomb Threats, Bombing Incidents and Suicide Police Officers Safety Association Responding to Bomb Threats, Bombing Incidents and Suicide Bombers For law enforcement, EMS TSA 15-00014 - 003444 fire, and services. v1 .0 v1 .0 Purpose This program is a resource for law enforcement, fire and EMS service personnel. While not all of the material in this program will be equally applicable to these three services, most of it will be. This program isn't specifically designed to be give as is (although it can be); rather it is designed to be a resource to help you construct a training program for your own purposes and audience. Permission is granted to copy freely from this program, but acknowledgement of it as the source is appreciated. TSA 15-00014 - 003445 All other documents referenced in this presentation, other than books, are included on this CD-ROM or are on the web page that you downloaded this file from. v1 .0 2 Acknowledgements Technical Review Committee: Bert DuVernay, Chief, New Braintree, MA PO Robert Heath, Chief, Kingston, MA FD August Vernon Forsyth County NC Office of Emergency Management Trent Walker Greensboro NC PO, Special Operations Division John Donnelly, Battalion Chief, Dist. Of Columbia Fire & EMS John Newton, Captain, Greenfield, MA PO Stuart Campbell, Bomb Appraisal Officer, TSA Don McKay, Captain, Amherst, MA FD TSA 15-00014 - 003446 v1 .0 3 Contents 1) Explosives - 5 2) Bombs and Terrorism - 29 3) Stages of a Bombing Incident - 35 4) Pre Attack Detection & Countermeasures-40 5) Bomb Threats- 51 6) Post Detonation Response - 71 7) Suicide Bombers - 85 8) Use of Force- 101 TSA 15-00014 - 003447 9) Facility Assessment - 115 10) Resources - 119 v1 .0 4 en (I) 'r- c ·-> 0 en ·-+-' 0 () Q) c.. (/) wX TSA 15-00014 - 003448 Explosions & Explosives • An explosion is a sudden increase in volume and release of energy in an explosive material in an extreme manner, usually with the generation of high temperatures and the release of gases. An explosion creates a shock wave. • Low explosives propagate the reaction by deflagration (burning) at speeds of 3300 feet/second or less. Low explosives are usually mixtures of a combustible substance and an oxidant. They are usually used as propellants and pyrotechnics . • With high explosives the reaction is propagated by the shock wave, traveling in excess of 3300 feet/second. High explosives are usually chemical compounds. TSA 15-00014 - 003449 • An explosive that deflagrates in open air may detonate if confined. v1 .0 6 High Explosive Types • Primary explosives are extremely sensitive to mechanical shock, friction, and heat. As a general rule, they are compounds that are sufficiently sensitive that they can be initiated with a blow from a hammer. Example: blasting caps (lead azide). • Secondary explosives (also called base explosives) are relatively insensitive to shock, friction, and heat. Examples: Dynamite, TNT, RDX (C4), PETN, HMX, det cord. They often require a primary explosive to initiate their detonation . • Tertiary explosives (or blasting agents) are insensitive to shock and cannot be reliably detonated with practical quantities of TSA 15-00014 - 003450 primary explosives; they require a secondary explosive to initiate their detonation. Example: e.g. ammonium nitrate/fuel oil mixture (ANFO) v1 .0 7 00 Q) -a. E nj wX c ·-nj ..c () Q) > ·-CJ) 0 -a. X w TSA 15-00014 - 003451 Fuel and Oxidizers • Just like an ordinary fire, all explosions require a fuel (something to burn) and an oxidizer (something to supply oxygen) • An ordinary fire draws oxygen from the air, which is a diffuse source of oxygen • An explosion draws oxygen from the oxidizer, which is a rich and concentrated source of it, thus the reaction is more intense and quicker-that is, it's an explosion rather than a fire. TSA 15-00014 - 003452 v1 .0 9 Common Fuels • Energetic Hydrocarbons • Hydrocarbons • Nitromethane (racing • Fuel oil fuel) • Turpentine • Nitrobenzene • Sugar • Ethyl Nitrate • Wax • Elemental • Vaseline • Powdered aluminum, • Sawdust magnesium, antimony TSA 15-00014 - 003453 • Glycerin • Phosphine • Hydrogen sulfide v1.0 10 Common Oxidizers • Background: Oxidizers consist of a binding agent and an oxygen supplying agent. e.g.: • Bonding agent: ammonium • Oxygen supply: nitrate • Combine to form the oxidizer: ammonium nitrate • Rule of thumb: many oxidizers end in "ate", uite ", or uide ". • Nitrate, peroxide, chlorate, dichroimate, iodate, permanganate, perchlorate TSA 15-00014 - 003454 • Another common oxidizer is nitric acid v1 .0 11 Explosives Examples • Oxidizer and fuel: • Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, or ANFO • Potassium Chlorate and sugar • Nitric Acid and Urea = Urea Nitrate • Remember that many high explosives (e.g., TNT, RDX (C4), PETN, HMX, det cord) are compounds, not mixtures. In their case you might notice materials that just plain look like packaged high explosives (TV and movies aren't too bad in this regard). They might also have commercial or military markings indicating so. TSA 15-00014 - 003455 • But many can also be molded or packaged to look like anything. v1.0 12 Improvised Explosives • Some other, peroxide-based, improvised explosives are: • HMTD: hexamethalene triperoxide diamine, a white powder • TATP : triacetone triperoxide, a white crystalline powder with a distinctive acrid smell • MEKP: methyl ethyl ketone peroxide, a colorless oily liquid • Oxy-acetylene • Ethylene oxidel propylene oxide, propane/butane TSA 15-00014 - 003456 • Most of these are very unstable and dangerous v1.0 13 Drug Test Kit Warning! • HMTD and TATP look like crack and meth • Drug-test kits can cause a hypergolic (sudden, violent) reaction • If you have ANY suspicion that a substance might be an explosive rather than drugs, do not use a drug-test kit! TSA 15-00014 - 003457 v1 .0 14 Cautionary Story On May 25, 2006, the HIDTA Meth Lab Unit in Phoenix, Arizona conducted a narcotics search warrant in Phoenix. During the execution of this warrant the suspect warned detectives of a substance that was in the kitchen, "because he didn't want anyone to get hurt". The suspect called this substance "flash powder". This substance, which was stored in plastic containers, looked like crystal methamphetamine No drug tests were performed on the substance and the Arizona Department of Public Safety Bomb Squad Unit was called. The Bomb techs took a very small sample, placed it in a hole and performed a burn test. The substance sparked and ignited. This was done again with a larger sample, and the substance TSA 15-00014 - 003458 exploded. v1.0 15 (/) Q) > ·-(/) 0 -a. w>< Q) E 0 en TSA 15-00014 - 003459 (/) Q) > ·-(/) 0 -a. w>< Q) E 0 en TSA 15-00014 - 003460 (/) Q) > ·-(/) 0 -a. w>< Q) E 0 en TSA 15-00014 - 003461 Some Explosives Sheet explosive TNT (RDX, PETN) TSA 15-00014 - 003462 DetaSheet (commercial name) v1.0 19 =N (/) ~ Q) I > u ·-(/) 0 -a. w>< Q) ,-._ E ~ I 0 ~u QJ QJ en ..... ~ QJ~ OO==QJ l;lj '-"= TSA 15-00014 - 003463 Bomb Components • Bombs consist of: • An explosive or explosive chain • An initiator: typically a blasting cap or a fuse • A power source such as a battery or a match • A switch (with an electric power source) • The detonation can be initiated by: • Electricity, including static electricity • Heat • Friction TSA 15-00014 - 003464 • Shock (impact) • Radio/cell phone transmissions v1 .0 21 Example Components + + Power source Switch Initiator + + - TSA 15-00014 - 003465 Explosive(s) Shrapnel NOTE: Bombs can also be initiated by fuses or mechanical triggers v1 .0 22 Q) ~ 0 '-1- Q) co .c ,.• (.ll E ) co0 ro~ 1~ ~~J () TSA 15-00014 - 003466 'I f • ~ ' Cl) ., . +-' I' • '+- ' <:( 1 \ .0 E ·), 0 a:l ..I v ,. ~ y ~ () TSA 15-00014 - 003467 Q) ~ 0 '+- Q) ~ bJ) ([) ~ ·"0~ . _... (],) ·~ '"0 .0 ::::1 0 ..0 (.) E .~ 0 ...c=~ 0 ..j..J _...~ ~ ·~ ([) • ~ ::::1 C/J..n ~ r./J Q) ~ ~ en ..0 ~ s~ cu 0 ·~ () ,.o...c= C/J ~ '+- ...c=·~ Q) ~ ·-~ ([) TSA 15-00014 - 003468 ~ (]) +-' '+- <( .0 E 0 (() (]) en ~ (.) '+- ·-(]) TSA 15-00014 - 003469 Explosive Pressures • 6 pounds C4 These are very rough but 7 feet: 62 to 444 psi conservative estimates. 50 feet: 2 to 5 psi Pressures can go up or down considerably • 300 pounds ANFO depending on reflection and shielding. Also 7 feet: 850 to 71 00 psi shrapnel and fragmentation can cause 100 feet: 4 to 9 psi additional injuries. • What does this mean? 1 psi will knock you down 5 psi will rupture eardrums TSA 15-00014 - 003470 30 psi damages lungs 100 psi will kill you v1 .0 27 Pressure Effects TI\ROI31 CLEMENT 01\MI\0£ OVEIU'RESSURES (PSI) Olus Windows 10'-'o Ohua wmdow bi'CAkosc O.J Some wondow fnunc llollurc 0 S-1 0 ~O'Yo Ohus window b"""k.Dae I I Sc:IICI"C window frame> failure I .S··3 .0 ~/o Ohu• window brcAkaac J ,) 99¥. OIDSS window b...,akDac 9.2 Wood Frome: Buildin~P Th...,shold 09 Roofr<lflcr11 cno.cked 0 S I.S Studs k JheAihlna cracked I 0..3.0 ~O%coll•pse JO Stt\ICIUJ'C collapoo Over S.O Metal (Butler) Buildina• Moderately buckledljoonuo ae,........,.t o.s 1.0 Scwc-rc bueklinjl/ponell torn ofT 1 0..2.0 Comple1e des:aruelion OverJ.O 8- 12'' Conctetc I'Jiock/anc" Severe rUimna<:ltluncrlna I 0..2 0 (Unrelnforc<od) Collapse 7.0..8.0 Coi'N&ntcd l\abe$caoa Sldlns Stunmna 1.0.2.0 Con<l.n!te Wnlll M o<lcl"AIC CttOCkln& 3 0-4.0 (Rcln(ofccd) Severe ~llng/wnll dlapiiK!emcnt 6 0.8 0 Conen:to JhiiiiCtS. ••eel .cmalnt 10-14 Complelo dc:st.ructlon 14·20 Llquld S torllllo TMkll Sllaht <latnft£C O. S· 1.~ Sev.,...,damnse 3 0-4.0 Colll\pso H 0..10 llcaV)' Maehlnery Moderute ciJunAii:e 6 0·8.0 Complcto ch•plnccmrnt 80-10 Dutrueu on 14-20 S1cel Tower& tllowndown 14-20 TSA 15-00014 - 003471 Vchlclel&I'Truilers Complete detlru<:tlon 10-14 v1.0 28 E en ·-~ 0 ~ ~ C\J Q) c I- 0 ·-+-' -o () c Q) ~ (/) en ..0 E 0 ca TSA 15-00014 - 003472 Why Bombs? • Easy and cheap to build • Plans all over the Net (e.g., thedisease.net) • Parts and chemicals easy to obtain • High impact • Many.
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