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Institute of Commonwealth Studies s University of London INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES VOICE FILE NAME: COHP (Mark Chona) Key: NOTE: The respondent stipulates that, before 2026, researchers should seek permission from him before citing this interview in their work. SO = Sue Onslow MC = Mark Chona SO: Sue Onslow talking to Mr Mark Chona in Makeni, Lusaka, on Tuesday 11th August, 2015. Sir, thank you very much indeed for agreeing to be interviewed for this oral history project. I wonder if you would begin please, Sir, by explaining how you came to be His Excellency's Kenneth Kaunda's special advisor on political affairs, and what was your view of the Commonwealth when you assumed that office? MC: Thank you very much. President Kaunda and I come from quite a distance in the past through my brother, Mainza Chona, who was in the UK at Grays Inn (1955-1958). When he qualified as a Lawyer, he came back and joined politics and became the first president of what became the ruling party, the United National Independence Party. President Kaunda then arranged with President Kennedy for me to be among the first prospective diplomats after independence, so I was in Washington at the American University from 1963 to 1964. After staying in Cambridge again for one year to study public administration, I came back into government administration. I had known President Kaunda earlier when I was at University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He was 1 very much in my blood as a student activist. So immediately after independence, following my diplomatic training, I was in his office up to 31 March 1965, when I became Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I took over from the British team in establishing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Of course, that was the year when UDI [unilateral declaration of independence] was declared in Rhodesia. So, as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was already involved with the Commonwealth institution and its role in galvanising opinion to try and stop the UDI, which failed. Immediately after that, we got involved in the management of the consequences of UDI. The diplomatic multi-pronged attack on the problem was launched in defence of Zambia's national interests as rebel Rhodesia then became a matter of national security to us. I was involved in the [Harold] Wilson meeting with President Kaunda in Livingstone (on 30 October), which became a big issue. After that I was involved in all the other meetings concerning Rhodesia. Then in 1968, I moved to his office in State House. But, I was already dealing with foreign policy issues before I went to State House on 1st April 1968. SO: How did you regard the Commonwealth at this particular point? You explain you were Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before you moved to President Kaunda's office. As I understand it, strategy for foreign policy for Zambia at that point was situated very much in the President's office, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implementing day-to-day foreign relations. Is that a fair explanation? Or was there tighter coordination between the Ministry and the President's office, precisely because the State of Zambia was much smaller? MC: Between 1965 and 1968 I was still managing a lot of President Kaunda's work from the Foreign Ministry. So, foreign policy issues were still managed by the Ministry. But, when he invited me to move to State House, he was more directly now concerned with foreign policy issues related to security. So, the issues of southern Africa were actually centred around State House. So, I went with them to State House. The rest of the world issues were dealt in the normal way by the Ministry. That is how, in many ways, we actually worked. 2 SO: So, it was because this was a crisis of national security for Zambia that there was a concentration of ‘resources’ in the President's office? MC: There was a concentration of, not financial resources, but effort by a small team. Basically we were not a big staff. There were only three of us. I recruited two officers. There were three who were really looking at southern Africa and developing the policies in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were the spokespeople. The Foreign Minister continued to be the spokesman on foreign affairs. We were backroom boys for the President and the Ministry. SO: Yes. 1965 of course saw the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, in the July of that year, and Arnold Smith’s appointment as the first Secretary General. So, the Commonwealth itself was changing to the modern Commonwealth for Zambia. At this particular point how did President Kaunda regard the Commonwealth, rather than the bilateral relationship between Lusaka and London? MC: President Kaunda immediately recognised the importance of the Commonwealth. Fortunately the appointment of Arnold Smith, a Canadian, who represented a degree of neutrality in approach to issues, rather than a Briton who'd be associated directly with the Foreign Office, that assisted President Kaunda's assessment of what kind of Commonwealth would develop, and that it would be much more focused, not only to look after British interests but overall interests of Commonwealth members, regardless of nationality, race, colour or creed. Since he had already developed that concept himself among his first speeches, actually drafted by British officials at that time at independence, he emphasised non-racialism. He went beyond multi-racialism; he was talking about non-racialism. Arnold Smith, his chemistry, his disposition, his gentleness reflected a very deep understanding of the kind of world President Kaunda was looking at. He had even signalled [Hendrik] Verwoerd before independence and said publicly that he was ready, to our shock, to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa; that he would be prepared to send an ambassador as long as the ambassador was not discriminated against. 3 Initially, as young people, it was a real shock but Verwoerd's response was the one that excited us because he thought our ambassador would be a Trojan horse; so he rejected President Kaunda's proposal and that was the end. It was good that it was not Kaunda who said we would never establish diplomatic relations, it was Verwoerd who said, "No, I don't want a Trojan horse in my country". So, President Kaunda therefore had a good idea of what kind of Secretary General was needed to build bridges across. He respected the Commonwealth right from the beginning. When Ian Smith declared UDI, and the British government under Harold Wilson was not showing resoluteness to resolve the problem, and everything that was said was no more than a cloak of verbiage signifying nothing, President Kaunda relied on international organisations. The Commonwealth came in very handy. He understood its limitations and the fact that it was based in London; psychologically, you felt that the Foreign Office would bear hard on the Commonwealth Secretary General and that he would not be independent. But, as we developed, we found that he had his own ideas and that was a source of comfort. SO: So, you had your own Trojan horse. MC: We had our own Trojan horse! [laughter] Every ambassador is, potentially, a Trojan horse. SO: Indeed, and the value of the Commonwealth High Commissioners’ network is considerable. MC: Absolutely. Absolutely. That was a source of strength for us. Morally it was comforting that we could probably get through the Commonwealth what we could not get directly from Mr Harold Wilson, who was extremely slippery for our purposes. SO: Indeed. Reading the transcript of the September 1966 meeting of the Commonwealth in London, it is clear Harold Wilson was furious that 4 there was a delay in re-starting the executive session as the African leaders had grouped together to discuss their position before they went back into the session. He said there should be no UN caucusing. MC: That's true. That was bound to happen because of shared visions and shared interests in attacking a common problem. We would be coming from different angles and it was absolutely necessary, we thought, for us to have a common understanding. After all, we had already an OAU position. That is the position we took with us to Commonwealth conferences, on common issues of international concern; but they were arising from Zambia's own national interests, which were identified, whether it was in Lagos or in London later that the declaration of UDI in Rhodesia was going to impact on Zambia's national security and economic interests. So, it was natural for African and also Asian countries to, first of all, discuss what the position should be. I'm sure that was also true of Harold Wilson's camp. He tried his level best to get New Zealand and Australia closer. Canada was beginning, it appeared, to be influenced by what the Secretary General could also say…I think they did listen to him. That was, in a way, helpful in the development of the future Commonwealth, which was not the ‘British’ Commonwealth, but actually a Commonwealth of Nations. So, the spirit was beginning to build. The only problem was that in this particular case Rhodesia affected Britain. That was the only problem. There would not have been a problem if the problem was not affecting Britain. Wilson would have no problem with the caucuses. SO: Sir, I'm just looking at the list of crises that confronted Arnold Smith in 1965. The Indo-Pakistan war; the ‘divorce’ between Singapore and Malaysia; and then, of course, the explosion of the long-running crisis of UDI in the November, which lasted for 15 years.
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