Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Pharaoh Reelected on the Road to Political Pluralism

Volker Perthes SWP Comments

Egyptian President ’s reelection on 7 September 2005 came as absolutely no surprise. The only open question was exactly how the vote would split between the president and his strongest opponent, populist liberal opposition leader Ayman Nour. The comfortable official result of 88.6 percent for Mubarak, 7.6 percent for Nour, and not even four percent for the other eight candidates together will allow Mubarak, who is seventy-seven years old and has held the office of president since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, to govern for another six years—assuming his health holds up. The important point, however, is not the result itself, but the mere fact that for the first time an Egyptian president has been chosen in a contest involving more than one can- didate, rather than by referendum. This remains true even though the conditions were so arranged that Mubarak’s rivals stood no chance of winning. The election brings about gradual change in the political system by introducing the principle of democ- ratic competition for the office of the supreme decisionmaker for the first time, but the real political effect of this development will not be felt until the Hosni Mubarak era is over.

Just a year ago the idea of permitting even gained in influence as the most impor- a modest degree of competition in the tant adviser to his father, who in 2000 presidential elections scheduled for 2005 appointed him to the leadership of the was not even under discussion in Egypt. governing party, the National Democratic Instead there was speculation within the Party (NDP), where he today heads the governing elite and in the wider political policy secretariat. His influence was felt arena about whether Hosni Mubarak above all in the composition of Prime would serve yet another term after twenty- Minister ’s reshuffled cabinet four years in office, or whether—notwith- of July 2004, whose members responsible standing repeated assertions that the for economic, financial, and social affairs Egyptian presidency is not hereditary—he all come from political circles close to the might find a way to ensure that his son president’s son. could succeed him. , aged 42 and a trained banker, has steadily

SWP Comments 39 September 2005

1 Internal and External Pressure Egyptian constitution to allow several In mid-2004 a small organization was set candidates to compete for the presidency. up in under the name of “Kifaya!” However, the conditions created by the (Enough!), with the purpose of starting a constitutional amendment in May were campaign under this simple slogan against anything but fair, to the extent that Mubarak’s reelection or the “inheritance” Egyptian commentators joked that the of the presidency. The loose alliance of most important prerequisite for being various opposition groups drew encour- accepted as a candidate in the presidential agement—even if it did not admit it elections was to have many years of directly—from the growing demands for experience as head of state. Although democracy and reform directed at the recognized parties can put up candidates Arab states by the United States and the under certain circumstances, independent European Union. candidates have to supply the supporting The regime responded to Kifaya’s activi- signatures of at least 250 deputies, and at ties—wide-ranging but generally involving least 65 of these must be members of the only a few hundred individuals—with lower chamber of parliament, where the nervousness and repression, and demon- president’s National Democratic Party strated a similar overreaction in its treat- currently holds 405 of 454 seats. This meant ment of Ayman Nour, independent par- that the strongest opposition force, the liamentary deputy and leader of the newly- (which has not been legalized Al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. Nour, legalized as a party or any other type of a 41-year-old businessman with a populist organization, but whose activities are liberal agenda, had also begun attacking tolerated to a certain degree), was unable the president and his long hold on power. to put up a candidate. The smaller legal He was arrested in January 2005 on parties are marginalized and stand no trumped-up charges. If the government chance against the NDP machine, the had intended to neutralize him it could successor to the erstwhile monolithic party not have made a bigger mistake. Nour’s of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Even if the NDP is arrest made him widely known for the first today officially one party among many, it time—outside Cairo (where his constituency remains de facto the party of state and is) and outside Egypt. Suddenly even CNN government. Above all, it spans a huge and American diplomats were mentioning web of patronage that extends across all the his name. regions and into every village. At the same time the American govern- ment began to address the domestic situation in Egypt. In his State of the Union Pluralist Authoritarianism speech of February 2005 President George Egypt’s political system can be described W. Bush referred to Egypt directly: “The as pluralist authoritarianism. It allows the great and proud nation of Egypt, which educated classes a comfortable degree of showed the way toward peace in the Middle personal freedom, and open criticism of the East,” he said, “can now show the way president is even permitted in the opposi- toward democracy in the Middle East.” tion newspapers, although their circulation Egypt, as the United States’ most important is not exactly broad. A range of ideological Arab ally, was not accustomed to hearing currents—from Nasserite and Islamist- that kind of criticism. influenced to left socialist—can be found Mubarak demonstrated his sense for in the spectrum of legal parties. The civil political danger and reacted with a move courts have generally maintained their that took the wind out of the sails of all his independence from the government (which rivals. Just three weeks after Bush’s speech is why trials of oppositionists are often he announced that he would amend the heard by military tribunals). At the same

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2 time, however, institutional mechanisms— Gamal specifically recruited reformers and and if necessary the state’s tools of coercion representatives of the middle generations too—are applied to ensure that the system to his policy secretariat and as of 2004 also of power itself and the political majorities into the cabinet, which pursued a course of remain unchanged. The president, as the reform, for example in education and law, supreme decisionmaker, is also the chair- and economic liberalization. There is, how- man of the governing party; loyalty to the ever, absolutely no guarantee of success president and his party is the most im- for the experiment of turning the old mass portant criterion for access to positions and regime party of functionaries, civil economic resources. Many speak servants, peasants, and village elders into with a mixture of criticism and approval of a modern reform-minded party. a Pharaonic system. Egyptian tradition, they say, has always featured a centralist system with a sacrosanct ruler who em- Opposition Weakness bodies the country’s unity, protects it Egyptian politicians insist that steps externally and—especially in view of new toward political reform can only come terrorist threats—internally, and at the from within, and cannot be initiated same time guarantees the political stability through external pressure. This position is that is so important in a largely agrarian hardly credible even at home, given the economy. very short interval between Bush’s speech With the Mubarak system Egypt has and Mubarak’s announcement that indeed developed a relatively durable trade- opposition candidates would be allowed off between dictatorship and democracy, to take part in the presidential election. involving elements that other Arab regimes However, stressing sovereignty over and use selectively. For that reason even gradual above the reform process also serves to changes in Egypt are always also of wider present the regime as the guarantor of regional significance. national rights and to divide the opposi- tion. Parts of the Kifaya movement share this nationalist slant, protesting loudly Modernizing within the System against any outside interference and Despite its dominant position, the NDP themselves participating in the defamation was made to feel the effects of widespread of those opposition figures who openly dissatisfaction over corruption and mis- attempt to harness Western calls for democ- management at the last parliamentary racy to their own agendas or suddenly find elections in 2000. It lost more than half its themselves on the itineraries of American seats, mostly to candidates who themselves visitors. This applies to Ayman Nour, for belonged to the party but had not been example, who quickly declared his inten- selected as candidates and had therefore tion to stand for the presidency. It is no run as independents. The party was only wonder that the already weak secular op- able to retain its overwhelming majority position groups were unable to agree on a in parliament because more than two shared line or a joint candidate. hundred of these “independents” joined The one and only opposition force that the NDP parliamentary group after the would be in a position to offer a real chal- elections—not least in order to enjoy lenge to the NDP’s machinery of patronage patronage themselves and gain benefits is currently the Muslim Brotherhood, for their own constituencies. which as both a social and a political move- Nonetheless, the election result was a ment can draw on its deep roots in the warning sign. Mubarak responded by giving middle classes and its network of countless his son Gamal responsibility for moderniz- mosques. The Brotherhood is itself under- ing the structures of party and regime. going a protracted process of clarifying its

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3 identity—social movement for Muslim position. He could then be elected “prop- improvement, force for political reform, or erly,” still as the candidate of the most fundamental opposition to the system—and powerful party but against one or more its positions. Although it now relatively serious opponents. That would be impor- clearly accepts the principles of democracy, tant both for his domestic legitimacy and it is still very vague on questions such as for close relations with the United States, the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims whose favor the Egyptian leadership before the law. Nonetheless, the Brother- certainly wishes to avoid losing. hood’s socially conservative ideology is German and European policy should popular and it enjoys a reputation of being focus on medium-term transformation in effective and uncorrupted. That has Egypt’s political and institutional frame- brought it regular successes in elections work—rather than on questions of per- to parliament (where it has seventeen sonnel. At the forefront should be efforts to deputies who officially had to stand as strengthen the rule of law and potentially

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und “independents”) and in the main profes- democratic institutions such as the parlia- Politik, 2005 sional organizations. It also played a role in ment, which is also due for reelection in All rights reserved the presidential contest, even though it was November 2005. In the absence of large-

SWP prevented from putting up a candidate of scale manipulation these elections will Stiftung Wissenschaft und its own. Mubarak’s NDP, Ayman Nour, and permit more real competition than the Politik German Institute for other candidates all courted the endorse- presidential election. International and ment of the officially banned Muslim Here, for once, we can follow the Ameri- Security Affairs Brotherhood. There may not be any truth can Secretary of State. In a public speech Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 in rumors that the NDP had offered to at the American University in Cairo, Condo- 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 release a number of its imprisoned leaders leezza Rice called surprisingly clearly for Fax +49 30 880 07-100 if it called for Mubarak’s reelection, but the promises of electoral freedoms to be ful- www.swp-berlin.org Brotherhood certainly found a middle way filled, for opposition groups to be allowed [email protected] that satisfied its own institutional interests, to meet freely, and for voting to be con- ISSN 1861-1761 calling on its supporters to participate ducted without intimidation. Similarly in the election without saying who they refreshing, undiplomatic remarks by should vote for. Although neutral, this European visitors would do nothing but stance legitimized the process itself and enhance the standing of European foreign was rewarded with the release of some of policy. the prisoners.

Promoting Institutional Change Although the result was predictable, the first multicandidate presidential election is significant for Egypt—above all for its political culture and future. Introducing political competition for even the highest office of state removes a central pillar of the Nasserite state model. The effect will be delayed, however, given that elections with genuinely open outcomes are unlikely to be held as long as Hosni Mubarak is still alive. In fact, the constitutional amendment increases Gamal Mubarak’s chances of succeeding his father in six years time without the stigma of having inherited the

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