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The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory

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The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory CEPS Working Document No. 328/May 2010 Rouba Al-Fattal Abstract Fifteen years after its launch, the impact of the Barcelona Process on the Palestinian Territories is in need of a reassessment. Despite some initial improvements in the political and economic structures, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership alone has failed to anchor a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. In response, the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched to bring out a number of new foreign policy instruments, which induced substantial reforms. Yet the win by Hamas in the 2006 elections brought a halt to the EU’s aid and diplomacy. This boycott proved detrimental, as it widened the rift between the main parties to the point of no reconciliation. Whether the Union for the Mediterranean proves any better than its predecessor policies in the region remains to be seen. This publication aims at providing a broad picture of the EU’s policies towards the Palestinian Territories, in order to draw lessons from them and offer proposals for the way ahead. CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted within CEPS research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which she is associated. ISBN 978-92-9079-988-7 Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) © Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010 Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... i 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1 2. Historical Background of the EU–PT Relations..................................................................... 3 3. EU Foreign Policy towards the PT over 15 years................................................................. 11 3.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995 to 2004) .................................................. 11 3.1.1 Political dimension............................................................................................ 13 3.1.2 Economic dimension......................................................................................... 32 3.1.3 Cultural dimension............................................................................................ 41 3.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy (2004 to mid-2008).......................................... 46 3.2.1 Political dimension............................................................................................ 48 3.2.2 Economic dimension......................................................................................... 69 3.2.3 Cultural dimension............................................................................................ 78 3.2.4 Migration dimension ......................................................................................... 81 3.3 Union for the Mediterranean (mid-2008 to 2010)........................................................ 85 4. Reflections, Proposals and Conclusions ............................................................................... 95 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................ 110 Glossary of EU Instruments in used in the PT .......................................................................... 112 References................................................................................................................................. 114 List of Figures Figure 1. EU–MEPP and critical junctures timeline ..................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Map of the West Bank and Gaza Strip......................................................................... 10 Figure 3. EU financial instruments to the PT from 1995 to 2010 ............................................... 35 Figure 4. Evolution of EC budget commitments to the PT ......................................................... 73 Figure 5. Immigration of southern Mediterranean countries to the EU-15 (2000) ..................... 84 List of Tables Table 1. EMP, ENP and UfM ..................................................................................................... 12 Table 2. EU funds for the Mediterranean partners of the Barcelona process.............................. 32 Table 3. Elections in the PT over the past 15 years .................................................................... 60 Table 4. Factors affecting the democratisation process in the PT............................................... 67 Executive Summary ifteen years after its launch, the impact of the Barcelona process on the Palestinian Territories (PT) is in need of a reassessment, especially in light of the two critical F junctures that have taken place, around which EU foreign policy has changed dramatically: the second intifada (2000) and the election win by the Hamas Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) (2006). The first 10 years, under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (1995–2005), proved ineffective in significantly changing the situation on the ground. Despite some initial progress in changing some structures (political and economic) at some levels (state and inter-state), the EU’s structurally-oriented foreign policy alone failed to anchor a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians – in need of a traditional conflict-resolution strategy as well. The outbreak of the second intifada was coupled with an increased level of terrorism and marked the EU’s switch from development assistance to humanitarian aid, while neglecting civil society and peace-building projects. The end of the EMP witnessed a foreign policy renaissance. European voices called for substantial reforms and civil society engagement in the PT. Thus, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was set up to bring a number of previously existing instruments and regional approaches together under the same umbrella and to improve their implementation through Action Plans. The PT witnessed substantial reforms in 2003–05, while the EU balanced its financial support between humanitarian and development aid, and started paying more attention to civil society. But before the PT could get back to where it was prior to the second intifada, Hamas won the PLC elections, bringing a halt to the EU’s aid and diplomacy. This boycott proved detrimental as it worsened the humanitarian situation in the PT and widened the rift between Hamas and Fatah to the point of no reconciliation. Since Hamas has taken over, the EU has backed the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority – leading by a presidential decree but lacking in legitimacy, while previously achieved economic, democratic and human rights reforms have been reversed. In sum, the Barcelona process is still affected by a quintessential gap between the EU’s own interests, the goals it sets and the expectations it raises, on the one hand, and the instruments it is willing to use and outcomes it can deliver, on the other. | i THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 328/MAY 2010 * ROUBA AL-FATTAL 1. Introduction It has been contended that the foreign policy of the EU directed at assisting the Palestinian Territory (PT)1 in its transition to an independent, democratic and stable state is failing because of an omniscient gap between rhetoric and political will, which has consistently dogged the EU and reduced its credibility to fulfil the goals that its rhetoric typically inspires. In essence, the image of the EU as a genuine and influential actor in the peace and democratisation processes in the PT has been typically inflated, while the political will and unity of its actors remain severely dwarfed and constrained by their conflicting interests or ideologies. The nadir of the EU’s failure to fulfil its declarations was particularly evident in its dealing with Hamas after they assured themselves a clear majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, in 2006. Not only did the US immediately withdraw its financial and political support from the democratically-elected body, but so did the EU, despite its “self-comfortingly superior moral identity”,2 boasting about democracy and hailing the success of the process of the elections. This reaction has deepened the humanitarian and political crises, particularly in the Gaza Strip, and widened the rift between Fatah and Hamas to the extent of making a national unity government impractical and almost unfeasible. After the end of the cold war (1991), politics have been defined by the “victory of democracy”, which has been seen as the panacea for failed states.3 Thus, since the mid-1990s the EU has been emphasising, in its speeches and through its partnership programmes in the Mediterranean, the dire need to restore peace, stability, democracy and good governance in the PT. The EU has seemed to understand that a comprehensive foreign policy approach is needed to promote peace and stability in the region, given that foreign policy is typically “directed at external actors and * Rouba Al-Fattal is a PhD candidate at the Institute for International and European Policy at the University of Leuven (KUL) in Belgium, and the co-founder of the Euro-Arab Forum (EAF), a Brussels- based
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