BRIEF POLICY

TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra

In June 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel launched SUMMARY Transnistria has long been seen as the most the Meseberg process. Under the plan, Russia would be “solvable” of all the post-Soviet secessionist included in European security policymaking through a joint conflicts. There is little ethnic hatred and most committee with the European Union. The price was concrete stakeholders accept in principle the need to progress towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict reintegrate Transnistria into Moldova. The in Moldova. For almost two years, Russia showed little election of a new Transnistrian leader and interest in the exchange and very little progress was made. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s engagement with the issue as part of Germany’s security dialogue But in 2012, the conflict settlement process received a boost with Russia have also fuelled hopes of a resolution with the election in Transnistria of a new leader, Evgeny of the dispute. However, the conflict will not be Shevchuk. Moldova finally managed to elect a president after solved through a diplomatic offensive. A quick a three-year constitutional deadlock, removing the cloud of and dirty solution based on a grand bargain political uncertainty that hung over the Moldovan political with Russia would almost certainly impair the elite. And Russia appointed a political heavyweight, Dmitry integration of Moldova into the EU. Rogozin, as Putin’s special representative on Transnistria. The EU and Moldova should instead pursue a Merkel sought to re-energise the conflict-settlement process bottom-up policy of de facto reintegration. The through a visit to Chisinau in August 2012. EU should keep high-level diplomatic pressure on Russia to expand the scope for confidence building These new developments create the conditions for potential measures between Moldova and Transnistria, progress on the Transnistria conflict. But they also mean modifying the peacekeeping arrangements, and that new policy choices are needed, not least from the EU. removing military checkpoints. The EU should Europe is already heavily invested diplomatically in conflict expand its interaction with the Transnistrian authorities through joint projects and seek to settlement in Transnistria. It has a 100-person strong EU connect the region to EU-Moldova cooperation, border assistance mission in the region, deployed in Ukraine including free trade. But by far the most and Moldova. And it has allocated substantial funds to important contribution the EU can make to the confidence-building measures. The EU also has a significant conflict settlement process is to anchor Moldova regional trade presence. It is the largest trading partner both in Europe by supporting the reform process, a of Moldova and of the secessionist region of Transnistria. visa-free regime and free trade between the EU What the EU does not have is a strategic framework into and Moldova. which to integrate its substantial but scattered actions on Moldova and Transnistria. Transnistria has long been seen as the most “solvable” of all However, the Transnistrian economy is in dire straits. Once the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts. There is little ethnic the economic powerhouse of Soviet Moldova, Transnistria’s hatred and most stakeholders accept in principle the need to industry sector now generates huge losses. The region’s reintegrate Transnistria into Moldova. The EU and Ukraine GDP per capita is roughly the same as Moldova’s, close both want to help solve a conflict right next to their borders. to $2,000 per capita in nominal terms, or $3,300 per Russia might accept a settlement that gives Transnistria a capita in purchasing power parity. Both are low, but the significant degree of power and influence in the potentially numbers behind these figures are much more disastrous for reintegrated Moldova. Transnistria itself might prefer Transnistria. Moldova’s external debt amounts to around 80 independence or being part of Russia, but is not completely percent of its GDP. But Transnistria’s is close to 400 percent averse to re-joining Moldova under the right circumstances, of the region’s GDP. As of mid-2012, Transnistria’s debt to if prodded, nudged, or pressed to do so, especially by Russia. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas supplier, stood at $3.8 But in practice the interests of all parties have never aligned billion. This is almost double the $2 billion gas debt owed by properly and it is not clear whether and when they would. Ukraine to Russia, which sparked the 2009 gas cut-off that left several EU member states freezing in mid-winter – and TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION Thus a rapid settlement is neither realistic nor desirable. A Ukraine’s population is over 100 times that of Transnistria. top-down solution is unlikely to be accepted by the societies As much as three-quarters of the Transnistrian budget is on either bank of the river Dniester; while a rushed solution reliant on direct or indirect subsidies from Russia. Russia’s could impair Moldova’s reform and its integration into the tolerance for Transnistria’s non-payment of gas debts is EU. Instead, the EU should help Moldova slowly to resolve one such indirect measure of support. The ability to run up the conflict from below by pursuing de facto reintegration debts is reflected in lower utility prices for the population, between Moldova and Transnistria through confidence- forming a key element of the Tiraspol authorities’ support. building, joint economic projects, and a greater EU presence One Transnistrian expert estimates that only around 25 in Transnistria. The EU should aim to consolidate Moldova’s percent of the population is employed. democracy, prosperity, and integration with the EU and to boost Moldova-Transnistria links and the EU’s presence and Shevchuk’s main goal in his first year in power was to leverage on Transnistria. It will take several years of such consolidate his authority. He moved quickly to appoint measures – perhaps even a decade – before Moldova and some of his few trusted people to key positions in the de Transnistria can realistically hope to achieve a sustainable facto state apparatus. He also ousted all former ministers, constitutional arrangement for conflict settlement. as well as some of Smirnov’s most notorious loyalists, such as the head of the local security apparatus. Shevchuk also sought to clip the wings of Sheriff. Under Smirnov, the Shevchuk’s power consolidation company was allowed to monopolise entire sectors of the local economy, from mobile telephony to imports and from In December 2011, Transnistrian politics underwent a supermarkets to petrol stations. Shevchuk moved to open serious shock. The region’s autocratic leader, Igor Smirnov, some of Sheriff’s monopolies to competition. He announced a Soviet-era apparatchik who led the region to secession a bid for a second mobile licence. And he lifted a 100 percent in the early 1990s, did not even make it into the second duty on imports from the rest of Moldova, which had round of leadership elections. Tired of Smirnov’s corrupt benefited Sheriff’s retail chains by effectively banning trade rule, the local population voted overwhelmingly for 43 between the two banks of the river Dniester. year-old Evgeny Shevchuk, a modern and pragmatic leader. Shevchuk was speaker of the local legislature between 2005- Shevchuk’s focus on consolidating power has two key 2009 and opposed Smirnov’s Soviet-style rule. implications for the conflict-settlement agenda with Moldova. His domestic power struggles mean that he is However, Shevchuk’s transition to leadership has not been unlikely to undertake any grand steps towards conflict easy. In spite of his overwhelming public support, Shevchuk resolution. He was not elected to reintegrate the region came to power from a relatively weak political position and into Moldova. Nor does he have the power to bring about against the preference of most local powerbrokers. He was reintegration, even if he wanted to, which in itself is very opposed not just by the Smirnov-built de facto state and its unlikely. And he is not willing to risk being portrayed by

www.ecfr.eu security apparatus, but also by the presidential candidate hard-liners as a sell-out to Moldova. So, Shevchuk’s election of the Renewal party. Renewal is the political front of the should not be seen as dramatically increasing the chances biggest local business conglomerate, Sheriff. It controls for a settlement, at least not in the near future. There are the region’s legislature and, during the campaign, enjoyed also concerns that Shevchuk’s rapid assertion of power could undisguised support from Russia, Transnistria’s main lead to the consolidation of a less than pluralist system. This patron. And although Shevchuk is popular, his support is could also limit the possibilities for engagement with the

September 2012 predicated on his ability to fulfil his campaign promises Transnistrian leadership and population. to bring change to the region, in particular economic improvement. At the same time, if he is to maintain his authority, Shevchuk needs not only to avoid political war but also to quickly ECFR/63 come up with some deliverables for the population. This 2 makes him open to cooperative endeavours that benefit Moldova’s views on reintegration the local population. So, Shevchuk’s personal pragmatism, along with a structural predisposition to cooperation, Through all the ups and downs of conflict settlement, has led to intensified dialogue with Moldova. In his first Moldova has continuously been affected by one underlying month in power, Shevchuk established a good personal dynamic: indifference to Transnistria. According to working relationship with Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad various opinion polls, Transnistria ranks as the ninth or Filat. He has also succeeded in intensifying Transnistria’s tenth priority for the population. As few as two percent of engagement in confidence building. people consider it the most pressing issue, and five percent consider it second, well behind issues such as poverty, crime, The various actors in the conflict-settlement process, with or inflation. This stands in striking contrast to the much Shevchuk’s participation, agreed to several steps that higher preoccupation with frozen conflicts in other post- should foster confidence building. They agreed to improve Soviet countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. the dynamic at conflict-settlement talks in the 5+2 format, which consists of Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for The positive side is that such “indifference” is clearly one Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as mediators, of the pillars of stability and peace in the region. The Moldova and Transnistria as conflict parties, and the EU lack of public concern means that there is little push and United States as observers. Freight train connections for militarisation or nationalist agitation around the between Moldova and Transnistria have been re-established. conflict zone, as has been the case in so many conflict Both sides approved the re-connection of telephone links, regions. But the downside is that because of indifference though this has not yet been implemented. There have to Transnistria, Moldovan society is not willing to make been discussions on re-opening a currently unused bridge significant concessions. As a result, Moldovan society between the two sides. And the stakeholders are looking for tends to be against most forms of meaningful power- ways to involve Transnistrian authorities in EU-Moldova sharing, such as federalisation or even a serious inclusion negotiations on free trade. of Transnistria elites in a reintegrated Moldova. Among Moldovan elites, most likely very few would be happy to However, for all the positive developments in conflict see a significant number of Transnistrians occupying senior settlement in Shevchuk’s first months, there are fears that political positions in Moldova, from ministers to members even the less divisive measures of cooperation with Moldova of parliament to ambassadors. will not be fully implemented. And there is concern that moving towards greater cooperation will be even more The Moldovan approach to Transnistria is increasingly difficult. For example, when Chancellor Merkel visited driven by a cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis rather than Moldova in late August, Shevchuk was expected to attend by grand aspirations to territorial integrity. Moldovan a joint meeting with her and the Moldovan prime minister. society and the elite are busy thinking through not only the This engagement was supposed to re-energise the conflict- benefits but also the potential costs of reintegration. And settlement process. At the last moment, Shevchuk pulled for a growing number of Moldovans, it is not clear that the out of attending the meeting – most probably at the behest benefits of reintegration will outweigh the costs. Moldova of Russia. is a weak state with divided elites, a shaky pro-reform consensus, and a broad but shallow pro-EU majority. Adding Shevchuk’s room for manoeuvre is limited. Moldova, too, is Transnistria’s Russophile and much less democratised unlikely to go out of its way to meet Transnistrian demands. public could tilt the balance of Moldovan politics away Filat’s own freedom of action is limited by various degrees from European integration, towards a perpetuation of the of scepticism towards greater engagement with Transnistria undemocratic politics and oligarchic capitalism typical of from coalition partners, civil society and political opposition. post-Soviet countries’ efforts to muddle through. And the Moldovan public would prefer to see Filat focus his attention more on matters closer to home. These problems could potentially be minimised if Moldova could strengthen its state institutions enough to be able to absorb Transnistria. But to achieve that, Moldova needs several more years, or even a decade, of systematic reforms, rapprochement with the EU, and increasing prosperity. And the success of such an enterprise is not guaranteed. One senior official and Moldovan politician, a long-term champion of conflict-settlement in Transnistria, argued, “The worst situation for Moldova would be to have a dysfunctional federation with Transnistria as envisaged by the Kozak Memorandum in 2003 (a Russian sponsored deal). The second worst would be to retain Moldova’s

1 Institutul de Politici Publice, “Barometrul de Opiniei Publice”, Civis, April 2012, p. 50, available at http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_05.2012.pdf 3 status quo – not being in the EU and having the conflict Russia’s Eurasian project unsolved. The next option, a rather favourable one, is to join the EU without Transnistria like Cyprus did, and the best In March 2012, Dmitry Rogozin was appointed Russia’s possible is to join the EU together with Transnistria. The special representative “on Transnistria” (rather than “on option of joining the EU without Transnistria could mean conflict settlement in Transnistria”). Rogozin is Russia’s either leaving it unsolved or even recognising it.”2 Of course, deputy prime minister responsible for the military-industrial Moldova’s own EU accession prospects are hardly set in complex as well as a former ambassador to NATO. He is a stone. This makes Moldovan elites even more uncertain sharp-tongued Russian nationalist who openly espouses about the possible effects of reintegration. dreams of a Eurasian empire. The appointment was one element of a part-defensive, part-offensive policy designed Moldovan elites have therefore started to think about to raise Russia’s game in Transnistria. reintegration through the prism of how it would serve the existing three million or so inhabitants of the Republic of Russia is already embedded in Transnistria through a Moldova. They are not willing to sacrifice what Moldova military presence that remains in the region in defiance TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION has achieved as a state for the sake of reintegration with of previous commitments on withdrawal and in spite of Transnistria. More and more, if state functionality and EU Moldovan protests. The country finances as much as 80 integration cannot be reconciled with reintegration, then percent of the Transnistrian budget, as the Transnistrian reintegration is considered to be the less important goal. leader himself acknowledges.3 And Russia is the region’s main political sponsor in international affairs. Russia These reservations complicate any discussion of a grand has also issued passports to some 150,000 residents of bargain on the status of Transnistria in a reunified Moldova. the region, which provides an additional justification for But that does not mean there can be no meaningful Moscow to interfere in Transnistrian affairs. engagement or confidence building with Transnistria. This kind of engagement has been taking place under the Despite its overwhelming support for Transnistria, Russia is leadership of Filat and Shevchuk. The two have established in principle in favour of Moldovan reintegration, because it a very good working relationship, and they have regular fears that Moldova without Transnistria would drift further formal and informal one-on-one meetings. They have met away from its zone of influence. But to ensure decisive not only in Moldova and Transnistria, but also in Bavaria influence in Moldovan affairs in the future, Russia wants as under the auspices of the OSCE (“beer diplomacy”), at much power as possible for Transnistria in a reintegrated Mount Athos in Greece at the initiative of the Metropolitan Moldova. For the time being, if a settlement plan that meets of Moldova (“Orthodox diplomacy”), and even at a concert its criteria is not on the table, Russia is content with the by French singer Lara Fabian in Chisinau. status quo. The current situation serves its goals of impeding Moldova’s European integration and maintaining Moscow’s Moldova hopes that its rapprochement with the EU, which influence in Moldova as a whole. involves a free trade area, a visa-free regime, and improved democracy and prosperity, will make it much more Almost immediately after his appointment, Rogozin set a attractive for the residents of Transnistria. But although high bar for progress by announcing a fairly unreasonable Moldova’s attractiveness is a necessary condition for conflict list of conditions under which Russia would support settlement, the Moldovan leadership realises that it is not Moldova’s reintegration, including a “recognition of Russia the only important factor. Moldova must therefore also as the only country which possesses political and coercive engage in confidence building with Transnistria. People- authority in the region” and said a future common state to-people contacts must be increased. Links such as train, could only be formed “on a federative or confederative telephone, and mass media connections must be established basis”. In a newspaper interview, he warned: “Do not try to between the two sides. And projects that promote economic play cat and mouse introducing as mediators players that development and interdependence should be developed. have nothing to do with this region.”4 Despite Rogozin’s Gradually, this approach could develop into a bottom-up nationalist credentials, his sharp statements often obscure reintegration process, which, in time, could substantially a wily and pragmatic way of thinking. But even if Rogozin is increase the chances of reaching a durable solution. But more pragmatic than his rhetoric might sound, he is not the

www.ecfr.eu even if Moldova is successful in its efforts, Russian interests person Russia appoints when it wants to be cooperative on in the region will continue to provide an additional layer of an international issue. complexity to the conflict-settlement process. Rogozin has intensified the pressure on Moldova to agree to the opening of a Russian consulate in Tiraspol, an institution that would in fact most likely become a governor-general’s September 2012

3 “Konferentsiya Prezidenta Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki Evgeniya Shevchuka”, Pervyi Respublikanskii Telekanal, 31 August 2012, available at http://

ECFR/63 www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWeMG-QnLRI. 4 Vladimir Soloviev, “To, chem ya zanimayusi ne sovsem chinovnichiya rabota”, 4 2 Unless stated otherwise, quotes are from interviews with the authors. Kommersant, 20 April 2012, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1919430. office. The Moldovan government has long refused to allow For all Russia’s assertive rhetoric, Russia does not want such a consulate, but is now considering such a move. But Transnistrian independence. Transnistria’s greatest value to if it does not give in, Russia is implicitly threatening to Russia is in providing a source of leverage within Moldova. unilaterally open a representative office of Dmitri Rogozin The Russian hope is that a reintegrated federative Moldova in Tiraspol, in defiance of Moldovan formal sovereignty. could be heavily influenced by Russia via Transnistria. Through what were probably calculated media leaks, Russia Moldova could perhaps even be induced to join the Russian- has also raised the possibility of deploying a radar station led Eurasian Union, which is Putin’s primary foreign-policy in Transnistria to counter the Romania-based US elements goal. On his first visit to Moldova in his new capacity, of the Anti-Ballistic Missile shield.5 And there have been Rogozin spent quite some time extolling the virtues of the reports that the Russian peacekeeping force could be turned Eurasian Union and predicting the imminent collapse of the into a military base in Transnistria. EU, as well as talking down the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. Besides attempting Russia is not keen on letting confidence-building measures to spin the economic attractiveness of a customs union with advance too far, fearing that they could lead to a decreased Russia, Rogozin carries the threatening stick of the $3.8 Russian role in the region. A recent instance of Russian billion Transnistrian debt to Gazprom. Russia considers the diplomacy behind the closed doors of the 5+2 format debt to be the Republic of Moldova’s obligation. He once exemplified that attitude. In April in Vienna, a new round stated that “if Moldova will not recognise Transnistria, then of 5+2 talks were held, one of the first rounds of the re- it means that the gas consumed by Transnistria belongs – is launched talks after a break of almost six years. One key Moldova’s debt, and Moldova should pay for it. How else? issue on the agenda was whether Moldova and Transnistria This a pragmatic approach.”6 could be considered equal parties. Transnistria and Russia pushed for recognition of the equality of the two sides, The debt itself is an interesting way of supporting whereas the traditional Moldovan position has been that Transnistria and enriching certain individuals, both in the there can be no parity between a recognised state and a region and in Russia. The debt has skyrocketed through secessionist entity. After the usual diplomatic wrangling, Russian gas deliveries to the Gazprom-controlled company, there was a coffee break. The Russian representative at the Moldova Gaz. This organisation has a monopoly on gas talks, Sergey Gubarev, left the room to smoke a cigarette. sales and distribution in Moldova, including in Transnistria. During the coffee break, Moldova and Transnistria agreed Of the gas delivered to Moldova Gaz, and to Moldova as a on a compromise that consisted of recognising the “equality” whole, roughly half goes to Tiraspoltransgaz, which handles of all participants in the negotiating process. gas distribution in Transnistria. In Transnistria, the gas is then sold below market price to residential and industrial The deal implied that Chisinau recognised its equality with consumers, generating huge losses for Tiraspoltransgaz and Tiraspol in the context of the talks, which was a formal Moldova Gaz. The money collected from gas consumers in recognition of the reality that Transnistria had always had a Transnistria is not transferred to Moldova Gaz and Gazprom, formal veto inside the talks. All the other participants in the but instead is spent by the secessionist authorities. This 5+2 – the mediators, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, as well constitutes Russia’s most substantial indirect subsidy to the as the observers, the EU and the US – would also be equal region. in the context of the negotiations. Upon returning from the break, the Russian diplomat was told that the parties had Close to half of the gas used by industry in Transnistria agreed on a compromise. This caused a clear disagreement goes to the Kuchurgan power plant, owned by the Russian from the Russian side. They wanted Tiraspol to be equal to state company Inter RAO. This firm’s CEO, Boris Kovalchuk, Chisinau, but did not want formal equality between Moscow is the son of one of Putin’s close friends. And its board of on the one hand and Washington and Brussels, which have directors until recently included Igor Sechin, one of Russia’s the formal status of observers, not mediators, on the other. most influential politicians, a close Putin confidant and the The Russian side attempted to block the agreement. The overseer of the energy sector.7 Another substantial consumer Ukrainian representative at the talks launched into a tirade of natural gas in Transnistria is the Moldovan Steel Works about the fact that the mediators’ role in the negotiations is in Ribnitsa, controlled by Alisher Usmanov, an oligarch to help Chisinau and Tiraspol find a solution, not to block a with close ties to Putin’s inner circle. The end result is that solution agreed upon by the two sides. Allegedly, after that Gazprom’s deliveries to Transnistria are used to subsidise round of talks, the Transnistrian authorities got a serious the Transnistrian authorities and Russian-owned industry. battering from Moscow for agreeing to compromises with Meanwhile, Moldova is left responsible for a gas debt that Chisinau without clearance from Moscow. continues to rise alarmingly.

6 “Tri Missii Rogozina”, 20 April 2012, Materik.ru, available at http://www.materik.ru/ rubric/detail.php?ID=14929&print=Y. 5 Svetlana Gamova, “Dmitrii Rogozin poshel v razvedku”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 April 7 See InterRAO UES Board of Directors, available at http://interrao.ru/en/company/ 2012, available at http://www.ng.ru/cis/2012-04-17/1_rogozin.html. rukovod/council/. 5 Russian assistance to Transnistria is crucial for the Russia’s ill-advised attempt to play favourites in the 2011 region’s economic survival. But it contrasts with the kind Transnistrian elections means that there is little love lost of international assistance received by Moldova. Moldova and not much trust between Shevchuk and Russia. And, gets substantial grants and credits, which are mostly despite regular proclamations of affection for Russia, much invested in development, such as roads, irrigation systems, of the Transnstrian elite would like more autonomy from and institution building, with the aim of building a more Russia. They might enjoy the opportunity to play some kind sustainable economy. In contrast, virtually all Russian of balancing game between various external stakeholders assistance to Transnistria is spent on current spending with such as Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. But Transnistria as little developmental potential. And unlike Western aid to a whole is dependent on Russian economic and political Moldova, very little of the Russian assistance to Transnistria support. Shevchuk’s own domestic agenda of consolidating can be audited in any meaningful way. This provides the power and improving the economy means that his only potential for much of it to be misappropriated. option is to be extremely cooperative towards Russia – whatever personal misgivings he may have about Russia’s Despite Russia’s important role in the region, its influence is heavy-handed political interventions. TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION not uncontested, and it is not always exercised constructively. Both Moldova and Transnistria conduct over 50 percent of There is little chance of Russia agreeing to a sustainable their trade with the EU, and much less trade with Russia. solution to the conflict in the foreseeable future. Such a Russia may have started to gain some ground in the solution would have to be based on devolution of power geography of exports from Moldova due to the EU’s recent from Chisinau, while preserving Moldova’s freedom to economic troubles. But the balance is still significantly tilted move towards the EU. Moldova’s persuasive powers in in favour of the EU. This makes the DCFTA the only possible Moscow are negligible. The EU and the US are supportive game in town. Once Moldova formally accedes to this free- of conflict settlement in general and are diplomatically trade agreement, the country will be anchored even more engaged with the resolution process. But they are clearly firmly in the pan-European economic space. not making Transnistria a big enough priority to change Russia’s current calculation of its approach to the conflict. Some Russian actions have served unintentionally to antagonise Moldova and even parts of the Transnistrian elite. In Moldova, on the morning of 1 January 2012, a Ukraine: irrelevant by choice Russian peacekeeper was involved in the fatal shooting of a Moldovan civilian at a joint peacekeeping forces checkpoint. Ukraine could be a key actor in conflict settlement in This was the first lethal incident since the end of hostilities Transnistria, but it is not. The country has no interest in two decades ago. Instead of apologising, then Russian having at its south-western border an unresolved conflict ambassador to Moldova Valeri Kuzmin blamed the civilian that sustains a Russian troop presence and perpetuates victim, saying he was drunk. He accused the media of a weak Moldova. And, like Russia, it has over 100,000 “instigating hysteria” and, bizarrely, of behaving “like Winnie passport holders who live in Transnistria. But Ukraine often the Pooh, who, while visiting the rabbit, was asked whether appears to be torn between multiple factors that prevent it he wants condensed milk or honey, said that he wants both from playing a coherent role in the settlement process. and without bread”.8 Besides such disrespectful “diplomatic” exchanges, there has been no proper investigation of the Ukraine is in favour of Moldova’s territorial integrity and incident. The Russian authorities refused to cooperate on greater EU involvement in the region. Kyiv supported the such an investigation with the Moldovan authorities. They deployment of the EU border assistance mission on its quickly made sure that all Russians involved in the incident territory back in 2005. It cooperated with the concurrent were relocated from the region to Russia. Moldovan-EU actions that forced virtually all Transnistrian exporters to register with the government in Chisinau. Russia has similarly mishandled its interactions with the Moldova and Ukraine have been engaged in a deep Transnistrian political elite. It aggressively involved itself rapprochement that has helped to solve several problems, in “internal” politics in Transnistria by backing a losing including the two countries’ longstanding border disputes. candidate against Evgeny Shevchuk in the December 2011 Ukraine also supports the transformation of the Russian-

www.ecfr.eu elections. This candidate, Anatoliy Kaminski, campaigned led peacekeeping operation into an international mission, with electoral posters featuring Putin and stamped with the which corresponds to the positions of Moldova and the imprint “supported by Russia”. Such behaviour by Russia EU. And Ukraine will hold the OSCE chairmanship in 2013, was consistent with the pattern of its ill-fated attempts to which will give it another platform to play a more visible act as kingmaker in Abkhazia in 2004 and South Ossetia role on Transnistria. During that time, Ukraine is likely to in 2011. be focused on 1+1 meetings between Shevchuk and Filat. At

September 2012 these meetings, Kyiv will try to play the role of moderator. This will follow on from the first ever Filat-Shevchuk meeting, which the Ukrainians brokered, in a minor diplomatic coup. That meeting took place in Odessa in early 2012. ECFR/63 8 Publika TV channel, 3 January 2012, ‘Kuzmin regreta moartea tanarului impuscat si ne 6 da sfaturi’ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1XRNxoOXKk. Ukraine has for a long time had a good relationship with In short, Ukraine often plays a positive role in the process, Evgeny Shevchuk. The Transnistrian leader is an ethnic but it has not managed to be particularly active on conflict Ukrainian, studied in Kyiv, and has been close to Ukraine settlement in a way that would be appreciated by Moldova, throughout his political career. The relationship was slightly Transnistria, or the EU. Ukraine’s approach to Transnistria overshadowed, but not permanently damaged, when is influenced by countervailing factors that leave Ukraine Shevchuk decided to make his first foreign trip to Moscow almost helplessly squeezed in the middle. rather than to Kyiv, upsetting many of Shevchuk’s Ukrainian political “friends”. After Ukraine’s falling-out with the EU following the imprisonment of former Prime Minister The EU’s plateauing engagement Yuliya Tymoshenko and several other former ministers, Kyiv has framed its constructive approach to Transnistria In December 2002, the EU issued a short first foreign-policy as one of the few areas where it can have a positive political statement on Transnistria in what would become the first dialogue with the EU. As a Ukrainian diplomat confessed, salvo of a growing involvement in conflict settlement. A “We clearly don’t want all our meetings in the EU to only be decade later, the US has become increasingly disengaged confined to the Tymoshenko affair. Having a meaningful from eastern European affairs in general. The OSCE plays a and positive discussion on Transnistria could help us defuse useful role as a forum and nexus of expertise on Transnistria, the currently tense relations with the EU.” but lacks the weight to drive the process. Aside from Russia, the EU is now the main international actor involved in Ukrainian diplomats think that confidence-building conflict settlement. Over the last decade, it has had an measures should remain the main tool for rapprochement impact on conflict settlement in Transnistria in two ways: between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Moreover, Kyiv thinks that by taking direct actions to influence conflict resolution, in the term “reintegration” is not a positive one and should be diplomacy, security, trade, and the financial sphere; and by excluded from the political lexicon. Alongside confidence- influencing the international environment and actors like building measures, the process should be focused on Russia and Ukraine. economic cooperation. This could help to create strong business ties. And it could convince Transnistrian business In 2005, the EU deployed an EU border assistance mission interests that cooperation with Moldova is their best chance that worked with Moldovan and Ukrainian customs and to engage in profitable, stable, and legal economic activity. border guards to reduce smuggling around the region. It introduced travel restrictions on Transnistrian leaders, Ukraine has several reasons for not focusing on reintegration which were later suspended. And it played a role in a joint as energetically as other regional players. Ukraine has Moldovan-Ukrainian-EU offensive that forced most of strong business and political links with Transnistrian elites. the Transnistrian exporters to register with the Moldovan Through the port of Odessa, the country is Transnistria’s authorities. But after an initial spike in the middle of the last gateway to the world. Ukraine would like to ensure the decade of initiatives designed to promote conflict settlement, language rights of a sizeable Ukrainian minority in the the EU has lost momentum. The EU’s own domestic region. And it sometimes buys into the unrealistic fears, economic problems, combined with the cumulative effect of fanned by Russia and Transnistria, that Moldova could unite years of Russian and Transnistrian stonewalling, may have with Romania. Ukrainian regional elites, especially but not taken their toll. only those in the Odessa region bordering Transnistria, have multiple business dealings with parts of the Transnistrian The Meseberg process offered Russia input into European elite. security policymaking in exchange for concrete progress on conflict settlement in Moldova. In launching this diplomatic Considering all the problems it has with Russia, from energy initiative in 2010, Chancellor Merkel was pursuing several conflicts and trade disputes to debates over the role of the goals. One was to respond to President Dmitry Medvedev’s Russian language, Ukraine does not want Transnistria to request to reconsider the European security architecture. become another factor that complicates its relations with At the same time, the initiative aimed to bring a more its large neighbour to the east. Ukraine is unlikely to push cooperative and constructive tone to the EU-Russia security for a settlement as long as it appears that the only potential agenda, an area that was put under serious strain by the solutions would involve some sort of federalism. Ukraine 2008 war in Georgia. Germany was also trying to support has in the past had its own problems with regions such as the Moldovan government, which had since 2009 been Crimea demanding more autonomy from the centre. Kyiv engaged in a dynamic rapprochement with the EU. therefore worries that a federative arrangement could set a precedent for Russia to engage in attempts to federalise From Moscow’s perspective, the Meseberg offer was Ukraine. Ukraine has its own domestic problems, such as not much more than hot air. It was being offered a “soft” economic troubles, tensions in its relations with Russia, institution in exchange for giving up its “hard” military and a lack of credibility with the EU. This internal situation and political presence in Transnistria. Russia tends to like means that Ukraine is not in a position to be a forceful grand-sounding committees and organisations. But it also player on Transnistria. knows that previous institutions, such as the 1997 NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the 2002 NATO- 7 Russia Council, along with other lower-level frameworks contacts across the river Dniester, since many residents between the EU and Russia, have almost never amounted of Transnistria are holders of Russian, Ukrainian, or old to real inclusion in decision-making either from NATO or Soviet passports. Border controls could cause complications the EU. The Meseberg process therefore failed to change the for them in crossing into the rest of Moldova. So far, the prevailing Russian approach to the region or to activate the EU, which wants to encourage people-to-people contacts EU as a whole. But Merkel’s diplomacy helped to re-launch between the divided parts of Moldova, has been flexible the 5+2 talks on Transnistria and it kept the spotlight on on the issue. However, as Moldova advances towards a Russia, limiting its potential to play a disruptive role. visa-free regime with the EU, it is possible that a stronger monitoring regime along the administrative boundary with In the absence of a high-political breakthrough, the EU Transnistria might be enforced. focused on smaller steps. It has already committed to spending almost €30 million on conflict settlement in Even more important is the potential impact on Transnistria Transnistria over the next few years. This money will support of EU-Moldova talks on deep and comprehensive free trade. the confidence-building process with concrete projects that Almost all Transnistrian exporters are currently registered TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION could bolster links and interdependence between the two with the Moldovan authorities. This makes it possible for sides of the river Dniester and increase the EU’s leverage them to export to the EU under a favourable trade regime in the region. However, many in Chisinau fear that this granted to Moldova called Autonomous Trade Preferences. approach could strengthen Transnistria’s international Because of this, in recent years, more than 50 percent of exposure and the sustainability of its de facto independence. Transnistrian exports, and sometimes closer to 60 percent, Even though there is a risk that such an approach risks have gone to the EU. But an EU-Moldova free trade area is set fuelling secessionist ambitions, it is ultimately sound. to enter into force in the autumn of 2013. The Autonomous However, whatever EU assistance is likely to be deployed to Trade Preferences will end, and Transnistria will have two bring Chisinau and Tiraspol closer together, it is dwarfed by choices. It can face a much tougher trade regime with the EU, Russia’s political and economic commitment to supporting as an exporter of “goods of non-specified origin”, to which Transnistria and maintaining the region’s separation from the highest tariffs apply. This could hit its exports hard. the rest of Moldova. Alternatively, it could implement the EU acquis so as to fall within the DCFTA. The “deep and comprehensive” formula EU ambitions on Transnistria appear to have plateaued. of the free trade area agreement means that Moldova But EU-Moldova integration has been on a rapid upward must adopt large swathes of the EU acquis, implement EU path since the pro-EU Alliance for European Integration standards, and engage in sweeping institutional reforms came to power in Moldova in 2009. Since then, Moldova as part of the DCFTA accession process. Implementing the has come to be seen as a model success story of the EU’s acquis is time consuming and very expensive, and Moldova Eastern Partnership – an impression that is amplified by has been receiving EU assistance in the process. Transnistria comparison to Ukraine’s backsliding and effective freeze will find it difficult to follow suit. in relations with the EU. Moldova has launched talks on an Association Agreement, entry into a DCFTA, and the Moldova invited Transnistrian representatives to participate establishment of a visa-free regime with the EU. in its talks with the EU on DCFTA in the hope that Transnistria would formulate requests on quotas, transition These initiatives have clear implications for Transnistria. periods, and potential EU assistance in the implementation With regard to visa-free talks, Moldova is supposed to of the acquis. Transnistria took up the offer half-heartedly, ensure that its borders are well managed. But since the sending a junior diplomat to observe the talks. It seemed Transnistrian authorities control a section of Moldova’s to have little intention of playing a pro-active role either in border with Ukraine, Moldova cannot be considered to trying to shape Moldova’s negotiation position or in adapting have full control of its border. The border is not completely to the DCFTA realities and implementing the necessary uncontrolled, since the Ukrainians have established parts of the acquis. Transnistria’s feeble response to the border controls, and the Transnistrian authorities also opportunity to participate in the DCFTA talks reflected its have their own de facto border and customs controls. But lack of people who were qualified to take part. It was also from a Moldovan standpoint, the country does not have evidence of its uncertainty about the benefits of DCFTA, as

www.ecfr.eu full say over who enters and exits the country through the well as its reluctance to upset Russia. Transnistrian region, because it does not conduct passport checks of individuals entering and exiting Transnistria. Transnistria’s political narrative and economic realities contradict each other. The region’s leadership has failed Moldova would in principle, even if reluctantly, be willing to start preparing for a DCFTA trade regime. It constantly to deploy border police on the administrative border line reassures Russia and its Russophilic population that it

September 2012 between the Chisinau-controlled part of the country and wants to integrate into Russian-led Eurasian integrationist Transnistria. This could ensure that Moldovan border initiatives. But this kind of policy could deliver a severe blow management complies with the standards expected by to its own trade and economic interests. Shevchuk has to the EU as part of the visa-free dialogue. However, this navigate between two extremes. He is dependent on Russia, ECFR/63 would likely have a disruptive effect on people-to-people and in the short term, it is urgent that the region continues 8 to receive Russian gas subsidies, cash transfers, and demilitarisation of checkpoints on the roads and bridges geopolitical sponsorship. But in the long term, Transnistria’s between Moldova and Transnistria. Peacekeepers should be interests lie in ensuring some of kind of functioning taken off these roads. They could maintain a presence in the economic base, such as could be achieved through a deeper security zone, but roadblocks, sandbags, and barbed wire political and economic engagement with the EU. So far, self- should be removed, and existing armoured vehicles should reliance has not been Transnistria’s preferred choice. The be replaced with army SUVs. The risk of military hostilities short-term benefits of Russian subsidies seem to outweigh is currently close to zero, and there is no need for visible Transnistria’s long-term interest in developing a more military infrastructure. These publicly visible changes sustainable economic base through trade with the EU. in the security zone would help create a sense of stability and greater trust between the conflict zones. And it would minimise the risks of security incidents, such as civilians Pursuing de facto reintegration being killed by peacekeepers.

Postponing conflict resolution is not something anybody Although Moldova has requested that Russian troops be wants. But a bad solution is worse than no solution. So, replaced with an international civilian mission, Transnistria realistically, the international community and the EU insists that they remain. While the EU and Moldova should should not push right now for a quick solution to the conflict. continue to ask for the withdrawal of Russian troops, an Instead, they should try to turn the tide of conflict settlement interim compromise solution would be to reduce the from the status quo of de facto Transnistrian independence number of peacekeepers, and add a substantial group into a policy of bottom-up de facto reintegration of Moldova of international (EU, Russian, and Ukrainian) civilian and Transnistria. monitors. These civilians would work to monitor the security situation alongside the existing peacekeeping format. A The EU should think through its policies at several levels. The mixed civilian-military force like this would be unique. But EU’s most important role is to shape and protect a regional it would represent a step towards ensuring that the peace environment that is conducive to conflict resolution. This support operation is acceptable to both sides in the conflict. should be achieved through engagement with Russia and And it would constitute a positive precedent in EU-Russia Ukraine and by supporting confidence-building measures. security cooperation. The EU should also become a party The EU must continue to develop its policies targeted to the existing trilateral Joint Control Commission that towards Transnistria and seek to build EU leverage and oversees the peacekeepers. profile in the region. The greatest impact that the EU will have on regional stability will be through its continuing support for Moldova’s European integration effort. This Working with Transnistria integration could build the basis for a sustainable solution to the conflict. Transnistria is willing to pursue engagement with Moldova and the EU. But it is constrained by domestic opposition to rapprochement, and more importantly, by Russia’s Engaging Russia wariness of these contacts. So, its scope for manoeuvre is drastically limited. The EU can respond to this challenge by Russia has a tendency to equivocate with its diplomatic pursuing engagement on several fronts. EU-funded projects partners, so it can often sound reasonable in conflict in Transnistria should be partly geared towards co-opting settlement talks on Transnistria but then suddenly adopt the Transnistrian authorities into a more cooperative and disruptive diplomatic tactics. Russia’s goal in the region is trust-based relationship – even if this sometimes provokes to have a reintegrated but compliant Moldova that is not wariness in Chisinau. moving towards the EU, but instead, is connected to if not fully integrated with a Russian-led Eurasian Union. And the It is equally important not to exacerbate Transnistria’s de EU’s soft diplomacy is unlikely to fundamentally change facto separation from the rest of Moldova. Rather than Russian objectives. development assistance solely aimed at improving the socio- economic situation in the region, EU funding should align However, the EU should keep Transnistria in the spotlight with the needs of conflict resolution by building more links of its diplomatic engagement with Russia so as to push for between the banks of the river Dniester. For example, the greater confidence building between Moldova proper and EU and Moldova could set up a fund to finance scholarships Transnistria. The EU should not rush into grand bargains or for Transnistrian students to study in Chisinau. Existing seek a quick solution on paper to the conflict. This conflict scholarships for Moldovans to study in the EU should be will not be solved through a diplomatic blitzkrieg. open to Transnistrians and be advertised more widely in the region. The recently created Euroregion involving parts of All interested players, including the EU, should promote Moldova, Ukraine, and the Transnistrian region could be measures to increase the sustainability of confidence another vehicle for more projects. The EU could make the building by making the process relevant and visible Euroregion a focal point for its assistance projects. This to the wider public. These measures should include a would allow it to undertake broader regional initiatives 9 involving Ukraine, as well as dealing with local Transnistrian Europeanising Moldova authorities. By widening the scope of participants, it could avoid some of the more politicised discussion on the legal Whatever actions the EU takes, the biggest impact it is status of the region. likely to have on conflict settlement will come from the effects of the broader EU-Moldova relationship. Moldova’s Most importantly, the EU must seek to connect Transnistria ability to consolidate as a democratic state making progress as much as possible to the EU-Moldova dialogue on issues towards the EU could have a decisive influence on conflict such as the deep and comprehensive free trade area and settlement. EU-Moldova free trade, visa liberalisation, and the dialogue on visa liberalisation. Transnistria will need to political rapprochement are all important stepping-stones move fast to associate itself with DCFTA negotiations, and to conflict settlement. So, once Moldova fulfils the necessary it will require outside assistance to do so. This presupposes conditions, the EU should move as soon as possible towards a fuller participation for Transnistrians in the Moldovan implementing a free trade area and visa liberalisation. negotiation team. More involvement in negotiations Under no circumstances should EU-Moldova relations be would enable Transnistria to convey the interests of the held hostage to Transnistria, for example on the DCFTA. TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION Transnistrian business community to Moldovan negotiators This would only embolden potential spoilers in the conflict- so that they can be taken into account in the talks. settlement process.

Although it will be difficult, Transnistria will have to start Moldova’s increasing attractiveness should be made as implementing the acquis and EU standards. Only by doing visible and obvious to Transnistrian residents as possible, so this can it save Transnistria’s export potential and provide as to change the “balance of attractiveness” on the ground. hope for its weak economy to rebound by securing continuing To achieve this, Moldova should prioritise development in and improved access to the EU market. The EU could assign its own towns and villages near the administrative border some trade advisors to work with the Transnistrian executive, with Transnistria. In concrete terms, it should invest in legislature, and business associations on a roadmap to development and job creation in and around towns such implementing the acquis that would allow Transnistria Rezina or Varnitsa, a suburb of the Transnistrian controlled to be fully associated with DCFTA. These advisors could Bender/Tighina. The EU could support projects that show be based with the OSCE office in Tiraspol. This measure Moldova benefiting from its dialogue with the EU in a way would be hard for the Transnistrian leadership to adopt, that is felt by ordinary citizens. In order to project this image, partly because of the strong anti-EU domestic currents, and the EU and Moldova should focus on concrete and publicly partly because Russia is likely to strongly disapprove of such visible life improvements. These could include renovating flirtation with the European agenda in the region. But if the cinemas and night clubs, lighting streets, and renovating region wants to have a productive economy and to avoid roads. Public Wi-Fi internet could be deployed in towns being completely subsidised by Russia, local businesses such as Rezina and Varnitsa. Schools and hospitals could need access to EU markets. The EU should also prepare a be upgraded and special support and tax incentives could plan B, in case Transnistria for political or technical reasons be given to small businesses. The right-bank Moldovan cannot associate with DCFTA. Part of this plan could be to audience should also be kept in mind. To sustain interest prolong the current facilitated trade regime for the region in reintegration among the right-bank population, public for a transition period beyond 2013, so as to give the region information campaigns underscoring the potential gains more time to associate with DCFTA. for Moldovan society from resolving the conflict will be essential. Another avenue for cooperation would be to extend engagement with Transnistria on border management. This Conflict resolution in Transnistria should not be understood would fit well into the EU’s efforts to improve border controls as a one-off event: a day when Chisinau and Tiraspol sign in the wider neighbourhood, such as its visa dialogue with a document that puts an end to the conflict. A quick and Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia. To facilitate these efforts, dirty deal might even be detrimental if it disrupts Moldova’s the EU border assistance mission should have its mandate reform and European integration process. Instead, the EU extended so that it can start cooperating directly with the should concentrate on building a solution from the bottom Transnistrian authorities. The EU border assistance mission up through policies that promote the de facto reintegration

www.ecfr.eu could work together with the Moldovan border police and of Moldova in various socio-political spheres. A formal deal Transnistrian de facto border guards to harmonise border will naturally follow. practices and bring them in line with each other and with European practices. Once – and if – EU engagement with Transnistria advances, steps should be taken to drastically simplify the movement of people across the Dniester. This

September 2012 could help to persuade Transnistria to remove its current de facto border posts with the rest of Moldova. ECFR/63 10 Acknowledgements About the authors

We are very grateful to Soros Foundation Moldova, whose Nicu Popescu is a Senior Policy Fellow and the head of generous financial support helped realize the publication the Wider Europe programme at the European Council of this briefs. However, this brief represents the views of its on Foreign Relations. Previously he was a research fellow authors and should not be taken as the official position of at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, a OSI, Soros Foundation Moldova or of ECFR as a whole. visiting fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and a senior foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Moldova. He holds a doctorate in international relations from the Central European University in Budapest (Hungary) and is the author of EU foreign policy and the post-Soviet conflicts: Stealth Intervention (Routledge, 2011). His publications for ECFR include Dealing with a post-BRIC Russia (with Ben Judah and Jana Kobzova, 2011), The Limits of enlargement-lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighbourhood (with Andrew Wilson, 2009) and A Power Audit of EU-Russia relations (with Mark Leonard, 2007).

Leonid Litra is deputy director of the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” in Chisinau (Moldova) and a visiting research fellow at the Institute of World Policy in Kyiv (Ukraine). In 2011 he was part of the expert team carrying out the European Commission’s Strategic Conflict Assessment of the Transnitrian conflict. He has co-authored several publications, including Transnistria after 20 years (2011) and Why isn’t federalization a valid solution for the Republic of Moldova? (2012). He also led a team of Moldovan experts for the “European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries” (2011, 2012). Leonid was a Carnegie Research Fellow at Yale University and holds a master’s degree in international relations and European studies from the European Institute of High International Studies in Nice (France).

11 ABOUT ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and values-based European foreign policy.

ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities:

•A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a distinguished Council of over one hundred and seventy Members – politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries – which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical

TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje.

• A physical presence in the main EU member states. ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. In the future ECFR plans to open an office in Brussels. Our offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications.

• A distinctive research and policy development process. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets.

ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the Spanish foundation FRIDE (La Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Communitas Foundation, the Italian UniCredit group, the Stiftung Mercator and Steven Heinz. ECFR works in partnership with other organisations but does not make grants to individuals or institutions.

www.ecfr.eu www.ecfr.eu September 2012 ECFR/63 12 Among members of the European Council on Foreign Relations are John Bruton (Ireland) Hanzade Dog˘an Boyner Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) former prime ministers, presidents, Former European Commission (Turkey) Former Chairman, Defence European commissioners, current Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Chair, Dog˘an Gazetecilik and Dog˘an Commission; former Defence Minister Minister (Taoiseach) and former parliamentarians and On-line Heidi Hautala (Finland) ministers, public intellectuals, Minister for International Development business leaders, activists and Ian Buruma Andrew Duff cultural figures from the EU member (The Netherlands) (United Kingdom) Writer and academic Sasha Havlicek states and candidate countries. Member of the European Parliament (United Kingdom) Erhard Busek (Austria) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) Executive Director, Institute for Strategic Asger Aamund (Denmark) Chairman of the Institute for the Former Foreign Minister Dialogue (ISD) President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Danube and Central Europe and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Hans Eichel (Germany) Connie Hedegaard (Denmark) Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Former Finance Minister Commissioner for Climate Action Urban Ahlin (Sweden) Member of the European Parliament; Deputy Chairman of the Foreign former President of the European Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Steven Heinz (Austria) Parliament; former Prime Minister Former Executive Chairman, United Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Affairs Committee and foreign Lansdowne Partners Ltd policy spokesperson for the Social Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Democratic Party Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) former OSCE High Commissioner on Minister for International Development National Minorities; former Chairman Annette Heuser (Germany) Cooperation Executive Director, Bertelsmann Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Stockholm International Peace Foundation Washington DC Chairman of the Board, Crisis Maria Livanos Cattaui Research Institute, SIPRI Management Initiative; former Diego Hidalgo (Spain) President (Switzerland) Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Co-founder of Spanish newspaper El Former Secretary General of the (Denmark) País; Founder and Honorary President, Giuliano Amato (Italy) International Chamber of Commerce Chairman, Baltic Development Forum; FRIDE Former Prime Minister; Chairman, former Foreign Minister Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna; Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Chairman, Istituto della Enciclopedia Director of Melak Investments/ Steven Everts Italiana Treccani; Chairman, Centro Journalist (The Netherlands) (The Netherlands) Former NATO Secretary General Studi Americani Carmen Chacón (Spain) Adviser to the Vice President of the Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Former Minister of Defence European Commission and EU High Danuta Hübner (Poland) Diplomat; former Member of Representative for Foreign and Security Member of the European Parliament; Parliament Charles Clarke Policy former European Commissioner (United Kingdom) Visiting Professor of Politics, University Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) Viveca Ax:son Johnson Member of the European Parliament Member of the European Parliament (Sweden) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary Chairman of Nordstjernan AB Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Nicola Clase (Sweden) President, Chamber of Deputies; Former Ambassador; former Executive Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) Ambassador to the United Kingdom; former Foreign Minister Director, Crisis Management Initiative Former Prime Minister former State Secretary Joschka Fischer (Germany) Toomas Ilves (Estonia) Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Former Foreign Minister and vice- President Member of Parliament; former Foreign Member of the European Parliament Chancellor Minister Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Robert Cooper Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Chairman, Munich Security Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) (United Kingdom) Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Conference; Global Head of Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Counsellor of the European External Government Affairs Allianz SE School of Economics; former Deputy Action Service Lykke Friis (Denmark) Prime Minister Member of Parliament; former Minister Minna Järvenpää Gerhard Cromme (Germany) for Climate, Energy and Gender (Finland/US) Lluís Bassets (Spain) Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Equality Deputy Director, El País ThyssenKrupp International Advocacy Director, Open Jaime Gama (Portugal) Society Foundation Marek Belka (Poland) Maria Cuffaro (Italy) Former Speaker of the Parliament; Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) Governor, National Bank of Poland; Maria Cuffaro, Anchorwoman, TG3, former Foreign Minister former Prime Minister RAI Professor, London School of Economics Timothy Garton Ash Roland Berger (Germany) Daniel Daianu (Romania) Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey) Founder and Honorary Chairman, Professor of Economics, National (United Kingdom) Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Roland Berger Strategy Consultants School of Political and Administrative Professor of European Studies, Oxford of Turkey on foreign policy and public GmbH Studies (SNSPA); former Finance University diplomacy Minister Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Chief Economist, European Bank for Chairman of the Portuguese Institute of Editorial Director, Le Monde Massimo D’Alema (Italy) International Relations (IPRI) Reconstruction and Development President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Olli Kivinen (Finland) President, Foundation for European Teresa Patricio Gouveia Writer and columnist Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Progressive Studies; former Prime Chairman, Prime Minister’s Economic Minister and Foreign Minister (Portugal) Ben Knapen Council; former Prime Minister Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Marta Dassù (Italy) Gulbenkian Foundation; former (The Netherlands) Carl Bildt (Sweden) Under Secretary of State for Foreign Foreign Minister Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Minister International Cooperation Affairs Heather Grabbe Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) (United Kingdom) Gerald Knaus (Austria) President, Polish Confederation of Foreign Minister Executive Director, Open Society Chairman, European Stability Initiative; Private Employers – Lewiatan Institute – Brussels Carr Center Fellow Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Charles Grant Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Founder, Communitas Foundation and Poet and Cultural Critic Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; President of Venture Equity Bulgaria (United Kingdom) former State Secretary Ltd. Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) Director, Centre for European Reform Member of the European Parliament; Bassma Kodmani (France) Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) former Prime Minister Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Executive Director, Arab Reform CFO & Deputy CEO, Vattenfall AB Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the Initiative Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) United Nations and the League of Emma Bonino (Italy) Director, Confindustria Delegation Arab States on Syria. Rem Koolhaas Vice President of the Senate; former EU to Brussels; former Member of the (The Netherlands) Commissioner European Parliament Elisabeth Guigou (France) Member of Parliament and President Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) Graduate School of Design, Harvard Stine Bosse (Denmark) of the Foreign Affairs Committee University Chairman and Non-Executive Board Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Member Marshall Fund of the United States Fernando Andresen Guimarães David Koranyi (Hungary) (Bratislava) (Portugal) Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Franziska Brantner (Germany) Head of the US and Canada Division, Center of the Atlantic Council of the Member of the European Parliament Kemal Dervis (Turkey) European External Action Service Vice-President and Director of United States Han ten Broeke Global Economy and Development, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Bernard Kouchner (France) (The Netherlands) Brookings. (Germany) Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Member of Parliament and Former Defence Minister Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) spokesperson for foreign affairs President, DEMOS Hungary and defence István Gyarmati (Hungary) Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal President and CEO, International Strategies Centre for Democratic Transition 13 Aleksander Kwas´niewski Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) Stefano Sannino (Italy) Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia) (Poland) Director-General, Institute of Director General for Enlargement, Former President International and European Affairs European Commission Former President Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Mart Laar (Estonia) Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Javier Santiso (Spain) Lawyer; former EU Commissioner Minister of Defence; former Prime Editorialist Director, Office of the CEO of Telefónica Europe Andre Wilkens (Germany) Minister Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Director Mercator Centre Berlin and Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Former Foreign Minister Marietje Schaake Director Strategy, Mercator Haus Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) (The Netherlands) Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Minister CEO, European Council on Foreign Member of the European Parliament Former Ambassador to Brazil Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Relations; former Europe Director, Klaus Scharioth (Germany) Amnesty International Stelios Zavvos (Greece) (Germany) Dean of the Mercator Fellowship CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd Member of the European Parliament Mabel van Oranje on International Affairs; former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia) Pascal Lamy (France) (The Netherlands) Germany to the US EU Representative to Kosovo; former Honorary President, Notre Europe and Senior Adviser, The Elders Foreign Director-General of WTO; former EU Pierre Schori (Sweden) Commissioner Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) Chair, Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Member of the Board, Fomento de former Director General, FRIDE; former Bruno Le Maire (France) Construcciones y Contratas; former EU SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire Member of Parliament; Former Minister Commissioner for Food, Agriculture & Fishing Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION Monica Oriol (Spain) Member of Parliament; former Mark Leonard CEO, Seguriber Chancellor (United Kingdom) Cem Özdemir (Germany) Karel Schwarzenberg Director, European Council on Foreign Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen Relations (Czech Republic) (Green Party) Foreign Minister Jean-David Lévitte (France) Ana Palacio (Spain) Former Sherpa to the President of the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) French Republic; former Ambassador to President and General Counsel of the Executive Vice President, Head of Public the United States World Bank Group Affairs Department, UniCredit S.p.A Sonia Licht (Serbia) Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Narcís Serra (Spain) President, Belgrade Fund for Political Chairman, People in Need Foundation Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice Excellence President of the Spanish Government Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Juan Fernando López Aguilar Chancellor of Oxford University and co- Radosław Sikorski (Poland) (Spain) chair of the International Crisis Group; Foreign Minister Member of the European Parliament; former EU Commissioner Aleksander Smolar (Poland) former Minister of Justice Diana Pinto (France) Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Historian and author Foundation CEO, Menemsha Ltd Javier Solana (Spain) Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Former EU High Representative for the Monica Macovei (Romania) Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Common Foreign and Security Policy & Member of the European Parliament Paris-Dauphine Secretary-General of the Council of the Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) EU; former Secretary General of NATO CEO of Marcegalia S.p.A; former Member of Parliament; Chairman of the George Soros President, Confindustria Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee (Hungary/USA) Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia) Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Founder and Chairman, Open Society Senior Advisor, World Bank Member of Parliament; former Foreign Foundations Minister I´ñigo Méndez de Vigo (Spain) Teresa de Sousa (Portugal) Secretary of State for the European Charles Powell Journalist Union (Spain/United Kingdom) Director, Real Instituto Elcano Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) David Miliband Playwright and Academic (United Kingdom) Andrew Puddephatt Rory Stewart Member of Parliament; Former (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Secretary of State for Foreign and Director, Global Partners & Associated Member of Parliament Commonwealth Affairs Ltd. Alexander Stubb (Finland) Alain Minc (France) Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) Minister for Foreign Trade and President of AM Conseil; former Foreign Minister European Affairs; former Foreign chairman, Le Monde Robert Reibestein Minister Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) (The Netherlands) Michael Stürmer (Germany) Foreign Minister; former Defence Director, McKinsey & Company Chief Correspondent, Die Welt Minister; former Member of the European Parliament George Robertson Ion Sturza (Romania) (United Kingdom) President, GreenLight Invest; former Dominique Moïsi (France) Former Secretary General of NATO Prime Minister of the Republic of Senior Adviser, IFRI Moldova Albert Rohan (Austria) Pierre Moscovici (France) Former Secretary General for Foreign Paweł S´wieboda (Poland) Finance Minister; former Minister for Affairs President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for European Affairs European Strategy Adam D. 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José Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark A Power Audit of EU-Russia The EU and Human Rights at the Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/42) Relations UN: 2010 Review Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Richard Gowan and Franziska Four Scenarios for the Reinvention November 2007 (ECFR/02) Brantner, September 2010 (ECFR/24) of Europe Mark Leonard, November 2011 Poland’s second return to Europe? The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe (ECFR/43) Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard with (ECFR/03) Dimitar Bechev, Jana Kobzova Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia & Andrew Wilson, October 2010 Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Nicu Afghanistan: Europe’s (ECFR/25) Popescu, November 2011 (ECFR/44) forgotten war Daniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/04) Beyond Maastricht: a New Deal for Rescuing the euro: what is China’s the Eurozone price? Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of Thomas Klau and François François Godement, November 2011 the Putin Succession Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/26) (ECFR/45) Andrew Wilson, February 2008 (ECFR/05) The EU and Belarus after the A “Reset” with Algeria: the Russia Election to the EU’s South Re-energising Europe’s Security and Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Hakim Darbouche and Susi Defence Policy and Andrew Wilson, January 2011 Dennison, December 2011 (ECFR/46) Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) (ECFR/27) Ukraine after the Tymoshenko Can the EU win the Peace in After the Revolution: Europe and verdict Georgia? the Transition in Tunisia Andrew Wilson, December 2011 Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, (ECFR/47) Andrew Wilson, August 2008 (ECFR/07) Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, March 2011 (ECFR/28) European Foreign Policy Scorecard A Global Force for Human Rights? 2012 An Audit of European Power at European Foreign Policy Scorecard February 2012 (ECFR/48) the UN 2010 Richard Gowan and Franziska March 2011 (ECFR/29) The Long Shadow of Brantner, September 2008 (ECFR/08) Ordoliberalism: Germany’s The New German Question: How Approach to the Euro Crisis Beyond Dependence: How to deal Europe can get the Germany it Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Guérot, with Russian Gas needs February 2012 (ECFR/49) Pierre Noel, November 2008 (ECFR/09) Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, April 2011 (ECFR/30) The End of the Putin Consensus Re-wiring the US-EU relationship Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson, Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and Mark Turning Presence into Power: March 2012 (ECFR/50) Leonard, December 2008 (ECFR/10) Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood Syria: Towards a Political Solution Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012 Daniel Korski, March 2009 (ECFR/11) May 2011 (ECFR/31) (ECFR/51)

A Power Audit of EU-China Relations Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: a Bolder How the EU Can Support Reform John Fox and Francois Godement, EU Approach in Burma April 2009 (ECFR/12) Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Jonas Parello-Plesner, March 2012 Nick Witney, May 2011 (ECFR/32) (ECFR/52) Beyond the “War on Terror”: Towards a New Transatlantic A Chance to Reform: How the EU China at the crossroads Framework for Counterterrorism can support Democratic Evolution François Godement, April 2012 Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 (ECFR/13) in Morocco (ECFR/53) Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu and The Limits of Enlargement-lite: José Ignacio Torreblanca, Europe and Jordan: Reform before European and Russian Power in the May 2011 (ECFR/33) it’s too late Troubled Neighbourhood Julien Barnes-Dacey, April 2012 Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, China’s Janus-faced Response to (ECFR/54) June 2009 (ECFR/14) the Arab Revolutions Jonas Parello-Plesner and Raffaello China and Germany: Why the The EU and human rights at the UN: Pantucci, June 2011 (ECFR/34) Emerging Special Relationship 2009 annual review Matters for Europe Richard Gowan and Franziska What does Turkey think? Hans Kundnani and Jonas Parello- Brantner, September 2009 (ECFR/15) Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June 2011 Plesner, May 2012 (ECFR/55) (ECFR/35) What does Russia think? After Merkozy: How France and edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard What does Germany think about Germany Can Make Europe Work and Andrew Wilson, September 2009 Europe? Ulrike Guérot and Thomas Klau, (ECFR/16) Edited by Ulrike Guérot and May 2012 (ECFR/56) Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 Supporting Moldova’s Democratic (ECFR/36) The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil Transition Jana Kobzova and Leila Alieva, Nicu Popescu, October 2009 (ECFR/17) The Scramble for Europe May 2012 (ECFR/57) François Godement and Jonas Can the EU rebuild failing states? A Parello-Plesner with Alice Richard, A Europe of Incentives: How to review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities July 2011 (ECFR/37) Regain the Trust of Citizens and Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Markets October 2009 (ECFR/18) Palestinian Statehood at the UN: Mark Leonard and Jan Zielonka, Why Europeans Should Vote “Yes” June 2012 (ECFR/58) Towards a Post-American Europe: Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, A Power Audit of EU-US Relations September 2011 (ECFR/38) The Case for Co-operation in Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, Crisis Management October 2009 (ECFR/19) The EU and Human Rights at the Richard Gowan, June 2012 (ECFR/59) UN: 2011 Review Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine Richard Gowan and Franziska The Periphery of the Periphery: The Andrew Wilson, March 2010 Brantner, September 2011 (ECFR/39) Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis (ECFR/20) Dimitar Bechev, August 2012 (ECFR/60) How to Stop the Demilitarisation Beyond Wait-and-See: The Way of Europe Lebanon: Containing Spillover Forward for EU Balkan Policy Nick Witney, November 2011 from Syria Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus and (ECFR/40) Julien Barnes-Dacey, September 2012 Daniel Korski, May 2010 (ECFR/21) (ECFR/61)

15 TRANSNISTRIA: A BOTTOM-UP SOLUTION

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ISBN: 978-1-906538-63-7 September 2012

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