A Guide to Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System
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STRUCTURING the PUBLIC DEFENDER Irene Oriseweyinmi Joe*
STRUCTURING THE PUBLIC DEFENDER Irene Oriseweyinmi Joe* ABSTRACT. The public defender may be critical to protecting individual rights in the U.S. criminal process, but state governments take remarkably different approaches to distributing the services. Some organize indigent defense as a function of the executive branch of state governance. Others administer the services through the judicial branch. The remaining state governments do not place it within any branch of state government, they delegate its management to local counties. This administrative choice has important implications for the public defender’s efficiency and effectiveness. It influences how the public defender will be funded and also the extent to which the public defender, as an institution, will respond to the particular interests of local communities. So, which branch of government should oversee the public defender? Should the public defender exist under the same branch of government that oversees the prosecutor and the police – two entities that the public defender seeks to hold accountable in the criminal process? Should the provision of services be housed under the judicial branch which is ordinarily tasked with being a neutral arbiter in criminal proceedings? Perhaps a public defender who is independent of statewide governance is ideal even if that might render it a lesser player among the many government agencies battling at the state level for limited financial resources. This article answers this question about state assignment by engaging in an original examination of each state’s architectural choices for the public defender. Its primary contribution is to enrich our current understanding of how each state manages the public defender function and how that decision influences the institution’s funding and ability to adhere to ethical and professional mandates. -
Suspended Sentence -- Banishment As Condition W
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 8 | Number 4 Article 19 6-1-1930 Criminal Law -- Suspended Sentence -- Banishment as Condition W. T. Covington Jr. Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation W. T. Covington Jr., Criminal Law -- Suspended Sentence -- Banishment as Condition, 8 N.C. L. Rev. 465 (1930). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol8/iss4/19 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES AND COMMENTS. Criminal Law-Suspended Sentence-Banishment as Condition The feme defendant, convicted in the Superior Court of violating the prohibition laws, was sentenced to two years imprisonment, capias to issue at the discretion of the solicitor, if at the end of sixty days the defendant was found within the state. The defendant left the state within the sixty days, but, four years after her conviction and two years after her return to the state, on a motion of the solicitor, while she awaited trial on another prohibition charge, the sentence was ordered under the previous judgment. Both the judgment' and the order 2 were affirmed on appeal. It is suggested in a Tennessee decisions that the suspended sen- tence having developed in England as an aid to substantial justice in lieu of criminal appeals, it is now properly employed only as an inci- dent of procedure. -
Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases by Caroline Wolf Harlow, Ph.D
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report November 2000, NCJ 179023 Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases By Caroline Wolf Harlow, Ph.D. Highlights BJS Statistician At felony case termination, court-appointed counsel represented 82% Almost all persons charged with a of State defendants in the 75 largest counties in 1996 felony in Federal and large State courts and 66% of Federal defendants in 1998 were represented by counsel, either Percent of defendants ù Over 80% of felony defendants hired or appointed. But over a third of Felons Misdemeanants charged with a violent crime in persons charged with a misdemeanor 75 largest counties the country’s largest counties and in cases terminated in Federal court Public defender 68.3% -- 66% in U.S. district courts had represented themselves (pro se) in Assigned counsel 13.7 -- Private attorney 17.6 -- publicly financed attorneys. court proceedings prior to conviction, Self (pro se)/other 0.4 -- as did almost a third of those in local ù About half of large county jails. U.S. district courts Federal Defender felony defendants with a public Organization 30.1% 25.5% defender or assigned counsel Indigent defense involves the use of Panel attorney 36.3 17.4 and three-quarters with a private publicly financed counsel to represent Private attorney 33.4 18.7 Self representation 0.3 38.4 lawyer were released from jail criminal defendants who are unable to pending trial. afford private counsel. At the end of Note: These data reflect use of defense counsel at termination of the case. -
A Note on Moral Insanity and Psychopathic Disorders
A Note on MoralInsanity andPsychopathic Disorders F. A. WHITLOCK, Professor of Psychiatry, University ofQueensland, Australia Despite a good deal ofargument to the contrary (Maughs, today. The second patient was probably subject to attacks of 1941; Hunter and Macalpine, 1963; Walk, 1954; Walk and temporal lobe epilepsy with characteristic epigastric sensa Walker, 1961; Craft, 1965; Whitlock, 1967) it is still com tions rising into the neck and head, but without proceeding monly believed that Prichard's 'moral insanity' (1835) was to a grand mal convulsion. He was a man ofgood character, the forerunner of our present-day concept of psychopathic well aware of his tendency to violence during these episodes, (sociopathic) personality; the most recent example of this and made every effort to avoid harming others by warning appearing in the paper by Davies and Feldman (1981), who them of his attacks. The third patient, the one who was write: 'In 1801 Pinel described a condition termed by him liberated by a mob to whom he appeared rational, but then man;e sans delire, the notable feature of which was that the became infected by the prevailing excitement and laid about sufferer showed bouts of extreme violence but with no signs him with a sword with fatal effects, was almost certainly of psychosis ... Prichard confirmed Pinel's observation and suffering from mania as now understood. coined the term "moral insanity" which led to "a marked Prichard's cases were also diagnostically heterogenous. perversion of the natural impulses".' A number of modem They included cases of mania, manic-depressive psychosis, textbooks (Sim, 1974; Friedman el ai, 1975; Slater and epilepsy, obsessional neurosis, two possible schizophrenics Roth, 1977; Trethowan, 1979) also appear to regard moral and a 46-year-old man who almost certainly was showing insanity as the precursor of psychopathic disorder, although early signs of dementia. -
Mental Illness, Your Client and the Criminal Law: a Handbook For
MENTAL ILLNESS, CE YOUR CLIENT AND THE CRIMINAL LAW R A Handbook for Attorneys Who Represent Persons With Mental Illness RESOU T e x a s a p p l e s e e d • T e x a s T e c h U n i v e r s i T y s c h o o l o f l a w h o g g f o U n d a T i o n f o r M e n T a l h e a l T h Acknowledgments This fourth edition handbook is made possible by the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health. The original handbook was supported by the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, Houston Endowment, and the Meadows Foundation. We would like to thank the following people for their contributions to this edition of the handbook: Brian Shannon, Jim Van Norman, M.D, Cindy Stormer, Jeanette Kinard, Floyd Jennings, Ph.D., Beth Mitchell, Kathryn Lewis, David Gonzales, and Raman Gill. A special thanks goes to Cindy Gibson with Disability Rights Texas for her review of Appendix B. We acknowledge contributions to prior editions from Ken Arfa, M.D.; Jay Crowder, M.D.; Joel Feiner, M.D.; and attorneys Nathan Dershowitz, Lynda Frost, Ph.D., Alexandra Gauthier, Jeanette Drescher Green, Debbie Hiser, Barry Johnson, Corinne Mason, and John Niland, as well as support from Reymundo Rodriguez and Jeff Patterson. Texas Appleseed 1609 Shoal Creek, Suite 201 Austin, Texas 78701 tel: (512) 473-2800 fax: (512) 473-2813 website: www.texasappleseed.net Texas Appleseed presents the information in this handbook as a service to attorneys who represent defendants with mental illness. -
Psychopathology and Crime Causation: Insanity Or Excuse?
Fidei et Veritatis: The Liberty University Journal of Graduate Research Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 4 2016 Psychopathology and Crime Causation: Insanity or Excuse? Meagan Cline Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/fidei_et_veritatis Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Cline, Meagan (2016) "Psychopathology and Crime Causation: Insanity or Excuse?," Fidei et Veritatis: The Liberty University Journal of Graduate Research: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/fidei_et_veritatis/vol1/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fidei et Veritatis: The Liberty University Journal of Graduate Research by an authorized editor of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Cline: Psychopathology and Crime Causation: Insanity or Excuse? PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND CRIME CAUSATION: INSANITY OR EXCUSE? By Meagan Cline One of the most controversial topics in the criminal justice industry is the "insanity defense" and its applicability or validity in prosecuting criminal cases. The purpose of this assignment is to identify and discuss psychopathology and crime causation in terms of mental illness, research, and the insanity defense. For this evaluation, information was gathered from scholarly research, textbooks, dictionaries, and published literature. These sources were then carefully reviewed and applied to the evaluation in a concise, yet informative, manner. This assignment also addresses some of the key terms in psychopathology and crime causation, including various theories, definitions, and less commonly known relevant factors influencing claims of mental instability or insanity. -
Senate Substitute
2012 SESSION SENATE SUBSTITUTE 12105312D 1 SENATE BILL NO. 111 2 FLOOR AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 3 (Proposed by Senator Howell 4 on February 9, 2012) 5 (Patron Prior to Substitute±±Senator Howell) 6 A BILL to amend and reenact § 19.2-306 of the Code of Virginia and to amend the Code of Virginia by 7 adding a section numbered 19.2-303.6, relating to establishing Sanctions with Unified Rapid 8 Enforcement (SURE). 9 Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 10 1. That § 19.2-306 of the Code of Virginia is amended and reenacted and that the Code of 11 Virginia is amended by adding a section numbered 19.2-303.6 as follows: 12 § 19.2-303.6. Sanctions with Unified Rapid Enforcement (SURE). 13 A. There is hereby created a program designated as Sanctions with Unified Rapid Enforcement 14 (SURE). SENATE 15 B. A person placed in the SURE program shall be frequently reviewed by the probation and parole 16 district office to ensure that the person has not violated any conditions of his suspended sentence. If a 17 probation officer has probable cause to believe that a person in the SURE program has violated any 18 condition of his suspension, he shall, without exception, under the provisions of § 53.1-149, immediately 19 arrest the defendant or cause him to be arrested by issuing a noncompliance statement. The defendant 20 shall not be admitted to bail. After being taken into custody, the defendant shall be brought before the 21 court within 48 hours, except that if the defendant is taken into custody on a Friday or the day before 22 an extended holiday, his hearing before the court shall be given precedence on the docket. -
Case 2:09-Cv-04870-MMB Document 49 Filed 07/20/11 Page 1 of 21
Case 2:09-cv-04870-MMB Document 49 Filed 07/20/11 Page 1 of 21 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JULIA QUAGLIARELLO : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : NO. 09-4870 OFFICER JOSHUA DEWEES, et al. : MEMORANDUM RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE Baylson, J. July 20, 2011 I. Introduction Currently pending before the Court in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law are the parties’ cross-motions in limine to exclude certain evidence at trial. Defendants filed the following three motions: 1) a Motion in Limine to Preclude Opinion Testimony of Walter Signorelli, Plaintiff’s Police Expert; 2) a Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Pre-Incident Lawsuits and Settlements; and 3) a Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff from Offering Evidence at Trial of Citizen Complaints filed Against Police Officer Dewees and Prior Disciplinary Records. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Preclude Introduction of Plaintiff’s Plea of Guilty in State Criminal Proceedings and to Preclude Testimony from Defendants’ Witnesses Anna Marie Murphy, Esquire, Anthony Amoroso, Esquire, Jay Mettera, Esquire, Sam Yim, Esquire and Donna Gorbey on June 1, 2011. The Court has reviewed the parties’ motions and responses in opposition, and held oral argument on pending motions on May 24, 2011. Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude Opinion Testimony of Walter Signorelli (ECF No. 25) will be granted in part and denied in part. -1- Case 2:09-cv-04870-MMB Document 49 Filed 07/20/11 Page 2 of 21 The Court will reserve decision on Defendants’ Motions in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Pre- Incident Lawsuits and Settlements (ECF No. -
The United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. V. North Carolina
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADOPTS A REASONABLE JUVENILE STANDARD IN J.D.B. V NORTH CAROLINA FOR PURPOSES OF THE MIRANDA CUSTODY ANALYSIS: CAN A MORE REASONED JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES BE FAR BEHIND? Marsha L. Levick and Elizabeth-Ann Tierney∗ I. Introduction II. The Reasonable Person Standard a. Background b. The Reasonable Person Standard and Children: Kids Are Different III. Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida: Embedding Developmental Research Into the Court’s Constitutional Analysis IV. From Miranda v. Arizona to J.D.B. v. North Carolina V. J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The Facts and The Analysis VI. Reasonableness Applied: Justifications, Defenses, and Excuses a. Duress Defenses b. Justified Use of Force c. Provocation d. Negligent Homicide e. Felony Murder VII. Conclusion I. Introduction The “reasonable person” in American law is as familiar to us as an old shoe. We slip it on without thinking; we know its shape, style, color, and size without looking. Beginning with our first-year law school classes in torts and criminal law, we understand that the reasonable person provides a measure of liability and responsibility in our legal system.1 She informs our * ∗Marsha L. Levick is the Deputy Director and Chief Counsel for Juvenile Law Center, a national public interest law firm for children, based in Philadelphia, Pa., which Ms. Levick co-founded in 1975. Ms. Levick is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University School of Law. Elizabeth-Ann “LT” Tierney is the 2011 Sol and Helen Zubrow Fellow in Children's Law at the Juvenile Law Center. -
The Climate Necessity Defense: Proof and Judicial Error in Climate Protest Cases
The Climate Necessity Defense: Proof and Judicial Error in Climate Protest Cases Lance N. Long Ted Hamilton* I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 58 II. ATTEMPTS TO ASSERT THE CLIMATE NECESSITY DEFENSE ............. 61 III. THE COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW OF NECESSITY ...................... 69 A. Development of the Necessity Defense .................................. 69 B. Recent Uses of the Necessity Defense .................................... 74 IV. THE CASE FOR CLIMATE NECESSITY—AND WHERE THE COURTS ARE GETTING IT WRONG ........................................................................ 78 A. Choice of Evils ...................................................................... 81 B. Causation .............................................................................. 84 C. Imminence ............................................................................ 89 D. Reasonable Legal Alternatives ............................................... 96 E. Direct vs. Indirect Civil Disobedience .................................. 104 F. The Right to a Jury .............................................................. 108 1. The Right to Have Facts Heard by a Jury ....................... 108 2. The Right to Present a Complete Defense ...................... 110 V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 115 * Lance N. Long is a Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law. Ted Hamilton is a co-founder and staff attorney -
The “Radical” Notion of the Presumption of Innocence
EXECUTIVE SESSION ON THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE POLICY THE “RADICAL” MAY 2020 Tracey Meares, NOTION OF THE Justice Collaboratory, Yale University Arthur Rizer, PRESUMPTION R Street Institute OF INNOCENCE The Square One Project aims to incubate new thinking on our response to crime, promote more effective strategies, and contribute to a new narrative of justice in America. Learn more about the Square One Project at squareonejustice.org The Executive Session was created with support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation as part of the Safety and Justice Challenge, which seeks to reduce over-incarceration by changing the way America thinks about and uses jails. 04 08 14 INTRODUCTION THE CURRENT STATE OF WHY DOES THE PRETRIAL DETENTION PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE MATTER? 18 24 29 THE IMPACT OF WHEN IS PRETRIAL WHERE DO WE GO FROM PRETRIAL DETENTION DETENTION HERE? ALTERNATIVES APPROPRIATE? TO AND SAFEGUARDS AROUND PRETRIAL DETENTION 33 35 37 CONCLUSION ENDNOTES REFERENCES 41 41 42 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AUTHOR NOTE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE SESSION ON THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE POLICY 04 THE ‘RADICAL’ NOTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE “It was the smell of [] death, it was the death of a person’s hope, it was the death of a person’s ability to live the American dream.” That is how Dr. Nneka Jones Tapia described the Cook County Jail where she served as the institution’s warden (from May 2015 to March 2018). This is where we must begin. EXECUTIVE SESSION ON THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE POLICY 05 THE ‘RADICAL’ NOTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE Any discussion of pretrial detention must Let’s not forget that Kalief Browder spent acknowledge that we subject citizens— three years of his life in Rikers, held on presumed innocent of the crimes with probable cause that he had stolen a backpack which they are charged—to something containing money, a credit card, and an iPod that resembles death. -
STATE V. KALLBERG--DISSENT
****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** STATE v. KALLBERGÐDISSENT ESPINOSA, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that the disposition agreement between the defendant, Craig Kallberg, and the state, as reflected in the tran- script of the September 22, 2011 disposition hearing, was ambiguous as to whether the defendant's charitable contribution of $271 was intended to be in exchange for the nolle prosequi of the charges that the state has reinstituted in the present case.