Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining Who Constitutes a Public Official Jeffrey Omar Usman Assist

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 47 Article 6 Issue 1 Fall 2015 2015 Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining Who Constitutes a Public Official Jeffrey Omar Usman Assist. Prof. of Law, Belmont University College of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Jeffrey O. Usman, Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining Who Constitutes a Public Official, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 247 (2015). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol47/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. USMAN (247-314).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015 5:15 PM Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining Who Constitutes a Public Official Jeffrey Omar Usman* INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 247 II. THE SUPREME COURT’S FRAMEWORK FOR CATEGORIZING PLAINTIFFS IN DEFAMATION SUITS ................................................. 258 III. COMMENTING ON LOWER-LEVEL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND PROTECTING POLITICAL SPEECH ............................................. 261 A. Inconsistency with the Rationale of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ................................................................................... 262 B. Nuanced Approaches Fail to Adequately Cover the Spectrum of Self-Governance .................................................. 265 C. Lower-Level Government Employees and Democratic Governance ............................................................................. 277 IV. THE GERTZ COURT’S RATIONALES ARE NO LONGER AVAILING WHEN APPLIED TO A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE ............................. 286 A. Dramatically Increased Access to Media ................................ 290 B. Private Individuals Are Less Private Than They Were in 1974 ......................................................................................... 298 C. Reduction in the Demands of Voluntariness ........................... 302 V. FIRST AMENDMENT DISSONANCE ................................................... 307 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 312 INTRODUCTION With its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court created critical free speech protections by imposing upon public officials a requirement to demonstrate actual * Assistant Professor of Law, Belmont University College of Law. I offer my appreciation to Amber Addison, A.C. Agee, and Caralisa Connell for their excellent assistance and for the able and skillful editorial aide provided by the members of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, most especially Ben Barnett, Ben Beaird, Liane Dublinski, and Samuel Dykstra. My thanks as always to Elizabeth Usman and Emmett Usman. 247 USMAN (247-314).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015 5:15 PM 248 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 47 malice in order to recover for defamatory comments related to their official conduct.1 However, in doing so, the Court declined to indicate which government employees constituted public officials to whom these restrictions would apply.2 In subsequent cases, most notably Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966)3 and Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979),4 the Supreme Court defined public officials in a manner suggesting exclusion of lower-level government employees.5 As a consequence, the speech-protective actual malice standard does not apply to a citizen’s comments about the actions of lower-level government employees in their official capacity. This Article argues for reconsideration of this approach, asserting that speech about the action and inaction of lower-level government employees in their official capacity should be protected under the First Amendment. Defining public officials in a manner that excludes lower- level government employees is inconsistent with the Court’s rationale in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Furthermore, even assuming that exclusion of lower-level government employees was ever proper, such exclusion is no longer tenable for four reasons. One, a dramatic transformation in understanding of the actual operation of the administrative state, which occurred after Rosenblatt and Hutchinson, has evinced the important role that lower-level government employees play in policy-making, governance, and public perception thereof. Two, social and technological changes have substantially effaced the justifications for states being able to protect lower-level government employees from scrutiny. Three, jurisprudential changes in how courts apply part of the defamation framework have undermined a critical conceptual basis for distinguishing lower-level government employees from their higher-level counterparts. Four, the failure to protect speech about the official conduct of lower-level government employees creates 1. See 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also, e.g., Walker v. Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. 1966) (“In the New York Times Company case the Supreme Court of the United States rather severely limited the right of public officials to recover for libelous newspaper articles by holding that the constitutional safeguards regarding freedom of speech and press require that a public official in a libel action against a critic of his official conduct must show actual malice on the part of such critic before the public official can make any recovery . .” (emphasis omitted)). 2. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23; see also Andrew L. Turscak, Jr., Note, School Principals and New York Times: Ohio’s Narrow Reading of Who Is a Public Official or Public Figure, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 172 (2000) (“Although New York Times established the rule that a public official must prove actual malice in order to recover for a defamatory falsehood, the Court did not define who is a ‘public official,’ or even issue rough parameters for determination.”). 3. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 4. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 5. See infra Part III.A (describing the inconsistencies with the rationale of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan). USMAN (247-314).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015 5:15 PM 2015] Defamation and the Government Employee 249 significant and troubling dissonance in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. To understand these issues, it is helpful to begin with the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan case, which was “about as easy to resolve as a landmark decision could be.”6 Responding to a civil rights movement fundraising advertisement that criticized the Montgomery Police Department in the pages of the New York Times,7 Montgomery County Commissioner L.B. Sullivan8 and the Alabama political establishment9 seized upon minor factual errors therein10 as part of a brazenly 6. John C.P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1478 (2003). 7. On March 29, 1960, the New York Times published a page-length editorial advertisement entitled Heed Their Rising Voices, which had been created by civil rights leaders A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin. KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 331 (5th ed. 2007); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 304 (2000). The advertisement, which listed eighty prominent endorsers, was an appeal to raise money to assist Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. with legal fees incurred in the civil rights struggle. Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25; POWE, supra, at 304–05. The advertisement included minor factual errors regarding the conduct of Montgomery police officers. SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OR LIBEL? 19 (2007). 8. L.B. Sullivan was one of three elected County Commissioners for Montgomery County, Alabama. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 256 (1991). In his position as Commissioner of Public Affairs, he supervised the Montgomery Police Department. Id. 9. The Alabama political establishment was extremely displeased with the press coverage of civil rights-related matters within the State. See GOLD, supra note 7, at 22–24 (describing the actions taken by various Montgomery officials in response to the advertisement). Alabama’s Attorney General saw an opportunity and advised state public officials to file multi-million dollar lawsuits against the New York Times Company. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 82 (1991). 10. Sullivan objected to assertions in the third and sixth paragraphs of the advertisement. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 12. In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee” on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truck-loads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was pad-locked in an attempt to starve them into submission . Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times—for “speeding,” “loitering” and similar

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