UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1 May ,g 83

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

DAVID A. REIN

ENTITLED CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE ON THE FORMULATION THE CASE STUDY OF •... •eoressMrpwr'MLFT"

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE O F BACHELOR OF ARTS IN LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF....

01W4 CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE ON THE

FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY:

THE CASE STUDY OF

CONGRESSMAN PAUL FINOLEY

BY

DAVID A. REIN

THESIS

for the

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

1n

LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

College of Llberel Arts and Sciences

University of Illinois

Urbane, Illinois

1963 111

TABLE Of COMTEHTS

Introduction 1

1. Investigative Approach 4

11. Problem Encounttrtd During Research 9

I. Tha Rola of Constituency Considerations 1n Paul Findley's

General Foreign Policy Outlook 18

II. Case Study: Constituency Influence During the Reagan

Administration Trade Sanctions 3 ,

III. Case Study: Constituency Influence During the Carter

Ada1n1strat1on Grain Embargo 44

IV. Case Study: Constituency Influence over Congressman

Findley's PLO Stand 57

V. Conclusion 72

Bibliography 73 TABLES

1. Illinois Twantlath District Congressional Votos

2. Illinois Farnars V1aws on Intomstlonsl Treda

Pol1c1as

3. Illinois Congressman's 1980 Campaign Flnancas V

FIGURES

1. Geographic voting blocs In Downstate Illinois: p. IE

Old Twentieth District

2. Geographic voting blocs 1n Downstate Illinois: P* 12

Now Twentieth District

3. Historical Downstate voting patterns: p< 13

Old Twentieth District

4. Historical Downstate voting patterns: p. 13

New Twentieth 01str1ct Introduction

Tho Hon. tail Flndloy served In tho United Status Congrats for twenty* two years. The entirety of his service was spent 1n the House of Represen­ tatives. Eventually he became one of the senior Republicans 1n the House.

He served on both the House Committee on Agriculture, where he was the second ranking Republican, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where he was the third ranking Republican. Findley was h1s party's ranking member on two House subcommittees: The Subcommittee on European and Mid­ east Affairs and the Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans and Feedgralns.

Foreign policy was a major concern of Congressman Findley. At one point early 1n M s career, he forfeited his position on the House Committee on

Agriculture 1n order to be grar'rd a position on the Foreign Affairs Com­ mittee.1 Other evidence of Findley's Interest In foreign affairs are the facts that he chaired a MATO task force for three years and that he lead a delegation which wont to China hoping to open up grain trade between the United States and the People's Republic.

The Twentieth Congressional District, which Paul Findley represented, 2 was located In West Central Illinois. It stretched from the western bor­ der of the state, the Mississippi River, to about halfway across the state, the easternmost county being Sangamon. The northernmost and southernmost counties were Adams and Madison, respectively. The district was first and foremost an agricultural area. Despite containing sizable population cen­ ters In Springfield, the state capital, Alton and Quincy, the territory was still primarily rural, being dominated by agriculture and agribusiness. 2 ■'

The preeminence of agriculture 1* attested to by the fact that appro- imate- * ly seven percent of the district's population were farmers. This percen­ tage 1s almost twice the national figure of nearly four percent*-

This study will Investigate the relationship between Paul Findley and the people of this congressional district during his years In the

House of Representatives. Specifically, 1t will attempt to discern to what extent Congressman Findley was Influenced by consdleratlons of M s constituency while making foreign policy decisions. The Investigation will consider the question from two different frames of reference. First, the Issue will be examined on general grounds: Did Paul Findley consider the whole area of foreign policy from a constituency dominated viewpoint or from a national perspective?. Did he think M s constituency played a very great role 1n defining his attitudes concerning the vaguely defined

Issue-area of foreign policy? Next, the study will concentrate on the three most visible foreign policy Issues of the latter part of Findley's congressional career. These Issues were the 1981 trade sanctions against the Soviet Union Imposed by the Reagan administration, the 1980 grain em­ bargo of the Carter sdmlMstraton, also directed at the Soviet Union, and

Congressman Findley's own controversial position regarding the Middle East, specifically, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Investigation will question whether the high visibility of these Issues, and the public

Interest generated thereby, altered Findley's general pattern of behavior concerning M s constituency and foreign policy as an Issue-area.

Before continuing, a clarification of terms 1s necessary. This study proposes to examine the influence that considerations of M s constituency had on Congressman Findley's foreign policy formulation. As such, the 3

manlng of Congressman Findley being "Influenced by considerations" of

M s constituency must necessarily be explained. The above phrase con, and will• pertain to several different situations. First, 1t could mean that Congressman Findley mas directly responding to pressure levied on

M m by his constituency, or at least pressure wMch he believed Mmself to be under. It could also mean that Congressman Findley was acting 1n a way that he believed M s constituency would want him to act, even If he had not been under any pressure to act 1n this fashion. Finally, It could mean that Congressman Findley was basing M s decisions on his be*

11efs of what was 1n the district's best Interests, regardless of whether the district had voiced this Interest.

This Investigation will look for all of these types of Instances.

However, 1n the context of this study, 1t does not matter which, 1f any, of the above turns out to be the case. The purpose of this study 1s merely to find out 1f such parochial considerations did play a part In determining national policy, or contrarlly, 1f Congressman Findley considered national

Interests as the foundation for M s decisions 1n the area of foreign policy.

The meaning of constituency must also be discussed, A congressman can look at his home district on several levels. He can believe that M s constl tuency, the people he has the responsibility Of representing, are only h1s most active supporters: that 1s, he can consider M s constituency to be his closest advisors and most Intimate circle, the people who can make their beliefs most clearly known to the Congressman. Contrarlly, he can see his constituency as his volunteers, the people who worked to get him elected and thus deserve some kind of compensation. H1s financiers can also demand special attention. He can look at M s constituency as those people who he 4

b«11eves to have voted for him and are thus responsible for him being 1n office. Finally, though the possibilities have by no means been exhausted, a Congressman can consider h1s constituency 1n the broadest possible terms: the people of his geographical district. This study takes this last ap­ proach when discussing Congressman Findley's district and 1t Is his rela­ tionship to M s constituency as per this definition that will be Investi­ gated. Indeed, Don Norton, a top Findley aide who worked closely with the

Congressmen for the last sixteen years, would claim that Mr. Findley him­ self adopted this view of his constituency. He believes that there was no * one group to which the Congressman felt particularly accountable.

1. Investigative Approach

In order to examine the question of whether Congressman Findley was In­ fluenced by considerations of M s constituency, four Investigative steps were undertaken. The first stage of the Investigation was to read background material of studies of this nature which had previously been conducted.

These sources, such as "U.S. House Members 1n Their Constituencies" by

Richard F. Fenno Jr., Congressmen's Voting Decisions by John W. Klngdon,

"The Representative and his District" by Lewis Anthony Dexter, and "Consti­

tuency Influence In Congress" by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, were

very helpful In that they provided questions to Investigate and set a stanoard against which results could be compared. However, the applicability of

their methods to this study proved limited. In general, the extensive pro­

cedures which were used by the aforementioned Investigators could not be

adopted for the purposes of this study due to both lack of time and resources. s

Also the scope of this Investigation differed from these former studies.

Where they chose to study vast numbers of Representatives and correlate the data In order to make generalizations, this study examines one Indi­ vidual and draws Inferences from that examination. Where the above authors studied Congressmen and their relationship to their constituencies con­ cerning several areas, this paper concentrates on one specific Issue-area, foreign policy. At best, these background studies can be considered jump­ ing off points at which to start this type of Investigation.

The second Investigative stage entailed a personal profile of Congress­ man Findley's writings and speeches. Findley 1s an accomplished author.

Before entering Congress he was the president and publisher of R1ko Press, a weekly newspaper emanating from Pittsfield. Illinois. During M s stay 1n

Congress he found time to write numerous articles for periodicals as well as two full-sized books: The Federal Farm Fable, and A. Lincoln: The Crucible of Congress. These articles and books, whether pertaining to this paper's topic of Investigation or not. provided Insight Into Congressman Findley's basic beliefs and stands. They also helped explain the grounds on which he based these stands. For Instance, 1n A. Lincoln: The Crucible of Congress

Findley writes,

Service 1n Congress provides an awareness of factors that Influence legislation and sway votes. . . the extent to which the 30th Congress resembles the Congress 1n which I have served 1s striking. The basic legislative process has emerged with remarkably few changes. ( and

Except for Its role 1n presidential succession, the House of Representatives now occupies exactly the same funda­ mental role under the Constitution as 1n Lincoln's day. 7

While writing about Lincoln, Findley actually 1s detailing to an extent the 6

way ha believes Congress operates* and subsequently the constraints he

feels he 1s under.

The personal profile of Congressman Findley's speeches also Includes

M s statements made on the floor of the House of Representatives. The

Congressional Record provides a list of the erases which Congressmen

Findley felt worthy of M s comnents and actions. It also details Findley's

rationale for M s actions.

The third stage of study was an examination of area newspapers, In­

cluding a detailed examination of the region's most circulated newspaper.

The Springfield State Journal Register. This research covered the years

1979 to 1982. A careful analysis of this sort 1s necessitated by several

factors. The medle has great access to public figures. These men purpose­

ly seek out the media as a tool for publicity, to voice their position

stands and justifications for their stands. Newspapers also detail the

actions of prominent figures. As such, a study of newspapers contributes

to the personal profile developed In the previous stage of Investigation.

An examination of the local press provides an added benefit: The newspapers

often described Congressman Findley and his relation to M s constituency while he was actually In M s district, rather than 1n far removed Washington.

When studying the Influence of a constituency on a Congressman 1t makes a sense to study how he acts while 1n contact with M s constituency.

An examination of local newspapers 1s also necessitated by the fact Q that these papers describe what Issues are Important to a district.

Coverage of a story might seem too dependent on the opinions of the Individual

newspaper staff to be considered a valuable source 1n defining Issue Impor­

tance. However, certain factors dilute the subjectivity of any given news­

paper. Often a consensus exists among newspapers as to what 1s a Nb1g

story". Such a story will get foremost play. Also, and perhaps more 1mpor- 7

tantly, the nature of newspapers precludes them from focusing on more than

a faw Issues at any one time. Each Item of news, subsequently, 1s In com­

petition with the others. Since a newspaper 1s a business, the editorial

board will select which Issues get the most coverage on the basis of what

will sell the most papers. The criterion for sales 1s reader Interest.

Consequently, the Issues which gat the most play will often be the Issues

about which the readership 1s most Interested.

Finally, the mass media can act as ' powerful agenda-setter. Even 1f

an Issue had not previously attracted the public eye, continuous newspaper

coverage will often stimulate reader Interest. In fact, newspaper coverage

1s often self-reinforcing. If a newspaper decides an Issue 1s Important

1t will cover It and subsequently add to Its Importance. It It decides the

Issue 1s not worthy of attention It Is likely that the Issues will remain

1n the background.

Congressmen themselves are likely to follow the media as they provide

valuable sources of Information that they need. This Information not only

Includes the types of Issues which are Important to the district but also

the types of questions he will be called upon to discuss. For Instance, a

Congressman will read the local papers In order to find out which of h1s own

positions and policies have been given much attention. This Information will tell him what types of questions to expect from M s constituency and which of M s positions he will be required to explain.

Thus, continuous, prominent coverage of a given Issue makes 1t virtual­

ly Impossible for a Congressman to Ignore the Issue, partly because he con­

stantly has 1t before him and partly because 1t stimulates constituents'

Interests or even their actions. 8

This general discussion of the Importance of studying newspapers provos to bo porfoctly oppUcoblt for this specific study. This assertion will be node dearer during the discussions of the specific Issues (Chapters

II-IV). Suffice It to say for the tine being that Congressman Findley himself recognized the Importance of the press. He has written,

Congressmen usually are highly solicitous of the feelings and concerns of MMspaper editors and publlshM's. At the top of ay checklist when I visit a hone-dlstrict communlty is the local news* paper editor as well as other news media. I read every editorial published In the district and sometimes place the text In the Congressional Record. 11 ------

The final step of the Investigation was to conduct Interviews with peo- pie who were 1n close contact with Congressmen Findley and active In district political events. A1 Henning and Kelly Smith are prominent members of the local media. Homing 1sa political reporter for the Snrlnafleld State

Journal Banister and Smith Is the statehouse reporter for television station

MICS, NBC 1n Springfield. Both these men have area politics as their prime responsibility. As such, they were attuned to both the general political mood of the area and specific Issues Involving the area. As members of the political media they both had access to Congressman Findley and M s staff.

Consequently, their Insight regarding constituency Influence on Congressman

Findley proved Invaluable.

Interviews with those members of the community who were active 1n re­ gards to the specific Issues covered In this paper also seemed warranted.

Harry Wells Is the ongoing president of UAW local #1027 The members of this chepter of the union were the people of the district most affected by the Reagan administration trade sanctions. Wells was the president of 9

M s local at this time as Mali. Ha and Congressman Findlay mat savaral

times during this period.

Leonard 6ardnar has worked for tha Illinois Farm Bureau since 1956.

Ha 1s currently Executive Director of tha Governmental Affairs Division.

He maintained continuous contact with Congressman Findlay during the whole

of the Congressman's stay In office. The period of the 1980 embargo was

no exception.

Lastly, tenor Loeb has been the Executive Director of the Springfield

Jewish Federation for the past six years. Paul Findley claims to have

first become Interested 1n the P10 question In 1977, when he traveled to

the Middle East to see about the release of a constituent from custody.

Loeb has therefore occupied her post at the Springfield Jewish Federation

Airing the whole of the time Congressmen Findley made the PLO a personal

Issue. During this time, she, too, met often with Congressman Findley.

The final person 1nterv1ewed**was Don Norton. Norton first joined

the Findley camp 1n 1966 as a volunteer and political advisor. Norton subsequently stayed With the Congressman throughout the rest of Findley's

Congressional career, eventually becoming a top aide, and then campaign mana­ ger. Don Horton was one of the Congressman's closest confldentes. If any­ one knows the reasons behind the Congressman's policies, Norton does.

Another reason Norton was an Invaluable source to Interview 1s that he was stationed 1n Springfield. It bears repeating that as a research strategy, when studying a Congressman's relationship to M s constituency 1t 1$ best to start In the constituency, rather than far away Washington.

11. Problems Encountered During Research

Several problems present themselves when making a study of this sort. 10

First, It Is s terribly difficult project to narrow down the source of •

Congressman's policy decisions to just one factor. In reality, many factors

Invariably weigh In the balance and often no one source predominates. The

best that can be hoped for 1s to find out If any one factor contributed to

the formulation of a policy decision. This hedge might serve to make the

conclusions of this study less definite but It cannot be avoided. An

example will help to Illustrate this point. Two of the specific Issues dis­

cussed later concern foreign trade. Congressman Findley was very active 1n

trying to see that this trade was not curtailed. Findley's activities will

be examined In regard to their connection with constituency considerations.

But, from a broader view, these actions must be looked at also In the con­

text of Congressman Findley's general philosophical outlook. The Inter­

viewees repeatedly asserted that "part of his basic philosophy wps that wa

(the United States) had to trade with the world."13 At a very early time

he "seized on exports as a way to solve (economic) problems through prlvata

enterprise."1* Just how many factors contributed to any one Irsue stand

1s difficult to discern and this study will not attampt to do so. This

study merely looks at the formulation of Congressman Flndely's foreign poli­

cy stands from a very narrow perspective, that of the Influence of considera­ tions of M s constituency.

Another, more mundane problem has to do with the accessibility of

research sources. Politicians, os can be expected, are often not eager to

proylde Information about their actions. Although each privately commissioned

polls and surveys during the 1980 and 1982 election campaigns, both the local

Democratic and Republican offices report that the results of these polls are

not available to the public. Both the Durbin1^headquarters and Don Morton n

representing Findley give the sene replies. Norton elso asserts that

Congressman Findley's personal papers, Including completed questionalres, surveys and M s weekly reports are under Interdict for a number of years.

Finally, regardless of whether the Congressman would have been willing to cooperate, he currently resides 1n Washington, lack of resources sub* sequently prevented questioning Mm. Hopefully, the Interviews with peo­ ple who did come 1n close contact with Findlay, such as the news media who had great access to Mm, and Don Norton, who was one of M s closest advisors, and the examination of Findlay's speeches and actions can compen­ sate for this shortcoming.

A final problem which confronted this Investigation was that of reap­ portionment. District lines for the 1982 election were redrawn with Illi­ nois losing two Congressional seats. The remaining districts were subse­ quently altered. The remap of the Twentieth District changed the character of the constituency considerably. The old district had been politically merglral, separating the Democratic South and the Republican counties to the north. The new Twentieth District became more noticeably Democratic.

(See figures 1 and 2.) Congressman Findley lost traditionally Republican areas such as the northern section of Sangamon County, Morgan and Jackson

Counties. Morgan County, along with Madison and Scott which were also lost, 16 had returned an 8000 vote margin for Findley In the 1980 election. In addition to these losses, traditionally Democratic areas such as Macon and

Christian Counties were added to Findley's district, (see figures 3 and 4.)

All told about thirty-five percent of the district would be new to

Findley.'7 These new voters were not familiar with Findley's years of providing good constituent services. Since Findley's opponent 1n the 12

Flouro 1 Figure t ftooorophlctl voting blocs pMcol votlno blocs 1n Dounstoto Illinois: toto Illinois: 014 Tfciitloth District tilth District (lo«o4 on historical oo4 (leeeS on histories! eni current votlno Bottoms current votlno Bottoms 1n sttte*14o contests*) In stotowMo contost.) $14ootato RepubHcon S14ostoto MptbHcon Countlos Countlos North Control North Control Mpo011con Counties NesotHcon Countlos ithoost Southwest >11con Counties Moot! Icon Countlos Southwest Southwest OORocretlc Countlos OoROcrotlc Countlos District lounSsry □ District Bounciory

Source: Peter U. Colby and Paul Michael Green, "Voting Patterns In the 9« Down state Counties," Illinois Issues, August 1978, p. 17. 13

Flgurt 3 Figure 4 Historical Downstoto Historical) Oounstato voting pot toms: voting pat toms: 014 Twontloth District Now Twentieth Olstrlct (Ioso4 on tho 12 pr»e14* (lfto4 on tim 12 pros 14- ontUI and It piUrm* ontlal an4 If gobome* tori a 1 contests f m 1932 torlal contest? fras 1932 tbroup 1971.) through 1971*) Ooaocrstlc Cottntlos pancratia Counties (corrloO by 101 or carrlo4 by W or aoro of Ooaocrots) of (Merits) Leaning Owocrotlc Uonlnp Ooaocrotle Countlos \carr1o4 countlos (corrloO by I1M0K of by^ tg l a l t - M M a of^ □ Om ocrits) □ ( M e r i t s ) Ccapotltlvo Count 1 os Caopotltivo Countlos (41v14o4 ovonly* (4^v14o4 ovonly, Oaaocrtts an4 □ Oawerats an4 Republicans) Republicans) Uon1i)9 Rpubibllcon Uanlm Republican Countlos (cancanio4 Counties (carr1o4 by S I M * o f □ by I I M I l o f □ Republicans) Republican Countlos Republican Counties *1o4 by M l or (carrlea by I P or Republicans) aero of RapubHeans)

Sources Peter U. Colby and Paul Michael Green, "Voting Patterns in the U Down- state Counties," Illinois Issues. August 1978, p. 17. 14

1982 election. Rlcharo! Durbin, due to previous political activity also had name recognition. Findley and Durbin started out on a more equal footing

1n this area than an encumbant would normally encounter.

Finally, although the character of the district still remained largely rural, the large population center of Decatur was added to the district.

This addition has more far reaching effects than merely shifting the urban/ rural breakdown of Findley’s constituency. Decatur at the time of the 1982 19 election had one of the highest unemployment rates 1n the country.

Findley's new constituency Included an area largely dissatisfied with the 20 current administration's policies.

All these factors Introduced by reapportionment made Congressman Findley much more vulnerable 1n the election than he had been previously and he tailored h1s actions accordingly. Findley treated the new areas as his own.

He used the franking privilege to send letters to the areas which would be

Incorporated Into the Twentieth District after 1982. His workers even answered phone calls meant for this area's acting Congressman.

However. Congressman Findley never actually represented this new district.

Consequently, since the purpose of this paper 1s to discern the Influences a Congressman's home district has on his formulation of foreign policy, the

ramifications of reapportionment will not be discussed In detail. This paper will address Congressman Findley's relationship to h1$ district, the old

Twentieth District. In fact, of the topics to be discussed, reapportionment

only really mattered during the trade sanctions. Congressman Findley's general

outlook on foreign policy and h1s stand concerning the PLO were both formulated

well before reapportionment. The grain embargo and Congressman F1nd1 ensuing

actions took place beginning 1n January 1980, before the results of or- IS

tlonment were known. His actions 1n these cases were totally propelled from a standpoint of h1s old district. As such, the effects of the remap, although far reaching, will be relegated for the purposes of this study. 16

NOTES

'Findley was later allowed to regain M s position on the House Agriculture Cowrit tee without losing rank.

ZThe above description concerns the Twentieth District before 1982. See pp. 11-15 for a discussion fo the 1982 reapportionment.

^Michael Barone and Grant UJ1 fusa§ The^Almanac of Amerj^^sn P^^^^t^cs. 1982 (Washington. D.C.: Barone & Company, lire Jp . 333.

4U.S. Congress, Extensions of Remarks, Congressional Record. 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, 126, pt. 49:1493.

“interview with Don Norton, Findley aide, Springfield, Illinois, 5 April 1983.

“Paul Findley, A. Lincoln: The Crucible of Congress (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1979) p. xTT,

7F1nd1ey, p. 108.

"Richard F. Fenno, Jr., “U.S. House Numbers 1n their Constituencies The American Political Science Review, September 1977, p. 883.

5I am deeply Indebted to John W. Klngdon for M s description of the Importance of newspapers In respect to Issue coverage. See John W. Klngdon, Congressmen*s Voting Decisions (New York: Harper 6 Row, Publishers, 1973).

10K1ngdon, p. 115.

^Findley, p. 165. l? ‘Charlyn Fargo, Springfield State Journal Realstar farm editor, was very helpful 1n relating possible research sources. However, she was not Interviewed. 13 Interview with Leonard Gardner, Executive Director of the Governmental Affairs Division, Illinois Farm Bureau, Bloomington, Illinois, 1 April 1983. ia 'Alan Ehrenhalt, Politics In America: Nambars of Congress 1n Washing­ ton and at Home. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional quarterly Press, 19tn I, p.3/1.

15R1chard Durbin was Paul Findley's opponent 1n the 1982 Congressional election. Durbin won that election, unseating Findley, who had met eleven previous challenges. 17

16Jeff Brody. “Durbin Loads F1ndl«y by Slight Margin," Staf Journal Register, 2 November 1982, p. 2,

17Jeff Brody. "20th District Democrats Agra# on Economy," Sorinoflald State Journal Raoliter 9 March 1982, p. 4A.

18A1 Nanning, "Durbin Gains Broad Party Support," Sorinoflald State Journal Register. 19 March 1982, p, 11.

^Interview with Kally Smith, Statahousa reporter, WICS Television, Springfield, Illinois 30-31 March 1983.

*°It Is Interesting to note that voter turnout 1n Decatur for the 1982 election which Findley lost was by far the greatest It had been 1n years. (Smith Interview) 18

Chapter I The Role of Constltuancy Considerations

1n Paul Findley's General Foreign Policy Outlook

Congressmen respond to each Individual Issue as they are confronted

by It. Yet* their reactions are not so distinctive as to prevent general­

ization. Issues can often be grouped Into categories. An Issue trill usu­

ally elicit a similar response from the Congressman as other Issues falling

Into the same category. The Congressman has usually developed a general out­

look concerning each different category of Issues* or* for convenience sake*

each different Issue-area. All these general perspectives combined com­

prise the basic foundation for the Congressman's actions.

Foreign policy Issues are one such Issue-area. Individual Congressmen

often react to foreign policy Issues In set ways; they use their general

foreign policy outlook as a basis for decisions. Specific foreign policy

issues may not fit neatly Into a Congressman's overall foreign policy stra­

tegy. but usually. If the entire 1ssues-area is considered, the Congressmen

will follow a discernible pattern of behavior. The following discussion

will attempt to discover 1f Congressman Paul Findley acted 1n this way.

Old Findlay maintain and adhere to a general foreign policy outlook? If so,

what were Its characteristics? However, the ensuing Investigation will

only study one element of this viewpoint. In specific, the following

will question what role, 1f any, did considerations of M s constituency occupy according to Paul Findley's general foreign policy outlook.

During his stay 1n Congress Paul Findley earned a reputation for M s

willingness to take a policy position that few 1f any other Congressmen

held. He had no fears about being "a voice 1n the wilderness."1 At the 19

s i m time Congressmen Findley had an untarnished reputation for honesty 2 and Integrity. He was above all a man of principle. It Is doubtful 3 that such a man. noted for his Independent, "lone wolf style* and his

advocacy of adhering to principle would Indetermlnantly follow the pre­

scripts of his district. Indeed, these do ibti are readily confirmed.

In matters of foreign policy, when taken as a general Issue-area, Congress­ man Findley felt free to act on his own Initiative. Not only did Findley

feel unconstrained to act 1n any certain way, he believed that he could

act, 1n direct contradiction to what he thought would be the electorate's wishes 1n matters of foreign policy without fear of electoral repercussions.

In fact, the latter often turned out to be the case.

Congressman Findley was often at variance with his constituency on

foreign policy matters because he relegated considerations of h1s constitu­

ency to what he believed was the national Interests. Furthermore, he wasn't really of a similar mindset as the members of his constituency.

These two factors tend to reinforce each other. First, Congressman Findley

aspired to be a real leader, not just 1n terms of the district but In na­

tional or even International terms/ He viewed M s role 1n this manner,

rather than as merely a representative of M s district's Interest. Conse­

quently, he had a broader view of Issues, looking at the national or Inter­

national ramifications, rather than parochially. Congressman Findley ex­

plains,

Each member (of the House of Representatives).,. . has a deep and undeniable allegiance to the Interests of his own constituency. But he also claims -and occasionally asserts- a role that rises beyond M s constituency. Every Congressman, at least now and then, thinks of himself as a United States Congressman, deciding Issues that know no sectional or local character and transcend M s district. 5 20

Don Norton maintains that 1n natters of foreign policy Findley acted

1n the above prescribed way: "He viewed M s responsibility In foreign policy to determine what was best for the nation as a whole, not local

Interests.

Notwithstanding all that has just been asserted. Congressman Findley still would not have been at variance with his constituency had he had a strong Identification with their beliefs. As John N. Klngdon relates,

"It often happens that a Congressman never feels pressured by M s consti­ tuency and never takes them Into account simply because he 1s 'their kind of people* anyway."7 In this case, the opposite holds true. Congressman

Findley was much more liberal than M s constituency. He was a early sup­ porter of civil rights and of ERA. He supported Nelson Rockefeller 1n the

1968 election and John Anderson 1n 1980. "He wasn't ever particularly at- 0 tuned to the members of his district."

A brief sketch of some of Congressman Findley's foreign policy posl- Q tlons confirm the previous discussion. This pattern of behavior first real­ ly surfaced 1n 1966. Before that Findley had basically voiced a reflection of the views of Most Central Illinois. H1s thinking could pretty much be matched up with that of M s district without much disparity. For example, he was harshly critical of acconmodatlon policies directed at the communist countries. However, 1n 1966 Congressman Findley began to enunciate a long line of unpopular policies, policies which were In disagreement with his district. During this time he began to advocate normalization of relations with Communist China. Simultaneously, he began to protest United States

Involvement 1n Vietnam*, he believed that 1f we weren't fighting the war to win we should get out. Later, Findley also advocated a relaxation of .21

Sovlet/Unlted States tensions. Don Norton would claim, with some vindi­ cation, that the wisdom of these policies has been proven by time; Con­ gressman Findley's only fault hat been that he was ahead of the times.^

However, regardless of Congressman Findley's personal philosophy of relegating considerations of his district's best Interests to national concerns, regardless of M s belief In formulating policy on the basis of principle, regardless of whether he has been vindicated with time, Findley would not have continued to act In such an independent, controversial fashion unless he felt^unconstralfiaOyMs constituency. Congressman

Findley did not desire forced retirement. If he did not have the support of the voters he would be out of a job as of the next election. As Kenneth

N. Waltz 1n "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises" astutely points 11 out, "Leaders may be made timid by their fear of a hostile public reaction."

The extent to which a Congressman's apprehension of a negative electoral response by M s constituency Influences his actions Is a matter of the

Congressman's perceptions. A Congressman's actions will be tailored by the amount of pressure he believes himself to be wider, real or Imagined. Con­ gressman Findley obviously recognized he was acting contrary to short run political expedience. H1s stands did pit M m against M s constituency and cause many problems. Instead of dealing with a complacent constituency

Findley had to spend much of M s time explaining M s beliefs. He received much antagonistic mall and even received censure by a local Republican or- 12 gaMzatlon due to M s position regarding China.

The question that must be asked, however, 1s what Importance did Con­ gressman Findley place on these problems. What did ho believe would be the repercussions of his foreign policy positions? When asked if Findley ?2

felt M s controversial foreign policy stands affected his chances of re-

election, Don Norton replied emphatically,

Lord no! I'm certain he did not see foreign policy as being crucial to M s election. In fact ne was told several times to put less emphasis on foreign policy and concentrate on domestic policy which the people were con­ cerned about. 13

This statement 1s crucial In analysing Paul Findlay's foreign policy

positions; he did not believe M s constituency was Interested enough 1n

foreign policy to translate their interest Into votes. He did not feel

M s electoral support was contingent on foreign policy positions. Congress man Findley therefore felt he had free reign 1n this area.

Several factors served to reinforce Congressman Findley's tendency to

relegate considerations of his constituency In regard to foreign policy matters, The first factor Is M s general belief 1n the predictability of

the voters. Findley asserts, "Once elected Congressmen tend to stay 1n office,"14 It 1s a strange, but true, phenomenon!. Despite a pervasive disapproval of Congress as a whole, people generally look up to their own

Congressman,1* Findley wes not an exception. Until 1980, during the whole of Findley's Congressional career he seldom had a closely contested elec­

tion.16 (See Table 1.) 23:

TABLE 1

Twentieth District Congressional Votes

Percentile Otter kip,-0«no T o U l W O fe jo r Vttt 0. .nr ' ; s : , . w * » Vote Plurality Roe. 0m . 899- 0m . 20 1900 220,37? 123,427 F1n41»y, P. 96.990 Robinson 26,477 R 56.0* 44.01 98,01 44.09 20 1978 199,480 111,094. Findlay, P. 40.426 Roberts 62.620 R 69.91 30*4* 88.81 30.49 20 1976 216,897 137,223 Flndlty. P. 71,634 Mick 90,109 R 63.01 3 4 .4 * 83.49 39.49 20 1974 193,987 84,429 Flndlty, P. 69,991 Nick 10 14,079 R 94.81 4 2 .2 * 94.89 42.29 20 1972 219,898 148,419 Flndlty, P. 07,449 O'SIlM 4 00,974 R 60.0* 3 M f 88.89 11.29 20 1970 193,212 103,489 Flndlty, P. <9,727 Cox 93,790 R 97.91 3 2 ,*1 87.99 32.99 20 1998 187,933 124,121 Flndlty, P. 63.412 ScMIson 60,709 R 66.2* 33.6* 98.29 33.89 20 1S69 164,994 102,609 F ln d lty , P. 62,343 Wolfe 12 40,266 R 62.23 3 7.8 * 82.29 37.89 20 196v 217,449 119,184 Flndlty, P. 98,299 Col 111.* 6 20,920 R $4.81 45.21 94.89 19.29 20 1962 190,080 100,999 Flndlty, P. 09,972 Nick 11,039 R 92.91 47.19 92.99 4 7.19

Ttblt c«tp11*d fro, R1ch»rd M. Scaamon and Allot V. 11c61111vrty, Patriot U (WtiMntton, D.C.i Congrtulontl Qutrtarly, 1981), n. 139j Rlchtrd N. “r------(Wrlri VBt*» 4 O.C.t Ctn- grtulontl Qutrtarly, 1972), p. 100, and Richard M. Soanton. Awtrlc. Vottl 6 (Mohlngton, D.C.: Con^ grantontl qutrtarly, 1966), p. 116.

Congressman Findley's record of providing good constituent services also enabled him to act more Independently. Often the first priority for constituents 1s this type of service. People remember something which 1s before them. An old but true platitude 1s that people often care more a- bout getting the pothole In front of their driveway fixed than foreign af­ fairs.

Findley paid a lot of attention to the members of M s district. (This activity must not be confused with having h1s policy formulation Influenced by considerations of M s district.) He made a concerted effort to provide constituent services. H1$ district office was unusually active. At all times this activity was carefully coordinated with public relations so that these actions were constantly before the people of the district. A classic example of Congressman Findley's emphasis on constituent services 1s that, In 1982 he himself raised the PLO Issue which had previously been used 24

against him. Findley did so 1n the context of campaign receipts, claiming that his opponent had received most of his funds from outside the district.

Findley asked how a man who was responsible to outside Interests could serve the people within the district.

Another reason Findley felt unconstrained by his constituency 1n mat­ ters of foreign policy was that he gave little credence to the doctrine of

Instruction. That 1s, Findley felt that, contrary to theory, the Idea that a Congressman must follow the dictates of his constituency had little valid­ ity. He explains his position while discussing Lincoln:

(Lincoln) could voice his limited support of the doctrine of Instruction without the least fear that 1t would Inhibit him from voting M s own conscience on each proposition that came before Congress. He would be comforted by the knowledge that M s constituency would have no clear way to make Its wish known to him. The same knowledge has comforted me, especial­ ly 1n those circumstances when I have had a strong suspicion that the 'wish* of my constituency did not at the moment square with my votes 1n Congress. 16

Despite all of the Interplay that went on between Findley and M s con­ stituency, the fact that the constituency could not clearly register Its will did Indeed prove to be fundamentally true. Findley was a highly visible

Congressman. He would hold town meetings nearly every trip back to the district. He wanted to let the people know what he was doing and to get feedback. However, much of this coamunlcation was unclear. Congressmen hear most often from those who agree with him. People have a tendency to In­ terpret what they hear to support their own viewpoints. Congressman Findley did pay attention to these public meetings. Yet, the Influence they had on him 1n regards to policy making can be considered minimal. He would often seize upon a particular statement that agreed with h1$ position and use 1t 10 as further justification of his original stand.

Incoming mall also didn't really Influence Findley's policy stands.

He always received quite a bit of mall. However, this mall generally 20 covered the whole range of alternatives. As there was no clear cut con­ sensus Findley obviously could not use mall as a basis for policy formu­ lation.

The lead editorial of the State Journal Register on October 23, 1960, which endorsed Findley for Congress, urged voters to select Findley on the grounds that "In dozens of return visits to his district, In newsletters and questionalres, he has sought the views of h1s constituency on key 1s- 21 sues." The statement was 1nd1sputedly true. He did seek the voters 22 opinions 1n questlonalres and surveys. However, as In the case of mall and town meetings, he felt little compulsion to follow the dictates of their results. Findley gives the following as explanation:

A legislator can rarely be absolutely certain of the Vish'of his district upon any particular question. In my service 1n Congress I have always sent out questlonalres and Invited constituents to public discussions with me regularly 1n order to rovoke the expression of home district viewpoints, Sut I have never felt bound by the outcome of these surveys. I solicit the views of all half million of those I represent but usually receive a response of only about 20,000 Individuals. This 1s less than 5 percent of the total population, and many views are expressed on the basis of sketchy Information. I re­ gard them as valuable but not binding. 23

All these factors contributed to Congressman Findley's belief In the lack of practical applicability of the doctrine of Instruction. A Congress­ man cannot know absolutely the will of h1s constituency. Even 1f the pro­ ceeding were not true and the constituency could make Its w111 known to the

Congressman, Findley claims this would not sway h1s position. Ever the man of principle, Findley asserts,

Every Congressman surely encounters moments when he ponders the question: Should he vote M s own convictions or the will of his district? . . . tyy answer: I vote my own convictions. 24

Finally, the character of foreign policy as an Issue-area contributed much to the lack of constraint Congressman Findley felt while making such decisions. Different types of Issues conmand varying responses from both

a constituency and a Congressman. A Representative will see h1s role dif­

ferently depending on the type of Issue; he might see himself as a spokes­ man for the constituency, an Interpreter of the district's Interests, or,

as Findley saw himself 1n the case of foreign policy as a general Issue-

area, as an Independent agent of choice. A representative's conception

of his duty 1s In large pert a reflection of how the constituency responds

to the Issue 1n question.

In general. In regards to any Issue the predominant mood of the mass

public Is Indifference and passivity. Most Americans are almost totally 26 unlnfonned about legislative Issues 1n Washington. In addition, the

constituency's awareness of a representative's policy stand on any given 27 Issue ordinarily Is slight. Foreign policy usually epitomizes the above

phenomenom. The public rarely has much subjective competence 1n foreign

policy matters. Facts about such matters are obscure. Foreign policy tends

to deal with remote matters. These seem too distant to the dally needs and wants of members of a district to arouse concern.

Congressman Findley thought of h1s constituency as fitting this pattern.

He did see that they had some Interest In foreign policy. They were con­

cerned with general matters such as national security and cosmunlsm versus

democracy. But this vague concern did not translate Into any distinct Issues 27

and It remained 1n the background. Congressman Findlay raallzad that

ha had to taka M s constituency's Interests Into account only In an 111- 28 defined way. It did not prevent him from doing what he had to do.

Only rarely 1s the public activated by a question of foreign policy.

The exception 1s the occasional situation where events external to the district appear to Intrude upon the dally life of members of the district.

If the people perceive themselves to be linked to the external environ­ ment. they become more motivated. Over the years this situation seldom arose 1n the Twentieth District. The period from 1980 to 1982 proved ex­ ceptional 1n this matter. Several significant Issues Involved foreign

policy. Congressman Findley's PLO stand was the main Issue of the 1980 campaign. At this time foreign policy also affected two of the three ma­ jor sources that drive the district's economy, agriculture and the auto

Industry.39 The members of the district were naturally concerned.

John W. Klngdon claims that "as constituents become more Intense, the Congressmen will weigh their opinions more heavily."30 Kenneth N.

Maltz concurs. "The more people care about foreign policy, the more close-

1y their opinions will limit the government." The following three chapters will address these hypotheses: Did the high visibility of these

Issues, and the subsequent public Interest generated about these Issues, cause Findley to alter M s general pattern of behavior and be more Influenced by considerations of his constituency 1n M s policy formulation? Did the public act as a constraint on Congressman Findley's free reign 1n foreign policy decision making? Robert Shapiroi —Con SESlii H u \ . ington, D.cmfrossmen liliefs itffltp «* Fr°* "**" 2 Interview with Kelly Smith, Statehouse reporter, MICS Television, Springfield, Illinois, 30*31 March 1983.

Alan Ehranhalt, is 1n Ma»h1no|^^nd s t e rna . 1 Washington. P.C7: congressione artirly

*Kelly Smith, lanor Loob and A1 Manning all expressed this opinion.

"Paul Findlay, A*, Lincoln: The Cruelb1 a of Congress (Naw York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. i d s .

^Interview with Don Norton, Findlay aide, Springfield, Illinois, 5 April 1983.

7John W. Mngdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (Naw York: Harper A Row, Publishers, 1973), p. 45.

interview with A1 Manning, Political reporter, Springfield State Journal Register. Springfield, Illinois, 31 March 1983.

®Don Norton was most helpful In relating Information about Findley's past record.

^Norton Interview.

^Kenneth N. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises," In Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The free Press, 19*777 p T w T

^Norton Interview.

13Norton Interview.

Findlay, p. 27.

^Wining Interview.

'^The relatively close margin 1n 1974 can be attributed 1n part to the fallout from Watergate and the fact that a former Congressman, Peter Mack, was Findley's competition. 29

^Shapiro, p. 4.

18F1ndley, p. 164-5, Ip Horton Interview. 20 Norton Intorviow.

21"Paul Findlay Should be Reelected," editorial Springfield State Journal Register. 23 October 1960, p. 8. 22 The reliability of the results of these surveys can be called Into question. Don Norton relates that Findley's adversaries often accused M m of posing questions 1n such a way so that they were self-answering, fore­ gone conclusions.

23F1ndley, p. 163-4.

24F1ndley, p. 163. 25 Warren E. Hiller, "Voting and Foreign Policy," 1n Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free P r e s s , 1967), p. <30. 26. Warren E. Hiller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence 1n Congress" 1n New Perspectives on the House of Representatives ed. Robert L. Peabody anOelson W. Polsby (CKTcago: Rand IcNany l Company, 1969), p. 47,

2*H111er and Stokes, p. 56.

2®Norton Interview. 29 The third driving source of the economy of the district 1s govern­ ment as the Illinois state capital, Springfield, 1s located 1n this dis­ trict.

^Klngdon, p. 35.

31Waltz, p. 272. 30

Chapter II Cast Study: Constituency Influence During the Retgen

Ministration Trade Sanctions

One type of Intensity deserves special mention, that related to an Important Industry In the district. If there Is a piece of legislation pending that mould help a district Industry 1n a direct way. of especially one that would hurt 1t. nearly ail congressmen defend that Industry's Interests. They do ft because they see the whole economy 1s at stake, jobs are on the line. 1

Flat-Allls Construction Machinery. Inc., a subsidiary of Flat Interna- 2 tlonal. 1s Springfield's largest private sector employer. The plant, which operates at full capacity with about 2400 employees, produces construction machinery and earthmovlng equipment. On December 29, 1981 the Reagan ad­ ministration Imposed trade sanctions on the Soviet Union which Included a ban on the trade of high technology materials and equipment to be used 1n the construction of the Trans-Siberian Pipeline. This measure, a protest against the Imposition of martial law In Poland for which the Reagan ad­ ministration held the Soviet Union Immediately responsible, directly affected

Flat-All 1s.3

Harry Malls, president of the union, UAH local 11027, whose members worked 1n the plant relates that the effects of these trade restrictions A were devastating. The sanctions might have hurt Flat-Allls more than any s other company Its size 1n America. The company had a multi-year $700 million deal to sell design-data and bulldozer components to the Soviet

Union. These tractors, 1n terms of American technology were obsolete. The company no longer built them for American consumption. Consequently, the only opportunity to sell the tractors was to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the trade sanctions also prevented the company from negotiating a large 31

contract for plpolaylng tractors, which It had hoped to do.

The magnitude of these losses 1s even more severe when looked at

1n the context of a prolonged slump 1n the domestic market for such equipment. Flat-All1s has been struggling, along with the rest of the

heavy equipment Industry. The company had been relying almost entirely

since 1980 on orders placed by the Soviet Union, which had been a major buyer since 1974. The 1981 order for crawlers and spare parts accounted for more than forty percent of the total production at the Springfield plant.6 Despite the Soviet order, 1n 1911 the company still lost $69 mil­ lion.' If the company were to lose the large Soviet portion of Its busi­ ness 1t would be faced with the possibility of folding.

The dangers presented by the sanctions to the company were foreseen by everyone, workers as well as ownership and management, As Harry Wells recalls, "Everyone at our plant recognized the sales (which were banned) as our chance for existence."6 Wells claims that the sales would have pro­ vided jobs for four to five hundred workers for a period of five to six years. The union, realizing the plight of F1at-Al!1s, desperately tried to keep the company afloat 1n the wake of the sanctions. They agreed to give up two cost of living increases and other benefits which, all told, Q cost the average worker $1,060.

This effort, however, was vo no avail. The sanctions continued and the Soviet contracts were given to Komatsu of Japan. The plant was forced to shut down on November 5, 1982. John Pannettlere, President of Flat-

All Is, firmly asserts that "the shutdown wouldn't have been necessary . . .

1f Flat-AllIs had been able to complete Soviet deals that were pending when

Reagan Imposed the trade restrictions."^ Seventeen hundred plant workers 32

joined the 340 m m who had already been laid off In the unemployment ranks.

Even after the sanctions have been lifted, their effects still persist.

The plant has reopened but with only 300 workers on -he lines. The com­ pany 1s still facing permanent closure. F1at-A111s had thought 1t might get some business back after the sales ban was ended, but 1t hasn't while

Japan's Komatsu just received an order for three to four hundred more units.

In part this can be attributed to the unreliability of the United States ** a market, 1n part to what Wells refers to as revenge by the Russians.

With the existence of the plant In dire straits, Wells sadly concludes,

"We probably wouldn't be 1n the position we are today If It hadn't been for those sanctions."

At the same time as F1at-Al11s and the workers thereof were suffering the repercussions of the sanctions, Paul Findley was putting tremendous efforts Into attempts to get the sanctions repealed. In fact, "nearly the whole of his efforts during h1s last six months 1n office were devoted to the sanctions Issue."For example, from the very outset of the sanctions

F'ndley kept In constant touch with top administration officials. In a two month period alone, beginning on January 29, 1982, the congressman cor­ responded with Secretary of State Haig, met with Secretaries of Commerce and Defense, Malcolm Hal deridge and Casper Weinberger, and also saw Na­ tional Security Advisor William Clarke, He even took his case to President

Reagan personally. Findley maintained this pattern throughout the rest of his final year as a Congressman.

Findley did not work alone In regards to the sanctions Issue. He coordinated h1s activities with other Illinois lawmakers, such as Senators 13 Alan Dixon and Churles Percy, and Representative Bob Michel. Findley 33

also sought help 1n pleading his case from the people of Illinois who were affected by the sanctions. He summoned Wells to Washington twice to testify. He also arranged for Wells to meet personally with Vice-

President Bush. Findley also accompanied a group of Illinois Industrial­ ists which met with top administration officials 1n June.

Findley's actions weren't just confined to meetings and discussions.

He took positive actions against the sanctions as well. For example, he requested hearings to take place before the House Foreign Affairs Commit­ tee's Subcoamlttee on International Policy and Trade and Europe and the

Nldeast. He proposed legislation concerning the sanctions. First he sponsored a bill which, 1f passed, would have mitigated the effect the sanctions had on American companies by providing financial relief to em­ ployers and employees directly affected by the restrictions, but which did not actually call for an end to the sanctions, tach later he spon­ sored a bill calling for Congress to do just this, end the sanctions. In fact, the whole of Congressman Findlay's actions were so extensive that even though ho failed to got the sanction lifted, he could not be faulted for not devoting enough effort to the matter. When asked 1f he felt whe­ ther Findley had done all he could, Wells replied, "I really do. He was quite aggressive. . . he did everything he could to get the sanctions lifted."4

The question that must be investigated non,' 1s whether a correlation exists between the dismal state of affairs at F1at-A1l1s caused by the sanctions and the Congressman's record of Intense action to protest the sanctions. Was Congressman Findley Influenced by the situation back home whan he acted on this foreign policy Issue, or was this situation merely coincidental to actions hewould have taken anyway? In general, did

Congressman Findley alter h1s pattern of behavior set out In Chapter

I because of the linkage between this Issue and his home district?

The district was certainly keenly aware and highly activated by this

Issue. As such, Findlay was under a lot of pressure from his constitu­ ency. Don Norton says that this wasn't the case 1n the beginning;

Findley reached his decision to act on his own, without pressure. Regard­ less of the truth value of this claim, Findley's activity and the subse­ quent year long front page coverage of the Issue made the constituency conemed about the sanctums, or, 1f they already were concerned, this un­ derlying Interest was heightened. Eventually, the Issue, which all told did not. have that great an Impact on the total economy was "blown all out £ of proportion" by radio, television, newspapers, and Findley himself.

The plant shutdown did cost 1,700 jobs. But, this number Is not that great when looked at 1n the context of a district of one half million people

However, perceptions are more Important than effect. The plant shutdown came to be viewed as a symbol of the whole unemployment Issue. By the summer of 1982 Findley was under tremendous pressure to do something about the sanctions.

Findley realized he was under this pressure, too. The newspapers were reporting that many people were likely to take their frustrations out on 17 Congressional members of the same party as the president, and that "Findley must work to reverse the (sanctions) decision or risk political retaliation lO on election day." The situation was magnified by the fact that 1n

September 1t was announced that barring no change 1n the situation, Flat-

All 1s would close Its doors on November 5, Just two days before the Congres- .35

slonal election. The danger of electoral retaliation was conveyed to

Findley directly as he toured areas of his district. For Instance, while campaigning throughout the district on August 25, 1982, "unemploy­ ment caused by the Soviet trade sanctions was the topic raised most of­ ten."*®

Congressman Findley responded to the pressure he was under. He tried to publicize h1s position against the sanctions and M s resulting actions. He did so via the public media and through newsletters he sent 20 out via the franking privilege. In full page paid political advertlse- 21 ments he claims to have led the movement to repeal the sanctions.

Findley made a concerted effort to see that the members of the Flat-All Is chapter of the UAH knew about the actions he was taking. He met with both the local 1n mass and with the leaders several times. Harry Wells says,

"He was very supportive, very enthusiastic." Findley's relationship to the union was a striking example of how Findley was Influenced by h1$ constituency In this matter. Wells relates that Findley had never really had much to do with labor before. He had not previously Indicated a will­ ingness to talk to labor leadership. "Twenty-two years 1n the House of 23 Representatives and he never visited us at all. Not one time."

All told, the attitude of the district had a profound Influence on

Congressman Findley's actions; he felt constrained by h1s constituency.

However, 1f, as Don Norton maintains, Findley made his decision to oppose the sanctions before this pressure had manifest Itself, then considerations of M s constituency did not shape Congressman Findley's foreign policy for­ mulation, they merely served to reinforce his previously arrived at policy.

In order to ascertain whether considerations of his constituency did figure 36

Into Findley's foreign policy formulation 1n the case of the trade sanc­

tions, 1f Findley altered his general pattern of behavior due to the na­

ture of the Issue, a careful examination of Findlay's justifications for

M s actions and the exact nature of his actions must be undertaken.

Congressman Findlay said all along that he did not agree with the

export sanctions. In part he founded h1$ position on national concerns. 24 He claimed, "Sanctions are not an effective tool of foreign policy."

He gave several reasons to substantiate M s belief. Sanctions Make no

sense at all In terms of national security. Their only purposes are then

as punitive measures and as tools for Influencing behavior. Neither of

these alms can be met 1f sanctions are unilateral. The trade sanctions

against the Soviet Union had no support from our allies. Consequently,

the sanctioned materials were widely available from other nations. As 25 such, the export sanctions had no Impact on Soviet behavior. Furthermore,

since the measures had no support from our allies the measures In fact

worked 1n a way to benefit the Soviet Union. The sanctions were causing

a deep rift In the NATO alliance. The United States Itself wes doing what 25 the Soviet Union had wanted to do for years. Finally, the sanctions af­

fected the Soviet perceptions of the reliability of the United States as a

trading partner, American companies were not only losing business during

the sanctions but would continue to do so after the sanctions were lifted.

Loss of business means loss of jobs and Findley laments that, sanctions to

the contrary, "Our primary concern must be labor 1n the United States."2'

Despite these arguments, there really Isn't much merit to the claim

that Findley based his Issue stand primarily on national considerations, as might be expected 1f M s general outlook on foreign policy formulation Is considered. As Don Norton readily admits, although Congressman Findley believed the sanctions were wrong judging from a national point of view, local considerations were 1n fact foremost and Findley made his case a- 00 gainst the sanctions primarily on local grounds. Findley presented this point of view In both the madia and on the floor of the House of Represents tlves. Findley's primary complaint was that the sanctions were not across the board; they just pertained to certain segments of the American economy.

As It happened, the effects of the restrictions fell heaviest upon Illinois 90 manufacturers. Findlay claimed that the unilateral sanctions did more damage to I111no1s1ans than they did to the Russians. The sanctions ac­ complished no positive end while putting Illinois workers out of work.

Findley argued In Congress, "A small percentage of the American work force should not have to pay the price of a United States foreign policy Intended 31 to benefit the entire American population."

Moreover, not only did the effects of the sanctions fall most heavily on Illinois, but they fell more heavily on Findley's district than any other Congressional district 1n America. When discussing the Issue with the local press Findley asserted, "Of the $850 million 1n lost export sales to the Soviets since the sanctions were Imposed, about $600 million were on products manufactured 1n or near M s central Illinois district. . .

Such a small segment of the American people should not be expected to carry the burden of misdirected United States foreign policy."3* Findley car­ ried this argument over to the House of Representatives. On September

29, 1982 1n order to support h1s bill to end the sanctions Findley directly discussed the situation at Flat-Allls as grounds for changing national policy.3* 38

Not only Findley's justifications for his actions, but the thrust of h1s actions themselves Indicate the parochial, constituency bound concern that Findley had 1n regards to the sanctions Issue. Findley first approached the problem by trying not to have the restrictions lifted across the board, but by trying to see that an exception was cade In the case of

Flat-All1s. Findley presented the argument to Secretary of Commerce

Baldridge 1n February that the F1at-A1l1s deal would not fall under the category of high technology transfer. His discussions with Clarke, Wein­ berger and Reagan followed the same pattern. He did not try to persuade these officials to 11ft the overall trade ban, but to reconsider the case of the F1at-A111s/Sov1et contract Individually.

At the same time, Congressman Findley attempted to. If he couldn't get the ban on F1at-Al11s sales lifted, provide legislation which would mitigate the effects that the sanctions had had on the workers of F1at-

AIHs. He urged the administration to help the firm find an alternative export market by providing financing Incentives for prospective buyers.

Later he Introduced legislation which If passed would have provided assist­ ance to workers and companies that lost jobs or business because of the export sanctions. Findley's argument for the bill 1s Indicative of M s parochial outlook on the matter: "This legislation would help workers 1n

Decatur, Springfield, Quincy, and other areas of our country who have been adversely affected by the sanction on pipeline equipment .'or the Soviet

Union."34

Findley only later 1n the year altered h1s stance. He began to call for an end to the sanctions; If the administration wouldn't do 1t. Congress should take the lead. But, even while he tried to get the sanctions lifted

Findley st111 emphasised parochial reasons. He Invited administration figures 39

such as Baldridge and Bush to coat to the Twentieth District to see first*

hand the effects of the sanctions. Findley even welcomed President Reagan

to the Twentieth District, hoping he would come to see how the sanctions

had caused such rampant unemployment. Rather than national grounds, Findley

cites his efforts to legislate an end to the sanctions "as proof of M s

commitment to easing the district's unemployment problem.”4 Of the whole

of M s efforts Findley said, ”1 did my damndest to get jobs for Flat-All 1s 36 and Caterpillar," a definite Indication of a narrow constituency minded

bias 1n a matter of national concern.

One other comment can be made concerning Congressman Findley's pattern

of action regarding the sanctions. The sequence of bisections provides a

further, 1f not the most telling example of the effects of the pressure

that Findley felt he was under. Findley all along voiced M s opposition to

the sanctions. But, at first, Findley only attempted to convince the ad­

ministration to make an exception of F1at-A111s. "Findley (did) not think

Congress would or should try to undo the trade limits Imposed In response

to the Imposition of martial law 1n Poland because he generally accepts

the philosophy that the president should be able to react with dispatch to 37 International situations." Yet, scarcely six months later, this same man, reacting to the same measure and the same International environment was calling on Congress to end the sanctions. He Introduced a bill "de­

signed to Increase that pressure (on Reagan) so that 1f the White House 36 doesn't do something to lift the sanctions Congress will." Findley

had taken an about face from his earlier position of giving the president

”d1spatch”. The external environment had not changed. Findley's reversal

was the result of Internal district changes. H1s constituency had become

aware of the Issue and activated by the Issue In a clear cut way. The 40

pressure exerted by M s constituency, regardless of whether 1t wes menu* factured 1n part by Findley's own actions, was now forcing Findley's hand.

He now felt that he must at all cost get something positive done about the sanctions. H1s actions were directly linked to considerations of his con­ stituency.

Thus, It appears that Congressman Findley was Indeed activated by considerations of M s constituency 1n the case of the trade sanctions. This foreign policy Issue directly affected M s district. Consequently he dis­ regarded M s general philosophical outlook and Instead of basing M s poli­ cy stand on national Interests he decided his actions primarily using the criterion of what would be In his district's best Interests. The trade sanc­ tions were supposed to be a national protest against the brutalization of the labor movement In Poland. Findlay put all M s efforts Into fighting the sanctions because this national protest adversely affected his district.

In Chapter I It was reported that Findley viewed his responsibility 1n foreign policy to determine what was best for the nation as a whole, not local Interests. In the case of the trade sanctions, the opposite held true. 4 1 '

NOTES

^John M. Kingdom. Conorot mom's Voting Oocislows (Now York: Harper I Row, Publishers, 1973). p. 3S

2Bob Estni. "Policy Revere I for Fist looks Bioak," Springfield Stata Journal Register. 23 Fabruary 1982 o. 13. % Caterpillar, which has plants In Decatur, also lost heavily as a result of the trade sanctions. Decatur was a part of the now Twentieth District. However, for purposes mentioned In the Introduction, the fol­ lowing discussion will pertain mostly to Flat-Allls In Springfield. Still, much of what will bo said can also apply to Catorplllar.

^Interview with Harry Wells, President of UAW Local #1027, Springfield, Illinois, 31 March 1983.

Michael Murphy, "Sanctions Stymie Flat's Soviet Sales," Springfield State Journal Register. 13 January 1982, p. 37.

^Michael Murphy, "Flat Lands Order with Soviet Union," Springfield State Journal Register. 28 April 1982, p. 1.

^Michael Murphy, "Flat Loss 1n *81— $69 Million," Springfield State Journal Register. 7 May 1982, p. 23.

®We11s Interview. Q Michael Murphy, "Un1on-F1at Talks Continue on Wage Freeze Plan," Springfield State Journal Register. 23 February 1982, p. 13.

Michael Murphy, "Findley Confident House Will Approve Anti-Sanctions Bill," Springfield State Journal Register 28 September 1982, p. 13.

^Wells interview. 1? '"Interview with Kelly Smith, Statehouse reporter, WICS Television, Springfield, Illinois 30-31 March 1983. 13 Michel, House Republican leader, was reluctant to act contrary to the Republican administration's edict at first. Findley was eventually able to persuade him to Join the anti-sanction camp and support legislation that Findley Introduced calling for an end to tho sanctions.

^Stalls Interview.

^Interview with Don Norton, Findley aide, Springfield, Illinois, 5 April 1983. 42

“ interview with A1 Hanning, Political reporter, Springfield Stata Journal Register. Springfield, Illinois. 31 Harch 1983.

**A1 Hanning, "F1at-A1l1s Situation Hurting Findlay." Sorlngflald Stata Journal Register. 2 September 1982, p. 7.

18A1 Hanning, "Phil Bradley likely to Set Board Post," Sorlngflald State Journal Heelstar. 27 July 1982, p. 8.

19Jeff B^ody, "Touring Findley Finds Soviet Sanctions Opposed," Springfield State Journal Register. 26 August 1982, p. 4.

28See for example "The Paul Findley Newsletter" distributed June 1982.

2*"Paul Findley: More for Springfield," Sorlngflald State Journal Register. 31 October 1982, p. 51.

22Wel1s Interview,

23Ne11s Interview.

2*Jeff Brody, "Touring Findley Finds Soviet Sanctions Opposed," Sorlngflald State Journal Register. 26 August 1982, p. 4. 25 U.S., Congress, Extension of Remarks, Congressional Record 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, 128 pt. 96:3428.

Bob Estlll, "Vote on Findley Sanctions Bill Postponed at Shultz Request," Sorlngflald State Journal Register. 29 September 1982, p. 2. 27 U.S.. Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, 128 pt. 132: 7921.

“ Norton Interview.

29Bob Estlll, "Vote on Findley Sanctions Bill Postponed at Shultz Request," Sorlngflald State Journal Register. 29 September 1982, p.2.

30Bob Estlll, "Should Pain of Sanctions be Eased?" Springfield State Journal Register. 24 January 1982, p. 11. 31 U.S.. Congress. Extension of Remarks. Congressional Record. 97 Cong., 2d sess., 1982, 128 pt. 105 : 3667. ------

32Bo6 Estlll, "Illinois Leaders Criticize Trade Edict Against Soviets," Springfield State Journal Register. 26 Hay 1982, p. 13.

U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record. 97th Cong., U sess., 1982, 128 pt. 132: 7920-1. ------43

34 U.S., Congress. House of Representatives. Congressional Record. 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, 128 p t. 105: 5053.

35J*ff Brody, "Durbin, Findley Both Confident of Victory 1n 20th District Race," Springfield State Journal Register. 26 October 1982, Pe W e

E T 1 n&am suntan

i T S ? - - ^ t e a s U M m - sa u ^S itt^; aJSStWTr,d* ““ 44

Chapter III Case Study: Constituency Influence

During the Carter Administration Oa1n Embargo

In the context of this study* the Carter administration grain embargo*

Imposed on January 4, 1980, at first glance appears to b« remarkably similar to the Reagan administration trade sanctions. Again as a protest against

Soviet actions one area of American exports to the Soviet Union was cut off. Congressman Findley's district, coincidentally, happened to be heavi­ ly Involved 1n this particular trade. Once more, Findley was very active

1n trying to get the trade restrictions lifted. However, the assumption that Findley was acting In response to considerations of h1s constituency cannot be made without further Investigation. Not surprisingly, under close examination the similarity between the two situations begins to dis­ solve. Consequently, this study must analyze In depth the grain embargo

Issue 1n order to ascertain whether Congressman Findley had Indeed been

Influenced by his constituency 1n regards to this Issue, as he had been 1n regards to the trade sanctions.

The fact that Findley's district was greated affected by the grain embargo can hardly be disputed. Agriculture 1s probably the single most

Important business or product 1n the Twentieth District. Outside of govern­ ment 1t 1s the largest single economic contrlbuter to the district.^ The

Importance of agriculture as an economic contrlbuter doesn't just concern the actual production of crops. Supply Industries such os feed, fertilizers and chemicals, processing plants and distribution systems must also be con­ sidered. F

quently, the ramifications of agricultural policy certainly affect the

entire district, cities as well as rural areas.

Not only does agricultural policy 1n general affect the Twentieth

District pronouncedly, but export policy 1n specific does so as well. 3 Illinois ranks first of all the states 1n agricultural exports. Aside

from being the nation's leader 1n total comnodlty exports, Illinois 1s the 4 number one exporter of feed grains and soybeans; one out of every three

planted acres 1n 111'io1s goes Into the world market. These were the

very products restricted under the Carter edict. From the standpoint of

sheer volume cutting off these sales probably hurt Illinois more than any

other state. Twenty percent of the total United States feedgraln shipment £ to the Soviet Union had been expected to come from Illinois.

The conclusion can easily be reached that Findley's district, 1f

taken as typical of Illinois agriculture dominated districts, suffered

proportionately during the grain embargo. In short, the embargo seriously damaged the economy of the Twentieth District. Not only did farmers lose

the Immediate sales which were restricted by the embargo, but future sales were also curtailed, American farmers lost much of the Soviet market to more reliable suppliers. The embargo also created further problems for fanners by decreasing the domestic market price for feedgralns. Farmers had overproduced 1n anticipation of the Soviet sales. When these sales were restricted tremendous overstocks resulted, which led to depressed prices.

Kelly Smith, statehouse reporter for WICS, NBC television 1n Springfield gives an example of how great these overstocks were. He relates that while touring the Twentieth District he came across grain elevator after grain elevator which were so full that unsold grain was left on the ground outside 46

0 of the elevators; Twentieth District fanners had produced tremendous amounts of grain which eventually went to waste.

As 1n the case of the trade sanctions, which also adversely affected

M s district. Congressman Findley actively sought the repeal of the grain embargo. He argued against the embargo during the entirety of Its slx- teen month course, during both the Carter and Reagan administrations. How­ ever. while the Democratic Carter administration was 1n office the Republi­ can Findley really did not have that much Influence. He could Just make anti-embargo speeches, cast negative Congressional votes and Introduce resolutions calling for an end to the embargo. He did take these actions, but they had little effect. For instance, 1n June of 1980 Findley Intro­ duced a bill which would have rescinded the embargo 1f passed. As expected, the measure failed.

Under the Reagan administration Findley's protest against the grain em­ bargo was more vocal. Reagan was a Republican. The grain embargo had not been a policy of h1s making. Furthermore, Reagan had promised during the presidential campaign to 11ft the embargo. All these reasons led Congress­ man Findley to believe that his efforts stood a better chance of success than under Carter. He urged Reagan to 11ft the embargo. He argued that the longer Reagan maintained the "Carter embargo" the more It would become the

"Reagan embargo". Reagan and the Congressmen who supported him would appear hypocrtlcal. Findley made speeches on the floor of the House of Representa­ tives and wrote newspaper articles to this effect.'0 Findley even suggested a face saving approach to the problem. He said that the United States should discontinue the grain embargo but review every sale to the Soviets. This ap­ proach would allow trade to continue but convey to the Soviets our disapproval of their actions. Findley broached this Idea to several members of the ad­ 47

ministration. Ha talked to Sacratary of Agrlcultura Block and Sacratary of Stata Haig about M s proposal. Ha also man t1 on ad his plan to David

Stockman, tha Director of Office of Management and Budget. As In the case of tha sanctions, Findlay even brought his case personally to tha president, meeting with Reagan In February. Eventually, 1n April, tha embargo was lifted. However, Findley's plan was not adopted and M s ac­ tions cannot be considered decisive to the embargo's repeal.

As the preceding has shown, the examination of the grain embargo Issue seems to be following a similar pattern to that of the trade sanctions

Issue. Both cases Involve an Issue which badly hurt the Twentieth Dis­ trict. In both Instances Congressman Findley was active 1n seeking the repeal of the measure. However, just because the two situations appear to resemble each other, Congressman Findley's actions 1n the case of the grain embargo cannot be assumed to be directly linked to his considerations of

M s constituency. This question must be Investigated. As 1t happens, under closer examination the superficial similarity between the two Issues begins to fade. In the case of the embargo a linkage between the local situation and Congressman Findley's foreign policy formulation Is much more difficult to discern than 1t was In the case of the trade sanctions.

Clearly, Congressman Findley's actions are 1n accordance with the ac­ tions that his constituency would have wanted him to take. American farmers as a whole generally opposed the embargo.^ Illinois farmers In particular were highly against the measure. A survey conducted during the embargo period under the auspices of Harold D. Go Ither, Professor of Agriculture and Food Policy at the University of Illinois, Indicates that the majority of Illinois farmers disagreed with President Carter's decision to limit agricultural exports to the Soviet Union. Moreover, a substantial majority

of those polled did not believe that farm exports should be used as an In

strument of foreign policy. (See table 2.) Congressman Findley's district

TABLE 2: Illinois Farmers Views on International Trade Policies

President was right In limiting exports to Russia In January 1980:

Strongly agree 10*

Agree 26

No opinion 4

Disagree 25

Strongly disagree 27

No answer 8

U.S. should not limit farm exports for political or foreign policy reasons:

Strongly agree 26

Agree 37

No opinion 6

Disagree 18

Strongly disagree 6

No answer 7

Source: Harold D. Gulther, How Fanners View Agricultural and Food Policy Issues (Urbane: Department of Agricultural Economics, 1981), p. 17.

certainly held true to this pattern. Leonard Gardner, Executive Director of the Governmental Affairs Division of the Illinois Farm Bureau, relates that 49

1n the Twentieth District, especially among the farm community, a consen­ sus against the embargo did Indeed exist. Gardner also contends that 12 t'lchout question Congressman Findley was aware of this consensus.

Gardner's periodic contact with Findley was enough to Insure this fact.

If Findley knew of h1s constituency's will then he also must have known that he was acting 1n accordance with this will.

However, this study's point of Inquiry 1$ to discern 1f conslderalons of M s constituency Influenced Congressman Findley's foreign policy posi­ tions. The fact that Findley knew that he was acting 1n accordance to the will of M s constituency does not substantiate the claim that Findley In any way based M s stand on what he believed to be his constituency's desires.

The two positions might merely accidentally coincide. Consequently, the question of constituency Influence over Congressman Findley's foreign poli­ cy stand still has not been answered.

In fact, Findley's justifications for his actions seem to Indicate that considerations of M s constituency's desires did not play a part In

M s anti-embargo position. His justifications also do not Indicate that he arrived at M s position by determining what policy would be 1n M s constitu­ ency's best Interest. Findley's actions could have easily been explained

In this way; M s district stood to benefit greatly from the repeal of the embargo. However, Findley's justifications for M s actions clearly do not stem from a local viewpoint. Don Norton, Findley's close advisor, asserts that Findley's belief that embargoes don't work was the result of national 13 and International considerations, not district. Findley argued that the

•nbargo was not an effective tool of foreign policy. Findlay believed that exports should only be limited 1n cases of national security. A protest measure against the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan certainly did not fit 50

this criterion. If a country resorts to an embargo when national security

Is not at stake, It cannot help but hurt Itself. For Instance, trade 1s a very Important souce In encouraging good relations. The more the Soviets become hooked on good quality food Imported from the United States, the more the two countries become Interdependent and the better the chance 1s for stable, satisfactory, peaceful negotiations. Trade also provides s forum for negotiation. The consultations would naturally cover the grain sales, but they would 1n addition provide an opportunity to discuss any other Item of mutual Interest, Including Soviet behavior. Furthermore, the United States could not mandate good behavior from the Soviets by re­ fusing to sell them grain. The Soviets simply were not that dependent on the American supply. Findley wrote that, In fact, the grain was so saslly available from other sources that Soviet Imports were expected to be a IS record high for the year ending July, 1981.

Since Soviet actions were not contingent on.the grain embargo, the

United States should determine Its export policy on the basis of the best

Interests of this country. Findley claimed that the embargo was hurting the United States more than the Soviets. Not only farmers but the trucking, storing, barging, processing and shipping Industries were being hurt. Sure­ ly Findley's district felt the effect of the embargo, but so did much of the rest of the nation's economy. Findley's actions may have been to the 1mned1ate benefit of farmers, but Findley obviously recognized that the whcie national economy would subsequently stand to gain. Findley argued h1s national perspective on the floor of the House.

Farmers may represent only about four percent of America's population, but I would hope that all of my colleagues recognize the fact that 100 percent of this Congress constituency 1s 51

affected by how well that four porcont forts In our econony today. 16

Finally, tha question of constltuancy prassura must bt addrassad:

Did Congrassmn Findlay act tha way ha did because ha fait M m t l f to ba

undar prassura to act 1n that manntr? If tha course of his actions during

the embargo Is considered, Findley does not seem to ba acting due to pras­

sura. Findley voiced his disapproval of tha embargo Immediately after Its

Imposition. In November 1980 Findley ardently assarted, "I have bean a- 17 gainst tha embargo from the beginning." Consequently, Findley formula­

ted h1s policy position before pressure could be levied against him. The

Illinois Farm Bureau did carry on a major campaign against the embargo;

every time they sat down to talk to a Congressman, not just Findley, the 18 counterproductivity of the embargo was discussed. This campaign might

constitute a type of pressure exerted on Findley, but 1t Is doubtful that

this pressure actually dictated Findley's actions. Illinois Farm Bureau

offlca! ten Gardner relates that Findley didn't act because someone told

him to act; he probably would have done so without the pressure. "It 19 didn't take a whole hell of a lot of pressure to moke M m act."

Findley also felt little pressure over the embargo during the 1980

election campaign. The embargo was a Democratic edict. The Democrats would bear the brunt of the adverse electoral repercussions generated by

the Issue. For Carter, the embargo was "a hot political Issue" which hurt his reelectlon bid. For Findley, the embargo Issue remained 1n the back­ ground. The Issue received scant newspaper coverage. In fact, the lead article 1n the farm section of the State Journal Register on October 30,

1980, which detailed Findlay's and his opponent's agricultural policy pos1- 21 tlons didn't even mention the embargo. sz

Congressman Findley* thus, appears not to have been under much pres­

sure from M s constituency during the embargo period. However, a main

reason for this lack of pressure was that Congressman Findley was acting

1n the very way that his constituency wanted him to act. In the opinion of 22 the Illinois Farm Bureau, Findley was doing as much as he possibly could.

It would have been pointless to exert more pressure on him.

A second type of pressure exists, other than actual pressure exerted

during the course of an Issue. This 1s the pressure which a Congressman

assumes will be exerted 1f he chooses a particular course of action. A

Congressman might believe that the outrage generated by a particular stand

would be so great that the Congressman will eliminate that stand as a pos­

sible choice. By anticipating a possible constituency reaction, before

the actual occurence of this reaction, the Congressman 1s acting 1n a con­

strained manner. The Congressman Is being Influenced by considerations of

M s constituency even though h1s constituency has not taken any positive

action. In the case of the grain embargo, Congressman Findley found himself

to be In this exact situation. Only when anelyzlng this type of pressure

does constituency Influence over Congressman Findley's foreign policy po­

sition regarding the grain embargo become apparent.

The 1980 grain embargo was an Interesting case. The characteristics

of the embargo afforded Findley the pleasure of being able to act In the manner that he preferred. He disagreed with the embargo from a philosophi­

cal outlook. His outlook fit 1n well with the mood of M s constituency. The

fact that the embargo was an edict of the Democratic administration meant

that Findley could feel free to protest the measure. However, 1f the

situation had been otherwise and Findley had wanted to support the embargo he would not have been able to do so. Findley recognized that agriculture 53

and agribusiness Mart the top economic priorities of the district. He recognized that the effects of agricultural policy shot through the entire district, not just the rural area. He realized that there was a < sanding

Interest against embargoes 1n his district. The reason that the embargo was not a hot political Issue 1n the Twentieth District was because he had acted 1n accordance with this standing Interest. If he had not, the pub­ lic's concern about the Issue, and anger at Findley, would have been fired and Findley would have faced dire electoral repercussions. As such, Findley really hrd no choice but to oppose the embargo, a position which luckily 1n this case coincided with M s personal preferences.

Congressman Findley realized that M s constituency was limiting M s

choice of actions, and 1n fact really had given him no options but to choose

the course he did, because of personal experience. In 1974 President Ford had Imposed a similar measure to the Carter grain embargo. Congressman

Findley doubted the merits of the measure but felt that he had to support the Republican president. His constituency reacted belllcosely. Findley received hostile letters and phone calls. Visitors relayed their disap­ proval, He was even lectured to by passerbys. Almost Immediately Findley changed M s position. H1s reversal resulted directly from constituency pressure. Never again has Findley supported such a measure. The reper­ cussions of M s actions during the Ford administration had shaped all

Findley's future actions 1n this area. The Carter embargo was merely one 24 such example. Even though Findley reached M s decision to oppose the embargo Immediately, before constituency pressure had arisen, Findley knew from past experience that such pressure would arise. Prior experi­ ence had forced Findley to act 1n a certain way. When asked 1f during the embargo 54

had Findley felt constrained by his constituency, Don Norton replied suc­ cinctly and emphatically, "YesJ" 25 He felt no need to elaborate.

Once again, just as 1n the case of the trade sanctions, local considera­ tions have been found to Influence Congressman Findley's foreign policy formulation. In this particular case, these local considerations happened to mandate the actions that Findley thought were 1n the best Interests of the nation as a whole. However, had the situation been different, It Is unlikely that these national considerations would have taken precldence.

The great linkage between the foreign policy and Internal district con­ ditions severly restricted Paul Findley's choice of options. NOTES

^Interview with Leonard Gardner, Executive Director of the Govern­ mental Affairs D1v1son, Illinois Farm Bureau, Bloomington, Illinois, 1 April 1983. 0 The 1980 embargo Issue occurred before reapportionment. At this time Quincy and Springfield were two major metropolltcan areas of the Twentieth District.

U.S., Congress, Extensions of Remarks, Congressional Record. 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, 126, pt. 49: 1493. 4 U.S., Congress, Extensions of Remarks, Congressional Record. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 127, pt. 138: 4493.

5Robert Shapiro, Ralph Nader Congress Project: Citizens look at Congress; Paul Findley fteoubl 1canl!epresentemr"fromTrnno1s~TBasTijng- ton.D.C.: firossman Fubllshers, 1982), p. IS. £ Bob Estlll, “Block Pessimistic on Relief for Farmers after Brief­ ing," Springfield State Journal Register. 12 January 1981, p. 3. 7 In fact, this conclusion might be a little conservative. Alan Ehren- halt reports that Findley's district 1s not typical but “one of the more prosperous agricultural areas of the nation." Since the district relies more on agriculture than most other areas, 1t can only be expected to suf­ fer more If agricultural policy has adverse results. See Alan Ehrenhalt, Politics 1n America: Members of Congress In Washington and at Home (Kash- Ington, DTTT.l Congressional Quarterly Press, 1961], p. 37?. Q Interview with Kelly Smith, Statehouse reporter, WICS Television, Springfield, Illinois, 30-31 March 1983. g The following discussion of Findley's activities Is based on reports of h1s actions written In the local newspapers and on the text of the Congressional Record.

®See for example Paul Findley, "Embargo 'Protection' Could Boost Farm Subsidies," Washington Star. 13 March 1981.

^"Canada Ends Soviet Grain Embargo," Springfield State Journal Register. 29 November 1980, p. 2. 12 Gardner Interview. 13 Interview with Don Norton, Findley aide, Springfield, Illinois, 5 April 1983. 56

^Th1s brief summary of Findley's policy position Is based on the Congressman's comments, as reported by the local newspapers, Findley's writings and M s speeches. See for example Paul Findley, "Embargo 'Pro­ tection' Could Boost Farm Subsidies." Washington Star, 13 March 1981, Bob Estlll, "Findley: Embargo Eventual!v wITT EndT^Sprlnoflaid State Journal Register. 18 February 1981, p. 2., or Findley, Durbin Yell iWV Their Stands," Springfield Stat? Journal Register. 24 October 1982, p. 8. is U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 127, pt. 46: 2*777" 16 U.S., Congress, Extensions of Remarks, Congressional Record. 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, 126, pt. 49: 1493.

^7"20th District U.S, House Race Positions," Springfield State Journal Register. 2 November 1980, p. 6. 18 Gardner Interview. 19 Gardner Interview. 20 "Bergland: Grain Embargo Hurt." Springfield State Journal Register. * * w ■ ...... i m i « i » ...... i nwi in » ' ■ ■in— n mi w November 1980, p. 31. 21 Charlyn Fargo, "Findley, Robinson Differ on Price Support and Loan Levels," Springfield State Journal Register. 30 October 1980, p. 41, 22 Gardner Interview.

23Much of the argument used to support this claim was derived from Information obtained during the Don Norton Interview. 24 A similar situation arose when the Reagan administration was con­ sidering extending the trade sanctions to Include a grain embargo. On several occasions Findley spoke up against such a policy and would have pro­ tested Its Imposition, even though Reagan was a fellow Republican. 57

Chapter IV Casa Study: Constltuancy Influanca

ovar Congressman Findlay's PLO Stand

The dominant Issue of the 1980 Twentieth District Congressional cam­

paign was Congressman Findlay's controversial position regarding the Pal­

estinian Liberation Organization.^ A more different Issue from the grain

embargo and the trade sanctions 1s hard to Imagine. Where the latter two

Issues had direct consequences for the people of the Twentieth District, a

linkage between a Middle East terrorist organization and a Central Illi­

nois rural district 1s Incredibly difficult to find. Yet, for the last

few years of Paul Findley's Congressional career the Issue was highly

visible and received tremendous attention both within and outside of his district. Since his constituency eventually did become aware of tne Is­

sue, this topic does warrant Investigation. Findley's controversial PLO

stand must be looked at 1n the context of constituency Influence: Did his constituency's aroused concern over the PLO question affect In any way

Congressman Findley's policy position?

The easiest conclusion that can be reached 1n this regard Is that

considerations of his constituency played very little part 1n Findley's decision to advocate h1s controversial position. The major actors con­

cerned with the Issue are half way around the world from Central Illinois.

Little linkage can be found between the Middle East and the Twentieth Dis­

trict. Findley believed that the two were not connected. When he spoke

about the Issue he did so from a national and International perspective,

not district. He justified h1s stand by saying, "The problem must be ex- 9 amlned first of all from the standpoint of U.S. national Interest." He 58.

3 based his case on pure pragmatism. S1nca Mars in tha Mlddlt East could

Involve the United States directly, any means to avoid Mars should be looked Into. The only May to see If the PLO Is Milling to take the measures needed for peace 1s to confer Mlth them. Negotiations Mlth the PLO also could sMlng them from their terrorist path. Findley said that the United

States could choose neither the organization that the Palestinian people supported nor the leaders of this organization. The PLO had this support.

Consequently, the United States had no choice but to Include the organiza­ tion 1n Its considerations of the Palestinian problem. Just talking to the PLO could not hurt; 1f the efforts didn't Mork then the talks could be ceased.

Furthermore, Findley believed that the United States had taken too one sided of an approach to the Middle East problem. A more "even handed approach" Mould better serve American national Interests. Certainly Israel could not be abandoned. It Mas a strategic asset as Mali as a tool for promoting Western Interests In the Middle East. HoMever, the United States had to look at the problem from a broader perspective than just Israeli

Interests. Doing so cost America In terms of our relationship Mlth the

Soviet Union and the Moslem countries of the Middle East. Talking to the

PLO Mould be one "simple, but sane" step toMards establishing better re­ lations Mlth these countries.

Findley's policy toMards the PLO m s s m « 11 In line Mlth his former be­ havior. He had alMays advocated establishing relations as a matter of ex­ pedience rather than as a mechanism for confirming approval of a government/

His encouragement of normalizing relations Mlth China, the Soviet Union and

Cuba are examples of M s operationalizing this belief. The case of the PLO 59

just extends his argument one step further, to recognition of an organize*

t1on, not an established government.

Findley also considered the PLO Issue from the standpoint of h1s

prior experience. Findley viewed his PLO stand as Just another Instance

of adopting an unpopular cause which would later be vindicated. At no

time did he dream that the Issue would have the repercussions which 1t C eventually did. He knew M s position was bound to be greeted with some

disapproval back home; he was the only Congressman out of 535 who held the

position he advocated. But, M s anticipation of an unfavorable reaction

did not sway him from M s path. He was well used to the situation. He had

adopted, and maintained many such unpopular positions 1n the past. H1s

early Insistence that the United States should recognize CoemuMst China, £ cited In Chapter I, 1s one example. He had played the maverick so often

during his Congressional career that he had developed the role Into an art form. Congressman Findley felt nominally constrained by M s consti­

tuency on this matter.

Findley had sound substantiation for M s belief that on this Issue he could act without regard to M s constituency, and during the first two years that he was Involved with the PLO Issue, his assumptions were con­

firmed. H1s position really did arouse little concern from his constituency.

The one exception to this claim was the Jewish population of Findley's district. They resented Findley's stand. The leadership of the Jewish community kept In contact with Findley. They met with him several times to voice their opinion. However, the size of this sector of Findley's constituency Is very small, less than one percent of the district's total 0 population. Consequently, the Impact of the Jewish lobby's protest on

Findley was minimal. Even their leadership recognized this limitation. *0

tenor Loeb, Executive Director of the Springfield Jewish Federation, ad- 9 m1ts, "No one really believed we could change his policy."

Aside from the Jewish sector, Findley perceived little Interest In the Issue originally. Don Norton claims that when Findley brought the

Issue up 1n town meetings no one wanted to talk about 1t; people didn't care. Findley's workers were reporting the same thing to him. James

Day, a Findley volunteer, claimed he didn't hear much about the PLO. Folks were more Interested In Inflation end crop prices. Congressman Findley's son Craig, publisher of a weekly newpaper who consequently can be expected to be conscious of public sentiment, concurred. He told his father that 10 he had heard little about the PLO and Arafat. Findley Just could not be­ lieve that the people of M s district could be Interested 1n the Issue. He didn't think that the farmers of M s district cared one bit about the 13 PLO. The PLO was just too peripheral to the concerns of his district.

He explained his belief to Loeb. She reports that Findley told her the

PLO Issue wasn't a concern of the district but a national concern. He said that M s constituency doesn't care about what he does on the Middle

East. As long as he was a good Congressman and did the things they think 14 ought to be done, they let him have this.

Even If Findley did perceive a slight disregard for M s position, some supporters and constituents were conveying their displeasure at what they believed to be Findley's stand, this perception did not cause him to alter M s course. At the time he first enunciated M s position Findley was riding a wave of popularity. Most of his previously unpopular stands had been vindicated. People were beginning to recognize this fact.

Findley thought that this situation encouraged the people of M s district 61

to give him the benef1t of tho doubt.**

Chapter I of this study outlined Paul Findley's general outlook on foreign policy decisions. The previous discussion Indicates that Findley's response to the PLO question fits Into this pattern perfectly. Findley faced an unconcerned constituency on a matter that had little Immediate relation to hit home district. He consequently decided M s position stand based on M s beliefs of national Interests. Even after M s position had not been well received Findley meintalned M s position because he felt the Issue was too perpheral to the district to greatly arouse his consti­ tuency's Interest. Although many of M s constituents and supporters were disturbed by his stand, at this time "no one was suggesting the PLO (might) cost Findley M s House seat."*®

This situation was soon to change. From late 1979 until M s defeet

1n the 1982 election, Findley's PLO stand was a key Issue. Findley's op­ ponents 1n both the 1960 Republican primary and the general election made

Findlay's PLO position the dominant Issue In their campaigns. The result 17 was, as Findley himself claims, the "stlffest challenge of (Ms) career."

Findley's 1982 opponent relegated the Issue but the damage was already done; people were already plenty familiar with the Issue.

The first matter that must be discussed 1s how an Issue so peripheral to the Interests of the Twentieth District became a key Issue within the district. The answer Is simple: The Interest 1n the Issue was manufactured.

As mentioned, both David Nuessen, Findley's opponent 1n the 1980 primary, and David Robinson, the Democratic challenger, made the PLO a main Issue of their campaigns against Findley, focusing In large part cn his PLO stand.*® Both challengers hit Findley hard on M s association with the PLO. 62

Robinson for example plowed much of his exorbitant campaign receipts

Into a smear campaign against Findley. The Robinson camp bought ad­ vertising space In many Jewish-American newspapers throughout the nation.

These ads quoted southern Illinois Jewish activist Jimmy Klaber as say- 21 1ng Findley Is a "practicing anti Semite." Robinson purchased time on the local television stations. He ran thirty second commercials "de­ signed to tell voters 1n the 20th Congressional District that Findley 1s 22 a friend of the terrorist PLO." He used phone canvassing to further 23 bring the Issue to the attention of the voters. Nuessen had prevlous- 24 ly acted In the same manner. The results of this paid media blitz was that this heretofore Inconsequential Issue was brought to the fore­ front of Twentieth District politics.

There 1s no question that this contrived Issue hurt Findley. Don

Norton Indicates the Importance of the Issue: "In no Instances In the past did the political fallout come close to generating the repercussions of the Middle East."*® This fallout enabled Robinson to present the first serious challenge to Findley in his entire congressional career. However, simply acknowledging the tremendous repercussions of the PLO Issue does not provide M y further conclusions about constituency Influence over

Congressmen Findley. The repercussions generated by this Issue must be analyzed 1n this context.

The foremost effect the Issue had was as a fundraiser. Had 1t not been for the Issue, In all probability, none of Findley's opponents, Nuessen,

Robinson, or Durbin, would have raised enough money to pose a serious chal­ lenge to the Congressman. For example, David Nuessen raised over $127,000

In h1s effort to win the Republican primary. This total 1s a remarkable contrast to the $8,320 that V1c Roberts, Findley's 1978 general election 6 3

opponent raised.2' The Robinson and Durbin campaigns continued this pattern. The I960 election receipts were $632,278 for Robinson, $582,118 for Findley.28 Both Findley and Durbin topped the $600,000 mark 1n 1982,29

These totals are staggering In the context of a Congressional race. (See

Table 3.)30

The source of these funds provides a telling statistic. In all three cases, a considerable majority of the money came from sources outside the

Twentieth Olstrlct. Forty-four out of fifty-two contributors of more than 31 $100 to the Nuessen coffers did not reside 1n the Twentieth District.

Much of both Robinson's and Durbin's money came from out of state. For example, during the three month period of July 1 to September 30, 1982 nine­ ty-four percent of Durbin's funds were donated by people living outside of the Twentieth District. A1 Nanning once wrote that Dick Ourbln need not publicize the PIO Issue as "he will receive the money and the support of the people who think the PLO Issue Is Important because they already are plenty familiar with the Issue." Nanning was undoubtedly right. The campaign receipts Indicate just who Nanning was talking about, just who thought that the Issue was Important. It was the people outside the district.

The plain fact of the matter was that, despite the Issue's great publicity, despite the Issue's financial repercussions, not many people within the district were concerned with the Issue. Nanning claims that "1n terms of 36 general Interest of voters, not really many people really cared. Congress­ man Findley surely recognized that this situation existed. This fact was conveyed to Findley as he took to the campaign trail. For Instance, during the Durbin campaign the two candidates participated 1n a debate at a dis­ trict University. Unbelievable as It seems not one panelist asked a question 64

TABLE 3

Illinois Congressmen's 1980 Campaign Finances

CD Congressman Receipts Expenditures

1 Harold Washington $ 77,672 $ 72,716 2 Gus Savage 72,996 72,461 3 Marty Russo 187,089 180,622 4 Edward >1. Derw1nsk1 79,771 98,597 5 John G. Fary 67,874 58,809 6 Henry Hyde 209,818 144,469 7 Cardlss Collins 29,215 19,409 8 Dan Rostenkowskl 301,676 124.725 9 Sidney Yates 74,981 63,024 10 John E. Porter 644,941 650,248 'll Frank Annunzlo 108,074 59,436 12 Philip M. Crane 326,509 191,160 13 Robert. McClory 112,760 98,805 14 John N. Erlenbom 79,041 66,340 IS Tom Corcoran 145,693 88,330 16 Lynn M. Martin 308,224 293,256 17 George M. O'Brien 122,443 132,147 18 Robert H. Michel 168,068 101,391 19 Tom Rallsback 72,297 78,384 20 Paul Findley 552,118 530,568 21 Edward R. Madlgan 147,512 148,147 22 Danle1 R. Crane 170,313 165,236 23 Melvin Price 28,222 21,747 24 Paul Simon 74,428 177,624

Table compiled from data presented 1n Alan Ehrenhalt, Politics in America: Members of Congress 1n Washington and at Home (Washington. D.C.: Congressional IJu a r^ T ^ re s s , T98TF, pp. » * = » “------66

35 related to the Middle East. Also during the 1982 campaign the Springfield

State Journal Register, while reporting the events of Findley tour of the

district, wrote,

The Incumbent's controversial stand 1n favor of recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organiza­ tion for negotiations, which has made the 20th district contest with Democrat Dick Durbin a target for Jewish and Arab special Interest cam­ paign donations, was questioned only once. 36

The preceding argument does not Imply that the voters of the Twentieth DIs

trlct were not aware of the Issue or had not formed an opinion about the

Issue, 1t merely Implies that most voters did not consider the Issue Impor­

tant enough to dictate how they should vote. In general, the feeling about the Issue was ant1-F1nd1ey. Norton says that the Findley camp recognized this mood. He adnlts that although public opinion was vague and Ill-defined, most people were In disagreement with the Image they had of the Issue and 36 of what they believed Findley was doing. But despite his recognition of this general mood of disagreement, Findley also realized that, aside from the Jewish sector of the district, there was no general mood of alarm over the Issue. Findley realized, as did most observers, that 1n terms of actual votes on election day the Issue really didn't have much an effect. 38 A1 Manning echoes this belief. Even Lenor Loeb of the Jewish Federation admits that she doesn't think that the relative merits of the Issue Itself 39 had anything to do with Findley's loss 1n the election. Findley conse­ quently did not feel he had to consider M s constituency, even when the

PLO Issue became a major political Issue. He maintained his position throughout the two elections which featured the Issue. He knew that the

Issue hurt him, but also, that 1t didn't hurt him within his constituency.

He wrote that the reaction to h1$ position "has cut me deeply and Kurt me 66

throughout the nation, outside the district where I really can't fight

back."40 After the Robinson campaign Findley tried to mend fences. He

tried to alleviate some of the pressure which had mounted against him.

He sent out ISO letters to Robinson supporters explaining and justifying

M s views. A telling statistic Is that ninety percent of these letters 41 were not only sent out of district, but out of state. Within the

district Findley felt that h1s constituency had not really been that con­

cerned with the matter. Even after Findley's defeat, Findley claimed

that the PLO Issue had 1n no way affected h1s constituency's disposition

to vote In one way or another. He did not believe that the repercussions

of the PLO Issue, either those within the district or without, had led to

M s defeat. He warned political observers across the country not to at­

tribute M s defeat to M s controversial position on the PLO:

I hope that those who analyze this campaign will recognize that 1t was not the weight of forces brought against me from the outside as the new character of district (which caused my defeat). 42

Findley's assertions that his PLO stand did not have that great of electoral repercussions Indicate that he did not feel enough pressure regard­

ing the Issue to modify his policy position. H1s constant adherence to M s

stand during two heated elections Implies that Findley did not feel con­

strained by M s constituency to change his policy position. The Issue really didn't matter that much to M s constituency.

There 1s one exception to this claim. Findley did modify M s PLO stand

1n one noticeable way. Analyzing this one exception suggests just when

constituency Influence over Findley would manifest Itself. The exception

revolves around the element of the time Findley spent dealing with Middle

Eastern affairs. Late 1n 1979 the Chicago Tribune quoted Findley as saying 67

that thasa days ha spends up to nlnaty parcant of M s time on Palestinian affairs.43 Both Nuessen and Robinson jumped on this statement. Thay said that Findlay's obsasslon with foralgn affairs causad him to naglact his district. Robinson askad 1f Findlay was spandlng nlnaty parcant of M s t1ma on outslda affairs, what was tha district getting for Its tan per­ cent.44 Thay said that Findley was Ignoring tha district's needs. Mora than anything e1*e this element of tha Issue aroused tha public's atten­ tion. Loeb maintains, "I don't think among tha rest of tha people there was much concern, except whan time was an Issue j'45 Manning agrees,

"Thera was general disagreement. Not generally with M s position but the -46 time he was spending on tha Issue."

Findley recognized that this aspect of the PLO Issue could cause him trouble. He was sensitive to the criticism that he was neglecting his responsibility to the district. Don Norton confirms that Findley felt pressure and subsequetly moderated M s public statements.47 For example,

Findley triad to explain to the press that the ninety percent quote was misconstrued. What he had meant to say was that on some work days foreign policy took up so much time that 1t seamed like he was spending ninety percent of M s time on It. In reality, he could not remember even one day where one foreign policy Issue took up ninety percent of M s time. To say that he spent ninety percent of his total time on any one Issue would be absurd.4®

It appears that once again, Congressman Findley's constituency had an

Influence over his foreign policy position. However, Findley only felt that he had to take h1s constituency Into account, and subsequently modify his position, after a direct linkage between the Issue and M s constituency's Interests had been established. Once Findley had acted to alleviate this area of constituency concern he felt free to act In an unconstrained fashion

After the Issue of tine had subsided Findley continued to advocate M s high­ ly controversial policy. The FLO issue remained highly visible* but

Findley believed that his constituency Mas rather unconcerned about 1t.

Consequently he did not take considerations of M s constituency Into ac­ count. 59

NOTES

*Ken Hutton, "Flndloy Atttckod on PIO Link." Springfield Stott Journal Register. 9 Horch 1980, p. 8.

2"The PLO Ittuo: Should US Opon Dialog with Arafat; Yat— Paul Findlay* No~Steven P. Stona," Sorlnoflold State Journal Raolstar. 11 November 1979, p,11, — — — -

^The following discussion of Findlay's Justifications for M s Issue stand 1s based on M s comments, as roportad by tha local press, his speeches, writings and tha Don Norton Interview. Sea for example "The PLO Issue: Should U.S. Open Dialogaioe with Arafat; Yes-Paul Findley, no-Steven P. Stone," Springfield State Journal r, 11 NovaMber 1979, p. 11., Rich Laden, "Findley Urges U.s. Lead lld^iflianceKF^n.» n.».Nova," Springfield State Journal Raolstar. 19 February 1980, p. 20, or U.S., congress, House of Representatives. Congressional Record. 95th Cono.. 2d sess., 1978, 124 pt. 10: 13489. — ------

*Pau1 Findley, "Excerpt from Remarks on U.S.-Cuba Relations March 9, 1977, " Congressional Digest. February 1978, p. 64.

^Interview with Don Norton, Findley aide, Springfield, Illinois, 5 April 1983. £ See Chapter ! p. go for further examples.

7 John Maclean,"Findley the Flak Catcher Says His PLO Stance Will Stand Up In Time," Chicago Tribune. 31 October 1979, p. 17. A Interview with Lenor Loeb, Executive Director Springfield Jewish Federation, Springfield, Illinois, 31 March 1983. g Loeb Interview.

*°Norton Interview.

, 11Maclean, p. 20.

12Maclean, p. 20.

13Maclean, p. 17. 14 Loeb Interview. 15 Norton Interview.

16Maclean, p. 17. 70

17Bob E*t1l1, "'Running Scared' After Primary Vote— Findlay," Springfield State Journal Register. 24 March 1980, p. 8.

18Watson, p. 8.

9A1 Nanning. "Nuesser Funds Less than Expected," Sorlnefleld State Journal Register. 14 March 1980, p. 7.

‘^Matson, p, 8.

21 "Charges of Anti-Semitism Are Most Painful— Findley," Springfield State Journal Register. 17 October I960, p. 18.

22"Charges of Ant1-Som1t1sm Are Most Painful— Findley," p. 18, 23 Jeff Brody, "Robinson Steps on 6as 1n Drive to Oust Findley," SpHngflfld State Journal Register, 4 October 1980, p. 4. 24 See, for example, Nuessen's full page Springfield State Journal Register advertisement of March 13, 1980, paid for by Nuessen for Congress. 25 Norton Interview.

26M1chae1 Barone and Grant Ujlfusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1981. (Washington, D.C.: Barone A Company, 198?),p7"334.

27Barone and Ujlfusa, p. 334. 28 Alan Ehrenhalt, Politics 1n America: Members of Congress 1n Washing­ ton j nd at Hoga (Washington, fl.t.: Congress1onal“Warter1y Press7n98l),

29 A1 Manning, "Robinson Comnerclal Stirs Reaction," Springfield State Journal Register. 17 October 1980, p. 11.

30The table Indicates that only one out of the other twenty-three Congressmen, John E. Porter, came close to the Findley totals. H1s op­ ponent Weinberger, however, came no where near to the totals of Findley's opponent Robinson: Receipts Expenditures Weinberger $266,914 $263,680 Robinson 632,278 631,098 31 'Manning, "Nuessen Funds Less Than Expected," p. 7.

32Mann1ng, "Robinson Commercial Stirs Reaction," p. 11.

33A1 Manning "Knuppel Likely to be Hurt by Charge," Springfield State Journal Register. 13 January 1980, p. 11. ^Interview with A1 Manning, Political Reporter, Springfield Stata Journal Realstar, Springfield, Illinois, 31 March 1963.

35A1 Manning, "Findlay, Durbin 1n Haatad Debate," Sorlnoflald Stata Journal Register. 27 October 1982, p. 11.

^Jeff Brody, "Touring Findley Finds Soviet Sanctions Opposed," Sorlnoflald State Journal Register. 26 August I960, p. 4. 37 Norton also claims that few people really knew exactly what the Congressman was advocating. Very often their perception of the Issue didn't match up with reality. People would react adversely to the mere mention of Arafat without looking at the merits of Findley's policy. (Norton Interview)

^Nanning Interview.

39Loeb Interview.

4®Bob Estlll, "Findley Contacting Robinson Supporters to 'Clear Name,"1 Springfield State Journal Register. 18 March 1981, p. 10.

41Est1l1, p. 10.

42"F1nd1ey: Impact of Oafeat Hasn't Hit," Springfield State Journal Register. 4 November 1982, p. 9.

43Mac1ean, p. 20.

44Watson, p, 8.

4*loeb Interview.

^Manning Interview. 47 Norton Interview.

**Natson, p. 8. Chapter V Conclusion

Tho purpose of this study has boon to Investigate the extent to which considerations of M s constituency Influenced Congressman Paul

Findley's foreign policy formulation. The results have Indicated that the question cannot be answered with simply a yes, he was Influenced or a no, he was not Influenced. Different situations elicited different responses from Congressman Findley. On the whole. Congressman Findley was not very Influenced by these types of considerations. Although the bulk of this paper studied Findley's response to specific highly visible

Issues, where In fact some connection between Findley and his constitu­ ency was found, 1t must be remembered that these Issues were the excep­ tion. The vast majority of Findley's foreign policy acltv ites Involved matters that aroused neither the Interest nor concern of most of M s constituency. In regard to most foreign policy decisions Findley chose to decide h1s position on the basis of national Interest, not local In­ terest. He felt under no obligation to follow M s constituency's "will".

Indeed, 1n most Instances the constituency was unconcerned; 1t did not have a "will" to follow. Even If 1t did, Findley felt free enough from constraint to act contrary to this will 1f he deemed It the right course to do so. Findley voted M s convictions.

Yet, this study has also shown that In regard to certain highly visible Issues, Findley did alter his general pattern of behavior. At times considerations of M s constituency played a paramount role 1n de­ termining M s activities. However, this Influence over Findley only really manifest Itself when there was a direct linkage latween the foreign policy 7 1

natter and the constituency. A brief review of the specific Issues will

explain this point. The trade sanctions and the grain embargo directly

affected the econoay of the Twentieth District. Findley reacted 1 "medi­

ately on M s constituency's behalf. He openly acknowledged In the case

of the sanctions that considerations of M s constituency played a pre­

dominant role In determining his actions. The case of the embargo was

different} Findley did act 1n the way he felt would be in the best

Interests of the nation. But, as Don Norton readily awaits, fear of a

possible negative response from M s constituency prevented Congressman

Findley from acting 1n any other way.1 Findley recognized that M s constituency was too concerned about the Issue to allow M m freedom of action,

The PLO Issue was also a Mghly visible Issue. However, 1n this case, M s constituency was not of a uniformed opinion and was not greatly alarmed over the Issue. Findley maintained M s controversial stand des­ pite the great attention It was receiving. Only when the constituency became directly linked to the Issue did Findley feel constrained. When

M s constituency began to think that Findley was neglecting Its best In­ terests Findley began to feel pressure. He subsequently modified M s stand.

Findley's foreign policy actions can thus be divided Into two catego­ ries. His treatment of an Issue was largely depending upon how he anti­ cipated M s constituency would react to the Issue. The great majority of his actions concerned Issues which did not Involve his constituency di­ rectly} Findley did not believe his constituency would be aroused by the issue and he subsequently did not let conslderations of M s constituency 74

influence him. He followed this pattern even when the Issue was highly visible as 1n the case of the PLO Issue. Only when the Iss"" became tied to local Interests and thus aroused local concern did Findley feel constrained by cite people of M s district. On the other hand, some is­ sues such as the trade sanctions and the grain embargo, Involved the constituency from the beginning. Findley knew his constituency would be concerned about these Issues. In these Instances Findley's constituency did have a discernible will. Findley felt compelled to act In accordance with this will. These types of Issues arose very Infrequently but when they did Congressman Findley was greatly Influenced by considerations of

M s constituency.

Obviously, the narrow focus of this study prevents deriving any broad generalizations about Congress from the results of the Investigation.

Hotvever, the conclusions reached do give rise to some very Interesting questions. James N. Rosenau claims that the role one occupies 1n a society plays an Important part In shaping the actions of a person. A role limits the possible courses of action an Individual can choose. Often­ times some adherence to the expectations Inherent 1n the role must occur 0 1f occupancy of the role Is to continue. What 1f Paul Findley was acting

In this manner 1n H1s role as a United States Representative? Even Findley, a Congressman who prided himself on his "lone wolf" style, was Influenced at times by considerations of M s constituency. If other Congressmen adhere to the same role pattern as Findley then the consequences for American foreign policy can be of great Importance. American foreign policy cannot be considered to be just a series of responses to International stimuli; national Interest cannot be considered the sole explanation of foreign poli­ cy. Intra-national considerations can be crucial to a nation's International behavior. 75

Trie domestic aspect of foreign policy decision-making can seriously

limit the chances for the nation to conduct a coherent, rational foreign

policy. "The Washington conmunlty Is often dlscrlbed as a group of people

all of whom come from somewhere else. All of these "somewhere elses" are

bound to produce different attitudes and have different overriding In­

terests. The problem that could arise from this situation Is that the

Individual Congressmen, If they are Influenced by considerations of their

constituency, would be founding their decisions on extremely diverse cri­

teria.

Some results of this study might seem to diminish the Importance of

the above situation. Findley was only Influenced by considerations of h1s constituency 1n rare Instances. On the majority of Issues and day to day

foreign policy matters the Congressman was free to act as he would. If

Findley Is considered to be a role player somewhat typical of all Congress­ men then 1t would seem that a coherent foreign policy 1s still possible..

However, when the nature of the Issues which Findley took his constituency

Into account Is studied the true danger of constituency Influence manifest

Itself. The Issues that aroused public Interest were major, far reaching 4 Issues. Findley went so far as to call them "crisis" Crises are situa­ tions that most demand a coherent foreign policy. But these are precisely the Issues which the constituency had the most Influence over the Congress­ man.

In the past, this situation might not have been that consequential.

Despite the wide potential authority 1n making and conducting foreign policy granted to Congress by the Constitution, In practice Congress had been largely subservient to the President 1n regard to these matters. However,

1n the wake of Vietnam and Watergate Congress has been taking and may con­ tinue to take a more active role 1n foreign policy making. Indeed Paul 76

Findley advocates Congress' assuming this role. “Some practical restraint on the freewheeling. , . authority of the presidency. . „ would help re­ establish the proper role 6f Congress."5

Consequently. 1f the results of this study are applicable to other

Congressmen then major obstacles confront the formation of a consistent

American foreign policy. However, by no means has this narrow focused In­ vestigation proven these suspicions. This study has merely posed a topic for future Investigation. 77

NOTES

^Interview with Don Norton, Findley aide, Springfield, Illinois, 5 April 1983.

2James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," 1n Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free P r e s i r wiy; friz:— Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "U.S. House Members In Their Constituencies," The American Political Science Review. September 1977, p. 884.

*"F1ndley, Citizens Exchange Views," Pike Press. Pittsfield, Illinois, 30 January i960, p. 1.

®Paul Findley, "Does American Foreign Policy Entail Frequent Mars," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. July 1967, pTsSf. 78

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baron*, Michael and Grant UJIfusa. Th* Almanac of American Politics. 1982 Washington, D.C.: Baron* and Company, 1982.

Colby, P*t«r and Paul M1cha*l Gr**n. "Voting Pattarns In th* 96 Downstat* m Counties," Illinois Issu*s. (August 1978), pp. 15-21.

Congressional Districts in th* 1970's. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973.

Dexter, Lewis Anthony. "Th* Representative and His District" In N w Representatives. jo: Rand n c m m 3-29.

Ehrenhalt, Alan. Politics In America: Mpfrrs gf ill nfftD and at Home. Washington, D.C.: Congressional QuarterlyPress, 1981.

Fenno, Richard F. Jr. "U.S. House Members 1n Their Constituencies," The American Political Science Review, (September 1977), pp. 883-917.

"Findley's Folly," Hew Republic. (7 May 1966), p. 7.

Findley, Paul. A. Lincoln: The Crucible of Congress. Hew York: Crown Publ 1 shers, Inc., 1979.

Findley, Paul. "America's Greatest Invention: address August 9, 1982," Vital Speeches. (15 October 1962), pp. 26-8.

Findley, Paul. "Cash Crop 1s Cash," Nation. (27 March 1972), p. 388.

Findley, Paul. "Create a Nation for Palestinians?" U.S. News and World Report. (20 September 1982), pp. 25-6.

Findley, Peul. "Does American Foreign Policy Entail Frequent Wars, ftuf^&flrpp^i^tS ^ £& S**1*1 SgljDse

Findley, Paul. "Embargo 'Protection' Could Boost Farm Subsidies," Washington Star. (13 March 1881).

Findley, Paul. "Excerpt from Remarks on U.S.-Cuba Relations March 9, 1977," Congressional Digest, (February 1978). pp. 64f. 79

Findley, Paul. "Excerpt from Views Filed on Federal Sugar Controls. Hay 17, 1974," Congressional Digest. (February 1975), pp. 56f.

Findley, Paul. The Federal Fans Fable. New York: Arlington House, 1956.

Findley, Paul. "Food Export Leverage Against OPEC: a case of apples and worms," USA Today. {March I960), pp. 20-1.

Findley, Paul. "Impact and Potential of American Diplomacy: address," Annals of tht American Aredsmy gf Political and Social Science. (duly 191577pp. ®s*7/.

Findley, Paul. "Let's Plug the B1111on-Do11ar Farm Drain," Readers Digest. (March 1968), pp. 72-6.

Findley, Paul. "Lobbyists', cloud of doubt," Newsweek. (25 October 1955), p. 34.

Findley, Paul. "Should Me Limit government Payments Per Farm," Farm Journal. (July 1959), pp. 15f.

Findley, Paul. "Sugar: a sticky mess 1n Congress," Readers Digest. (June 1955), pp. 86-92.

Gardner, Leonard, Executive Director of the Governmental Affairs Division, Illinois Farm Bureau, Bloomington, Illinois. Interview April 1983.

Gulther, Harold 0 Urbene: Unt

"Israel's Supporters Working to Beet U.S. Rep. Findley," Chicago Tribune. (31 March 1182), sect. 1 p.. I.

K1

Loot, Lenor, Executive Director, Springfield Jewish Federation, Springfield, Illinois. Interview 31 March 1963.

Mackey, Robert. "Anderson's Meet," Illinois Issues, (Nevofter 1980), p. 33.

Mackey, Robert. "Dams Lead Delegation, 12-10," IIHeels Issues, (December 1982), p. 18.

Mackey, Robert. "The New Congressional Districts," Illinois Ispmes. (April 1982), pp. 5-9.

Mackay, Robert. "The New and Newly Powerful In the Illinois Delegation," Illinois Issues. (December I960), p. 333. Maclean, John. "Findley the Flak-Catcher Says HI* PLO Stance Will Stand Up In Time," Chicago Tribuna. (31 October 1979). p. 17.20.

Nanning» A1. PolItlcal raporttr, Springfield Stata Journal toolstar. Splngflald. Illinois. InUrv1aw 3T Harch T9B.

Harrltt. Anna J.MdistrlctjNw: An Exorcist In Prophicy. Urbana: Uni­ varsity of Illinois, 19827

Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. "Constituency Influence 1n Congress" 1n New Perspective on the House of Representatives, ed. Robert L. Peabo3y and nelson W7 PoTsby.Chicago: RandNcNa 11 y t Company, 1909, pp. 31-93.

Norton, Don. Findley aide, Springfield, Illinois. Interview 5 April 1

"The Paul Findley Newsletter," location of publication not listed, dis­ tributed Nay 1992.

"The Paul Findley Questlonalre," location of publication not listed, dis­ tributed June 1982.

Pike Press. Pittsfield, Illinois.

Rosenau, James N. Domstlc Sources of Foreign Policy. New York; The Free Press, 1967.

Scammon, Richard N. America Votes 6. Washington. D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1966.

Scammon, Richard N. America Votes 9. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1972.

Scammon, Richard N. and Alice V. McGill Ivray. America Votas 14. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 19617

Smith, Kelly. Stateheuse reporter, WICS Television, Springfield, Illinois. Interview 30-31 March 1963.

lln ij

State Jemrnal Register. Springfield, Illinois.

Illinois Depart <1

"Three Speeches," Nation, (14 April 196";, pp. 450-1.

U.S. Congress. Congressional Record.

Wells, Harry. President UAH Local #1027, Springfield, Illinois, Inter- viiw 31 Nifcn 1983*

T o r n r 5 1 — e d n io n - Ch1ca90: Harquls Who's Who, Inc. ,