Fortunio Liceti on Mind, Light, and Immaterial Extension

Andreas Blank University of Hamburg

Almost half a century before Henry More, the Padua-based natural philosopher Fortunio Liceti (1577–1657) formulated a distinction between material extension and immaterial extension. While More’s version of the distinction is seen as one of the most characteristic features of his metaphysics— underlying both his theory of individual spirits and of absolute divine space—Liceti’s metaphysics of immaterial extension has not received much attention by commentators. Liceti ascribes immaterial extension to light and the human mind and, like More, he uses the analogy between light and mind to explicate the structural differences between material and immaterial extension. In this article, I explore how Liceti—following some aspects of Albert the Great’s eclectic Aristotelianism—tries to combine broadly Aristotelian accounts of light and mind with the Platonic concept of emanative causation. I argue that, in Liceti, the notion of existential independence from matter lies at the heart of his conception of extended, but actually indivisible, immaterial beings: Such beings cannot be divided through the division of matter because their existence, due to the role of emanative causation, does not depend on the potencies of matter.

1. Introduction In the history of seventeenth-century philosophy, the distinction between material and immaterial extension is closely associated with the Cam- bridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687). The aspect of More’s conception of immaterial extension that proved most inºuential is his theory of absolute divine space. Very plausibly, the Newtonian conception of space owes a great deal to More’s views on space. More’s views on space in turn were closely linked to his views on the nature of individual spirits—the

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souls of brutes and humans, as well as the intelligences of the angels. It has been acknowledged that More’s theory of absolute space was not without precedents. Most importantly, Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529– 1597) developed the view that space is dimensional and independent of the objects located in it (although Patrizi remained rather evasive as to the material or immaterial nature of space).1 Are there similar precedents for More’s views about immaterial but extended individual spirits? I have not seen any concrete suggestions concerning this issue in the literature on More. Hence, it might be worth pointing out that the distinction between material extension and the extension of immaterial minds can be found, almost 40 years before More’s ªrst explicit formulation of the distinction in the Appendix to An Antidote Against Atheism (1655), in a work by the Paduan natural philosopher Fortunio Liceti (1577–1657), aptly entitled On the Coextension of Soul and Body (1616). In The Immortality of the Soul More includes references to another area of Liceti’s work, the theory of monsters.2 In fact, Liceti’s contribution to the theory of biological reproduction has been given some attention in recent scholarship.3 By contrast, his contribution to the metaphysics of immaterial extension has not yet been explored. This is what the present paper aims to make a start at. There are substantial similarities between Liceti’s and More’s views. Just as More compares the relation between spirits and matter with the relation between light and illuminated matter, so does Liceti compare the relation between mind and matter with the relation between light and illuminated matter. More is explicit that what he has in mind when he makes this comparison is the Aristotelian conception of light as intentional species.4 On ªrst sight, however, it is not obvious how this comparison could be of any help for More. Certainly, inºuential medieval Aristote- lian theories of light, such as those of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1168–1253) and Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292), regard light as a corporeal being. Bacon maintains that the dimensionality of light is derived from the dimensionality of its medium.5 Grosseteste maintains that light is consti-

1. See Patrizi 1943, p. 237 (on dimensionality), p. 241 (on independence from other objects and on the question of the material or immaterial nature of space). On Patrizi’s conception of space, see Grant 1981, ch. 8; Kochiras 2012, pp. 54–56. 2. More 1662 [1659]. The Immortality of the Soul (hereafter Immortality), III, 7, 3, p. 174. 3. See Ceard 1977, pp. 442–447, 451–456; Daston and Park 1998, pp. 191, 200, 209, 213. 4. Immortality, I, 5, 2, p. 25. 5. Lindberg 1983, pp. 190/191. On Bacon’s theory of light, see Lindberg 1986, pp. 19–22.

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tutive of bodily extension.6 In neither case was the extension of light con- ceived as being independent of the extension of matter.7 When Liceti claims that the extension of light differs from the extension of matter he may have gone substantially beyond other Later Aristo- telian thinkers. The closest historical antecedent of Liceti’s theory of light can be found in Albert the Great’s (d. 1280) highly eclectic De anima commentary. Most importantly for present purposes, Albert connects the Aris- totelian view that light perfects the body that it illuminates by making it actually perspicuous or “diaphanous”8 with the Platonic notion of emanative causation.9 Liceti takes up this eclectic approach to light but makes some implications that such a theory of light has for the relation between the extension of light and the extension of body. Exploring Liceti’s usage of the analogy between mind and light thus may help us to understand the sense in which, in Liceti’s view, mind can be at the same time immaterial, extended, and indivisible. I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I explore how Liceti argues for the extension of the mind and how he dis- tinguishes the mind’s extension from the extension of vegetative and sensitive souls. In section 3, I investigate how Liceti, in his early and middle years, argues for understanding light as an extended but indivisible being. In section 4, I bring together both strands of thought to explicate the role of the notion of existential independence in Liceti’s usage of the analogy between light and mind. Finally, in section 5, I spell out how Liceti inte- grates some forms of dependence of mental activities on the body with his account of indivisible immaterial extension.

2. The Coextension of Soul and Body Liceti ascribes extension to all kinds of souls (vegetative, sensitive, and rational), and the grounds for this are closely connected with his account of 6. Baur 1912, p. 51. On Grosseteste’s metaphysics of light, see Baur 1917, pp. 76–84; McEvoy 1982, pp. 151–158. 7. To be sure, Nicolaus Oresme’s theory of light may be a less clear-cut case. Oresme maintains that light belongs to the “corporeal accidents or qualities” but qualiªes this claim by ascribing a “spiritual being” to it. One clear sense associated with this qualiªcat- ion is that light does not follow from primary qualities (see Patar 1995, p. 276). But as Annelise Maier has remarked about cases such as Oresme: “That it is not a ‘proper’ esse spirituale like that of rational souls and intelligences went without much saying; but it never came to a precise and generally accepted clariªcation of the special intentional being that was ascribed to the species in a medium” (Maier 1963), p. 7). And, in any case, Peter Marshall seems to be right when he points out that “Oresme never made clear how there could be dimensionality without material being” (Marshall 1981, pp. 361–362). 8. See Aristotle, De an. II, 7. On Aristotle’ notion of the diaphanous and its inºuence in medieval thought, see Vasiliu 1997. 9. On the origins of the emanation theory of light, see Lindberg 1976, pp. 96–98.

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the coextension of soul and body. In particular, he understands the coextension of the rational soul and the body in close analogy to the coextension of the vegetative and sensitive soul and the body. Therefore, it will be helpful ªrst to consider his conception of the coextension of the vegetative soul and the organic body of a living being. With respect to the nutrition of plants, he argues that the vegetative soul is where the operations occur, of which the soul is the primary efªcient cause since according to Aristotle all physical action is by contact;10 moreover, according to Aristotle everything that is nourished is nourished with respect to the smallest part of its body.11 He develops analogous arguments for the coextension of sensitive souls and the organic bodies of animals. The most telling argument for our present concerns is an argument based on the relation between the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul of an animal. Liceti starts from the observation that when the sensitive soul is occupied with something and applies all its forces of passion to it, then nutrition, augmentation and the functions of sexual reproduction that are governed by the vegetative soul are impaired or interrupted. Liceti interprets these observations as in- dicating that in a sensitive being the vegetative soul is dominated by the sensitive soul.12 He comments: “[Y]ou can derive the fact that the domi- nating sensitive soul is coextensive with the dominated vegetative soul from the fact that all physical domination takes place by means of contact and contiguity.”13 As far as vegetative and sensitive souls go, Liceti believes that division of souls is not only a genuine possibility but something actually involved in every case of the generation of a living being:

[A]s long as twigs are on the tree, they live by the same soul as the tree is said to live by; the soul of the tree subsequently is multiplied and divided according to the division of the subject [. . .]. Al- most in this way, I believe the seed enjoys the same soul as the father; which I believe is divided and multiplied according to the 10. Liceti refers the reader to Aristotle, Phys., VII, 10–12; VIII, 33; De an., 2, 3. On scholastic views on the “no action at a distance” principle, see Kovach 1990, pp. 161– 171. 11. Liceti 1616, De animarum coextensione corpori libri du (hereafter ACC), p. 12. See De an. II, 4. 12. ACC, p. 36. 13. ACC, p. 36: “[S]ensitricem gubernantem coextensam esse vegetali animae guber- natae inde apertissime colligas, quia gubernatio physica ªt per contactum, & contiguita- tem: Aristoteles enim alicubi sanxit necessarium esse mundum hunc inferiorem contiguum extare supernis lationibus, ut omnis huius mundi virtus gubernetur inde [Meteor. I, 2].” For a more detailed discussion of Liceti’s view on vegetative and sensitive souls, see Blank 2010.

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division of the subject when the seed is separated from the body of the father.14

Thus, for Liceti plant souls are extended beings that are divided when the organic body of the plant is divided. The two parts of a divided plant live by the two parts of a divided plant soul. Likewise, animal souls are extended beings that are divided when the organic body of the animal is divided. When the body of the seed is separated from the body of the parent the seed lives by a part of the soul of the parent. Liceti’s ontology of vegetative and sensitive souls thus would evidently allow such souls to be actually divided. Still, while Liceti is committed to the material and divisible nature of vegetative and sensitive souls, he also holds that “the more potent, intellective part of the human soul is not educed from matter but created out of nothing, and is immortal [. . .].”15 His argument for the extended nature of this immaterial part of the human soul starts with the assumption that “as the sentient soul governs the vegetative soul in producing each of its functions, the rational soul evidently governs the vegetative and sensitive souls in all of their operations.”16 In fact, in his early De vita he offers a (partial) argument for this assumption:

[T]he vegetative soul does not operate anything in us unless it is governed by the sensitive soul; likewise, the sensitive soul does not operate anything in a human being unless the intellective soul assists it; from whence it comes about that while the sensitive or rational soul is vehemently occupied with something, as in big pas- sions of the soul, the usual assistance to the vegetative soul is interrupted; and for this reason it is often forced to desist from its usual duties and to interrupt nutrition and its other functions [. . .].17 14. Liceti 1602, De ortu animae humanae, hereafter OAH, p. 329: “[F]ructus, dum arbori haerent, eiusdem animae beneªcio vivunt, qua & arbor ipsa vivere dicitur, quae ar- boris anima postmodum pluriªcatur, dividiturque ad subiecti divisionem . . . Ita prorsum arbitror semen in corpore patris eadem anima potiri, quae & pater ipse fruitur; quam dividi, ac pluriªcari censeo ad subiecti divisionem, dum semen a patris corpore seiungitur [. . .].” 15. OAH, p. 301: “potior humanae animae pars intellectiva sit non educta de sinu materiae, sed creata ex nihilo, & immortalis [. . .].” 16. ACC, p. 40: “quemadmodum sentiens anima gubernat vegetalem in quibusque suis functionibus edendis; ita plane rationalis & vegetalem, & sentienten regit in omnibus earum operationibus.” 17. Liceti 1607, De vita (hereafter DV), pp. 137–138: “[V]egetalis anima in nobis nihil operatur nisi a sensitrice gubernetur; perinde ac neque sentiens in homine suo munere fungitur nisi ab intellectrice fuerit adiuta; unde ªt ut anima sentiente, aut rationali vehe- mentius occupata circa obiectum aliquod, ut in magnis animi passionibus, consuetum aux-

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Thus, what speaks for the dependence of the operations of the vegetative soul on operations of the sensitive or rational soul is that the former can be impeded by the malfunctioning of the latter. Even though Liceti does not offer an explicit argument for the dependence of the operations of the sensitive soul on the operations of rational soul, constructing such an argument along similar lines would be easy. For Liceti, the dependence of the operations of the vegetative and sensitive soul on the operations of the rational souls implies that the rational soul acts upon the vegetative and sensitive souls. As in the case of sensitive souls that govern vegetative souls, he applies the principle that something has to be where it operates: “if what governs must be contiguous to the governed [. . .], the rational soul must be coextensive with the vegetative and the sensitive soul.”18 This is why Liceti believes that the rational soul must also be coextensive with the body that it animates: “If these functions of the mind and the will are considered in so far as they are the conditions that constitute the existence of a principle of motion for the human being that contains them, intellection and appetition, in so far as they lead to motion, are necessarily coextensive with the whole body [. . .].”19 In Liceti’s view, intellection and appetition, taken separately, do not depend on the body: “[B]ecause intellection is produced without the help of any bodily organ, intellection is properly not a bodily action, if you understand it precisely as mere cognition; [. . .] the same I will say about pure appetition [. . .].”20 Nevertheless, he argues that they must be present jointly in every region of the body: [T]he two potencies of the rational soul, namely, intellect and will, insofar as they come together in a single principle of local motion of the entire human being in which they are contained, as well as of each of its parts, they are coextensive with the whole body and re- side in each particle of the body.21

ilium vegetali animae intercipiatur; & iccirco haec a solitis ofªciis saepe desistere cogitur, ac nutritionem, aliaque sui munia multoties intermittere [. . .].” 18. ACC, p. 40: “si ergo gubernans gubernato contiguum esse oportet. . . ; profecto rationalis anima & vegetanti, & sentienti coextensa esse debet [. . .].” 19. ACC, p. 40: “[si] hae functiones mentis, & voluntatis considerentur quatenus sunt conditiones constituentes in esse principium motivum hominis continentis. . . ; necessario intellectio, & appetitio, ut ad motum diriguntur, toti corpori sunt coextensae [. . .].” 20. ACC, pp. 51–52: “[I]ntellectio quum nullius organi corporei ministerio edatur, si eam ut mera cognitio est praecise sumpseris, proprie actio corporea non est [. . .]. Idipsum iudicavero de appetione pura [. . .].” 21. ACC, p. 51: “[H]ae duae facultates animae rationalis, intellectus nimirum, atque voluntas, quatenus coincidunt in unum principium loco motivum totius hominis contin-

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That certain mental potencies are coextensive with the body, in turn, implies that the substance that possesses potencies is coextensive with the body: [W]hen any function is an act of an agent which is entirely inseparable from it because the act cannot be without the entity whose act it is, indeed also the essence of the intellectual souls from which operations of this kind proceed [. . .] will be present as a whole in the whole and as a whole in the single parts.22 Due to the role of the rational soul as principle of local motion, Liceti would thus subscribe to a traditional notion of the relation between soul and body that goes back to Plotinus and was widely accepted in scholastic thought: the notion that the soul is present as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part of the body.23 Such a view clearly implies that the rational soul cannot be divided into parts that possess different essences. Still, it leaves open the question why the rational soul could not be divided into parts that possess the same essence. Does Liceti’s natural philosophy contain resources to answer this question? I think it does. The relevant material can be found in Liceti’s discussion of the relation between the extension of the rational soul and the extension of the body animated by it. To explicate this relation, he invokes the analogy between minds and light. In order to get a grip on how this analogy is meant to work, we thus have ªrst to look into Liceti’s analysis of the structure of light.

3. Light and Existential Dependence In his later years, Liceti wrote extensively about light. In his later writings, he understands lumen to be “a quality perceptible by vision that is physically produced by a luminous body.”24 According to his later theory of light, the mode of physical production is reduced to efªcient causation by means of local motion. And the product that is produced in this way

entis, & singulorum membrorum illius, sunt universo corpori coextensae, deguntque in singulis corporis particulis.” 22. ACC, p. 51: “[Q]uando functio quaevis est actus operantis ab eo penitus insep- arabilis ea ratione, ut actus non sit sine illo, cuius est actus; profecto & animae intellectricis essentia, a qua huiusmodi operationes prodeunt [. . .] tota in toto & tota in singulis partibus inerit.” 23. On the inºuence of this view, often dubbed “holenmerism,” in the Neoplatonic and scholastic traditions, see Grant 1981, 222–225; Des Chene 2000, pp. 191–202; Roze- mond, 2003; Reid 2007, pp. 88–89. For authoritative formulations of the doctrine, see Plotinus 1984, 4:418; 4:294; Ficino 2001–2006, 1: 237–239; 2: 229. 24. Liceti 1640a, p. 99: “lumen esse sensibilem visu qualitatem physice productam a corpore lucido”

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stands in the relation of inherence to the illuminated body: “Lumen is an accidental quality, and a corporeal quality, for the reason that it requires the underlying body in which it inheres [. . .]”25 Hence, it is a quality that depends for its existence on the illuminated body. Moreover, it is a quality that is divisible, “for everything that is received is received in the mode of the receiver: but the disposed matter that receives in it the form of light is a perspicuous body that is itself a quantum and divisible”26 Evidently, such a conception of light would not be helpful in explicating the immaterial and indivisible nature of mind. Yet, the conception of light in his later writings diverges considerably from his much shorter treatment of light in De vita and De animarum coextensione corpori, and it is his earlier treatment that matters for our present purposes. In his early De vita (1607) he clariªes his own understanding of the similarity between soul and light by discussing Albert the Great’s theory of light. He notes that Albert holds that life is, not so much an operating soul, but rather some work of the soul, which he calls internal act, or essential perfection immediately proceeding from the soul and into the body [. . .]. [T]his perfection is described by Albert as the essential act proceeding immediately from the soul into the body entirely in the same way as the sun that is present is used to send forth lumen into the perspicuous body, such that lumen is the perfection of the perspicuous body proximately ºowing from the lux of the sun that is present in the perspicuous body [. . .].27 In this passage, the traditional distinction between light as an entity present in a luminous body and light as an entity present in an illuminated perspicuous body plays a crucial role. The distinction goes back at least to the eleventh-century Arabic Aristotelian natural philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and in the Latin tradition was expressed in terms of the distinc- 25. Liceti 1640b, p. 179: “lumen esse qualitatem accidentalem, & qualitatem ea ratione corporea, quia subiecti coporis indiget, in quo haereat [. . .].” 26. Liceti 1642, p. 328: “omne quod recipitur, per modum recipientis recipitur: materia vero disposita recipiens in se formam luminis est diaphanum corpus per se quantum ac divisibile.” See also Liceti 1640a, pp. 115–116. On Liceti’s later theory of light, see Zoubov 1936. 27. DV, pp. 68–69: “vitam esse, non certe animam operantem, sed bene opus quoddam animae, quod ipse appellat actum internum, seu essentialem perfectionem immediate prodeuntem ab anima in corpus [. . .]. [A]tque ista perfectio ab Alberto nuncupatur actus essentialis immediate proºuens ab anima in corpus eodem prorsus modo, quo a Sole prae- sente prodire consuevit immediate lumen in corpus diaphanum, & quemadmodum lumen est perfectio corporis perspicui proxime proºuens a luce Solis praesentis in corpus diaphanum [. . .].”

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tion between lux and lumen.28 Unsurprisingly, both the nature of this relation and the nature of lumen were objects of controversy within medieval and early modern philosophy. Albert the Great suggested an analysis of the relation between lux and lumen that involves only the essence of lux: “The soul is said to live causally in itself because it is the cause of life and living in itself, as lux is said to be luminous and the cause of lumen; and because of this even the higher beings are said to live a more noble life, because in them there is nothing relating to a moving or moved being [. . .].”29 Thus, for Albert the relation between lux and lumen does not in- volve any motion but rather is constituted by emanative causation. This is how he further explicates this relation: [L]ux is the being and the ªrst actuality of the luminous body, and sending forth lumen is its essential secondary actuality, in so far as this is its activity, which consists in some essential diffusion of its form; for each essence has a proper and essential operation, of which it is never deprived, provided it is essential, as lux is not deprived of sending forth lumen which is its activity.30 And he is explicit that the same kind of relation holds between forms and their operations in general: “[I]n this way, things are with each natural and substantial form that is by itself the principle of its essential operations and not by something else added to it.”31 Thus, being by itself the source of activity is what, for Albert, constitutes an analogy between lux and other substantial forms such as the human soul. Liceti accepts certain aspects of Albert’s theory of light. Most importantly, Liceti shares the view that the production of lumen involves emanative causation: Heaven and nature is said to depend on god as an efªcient cause [. . .]; the sun possesses an efªcient cause from which it proceeds 28. See Avicenna Latinus 1972, pp. 170–172. 29. Albertus Magnus 1968, p. 74: “Anima autem etiam in se dicitur vivere causaliter, quia est causa vitae et viva in seipsa, sicut lux dicitur luminosa et causa luminis; et proter hoc etiam superiora dicuntur vivere nobiliri vita, quia nihil est in eis ex parte motoris vel mobilis [. . .].” 30. Albertus Magnus 1968, p. 65: “[L]ux lucentis est esse et actus primus, et lucere est actus essentialis eius secundus, eo quod haec est actio eius, quae suae formae diffusio quaedam est essentialis; omnis enim essentia propriam et essentialem habet operationem, qua numquam destituitur, quando est essentialis, sicut lux non destituitur a lucere, quod est eius actio.” 31. Albertus Magnus 1968, p. 65: “[I]ta etiam est de omni forma naturali et substan- tiali, quod ipsa est principium suarum operationum essentialium per seipsam et non per aliud sibi additum.”

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eternally by simple emanation without any novelty of being; in the same way, from the lux of the sun [. . .] lumen proceeds eternally through simple emanation as from its proximate and immediate efªcient cause [. . .].32 Due to its origin in emanative causation, he takes lumen to be “nothing other than an image of lux from which it proceeds [. . .].”33 Liceti also accepts that there is a strong analogy between soul and light but has objec- tions against using the analogy in the way suggested by Albert: for the soul by itself is the ªrst actuality and the essential and internal perfection of the natural body, which is the living potency [. . .] but the sun cannot similarly be said to be the ªrst actuality and internal and essential perfection of the perspicuous body, which is illuminated through the potency; but lumen is rather something like that, namely an actuality, or a perfection of the perspicuous body; [. . .] and hence the soul is proportional to lumen, but not to the sun, from which lumen proceeds [. . .].34 From the central role that Liceti ascribes to lumen for understanding the structure of the human soul derives his strong interest in analyzing the relation between lumen and material extension. And on this issue, he is in fact much more explicit than Albert. On the suggestion (which Liceti, probably erroneously, ascribes to Aristotle’s Rhetoric) that “intellect in the soul is kindled by God as lumen is kindled by the sun in the perspicuous body,”35 he comments: “Since lumen in the perspicuous body is not there as an indivisible point but rather is coextensive with every dimension of the perspicuous body.”36 Still, due to the emanation relation between lux 32. Liceti 1629, De animarum rationalium immortalitate (hereafter ARI), p. 154: “A Deo [. . .], ut a causa efªciente, pendere dicitur caelum, & natura [. . .]; solem obtinet causam effectricem, a qua per simplicem emanationem absque novitate essendi ab aeterno prodi- erit; sic a Solis luce [. . .] lumen ab aeterno prodiit absque novitate essendi per simplicem emanationem ut a sui causa effectrice proxima, & immediata [. . .].” 33. ARI, p. 156: “lumen revera nihil aliud est, quam imago lucis, a qua proªciscitur [. . .].” 34. DV, pp. 75–76: “anima etenim secundum se ipsamet est actus primus, perfectio essentialis, & interna corporis illius naturalis, quod est potentia vivens [De an., II 6] [. . .] non autem consimiliter Sol dici potest actus primus, perfectioque internum & essentalis corporis perspicui, quod est potentia illuminatum; sed lumen est potius tale quid, nempe actus, sive perfectio corporis perspicui [. . .] & ideo anima proportione respondet lumini, non Soli, a quo lumen proªciscitur.” 35. ACC, p. 54: “Intellectum in anima esse a Deo accensum ut lumen a sole in perspicuo”; I have not been able to trace this quotation in the Aristoteles Latinus database. 36. ACC, p. 54: “Quum autem lumen in perspicuo sit non ut prunctum indivisibile, sed perspicui dimensionibus omniquaque coextensum [. . .].”

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and lumen, lumen is existentially independent of the perspicuous body: “[L]umen is said to be external to the air whose assisting form it is since it does not depend on the air, even though it actualizes the innermost parts of the air.”37 Accordingly, he describes the relations of existential dependence relevant for lumen as follows: We deny [. . .] that whatever is in matter, instantly is affected by the conditions of matter; because it can be in matter in various ways, both dependent on it, and independent from it; of course, those things that are in matter and depend on it are affected by the conditions of matter and are inseparable from matter; but these things that are in matter and do not depend on it, are not affected by the conditions of matter; in this way lumen is in a dirty and stinky body, independent of such subjects; for it depends only on the luminous body [. . .].38 Obviously, lumen does not become dirty and stinky by illuminating a dirty and stinky body. But what is more important for our present concerns is that local motion belongs to the conditions of the illuminated matter that do not affect lumen. Of course, lumen can be moved through the motion of the luminous body from which it originates; the same, however, is not true of the body that it illuminates: Nothing can be moved through the motion of something else unless it exists either in it as something located there as in a place; or as a form, either an accidental form in the subject of inherence, or a substantial form in the subject of inexistence; or as an organ in the potency of the primary agent; or generally not unless it depends for its existence on it in some way. But an assisting form is where its underlying body is located and guides it, but is not in it as in a place, nor as in a subject of inherence or of inexistence, nor as an organ in the potency of the primary agent, and generally does not depend on the body that it assists.39 37. ARI, p. 151: “[L]umen dicitur esse aeri extrinsecum, cuius est forma assistens, quoniam ab aere non pendet, quamvis intimas quasque partes aeris actuet.” 38. ARI, p. 71: “Negamus [. . .], quicquid est in materia, id afªci statim conditionibus materiae; quia multifariam quid in materia inesse potest, tum dependenter ab ea, tum independenter: sane quae sunt in materia dependenter ab ea, conditionibus materiae afªciuntur, & a materia sunt inseparabilia; quae vero sunt in materia independenter ab illa, conditionibus materiae non afªciuntur: sic lumen in luto, & in foetido corpore inest, independenter a talibus subiectis; quum a solo corpore lucido dependeat [. . .].” 39. Liceti 1627, De intellectu agente ( hereafter DIA), p. 184: “[N]ihil moveri potest ad motum alterius nisi in eo insit vel tamquam locatum in loco; vel tamquam forma, sive accidentalis in subiecto inhaesionis, sive substantialis in subiecto inexistentiae; vel tam-

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That lumen does not depend on the illuminated body as on a place seems to be a straightforward consequence of Liceti’s acceptance of an Aristotelian conception of place. As Liceti puts it: “The reason why something is a place is that it contains and preserves what is located [. . .]; for place is deªned to be the boundary of what contains something [. . .].”40 Thus, it is not the illuminated body that deªnes a place and, hence, lumen cannot depend on the illuminated body as on a place. Moreover, Liceti’s categoriza- tion of lumen as an assisting form implies that lumen cannot depend on the illuminated body as on a subject of inherence or information. Also, because it emanates from lux, lumen cannot be understood as an instrument that depends on some bodily agent. In this way, Liceti excludes the various ways in which the motion of lumen could depend on the motion of the illuminated body. This conclusion has far-reaching implications for the divisibility of lumen: lumen that is not movable through the local motion of the underlying air; which shadows that are immobile in moved air indicate [. . .]; evidently, they cannot be said to be divisible through the division of the underlying air because with real division the local motion of the parts that are divided is necessarily conjoined.41 Because parts of shadows do not undergo local motion at the separation of parts of perspicuous bodies, also the lumen that brings about these shadows does not undergo motion through the motion of the parts of perspicuous bodies. Hence, the perspicuous body that is illuminated by lumen can be divided without a division of lumen.

4. Mind, Light, and Immaterial Extension Thus far, Liceti has given an account of how the existential independence of lumen from matter implies a kind indivisibility of lumen: lumen does not undergo division through the division of matter. Does this structure carry over to the relation between mind and matter? Liceti acknowledges pro-

quam organum in potestate agentis praecipui, ac omnino nisi quoquopacto ab eo dependeat in esse. Forma vero assistens adest quidem, ac praeest subiecto corpori, sed in eo non inest ut in loco, nec ut in subiecto aut inhaesionis, aut inexistentiae, nec ut organum in potestate agentis praecipui, atque omnino a corpore non dependet, cui assistit.” 40. ARI, p. 292: “ratio loci sit in eo, quod est continere, consevareque locata. . . ; deªnitur enim locus esse terminus continentis [. . .].” See Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 209a5– 10. 41. ACC, p. 69: “Lumen etenim, quod non est ad subiecti aeris motum localem loco mobile; quod indicant umbrae stabiles in aere moto [. . .]; plane ad eiudem substrati aeris divisionem partibile dici non possunt, quia cum reali divisione coniunctus necessario est eorum, quae dividuntur, motus localis.”

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found dissimilarities between lumen and mind. Whereas he regards lumen as an assisting accidental form, he accepts the Aristotelian view that the mind is “inexisting and informing.”42 This difference between lumen and mind implies that minds behave differently from lumen with respect to local motion: “An assisting form is not necessarily moved through the motion of the body that it assists; but in contrast, the informing form is necessarily moved through the motion of the body that it informs.”43 These differences given due attention, Liceti nevertheless believes that there is an informative analogy between lumen and mind: [I]t is plain that the rational soul is in the whole human soul and entirely in the body as light is in the perspicuous body; or that the intellect [. . .] is infused by god into the irrational soul of the fetus, as lumen is infused by the sun into the perspicuous body; namely, lumen is not educed out of the potency of the perspicuous body by any change of the perspicuous body brought about by the luminous body; but the luminous body infuses lumen into the perspicuous body, as a foreign form reaching the perspicuous body from the outside [. . .]; for visible species are not educed from the potency of the medium; but as something independent from the medium, they ar- rive from the outside of some object: a visible species is so independent from a medium, and especially lumen from the perspicuous body in which it is, that it is not moved through the motion of the body, and is not corrupted through the corruption of the body [. . .].44 Hence, the analogy has to do with the emanation relation and the ensuing existential independence from matter: as lumen is existentially independent from matter because it emanates from lux, so is mind existentially independent from matter because it emanates from God. For Liceti, the existential independence of mind from matter entails that minds possess 42. DV, p. 326. 43. DIA, p. 240: “[A]ssistens forma non necessario movetur ad motum corporis, cui assistit; informans e contra forma necessario movetur ad motum corporis, quod informat [. . .].” 44. ARI, p. 167: “[C]onstat apertissime rationalem animam esse in humana anima tota, & omnino in corpore, ut lumen in perspicuo; seu Intellectum a [. . .] Deo in animam irrationalem faetus immitti, ut lumen a Sole in perspicuum immittitur: porro lumen non educitur ex potentia diaphani per transmutationem ullam translucidi factam a lucido; sed a corpore lucido inditur ipsi transparenti lumen, ceu forma peregrina exterinsecus adveniens diaphano [. . .]; modo species visibiles non educuntur ex potentia medii, sed independenter a medio illi extrinsecus adveniunt ab obiecto: species visibiles a medio, & speciatim lumen a diaphano, in quo est, ita est independens, ut ad eius motum non moveatur, & ad eius in- teritum non corrumpatur [. . .].”

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several structural features that distinguish them from material beings. One of these features, already noted in the passage just cited, is that a mind is not affected in its existence through the corruption of a portion of matter associated with it. A second feature is that minds confer being onto composite substances—human beings that possess mind and body—but do not derive their being from any other constituent of a composite: A form is not to a lesser degree a being than the composite; because from it the composite has it that it is a being. But a form that can exist in a composite and also separate from it, is of all things a being in the highest degree; both because it makes the composite a being, and because it is an individual substance by itself, even separated from the body [. . .]. A form is [. . .] by itself a substance and a being; and what is through something else or dependently on something else, is a being in a lesser degree than what is a being by itself and independently.45 A third feature of mind is its separability from matter—a feature that minds share with lumen: “Absolutely all forms, be it informing or assisting,...that have an operation proper to them, can be separated from their underlying bodies [. . .].”46 In fact, this property both in the case of lumen and in the case of mind is closely connected with emanative causation: Those beings whose operation emanates immediately from their mere essence are rightly said to be of the kind whose operations exist and come about [. . .] through their simple substance; not because the function in them was not formally distinguished from their essence; but because they operate alone through their simple substance, not through the intervention of any other thing; in this way, lumen illuminates only through its presence and its simple essence, without using any instrument [. . .]; the active intellect has this attribute in common with the passive intellect [. . .].47 45. ARI, p. 15: “[F]orma non minus est hoc aliquid quam compositum; quum ab eo compositum habeat id, ut sit hoc aliquid: at forma, quae in composito & ab eo separata esse potest, omnium maxima est hoc aliquid: tum quia composito tribuit esse hoc aliquid; tum quia ipsa secundum se a composito separata est substantia individua [. . .]. [F]orma [. . .] est de se substantia, & hoc aliquid; quod autem est per aliud, seu dependenter ab alio tale, minus est tale quam id quod est de se tale, ac independenter.” 46. DIA, p. 275: “[F]ormarum absolute, sive informatium, sive assistentium, [. . .] qui habent operationem propriam, hae possunt a subdito sibi corpore separari [. . .].” 47. DIA, p. 287: “Haec sane, quorum operatio immediate a nuda sui essentia pro- manant, recte dicuntur esse talia, ut ipsoum operationes sint, ac ªant [. . .] simplici eorundem substantia; non quia functio formaliter in eis non distinguatur ab essentia; sed quia sola sui substantia simplici, non alterius interventu rei, operantur: ita sane lumen sola

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The next section will return to the question what the mental operations emanating immediately from the mind’s essence are. For now, it is suf- ªcient to note that Liceti grounds the separability of both mind and lumen from matter in the existence of operations emanating immediately from essences. A fourth feature that mind, in Liceti’s view, seems to share with lumen is immortality: “Every substantial form that proceeds like lumen from the luminous body, is not educed from the potency of matter though its trans- mutation but reaches it from without; and something that is so independent from matter is immortal [. . .].”48 Of course, one might wonder whether the notion of immortality that Liceti has in mind here is suf- ªcient to ªll out the theological doctrine of the immortality of the human. But certainly, Liceti’s notion of immortality captures that an entity that does not arise from material potencies also cannot be destroyed through the destruction of the potencies of matter. Finally, the analogy between lumen and rational souls is meant to bring out that the extension of rational souls relates to material extension in a different way than the extensions of vegetative and sensitive souls do:

Some forms that are coextensive with their underlying bodies are accidental quanta relative to the quantity of the underlying body, such that their quantity depends on the quantity of the underlying body in every respect; and forms of this kind are accidentally divisible through the division of the underlying body; of this kind are all perishable forms that are educed at their origin from the womb of matter by a generating being. But of a different kind are forms that are quanta by themselves that possess some proportional immaterial quantity and that are coextensive with the dimensions of the underlying body; the quantity of these forms by no means depends on the dimensions of the underlying body. This is how forms are that are not accidentally divisible through the division of the underlying body; in themselves they are only divisible through designation and in the mind, but not in reality; and of this kind are lumen and immortal souls [. . .].49

sui praesentia, suaque simplici essentia illuminat, nullius instrumenti ministerio utens [. . .] quod attributum habet commune intellectus agens cum intellectu possibili [. . .].” 48. ARI, p. 168: “omnis forma substantialis, quae ut lumen a lucido provenit, ea non educitur de potentia materiae per huius transmutationem, sed huic extrinsecus advenit; atque adeo independens a materia est immortalis.” 49. ACC, p. 69: “[F]ormarum subiacenti sibi corpori coextensarum aliae sunt quantae per accidens ad subiecti corporis quantitatem, ut quarum quantitas a substrati corporis quantitate omnino dependet; ac huiusmodi formae revera sunt per accidens divisibiles ad

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It is the existential independence of the extension of lumen and rational souls on the extension of bodies that leads Liceti to the conclusion that in nature there are two different kinds of extension: “We afªrm that in things there are two kinds of extension: one material and belonging to magnitude [. . .], the other formal, belonging to power and incorporeal substance, without which power cannot exist.”50 Taken together, Liceti’s claim that rational souls are coextensive with the body and his claim that the extension of rational souls is independent of the extension of the body have a further consequence. Even if rational souls cannot be divided through the division of the body, the extension of the rational soul changes and is diminished when the body loses parts:

The mind dilates and contracts itself in the augmentation and dim- inution of the body independently of the body, such that the pro- portion of the extension with the body is preserved [. . .] as long as it does not exceed the limits of its extension prescribed by nature; which it never can do; and this is why the human intellect in no way can actualize a portion of matter as large as a big mountain nor as small as a grain of mustard [. . .]. Otherwise, if the human intellect did not have such a limited extension of its substance and power but were without any extension at all, a human being as small as an atom could be born [. . .].51

In this way, Liceti combines his view that the coextension of mind and body implies that the mind always occupies the same part of space as its underlying body with a traditional element of the Aristotelian theory of

subiecti corporis partitionem; tales autem sunt formae caducae omnae e materiae sinu eductae a generante in earum origine [. . .]. [A]liae vero sunt formae quantae per se im- materiali quadam quantitate, proportionata coextensae subiacentis corporis dimensioni; quae formarum propria quantitas a subiecti corporis quantitate minime dependet: huiusmodi autem formae sunt, non quidem divisibiles per accidens ad subditi sibi corporis partitionem; sed per se divisibiles sunt sola designatione, ac mente, non reipsa, ut lumen, & immortales animae [. . .].” 50. ACC, p. 71: “[A]sseveramus duplicem in rebus inveniri extensionem; alteram materialem, ac magnitudinis; [. . .] alteram formalem, ac virtutis, & substantiae incorporeae, sine qua virtus esse non potest.” 51. ACC, p. 63: “[M]ens extenditur, & contrahitur per se in augmento, & in decremento corporis independenter a corpore, ut servet cum corpore proportionem exten- sionis [. . .] [D]ummodo non excedat limites extensioni suae a natura praescriptos; quod nunquam efªcere potest; atque hinc est, quod intellectus humanus haudquaquam potest actuare materiam mole magno monti aequalem; nec vicissim parvam aequalem grano sin- apis [. . .]. Secus enim si extensionem substantiae, ac virtutis ita limitatum non haberet intellectus humanus, sed esset omnino sine ulla extensione; iam posset homo nasci pusillus ut atomus [. . .].”

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natural minima and maxima. According to this theory, the notion of natural minima and maxima is essentially bound to the notion of substantial form.52 For example, Thomas Aquinas argues that each determinate form is accompanied by determinate accidents, including quantity. This is why he believes that every body, by possessing a determinate form, also has a determinate quantity with respect to a lower and an upper limit.53 Roger Bacon goes one step further, asking why it is that a substantial form is bound to determinate minimal body size and considers both the possibility that this could be due to the function of forms to confer being and the possibility that this could be due to the function of form to be principles of operation.54 With respect to homogenous mixtures such as bone or ºesh Bacon’s answer is clear. With respect to their maximal size, the function of forms to confer being could well be relevant; but not so for their minimal size: If such mixtures fall below a minimal size, their substantial forms could not operate at all.55 William of Ockham, in turn, gives voice to a more general conception of the relevant sense of operation when he clariªes the sense in which he wants the concept of a “minimum in natural things” to be understood: It is a “minimum that can perform the action of the species in question.”56 Understanding minima in this way opens up the possibility to apply the notion of a natural minimum not only to elements and homogeneous body parts but also to entire living beings: The minimal size of a living being belonging to a particular species is the size below which the substantial form of this living being would cease to be able to operate. Liceti’s view that the human intellect could not animate an organic body below and above a certain size is a straightforward application of this traditional line of thought to the minimal and maximal size of humans. In

52. On this sense of minimism, see Maier 1949, pp. 181–186; Emerton 1986, pp. 90– 91; Murdoch 2001, 101 n. 28, pp. 104–106. 53. Aquinas, STh, I, q. 7, a. 3: “[O]mne corpus naturale aliquam formam substantialem habet determinatam: cum igitur ad formam substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam quantitatem et in maius et in minus.” 54. Bacon 1928, pp. 153–154. 55. Bacon 1928, p. 156: “Si autem sit corpus mixtum simile in specie, vel om- mogenium, ut caro, tunc non contingit stare a parte materie, nec a parte forme ut dat esse nisi in suppremo, set in inªmo vel dividendo contingit stare ut est operis principium, et hoc quia amplius operari non possit.” 56. Ockham 1984, q. 82: “[U]bique dicunt Philosophus et Commentator quod contingit dare minimum in rebus naturalibus, intellecto de minimo quod potest agere actionem illius speciei, sicut dicit Commentator VII Physicorum commento 2.”

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particular, Liceti seems to allude both to the view that form as a principle of being is bound to a body of a size with determinate limits when he mentions the form’s function to actualize the body and to the view that the same applies to form as a principle of operation when he mentions the form’s powers. However, he combines these traditional ideas with his novel conception of immaterial extension. Doing so leads to a quite un- precedented consequence: As long as the body is not diminished below the natural lower limit, the rational soul not only continues to animate the body even after the body has lost some of its parts; it also diminishes its own extension to the same extent as the extension of the body is diminished. In this sense, extended rational souls have the capacity of contract- ing and expanding themselves within the limits set by the minimal and maximal size of their bodies.

5. Conclusion Liceti’s usage of the analogy between light and mind thus is central to his understanding of the distinction between immaterial and material extension. The independence of lumen from the motion of the matter that it illuminates indicates that the extension of lumen does not derive from the extension of matter. For Liceti, lumen depends for its existence on a principle from which it emanates (lux), in such a way that is existentially independent from illuminated matter. Lumen is indivisible in the sense of not being capable of being divided through the division of illuminated matter. This is gives the clue to the sense in which mind can be at the same time extended and indivisible. It is extended due to its capacity of moving the whole body and as well as its parts indicates. Nevertheless, it does not derive its extension from the matter animated. For Liceti, this is so because mind, too, has a principle from which it emanates (God), in such a way that it is existentially independent from animated matter. This is why mind is not divisible through the division of animated matter. To be sure, for Liceti there are structural dissimilarities between lumen and mind. Most notably, lumen is understood as assisting accidental form, while mind is understood as a substantial informing form. For this reason, mind does not behave exactly as lumen does on the occasion of the division of matter. Still, Liceti’s usage of the analogy between light and mind makes clear in which the sense a being that possesses immaterial extension can at the same time be indivisible. Liceti’s metaphysics of immaterial extension—one of the earliest in seventeenth-century philosophy—certainly is of considerable interest in itself. But it might also be helpful, by comparison and contrast, to understand the role that immaterial extension plays in other positions of early

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modern philosophy. In particular, it raises the question of whether a similar pattern of thought may be found in More’s usage of the analogy between individual spirits and Aristotelian intentional species. A full discussion of this question obviously would go beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, there are some hints that More had in mind the existential independence of individual spirits from matter when he compared spirits with light. He holds that what he calls the “secondary substance” of an individual spirit—e.g., its vegetative parts—emanates from the “primary substance” of a spirit and, for this reason, depends for its existence only on the persistence of the primary substance but not on any portion of matter that it animates.57 Also, he maintains that individual spirits depend for their existence only on God.58 Likewise, he explicates the sense in which he takes Aristotelian intentional species to be something substantial in terms of their existential independence from the medium that they illuminate.59 And he is aware that the observation that motion of the air does not cause motion of shadows in the Aristotelian tradition was used to argue for the existential independence of light from the medium.60 Hav- ing the conceptual pattern developed by Liceti in mind could thus be helpful in making visible the connection between some of More’s rather scattered remarks concerning existential independence from matter and the physical indivisibility of beings that possess immaterial extension. To substantiate this suggestion, however, will be the task of another paper.

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