Living Atoms, Hylomorphism and Spontaneous Generation in Daniel Sennert

LIVING ATOMS, HYLOMORPHISM AND SPONTANEOUS GENERATION IN DANIEL SENNERT

Hiro Hirai*

1. Introduction

The professor of medicine at the Lutheran University of Wittenberg, Daniel Sennert (1572–1637), has recently drawn the keen attention of historians. Going beyond the traditional treatment, which consists in seeing him simply as one of the fĳirst proponents of early modern atomism, a careful revision of his entire work has begun.1 In the context of seventeenth-century “chymistry” (chemistry/alchemy) and corpuscular philosophy, his role as a major source for the Christian virtuoso, Robert Boyle (1627–1691), has been set in a fresh light.2 His theory of the soul, where Aristotelian hylomorphism and Democritean atomism intersect, has also been the subject of recent studies.3 The relationship of embryological pre- formationism with the theory of monads has made some specialists of

* I acknowledge the generous support of the Chemical Heritage Foundation and the help of Christoph Lüthy, Richard Arthur and Kuni Sakamoto in the preparation of the present study, whose shorter version is: “Atomes vivants, origine de l’âme et génération spontanée chez Sennert,” Bruniana & Campanelliana, 13 (2007), pp. 477–495. 1 See Christoph Meinel, “Early Seventeenth-Century Atomism: Theory, Epistemology, and the Insufffĳiciency of Experiment,” Isis, 79 (1988), pp. 68–103; Antonio Clericuzio, Ele- ments, Principles and Corpuscles: A Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 23–33; Christoph Lüthy and William R. Newman, “Daniel Sennert’s Earliest Writings (1599–1600) and their Debt to Giordano Bruno,” Bruni- ana & Campanelliana, 6 (2000), pp. 261–279. See also my Le concept de semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance: de Marsile Ficin à Pierre Gassendi (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 401–406. 2 See William R. Newman, “The Alchemical Sources of Robert Boyle’s Corpuscular Phi- losophy,” Annals of Science, 53 (1996), pp. 567–585; idem, “Experimental Corpuscular The- ory in Aristotelian Alchemy: From Geber to Sennert,” in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. Christoph Lüthy et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 291–329; idem, Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientifĳic Revolu- tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 85–153. 3 See Emily Michael, “Daniel Sennert on Matter and Form: At the Juncture of the Old and the New,” Early Science and Medicine, 2 (1997), pp. 272–299; eadem, “Sennert’s Sea Change: Atoms and Causes,” in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theo- ries, pp. 331–362; Michael Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul: The Medical and Lutheran Con- text of Daniel Sennert’s Atomism,” Medicina nei Secoli, 15 (2003), pp. 177–203.

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G.W. Leibniz (1646–1716) consider Sennert seriously as a key fĳigure, otherwise very little explored in the history of philosophy.4 Sennert’s work encompasses the cluster of problems occurring in the seventeenth century between matter theories and the life sciences. The question of the origin of the activity of matter and its animation is without doubt one of the most important issues in this domain. The idea of “abiogenesis” or “spontaneous generation”, that is, the belief in the generation of living beings from lifeless matter, seems particularly pertinent. Sennert wrote a treatise precisely on this subject, entitled De spontaneo viventium ortu, which he published at the end of his masterpiece Hypom- nemata physica (Frankfurt, 1636). Notably, he developed a corpuscular interpretation of the origin of life in order to explain spontaneous generation, while biological generation provided the foundational model for his philosophical reflections in general. In the present study, I shall fĳirst analyze Sennert’s discussions on the “normal” generation of living beings, plants, animals and humans, which gives the basis of his doctrine on the origin of souls. I shall then, properly speaking, examine his theory of spontaneous generation. Before starting the analysis, let us fĳirst look at what Sennert declares in a passage of the book designed to explain atoms and mixture: Now there are atoms not only of inanimate bodies, but also of certain animate ones; and the soul itself can sometimes lie hidden in its integrity and preserve itself in such minute corpuscles, as will be related below regarding the mixture and spontaneous generation of living beings. And it is upon this doctrine of atoms that the most learned Fortunio Liceti has built almost the whole of his opinion on spontaneous generation.5 What do the atoms of living beings mean for Sennert? How can the soul lie hidden in these atoms? What is the doctrine of this Fortunio Liceti (1577–1657) whom he calls upon here?6 What is the real contribution of

4 See Richard T.W. Arthur, “Animal Generation and Substance in Sennert and Leibniz,” in The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Justin E.H. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 147–174. 5 I have used the edition of Opera omnia (Lyon, 1650), I, pp. 132–242. Sennert, Hypom- nemata physica (hereafter HP), book 3, chapter 1, page 162: “Immo dantur atomi non solum corporum inanimatorum, sed et animatorum quorundam: et ipsa anima interdum in talibus minimis corpusculis integra latere et sese conservare potest; ut postea, de mistione et spontaneo viventium ortu, dicetur: et huic de atomis doctrinae totam pene suam de spontaneo viventium ortu sententiam superstruxit doctissimus Fortunius Licetus.” 6 On Liceti, see Dizionario biografĳico degli italiani, 65 (2005), pp. 69–73; Giuseppe Ongaro, “La generazione e il ‘moto’ del sangue nel pensiero di F. Liceti,” Castalia, 20 (1964), pp. 75–94; idem, “L’opera medica di Fortunio Liceti (nota preliminare),” in Atti del XX°

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Sennert himself ? How far does the biological model afffect his atomism and hylomorphism? These are the questions that I shall tackle in the present study.

2. The Origin of the Soul in Normal Generation

Sennert’s work, Hypomnemata physica (Physical Memoirs), is composed of fĳive books, treating respectively: 1) the principles of natural things; 2) occult qualities; 3) atoms and mixtures; 4) the generation of living beings; and 5) spontaneous generation. His discussion of the origin of souls is deployed in the fourth book, after the book devoted to the theory of atoms. In this fourth book on the “normal” or “non-spontaneous” generation of living beings, Sennert fĳirst asks whether souls can be produced. Against those who hold the doctrine of the “eduction” (eductio) of forms, according to which all forms, including souls, are drawn from the potentiality of matter, he afffĳirms that souls are multiplied rather than produced. In fact, the defense of the theory of the form’s “multiplication” (multipli- catio), by rejecting eduction, is the Leitmotiv of his discussions.

2.1. The Giver of Forms and Astral Causality Next, Sennert calls to mind a theory attributed to Avicenna that forms come from a celestial and superior intelligence, called “the Giver of Forms” (dator formarum).7 According to this theory, relates Sennert, the superior

congresso nazionale di storia della medicina (Roma, 1964) (Rome: Società italiana di storia della medicina, 1965), pp. 235–244; Hiro Hirai, “Interprétation chymique de la création et origine corpusculaire de la vie chez Athanasius Kircher,” Annals of Science, 64 (2007), pp. 217–234; idem, “Âme de la terre, génération spontanée et origine de la vie: Fortunio Liceti critique de Marsile Ficin,” Bruniana & Campanelliana, 12 (2006), pp. 451–469; idem, “Earth’s Soul and Spontaneous Generation: Fortunio Liceti’s Criticism against Ficino’s Ideas on the Origin of Life,” in Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and his Influence, ed. Stephen Clucas et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 273–299. 7 On the Giver of Forms, see Alfonso Nallino, “La Colcodea d’Avicenna e Campanella,” Giornale critico della fĳilosofĳia italiana, 6 (1925), pp. 84–91; Amélie-Marie Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sînâ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), pp. 301–303; eadem, Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sînâ (Paris: Desclée de Brou- wer, 1938), pp. 440–441; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, Le Monnier, 1965), pp. 233–235, 313–314; Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intel- lect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), passim; Helen T. Goldstein, “Dator Formarum: Ibn Rushd, Levi ben Gerson, and Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne,” in Islamic Thought and Culture, ed. Ismail al-Faruqi (Washington DC: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), pp. 107–121; Jules Janssens, “The Notions of Wâhib al-Suwar (Giver of Forms) and

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intelligence, also called “Colcodea,” uses seeds as instruments to produce the vegetative and sensitive soul, and when this soul informs the body appropriately, the rational soul is introduced by itself without the aid of matter. But judging this metaphysical theory unfounded, Sennert rejects it in the realm of natural philosophy. To him, although the astral causality promoted by this kind of idea is widely difffused, it should be considered a remote cause. Even if this superior intelligence can be identifĳied with the Creator God, since the question here concerns generation and not Creation, Sennert regards this doctrine false. For him, after the Creation of the world, God created nothing but miracles. Having ordained nature to achieve and preserve the course of generation and corruption, God stands only as the fĳirst and universal cause. The generation of all things is directly executed by the second causes to which God gave a capacity to produce their efffects. If Avicenna or other Platonists take for the efffĳicient cause of souls such a superior entity as Colcodea, there would exist no “univocal generation” (generatio univoca), in which the parent and its offfspring belong to the same species as in the case of humans who generate humans.8 Naturally enough, Sennert also rejects the very popular theory of French physician Jean Fernel (1497–1558), according to which souls come from heaven into matter when the latter is duly prepared. Fernel used spontaneous generation as evidence to defend his theory since he did not fĳind any seed or parent in this generation.9 Sennert thinks that, if some living beings are produced in this way, they are not the offfspring of the parent of the same species but those of heaven. This contradicts the axiom of univocal generation. Moreover, according to Sennert, it is unnecessary to draw souls down from heaven, because in the Creation of the world God gave to these living beings the capacity to multiply. Thus, he afffĳirms that, even if there is something divine in these terrestrial beings, they do not draw it from heaven, since each of them possesses its degree of dignity and

Wâhib al-‘Aql (Bestower of Intelligence) in Ibn Sînâ,” in Intellect et Imagination dans la philosophie médiévale, ed. Maria Cândila Pacheco (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), I, pp. 531–562; Hiro Hirai, “Semence, vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicolò Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs,” Early Science and Medi- cine, 12 (2007), pp. 134–165; idem, “Formative Power, Soul and Intellect in Nicolò Leoniceno between the Arabo-Latin Tradition and the Renaissance of the Greek Commentators,” in Psychology and the Other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250–1750), ed. Paul Bakker (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming). 8 Sennert, HP, 4.2, pp. 169–170. 9 See Hiro Hirai, “Alter Galenus: Jean Fernel et son interprétation platonico-chrétienne de Galien,” Early Science and Medicine, 10 (2005), pp. 1–35; idem, Le concept, pp. 83–103.

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humans, the noblest creature of all, are nobler than heaven. Furthermore, even if forms are not drawn from the potentiality of matter, this does not directly mean that they are procreated by heaven. So Sennert concludes that one who believes that the soul comes from heaven is at the same time ridiculous as a philosopher and execrable as a Christian, since it is God, not heaven, who gives to forms their specifĳic origin.

2.2. The Eduction of Forms Having thus refuted astral causality as the immediate cause of the generation of living beings, Sennert enumerates four positions among common opinions. Those who think the seed inanimate are divided into two parties: 1) some believe that the seed plays the role of matter and from its potentiality an external agent draws out the soul; 2) others posit the existence of a formative power, given to the seed by the parent to produce the soul. Similarly those who see the seed as animate are divided into two groups: 3) some hold that all seeds including those of humans contain a soul from the beginning; 4) others think that although the seed is animate only the human soul, also called the “rational soul” or “intellect,” comes from the outside.10 Sennert examines the fĳirst position based on the doctrine of the eduction of forms. Observing that most Scholastics hold this theory, he lists in particular Thomas Aquinas and the Jesuits, such as Francisco Tole- tus (1532–1596) and Benito Pereira (1535–1610), as examples. Sennert reproaches them for not adducing solid arguments and for repeating what their teachers had already said. For him, even if forms are drawn out from the potentiality of matter, the question of where they originate from is left entirely unanswered. Against the eduction of forms, Sennert advances the idea that all forms can multiply, just as Genesis says: “Be fruitful and multiply.”11 That is why he thinks that the soul is not produced anew but multiplies in the generation of natural beings. It is only the fĳirst soul of each species that was created by God in the Creation. The multiplication of forms is sufffĳicient for the soul of all individuals which existed, exist and will exist. Then Sennert recalls Aristotle’s defĳinition that generation is “the

10 Sennert, HP, 4.3, p. 171. Cf. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 2.3, 736b27–29. 11 Genesis, 1.22. On the rejection of the everyday creation of souls by God in the Lutheran context, see Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul,” pp. 190–193. By contrast, Schegk, also a Lutheran, defends it vigorously.

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initial participation in the nutritive soul by native heat.”12 According to his interpretation, this participation is realized at the moment when plants and animals communicate their own soul to their seeds by their innate heat and not when a new plant comes out from the seed. Sennert then asks what is drawn out from the matter’s potentiality and what this potentiality really is. Is it “a disposition of matter to receive a certain form,” as some people would say? For Sennert, this “disposition” is only a “temperament” (temperamentum) of the body.13 But how can the temperament of base matter generate a form which is divine? This is the way he criticizes the doctrine of eduction. As for the immediate agent of eduction, Sennert reproaches those who follow Thomas Aquinas for not giving a clear answer either. For him, matter itself, only a passive principle, cannot be the agent of eduction. The agent cannot be celestial bodies either, nor external heat. For all these contradict the principle of univocal generation. Next, Sennert takes up the opinion of Liceti. In the work De spontaneo viventium ortu (Vicenza, 1618), after which Sennert entitles his own treatise, this professor of philosophy at Padua teaches that forms are generated from a certain “rudiment” (rudimentum) of form pre-existing in matter.14 Sennert criticizes this opinion since Liceti does not make clear what this rudiment really is. If it is the substance of matter, matter must be a form. This is completely contradictory to the defĳinition of matter. By contrast, if it is an accident of matter, it cannot produce a substance, that is, a form.15

12 Aristotle, On Youth, Old Age, 24 (18), 479a28–29. Cf. Gad Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 115. 13 On the temperament (complexio), see Erich Schöner, Das Viererschema in der anti- ken Humoralpathologie (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1964); Raymond Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art (London: Nelson, 1964); Per-Gunnar Ottosson, Scholastic Medicine and Philosophy (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1984), pp. 129–154; Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 101–104; Danielle Jacquart, “De crasis à complexio: note sur le vocabulaire du tempérament en latin médiéval,” in eadem, La science médicale occidentale entre deux Renaissances (XIIe–XVe s.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 71–76. 14 Hirai, “Âme de la terre,” pp. 458–459. Cf. Liceti, De spontaneo viventium ortu [hereafter SVO] (Vicenza, 1618), book 1, chapter 83, p. 84. 15 Sennert inserts here the term inchoatio next to rudimentum, making allusion to Albertus Magnus’ theory on the “germ of the form” (inchoatio formae). He thus thinks it possible to locate the source of Liceti in Albert. On Albertus’s idea, see Bruno Nardi, “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’inchoatio formae,” in idem, Studi di fĳilosofĳia medievale (Rome: Storia e letteratura, 1960), pp. 69–101.

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Moreover, Sennert knows that Liceti posits elsewhere the “generic nature” (natura generica) of the rudiment of form which persists in matter even under unfavorable conditions.16 He regrets that a very diligent searcher of nature like Liceti is too attached to the doctrine of eduction by introduc- ing such a strange modifĳication. In particular, Sennert does not accept the idea that form, fĳirst possessing a generic nature, then receives its own specifĳicity from an outer agent. He fĳinds Liceti’s argument incoherent because the latter explains elsewhere that spontaneous generation is not realized by an external agent but by an internal agent which lies hidden in matter. According to Liceti, this agent does not generate a new form but this agent itself, given to matter, performs as a form the functions of the soul. Sennert reproaches Liceti for not explaining how this process takes place. He also rejects the idea of “generic nature”: [. . .] it is a vain fĳiction to say that the generic nature is a rudiment of form and, as it were, a semi-form. From this opinion, it would follow that like does not generate its like. For, since the specifĳic form gives each thing its own nature but not a generic nature, if the parent should only give the matter in which the generic form exists, i.e. a rudiment of form or a semi-form as Liceti says, then it would be an external agent like heat that would intro- duce the specifĳic diffference [. . .].17 But, for Sennert, a simple quality like heat cannot produce a form which is a divine substance. So he asks why Liceti wastes his time on the theory of eduction while admitting elsewhere that the seed is animate and has a soul. He thus concludes that besides the disposition of matter something formal is needed in the seed as the cause of its action.

16 Liceti, SVO, 4.15, pp. 267–268. On the Averroistic idea of forma generica, see Hirai, “Âme de la terre,” p. 459; Bruno Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento italiano (Rome: Edizioni italiane, 1945), pp. 18, 73; idem, Saggi sull’aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI (Florence: Sansoni, 1958), pp. 108, 243; Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance: la théorie de l’intellect chez les averroïstes latins des XIIIe et XIVe siècles (Ossolineum: Académie polonaise des sciences, 1968), pp. 45, 85, 159; Jorge L. Soler, The Psychology of Iacopo Zabarella (1533–1589), Ph. D. diss. (The State University of New York at Bufffalo, 1971), pp. 19, 23, 51–54. 17 Sennert, HP, 4.4, p. 174: “[. . .] inane fĳigumentum est, dicere, naturam genericam esse formae rudimentum, et quasi semiformam. Ex hac ipsa opinione sequeretur, simile non generare simile. Cum enim specifĳica forma naturam cuique rei largiatur, non vero generica, si generans saltem daret materiam, in qua sit forma generica, aut rudimentum formae, aut semiformam, ut loquitur Licetus, agens vero externum, ut calor, inferret specifĳicam diffferentiam [. . .].”

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2.3. Jacob Schegk and Plastic Force Next Sennert tackles the theory of a formative power, which professor of philosophy and medicine at Tübingen, Jacob Schegk (1511–1587), called the “plastic reason-principle” (logos plastikos).18 For Sennert, this theory is linked to the second position which advances that although the seed is not animate there is in it a power to produce the soul. He fĳirst gives the name of Albertus Magnus as the authority of this theory.19 But it is soon made clear that the target of his criticism is Schegk himself. According to Sennert, by the term logos, Schegk means the substantial form or substantial actuality, while the term “seed” (semen) does not signify a principal agent but only an instrument since the seed works like a hand of God in the formation of living beings. Indeed, for Schegk, the plastic logos is the second actuality, separable from the fĳirst actuality that is the soul of the parent, while the spermatic liquid is only conceived as its material vehicle. This logos, “productive” (poietikos) or “formative” (plastikos) but not “enmattered” (enulos), establishes animate bodies although it is not itself animate. It stands, in a sense, in the middle realm between what is animate and what is to be animated. After this general presentation of Schegk’s argument, Sennert gives his own view: But unless Schegk’s opinion is explained in the following way, it cannot be accepted: that the plastic logos is the soul itself by which the seed is animated, and belongs to a defĳinite species; that the plastic dunamis is a proper afffection of the soul, which the soul possesses when it is in the seed; that the soul draws it outside when an animal is generated; but that, as far as there is not actually in the seed an organic body that the soul informs, one can say that the form is absent. For, to hold a plastic logos, which is not the soul, is to multiply [useless] things without reflection. Since all the properties and operations of the soul are found in and attributed to this plastic logos, why should it not be called “the soul”? Since the soul in the seed is sufffĳicient to

18 Hiro Hirai, “The Invisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk’s Theory of Plastic Faculty,” Early Science and Medicine, 12 (2007), pp. 377–404. Cf. Walter Pagel, New Light on William Harvey (Basel: Karger, 1976), pp. 100–103. On “plastic force” (vis plastica) in the seventeenth century, see Hirai, “Interprétation chymique;” idem, “Semence, vertu formatrice;” William B. Hunter Jr, “The Seventeenth Century Doctrine of Plastic Nature,” Harvard Theo- logical Review, 43 (1950), pp. 197–213; Guido Giglioni, “Spiritus Plasticus between Pneuma- tology and Embryology (A Note about Comenius’ Concept of Spirit),” Studia Comeniana et historica, 24 (1994), pp. 83–90. 19 In Albert, see Pagel, New Light, pp. 95–98; Adam Takahashi, “Nature, Formative Power and Intellect in the Natural Philosophy of Albert the Great,” Early Science and Medicine, 13 (2008), pp. 451–481.

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all these actions which are attributed to this plastic logos, why should one hold any other [entity] than the soul?20 Sennert afffĳirms elsewhere that it is not necessary to posit the plastic logos in the seed as the second actuality and as the instrument of the parent. For him, the plastic logos is identical to the soul which is the principal agent, not the instrument, of generation. Then he explains what the second actuality is. According to him, if the instrument is not governed by the agent which has the fĳirst actuality, it cannot produce a nobler efffect than itself since the instrument can possess the second actuality alone. Later he explains the internal principle of generation in connection with the theory of the plastic logos: If you ask now what this internal principle is, it cannot be called anything else than the soul. Certainly some say that it is a plastic logos. But, unless one understands this plastic logos to be the soul itself endowed with a formative force, this opinion cannot hold [. . .]. Others say that it is innate heat. But this is not the principal cause of formation either. For, so noble an action, which all philosophers cannot sufffĳiciently admire, cannot be attributed to a mere quality. And heat is only a common instrument [. . .], and no quality can act at all unless it is directed by a principal and superior force [. . .].21 For Sennert, it is absurd to say that the formative power, which he places among secondary qualities, produces such a noble and divine substance as the soul. This power cannot be the faculty of the seed having no soul, but it must be the faculty of the soul residing in the seed. That is why

20 Sennert, HP, 4.5, pp. 174–175: “Verum nisi Schegkii opinio ita explicetur, quod λόγος πλαστικός sit ipsa anima, per quam semen est animatum et certae speciei; δύναμις πλαστική vero sit propria afffectio animae, quam ea habet, dum est in semine, illamque exserit, dum generatur animal, quatenus autem in semine non est actu corpus organicum, quod anima informet, eatenus abesse formam dici possit: tum ea non admitti potest. Etenim statuere λόγον πλαστικόν, qui non sit anima, est temere multiplicare entia. Cum enim huic λόγῳ πλαστικῷ omnes proprietates et operationes animae competant et tribuantur, cur non anima dicendus est? Et cum anima in semine ad omnes hasce operationes, quae λόγῳ huic πλαστικῷ tribuuntur, sufffĳiciat, cur enim alium ab anima statuere opus est?” Cf. Pagel, New Light, p. 85. 21 Sennert, HP, 4.9, p. 194: “Si autem jam quaeras quodnam sit illud internum principium, nullum aliud dari potest, quam anima. Nonnulli equidem λόγον quendam πλαστικόν id esse dicunt: sed, nisi per λόγον πλαστικόν intelligatur ipsa anima vi formatrice praedita, opinio haec locum habere non potest [. . .]. Alii calorem nativum: sed nec is causa prin- cipalis conformationis est. Neque enim tam nobilis actio, quam omnes philosophi satis admirari non potuerunt, qualitati solum adscribi potest. Et calor saltem instrumentum commune est [. . .], et omnino nulla qualitas agere potest, nisi a vi principali et superiori dirigatur [. . .].”

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he rejects the idea that the formative power produces the soul from the seed.

2.4. The Nature of the Seed and its Spiritus For the third position which holds that the seed is animate and possesses in itself a soul, Sennert enumerates as authorities the author of the Hip- pocratic treatise On Regimen, Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Themistius, Scaliger, Cardano, Zabarella, Piccolomini and Liceti. It is this position that he wants to defend. He fĳirst gives the defĳinition of the term “seed”: It should, however, be noted here that the name of seed is taken sometimes in a broader sense, sometimes more strictly. In the broader sense, the seed is taken for all that body which serves for the propagation and generation of a living being. Taken strictly, on the other hand, it is a simplest substance or a certain spiritus, in which the soul and the plastic force immediately reside, and contains in itself the idea of the organic body from which it has fallen, and thus possesses the potency both to form a organic body similar to that from which it has fallen and to perfect itself into an individual of the same species as [that] of the parent.22 On the matter of seed, then, Sennert admits two components: 1) a thick part and 2) a spiritual part or a spiritus, along with its nature, which corresponds by analogy to the element of the stars.23 The internal spiritus of the seed is thus important for him as it is for Fernel. Sennert makes it clear, however, that this spiritus is not the principal cause of generation but the instrument of the soul. He does not admit seminal heat as a principal cause either, since there needs to be a divine agent such as Scaliger speaks

22 Sennert, HP, 4.6, p. 177: “Notandum tamen hic, seminis nomen interdum latius, interdum strictius accipi. Semen late sumptum pro toto illo corpore quod propagationi et gen- erationi viventis inservit, accipitur. Stricte vero sumptum est substantia simplicissima, seu spiritus quidam, cui anima et virtus πλαστική proxime insidet, et ideam corporis organici, a quo decisum est, in se continet, et prodinde corpus organicum simile ei, a quo decisum est, formandi, et in individuum ejusdem speciei cum generante sese perfĳiciendi potentiam habens.” This passage seems to be the source of Kircher, Mundus subterraneus (Amster- dam, 1664–1665), 12.1.1, p. 329: “[. . .] natura quae in eo spiritu est, proportione respondeat elemento stellarum, nempe illud, cui anima et virtus plastica proxime insunt [. . .]” (empha- sis is mine). Cf. Hirai, “Interprétation chymique,” p. 225. 23 Allusion to the famous passage of Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 2.3, 736b35–737a1. Cf. Friedrich Solmsen, “The Vital Heat, the Inborn Pneuma and the Aether,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, 77 (1957), pp. 119–123; Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory, pp. 107–114; Hirai, “Alter Galenus,” pp. 24–27; idem, “Invisible Hand,” pp. 391–392; idem, “Prisca Theologia and Neoplatonic Reading of Hippocrates in Fernel, Cardano and Gemma,” in Cornelius Gemma: Cosmology, Medicine and Natural Philosophy in Renaissance Louvain, ed. Hiro Hirai (Rome: Serra, 2008), pp. 91–104.

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of: the soul. This priority accorded to the soul is a distinctive character of Sennert’s natural philosophy. Thus, according to him, the soul uses the spiritus residing in the seed. Inasmuch as the spiritus is in the seed, the soul is, so to speak, in its own subject. But when it goes away, the soul cannot remain in the seed anymore and the seed becomes sterile. Then Sennert answers to the objection of Thomas Fienus (1567–1631), medical professor of Louvain, who wrote several embryological treatises.24 Fienus denied the existence of the seminal spiritus, by asking what the “spirituous substance” of vegetable seeds could be such that they may be preserved for a long time in a box and remain fertile. Sennert says: I admire this spiritus that Fienus could not recognize. Certainly, if he had seen a spiritus obtained by chymical distillation from dry seeds which also catch fĳire, he would not have written in his On the Formative [Cause] of the Fetus, question 6: “What is the spirituous substance in the seeds of plants?” [. . . ].25 Chymical explanations, hardly found in the embryological texts of the Renaissance, become very important in Sennert. This tendency is observ- able when he explains the multiplication of forms. He fĳirst afffĳirms that multiplication is more suitable for the substantial form than the accidental form, since the latter is only the image or shadow of the substantial form. For him, the soul of living beings is multiplied by itself. Sennert goes even further by saying that the same principle is also applicable to the forms of metals and minerals. Indeed, such an explanation appears in his early work De chymicorum cum Aristotelicis et Galenicis consensu ac dissensu (Wittenberg, 1619) under the clear influence of Anselmus Boethius de Boodt (1550–1632), physician to the emperor Rudolph II of Prague, who

24 Thomas Fienus, De formatrice [sic!] fœtus liber (Antwerp, 1620), quaestio 6, p. 118. On Fienus, see François-André Sondervorst, “Vie et ouvrages des Feyens d’Anvers,” Yperman: Bulletin de la société belge d’histoire de la médecine, 5 (1958), pp. 1–7; Lelland J. Rather, “Thomas Fienus’ (1567–1631) Dialectical Investigation of the Imagination as Cause and Cure of Bodily Disease,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 41 (1967), pp. 340–367; Jan Papy, “The Attitude towards Aristotelian Biological Thought in the Louvain Medical Treatises during the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Century: The Case of Embryology,” in Aristo- tle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. Carlos Steel et al. (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1999), pp. 317–337. 25 Sennert, HP, 4.7, p. 188: “Quem spiritum, quod agnoscere non potuerit Fienus, miror. Certe, si destillatione chymica e siccis seminibus spiritus, qui flammam quoque concipi- unt, elici vidisset, non scripsisset, De formatrice foetus, quaestio 6: Quae substantia spiri- tuosa est in seminibus plantarum [. . .].” On Sennert’s notion of spiritus, see Clericuzio, Elements, pp. 24–33; Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul,” p. 188.

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explained the generation of metals and minerals by the chymical notion of spiritus architectonicus.26 As for the fourth and widely accepted position, that only the intellect or rational soul comes from the outside, Sennert rejects it simply by afffĳirming that the soul separated from the body does not communicate any more with it. For him, the human soul emerges from the fĳirst conception, that is, as soon as the male seed and the female seed meet together and are retained in the womb. Unlike Thomas Aquinas and his followers who maintain the gradual replacement of the vegetative soul by the sensitive soul and then by the rational soul which comes from the outside, Sennert admits only a single soul endowed with diverse faculties. Thus, for him, humans possess from the beginning only one rational soul, which has vegetative, sensible and intellectual faculties and which is transmitted through the seed.27

3. Spontaneous Generation in Sennert

On the basis of all these discussions, Sennert takes up the problem of “equivocal” (equivoca) generation, usually called “spontaneous generation,” where a parent and its offfspring are not of the same species. It should be noted that Sennert’s discourse here is much influenced by Liceti.28 Just as in the case of the univocal generation of plants and animals, he does not admit the intervention of heaven or a superior and celestial intelligence as the immediate cause of generation. Nor does he accept such causes as occult qualities, the World-Soul, or the vivifying spiritus sent from heaven. He also rejects chance or hazard.29

26 Sennert, HP, 4.6, p. 184. On De Boodt and Sennert, see Hirai, Le concept, pp. 375–399, 405. Cf. Hiro Hirai and Hideyuki Yoshimoto, “Anatomizing the Sceptical Chymist: Robert Boyle and the Secret of His Early Sources on the Growth of Metals,” Early Science and Medicine, 10 (2005), pp. 453–477, esp. pp. 473–475; Kuni Sakamoto, “The German Hercu- les’s Heir: Pierre Gassendi’s Reception of Keplerian Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 70 (2009), pp. 69–91. 27 Sennert, HP, 4.14, pp. 205–206. Cf. Michael, “Sennert on Matter,” p. 293. 28 See Hirai, “Interprétation chymique;” idem, “Âme de la terre;” Carlo Castellani, “Le problème de la generatio spontanea dans l’œuvre de Fortunio Liceti,” Revue de synthèse, 89 (1968), pp. 323–340. 29 Sennert, HP, 5.1, pp. 210–214. On spontaneous generation, see Edmundo O. von Lipp- mann, Urzeugung und Lebenskraft: Zur Geschichte dieser Probleme von den ältesten Zeiten an bis zu den Anfängen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Springer, 1933); Everett Mendelsohn, “Philosophical Biology vs Experimental Biology: Spontaneous Generation in the Seven- teenth Century,” in Actes du XIIe congrès international d’histoire des sciences (Paris, 1968),

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3.1. The Soul, Seminal Principle and Corpuscles After dismissing the series of causes advanced for spontaneous generation, Sennert explains the opinion of Liceti according to whom this kind of generation is realized by an internal principle lying hidden in matter. He admits that the cause of spontaneous generation, thus explained, does not difffer much from that of non-spontaneous generation. For, even in the latter, the principle of generation is also hidden in matter and inac- cessible to human sense-perception.30 Following Liceti, Sennert goes even further by arguing that all spontaneous generation is caused by a univocal agent. To explain this agent, he makes recourse to Liceti’s idea according to which living beings, which do not reproduce by seeds, nevertheless possess something analogous to seeds.31 The seed, properly speaking, is a body. It contains the soul of the same species as that of the parent and is given to living beings which are generated univocally. By contrast, the “analogue of seed” does not actually contain a soul but only a principle or a form, which begins to perform the functions of the soul when it meets suitable matter. It is in this way that worms may be born of the corpses of plants and animals; they contain a particular form, which manifests itself as a soul under certain conditions. To stress the “univocality” of this agent, Sennert afffĳirms that the soul of the living creature and that of the worms born from it are of the same species. Thus every generation which seems spontaneous is realized in reality by this internal principle, also called “the soul.” This principle is carried by the “analogue of seed,” which lies hidden in the corpse or other materials where spontaneous generation occurs. Sennert describes various modes in which the soul functions. Two modes are essential actuality and accidental actuality. The former is the naked essence of the soul and the latter is defĳined as operations coming from the soul. Due to these dual modes, the soul’s “participation” in the body is doubled: under the fĳirst participation the soul works as a form in

vol. 1-B (Paris: Blanchard, 1971), pp. 201–226; John Farley, The Spontaneous Generation Con- troversy from Descartes to Oparin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Remke Kruk, “A Frothy Bubble: Spontaneous Generation in the Medieval Islamic Tradition,” Jour- nal of Semitic Studies, 35 (1990), pp. 265–282; Maaike Van Der Lugt, Le ver, le démon et la vierge: les théories médiévales de la génération extraordinaire (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004); Dag N. Hasse, “Spontaneous Generation and the Ontology of Forms in Greek, Ara- bic, and Medieval Latin Sources,” in Classical Arabic Philosophy: Source and Reception, ed. Peter Adamson (London: The Warburg Institute, 2007), pp. 151–175. 30 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 214. Cf. Liceti, SVO, 2.2, p. 156. 31 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 215. Cf. Liceti, SVO, 4.2, p. 253.

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matter; under the second, the soul performs vital activities through bodily organs. Sennert adds a third mode: But, besides these two modes, there is yet a third, and the soul can be in some matter after yet another way, so that it does not inform or vivify this matter, nor give the operations proper to this living being either. Thus the seeds of plants and animals can reside in water and earth, and the soul [can reside] in these [seeds], although they do not inform or vivify the water or the earth.32 As every seed contains a soul or an analogous principle, the omnipresence of seeds in the world directly signifĳies that of souls. That is why, continues Sennert, Aristotle teaches in his treatise Generation of Animals, 3.11: “In earth water is present, and in water spiritus is present, and this spiritus is penetrated in its entirety by soul-heat, so that in a way all things are full of soul.”33 According to Sennert, this phrase does not mean that all things are animate, but that there is in all things a hidden entity, which, when it fĳinds suitable matter, becomes manifest and performs the functions of the soul. To further explain the omnipresence of this entity, Sennert intro- duces a corpuscular interpretation: To be sure, as Aristotle teaches, animal heat and especially that kind of heat that possesses the adjoined soul are truly in this whole part of the inferior world (earth, water and air); not, however, as their essential part or essential attribute, because earth and water are cold by their nature and because neither earth nor water is informed by the soul, but as a thing placed in a place or in a vessel, without doubt because earth, water and air contain the living beings’ corpses, parts and excrements, in which there are atoms and corpuscles possessing a soul.34

32 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 216: “Verum praeter hos duos modos datur adhuc tertius, et potest adhuc alio modo anima esse in materia aliqua, ita ut neque eam informet, et vivifĳicet, neque etiam operationes viventis illius proprias edat. Ita in aqua et terra semina plantarum et animalium, et in iis anima inesse possunt, ut tamen neque aquam, neque terram informent et vivifĳicent.” Liceti, SVO, 2.2, p. 164, also suggests the third mode: “[. . .] gemina est animae participatio; prima quidam est participatio simplicis, ac nudae substantiae animae, ut formae substratam sibi materiam perfĳicientis; compositumque in esse constituentis ante omnem sui operationem: quae namque hanc praecedere potest participatio animae in materia, ut in vase, non est formaliter animae participatio; quia materiam, in qua ut in vase inest, anima non actuat. Seconda vero est participatio animae operantis [. . .].” 33 Cf. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 3.11, 762a18–21. On the idea of “soul-heat,” see Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 2.1, 732a18; 2.4, 739a11; 3.1, 752a2; 3.4, 755a20; Hirai, “Invis- ible Hand,” p. 395. 34 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 216: “Nimirum, ut docet Aristoteles, calor animalis, atque adeo is, qui animam adjunctam habet, est equidem in universa hac mundi inferioris parte, terra, aqua et aere: verum non ut pars eorum essentialis, vel attributum essentiale; cum terra et aqua natura sua frigida sint, et ab anima neque terra neque aqua informatur: sed ut locatum

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Sennert is assured of the omnipresence of souls by these atoms, or corpuscles, which are distributed throughout the world. He afffĳirms that spontaneous generation occurs either: 1) when heat unites souls to the things in which they are contained, as if posited in a vessel; according to Liceti such souls play the role of the efffĳicient cause of an organic body; or 2) when matter seizes animal heat and the soul in it, and is made suitable to this soul (according to Aristotle). For Sennert, these two explanations mean the same thing. Through spontaneous generation matter “is established in a living nature” (consistit in naturam viventem), “clothing the soul under the nature of a form” (induendo animam sub ratione formae). The soul, contained in matter as if in a vessel, is distinct from the nature of the matter. For this development, Sennert relies on the theory of Liceti: On this subject, Fortunio Liceti writes copiously [. . .] and laboriously tries to prove that the form and soul reside in matter in two manners, namely, fĳirst as an actuality or perfection in its own subject, and second as a thing contained in a vessel, not belonging at all to this [matter], or almost as an accident in the subject. His entire theory on the origin of living beings which are spontaneously generated is based on this distinction as its foundation.35 Sennert interprets this idle state of the soul almost as an accident. But what is more important comes next. To illustrate Liceti’s idea, Sennert gives an example of the chymical dissolution of metals as the clearest explanation of all. According to him, gold is dissolved into minima by aqua regis, while silver is dissolved by aqua fortis. For him, even in dissolution, the forms of gold and silver are retained although they do not inform the acids in which they swim. Thus these forms exist in the acids as if they were posited in a vessel. Sennert thinks it possible to apply the same chymical and corpuscular reasoning to the souls of living beings in spontaneous generation.36 If not soul or internal principle, he uses the term “seminal force” (vis seminalis), inculcating an atomist interpretation:

in loco vel vase, nimirum quia terra, aqua et aer viventium cadavera, partesque et excre- menta viventium, in quibus atomi sunt, et corpuscula animam habentia, continent.” 35 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 216: “Qua de re prolixe agit Fortunius Licetus [. . .] et operose pro- bare conatur, formam et animam in materia bifariam inesse, nempe ut actum et perfec- tionem in proprio subjecto, deinde ut contentum in vase, nihil ad eam pertinens, vel quasi accidens in subjecto. Et huic distinctioni tota ejus de origine sponte ortorum viventium theoria, tamquam fundamento, innititur.” Cf. Liceti, SVO, 2.11, p. 164; 2.28, p. 179. 36 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 216: “Et, quod clarissimum est exemplum, est in aqua regis aurum in minima solutum, et in aqua forti argentum in minima solutum; ita tamen, ut formas suas, ut ex reductione patet, integras retineans, nihilominus aquas illas non informant, sed auri et argenti forma est in aqua illa, ut in loco. Idem et in animabus viventium apparet.”

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Thus, as has been said above, there is not just one mode of generation of plants and animals which are born spontaneously. For, some are really born from seeds generated by a living being of the same species, even though they seem to be born spontaneously [. . .]. There are also seeds of a difffer- ent nature. For, some lose their seminal force and their soul unless they are carefully preserved and treated. By contrast, [there are] others, even though they seem corrupted, whose seminal force remains in a certain juice or in atoms.37 Then Sennert tackles the problem of the material cause of spontaneous generation. To him, spontaneously generated beings are distinguishable, by their matter, from those that reproduce through visible seeds. But there really exists, for him, an internal principle of spontaneous generation; it is so well hidden from human sense-perception that it seems to occur without a parent. From here on, Sennert explicitly calls the internal principle a “seminal principle” (principium seminale). Sennert asserts that the principle is not attached to the same matter for all living beings and so it is not surprising that it lies hidden even in rain waters or in the excrement of living beings. It should be noted here that Liceti admits the mutation of one form into another in spontaneous generation. The soul, which lies hidden in the corpse of living beings as if it were posited in a vessel, fĳirst possesses the same essence as that of the form contained in the previously described living beings. After a great change in matter and because of the loss of heat supporting the soul, the soul degenerates into another, inferior, species. The weakening of the soul-heat is a key to understanding Liceti’s theory of spontaneous generation. By contrast, Sennert does not accept the mutation of forms. For him, species should be immutable thanks to their forms. Thus he suggests that when the body of a living being is corrupted, its soul or seminal principle can adhere to another kind of matter and revivify. This explains the diffference of species between a corpse and what is born from it. Then Sennert proposes another solution based on the theory of the plurality of substantial forms: But it seems to me more suitable that there are diverse auxiliary and subordinate forms in living bodies, yet in such a way that there is a principal and master [form], which informs the living being and from which the living

37 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 217: “Itaque, ut supra dictum, non una est sponte nascentium plantarum et animalium generatio. Quaedam enim revera ex semine a vivente ejusdem speciei genito generantur, etsi sponte nasci videantur [. . .]. Et sunt semina diversae natu- rae. Quaedam enim, nisi diligenter asserventur, et colantur, vim seminalem et animam amittunt. Alia vero, etsi corrupta videntur; tamen in succo quodam, vel atomis vis seminalis remanet.”

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being receives its own name, namely the soul itself of each living being. By contrast, the other forms are as it were servants, which, so long as this superior form is present, belong to the disposition and condition of their own matter. For this reason they inform their own matter in their own way to render it a suitable subject for its specifĳic form and even possess their own actions. But they do not animate it, nor give it the name of a living being; this is the task of the specifĳic soul alone.38 According to Sennert, when the principal and master substantial form dis- appears, one of these subordinate substantial forms replaces it, and takes over its functions. It is in this way that an inferior being is born from the corpse of a living being. Then Sennert plunges again into corpuscular speculation. According to him, the seed’s matter, coming from the parent, is the proper subject of the soul and is so well disposed that it can retain its soul even if it is divided into minima. Without being altered in their essence souls can reside in minima or atoms, just as gold and silver, dissolved by acids, are divided into small atoms but retain their essence. Sennert afffĳirms that the seminal force of spontaneously generated beings persists at the level of atoms until it fĳinds suitable matter to establish an organic and animate body. But he expresses a reservation by saying that the seminal force can be destroyed: Sometimes, however, this seminal force completely dies and perishes. For the things I have said so far and will say later, about the souls and seminal force [residing] in atoms and minute corpuscles, are not such that someone

38 Sennert, HP, 5.2, p. 218: “Mihi vero magis consentaneum videtur, in corporibus viventibus plures formas succenturiatas esse, et subordinatas, ita tamen, ut una sit prin- ceps et domina, quae vivens informat, et a qua vivens nomen habet, ipsa scilicet viventis cujusque anima; reliquae vero ministrae quasi, quae quandiu forma illa superior praesens est, ad materiae propriae dispositionem et conditionem pertinent, et propterea materiam quidem illam, ut sit idoneum formae specifĳicae subjectum, suo modo informant, suasque etiam actiones habent; eam tamen non animant, nec ei nomen viventis tribuunt; quod solius animae specifĳicae offfĳicium est.” There is a slight diffference between informare and animare. On this Averroistic doctrine of forma informans and forma assistens, see Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi, pp. 169–170, 350–351, 360–361 and passim; Kuksewicz, De Siger de Brabant, pp. 186–190, 196–199; Soler, Zabarella, pp. 12, 15, 25–26, 36–39, 63–67, 71–77; Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 77–79. On the plurality of forms, see also Michael, “Sennert on Matter;” eadem, “Sennert’s Sea Change,” pp. 343–345; eadem, “The Nature and Influence of Late Paduan Psychology,” History of Universities, 12 (1993), pp. 65–94; eadem, “Renaissance Theories of Body, Soul and Mind,” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed. John P. Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 147–172.

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should mock them and make me out to hold that such souls are immortal since they remain intact throughout so many changes.39 In this way Sennert tries to avoid criticism for supporting the notion of the immortality of the beasts’ souls through the extraordinary persistence of the seminal principle contained in their atoms. Later in a recapitulative chapter, Sennert afffĳirms that spontaneous generation is realized when the seed, the seminal principle or the soul of a living being, which lies hidden somewhere, fĳinds suitable matter and, stimulated by ambient heat, begins to perform vital activities.40 The necessary matter, coming from the body of beings once animated, contains within it an entity which is the cause of this generation. Whatever name is given to this entity—seed, seminal principle or soul—it resides in the atoms of the material from which inferior beings are born.

3.2. The Atoms of Living Beings and their Soul Now the time is right to look a little closer at the relationship between the soul and the atom which carries it. It should fĳirst be remembered that, according to Sennert’s hierarchy of atoms, the “atoms” of living beings are in reality corpuscles composed of primordial atoms. In this sense, they may correspond better to the corpuscles later called “molecules” (molecu- lae) or “seeds of things” (semina rerum) by French atomist Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655).41 Speaking of the generation of mushrooms Sennert advances the idea that although the soul contained in one atom may be weak, if several atoms are united, the souls contained there gather to become more pow- erful. He relates this idea in the name of Liceti:

39 Sennert, HP, 5.3, p. 221: “Interdum tamen ista vis seminalis plane emoritur et perit. Neque enim est, ut ea, quae hactenus dixi, et postea dicentur, de animabus et vi seminali in atomis et corpusculis minimis quis cavilletur, et mihi afffĳingat, quasi statuam, animas tales, cum in tot mutationibus integrae maneant, immortales esse.” Johann Freytag (1581– 1641) criticized Sennert mainly on the immortality of the soul of beasts. Cf. Wolfgang U. Eckart, “Der Streit zwischen Daniel Sennert (1572–1637) und Johann Freitag (1581–1641),” in Deutsch-Niederländische Medizinhistorikertrefffen, ed. Karl E. Rothschuh (Münster: Institut für Geschichte der Medizin der Universität zu Münster, 1978), pp. 21–35; Clericuzio, Ele- ments, pp. 31–32; Arthur, “Sennert and Leibniz,” p. 154. 40 Sennert, HP, 5.5, p. 223. 41 On Gassendi’s idea, see now Hiro Hirai, “Le concept de semence de Pierre Gassendi entre les théories de la matière et les sciences de la vie au XVIIe siècle,” Medicina nei Secoli, 15 (2003), pp. 205–226; idem, Le concept, pp. 463–491. Sennert’s influence on Gassendi is a subject not sufffĳiciently explored by scholars.

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Liceti says in the third book of his On the Spontaneous Origin of Living Beings, chapter 10, that necessarily many atoms of this kind, ready to generate mushrooms, are at once united into a sensible mass in the formation of mushrooms. For, the soul of one single atom is so weak that it cannot vivify or inform the matter of mushroom, nor perform what the souls, gathered from many [souls], of numerous atoms united into one body, can do.42 This statement alone is remarkable. Indeed, Liceti claims almost the same thing, even using the term “atom,” which is rare for him.43 Thus, these two ideas (the residence of a soul in one atom and the gathering of the souls of many atoms) are not original to Sennert, but must be attributed to Liceti. What is more remarkable comes next. Like Liceti, Sennert admits that some plants reproduce themselves through invisible seeds coming from the plants of the same species. The seeds of plants do not always manifest themselves as visible bodies but as minute corpuscles containing a soul of the same species and lying hidden in water and earth. Although Liceti admits that these corpuscles play the role of seeds and correspond by analogy to them, he does not accept calling them “seeds.” By contrast, Sennert does not fĳind any reason to refuse them this title, unless it is because they do not possess the external appearance of ordinary visible seeds. Saying that such an entity can at least be called a “seminal principle,” he continues: For, what primarily constitutes a seed is not its external fĳigure or its formation in a defĳinite way, but the soul latent in it, with that implanted spiritus which is said to correspond to the element of the stars and makes the seeds fertile. Since they, with their subject, can even reside in minute corpuscles, there is no reason why they cannot be called “seeds” in their own way, or a “seminal principle.” Although the soul which lies hidden in such corpuscles does not inform the earth or water, which contain it, but lies hidden in them as in a vessel, it nevertheless informs these corpuscles, in which it resides as

42 Sennert, HP, 5.6, p. 224: “[. . .] statuit Licetus libro 3. De spontaneo viventium ortu, cap. 10. necesse esse, simul plures ejusmodi atomos ad fungos generandos aptas in sensibilem molem coire in constitutione fungi: quia unius atomi anima imbecillium sit adeo virium, quae nequeat materiam fungi vivifĳicare vel effformare, neque id praestare, quod multarum atomorum in unum corpus coentium animae ex pluribus coagmentatae efffĳicere possint.” 43 Liceti, SVO, 3.10, p. 203: “[. . .] necesse est autem simul plures atomos (liceat hoc uti nomine) plantarum, et sensibilem excrementorum, succique a viventibus efffuxi molem coire in constitutione fungi, tum quia celerrima fungi origo et auctio non potest esse ex minima materia, tum quia unius atomi anima imbecillium est adeo virium, quae nequeat materiam fungi vivifĳicare, ac effformare; quod multorum atomorum in unum corpus coentium anima ex pluribus coagmentata efffĳicere potest [. . .].”

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if it were in its proper subject, and exists in them under the fĳirst actuality, while it attains the second actuality when it fĳinds a suitable place.44 This declaration is particularly important. Even his master Liceti, whom Sennert follows faithfully in most cases, does not go so far. Indeed, for Sennert, the soul of one atom of a living being does not inform the earth and water which contain this atom, since they are only its recipients. By contrast, this same soul well and truly informs or animates the atom which carries it. Thus Sennert’s atom or molecular corpuscle is not simply a vehicle for the soul, but, being itself animated, provides the basis for living matter. Normally, this soul is in the state of the fĳirst actuality, where it works as a form which perfects matter, but not in the second actuality, where it performs the vital activities. Now it should be remembered that this soul is univocal, that is, it is of the same species as that of the parent. This is really radical in comparison to the theories of other seventeenth- century atomists such as Gassendi. It is true that, for Gassendi, certain seminal molecules contain a “tiny soul” (animula). But he does not explain in detail its presence in these molecules.45 His notion of seminal molecules is strongly influenced by the “philosophy of seeds” of the Dan- ish Paracelsian Petrus Severinus (1540/42–1602), according to whom all natural things are generated from invisible, incorporeal and spiritual principles which he calls “seeds” (semina). But Sennert in his turn rejects Sev- erinus’ theory, by identifying these seeds with substantial forms and souls. Again, it is on the soul that Sennert builds his philosophical reflection.46 For him, it is the soul that must guarantee the permanence of the species of living beings. At any event, to Sennert, the soul which informs its vector

44 Sennert, HP, 5.7, p. 226: “Non enim externa fĳigura et certo modo facta formatio, semen constituit primario, sed anima in eo latens, cum spiritu illo insito, qui elemento stellarum respondere dicitur, et foecunda facit semina: quae quia cum illo suo subjecto in minimis etiam corpusculis esse possunt, nulla causa est, cur non et illa semina suo modo, aut seminale principium dici possint. Et licet anima, quae in talibus corpusculis latet, terram vel aquam, in qua continetur, non informet, sed in iis ut in vase lateat: tamen corpuscula illa, in quibus ut proprio subjecto est, informat, et in iis actu primo est, ad actum vero secundum accedit idoneum locum nacta.” Cf. Michael, “Sennert’s Sea Change,” p. 351; Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul,” p. 181. 45 Hirai, “Gassendi,” pp. 216–217; idem, Le concept, pp. 482–483. Giordano Bruno’s (1548?–1600) atoms are animated by the internal spiritual substance. Cf. Paul-Henri Michel, La cosmologie de Giordano Bruno (Paris: Hermann, 1962), pp. 280–283; Hilary Gatti, “Giordano Bruno’s Soul-Powered Atoms: From Ancient Sources towards Modern Science,” in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, pp. 163–180. For Nicholas Hill (1570?–1610), see the critical edition by Sandra Plastina, Nicholas Hill: Philosophia Epi- curaea Democritiana Theophrastica (Rome: Serra, 2007). 46 Cf. Hirai, Le concept, pp. 402–403.

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corpuscle holds the secret of the real identity of the “seminal principle,” to which the young Robert Boyle was to pay considerable attention.47

4. Conclusions

In conclusion, Sennert afffĳirms that there is nothing which is really born in a spontaneous way, but that everything is generated by its own soul or, at least, by the seminal principle which corresponds to it by analogy. Living beings which seem to be spontaneously born are not generated by an equivocal external agent but by a univocal internal principle, which can be called “seed,” “seminal principle” or “soul.” What is more important is the fact that, in Sennert, the soul latent in matter does not procreate another soul. The act of the production of souls is reserved only for God, who executed it in the Creation of the world. After that, there is only the multiplication of forms through the seminal principle. I have shown Sennert’s exceptional adhesion to Liceti’s corpuscularism. It is therefore difffĳicult to imagine that the latter’s work of 1618 did not have any serious impact on Sennert, whose real conversion to atomism occurred around 1619 or later.48 If chymistry fĳirst persuaded him to accept the corpuscular conception in natural philosophy, then biological generation, the central phenomenon of the life sciences, contributed in a decisive way to reinforcing his atomist conviction, and thus influenced the later evolution of seventeenth-century corpuscularism. Sennert has often been criticized as an eclectic mind by historians, probably because of his synthesis of Aristotelian hylomorphism with

47 Sennert often uses this term in his discussions on spontaneous generation. That is why the young Boyle, an assiduous reader of Sennert, was keenly interested in the idea of seminal principle. Cf. Antonio Clericuzio, “A Redefĳinition of Boyle’s Chemistry and Corpuscular Philosophy,” Annals of Science, 47 (1990), pp. 561–89, esp. pp. 583–587; Peter R. Anstey, “Boyle on Seminal Principles,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology, 33 (2002), pp. 597–630; Hiro Hirai, “Quelques remarques sur les sources de Robert Boyle en guise de compte rendu de la nouvelle édition de son œuvre,” Archives internationales d’histoire des sciences, 53 (2003), pp. 303–318, eps. p. 315. For Sennert, see Clericuzio, Ele- ments, pp. 24–25. 48 Christoph Lüthy, “Daniel Sennert’s Slow Conversion from Hylomorphism to Atom- ism,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal (The New School for Social Research, New York), 26 (2005), pp. 99–121. See also William Newman’s article in the present volume. In the revised edition of his De Chymicorum cum Aristotelicis et Galenicis consensu ac dissensu (Wittenberg, 1629), Sennert does not mention Liceti. Cf. Wolfgang U. Echart, Grundlagen des medizinisch-wissenschaftlichen Erkennes bei Daniel Sennert (1572–1637) untersucht an seiner Schrift De Chymicorum liber . . . , Wittenberg, 1629, Ph. D. diss. (University of Mün- ster, 1977).

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Democritean atomism. But, as I have shown, his synthesis went very far, beyond a simple fusion of these two hard-to-reconcile systems, and the consequence of his corpuscularism was distinctly radical in comparison to other variants of seventeenth-century atomism. Sennert’s theory in its last phase was the production of a real avant-gardist. Once this point is accepted, it is not difffĳicult to understand why leading natural philosophers of the next generation such as Gassendi and Boyle (and probably even Leibniz) carefully studied his work.

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Edited by Gideon Manning

Leiden • boston 2012 Cover Illustration: Hooke, Robert. Micrographia, or some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries thereupon (London: J. Martyn and J. Allestry, 1665), Schema III, 7r. Private collection.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Manning, Gideon. Matter and form in early modern science and philosophy / by Gideon Manning. p. cm. — (History of science and medicine library, ISSN 1872-0684 ; v. 28. Scientific and learned cultures and their institutions ; v. 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-21870-3 (hardback : acid-free paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-22114-7 (e-book) 1. Hylomorphism. 2. Science—Philosophy. I. Title.

Q175.32.H95M36 2012 117—dc23 2012013363

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ISSN 1872-0684 ISBN 978 90 04 21870 3 (hardback) ISBN 978 90 04 22114 7 (e-book)

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This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents

Foreword ...... vii Mordechai Feingold Notes on Contributors ...... ix

Three Biased Reminders about Hylomorphism in Early Modern Science and Philosophy ...... 1 Gideon Manning

Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology ...... 33 Michael Edwards

Living Atoms, Hylomorphism and Spontaneous Generation in Daniel Sennert ...... 77 Hiro Hirai

Elective Affinity Before Geoffroy: Daniel Sennert’s Atomistic Explanation of Vinous and Acetous Fermentation ...... 99 William R. Newman

Substantial Forms as Causes: From Suárez to Descartes ...... 125 Tad M. Schmaltz

Mechanizing the Sensitive Soul ...... 151 Gary Hatfield

Descartes and His Critics on Matter and Form: Atomism and Individuation ...... 187 Roger Ariew

‘Spirit is a Stomach’: The Iatrochemical Roots of Leibniz’s Theory of Corporeal Substance ...... 203 Justin E.H. Smith

Leibnizian Hylomorphism ...... 225 Daniel Garber

Index of Names ...... 245