SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Originary Metaphysics: Why Philosophy has not Reached its End A Dissertation Presented by Julia Sushytska to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University August 2008 Copyright by Julia Sushytska 2008 Stony Book University The Graduate School Julia Sushytska We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Edward S. Casey—Dissertation Advisor Distinguished Professor Department of Philosophy Peter Manchester—Chairperson of Defense Associate Professor Department of Philosophy David Allison Professor Department of Philosophy Mariana Ortega Associate Professor of Philosophy John Carroll University This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Lawrence Martin Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation Originary Metaphysics: Why Philosophy has not Reached its End by Julia Sushytska Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2008 In response to the increasingly widespread contemporary assertion concerning the end of philosophy as metaphysics, I show that philosophy has by no means reached its end. I accomplish this by developing the notion of originary metaphysics. Since such metaphysics or thinking can only happen in the present, it does not have a past, and so cannot come to an end. Originary thinking is different from the historiographic kind— the kind that, as I argue, is always already over. Thus, when Heidegger and Deleuze assert that metaphysics has completed itself, or that it needs to be overturned they cannot be referring to originary thinking, but are merely making a statement about its ossified historiographic double. My notion of originary metaphysics emerges from an engagement with the writings of Parmenides and Plato. Through a close analysis of Parmenides’ Poem I show in what sense intuition constitutes the beginning of originary thought, as well as the way in which this thinking relies on the oneness of everything that is. Next, I consider Plato’s dialogue The Sophist in order to explore the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist. As a result, I establish that the sophist and his or her art of manipulating appearances are absolutely indispensable for the philosopher. The third chapter confronts some historiographic interpretations of Descartes’s mind/body distinction by focusing on his intuition of the cogito. It is by means of this intuition that Descartes radically distances himself from the historiographic philosophy while simultaneously continuing Western philosophical tradition. iii Дедушке Table of Contents Introduction: Heidegger and Metaphysics 1 The Metaphysics that has Ended 5 Criticism and Creation 11 Originary Metaphysics 16 Conclusion 24 Chapter 1: Parmenides’ Poem and the Beginning of Philosophy 27 Intuition 30 The Enigmatic Poem 44 All Is One 47 Difference within Oneness 64 Conclusion 81 Chapter 2: The Philosopher and Plato’s Sophist 83 The First Take or the Mortal’s Failure 84 The Second Take or the Sophist’s Success 93 The Third Take or the Exalted Philosopher 100 Conclusion 109 Chapter 3: Descartes’s Now 112 The Problematic Distinction 115 Method 124 Memory 134 The Mask 139 Conclusion 150 Conclusion: Deleuze the Sophist-Philosopher 152 Deleuze’s Problem 153 Wholeness of the Concept or the Definition of Philosophy 162 The Rule of the Sophist 171 Conclusion 176 Bibliography 180 v Introduction Heidegger and Metaphysics This work is a response to the by now deeply rooted sentiment of the end of philosophy as metaphysics, and I say sentiment because by the beginning of the twenty first century we have become accustomed to this idea to such an extent that it has turned into one of the habits of thinking. It is the same kind of habit that makes our hearing and sight dull and misleading, as Parmenides’ goddess will assert in the Poem, the same kind of habit with which Descartes will try to dispense through his method of doubt. The sentiment of the end can be traced to several different moments in philosophy’s history: Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida. Ultimately, it makes no difference with which of these thinkers this idea is associated, although every attempt to trace it to one of them will have its own distinct shape. It is possible, of course, to map out the idea’s history through all four thinkers, or find other—both earlier and later—philosophical figures who could be seen as the ultimate proponents of this end. My own trajectory of thought goes back to Heidegger, although Heidegger himself refers back to Nietzsche. So what exactly is this sentiment? It is the tendency to think that philosophy as metaphysics is no longer possible, that the kind of thinking that was available to Plato or Hegel—the kind of thinking that has been called since Aristotle first philosophy—has exhausted or completed itself. Although the present manuscript is concerned exclusively with philosophy, the sentiment of “the end,” as well as nihilism and relativism that often accompany it, pervade many different spheres of Western thought.1 The formulations of the end of metaphysics are diverse. Some of them assert that philosophy is impossible after the wars of the previous century,2 others declare that we “must no longer be in desire of philosophy” or that “[p]hilosophy as architecture is ruined.”3 Using slightly different terminology, Jan Patočka claims that “Europe has disappeared, probably forever,” where by “Europe” he means the Western tradition of 4 thought. 1 Consider, for instance, a recent book by Donald Kuspit entitled The End of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 2 Mentioned in Alain Badiou. Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return of Philosophy. London: Continuum, 2003, p. 143. 3 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-François Lyotard, respectively. Quoted in his Manifesto for Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 28. 4 Jan Patočka. Plato and Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 89-90. 1 Let’s consider an instance of this “sentiment of the end” in the work of one of its key advocates in the most recent decades, Jacques Derrida.5 In doing so I will also indicate the kind of approach that the present work will take. Derrida writes: “Metaphysics—the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason.”6 Even though this passage does not explicitly proclaim the end of metaphysics, yet in it a strong suggestion to that effect is made insofar as metaphysics is exposed as non-rational—a fact that is supposed to subvert the long-standing tradition of Western thinking. Thus, here Derrida might be seen as intending to undermine Western philosophy, or, at least, Western metaphysics, and although the aim of my project cannot be farther from this, I entirely agree with this thinker on at least one point: myth and reason are one every time philosophy begins. Yet, as I will argue, this fact in no way jeopardizes or undermines metaphysics. Derrida continues: “White mythology—metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring…”7 True, but only a certain kind of thinking disrupts its connection with this “scene,” and therefore, turns into a caricature of metaphysics, or what I will call the metaphysical double. Insofar as originary metaphysics is concerned, even though it might not be explicit about the oneness of mythos and logos, it necessarily draws from this oneness. Throughout this work I will maintain that the postmodern attack on metaphysics can only reveal the shortcomings of the metaphysical double, and thus, in no way jeopardizes the status of originary thought. In the above passage by Derrida we witness an accurate observation that is clearly misapplied if it is being taken to mean the end of a certain kind of thinking, for it merely points out a necessary feature of this thinking. Let us consider one more instance of this attitude, this time in Heidegger’s writings. As is well known, in his so called middle and late periods he insists on the need for another beginning. This theme is especially dominant in the Contributions to Philosophy, and in the first lines of his essay “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God Is Dead’” Heidegger writes:8 The pointing of the way [towards asking about the essence of nihilism] will clarify a stage in Western metaphysics that is probably its final stage; for inasmuch as through Nietzsche metaphysics has in a certain sense divested itself 5 I would like to make it clear that given that Derrida’s thought is subtle and difficult to pinpoint or classify it might be argued that he does not endorse this attitude. Yet, very often he is, and sometimes with good reason, understood to say just that. 6 Jacques Derrida. “White Mythology.” Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 213. 7 Derrida, “White Mythology,” p. 213. 8 This essay is based upon Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche (given between 1936 and 1940). Cf. Martin Heidegger. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. x. 2 of its own essential possibility, other possibilities of metaphysics can no longer appear.9 If we read the above quotation carefully, we will notice that in the span of one sentence Heidegger twice qualifies his assertion that philosophy as metaphysics has reached its end by saying that probably metaphysics is in its final stage and that with Nietzsche metaphysics in a certain sense has deprived itself of its possibility.