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Historical Background Scipio Brothers Consolidated Their Carthage Held All of Southern and Control North of the Ebro and Prepared Eastern Spain, up to the Ebro River

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Historical Background Scipio Brothers Consolidated Their Carthage Held All of Southern and Control North of the Ebro and Prepared Eastern Spain, up to the Ebro River Romans. However, Gnaeus Scipio reinforced his fleet with picked legion- naires, caught the Carthaginian fleet by surprise, and crushed it at the Battle of the Ebro. In the fall of 217 BC, Publius Cornelius Scipio, now a pro-consul, finally arrived in his allotted province with 8,000 reinforcements. Meanwhile, in Italy, Hannibal won three spectacular victories over the Romans at Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae by the summer of 216 BC. The Carthaginian government resolved that the time had come to reinforce Hannibal in Italy with an army from Spain and bring the war to a conclusion. Carthage sent Hasdrubal 4,000 foot and 500 horse as reinforcements, along with orders to march for Italy. A rebellion among the Tartesii tribe in southern Spain, how- ever, delayed his invasion until the following year. In the meantime, the As the Second Punic War opened, Historical Background Scipio brothers consolidated their Carthage held all of southern and control north of the Ebro and prepared eastern Spain, up to the Ebro River. At the onset of the Second Punic War in to meet Hasbrubal's onslaught. 218 BC, Rome dispatched one of its When Hannibal departed for Italy, he consular armies, under Publius Cornelius left his brother, Hasdrubal Barca, with 12,650 infantry, 2,550 cavalry, 21 Scipio, to invade northern Spain. Arriv- The Battle of Dertosa elephants, and a small fleet to hold the ing at Massilia (modern Marseille), the In the spring of 215 BC, Hasdrubal province. After a swift conquest of Romans were stunned to discover that moved north with some 25,000 foot, northeastern Spain, Hannibal left Hanno Hannibal was already on the east bank of 4,000 horse and 21 elephants. The with another 11,000 troops to control the the Rhone, headed for Italy. In what was Scipio brothers masses 30,000 infantry newly-won territory. Hannibal took possibly the key strategic decision of the and 3,000 cavalry to bar his path at the with him all the veteran troops and war, Publius opted to continue with the Ebro River. Hasdrubal's objective was experienced officers of Carthage's invasion of Spain. He sent his army on to defeat the main Roman field army so Iberian army. He had also bypassed the under the command of his older brother that he could cross into Italy while still coastal Greek cities of northern Spain, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, while Publius maintaining Carthaginian control of allies of Rome. himself returned to Italy to face Spain. The Scipio brothers likewise Hannibal. This move resulted in a 13- aimed to defeat Hasdrubal in open Gnaeus Scipio had 22,000 infantry, 2,200 year duel for supremacy between Rome battle to prevent his crossing into Italy cavalry and a small fleet with which to and Carthage for control of the Iberian and to break his grip on the Iberian undertake the invasion of Spain. With Peninsula. Peninsula. these troops, and friendly bases at Emporiae and Tarraco, Gnaeus easily Following the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and Hasdrubal's army was comprised crushed Hanno's army and took control Corsica to Rome during the First Punic mainly of African and mercenary of northern Spain in the fall of 218 BC. War (264-241 BC) and its aftermath, regulars augmented by Iberian levies. Hamilcar Barca ((Hannibal's father) The following spring, Hasdrubal, his forces augmented by Iberian levies, His infantry consisted of around 15,000 carved out an extensive Spanish province Libyan spearmen, 1,000 mercenaries for Carthage between 238 and 229 BC. advanced north to challenge the (Ligurians and other unspeci- fied soldiers of fortune), 8,000 Iberians, and 1,000 Balearic slingers. His mounted force included 2,300 Numidian light cavalry, 450 Liby-Phoenician heavy cavalry, 1,200 Spanish horse, and 21 elephants. Reportedly, his Spanish levies were none too anxious to make the trek to Italy that would follow a victory. The Scipio brothers' forces included two reinforced Roman legions, consisting of 10,000 foot and 600 horse, and allied Italian troops number- ing nearly 18,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry. Their auxiliary Iberian forces probably included about 2,000 foot and 400 horse. The Roman command was exercised jointly by the Scipio brothers. Although Publius had initially been the supreme commander, with Gnaeus as his deputy, the command by this point was largely shared. Gnaeus was the elder brother, and he had served a coming down onto a nearby plain to wing was also reinforced with about ten consulship with distinction against the face them. The two camps were about African war elephants (the same Insubrian Gauls in 222 BC. Gnaeus has five miles apart, and the two armies felt disposition Hannibal had employed at also served as the sole commander in each other out during five days of the Battle of Trebbia). The Balearic Spain for over a year before Publius skirmishing. The stage was set for the slingers formed an extended skirmish arrived. The Senate appears to have climactic showdown. line. The remaining infantry, 2,000 to vested both brothers with pro-consular 3,000 in number, guarded his camp. authority. Hasdrubal, on the other The Scipio brothers deployed their army hand, was the unquestioned sole in standard fashion, with the two The Roman battle plan appears to have Carthaginian commander. This was legions in the center and the allied mainly because he had no subordinate been typically straightforward—a infantry divided evenly between the frontal assault, weighted in the center. commanders of note. Himilco, his wings. The Roman cavalry, reinforced deputy, remained behind in southern The Scipio brothers, like Hasdrubal, with the Spanish horse, formed on the were well aware of what had occurred Spain to maintain control of the vast extreme right. On the far left were Carthaginian province. at Cannae. They apparently believed posted all the Italian cavalry. About the appropriate counter to envelopment 2,000 roman and Italian infantry and the Since both sides sought to fight a was to rupture the enemy center. For Spanish auxiliary foot remained behind his part, Hasdrubal knew that the decisive battle, the maneuvering was as a camp guard. limited and straightforward. In the circumstances he faced were signifi- cantly different from those at Cannae. early spring of 215 BC, the Romans Hasdrubal, who by now had received a crossed the Ebro and laid siege to the His infantry was much closer in full account of the action at Cannae, numbers to his Roman opponent's than Carthaginian allied city of Ibera (the posted his sturdy African phalanxes on Battle of Dertosa is also known as the Hannibal's had been, but he lacked the the wings of his infantry line. The right decisive cavalry superiority his brother Battle of Ibera). Hasdrubal in turn laid wing was purely African, while the left siege to a small Roman allied city, also had exploited to such good effect. wing was reinforced by his mercenaries. Hasdrubal could only hope that his on the south bank of the Ebro, across The center was composed entirely of from the city of Dertosa (modern elephant corps would provide the Iberian tribal levies. He stationed his quick victory he needed from his Tortosa). The Romans then moved Liby-Phoenician heavy cavalry and against Hasdrubal and he obliged by cavalry on the flanks, and that his Iberian horsemen on his far left, unenthusiastic Iberian infantry could opposite the Roman cavalry. Against hold in the center long enough for the the Italian horse he posted his superb envelopment to unfold. Numidian light cavalry. Each cavalry The action began in the center with the Italy with a second Carthaginian army. The Final Analysis charge of the two Roman legions into He would not accomplish this for Why did Hasdrubal fail at Dertosa Hasdrubal's Iberian infantry; the another eight years (208-207 BC). while his brother Hannibal had suc- Spanish troops immediately gave ceeded at Cannae against a far larger ground. The African phalanxes and Although the failed invasion attempt of Roman army? Many have assumed mercenaries on the wings now came 215 BC has been historically eclipsed by that Hasdrubal was simply inferior to into play and forced the allied Italian the Metaurus campaign of 207 BC, his older brother in command ability. foot back. Meanwhile, on the extreme Hasdrubal's earlier effort actually posed While this charge may have some merit, flanks, the elephant charges proved a far greater threat to Rome's survival. Hasdrubal undeniably suffered from a ineffectual, and neither side's mounted In 215 BC, Rome, still reeling from number of serious disadvantages. troops gained a quick advantage. At Cannae, would most likely have been First of all, he lacked the cavalry this critical juncture, the Carthaginian overwhelmed by the combined forces of superiority (10,000 to 6,000) that center broke in the face of the aggressive the two eldest sons of Hamilcar Barca. proved decisive at Cannae. He lacked Roman assault. Although Hasdrubal By 207 BC, Rome was far better pre- the disciplined troops that Hannibal had thus lost his chance for scoring a pared to handle a second invasion, as commanded, veterans of 20 years of "Cannae," he could still win a "Trebbia" the resulting Battle of Metaurus demon- continuous warfare in Spain. Even at this point. For just as in that earlier strated. more important, he lacked the cadre of battle, the Carthaginian infantry wings highly trained, professional staff officers were victorious even as their center The Roman victory at Dertosa also that accompanied Hannibal into Italy. faltered. In fact, the Italian infantry was brought the Scipio brothers new Iberian This was particularly evident in the hard pressed and effectively outflanked allies and the opportunity to carry the failure of the Carthaginian cavalry to by the African phalanxes.
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