ARMED VIOLENCE Issue Brief Number 2 December 2012
Political Conflict and Vulnerabilities Firearms and electoral violence in Kenya
Introduction ents feel regarding their safety during determining, delaying, or influencing political campaigns by analysing area- an electoral process (Fischer, 2002, p. 8). A 2011 assessment of the availability specific and historical dynamics that Starting from a typology of electoral of small arms and perceptions of secu- fuel current insecurity. Rather than violence—including identity conflict, rity in Kenya—conducted by the Kenya restricting analysis of causes to the post- campaign conflict, balloting conflict, National Focal Point on Small Arms 1990s’ era, this study proposes that results conflict, and representation and Light Weapons (KNFP) and the current violence is a metamorphosis of conflict (Fischer, 2002, pp. 8–11)—this Small Arms Survey—found that safety much earlier, largely state-sponsored study focuses in particular on conflicts during electioneering periods was the violence. Considering Kenya’s transi- involving identity, results, and repre- highest concern among household tional status and that the country’s sentation that are products of the coun- respondents. Specifically, 48.4 per cent politics has been the greatest determi- try’s political dynamics. felt most unsafe during political cam- nant of its stability, this analysis aims As Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) paigns (Wepundi et al., 2012, p. 60). to inform ongoing reform efforts and suggest, theoretical analyses of political This finding is understandable, given policy dialogue on birthing a new violence fall broadly into two camps, one Kenya’s recent political history and its Kenya. This Issue Brief builds on the of which is supported by the argument recurrent electoral violence. findings of the KNFP–Small Arms that Africa’s ethnic identities are salient Politics in Kenya has borne an Survey national assessment (Wepundi in that they reflect traditional loyalties immense cost. For example, in succes- et al., 2012), triangulating primary to kith and kin. This is countered by sive elections that have taken place since data with other independent research the other postulation that as ethnicity the reintroduction of pluralist democ- (including opinion polls), synthesizing is a functional construct, it is bound racy in the 1990s, politically instigated them with secondary literature and up in political competition. In Kenya’s ethnic violence has resulted in consid- an analysis of current trends. case, social and political ruptures are erable death, injury, human displace- The discussion that follows draws predominantly ethnically motivated ment, and the destruction of public upon the concept of electoral violence and, during elections, the political elite and private property. The history of as random or organized acts aimed at often manipulate identity consciousness. this violence is deeply entrenched, as old as Kenya itself; but these problems will prevail without changes to the political culture. Even though electoral violence has occurred predominantly in Coast, cen- tral Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western provinces, most analyses to date have overlooked similar violence in other areas, violence associated with other matters, such as cattle rustling.1 Moreover, the impact of such politi- cally induced insecurity and its correla- tion to demands for self-help security, i.e. armament, creates a new dynamic. There will be serious consequences if these matters are not addressed.2 This Issue Brief contextualizes the elevated fears that household respond- People displaced by electoral violence crowd to receive food aid in Nairobi, Kenya, January 2008. © Simon Maina/Associated Press
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 In reflecting on Kenya’s political The by-elections were held in 1966 stitutional amendment in 1982, he made development, it is possible to trace and became known as the ‘little gen- Kenya a de jure single party-state back the nature of electoral violence eral election’, but were tainted by state (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, p. 37). and conflict. The main findings of this intimidation of opposition supporters During the Moi era, elections in Issue Brief are: (Branch, 2011, p. 59), ‘virulence of lan- 1983 and 1988 were almost entirely guage’ in campaigns (p. 60), and the manipulated. In the 1988 elections, Political violence is not new to harassment of KPU candidates by the the queue voting system (referred to Kenya; and current manifestations provincial administration and the KANU in Swahili as the ‘mlolongo system’) need to be understood in a histori- youth wing (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, was introduced for the primaries, but cal context. p. 14).4 The use of the youth wing to a secret ballot run-off would not have The threat of electoral violence for intimidate political opponents at this been necessary had the winner in the 2013 must be looked at from the early stage in political history fomented first round garnered more than 70 per standpoint of how existing divisions the role that organized gangs play in cent of the vote (Throup and Hornsby, and conflicts manifest themselves electoral violence today (Anderson, 1998, p. 42). The result was a parliament in the overall political situation 2002, pp. 550–51). Furthermore, when ‘tainted by rigging’ (Hornsby and of Kenya. the state chose to politicize ethnicity, Throup, 1992, p. 193), at least for ‘one Small arms, an exacerbating factor political mobilization was carried out third of the electoral contests (over 60 in current violence, pose a threat primarily along ethnic lines.5 seats)’ (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, p. 42). as the 2013 elections approach. A few years later, during the cam- The electoral malpractice committed Importantly, the prevalence of paigns leading up to the 1969 elections, in President Kenyatta’s and President arms anywhere in the country President Kenyatta was heckled by a Moi’s eras thrived on the complicity of potentially results in easy access stone-throwing contingent in Kisumu, the provincial administration, which to weapons wherever electoral upon which his bodyguards began ensured an uneven playing field by violence flares up. shooting into the crowd. Estimates of the licensing the campaigns of preferred Certain steps have been taken to number of people shot dead vary from candidates only, barring their opponents, address these issues, but they can eight (Branch, 2011, p. 88) to 100 (Throup and using other forms of manipulation be deemed adequate only if they and Hornsby, 1998, p. 14). Immediately (Hornsby and Throup, 1992, p. 192). stay true to the new constitution. after this incident, the government At the height of President Moi’s rule banned the KPU and had its leaders (1982–90), the KANU youth wing was detained (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, revitalized ‘as a powerful instrument 3 Electoral violence in p. 15). State repression was on the rise. for monitoring and punishing public Kenya’s history Assassinations—targeting those dissent and asserting [the president’s] leaders deemed a political threat— authority’ (Kagwanja, 2005, p. 55). Immediately post-1963, Kenya’s politi- recurred, with the killing of Tom Mboya In so far as the lines between party cal system was pluralist, with two in 1969 (Branch, 2011, p. 79), Josiah and state were blurred, the violence dominant parties: the Kenya African Mwangi Kariuki in 1975 (Throup and spread by the KANU youth wing was National Union (KANU) and the Kenya Hornsby, 1998, p. 19), and Robert Ouko state-sponsored—mainly targeting the African Democratic Union (KADU). in 1990 (Branch, 2011, p. 190). Besides KPU in President Kenyatta’s time—and Multi-party democracy lasted only one eliminating ‘threats’, such targeted targeting democracy activists during year, however, as the president soon killings functioned as a means to President Moi’s rule. For instance, in consolidated his personal authority destroy potential political succession. the December 1991 drive for a return and created a government of national For example, the murder of Mboya and to multi-party democracy, the KANU unity. In December 1964, Kenya became Mwangi Kariuki effectively purged government recruited more youth wing a de facto single-party state; these ten- them from President Kenyatta’s suc- members, apparently to intimidate dencies towards authoritarianism were cession line (Branch, 2011, pp. 75–79; and assault those activists promoting amplified by the assassination of Pio pp. 112–18). The resulting lack of pluralist democracy (Mwagiru, Sana, Gama Pinto in 1965 and the deten- political competition, years later, and Njau, 2002, p. 6). tion without trial of John Keen in 1967 caused the conflict between the govern- In time, there was a proliferation of (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, pp. 12–13). ment and its opposition to escalate, state-sponsored vigilantes (in Swahili, When ideological differences led to thereby creating fertile ground for elec- referred to as ‘majeshi ya wazee’, meaning a rift between Vice President Jaramogi toral violence (Kirschke, 2000, p. 395). ‘armies of the elders’) who appear to Oginga Odinga and President Kenyatta, Even then, violence during campaign- have been instructed to disrupt rallies Oginga Odinga broke away to form a ing was common, although it was held by opposition groups and gener- new political party, the Kenya People’s ‘localised in particular high-tension ally to derail democracy (Kagwanja, Union (KPU), in 1966 (Branch, 2011, constituencies such as Mathira in Nyeri’ 2005, p. 56). In response, opposition p. 58). Apart from ideological differ- (Hornsby and Throup, 1992, p. 192). parties recruited their own youth to ences, Oginga Odinga was displeased In the early years of Kenya’s second counter government-sponsored attacks. with the alleged rigging of a series of post-independent regime, President This led to increasingly lethal clashes KANU elections (Throup and Hornsby, Daniel arap Moi attempted to build a between government-sponsored and 1998, p. 13). strong party-state. By means of a con- opposition-supported gangs. In one
2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 December 2012 such incident in late 1991, at a rally held was destroyed. The value of damage to nism [and] despotic rule’ (Nyawalo in Kamukunji, tens of people were killed property in 1992 election-related clashes et al., 2011, p. 9). During President and hundreds injured in a fracas pitting was estimated to be KES 210 million Kenyatta’s neo-patrimonial rule, he the police, paramilitary General Service (USD 2,625,000) (Africa Watch, 1993, drew on and therefore empowered Unit (GSU), and KANU youth wingers p. 42). In the violence surrounding the the provincial administration rather against opposition party supporters, 2007 elections, ‘117,216 private properties than his political party. This effectively sympathizers, and youth wing members (including residential houses, commer- weakened KANU, to the extent that it (Mwagiru, Sana, and Njau, 2002, p. 7). cial premises, vehicles, farm produce) was moribund by 1975 (Throup and The push for wider democratic were destroyed, while 491 Government- Hornsby, 1998, pp. 17–18). space was not purely internally driven. owned properties (offices, vehicles, President Moi, on the other hand, As in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, health centres, schools, and trees) sought to create a strong party-state, external pressures (particularly politi- were destroyed’ (CIPEV, 2008, p. 346). for which KANU was used to monitor cal conditionalities, by which donors In total, 1,133 people died and more than public sentiment and suppress oppo- of development aid tied their contribu- 600,000 were displaced as a result of sition (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, p. 37). tions to requisite political reforms) con- the 2007–08 electoral violence (CIPEV, Moi also maintained provincial admin- tributed considerably (Kirschke, 2000, 2008, pp. 305, 334; UNOCHA, 2011). istrators as his personal representatives p. 389). Yet, when political pressure In order to understand better how at local levels of society (Branch, 2011, from donors combined with local pro- elections can become this violent, it is p. 173). Both approaches led to mounting democracy activism, the government necessary to analyse the root causes repression, the restriction of democratic reaction was to privatize violence. of such developments. Causal factors space, and the political assassination Privatized violence involved the contributing to disruption may play of opponents (NSC, 2011a, p. 26). These use of political agents and gangs to out at the national and local levels and, assassinations triggered street riots and neutralize the threat of the opposition, at times, both simultaneously. demonstrations (Hyden, 1994, p. 81), as an effective alternative to official but, more importantly, they incited state repression by means of the secu- inter-ethnic animosity (Branch, 2011, rity forces and provincial administra- Structural causes of p. 84). Both presidents primarily deter- tion6 (Roessler, 2005, p. 207). As the electoral violence mined how patronage benefits were drive for democratization grew, in the distributed. In most cases, the presi- post-cold war climate of reduced super- Of historical factors that informed dent’s family, inner circle, and ethnic power interest in creating spheres of present conflict dynamics, the most group were the key beneficiaries influence, sub-national violence pro- often cited are deep-seated grievances (Hyden, 1994, p. 81). Consequently, 7 liferated (Roessler, 2005, p. 207). in communities. Politicization of iden- the institution of the presidency was In addition to using vigilantes in tity and resource allocation, greed, and valued highly by the political elite and privatized violence, the state employed grievance have strongly influenced the ethnic groups saw the advantages of powerful lethal strategies to thwart fierceness of political competition and electing a member of their own com- 8 opposition leaders and intimidate the conflict in post-independence Kenya. munity as head of state. pro-opposition electorate. KANU lead- The clashes of the 1990s should be ers highlighted instances of historical The personalization of power understood in this context. In the ensu- injustice that resonated within their First and foremost, the personalization ing violence, pro-Moi communities were constituencies, deliberately politicized of power has fostered ‘ethnic antago- incited to protect what they perceived ethnicity, and used state organs to incite violence, especially in coastal and west- ern Kenya. Subsequent cycles of elec- Table 1 Electoral violence-induced displacement, death, and injury, from the 1990s onwards toral violence were influenced by this Year Number of internally displaced people Deaths Injuries early reaction to pluralist democracy. In the first phase of election-related 1993a 300,000 1,500 654 conflict after1990 , an estimated 300,000 1995b 350,000 1,800 3,000 people were displaced and by 1993, 1,500 had died (Africa Watch, 1993, p. 1; 1997–98c 130,000 * * Table 1). Other calculations estimate 2002d * 325 * that by July 1995, at least 1,800 people had been killed, 3,000 injured, and 2004e 360,000 * * 350,000 displaced (Nyukuri, 1997, p. 15). 2007–08 663,921f 1,133g 3,561g Studies show that between 1991 and 1997, election-related clashes displaced Note: * Areas for which figures are not available are indicated with an asterisk. Between 1991 and 2001, more than 4,000 people died and 600,000 more than 600,000 people in Coast, cen- were displaced due to political violence (Mutahi, 2005, p. 69). From 1993 to 2004, statistics for displacements are cumulative; records show that 300,000 and 350,000 were displaced in 1993 and 1995 respectively, in real terms, representing an increase of 50,000. In addition, while there was tral Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western no major politically fuelled conflict in 2002, there were still displaced persons from previous violence, as seen in 2004. provinces (KHRC, 2011, p. 8). Thousands Sources: a: Africa Watch (1993, pp. 1, 97); b: Nyukuri (1997, pp. 15, 17, referring to the September 1992 estimation by the Parliamentary Select Committee of people were killed, many more to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other parts of Kenya and to an NCCK report of 1994–95); c: Kamungi (2002, p. 25); d: Mutahi, 2005, p. 73; injured, and millions’ worth of property e: KHRC (2011, p. 12); f: UNOCHA (2011); g: CIPEV (2008, pp. 305, 334)
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 3 as entitlements, and so they targeted multi-ethnic opposition was founded regarding the impact of national poli- those they perceived to be supporters under the National Rainbow Coalition ticians’ statements on local, inter-ethnic of the opposition. In September 1991, (NARC), led by Mwai Kibaki (Barkan, relations. This has become a factor in the sustained drive by opposition activ- 2004, pp. 91–92).10 President Kibaki ethnic polarization, as leaders have ists for the reintroduction of multi- secured a landslide victory with over pursued ethnic alliances while groups, party democracy was countered by a 62 per cent of the vote, as compared to such as the Mombasa Republican revival of calls for majimboism 9 (Throup Uhuru’s 31 per cent. His NARC coali- Council (MRC) in Coast, have sprung and Hornsby, 1998, p. 188). This pro- tion scooped 125 of the 210 contestable up to fight, often violently, for sectar- voked ethnic rivalries, especially in parliamentary seats and that seemed to ian rights (Ndung’u and Wepundi, Rift Valley, culminating in violence on bode well for national unity (African 2012, pp. 6–7). Miteitei farm, in Tinderet, in November Election Database, 2012). 1991. Violence then spread to the Soon there was disgruntlement, Credibility of electoral Nandi-Luo border and other parts of however, about unfulfilled commitments the country (p. 188). among coalition partners. Specifically, management body the Raila Odinga-led wing of the coali- As demonstrated in the historical The ethnic nature of politics tion argued that President Kibaki had context of electoral violence, flawed not fulfilled his duties in line with a pre- elections can fuel significantly the The ethnic make-up of politics and election Memorandum of Understand- likelihood of post-poll conflict. This the state has fuelled hegemonization ing (MoU) (CIPEV, 2008, pp. 29–30). section focuses on the most recent efforts by different groups, such as the Simultaneously, the growing percep- events that necessitated international Kikuyu during the 1963–78 Kenyatta tion that the Kibaki government was mediation. presidency (AMANI Forum, 2008, p. 12). bringing about the re-Kikuyuization The environment for ensuring This ‘Kikuyuization’ entailed consoli- of politics and the economy revived credible general elections in 2007 was dating political power and controlling anti-Kikuyu sentiments of the past jeopardized by disgruntlement over the the economy (p. 11). When Moi took (AMANI Forum, 2008, p. 12). unilateral presidential appointment over in 1978, he embarked on a decade When a constitutional referendum of 15 commissioners to the Electoral of gradual ‘de-Kikuyuization’ and was held in November 2005, the dis- Commission of Kenya (ECK). President ‘Kalenjinization’ of the state (Hornsby affected coalition partners—the ‘No’ Kibaki disregarded the 1997 Inter- and Throup, 1992, p. 191). In essence, team, whose symbol was an orange— Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) he dismantled President Kenyatta’s campaigned aggressively against the agreement that provided for an inclu- Kikuyu network of the political and government-supported proposal.11 sive appointment process12 in which economic elite and replaced it with a Political rhetoric abounded during the political parties were to submit a list powerful clique of his supporters, pre- campaigns about the proposed consti- of names from which the president dominately ethnic Kalenjins (Foeken tution and the majimbo debate of the would select commissioners. Instead, and Dietz, 2000, p. 124). 1960s and 1990s was revived (Makabila, the president, without consulting other Consequently, in the 1990s, the 2010). Opinion on the proposed consti- party leaders as guided by the IPPG Kikuyu elite strove for more significant tution was divided largely along ethnic arrangement, replaced ten commis- political and economic representation lines. The intense polarization that had sioners in January 2007 and another (Hornsby and Throup, 1992, p. 191). characterized the immediate pre- and five in October, just weeks before the Despite the sectarian elite having weak- post-referendum politics set the tone for December 2007 elections (IREC, 2008, ened the country, history demonstrates how events unfolded in 2007 (CIPEV, pp. 30–31). that the drive for pluralism in the 1990s 2008, p. 30). The 2007 election cam- It would emerge later that these was successful largely because of its paigns consequently became highly appointments fuelled mistrust, not inter-ethnic nature. The movement sectarian, with much of the political only among the public, but also within involved key political leaders, includ- discourse focusing on betrayal (over the electoral body, as both politicians ing Oginga Odinga (referred to as ‘the the MoU) and on ethnically motivated and the public feared the ECK would be father of opposition politics’), Masinde government appointments (Dercon and compromised. For instance, the ECK Muliro, and Martin Shikuku, among Gutiérrez-Romero, 2010, pp. 8–9). chairman allegedly reported that he others representing many parts of the Pre-election violence occurred at was concerned that President Kibaki country. Later, the opposition again campaign rallies and in at least one would replace him with the president’s split along ethnic lines (Foeken and hotspot—an area with the most (recur- former lawyer, Muturi Kigano (Ochami Dietz, 2000, p. 126). rent) incidences of political-related and Ombati, 2011). Ahead of the 2002 elections, Presi- violence)—leading to the death of 41 Actual elections were nonetheless dent Moi unilaterally endorsed Uhuru people in December 2007. Twenty-five largely peaceful, but the processes of Kenyatta—the son of the former pres- of them were killed in Molo district, cen- vote-tallying and announcing results ident—as his successor, a move which tral Rift Valley (Dercon and Gutiérrez- fuelled tensions, leading to violence. proved counterproductive (AMANI Romero, 2010, p. 10). Initial results gave the Orange Demo- Forum, 2008, p. 12). It triggered the Present political dynamics remain cratic Movement (ODM) party’s Raila defection of key KANU leaders to the influenced by ethnic affiliation, arousing Odinga a clear lead over the incum- opposition and, in the process, a strong, concerns among community members bent President Kibaki of the Party of
4 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 December 2012 National Unity (PNU) (Dercon and In a national conflict mapping exercise respondents in Rift Valley and Central Gutiérrez-Romero, 2010, p. 12). But conducted by the National Steering provinces (18 per cent and 20 per cent by the afternoon of 29 December, Committee on Peacebuilding and respectively) anticipated violence Odinga’s lead had shrunk to just over Conflict Management (NSC), 30 per (KNFP and Small Arms Survey, 2011). 100,000 votes.13 cent of respondents viewed politics The present accord between leaders Tensions across the country were as the foremost contributor to conflict, from the two regions may contribute elevated further by delays in releasing above security, socio-cultural, economic, to the relatively optimistic outlook of results from the remaining voter zones, justice-related, and environmental fac- respondents from the two areas regard- the locations of the announcements, tors (NSC, 2011b, p. 11). A follow-up ing the next polls. This points to the and the ensuing questions about the study to the NSC work indicated that potential for new dynamics of accord integrity of voter results (KPTJ, 2008, all counties but four (Embu, Machakos, and discord along political alliances p. 2). The ECK chairman announced Vihiga, and Siaya) were to be consid- to be forged in communities. that President Kibaki had won by a ered high- to moderate-conflict risk The KNFP–Small Arms Survey sur- margin of 225,174 more votes than areas in the run-up to the next elec- vey highlights the fact that households in those of his main rival, Raila Odinga tions, because of their vulnerability to high-volatility areas16 are significantly (Gibson and Long, 2009, p. 499). The identity- and resource-based conflict, more fearful of political campaigns Independent Review Commission among other factors (CRECO, 2012, than their counterparts in low- and (IREC) subsequently tallied votes in a pp. 21–93). A scrutiny of public views medium-volatility areas (see Figure 1). sample of 18 constituencies and found on politics, elections, and security is This underscores that households may that in those areas, President Kibaki useful in determining threats to peace- continue to fear for their own safety, was awarded 41,699 votes too few ful elections, now and for the future. despite better inter-ethnic relations de- and Raila 28,193 votes too few (IREC, veloping from current political unions. 2008, pp. 129–30). It is interesting to As these persisting fears regarding note that votes were deflated for can- Citizens’ fears security, insecurity, and violence in didates on both sides of the political There is considerable concern about the run-up to the March 2013 general divide. This scenario prompted the Kenyan elections turning violent in elections are likely to affect citizen IREC to conclude that ECK figures future. A recent opinion poll taken by participation in ongoing democratic were unreliable (IREC, 2008, p. 136). Infotrak Harris revealed that a majority processes, they may be detrimental to On 30 December 2007, the ECK of respondents (91 per cent) intend to voter turn-out. This is endorsed by the announced the presidential results. vote in the next political poll (Infotrak, KNFP–Small Arms Survey findings President Kibaki’s subsequent inau- 2012, p. 3). But more than one-fifth (22 that households in which a member guration gave rise to three forms of per cent) of those who plan not to vote had been victimized by a crime were violence: spontaneous protests; organ- cited fear of violence as the reason (p. 4). significantly more fearful of their safety ized militia activity; and the excessive In a recent study, the Kenya National during political campaigns (Figure 2; use of force by the police forces (KPTJ, Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) KNFP and Small Arms Survey, 2011). 2008, p. 1). Monitoring Project found that 21 per Victimization is a more influential The violence that followed seem- cent of respondents anticipate vio- determinant, more so than geography, ingly took on a momentum of its own lence in the next polls, indicating an of households’ perceptions of security and was fanned by many factors, increase from 17 per cent observed during elections. Although no causal- including discontent resulting from in the previous year (KNDR, 2012, ity can be established, the volatility of the elections. Other factors included p. 23). In addition, the same KNDR a region plays an important role where persistent grievances about historical study found that a marginally higher respondents within a region of high injustices, especially relating to land proportion of urban (22 per cent) than distribution; the consequences, inten- rural respondents (20 per cent) felt Figure 1 Households’ feeling of security, tional or otherwise, of political instru- violence would be likely. Other analy- relative to volatility (N=1,884) mentalization of ethnicity (resulting ses of the 2007 post-election violence MEAN LEVEL OF SECURITY from PNU–ODM sectarian campaigns); examined the vulnerability of urban 2.8 and pre-existing organized gangs areas to intense violence, demon- (Kanyinga, 2009; AMANI Forum, strating that, in Nairobi for example, 2.7 2008, pp. 9–14). slums were ‘violently fragmented into 2.6 various ethnic enclaves’ (Jacobs, 2011, 2.5 pp. 14–15). 14 Present vulnerabilities Further analysis of the results of the 2.4 Past surveys have demonstrated that survey conducted by KNFP and the 2.3 15 Kenyans believed political issues were Small Arms Survey (2011) indicates 2.2 the second most significant cause of that the most apprehensive respond- 2.1 violent conflict after boundary and ents were from Nyanza and Nairobi; High Medium Low land disputes (Wolf et al., 2004, p. 51). in both areas, more than a quarter (26 VOLATILITY OF THE REGION Recent research shows that generally per cent) anticipated violence (KNFP Note: Higher mean levels indicate higher levels of security. Kenyans view politics with scepticism. and Small Arms Survey, 2011). Fewer Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 5 Figure 2 Households’ feeling of security, Figure 3 Households’ feeling of security, weapons were used in areas considered relative to volatility and victimization relative to household firearm ownership hotspots.17 However, violent disputes experience (N=1,881) (N=1,857) in pastoralist areas, in particular, which
Victimization No victimization Ownership No ownership were primarily understood to result MEAN LEVEL OF SECURITY MEAN LEVEL OF SECURITY from conflicts over pasture, water, and livestock, are increasingly understood 3.0 3.0 to be political in origin.18 The dynamics evident in many areas point to an in-
2.5 2.5 creasing link between arms and politics. There is an unresolved conflict between the Pokot and Turkana of West
1.5 1.5 Pokot and Turkana counties respectively, over their boundaries. This conflict is multi-faceted: it stems from a historical
1.0 1.0 dispute between the two communities, High Medium Low High Medium Low and from the communities’ interests VOLATILITY OF THE REGION VOLATILITY OF THE REGION in controlling valuable resources— Note: Higher mean levels indicate higher levels of security. Note: Higher mean levels indicate higher levels of security. such as the KENGEN power genera- Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011) Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011) tion plant in Turkwell and the oil-rich areas of Ngamia—which have made volatility report significantly reduced political campaigns than those experi- the resolution of the boundary dispute feelings of security than both medium- encing low- to medium-volatility. In more urgent.19 In the view of these and low-volatility regions. these same (high-volatility) areas, communities, if the land holding these Since previous victims of electoral households with firearms feel less resources were determined to belong violence are likely to have heightened secure during political campaigns. to either of them, the relevant county fears about their security, especially This correlation is negated only in would be richer (Wepundi and Otieno, during political campaigns, voter turn- those instances where respondents 2012, pp. 16–17). out of this group is likely to decrease. perceive the prevalence of arms to be As this sectional dispute became Enhancing security measures to deter high, yet feel relatively safe during violent, several people were killed. the criminality and violence associated political campaigns. Two observations These killings were notably frequent with political campaigns is necessary can be made: the groups which believe at the time when the Independent to build public confidence in the act that arms are widely prevalent (owned Electoral and Boundaries Commission of voting. Failing this, over and above by almost all households) may consider (IEBC) was deliberating on the delimi- voter apathy, citizens’ fears provide this as part of the security arrangements tation of new constituencies. The IEBC’s fertile ground for precautionary self- and therefore feel protected. Their feel- decision—to make wards perceived help security to flourish. ings of safety may stem from the min- to be in Turkana South become parts imal relevance of the political aspects of constituencies in Pokot Central and of conflict to this group. However, Pokot East—triggered a court case ini- Small arms and safety in elections where groups have a greater interest tiated by the Turkana representatives While small arms have not been consid- or involvement in politics, their sense and intensified local disputes over ered a major concern in earlier cycles of insecurity in the light of arms avail- territory (Obare, 2012). of electoral violence, the KNFP– ability grows. Kenya’s new constitu- Although the IEBC’s official posi- Small Arms Survey study revealed tion has devolved the government to tion is that they are mandated only that firearm possession among house- 47 counties and with this new arrange- to delineate electoral units, while the holds negatively affects their sense of ment it is likely that formerly national central government is charged with security during political campaigns. issues will play out at the local level, determining administrative units, such That is, households that admitted to if the September 2012 Tana River vio- a decision in a region with a predispo- owning firearms cited electioneering as lence is anything to go by (Gitau, 2012). sition to armed conflict is bound to the period when they feel most unsafe Inter-group competition at the county intensify pre-existing conflict and to (KNFP and Small Arms Survey, 2011). level will be heightened by communi- complicate public participation in As households perceive an increased ties’ need to control local government, elections (especially in those areas prevalence of firearms, their perception hence potentially reducing conflict at the where delimitation is contested).20 As of their own safety during political national level (Ndung’u and Wepundi, such, most incidents occurring as live- campaigns decreases—suggesting an 2012, pp. 7–8). stock raids and killings on the border inverse relationship (see Figure 3). The contributing role of small arms between West Pokot and Turkana Firearm ownership plays a significant in electoral insecurity has not been counties can be regarded as forms of role in one’s feeling of security, specifi- studied adequately in Kenya, probably pre-election violence, with each com- cally in regions of high volatility. High- because in previous cycles of electoral munity seeking to assert its territorial volatility zones are more fearful of violence, mainly bladed and traditional rights. It is doubtful whether elections
6 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 December 2012 held in electoral wards in contested ter- to central Kenya, including Nairobi opinion on the ICC process has shown ritory could be successful or peaceful. (pp. 24, 49, and 58). Findings from a steady decline of approval from 89 Another example of an area prone other studies conducted in 2008 have per cent in June 2011 to 55 per cent in to election-related violence is Isiolo. highlighted the fact that, post-election, April 2012 (KNDR, 2012, p. 25). Most This county, in which arms are preva- violence-fed trafficking to central Rift of the respondents who were not in lent, has been earmarked for elevation Valley involved arms originating pre- favour were from Uhuru Kenyatta’s to a resort city under Kenya’s devel- dominantly from West Pokot (Ekuam, and William Ruto’s political strongholds opment blueprint called ‘Vision 2030’ 2008, pp. 15–18; Nguli, 2008, pp. 3–4). of Central and Rift Valley provinces (Government of Kenya, 2007, p. 10) In a current case at the International respectively (KNDR, 2012, p. 26). In and has become a hotspot for often Criminal Court (ICC), the chief pros- the aftermath of the ICC confirmation violent, identity-related politics. The ecutor has focused on the role of key of charges hearings, the two leaders resident Borana, Somali, and Turkana political leaders in post-electoral vio- held mass rallies to mobilize political groups are pursuing political and socio- lence.23 This indicates that there is a support. This may have caused a de- economic goals, frequently in violent link between politicians’ support and crease in public support for the ICC ways, which leads to the killing and trends in the arming of communities. (Ndung’u and Wepundi, 2012, p. 6). displacement of people. The continued flow of arms through The partisanship present in dis- In 2007, when Borana and Somali Kenya’s frontier districts is likely to cussions pertaining to the ICC cases groups learned that the Turkana com- continue to feed demand for weapons threatens to obscure the course of jus- munity had grown in numbers (Ruto in other parts of the country. In the tice and accountability. To date, judicial et al., 2010, p. 3),21 inter-community absence of reliable government security action has not been effective as regards hostilities erupted, primarily driven by guarantees for all citizens, regardless the prosecution of perpetrators behind the objective of maintaining political of their ethnicity and area of settlement, Kenya’s cycles of electoral violence. In influence and control in the constitu- fear of electoral violence will rise and January 2012, with the ICC confirma- ency. Inter-group attacks escalated, citizens may resort to self-help secu- tion of cases, political mobilization resulting in those households on land rity arrangements, such as acquiring took the form of mass prayer rallies designated for resort city development arms, organizing gangs, and conduct- (Ndung’u and Wepundi, 2012, p. 6). being displaced. Certain groups are ing retaliatory attacks. According to KNDR, a cumulative hoping to receive compensation for 36 per cent of respondents believed the sale of land for the resort city, and that the ongoing ICC trials were likely associated political dominance is often Possible trigger factors to trigger violence. These views were determined by violent means (Ndung’u Three main factors may contribute to strongest in Nairobi, Central, Nyanza, and Wepundi, 2012, p. 11).22 By late wider conflict. Eastern, and Rift Valley (KNDR, 2012, 2011, over 1,000 families had been p. 24). In the absence of a moderating displaced and tens of people killed 1. ICC-related discourse voice in the debate on ICC issues in (Tulel, 2011, pp. 1–2). The government’s failure to ensure the country, the public is likely to be These examples underscore the comprehensive local investigation more polarized at the height of politi- incidence and potential of electoral into crimes and adequate prosecution cal campaigns for the 4 March 2013 violence in pastoralist areas, a matter of the perpetrators of the 2008 violence elections. The current public discourse which warrants broader attention. has resulted in impunity, necessitating has focused on the eligibility of leaders This is especially urgent, considering the ICC involvement in the Kenyan who are ICC suspects to run for public that the stabilization of those areas in case. Impunity of electoral violence office (Ogemba, 2012). Kenya in which arms are particularly has historical roots: inquiries24 into prevalent (i.e. closest to the conflict- the post-1990s political violence did 2. Intensified local-level competition ravaged countries in the Horn of not lead to any prosecutions (CIPEV, Partly as a function of present devolu- Africa) is increasingly dependent on 2008, pp. 443–69). The ongoing case tion, there is renewed county-level, efforts to promote healthy political against four Kenyan suspects—two of inter-group competition for resources competition and elections free of whom, Uhuru Kenyatta and William and political power.26 This political armed violence. Ruto, are key political leaders, aspiring rivalry is primarily identity-based, Direct arms-trafficking routes, lead- to presidency in 2013—has fostered with ethnic groups becoming increas- ing from Kenya’s frontiers to the heart parochialism.25 ingly wary of the potential hegemony of the country, were identified by sur- National support for the ICC process of bigger communities within certain vey respondents (Wepundi et al., 2012, has diminished over time. In a survey counties. This friction is part of what has p. 71). Firearms transported from the carried out in October 2010, when the informed the Constitution and Reform north-east, in Garissa, may end up list of the initial six suspects had not Education Consortium (CRECO)’s in Nairobi’s Eastleigh and even Rift yet been revealed, 60 per cent of re- designation of all counties as conflict Valley’s Nakuru. Arms from Turkana spondents were in favour of the ICC. hotspots, save four (CRECO, 2012, p. 13). and Pokot are transferred to Rift Valley’s In October 2011, after confirmation of Consequently, electoral violence and Eldoret and Nakuru (Wepundi et al., the hearings, the percentage in favour other conflicts in the immediate future 2012, p. 58). Isiolo was also found to declined to 59 (Ipsos-Synovate, 2011, are likely to be localized in nature and be a conduit for guns being smuggled p. 2). The KNDR tracking of the public in location.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 7 Based on recent media reports issues, however, have triggered ten- subsequently stepped in to assist the (Wanyonyi, 2012), the National Secu- sions in some electoral units and electoral body in acquiring the BVR rity and Intelligence Service (NSIS) planted a seed of doubt as to whether kits (Kutuny, 2012; IEBC, 2012; Menya, has warned that 27 counties are poten- the electoral body is fit to oversee 2012; and Mayabi, 2012). tial hotspots of electoral violence. credible general elections (Ng’etich, While it is laudable that the stake- Accordingly, the National Cohesion J., 2012). holders involved are all committed to and Integration Commission (NCIC) The IEBC’s delimitation of elec- the realization of a reliable voter regis- is currently embarking on peacebuilding toral units (wards and constituencies) tration process and electronic voting, initiatives, such as inter-community resulted in identity-based claims for there are some concerns. The IEBC’s power-sharing pacts for peace, in which territory in the process, thereby feeding decisions regarding these pre-election ethnic groups are encouraged to com- tensions. While IEBC’s mandate is to procedures have been called into ques- mit to sharing county-level elective determine electoral and not adminis- tion. Such prevailing suspicions could positions (see Wanyonyi, 2012). trative boundaries, previously, con- ultimately lead to disputes of election In some of these crisis zones, arms stituency and ward boundaries were results. Furthermore, a fact which few are prevalent—making a stronger link within the limits of administrative parties have commented on is the between guns and electoral violence units (such as districts). By undermin- downside of the government’s expe- very likely. For example, a firearms ing this precedent, the IEBC probably diency in facilitating the IEBC’s acqui- ownership rate of 13.3 per cent of did not foresee the risk of its decisions sition of BVR kits. Such involvement households was observed in Bungoma resulting in conflict, especially in cases could cast doubt on the autonomy of county (Wepundi et al., 2012, pp. 42–43), such as the constituencies of Dadaab the IEBC in discharging its mandate. where ethnic tensions over county gov- (Garissa County) and Turkana South If the executive and legislature appear ernance issues (such as the control of (Turkana County). There were a total to control the hand of the electoral political seats and the location of of 125 court cases against the IEBC, body,31 grounds may be set for a com- county headquarters) are probable. in which petitioners sought a judicial promised IEBC. These developments— This was almost five times above the review of electoral units (Kenya Law on the IEBC’s decisions on the OMR national average rate of 2.7 per cent. Reports, 2012, p. 7, para. 19; p. 37, and BVR approaches—led the Institute In the county’s Mt. Elgon area, para. 110; p. 118, para. 4). for Education in Democracy to express residents feared the re-emergence of In the Dadaab Constituency case, concern over the executive’s directives militias, specifically the Sabaot Land the High Court transferred Alango- to the IEBC to register voters biometri- Defence Force (SLDF).27 Similarly, Arba sub-location from the Balambala cally and over the executive’s decision arms were available in Baringo, Isiolo, Constituency back to the former elec- to take over the procurement of BVR Laikipia, Marsabit, Samburu, Tana toral unit (Kenya Law Reports, 2012, kits (Institute for Education in Democ- River, and Turkana counties (Wepundi p. 120). The IEBC decision had accen- racy, 2012, p. 2). et al., 2012, pp. 43, 45). In Nakuru, fire- tuated clan-based claims over Alango- arms have been linked to urban crimes Arba (Kenya Law Reports, 2012, pp. and respondents feared that in the event 118–30). The court ruling calmed these Conclusion of a recurrence of electoral violence, tensions. However, the court sided This Issue Brief traces the origins of 28 illicit guns would be used. Most re- with the IEBC’s decision to transfer electoral violence in Kenya’s 49-year, cently, in Tana River in Coast Province, some wards in Turkana South to post-independence history. It concludes electoral violence resulted in the killings Pokot-predominated constituencies. that cycles of conflict have been fuelled of more than 100 people (Babo, 2012). This decision served only to compli- by inadequate government measures In this same region, the Mombasa cate a pre-existing, and often violent, to ensure its citizens are safe during Republican Council has exacerbated boundary dispute waging between the elections and a lack of justice for 30 insecurity: the gang with secessionist the Pokot and Turkana. the victims and perpetrators of elec- demands threatened to disrupt national Although the judiciary established toral violence. That said, Kenya has primary and secondary school exami- itself as an increasingly trusted insti- made certain gains. Primarily, these nations; their members attempted to tution to resolve election-related cases lie in promulgating a new constitu- kill a government minister, but were such as those on delimitation, the IEBC tion with a less powerful presidency, thwarted; and they were threatening faltered in its preparations for the 2013 guaranteeing the independence of the to disrupt the March 2013 elections elections. The IEBC has reconsidered IEBC (with commissioners selected (Standard Digital News, 2012). its position on the issue of mode of in a transparent vetting process), and voter registration. Initially, it planned with progressive provisions regarding 3. Electoral management for the more expensive biometric voter land management. These gains should The basic prerequisites for the credible registration (BVR) system, but later be built upon, rather than eroded, in management of forthcoming elections reverted to the manual system that order to eliminate key preconditions have been put in place. The IEBC, utilizes the optical mark reader (OMR). for electoral violence. whose autonomy is protected under This change was largely due to con- The IEBC needs to boost the con- the new constitution and relevant troversies over the tendering for the fidence of Kenyans in its capacity to electoral laws, has been established.29 BVR kits (Institute for Education in oversee credible elections. For a start, The IEBC’s decisions on a number of Democracy, 2012). The government the IEBC and relevant stakeholders
8 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 December 2012 such as the NCIC and the NSC have on Election Preparedness (Kenya’s Office tion and harassment, targeted assassina- invested in early warning and response of the Chief Justice, 2012, p. 11). The tions, and increased civilian deaths. This through the constitution of the National Rules Committee of the Judiciary is Issue Brief broadens the scope to include displacement resulting from politically Steering Committee on Election Mon- also simplifying various court proce- fuelled insecurity. itoring. The monitoring of indicators dures, including the Supreme Court 4 The state intimidated Kenya People’s of potential violence (including hate Presidential Election Petitions Rules Union (KPU) supporters by deploying speech, militia activity, low-scale vio- (p. 32). The Working Committee on the paramilitary General Service Unit lence, armament, and families relocat- Election Preparedness has committed (GSU) to disrupt their anti-government ing in fear of political violence, among the judiciary to dispensing with election protests. In a show of force, the army held public demonstrations in opposition- others) is an extensive undertaking that petitions from the general elections controlled zones. This prompted an oppo- calls for a multi-stakeholder approach within six months (Ng’etich, P., 2012). sition leader to counter with a promise to at all levels. Specifically, the monitor- Support for effective judicial reforms stage ‘a clean fight without recourse to ing of arms dynamics as a threat to will guarantee the use of courts in violence’ (Branch, 2011, pp. 59–60). peaceful elections is an area that should resolving electoral disputes, and this 5 Throup and Hornsby (1998, p. 14) wrote: not be overlooked. in turn will contribute to peace and ‘Ethnicity and state power proved more influential than class or ideology in deter- Secondly, as long as the structural stability. mining political preferences.’ factors that underpin local conflicts Lastly, discourse on political violence 6 This led to accusations that the Moi regime remain unaddressed, elections will should not exclude pastoralist areas was sponsoring electoral violence (see continue to provide opportunities for where identity-based competitions are Africa Watch, 1993). the revival of grievances. The airing of equally intense during elections; and it 7 Kanyinga (2010, p. 326) notes that the these grievances would arise through is in these zones that arms-trafficking land question is a fulcrum for major politi- cal events. AMANI Forum (2008, pp. 9–10) an interaction between the political corridors to other parts of Kenya orig- examines historical injustices that have aspirants’ exploitation of these issues inate. A holistic approach to ensuring contributed to inter-ethnic animosities. to win votes, and the electorates’ need free, fair, and peaceful elections nec- 8 The colonial contribution to structural of a leader that best represents their essarily means paying attention to weaknesses that predisposed Kenya to interests. These two factors are more Kenya’s marginalized areas in all elec- conflict is acknowledged in many studies, including Nyawalo et al. (2011, pp. 6–8) and likely to heighten tension and trigger tion planning efforts. Kanyinga (2009, pp. 327–28). Specifically, armed violence where frustration over For the first time local issues, at AMANI Forum (2008, p. 9) argues that the unresolved issues is greatest. the county level, will be given equal colonial administration’s constitution of Political leaders would be more suc- weight in Kenyan elections as national Kenya in purely economic terms—admin- cessful at the national level if, instead issues. Pastoralist territorial and istered by the Imperial British East Africa of polarizing voters, they were to focus resource-based disputes, along with Company—created structural conditions for economic injustices that explain present on key cross-cutting election issues pressure for adequate representation, conflicts. ThisIssue Brief focuses on Kenya’s that concern all Kenyans. According to need to be given proper considera- experience of electoral violence after 1963, a recent Gallup poll, top concerns for tion, not least as these communities, when the country gained independence. voters include job creation, reducing although geographically marginal, are Controversy regarding the allocation of corruption, and improving education, the most heavily armed in Kenya. resources, such as land distribution, has agriculture, healthcare, and electricity served as a convenient tool for ethnic mobilization. (Tortora and Rheault, 2012). The transi- 9 Majimboism refers to regionalism or feder- tion to issue-based, ideologically driven Endnotes alism. Its advocates promoted the devo- politics can be guaranteed by focusing 1 This is reflected in works such as the lution of more fiscal and political powers efforts on protecting the inviolability Africa Watch Report, Divide and Rule: to regional units so as to give local commu- of the constitution and the Political State-sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya nities a greater voice in local governance. Parties Act, while ensuring democratic (1993) and government reports such as Given Kenya’s ethno-regional distribution, this approach was inherently ethnically management and national representa- those of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV, 2008). motivated. tion of political parties. Strengthening 2 Most previous analyses, such as those 10 Defectors included Raila Odinga, Kalanzo the basic democratic structures is essen- carried out by the National Council of Musyoka, George Saitoti, and Simeon tial to progressively dismantling paro- Churches of Kenya (NCCK) (1992), cite Nyachae who ran on his own under the chialism and ethnic mobilization. the use of traditional weapons, such as FORD-People ticket (Amutabi, 2009, p. 71). In addition, it is necessary that bows and arrows. But Human Rights 11 The symbol on the ballot that indicated approval of the constitution was the banana. the Kenyan cases at the ICC are not Watch found a link between arms and the political violence of 1997, specifically 12 Ironically, President Kibaki was in the invoked as a political campaign issue. in Coast province (HRW, 2002). These opposition when political parties pushed Such a dynamic would cause concerns analyses explore the role of warriors or then President Moi to accept the Inter- and heighten divisions along partisan raiders in electoral violence. This Issue Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) deal and ethnic lines. Brief paper examines more closely the in 1997. See Murimi (2008). On a positive note, the ongoing correlations between arms and violence 13 See Kenyans for Peace with Truth and in Kenya. Justice’s (KPTJ) report (2008) for a time- judicial reforms bode well for Kenya’s 3 According to the African Electoral Vio- line of events. It should also be noted that, solidifying democracy. In preparation lence Database (AEVD) (Straus, 2012, whether intentionally or not, the Elec- for the elections, the Chief Justice con- p. 193), the following are considered to toral Commission of Kenya (ECK) began stituted the Judiciary Working Committee be elements of electoral violence: intimida- releasing results mostly from Orange
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 9 Democratic Movement (ODM)-friendly Commission (Kenya Judicial Commis- Barkan, Joel. 2004. ‘Kenya after Moi.’ Foreign areas while those from Kibaki-friendly sion, 1999). Affairs, Vol. 83, No.1. January–February, areas were among the last to come in. That 25 For more details on the current investiga- pp. 87–100. Raila Odinga maintained a consistent tions by the ICC in Kenya, see ICC (2012). Branch, Daniel. 2011. Kenya: Between Hope and lead over Mwai Kibaki in early results 26 Devolution under the new constitution Despair, 1963–2011. New Haven: Yale confirms this (Dercon and Gutiérrez- has created 47 counties and six elective University Press. Romero, 2010, p. 12). posts (president, member of parliament, CIPEV (Commission of Inquiry into the Post- 14 While this Issue Brief restricts itself to senator, governor, women’s representative, Election Violence). 2008. Final Report of issues relating to present fears, small arms and county representative). Regarding the Commission of Inquiry into the Post- perceptions, and trigger factors, many devolution in the new Constitution in Election Violence. Nairobi: Government of other factors are at play. They include Kenya, see Nyanjom (2011). The creation Kenya and UNDP. land, youth unemployment, devolution, of these devolved structures has triggered CRECO (Constitution and Reform Education and border porosity. See Ndung’u and county-level competition for control of Consortium). 2012. Building a Culture of Wepundi (2012, pp. 4–15). the posts, prompting efforts to broker Peace in Kenya: Baseline Report on Conflict- 15 The database of the survey conducted by ethnic-based county power deals. See mapping and Profiles of47 Counties in Kenya. KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011) was Wanyonyi (2012). April. Nairobi: CRECO. used for further analysis in this Issue Brief, 27 Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Mt. Elgon, Dercon, Stefan and Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero. in addition to the findings published in 4 June 2011 (KNFP and Small Arms Sur- 2010. ‘Triggers and Characteristics of the Wepundi et al. (2012). vey, 2011). 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence.’ World 16 In the Special Report, volatile counties are 28 FGD, Nakuru, 28 April 2011 (KNFP and Development, Vol. 40, No. 4. April, pp. 731–44. defined as ‘those tending or threatening Small Arms Survey, 2011). Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel to break out into open violence, where 29 These are the Elections Act 2011, which Posner. 2010. ‘Political Competition and crime is common and insecurity is very covers matters on electoral management Ethnic Identification in Africa.’ American high. A county’s level of volatility was (Kenya, 2011), and the Political Parties Act Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 2. 494 510 determined based on numerous sources, 2007 (Kenya (revised and published in April, pp. – . Ekuam, Daudi. 2008. An Overview of the Status in addition to local awareness’ (Wepundi 2009), governing the political party issues. of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Areas et al., 2012, p. 37). 30 Turkana leaders petitioned the courts over Affected by Post-election Violence in Rift 17 The KNFP–Small Arms Survey study the boundaries to secure community inter- Valley Province. Unpublished UNDP found that possession of bladed weapons ests on resource use. See Wamalwa (2012). research report. October. in Kenya is high in high- to low-volatility 31 Even the IEBC’s decision to revert to the Fischer, Jeff. 2002. Electoral Conflict and Vio- areas (see Wepundi et al., 2012, pp. 50–51). use of the optical mark reader (OMR) in registration came after a cabinet minister lence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention. An NCCK report (1992, p. 6), provides asked the IEBC to use the manual regis- White Paper, 5 February. Washington, DC: insights into the use of bows and arrows tration system if the biometric voter reg- International Foundation for Electoral in the early 1990s’ clashes. istration (BVR) tendering was not above Systems (IFES). 18 For example, in January 2012, the National board (KBC Reporters, 2012). Foeken, Dick and Dietz, Ton. 2000. ‘Of Ethnic- Cohesion and Integration Commission ity, Manipulation, and Observation: The (NCIC) warned that recent conflicts in 1992 and 1997 Elections in Kenya.’ In Jan Marsabit and Isiolo counties were not Abbink and Hesseling, Gerti, eds. Election merely traditional community rivalries References Observation and Democratization in Africa. among pastoralists; rather they were Africa Watch. 1993. Divide and Rule: State- London: Macmillan Press, pp. 122–49. electoral. See Kibunjia (2012b). sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New FriEnt and FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). 2011. 19 Boundary disputes have taken place York, Washington, Los Angeles, and Minutes of the Round Table: Kenya – Sailing between the two communities for some London: Human Rights Watch. into Uncertainty – Preparations for the 2012 time, but the discovery of oil in the region African Election Database. 2012. ‘Election in Elections. 16 November. Berlin: FriEnt threatens to intensify the conflict. See Kenya.’ Accessed May 2012.
10 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 December 2012 Joel Barkan, ed. Beyond Capitalism vs. Fcickenya.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffile Makabila, Stephen. 2010. ‘Majimbo Debate is Socialism in Kenya & Tanzania. Nairobi: s%2FActs%2FTHE%2520ELECTIONS%2 Here Again.’ Standard Digital News. Web East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 520ACT_0.pdf&ei=v_qkUNyZAdSP4gS7- edition, 30 March.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 11 Nyanjom, Othieno. 2011. Devolution in Kenya’s Roessler, Philip. 2005. ‘Donor-induced Democ- UNOCHA (United Nations Organisation for New Constitution. Constitution Working ratization and the Privatization of State the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Paper Series No. 4. Nairobi: Society for Violence in Kenya and Rwanda.’ Com- 2009. OCHA Kenya: Frequently Asked Ques- International Development. parative Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2. January, tions on IDPs. 16 July. Nairobi: UNOCHA. Nyawalo, Phoebe Akinyi-Dar et al. 2011. The pp. 207–27. Wamalwa, Nicholas. 2012. ‘Turkana Fights Invisible Violence in Kenya: A Case Study of Ruto, Pkalya et. al. 2010. Conflict Dynamics in Loss of Oil-rich Zones to West Pokot, Rift Valley and Western Regions. Nairobi: Isiolo, Samburu East, and Marsabit South Baringo.’ The Star. Web edition, 7 April. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Districts of Kenya. AMANI Papers Vol. 1,
About the Small Arms Survey Author: Manasseh Wepundi The Small Arms Survey serves as the principal interna- tional source of public information on all aspects of small Copy-editor: arms and armed violence, and as a resource centre for Estelle Jobson
governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. In Statistical analyst: addition to Issue Briefs, the Survey distributes its findings Ryan Murray through Research Notes, Occasional Papers, Special Reports, Proofreader: a Book Series, and its annual flagship publication, the John Linnegar ([email protected]) Small Arms Survey. The project has an international staff with expertise in Design and layout: security studies, political science, international public policy, Richard Jones ([email protected]) law, economics, development studies, conflict resolution, Small Arms Survey sociology, and criminology, and works closely with a world- 47 Avenue Blanc wide network of researchers and partners. 1202 Geneva The Small Arms Survey is a project of the Graduate Switzerland Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org. t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e [email protected]
12 SmallSudan ArmsIssue BriefSurvey Number Issue Brief 6 April Number 2007 2 December 2012