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Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind

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Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 1-1-2018 Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind Shaun Gallagher University of Wollongong, University of Memphis, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons Recommended Citation Gallagher, Shaun, "Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind" (2018). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers. 3784. https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3784 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind Abstract Context: Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. Problem: Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment. Method: I review four areas of research (perception, action/ agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain. Results: Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience. Implications: Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of computational neuroscience. Constructivist content: This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist approach to cognition. Disciplines Arts and Humanities | Law Publication Details Gallagher, S. (2018). Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind. Constructivist Foundations, 14 (1), 8-21. This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3784 4E Cognition Decentering the Brain Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind Shaun Gallagher University of Memphis, USA, and University of Wollongong, Australia • s.gallagher/at/memphis.edu > Context • Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. > Problem • Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynami- cal relations among brain, body and environment. > Method • I review four areas of research (perception, action/ agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain. > Results • Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience. > Implications • Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vo- OGNITION C cabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems E theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of computational neuroscience. > Constructivist content • This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist approach to cognition. > Key words • Internalism, perception, agency, autonomy, self, social cognition, predictive TS IN 4 P processing, enactivism. ONCE C HICAL P Introduction: Internalism that are built into our brains at the factory. These health states: “The brain is like a central and methodological devices do crucial things for us, from managing computer that controls all bodily functions individualism in cognitive our walking and breathing to helping us with syl- […]” Likewise, according to many research- PHILOSO logisms.” (Gazzaniga 1998: xiii) ers, improving education involves learning science how the brain learns, since that is where 8 « 2 » The related claim by Alvin Gold- learning happens (e.g., Blakemore & Frith « 1 » According to classic cognitivist, man and Frederique de Vignemont (2009: 2005; Jones 2009). i.e., computationalist/internalist theories, 154) that the “central system of the mind [… « 3 » In thinking about cognition, self, the brain is the most central part of the i.e., ] the brain is the seat of most, if not all, agency, free will, autonomy, social cognition, central nervous system, where everything mental events” represents a similar view. Ac- and other aspects of mind – and in think- of importance concerning cognition, ac- cording to this classic orthodoxy, the brain ing about when things go wrong in these tion, self-awareness and our relations with is where emotions happen; it is where inten- domains (as in psychopathology) – neuro- others happens. Michael Gazzaniga (1998), tions are formed, and actions are prepared; centrism (or neuroessentialism) is standard. in his prediction that psychology will be a it is where our understanding of others takes Indeed, recently developed neuro-based dis- thing of the past, to be replaced by neurosci- shape. If there is a self it is in the brain (e.g., ciplines – neurophilosophy, neurotheology, ence, provides a nice example of an idea that Northoff et al. 2006), or as Francis Crick neuroeconomics, neuro-marketing, neuro- operates in numerous theories of cognition, once put it: “You’re nothing but a pack of aesthetics, neuropolitics, neurolaw, neuroed- namely that psychological processes are re- neurons” (Crick 1994: 1). This neurocentric ucation, and so on – purportedly help us to ducible to neurological processes: view has become so pervasive it is taught to explain any topic. Across a number of fields, parents who want to understand their chil- neurocentrism has strong advocates who de- “ My view of how the brain works is rooted in an dren. Thus, a website1 devoted to children’s fend it as the only or best way to think about evolutionary perspective that moves from the fact such things (e.g., Huber & Kutschenko 2009; that our mental life reflects the actions of many, 1 | http://kidshealth.org/en/parents/brain- Titley, Brunel & Hansel 2017; Shelley 2013; perhaps dozens to thousands, of neural devices nervous-system.html accessed 17 May 2018. Lee, VanderPloeg & Strifler 2016). CONSTRUCTIVIST FOUNDATIONs vol. 14, N°1 4E Cognition TOC Shaun Gallagher « 4 » In philosophy, neurocentrism here.2 My intent is to paint a large picture long known and well established (Broca as a form of internalism is represented by and to suggest that, taken together, such 1861). The presence of mirror neurons in the well-known brain-in-the-vat thought analyses form a comprehensive alternative this area links it to action recognition (Riz- experiment, which, beyond its use as a to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, zolatti et al. 1996). Mirror neurons are an- thought experiment, is sometimes pro- computational neuroscience. If one thinks other example of reuse: originally motor posed as a model for our best understand- of these different areas of research as four neurons involved in motor control, they are ing of how things work. distinct topics, then one might also think exapted in the course of evolution to serve that these apparently dissociated investiga- social cognition. “ Some form of internalism must be right be- tions actually converge on some basic as- « 9 » This idea of reuse has been ap- cause there isn’t anything else to do the job. The sumptions about how to best make sense propriated by a narrow, internalist “weak” brain is all we have for the purpose of represent- of cognitive phenomena. I will try to show, conception of embodied cognition (EC). ing the world to ourselves and everything we can as we go along, however, that the conver- According to weak EC, neither the physical use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs gence of principles reflects deeper connec- body itself (its anatomy, activity, postural must be possible for a being who is a brain in a tions among these areas. Before turning to body-schematic processes) nor the environ- vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat; these topics, I will discuss the idea that we ment is an important contributory to cog- the vat is a skull and the ‘messages’ coming in are need to re-think our understanding of how nition. Rather, what is important for weak coming in by way of impacts on the nervous sys- the brain itself works, specifically from the EC are B(ody)-formatted representations tem.” (Searle 1983: 230) perspective of
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