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1-1-2018

Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind

Shaun Gallagher University of Wollongong, University of Memphis, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Gallagher, Shaun, "Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind" (2018). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers. 3784. https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3784

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind

Abstract Context: Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories.

Problem: Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment.

Method: I review four areas of research (perception, action/ agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain.

Results: Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience.

Implications: Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of computational neuroscience.

Constructivist content: This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist approach to cognition.

Disciplines Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details Gallagher, S. (2018). Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind. Constructivist Foundations, 14 (1), 8-21.

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« 4 » In philosophy, neurocentrism here.2 My intent is to paint a large picture long known and well established (Broca as a form of internalism is represented by and to suggest that, taken together, such 1861). The presence of mirror neurons in the well-known brain-in-the-vat thought analyses form a comprehensive alternative this area links it to action recognition (Riz- experiment, which, beyond its use as a to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, zolatti et al. 1996). Mirror neurons are an- thought experiment, is sometimes pro- computational neuroscience. If one thinks other example of reuse: originally motor posed as a model for our best understand- of these different areas of research as four neurons involved in motor control, they are ing of how things work. distinct topics, then one might also think exapted in the course of evolution to serve that these apparently dissociated investiga- social cognition. “ Some form of internalism must be right be- tions actually converge on some basic as- « 9 » This idea of reuse has been ap- cause there isn’t anything else to do the job. The sumptions about how to best make sense propriated by a narrow, internalist “weak” brain is all we have for the purpose of represent- of cognitive phenomena. I will try to show, conception of embodied cognition (EC). ing the world to ourselves and everything we can as we go along, however, that the conver- According to weak EC, neither the physical use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs gence of principles reflects deeper connec- body itself (its anatomy, activity, postural must be possible for a being who is a brain in a tions among these areas. Before turning to body-schematic processes) nor the environ- vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat; these topics, I will discuss the idea that we ment is an important contributory to cog- the vat is a skull and the ‘messages’ coming in are need to re-think our understanding of how nition. Rather, what is important for weak coming in by way of impacts on the nervous sys- the brain itself works, specifically from the EC are B(ody)-formatted representations tem.” (Searle 1983: 230) perspective of phylogeny, the importance of and the reuse hypothesis. B-formatted rep- which was already intimated by Gazzaniga. resentations are non-propositional intero- « 5 » In theories of social cognition, we ceptive or motoric representations “of one’s find a complementary focus on method- own bodily states and activities” (Goldman ological individualism – the idea that we Brain, body and beyond 2012: 74). These B-formats are character- can find a complete explanation of how we ized as “sanitized” neural representations understand others in a set of mechanisms « 8 » The neural reuse hypothesis is an (Goldman & de Vignemont 2009), and are that are entirely contained in the individual important and influential insight into how sometimes discussed under the heading of brain – a theory of mind module (ToMM) we understand brain functions. As Michael the “body in the brain” (e.g., Berlucchi & or a mirror neuron system that automatical- Anderson (2010) explains it, neural circuits Aglioti 2010). On the weak EC view, the re- ly simulates the other person’s mental states. originally established for one use can be re- use hypothesis is put to use as follows: Any « 6 » Neurocentrism can be described used or redeployed for other purposes while cognitive task that employs a B-formatted as a “narrow” perspective on cognition. still maintaining their original function. representation in either its original function The term “narrow” is a technical term in This hypothesis was originally understood or its exapted/derived function is, on this philosophy of mind. It refers to processes in terms of an evolutionary notion of plas- definition, a form of embodied cognition. contained “in the head” – for example, ticity, exaptation: “the shift in the course Examples include not only mirror neurons brain-based representational processes and of evolution of a given trait or mechanism, and their role in social-cognitive simulation, contents. Narrow-minded views have been which is later on reused to serve new pur- but also Friedemann Pulvermüller’s (2005) challenged by “wide” “E-approaches” – that poses and functions” (Gallese 2014: 6). A language-grounding hypothesis – the idea is, embodied, embedded, extended, enac- good example is Broca’s area in the human that action words, like lick, pick, and kick 9 tive, ecological approaches to cognition, brain. The homologous area in the monkey activate cortical motor areas that involve which in various ways argue that the unit involves motor functions. Across evolution- tongue, hand, and foot, respectively. In this of explanation ought to be brain-body- ary changes it retains these original func- case, motor areas and interoceptive, B-for- environment. On such externalist views, tions – movement preparation, action se- matted motor representations are reused for the brain is not dismissed as unimportant quencing, and action imitation (Binkofski & language processing. Along this same line, for understanding cognition, action, emo- Buccino 2004). But, in the human, this area by simulation or metaphor, one can explain tion, human experience, and so on; rather it is exapted for additional functions involving the embodied roots of abstract thought is decentered and given a partial, although language and action recognition functions. (Barsalou 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). still important, role to play along with bodi- Its function in speech production has been Thus, “higher-order thought is grounded in ly and environmental factors. low-level representations of motor actions” « 7 » In this target article I review four 2 | These are all themes that I have discussed (Goldman 2014: 94). areas or issues where challenges by these extensively in other publications. On perception, « 10 » The evolutionary principle of E-approaches have provided good reasons see Gallagher (2015a, 2017; Gallagher & Zahavi reuse can get reframed as a developmen- to shift away from neurocentric theories: 2012; Hutto et al. in press), on agency, autonomy tal principle, in, for example, Stanislas perception, agency and free will, self, and and free will, see Gallagher (2006, 2007, 2012, Dehaene’s (2005) “neuronal recycling” hy- social cognition. Each of these is a com- 2013a); on self, see Gallagher (2000, 2013b; Gal- pothesis, according to which there are on- plex and multifaceted topic, and I will not lagher & Daly 2018); and on social cognition, see togenetic changes in the “visual word form be able to do justice to any one of them Gallagher (2001, 2005, 2008a, 2008b). area” of visual cortex when a person learns

http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher 10 Philosophical Concepts in 4E Cognition erl igitc – a eclet example excellent “an – linguistics neural in work Pulvermüller’s of man’s discussion remains unstated, but implicit even in - Gold This contexts. developmental in relevant ly cultural environment, for example, is direct- happens developmentbrainevolutionnor brain ther tion. ac- ofeveryday opmental, timescale and the evolutionary,devel- timescales: cognition all across – of account internalist purely a undermines actually hypothesis, grounding language- (2005) Pulvermüller’s and esis, hypoth- recycling neuronal (2005) haene’s including hypothesis, reuse the of use the in extensions these accepting that gued reuse. lutionarychanges brain, the in and promote evo- drive which of all etc., feet, hands, ing involv- changes morphological other many by accompanied are changes These speech. of development the for and brain larger a a restructuring of the skull and jaw, allow for that allow for the upright posture, leading to man body. Evolutionary changes in the body ously,hu - humanthe brainevolveswith the de & (Goldman EC weak by trivial as missed dis- are which features, morphological its including – body the with do to everything EC. a implies reuse neuronal of task” (ibid: 79). motoric novel,cognitivelyinterpersonal,a formatin the of redeployment “a is which of which is the activation of mirror neurons, example an 83), 2012: (Goldman task” tive - cogni non-bodily fundamentally a execute to B-formats redeploying or “reusing tions men- example,he Forevents. cognitive and activations neural token to apply to reuse of concept the uses also Goldman read. to yohss (A hypothesis” brain “social the generally,genes,”moreor, and culture of “coevolutionconstruction,” “niche understand to seeking re- biology cent in research naturalistic by supported is factors non-neural these of importance The recycling. neuronal or reuse understanding neural of any for developmentally, and evolutionarily both factors, important are environments cultural and social, cal,

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higher-level cognitive or conceptual repre- ƒƒ Perception is shaped by bodily-affective moment that visual stimulation begins.” (Bar- sentations, and all of this followed by mo- processes (Colombetti 2014; Gallagher rett & Bar 2009: 1325) toric processing leading to action. This is 2017; Gallagher & Bower 2014; Thomp- what Susan Hurley (1998) critically called son & Stapleton 2009). « 22 » This is not just a matter of inter- the “sandwich model” of perception, where In the case of sensorimotor contingencies, nal processing in the brain, but includes a sensory input leads to higher-order cog- not only does motor control depend on per- dynamical relation between brain and body. nition resulting in action output. These ceptual input, any movement of one’s body Along with processing in the early visual processes may be conceived as being more changes one’s perception. Informed by de- area, for example, activation of the medial or less dynamically integrated. Perception tailed sensorimotor contingencies, enac- orbital frontal cortex (OFC) initiates a may be thought to be an inferential proc- tive perception is often described in terms train of muscular and hormonal changes ess as Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and of affordances. In the phenomenological throughout the body. This generates in- more recent predictive models (e.g., Hohwy philosophers this idea can be traced back teroceptive feedback from organs, muscles, 2013) would have it, where perception is to Edmund Husserl’s (1989) notion of the and joints associated with prior experience, constituted in top-down predictive process- “I can.” The idea is that I perceive the world which immediately integrates with current es (informed by generative models on what in the pragmatic terms of what I can do, or exteroceptive sensory input. This means is typically considered the cognitive level), in terms of my skill or my expertise. Percep- that the organism as a whole is responding and, in some cases, active inference (when tion is, as James Gibson (1977) argued, af- and contributing to perception. action is involved). fordance-based. An expert trained in archi- « 18 » For Jacob Hohwy (2016) and tecture may perceive more affordances than “ The OFC’s ongoing integration of sensory in- many others who champion Bayesian the novice, or different ones; a city-dweller formation from the external world with that from predictive coding, all such processing is may see the surrounding city environment the body indicates that conscious percepts are brain-bound, tightly wrapped in a Mar- or a rural pasture differently from how a indeed intrinsically infused with affective value, kov blanket that strictly isolates the brain farmer would. so that the affective salience or significance of an from body and world. Prediction-error « 20 » Perception is shaped not only by object is not computed after the fact. […T]he pre- minimization (PEM) in the brain does the pragmatic affordances related to sensory- dictions generated during object perception carry important work; active inference (moving motor contingencies – the “I can” – but also affective value as a necessary and normal part of around the world) simply serves the central by affective factors of embodiment. Even visual experience. (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1328). processes: if I am skilled and capable of grabbing an object, I may not feel “up to the task,” or I « 23 » Perception involves whole-body “ PEM should make us resist conceptions of [a may not feel motivated or interested. I may dispositions and adjustments and what Pat- mind-world] relation on which the mind is in not see the object in precisely the same way rick Freund et al. (2018) call “anatomically some fundamental way open or porous to the as I would if I were interested, or if I were informed priors” (see also Allen & Friston world, or on which it is in some strong sense em- not so tired. There may be an affective cost 2018). This implies, first, that perception bodied, extended or enactive. Instead, PEM re- that diminishes what an object affords. Not is not just action-oriented, or recognition- veals the mind to be inferentially secluded from only does one have a practical (sensorimo- oriented; it is also reward-oriented, hedonic, the world, it seems to be more neurocentrically tor) apprehension of accessibility, but one aesthetic, and affective in the broadest sense. skull-bound than embodied or extended, and also has an affective take on that same ac- Second, it means that perceptual networks 11 action itself is more an inferential process on cessibility, in terms of interest or inclination are dynamically connected to and deeply af- sensory input than an enactive coupling with the to follow through or in terms of the ease or fected by embodied processes that involve environment.” (Hohwy 2016: 259) difficulty of acting. multiple systems, such as endocrine and au- « 21 » This affective dimension can be tonomic systems (Gallagher & Allen 2018). « 19 » In contrast to such internalist cashed out in terms of a more liberal pre- Fatigue and hunger, for example, involve conceptions, phenomenology and enactive dictive processing view where the priors or extra-neural processes that influence brain and extended EC approaches argue that generative models are not reduced to brain- function and have an effect on perception. perception should be understood as a set of bound processes but can include embod- Homeostatic regulation depends on chemi- dynamical processes that relate brain, body, ied, affective components. Lisa Barrett and cal influences in the endocrine system. In and environment. Inspired by Merleau- Moshe Bar (also see Barrett & Simmons hypoglycemic conditions (which can slow or Ponty, for example, enactivists argue that 2015; Chanes & Barrett 2016), for example, weaken brain function) perception is modu- the body is involved in at least two ways in have proposed the “affective prediction hy- lated by complex chemical processes in the perception: pothesis,” which body-brain system as it couples with the en- ƒƒ Perception is closely tied to action, and vironment. thus partially constituted by sensorimo- “ implies that responses signaling an object’s « 24 » These considerations lead away tor contingencies (Di Paolo, Buhrmann salience, relevance or value do not occur as a from narrow, internalist conceptions of the & Barandiaran 2017; O’Regan & Noë separate step after the object is identified.I nstead, mind, even in predictive processing (PP) 2001; Noë 2004), and affective responses support vision from the very theories. Andy Clark points in this direction:

http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher 12 Philosophical Concepts in 4E Cognition Kiverstein &R diction error minimization Bruineberg, (see inferencetermsin of active understand to need we perception, ment. coordinated across brain, body and environ- cesses, we can prorefer- to a generative environmentaldynamics and bodily from rate - sepa dynamics internal additional an plies R that we toneed keep the concept of a even world,or the of model own its quiring brainreas - ofthe think to need thatstill we world – it is a model.” With this it is not clear its of model “anhavea not rizes, agentdoes that we become conscious of decisionthe or motorshowedcommand.a of issue Libet to prior just occurring activation neuronal of milliseconds 150 the span that processes in found be to is it exist does will free if that suggested 1992) (1985, Libet Benjamin by “ puts it: 2018). Friston & Badcock & Gallagher 2018; & Kiverstein Bruineberg, 2018; direction (A that in more even move model predictive the of interpretations Enactivist errors. prediction reduce to order in ment environ - the manipulates that engagement embodied inference–active, active phasizes em- 133) (ibid: Clark work, the of most do rocentrically skull-bound” generative model I “ perceptual-motor activity. of cycles by world the of engagement constant the stresses that work – mind embodied the on fect neuro-computational partner for recent work ment. environ- embedded the and organism embodied as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’betweenthe active, sitions,morphology, architecture, neural and and - dispo interpretivecombining as sense, inclusive

Constru n contrast to Hohwy,“neucontrastto the - n makes who ather than a generative model, which im- which model, generative a than ather PP thus provides, or so so or provides, thus PP We must here understand ‘model’ in the most the in ‘model’understand hereWe must llen & Friston 2018; Bitbol & Gallagher Gallagher & Bitbol 2018; Friston & llen « 26» autonomy Action, agency, and « 25» ” T (Friston etal. 2012:6) o develop a conception of enactive of conception a develop o c tivist Foundation tivist A The well-known experiments well-known The Fitn 21: 1) summa- 213) (2013: Friston s ietveld 2018). A actionrather thanpre - ln 2018; llen ” il ru, h per the argue, will I (Clark 2016:1) s vol. 14,N°1 A Kr Friston Karl s R amstead, R ietveld model. - of inadequacy in such circumstances, simply watching her.watching superstars basketball audienceofan is there negativelybe affected simply thatthe by fact agency,may of sense her and performance, narrative. in shape take mayattributionthat retrospective as well as people, other with communications from benefit may that formation intention prior include environments; also specific can in it agent the to available affordances of scope aspect. intentional ate - immedi its or action bodily physical yond - be go that factors of variety a on depends agency of one’s experience this, than more Even 2017). Haggard 2012; (Gallagher ing accomplish- is action one’s what of sense a – world the in doing is one what of sense - experi control. this motor just of ence than complex more is basketball through a hoop. a through basketball action forming may be both capable of and proficient atper possibilities. action of perception my on effect anhave can others of presence the level, pre-reflective the on agency.Even one’s on effect forcesanhave of social sense cumstances. cir cultural and social physical, in situated cesses thatcesses just precede motor command. pro- neuronal in generated itself action the somethingasthat – anticipates2000) lagher - Gal 1999; Eimer & Haggard 1999; Magno (Haggardofagency aboutsense the & think one’s action. This hasbeen a standard way to to intrinsic pre-reflectively, as experienced, is that agency of sense a generateto time of plenty is processes pre-motor in activation point. processes. neuronal to reduced be cannot that factors and escales scious, and that free will involves larger - tim uncon- remain typically that processes trol con- motor about were Libet’sexperiments will. free with do to ing noth- has this result.First, aboutthis things before motor activation. We should note two at least until approximately action, 150 milliseconds the causing in role a play not does consciousness that suggests This occurred. already have action) specific that for tion prepara- with correlates which potential,” “readiness (the activity brain of liseconds - mil 500–850 some after only move to urge « 27 » S econd, 150 milliseconds ofneuronal milliseconds econd, 150 The sense of agency, however, agency, of sense The I mportantly, other people and people other mportantly, S he may in fact feel a degree a feel fact in may he , for example, throwing a throwing example, for A, will return to this this to return will I I t may include the the include may t have argued that argued have I I as icue a includes also t A N to i always is ction onetheless her onetheless A n agent n - - tion. tion. descrip of level pragmatic appropriate an at described themselves, actions intentional and agent situated engaged, an to applies it actions; intentional up make that processes motor abstract with associated not is least, at autonomy, of notion The autonomy. of concept the to shift to productive be may it movement), bodily of causation mental ing involv (as will free of conception ditional individualistic concept. Harry Frankfurt Frankfurt (1982), for example, frames it in terms of ra Harry concept. an be individualistic to it take autonomy of discussions contemporary most tradition, this lowing Fol self-determination. or self-legislation, self-sufficiency, involves which autonomy, classicus recessive. and minimal typically is movement bodily ing to move one’s body. - ondecid focused experiments) Libet the in (as not is action to pertains that sciousness con- The will. free of exercise the as thing we are not usually conscious, is not the same Motor control, the body-schematic details of which 2006). (Gallagher neuroscientists and philosophers contemporary many to from will free of thinking of way standard the and experiments, Libet the of ment (mental causation), which is the target move- bodily of control and initiation the to equivalent as will free of exercise the of will, brainstates. not are one’ssimplystatesin mental causal or head, act to motivation and formation intention deliberation, sciences, the cognitive and mind of philosophy in agency of analyses many to contrast in and Likewise, present. are people of set specific a because (Gallagher 2012). (Gallagher tially robbing them of possibilities for action - essen agency, of sense people’s)long-term (or a person’sa on effects prolonged have can apartheid, as such arrangements, cial so- long-standing of types specific that case act. to ability and agency of one’s feeling increase or from detract may others. of presence the in social referencing, or one’s habitual behavior explicit or implicit pressure, peer of effects the communication. also of Consider cesses pro- in others with co-constituted states or « 28» « 29 » 29 « have argued that we should not think think notshould we thathaveargued I I mmanuel Kant (1996) is the the is (1996) Kant mmanuel o te rdtoa cneto of conception traditional the for

R Given the prevalence of the tra the of prevalence the Given eturning to the question of free free of question the to eturning R ather,are they often processes R ather, awareness of S uch phenomena uch I t is also the the also is t D escartes escartes locus locus - - - - - 4E Cognition Decentering the Brain Shaun Gallagher

tional-reflective decision-making processes and even if these are understood in relation- activation in the [self condition] was also – a deliberation leading to the formation of al terms, it refers us directly to some concept found in either the [other person condi- second-order intentions or desires. Other of self. To understand action and agency we tion] or the [general semantic] condition, or theorists take narrative competency to be need to understand the agent, and precisely both” (Craik et al. 1999: 30; also Gillihan & an important part of the precise kind of what it is that constitutes the agent. Farah 2005: 94). It thus seems right to say self-reflection that informs decision-mak- that the self is both everywhere and nowhere ing. David Velleman (2005), for example, in the brain (Vogeley & Gallagher 2011). It argues that narrative-based reflection pro- Self is not just that the brain is so complex, how- vides a framework for forming and testing ever, but also that the concept of self is am- one’s intentions and for guiding actions and « 32 » There is a long tradition of look- biguous. Accordingly, in any analysis of self the formation of self-identity. This allows ing for the self in the brain. Even those who we need to define the precise aspect of the for autonomous self-governance, which de- would deny that the self is reducible to brain self under study. Selves consist of a variety pends on forming intentions that are con- processes consider the self to have a special of aspects – experiential, ecological, agen- sistent with one’s narrative understanding relation to the brain. Karl Popper and John tive – and are capable of various forms of of oneself. Eccles (1977), for example, defend a dualism self-recognition, self-related cognition, self- « 30 » Embodied action, however, hap- that takes the self to be an autonomous entity narrative, and self-specific perception and pens in a world that is not only physical but that significantly interacts with and controls action. In this respect, selves are more “in- also social. Our actions and our decisions neural processes. “The self-conscious mind the-world” than “in-the-brain” (Vogeley & often involve other people; they are often acts upon […] neural centres, modifying Gallagher 2011: 129). joint actions steered by physical and so- the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the « 35 » In contrast to theories that would cial forces and affordances. In this respect, neural events” (Popper & Eccles 1977: 495). reduce the self to one particular type of autonomy is relational (Christman 2004; « 33 » There is still great interest in how thing – for example, a self-model gener- Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000). In contrast to various aspects of self relate to brain, or how ated by neuronal processes, and nothing traditional models of an autonomous in- specific brain areas correlate with self-relat- more (e.g., Metzinger 2004); or the abstract dividual, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie ed phenomena. Self-referential processes, product of narratives, and nothing more Stoljar (2000: 4) suggest that we think of including autobiographical knowledge, per- (e.g., Dennett 1991); or nothing more than autonomy “as a characteristic of agents who sonal beliefs, self-conceptions, and face self- a 3-second-long experience sans body or are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, recognition are related to left hemisphere agency or narrative (Strawson 1999) – plu- and feeling, as well as rational, creatures.” activity (Turk et al. 2003; see also Kircher et ralist theories suggest that the self is many Indeed, our deliberations, and our inten- al. 2000) or right frontal cortex (Platek et al. things. William James (1950), for example, tions may be formulated in communicative 2003), or right lateral parietal cortex (Lou et distinguished between physical, social, and practices, and may not be reducible to pro- al. 2004) or medial prefrontal cortex bilater- private selves. Ulrich Neisser (1988) distin- cesses that are exclusive to one individual. ally (Fossati et al. 2003). Moreover, cortical guished ecological, interpersonal, concep- In that sense they may be co-constituted in midline structures (CMS) process informa- tual, extended, and private selves. In an at- one’s interactions with others. They may be tion related to self when subjects reflectively tempt to capture the plurality of self-related shaped by institutional forces, social prac- think about themselves, or when they make factors and the idea that the agentive self is tices, and normative expectations. Accord- judgments about their own personalities more “in-the-world” than “in the brain,” I 13 ingly, autonomy is a matter of degree, some- (D’Argembeau et al. 2007; Gutchess et al. have proposed a pattern theory of self (Gal- thing that is enhanced or reduced by various 2007; Northoff & Bermpohl 2004; Northoff lagher 2013b). In brief, the pattern theory of physical, social, economic, cultural factors, et al. 2006; Ruby et al. 2009). Northoff con- self (PTS) argues that a self is constituted as our relations with others, as well as our own tends that the CMS includes a unitary neu- a pattern or dynamical Gestalt comprised of narrative practices. Individuals are always ral network responsible for all self-related a sufficient number of characteristic factors, embedded in social contexts, characterized phenomena (Northoff et al. 2006). The CMS including embodied, experiential, affective, by intersubjective and normative relations also connects to subcortical areas, suggest- behavioral, intersubjective, psychological/ that can either enhance or impoverish the ing a relation to an embodied self (Northoff cognitive, reflective, narrative, extended control they have over their lives and can & Panksepp 2008). and normative factors (see Table 1). It is expand or constrict their action possibili- « 34 » Given the diversity and large important to note that this is not an addi- ties. For this reason, it is best to conceive of number of cortical areas correlated with tive list of factors; rather these components agency, intention, and autonomy in these self-reference, Seth Gillihan and Martha or aspects are dynamically interrelated in a embodied and socially situated terms, rather Farah (2005) were led to suggest that there pattern or Gestalt arrangement (Gallagher than in terms of brain processes measured is no specialized brain area responsible for & Daly 2018). Accordingly, a change in one in milliseconds. generating “the self.” Dorothée Legrand and element, above a certain threshold, will lead, « 31 » Autonomy, as I mentioned, is Perrine Ruby (2009) argue in a complemen- via dynamical interactions, to changes in closely connected to notions of self-determi- tary way that no area of the brain is exclu- others. For example, as suggested above, as- nation, self-legislation, and self-sufficiency, sively self-specific since “every significant pects of self-experience, such as the sense of

http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher 14 Philosophical Concepts in 4E Cognition

Constru Reflective capacities Reflective moid elements Embodied capacities neatos and interactions Intersubjective fetv aspects Affective Narrative capacities Narrative elements experiential Minimal elements Psychological/cognitive elements Extended/situated eairl aspects Behavioral omtv factors Normative lements of Elements c Table 1 tivist Foundation tivist the pattern the

• Dynamical aspectsoftheself-pattern (fromGallagher&Daly2018). s vol. 14,N°1 related to the notions of autonomy and moral and autonomy of notions the to related closely – actions and experiences one’s on reflect to ability The system to system the interoceptive factors,allowing and biological, ecological Core others (Mead 1913), manifested (Mead others self-for- a – self-consciousness social a into develops existence, which intersubjective to capacity forattuning a with born Human are classic view that goes back at least to Aristotle. to least at back goes that view classic status, that define our way our define status, that involving physicalandmentalhealth,gender, race,andeconomic constitutive for selves (Schechtman 2011), for PTS 2011), for (Schechtman selves for constitutive Affect/emotion/temperament, ranging from bodily affects to affects bodily from Affect/emotion/temperament, ranging u poesosadteisiuin we professionsandtheinstitutions our ability to construct a self-narrative (as in (as self-narrative a construct to ability Although some theorists make the strong claim that narratives that claim strong the make theorists some Although range from explicit self-consciousness to a conceptual a to self-consciousness explicit from range eoy r hglgtd in highlighted are memory still remain a self to the extent that extent the to self a remain still First-person, pre-reflective,consciousexperience,reflecting reflect, and perhaps actually constitute, our character. constitute, actually perhaps reflect, and extremely (the “mineness” of “mineness” (the ownership a including – modalities (kinaesthesia, proprioception,touch,vision,etc.) sensory-motor various in distinction,manifest non-self dniy ih u mtra belongings, material our with identify rdtoa tere o te ef ou o tee factors,which these on focus self the of theories Traditional practices. (Gallup, Anderson&Platek2011),jointactionsandcommunicative n vros hns ht e own we that things various and property, of pieces Including thepossibilitiespresentedbyphysical place. in remain of self as self, to personality traits of which traits personality self, to as self of Behaviors and actions make us who we are – behavioral are we who us make actions and Behaviors 2015). (Newen, Welpinghus &Juckel pattern emotion or affective typical a be desires (Frankfurt 1982; (Frankfurt desires conscious at all – psychological – all at conscious n situationinwhich and structure family of acrosspossibilitiespresentedbythekind Ranging dynamically relatedtotheactionpossibilitiestheyafford. the capacity to reflect and form and reflect to capacity the for one’s actions one’s for

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may are Fingelkurts 2017). & (Fingelkurts self-pattern the “index” in changes can neurophysiology in changes brain. and self between connection no is there that mean not does pattern.This note that to a self-pattern is more than a simply neural is intention my however, Here, the self-pattern (see Gallagher & of aspects dynamical investigatethe to how about and PTS about say to more much is There agency. of sense one’sand autonomy enhance or diminish either can that factors intersubjective specific by and etc., health, race, gender, culture, involve that factors normative social, as such aspects, relational agency, can be modulated by other complex, brain, and body environment. of elements the across coordinated namics dy - generative of pattern a but brain the in a self, it havenot does agent the Friston,paraphrase andextendedand the normative aspects. self-pattern the of aspects experiential and embodied the between relations dynamical and various the reflect integrations extra-neural neural dynamical these again, Once (ibid: 14) “ been shownbeen to be different acrosscultures […]. has recognition face self-other instance, For ing. decision-mak- self-other on have effects societal and cultural that role related the by highlighted self-recognition priors, on influences textual brain that are self-specific. the of parts or circuits specialized positing in involved above) (outlined problems ing any multisensory processing, thereby avoid- in arise may processing neural self-specific culturally shaped priors on PP: Manos self-recognition to (A relate also that 2013) (S integration multisensory involve may ferral.” self-re- of forms cognitive higher-level, for generative […] hierarchical model a onto “mapped be can self bodily the of aspects periential ex- (pre-reflective) minimal the that argue example, for 1), (2013: Blankenburg Felix tive processing (PP), Jakub Limanowski and There is also evidence of more long-term con- long-term more of evidence also is There pps & pps « 36» « 37 » n the same model affective factors affective model same the On is a self, where the self is not a model T sakiris also note the influence of influence the note also sakiris T I sakiris 2014). Matthew 2014). sakiris Within the framework of predic - of framework the Within praty o a P approach, PP a on mportantly, n my osiue h basis the constitute may and I ndeed, D A aly 2018). A pps and pps pps and I ndeed, eth eth T ” o 4E Cognition Decentering the Brain Shaun Gallagher

Tsakiris (2014: 8) claim that a PP account among brain-body-environment (broadly and if these patterns include bodily expres- “provides flexibility, with fewer constraints speaking). Such dynamical relations may be sions, comportments, and actions, then on what types of information can drive self- partially indexed or traced by neuronal pro- (consistent with what we said in previous recognition.” The strong claim is that pre- cesses to the extent that the latter partially sections) my perception of another per- dictive models can explain all of the various underpin various factors of the self-pattern, son’s emotions may be considered a form factors that contribute to the self-pattern. As but they are not reducible to such processes. of perceptual pattern recognition – one that they note, One important component of this pattern is action- (or interaction-) oriented and includes the agent’s intersubjective inter- takes that pattern as a social affordance for “ This is particularly important, given the evi- actions and capacities for social cognition, further response on my part. On this view dence to suggest that the continuity of the self phenomena that are clearly more than just we are not engaged in third-person obser- may be underpinned by many different types of brain processes. vation of others, but in second-person (“I- information, the integration of which leads to a thou” or “we-mode”) interactions. In con- coherent sense of one’s body.” (ibid: 9) trast to methodological individualism, what Social cognition does the work of social cognition are not « 38 » To be clear, this type of analysis mechanisms internal to the individual, but sends us back to issues previously discussed « 40 » Standard approaches to social our engaged interactions that happen in our (in the section on perception) about how cognition (theory of mind – ToM) typically shared, intersubjective world and that build we might best interpret predictive process- accept the assumption of methodologi- on shared or reciprocal social affordances. ing models. Although Hohwy and John Mi- cal individualism. Although ToM seeks to « 42 » Scientific evidence for this is chael (2017) build an internalist PP model explain how we understand the minds of found in developmental studies of infants, of self, it is interesting to note that they others, via mindreading processes, all those from birth onward, in their face-to-face, see their account as consistent with PP ac- processes are said to be contained in the primary intersubjective relations, and their counts of minimal phenomenal (experien- observer’s own head/brain. Either a theory pragmatically contextualized secondary in- tial) selfhood, or self model Limanowski( & of mind module (ToMM) in pre-frontal tersubjective relations (Trevarthen 1979). Blankenburg 2013; Metzinger 2004), bodily areas activates subpersonal processes that Primary intersubjectivity involves innate or self-awareness (Apps & Tsakiris 2014), in- constitute a “tacit theory” or implicit use of early-developing sensory-motor capacities teroceptive aspects (Seth, Suzuki & Critchley folk psychology (Carruthers 2015), or mir- that bring us into relation with others and 2011), intersubjective aspects that relate self ror neurons generate subpersonal processes allow us to interact with them. In part, these and other (Moutoussis et al. 2014), social un- that simulate the actions and minds of oth- capacities involve action and perceptual ex- derstanding of self and other (Frith & Friston ers (Gallese 2001; Goldman 2006). perience – we are able to see or more gen- 2015), and psychodynamical notions of self « 41 » The alternative phenomenolog- erally perceive in the other person’s bodily (e.g., Fotopoulou 2012), thereby touching on ical-enactive approach to social cognition, postures, movements, gestures, facial ex- many elements of the self-pattern. All of this, interaction theory (IT), rejects the idea that pressions, gaze direction, vocal intonation, however, on their account, is reducible to the we mindread the hidden mental states of etc. what they intend and what they feel. brain’s predictive model. Rather than taking others. It focuses on embodied interaction We respond with our own bodily move- the fully embodied self to be the agent of ac- processes that draw on multiple semiotic ments, gestures, facial expressions, gaze, etc. tive inference, or part of a dynamical system resources in the other’s postures, move- On this view, the other’s mind is in her em- 15 that includes the brain, Hohwy and Michael ments, gestures, facial expressions, vocal bodied comportment, and manifests itself take the body to be a representation in the intonations, communicative practices and in second-person interactions. For infants, internal model of the agent: actions in contextualized social and cul- these highly embodied and situated interac- tural environments. This includes an enac- tions form the basis for a developing under- “ The body is nothing special, it is just one tive model of direct social perception of the standing of others. among many causes interacting with each other other person’s embodied mental states (es- « 43 » Infants already have a sense, from in the environment, and in the course of this im- pecially intentions and emotions) (De Jae- their own self-movement and propriocep- pacting on the senses. Representation of the body gher, Di Paolo & Gallagher 2010; Gallagher tion, of their own agency, and they see this is nothing special either; it is just one among 2005, 2008a; Reddy 2008). For example, if kind of agency in others. They respond, many causes that get represented in the internal emotional episodes, as Giovanna Colom- interactively, to certain kinds of entities model used for prediction error minimization.” betti suggests: (specifically to other agents) in the environ- (Hohwy & Michael 2017: 367f) ment. They can respond in a distinctive way “ correspond to specific self-organizing forms to human faces (Johnson 2000; Johnson, « 39 » In contrast to reducing the self or second-order constraints – emotion forms, as Slaughter & Carey 1998; Legerstee 1991), for to neuronal patterns, or to the patterns of I call them – that recruit or entrain various pro- example. From birth infants are capable of inference that constitute a self-model, PTS cesses (neural, muscular, autonomic, etc.) into perceiving and responding to facial gestures argues that the self-pattern is a “real pat- highly integrated configurations or patterns.” presented by others, and seem to be directly tern” (Dennett 1991) of dynamical relations (Colombetti 2014: 69) attuned to the actions and gestures of other

http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher 16 Philosophical Concepts in 4E Cognition lagher & Meltzoff 1996). Meltzoff & lagher humans (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1994;- Gal ated in circumstances that involve our own our involve that circumstances in ated analysis, the rich analysis of speech acts situ- conversationfoundin be tersubjectivitycan s goal-directed. as 2002). 1993, pressionof emotions (Walker Hobson1982; ex- the specifying correspondences audio A ward &S & Baird 2001; Baird & Baldwin 2001; Wood- (Baldwin action continuous within of kinds some boundaries intentional parse can movements agents’ (T the of intrinsic temporalities the of integration the and tions rela- dynamical their in detail in specified be can that and that interactions attunement characterizes a mutual of part is This 1997). Meltzoff & (Gopnik behavior fants’ in- of response emotional and timing the second-person 1981). Barrera & Maurer 1995; (Baron-Cohen gaze and movements other’s head the followson’s they attention; per other the attunedinfantstoalreadyare in moremuch detail. specified

stitute meaning the of world. the co-con- intersubjectively to us helps it and important, very becomes context jectivity intersub- secondary andattention joint For world. the howengageothersnotice with to towards the end of the first year, infants start contexts. world, specific the to anchored in situated are they air; the in freely float not movementsdo gestures,and early social interaction.early social even a mere arousal response could facilitate etc. games, facial with continue to encouraged is who adult the on effect an has response infant’s the turn in response; and infant’s arousal the motivate may ture interaction. intersubjective - to caregiver and infant leads 2017b; N see but 2009; 2006, Jones sponse (A re- arousal mere a or imitation differential for worry a not is this sial, controverremainimitation neonatal about Constru 57 ots nat cn eet visual- detect can infants months 5–7 t agy, Pal & eate 1999; revarthen « 46 » « 45» « 44» V c incini & Jhang& incini it2018) nonetheless ommerville 2000). ommerville tivist Foundation tivist nisfeld 2005; Keven & S Primary intersubjectivity can be be can intersubjectivity Primary good exampleA good ofin- secondary c epesos intonations, expressions, uch rvos Orvos 2014; A t 6 months they see grasping see they months 6 t is interaction A A n initial adult facial ges- facial adult initial n T 1–1 ots infants months 10–11 t eate e a. 2006). al. et revarthen V A s vol. 14,N°1 incini et al. 2017a, N A IT lso at 2 months, 2 at lso agy et al. 2013; al. et agy tog claims lthough . Whether it is it Whether . vdne by evidenced A A A I t 2 months,2 t ccordingly, n this way, this n kins 2017; - - onpreciselycomplex this integration ofpri- to cording interaction. two-way upon depends it rather individual; one just of control the under not is meaning of accomplishment The re-established. then and broken then vironment, joint attention is established and en- surrounding the to made is reference – gesture and vocalization to confined not is sponse. one-sided. two young girls over agame of hopscotch. vides a detailed analysis of a dispute between also havealso meaning. would occurred touch the where and soft, or hard how gesture, a than rather touch a meaning. has girl’sface other the “ of her torso are actually leaning towardleaning actually are torso her of part upper the and arm hand, her which in tion configura- a intoCarla’s Diana’s twists body face toward hand gesturing the thrusting […] sight in positioned explicitly is hand by perceived be will they that so gestures hand her position to works actively girls] the of [one Carla means] (Goodwin 2001:1498) (Goodwin actions; interruption of activities, and so on. completed to references norms; orientations; instituted bodily and postures ments, move - force); descriptive than rather ontic intonations vocal (some ofhave which de- a 1494): (ibid: other” each elaboratemutually that fields semiotic multiple public of deployment “visible, the emphasizes etc.”Goodwin another, in body the use orientation and postureway, while particular a in body within the stream of speech, gestures use the signs builds language spoken“Forexample, pragmatics. whole-body in and vironment en- the in available resources” semiotic of kinds “different on drawing by but speech ment.Meaning accomplished,is not just via environ mate - the - of structures temporaland rial cultural, social, at of intersection specifically the interaction, emerges and action meaning in that shows Goodwin Charles 2017). 2000, (Goodwin fordances af- and arrangements environmental with alongmovements, and others’postures and U « 49» « 47 » « 48» lk tl, etrs a’ b had [This heard. be can’t gestures talk, nlike I n the interaction, the conversation the interaction, the n A The proximity of the gesture to gesture the of proximity The I epne rw a ute re- further a draws response A praty itrcin s not is interaction mportantly, IT a eape Gown pro- Goodwin example, an s aa te te gr] … Carla’s […] girl] other [the Diana sca udrtnig builds understanding social , aas ie of line Diana’s I f it were it f Diana. A ” c-

ual brains.ual individ- in than rather world the in happen environments in support of interactions that constrained normatively and cultural cial, - so physical, in situated others, and bodies, agentive requires it neurons; of interaction the to reducible not is cognition social to ais f moid n stae cognition, situated and embodied of laries vocabu foundthe - may in brainbe function ofexplanation best the that suggest to want oauay f neuroscience. of vocabulary the in out worked be would function brain explanation best of the that The was expectation 1998). (Gazzaniga accordingly mind of philosophies our adjust will we that and psychology replace point some at will ence neurosci- that been has science cognitive in Gallagher 2010). Gallagher dividual brain states (D individualsinvolved, the ofactionsin- toor the to reducible not something contributes I communicativeing narrativeandprocesses. support - and with supplemented contexts, social and pragmatic within situated ties, capaci- intersubjective secondary and mary precisely how Iunderstand your action. is that and etc., practices, cultural actions, broadercontextsinteractions, jointofsocial – affordancean that motivates action own my ingmetaplasticity. Thus, of reuse in relation to wider contexts involv- reinterpretationa requires this §§13–14) in (asbut againcognition, social of contexts in systems motor our of reuse the to through carries orientation action this (A significant is observation, for than rather for designed originally were systems perceptual-motor our that fact the then so, use. original by constrained way some in tion. - cogni social explaining in role some play may reuse notionsof andcontrol processes, cognition. social and cognition in role important an an important part of the body or that it plays n this regard, it is the interaction itself that itselfinteraction the is regard,it this n see it as something as it see I nderson & Chemero 2017). « 50 » « 52» Conclusion « 51» I i raoal t tik ht es is reuse that think to reasonable is t h itrcin ht s essentialis that interaction The S does notIT does deny that brain the is I ne h 19s te assumption the 1990s, the ince de, irr ern, motor neurons, mirror ndeed, e Jaegher, can respond to in to respond can I see youras action see I I I contrast, n t is likely that Di Paolo & indicatedI action, I I f 4E Cognition Decentering the Brain Shaun Gallagher

Shaun Gallagher { is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis. His areas of research include phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, especially topics related to embodiment, self, agency and intersubjectivity. Gallagher holds a secondary research appointment at the University of Wollongong, Australia, and is Honorary Professor of Health Science at the University of Tromsø, Norway. He has held visiting positions at Cambridge; Copenhagen; the Ecole Normale Supériure, Paris and Lyon; the Humboldt University in Berlin, and most recently at Keble College, University of Oxford. Professor Gallagher received the Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier Research Award (2012–18). His publications include How the Body Shapes the Mind (2005), The Phenomenological Mind (with Dan Zahavi, 2008, second edition 2012); and Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind (2017).

developmental psychology, ecological psy- “ The nervous system emerges from a preneural brain is doing, operating as part of a larger chology, dynamic systems theory, applied dynamic. Thus when the nervous excitation occurs, circuit that includes body and environment. linguistics, the theory of affordances, along it can’t play an important role in the organization The brain is not at the center of a circle with with the anthropological insights found in of the nervous system. This organization is not so radii of control extending to other elements; discussions that extend from concepts of much due to the functioning of the neuron as to the it is one component arranged in the circuit, cultural niche to material engagement. There growth of the total organism. The preneural system or in what Viktor von Weizsäcker (1986) is a methodological question involved here: of integration ‘strides across’ the nervous function- called a Gestalt circle of brain, body, and the whether neuroscience can start to speak this ing and it doesn’t stop when it appears. So the ner- (physical, social, cultural) environment. different language and enter into the right vous system can’t be the ultimate explanation. Then kind of dialogue. There is also a substantial we must admit an intrinsic potentiality of growth, question: how do brains operate in the com- a dynamic system reacting to its surroundings as Acknowledgements plex and dynamical mix of interactions that an organism would do. It replaces the function of involve perceiving, moving, gesturing, act- conduction as being a consequence, not a principle Research for this article was supported ing, emoting and expressing bodies? of the system.” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 192) by the Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier Research Award and the Australian “ It is conventional to think of the nervous sys- « 54 » In this article I have considered Research Council (ARC) grant, Minds in tem as an organ that monitors and motivates the a sampling of research areas in the cogni- Skilled Performance. DP170102987. I ben- 17 body rather than an organ controlled by the body tive sciences – perception, agency, self and efitted greatly from the comments of two […]. Nevertheless, the body’s influence on the social cognition. In each case I have argued blind, but insightful reviewers. nervous system is as important for the organ- against a narrow or neurocentric reduc- ism as is neural dominion over the body. (Purves tionism. These are basic phenomena upon 1988: 1) which many cognitive capacities are built. References One could easily see the same principles « 53 » That the body essentially con- at work in a number of other areas where Allen M. & Friston K. J. (2018) From cogni- strains and “pushes” the organization of the more comprehensive accounts have been tivism to autopoiesis: Towards a com- brain through its dynamic behavioral inter- developed by taking embodied, ecological, putational framework for the embodied action with the environment was already enactive and extended approaches seri- mind. Synthese 195(6): 2459–2482. well documented by George Coghill (1929), ously – for example, research on memory ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4099 in Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior. (Sutton 2010), expert performance (Høffd- Anderson M. L. (2010) Neural reuse: A funda- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his 1957–58 lec- ing 2015; Ilundáin-Agurruza 2016), collec- mental reorganizing principle of the brain. tures on the concept of nature, was inspired tive intentionality (Tollefsen & Gallagher Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 245–266. by Coghill’s work for setting the principles 2017), psychopathology (Gallagher 2013c), Anderson M. & Chemero A. (2017) The brain of dynamic anatomy in opposition to strict and psychotherapy (Garcia & Di Paolo 2018; evolved to guide action. In: Shepherd S. V. determinism, and he provides an appropri- Röhricht et al. 2014). In each case one can (ed.) The Wiley handbook of evolutionary ate conclusion. acknowledge the importance of what the neuroscience John Wiley, New York: 1–20.

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