Aristotle, Kant and Weber - Preliminary Philosophical for Journalism Ethics
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Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts - Volume 3, Issue 2 – Pages 93-108 Aristotle, Kant and Weber - Preliminary Philosophical for Journalism Ethics By José Manuel Chillón The approach of the moral dimension of news journalism can be done from the need to establish a discipline with the own identity of the wisdom applied, while, that from the urgency of having a tradition of moral thought to know and to invoke and to refer to it more than ever in these times when journalism is in the hands of professionals and businessmen devoid of moral scruples. Moments, of course, in which the journalistic knowledge is also in the making. So, I think that the ancient and modern philosophers should mention a matter as contemporary as journalism. In this paper, I will try to study the contributions that ethics of responsibility, prudence like professional virtue or some notions of kantian ethics and discoursive ethics can offer to journalistic ethics. Introduction It is now common to accept that bioethics, environmental ethics or business ethics are disciplines that are part of the list of applied ethics. They have their own principles, they know the professional practices and they represent the moral progress of a particular society which has to solve complex contemporary problems specifically as far away from the cradle to the Greek philosophy or Kantian modernity, to give an example. It would seem then that applied ethics must take a path beginning from zero due to the asymmetry between the most pressing issues of today and apparently the outdated assumptions and approaches in the history of moral thought. However, a more discerning eye will discover that, although the faces of the problems are so different and unthinkable for the old time philosophers, the key issues on which they pivot are exactly the same as those that address contemporary thinkers: the debate on the suitability of the means in relation to the ends intended; the value of virtue, the issue of non-negotiable priority for human dignity, moral autonomy ... so new and so classic, so as of yesterday and today. It is clear to what extent the consolidation of knowledge about applied ethics depends on establishing these links between the most pressing moral issues of our day and the moral approaches of ethical reflection giants, whose shoulders we must continue to rely on. Links must be continually Professor of Contemporary Philosophy, University of Valladolid, Department of Philosophy, Spain. https://doi.org/10.30958/ajha.3.2.2 doi=10.30958/ajha.3.2.2 Vol. 3, No. 2 Chillón: Aristotle, Kant and Weber... remade in a constant hermeneutical work with the pressing challenges that daily present a rapidly changing society such as ours. Journalistic ethics could be considered as applied ethics if the journalistic practice, hard hit by the technological revolution of nearly unpredictable consequences , is permeable to systematic ethical proposals. Aristotle, Kant and Weber, among others, have something to say about the moral principles that guide human action and when this action is professionally dedicated to the production of information transmitted through the media. Thus, to justify what sense of journalistic ethics is applied, ethics contribute to the task of providing enough intellectual entity to that discipline. We propose two complementary theoretical courses. The first one tries to understand journalistic ethics as ethics of responsibility moving weberianʼs reflections on the political vocation to occupation, also public, on the media reports. The second, meanwhile, will suggest professional ethics grounded in virtue for the responsible public mission: the wisdom of Aristotleʼs stamp. Tours will be completed with a tracking Kantian ethic and contributions from the pragmatics of Habermas. It will discuss fundamentals, principles and journalistic theory and practice information. Is this a good way to "philosophize about a real problem" which Popper would say? The Moral Dimension of Public Action: M. Weber Journalism news is a chore. Such endeavor is the result of a personal and professional freedom. Modern societies have wanted journalism to represent the right of freedom of expression. A freedom that supports democracy and that recognizes social and political pluralism as a fundamental value of the legal system. But, as it happens to any exercise of freedom it is not free of responsibility. It seems clear therefore that journalistic ethics should think about the moral foundations of this relationship between professional freedom exercised and the special public responsibility due. Before addressing this question, I propose to recall the classic distinction given by the Spanish philosopher X. Zubiri. We refer to the distinction between moral structure and moral content. He distinguished between the constitutive and moral dimension of human action, to the extent that it is free, and between the post-qualification of such action by moral standards of those who have. Human actions can be moral or inmoral but not unethical. Obviously it is not the journalistʼs professional activity to decide what to report, what to include, how much space to reserve, what should be omitted or in which direction to investigate ... these are professional actions in which the journalistʼs freedom comes into play. The satisfaction of the fundamental right of the public to receive truthful information depends on the free exercise, 94 Athens Journal of Humanities and Arts April 2016 professional and moral structurally. Hence this special responsibility for which we asked before. This responsibility is the mission given by democracies to informative journalism. There are a few professions in which any move, any choice or any decision may have political repercussions. These are probably only politics and journalism. So I think that a good way to treat the specificity of journalistic ethics may involve recourse to Max Weber and the conception of the moral dimension of the public policy action proposed: the ethic of responsibility. Knowing that politics aim to achieve the power, and that after power comes violence, is an ethic regulation of politics possible? This is the key question of Weber in Politics as a Vocation, a text appearing in the conference that the German sociologist pronounced in the Free Association of Students of Munich during the winter of 1919. Weber then proposes a certain conception of politics, a realistic conception that takes into account the real situations in which the politician action unfolds and he thinks from there the possibility of ethics for the public mission. A very different realistic conception of political realism is that of Machiavelli that subordinates ethics to the strategic pursuit of policy objectives. And this proposal of Weber is also far from the moral convictions of the man who decides not to interfere in worldly matters that might sully their hands of someone with impeccable convictions. What relationship does the professional politician, who knows the rugged terrain where politics is played, with the necessary moral guidance for their actions? And this is his central idea: "Any action that is morally oriented has to adjust to two different theories that are irremediably opposed: the ethics of conviction and responsibility."1 The difference between these two forms of guiding ethical action lies in, at first, the inconsistency that appears to exist between the two, knowing that the man who acts out of conviction ignores the actual consequences that their actions may have, whatever they may be. However, Weber immediately appeals to the experience to realize that, on many occasions, to achieve good ends, we must use means that are less so. What happens is that this moral calculus of means in order to get the end is unbearable, because it is irrational, for whoever acts according to the ethic of conviction. The immediate imposition of absolute moral principles (such as the ethics of conviction) to the actual conditions of the policy would be the perfect reason to disregard the moral interference in public administration. Precisely, because Weber wants to avoid this separation between ethics and politics and the consequent reduction of morality into the private sphere, he proposes the ethic of responsibility as the place of politics itself: an ethic that does not 1. Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (Politics as a Vocation) (Muenchen: Gesammelte Politische Schriften, 1921), 164. 95 Vol. 3, No. 2 Chillón: Aristotle, Kant and Weber... despise the principles, an ethic that assumes the consequences of moral action as an essential of its reflection. A responsible politician is one who treads the harsh reality, that governs power motivated by principles which, necessarily, on penalty of being useless, abandons their absolute bound by the same reality, principles that are not only the beginning of each political action, but in the end, when the politician who is mature, the politician who has vocation says, "I stay here." Because if the politician gave a further step he would be betraying his convictions by force of circumstances. Political vocation is needed to reconcile personal conviction and public demands. Political vocation is needed to avoid the gap between individual morality and the renunciation of the principles that may impose a harsh reality. Vocation, in short, tries to make all public missions ethically responsible tasks. Could we speak, in this same sense of vocation as a journalist? To what extent can the discourse on the moral dimension of journalism be illustrated from a possible ethics of responsibility? When we ask for the professional responsibility of communication we are asking for the justification of their activity in social life.2 What does it do? What are the expectations of citizens about the media and its professionals? First, we say that the responsibility of journalists is the tribute that the profession owes to society to give the essential role of covering the fundamental right of the public to receive truthful information and the media only makes sense if they contribute to that end that gives them meaning.