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Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao’s Long March to Moscow, 1949 By Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff◊ etween December 1949 and February 1950 Mao vis- Russian Presidential Archive, an institution notoriously unwel- ited Stalin in Moscow and the world waited in anx- coming of scholars. In fact, original documents in the archive Bious anticipation. What would the communist giants are entirely inaccessible except to those on a short list of hand- decide? What great good (or evil, depending on your side) picked Russian researchers who, over the last 15 years or so, would result? In the mid 1990s, the declassification of these have leaked certain “declassified” documents, showcasing talks was one of the exciting highlights at the dawn of archive- them in memoirs, articles, and documentary collections. One based Cold War international history. Now a whole new tranche such collection, Volume 5 of Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnoshniia has emerged adding both length and depth to the telling of this (Soviet-Chinese Relations) edited by Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa dramatic story both from the Russian and Chinese sides. Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov—all heavyweights It is common diplomatic practice to prepare a summit either of Russian Sinology—appeared in print in Moscow in 2005. through confidential talks conducted by the leaders’ trusted Volume 5 is the latest installment in a series on Sino-Soviet advisors or foreign ministers. Also common is a variant where relations published under the auspices of the Russian Institute one leader dispatches an envoy to flesh out the agenda and of the Far East (Institut Dalnego Vostoka). The present volume, then his counterpart sends a reply visitor to choreograph the made up of two books, includes documents from 1946 until meeting in greater detail. The latter route was chosen by Mao February 1950 (Mao’s visit to Moscow), with an unexpected Zedong on 17 January 1949, when, after multiple postpone- addendum of 1952 talks between Stalin and Zhou Enlai. ments of his own trip to Moscow, Stalin again put him off. The Some of the documents included in Volume 5 (for exam- eleven-month long preparation process that ensued has left us ple, Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union and the aforementioned a rich record, much, but not all, of which has now leaked into talks between Stalin and Zhou Enlai) have long been known the public sphere. Below, following several earlier CWIHP in the West, and their translations have appeared in previous publications on this topic, is the latest installment for those issues of this Bulletin. But some very interesting documents who want to know what went wrong in the Mao-Stalin rela- in Volume 5 have been put into circulation for the first time. tionship and how it affected the whole course of Sino-Soviet Documents translated below came from three fondi and seven relations thereafter. distinct dela of the Presidential Archive. These are cables Realizing that the visit would be a turning point for both, in between Mao Zedong and Stalin through Orlov, reports from the late 1940s Mao and Stalin each tried to control the timing Soviet representative to the CCP Ivan Kovalev (who replaced of their eventual meeting, with one or the other putting the visit Orlov as liaison to Stalin in 1949), and Anastas Mikoyan’s off time and again, with greater or lesser warning, with more reports on his meetings with the Chinese leadership in Xibaipo or less convincing reasons. All these exchanges are well-pre- in January-February 1949. A simple comparison of archival served since they were precisely encoded by the Soviet doctor citations reveals that the editors of Volume 5 omitted a large and GRU agent in China, Andrei Orlov (code name: Terebin). number of documents (likely, further correspondence between In Moscow, they were decoded and brought directly to Stalin. Mao Zedong and Stalin, and possibly transcripts of Stalin- The exchanges appear more like a cat-and-mouse game than Liu Shaoqi meetings in Moscow), while several reprinted alliance formation. documents show obvious signs of tampering. In other words, Most of the documents reproduced below are ostensibly Volume 5, and the translations below, still cannot be the final traceable to the Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii—the word on the making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance; yet these new Sergey Radchenko is a visiting professor at Pittsburg State University and the author of The China Puzzle: Soviet Policy Towards the People’s Republic of China, 1962-67, to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press later this year. David Wolff is professor of Eurasian History at the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan, and a former director of the Cold War International History Project. He is also the author of CWIHP Working Paper #30 and To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914 (Stanford University Press, 1999). 105 Inside China’s Cold War documents vastly enrich our understanding of this intricate P. Fedorov who related Gao Gang’s urgent request for ammu- process. nition, desperately needed by the CCP forces for the planned Two additional documents come from a Chinese documen- offensive on the railroad town of Siping.3 There are good rea- tary collection, Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao. The first sons to think that Stalin ignored this request. In the meantime, four volumes of this series appeared in 2005. Liu is, after Mao worn down by Du Yuming’s forces, the PLA lifted the siege and Zhou, the number three man in Chinese Communist his- of Siping.4 tory, so it is no surprise that documents from his files held by It is not clear whether Stalin’s decision to postpone Mao’s the Central Archives and accessed with the authority of the visit had something to do with the Siping operation, or devel- Central Committee’s Document Research Unit, would be of opments in Shaanxi, and whether it reflected Stalin’s genuine interest. For over thirty years, Liu served as the top expert on concern about military prospects of the CCP in Mao’s absence, organization and administration inside the CCP Politburo, so or merely his unwillingness to make any promises to Mao it was logical that he should visit Moscow to take the mea- while the outcome of the Civil War remained uncertain. In any sure of the Soviet model. And it was not Liu’s first time. When case, the subject of Mao’s visit to Moscow was shelved for sev- Mao was visiting Beijing in 1920, learning about the exciting eral months until Mao asked again, possibly on 30 November, events taking place in Moscow and buying his first copy of and Moscow confirmed his invitation in December 1947. Then The Communist Manifesto, knowledge that would make him a Stalin did not write for four months. Marxist, Liu was already in Moscow. As we will see below, the A long report from Mao finally provoked Stalin’s reply. most contentious moments of Liu’s conversations with Stalin Stalin casually apologized for his prolonged silence on the have been removed, so that neither Stalin’s unwillingness to aid absurd pretext of having taken the time to “check the data” the CCP’s planned campaign against Taiwan nor Stalin’s fatal necessary for his reply. It is possible that Stalin wanted to attentions toward Gao Gang, the Manchurian party boss and a see where the wind was blowing on the Civil War fronts, and member of Liu’s delegation, would be revealed. Nonetheless, his skeptical attitude is understandable—even Mao, in his 15 the parts of the conversations that have been printed are quite March 1948 report to Stalin predicted that the Guomindang revealing, nicely complementing Russian materials on Liu’s would only be defeated in three or more years.5 visit. There are still gaps, but they are getting smaller. In his letter Stalin took issue with Mao’s plan to abolish other political parties once the CCP gained power and insisted Mao postponed that bourgeois parties would have to be included in the Chinese Mao allegedly requested a meeting with Stalin in early 1947, political process for the foreseeable future. Such advice was in though documentary evidence is still very scant on this point.1 line with Stalin’s understanding of the character of the Chinese We can only speculate about Mao’s reasons for insisting on Revolution as essentially an anti-imperialist, not a communist such a meeting; Dieter Heinzig cites his pressing need for revolution. Mao, on the contrary, peddled more radical poli- Soviet aid, especially weapons, while Odd Arne Westad adds cies in his communications with Stalin, whether out of sheer to these practical concerns Mao’s intention to re-order his conviction or for tactical reasons, as a proof of his pro-Soviet long-term relationship with the Soviet ally.2 But in the spring orientation. Whether or not Mao was disappointed by Stalin’s of 1947 the Chairman was in no position to travel to distant rebuke, in one important way the letter was very welcome places; in March he had to abandon the long-time revolution- news, for it mentioned the inevitable “victory of the people’s ary base of Yan’an to the advancing Guomindang forces (a liberation armies”—was this not sure indication that Stalin move later portrayed in Chinese historiography as work of a was coming down on the CCP side of the fence? tactical genius, but at the time something of a setback for the Mao must have thought so, for on 22 April, only two days CCP).

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