DOCSLIB.ORG

September 2018 MLM

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
September 2018 MLM VOLUME IX, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2018 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION From the Inner Circle of Ahmed al- The Mystery Al-Tajouri, Al- Chalabi’s INC to Emir: Who is IS- Kani, Badi and Boko Haram to America’s New K Commander Ansaru to ISWAP: Trabelsi: The Shaikh Aslam Specially Designated Terrorist—A Profile BRIEF Militia Leaders Farooqi? A Post-Mortem Fighting for Analysis of Abu of Iraqi Banker Aras Tripoli Fatima Habib SUNGUTA WEST DARIO CRISTIANI FARHAN ZAHID JACOB ZENN RAFID JABOORI VOLUME IX, ISSUE 9 | SEPTEMBER 2018 LEADERS OF MOZAMBICAN Since October 2017, attacks by the group have MILITANT GROUP REVEALED caused panic and fear in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, near the Tanzanian border. Sunguta West The province has been the focus of the global petroleum industry following the discovery of Until recently, the top leadership of the rising huge deposits of natural gas. Some multinational Islamist Mozambican militant group, Ansar al- oil and gas companies like Italy’s Eni Oil and the Sunna, had been a matter of speculation. U.S. Company Anadarko, among others, are However, in mid-August, the country’s police building facilities in the province (AllAfrica.com chief released several names of suspected August 11, 2017). Islamists who the country’s security and Reports indicate that the group has killed an intelligence agencies believe are ringleaders of estimated 200 people. Villages, trading centers, the militant group. (EWN, August 15, 2018) churches and mosques have been targeted, and According to the police, Abdul Faizal leads the an estimated 400 homes have been torched. group locally known as al-Shabaab, similar in Most of the victims have been beheaded in hit- name to the Somalia-based militant group. No and-run raids, during which the militants also clear connection exists between the two steal food supplies. (cajnewsafrica , July 23, organizations. The details of the Mozambican 2018). al-Shabaab leader are scanty. Other leaders Like many of the Islamist militants groups in include Abdul Remane, Abdul Raim, Nuno Africa, Ansar al-Sunna is seeking to establish an Remane, Ibn Omar and Salimo Kijepel (Club of Islamic State in northern Mozambique. Mozambique, August 13, 2018). !1 VOLUME IX, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2018 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Earlier reports quoting local Muslim leaders Al-Tajouri, Al-Kani, Badi and alleged that the group was led by a Gambian Trabelsi: The Militia Leaders Muslim leader, or imam, named Musa. Fighting for Tripoli According to the leaders, Musa had aggressively recruited in Montepeuz District among Dario Cristiani populations with grievances against the security forces and an international mining company On September 25, the Tripoli Security (African Center for Strategic Studies, March 28, Directorate announced the end of fighting in the 2018). Libyan capital Tripoli (Libya Observer, Sept 26, 2018). This declaration comes after almost a The other leader identified by the Muslim month of fierce clashes that left around 117 leaders was Nuro Adremane, who received people dead and 560 others wounded (Libya training from al-Shabaab fighters after traveling Observer, Sept 27, 2018). The conflict involved to Mozambique through Tanzania and Kenya. the Seventh Brigade from the town of Tarhouna Many other fighters are alleged to have trained and two of the most important Tripoli-based in Somalia. militias, the Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigades The group started as a religious organization, (TBR) and the Nawasi. but it set up military camps in 2015. Its leaders The TBR, also known as the First Security are believed to have links with Islamist militant Division of the Central General Security groups in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and the Administration (CGSA), is headed by Haithem Great Lakes Region. (Club of Mozambique, Jun al-Tajouri. Considered the most powerful militia 8, 2018). For some time, al-Shabaab, is believed leader in Tripoli, he had to return from his Hijra to have sought to establish itself in the Great in Saudi Arabia due to the fighting (The Lakes through its affiliate, the Allied F National, August 29). The TBR headquarters is Democratic Front (ADF). located in al-Shat, in the area of Abu Sittah, Sunguta West is an independent journalist based in near the Tripoli Corniche. Al-Tajouri is not Nairobi. known for having any particular ideological orientation. Over the past few years, the group has strengthened its presence throughout the entire city and has gained significant control of its economy. For instance, the CGSA gave al- Tajouri the mandate to protect the port of Tripoli in February 2017, which is an essential asset for business in Tripoli and Libya. The group also maintains significant control over the branches of local banks and the financial operators in Tripoli (Middle East Eye, April 10, !2 VOLUME IX, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2018 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION 2017). The Nawasi Brigade, also known as the progressively and steadily increased their Eighth Brigade, is run by members of the influence, becoming the actual kingmakers of Qaddur family and has a more Islamist outlook. the city. As such, it is not uncommon—and will Strongly opposed to the radical version of the happen again—that militias formally belonging Salafism of the Islamic State (IS), on the one to the same alliance can clash suddenly, in many hand, and Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the cases over local and material issues. The rising eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), on tension between the Tarhouna-based Seventh the other, they maintain a significant presence in Brigade and the TBR and the NB created the Northern and Western areas of Tripoli. opportunity for the many rivals of Sarraj and the Tripoli militias to try exploiting the situation. The Seventh Brigade is also known as the Salah Badi and Khalifa Haftar are prime Kanyat or the Kani Brigade, as the al-Kani examples of this. family heads it. The eldest of the four al-Kani brothers, Mohammed al-Kani, is the formal Allegedly, Badi’s forces provided most of the leader. The Kanyat became part of the forces weaponry used by the Seventh Brigade in their associated with the Government of National bid to enter Tripoli. The al-Kani decision to Accord (GNA), the United Nations-backed strike an alliance with Badi brought the GNA to government of Libya, in 2017. Interestingly dismiss the Seventh Brigade from its forces. Badi enough, the Kanyat has often worked together is the leader of the Jabhat al-Samud (the with the TBR and the other Tripoli militias. For Steadfastness Front), initially also known as the instance, back in October 2017, the Kanyat Libya Dawn Mark-2. The Misratan Badi is one backed the TBR and the Misratan forces of the of the closest militia leaders to Khalifa Ghwell, Halbous’s 301 Brigade in a military operation in the Prime Minister of the Libyan National the areas of Qasir Ben Ghashir, Sayah and Wadi Salvation Government. Badi is a former officer Rabe. This action was aimed at eliminating an of Qaddafi's army but was later imprisoned as a armed group loyal to former Libyan dictator dissident. He then led Misrata militias in the Qaddafi, led by Salah Al-Marghani and victory against loyalist forces and was elected to Mabrouk Qaddafi. (Libya Observer, Oct 4, the General National Congress in the July 2012 2017). The Kanyat justified its actions by elections, but resigned in 2014. He has been a proclaiming its ambition of freeing Tripoli and fierce enemy of Sarraj since his appointment, its people from gangs looting public money in often claiming that his major and final ambition the city ( Al-Arabiya, Sept 3, 2018). was to kick Sarraj and the GNA out of Tripoli (Afrigate News, Feb 21, 2017). However, the recent eruption of violence pitting this militia against the TBR and the NB is not Badi’s support for the Kanyat is a further the symptom of a new, widening conflict in demonstration that groups in Misrata remain Tripoli, or of the new importance of local divided. Some of the militias support support militias in running Tripoli's affairs. Since the Sarraj, some others work directly with Tripoli’s establishment of the GNA, Tripoli's militias have militias, while some want to return to Tripoli to !3 VOLUME IX, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2018 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION fight against the militias currently in charge of staunchly opposes. Badi himself remains one of the city. the fiercest enemies of Haftar. In the wake of this eruption of violence, Haftar The latest eruption of violence in Tripoli announced that forces belonging to his LNA represents nothing new. Although the numbers were not involved in the clashes and threatened of casualties is particularly significant, the —once again—to enter Tripoli to enforce sudden outbreak of clashes between militias is a security. However, despite his rhetoric as possible common feature of the Tripoli's security “National Savior,” the role of Haftar remains environment since 2014. Since 2016, the geographically limited. He still has the ambition enlargement of a group of local militias’ of becoming more relevant in Tripoli and the territory has often triggered the reaction of other west of Libya, but this ambition clashes with the groups who feel excluded or who want to return reality on the ground. His strategy of penetrating to Tripoli. Against this volatile background, the the south of Libya, and from there moving to militias' leaders have a fundamental role, as no Tripoli, suffered a significant blow in May 2017 effective, superior authority can bind them when Haftar lost 141 soldiers in an ambush at together. They enjoy significant freedom of the Brak al-Shatt airbase (see TM, June 2, 2017; action. As such, their will is often decisive in Libya Herald, May 18, 2017; Al-Jazeera, May shaping the security dynamics on the ground, 20, 2017).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ISIS in Africa: Implications from Syria and Iraq Dr
    ISIS in Africa: Implications from Syria and Iraq Dr. Joseph Siegle28 Africa Center for Strategic Studies National Defense University At the end of 2016, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), announced that the group had “expanded and shifted some of our command, media, and wealth to Africa.” ISIS’s Dabiq magazine referred to the regions of Africa that were part of its “caliphate:” “the region that includes Sudan, Chad and Egypt has been named the caliphate province of Alkinaana; the region that includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda as the province of Habasha; the North African region encompassing Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, Niger and Mauritania as Maghreb, the province of the caliphate.” Leaving aside the mismatched ethno-linguistic groupings included in each of these “provinces,” ISIS’s interest in establishing a presence in Africa has long been a part of its vision for a global caliphate. Battlefield setbacks in ISIS’s strongholds in Iraq and Syria since 2015, however, raise questions of what impact this will have for ISIS’s African aspirations. A useful starting point in considering this question is to recognize that the threat from violent Islamist groups in Africa is not monolithic but is comprised of a variety of distinct entities. For the most part, these groups are geographically concentrated and focused on local territorial or political objectives. Specifically, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has identified 5 major categories of militant Islamists groups in Africa (see map): http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Africas-Active-Militant-Islamist- Groups-November-2016.pdf.
    [Show full text]
  • BOKO HARAM Emerging Threat to the U.S
    112TH CONGRESS COMMITTEE " COMMITTEE PRINT ! 1st Session PRINT 112–B BOKO HARAM Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES December 2011 FIRST SESSION U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 71–725 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman LAMAR SMITH, Texas BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia LAURA RICHARDSON, California CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TIM WALBERG, Michigan BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota JACKIE SPEIER, California JOE WALSH, Illinois CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan BEN QUAYLE, Arizona WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York BILLY LONG, Missouri VACANCY JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MO BROOKS, Alabama MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director & Chief Counsel KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director (II) C O N T E N T S BOKO HARAM EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 II. Findings ..............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Khabarnama 806.Qxd
    RAI LAW OFFICE Barrister Soliciter Notary Public For All Immigration Matters REAL ESTATE Family Law & Criminal Cases Sales, Purchase, Lease, Mortgages of Residential pjM fbI vIklI & Commercial Properties KHABARNAMA PUNJABI WEEKLY (owned and operated by Khabarnama Inc.) Tel: 905-791-9292 11 Squirreltail Way, Brampton, Ont., L6R 1X4 2565 Steeles Ave East, Unit #4, Brampton Balbir Singh Rai Vol 17, No. 806 Friday Feb. 20-2015 Ph: 905-793-5072 Fax: 905-488-1821 Website: www.khabarnama.com email : [email protected] Khabarnama and people associated with it are not responsible for any claims of its advertisers and do not endorse products/services advertised in it. Please consult your lawyer before buying through the advertisements published in Khabarnama. We sell space in the paper, and claims are those of the advertisers. riw Kaf mqM rI vlNo ierfk ierfk, kru d aq y amrIkf kr knY zy f n y bxfeI ‘smfrt imsnL `c vfDf krn df skM qy hfeI-ttkY ’ asflt rfeIPl rh y hn vzw y hml y dI iqafrI aftvf, 19 PrvrI :- kYnzfy dy rwiKaf mMqrI PYzrl mMqrI mMzl imsLn dI smIKsLf krygf vfisLgtn, 19 PrvrI :- ierk, kurd aqy tU hfAUs” lVfeI hovygI ijs ivwc eyar Pors aftvf, 19 PrvrI :- kYnzfy ny nvIN ‘smfrt hiQafr “lIQl, PlYksIbl jnrl prpjL vloN ierfk imsLn `c vfDf krn df sMkyq idwqf aqy PYslf krygf ik imsLn dI imafd vDfAux amrIkf agly kuJ mhIinaF ivwc ieslfimk df rlo bhuq sImq hovygf. kurd POjI ajy ies hfeI-tYk’ asflt rfeIPl bxfeI hY ijs dI plytPfrm” hY. ieh hr iksm dIaF hflqF igaf hY.
    [Show full text]
  • Sunni Suicide Attacks and Sectarian Violence
    Terrorism and Political Violence ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20 Sunni Suicide Attacks and Sectarian Violence Seung-Whan Choi & Benjamin Acosta To cite this article: Seung-Whan Choi & Benjamin Acosta (2018): Sunni Suicide Attacks and Sectarian Violence, Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1472585 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1472585 Published online: 13 Jun 2018. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ftpv20 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1472585 Sunni Suicide Attacks and Sectarian Violence Seung-Whan Choi c and Benjamin Acosta a,b aInterdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel; bInternational Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel; cPolitical Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA ABSTRACT KEY WORDS Although fundamentalist Sunni Muslims have committed more than Suicide attacks; sectarian 85% of all suicide attacks, empirical research has yet to examine how violence; Sunni militants; internal sectarian conflicts in the Islamic world have fueled the most jihad; internal conflict dangerous form of political violence. We contend that fundamentalist Sunni Muslims employ suicide attacks as a political tool in sectarian violence and this targeting dynamic marks a central facet of the phenomenon today. We conduct a large-n analysis, evaluating an original dataset of 6,224 suicide attacks during the period of 1980 through 2016. A series of logistic regression analyses at the incidence level shows that, ceteris paribus, sectarian violence between Sunni Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims emerges as a substantive, signifi- cant, and positive predictor of suicide attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • Boko Haram Stands at a Crossroads: Is the Era of Shekau Over ?
    Boko Haram Stands at a Crossroads: Is the Era of Shekau Over ? Dr. David Doukhan May 2021 Boko Haram Stands at a Crossroads: Is the Era of Shekau Over? Since May 21st, 2021, all eyes have been focused on the elimination of Boko Haram’s leader Abu Baku Shekau. History shows us, that since 2009, Shekau has been allegedly killed four time on the battlefield. The last time, by the way, in 2016, he was only 'fatally wounded'. Each time, following his death announcement, like a phoenix in a well-prepared video, he reappears completely alive and well. In his speeches, he seems very comfortable, in full control and confidence, he speaks in the native Hausa language, spiced with verses from the Koran, in Arabic. Overall, he insists that he is alive and 'only by the will of God he will die' ([…] should know that he could not die except by the will of Allah […]). 1 Shekau is wanted by the United States (a bounty of $7 million was placed on his head).2 According to ISWAP (Islamic State of West Africa Province)3, Abu Bakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, has barricaded himself with some of his followers and dozens of fighters in the thick forest of Sambisa. His hiding place was attacked by more than 30 armored vehicles carrying heavy weapons assisted by dozens of ISWAP fighters mounted on motorcycles. The attackers forced his fighters and bodyguards to surrender. According to their reports, Shekau chose to blow himself up rather than 1 About Shekau who died and was resurrected several times see the link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37476453 2 On June 21, 2012, the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Nigeria's Boko Haram
    Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs March 29, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43558 Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions Summary Boko Haram, a violent Nigerian Islamist movement, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years, drawing on a narrative of victimization and vengeance for state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. The group’s April 2014 abduction of almost 300 schoolgirls drew particular international attention, including from the Obama Administration and Members of Congress. Its high death toll and its pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS) in March 2015 have further raised the concern of U.S. policy makers. The group has sought to rebrand itself as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), though it remains more popularly known by its original nickname. The State Department has named several individuals linked to Boko Haram, including its leader, Abubakar Shekau, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, and the group was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the State Department in November 2013. More than 15,000 people are estimated to have been killed by Boko Haram, including more than 6,000 in 2015 alone, making it one of world’s deadliest terrorist groups. By U.N. estimates, roughly 2.8 million people have been displaced by Boko Haram-related violence in the Lake Chad Basin region, where approximately 5.6 million are in need of emergency food aid.
    [Show full text]
  • How Far Can Isis Go in Afghanistan?
    CAPS In Focus 12 September 2016 www.capsindia.org 94/16 HOW FAR CAN ISIS GO IN AFGHANISTAN? Radhika Halder Research Associate, CAPS During his recent visit to New Delhi, former commander Hafez Saeed Khan as its “governor”. Most Afghans who swore allegiance to IS Caliph, President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai conveyed Abu Bakr al Baghdadi comprise of disaffected an important message regarding the presence of Taliban commanders who found an the Islamic State (IS) in the country. Karzai has impressionable alternative in what IS has to made it clear that IS is not indigenous in offer.2 Both groups (Taliban and IS) are bitterly Afganistan and its objectives are far more divided over leadership and strategy, despite “sinister” than any other radical extremist sharing the same will to impose a harsh version elements in the region, mainly Taliban.1 of Islamic rule in the territory. The Taliban has While the global franchise of the IS has focused mainly on Afghanistan whereas, the IS been seen to expand beyond Iraq and Syria by aims to establish a Global Caliphate. In a video influencing pre-existing home-grown groups in released soon after the declaration of the Nigeria, Libya and Southeast Asia, the Taliban in Khorasan province, an IS jihadi threatened the Afghanistan doesn’t seem to follow suit. IS seeks Taliban, indirectly comparing Baghdadi with to establish a Global Caliphate, under the leader of Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar. The leadership of a “Caliph” and the enforcement of speech rejected the existence of two caliphs and Sharia law. It is this very ideology of IS that has could be seen as a call to eliminate Omar.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 20 Section 3
    CHAPTER 20 SECTION 3 Oil and strategic trading lands have continued to be sources of conflict in the Middle East o United States and Soviets fought for control during the Cold War o Western countries continue to want control today Israel’s creation by the United Nations in 1948 was not recognized by Arabs in Palestine, leading to many conflicts still continuing today o Three wars 1956, 1967, and 1973 . Leads to Israel gaining more land; While between wars, Israelis faced terrorist attacks; United States continually attempts to make peace, unsuccessfully . 1967 war Israeli military takes control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, and Golan Heights from Syria . 1973/Yom Kippur War Arabs surpassingly attacked on Yom Kippur, but still could not take back occupied lands; Israelis begin housing Jewish people in occupied lands o Palestine Liberation Organization leads Arab fight against Israel . Led by Yasir Arafat; Extreme dislike of Israelis, and wanted to destroy Israel; Attacked Israel numerous times; Airplane hi-jacking and Olympic killings . In 1987, Arabs in Israel-occupied lands attempt to revolt; Using suicide bombers and terroristic attacks, with many Israelis and Arabs dying o United States and United Nations have attempted to bring peace to the region . Golda Meir was in peace talks in 1973 when Arabs attacked; Peace Accord signed in 1979, giving Sinai Peninsula back to Egypt; Jordan makes peace with Israel in 1994; Syria and Israel continue to fight over Golan Heights . Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 by Yasir Arafat and Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin gave Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank limited self-rule, and recognition by Israel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization stops terrorist Attacks on Israel o Even with pledge by Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian violence on Israelis continued .
    [Show full text]
  • “New Type of Major-Country Relationship” with the United States
    U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder June 25, 2013 China Seeks a “New Type of Major-Country Relationship” with the United States by Caitlin Campbell Research Director and Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs and Energy and Craig Murray Senior Policy Analyst, Military and Security Affairs Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report. China is seeking a “new type of major-country relationship”* with the United States, according to official statements from Chinese leaders. Beijing has deliberated this concept since at least 2011, and it has been referenced frequently by high-level Chinese officials and widely discussed in Chinese media since February 2012, when then presumptive Chinese president Xi Jinping evoked it during a visit to the United States. 1† This approach likely is intended to create an environment more conducive to China’s rise by promoting more stable relations with the United States and avoid or, if necessary, manage tension that history suggests is inevitable between established and rising powers.
    [Show full text]
  • Appendix C: Military Operations and Planning Scenarios Referred to in This Report
    Appendix C: Military Operations and Planning Scenarios Referred to in This Report In describing the past and planned use of various types conducted on the territory of North Vietnam during of forces, this primer mentions a number of military the war (as opposed to air operations in South Vietnam, operations that the United States has engaged in since which were essentially continuous in support of U.S. World War II, as well as a number of scenarios that and South Vietnamese ground forces). The most nota- the Department of Defense has used to plan for future ble campaigns included Operations Rolling Thunder, conflicts. Those operations and planning scenarios are Linebacker, and Linebacker II. summarized below. 1972: Easter Offensive.This offensive, launched by Military Operations North Vietnamese ground forces, was largely defeated 1950–1953: Korean War. U.S. forces defended South by South Vietnamese ground forces along with heavy air Korea (the Republic of Korea) from an invasion by support from U.S. forces. North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). North Korean forces initially came close to 1975: Spring Offensive.This was the final offensive overrunning the entire Korean Peninsula before being launched by North Vietnamese ground forces during the pushed back. Later, military units from China (the war. Unlike in the Easter Offensive, the United States People’s Republic of China) intervened when U.S. forces did not provide air support to South Vietnamese ground approached the Chinese border. That intervention caused forces, and North Vietnamese forces fully conquered the conflict to devolve into a stalemate at the location of South Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 5 | May 2017
    Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 5 | May 2017 A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH The Islamic State’s Northward Expansion in the Philippines Rohan Gunaratna The Revival of Al Qaeda’s Affiliate in Southeast Asia: the Jemaah Islamiyah Bilveer Singh IS Footprint in Pakistan: Nature of Presence, Method of Recruitment, and Future Outlook Farhan Zahid Islamic State’s Financing: Sources, Methods and Utilisation Patrick Blannin The Islamic State in India: Exploring its Footprints Mohammed Sinan Siyech Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security Editorial Note The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group that (AQ) return to the top of the jihadi pyramid and emerged victorious in Iraq in 2014 has lost its merger between the two old jihadi allies. Iraqi eminence. Presently, it is on the defensive, Vice President Ayad Allawi recently stated that struggling to retain its strongholds in Iraq and ‘discussions and dialogue’ have been taking Syria. This contrasts with the situation in 2014 place between Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi’s when the group was on the rise. It was representatives and AQ chief Ayman Al expanding territorially, producing shockingly Zawahiri. Any rapprochement between the two brutal videos with cinematic flare, and rivals is likely to further complicate the jihadi proclaiming its revival of the so-called landscape in Iraq, Syria and beyond. ‘caliphate’ and implementation of Sharia to beguile local and foreign Muslims and fellow Against this backdrop, the latest issue of CTTA jihadists.
    [Show full text]
  • THE IMPACT of the IRAQ WAR on ISRAEL's NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION by Jonathan Spyer*
    THE IMPACT OF THE IRAQ WAR ON ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION By Jonathan Spyer* Abstract: This article deals with the effects and implications of the Iraq War, and the current situation of insurgency in that country, on Israel's perception of its national security. Specifically, it examines the extent to which the war has impacted on and transformed the three tiers of threat facing Israel--namely the irregular, conventional and non-conventional levels of warfare. The article outlines the nature of each of these three levels of threat, observing the impact of the Iraq War on it. It then moves toward some general conclusions on the Iraq War of 2003 and the events that have followed it as viewed through the perception of Israeli thinking on the region. In each area, this article observes the responses emerging from the Israeli strategic and policymaking echelon to the new situation opened up by the war of 2003. In this regard, it considers Israel's current unilateralist turn in the context of the broader view of current political trends in the region which prevails in the Israeli policymaking echelon. Israel is a country unique among members same dispensation, the same regimes, the of the modern states' system in that the same prevailing ideas, often even the same basic legitimacy of its existence as a individuals (or their sons) dominate the sovereign body is rejected by its neighbors. region as did so in the late 1970s. The dominant political currents of the The region remains stymied by Middle Eastern region place the perception economic stagnation, and the failure of the of Israel as a foreign, illegitimate implant in regimes to develop the potential of the the Middle East somewhere near the center populations under their control.
    [Show full text]