Avner Cohen

ISRAEL AND THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY: THE CRITICAL DECADE (1958-1968)

by Avner Cohen1

Dr. Avner Cohen is a Senior Fellow in the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. He was a lecturer in philosophy at Tel Aviv University from 1983 to 1991 and has held visiting posts at several American universities. He has also served as co- director for a project on nuclear arms control in the Middle East at the MIT Center for International Studies. He is the author of many works on proliferation issues, including the forthcoming book Israel and the Bomb: A Political History (1950-1970) (Columbia University Press, 1998).

ver since the Baruch Plan a powerful testimony to the wards Israel and even beyond (1946), the United States has Eisenhower administration’s failure American interests in the region. opposed the spread of to come to grips with the reality of While he was committed to the se- Enuclear weapons. Until the 1960s, nuclear proliferation. Although the curity of Israel, he was also con- however, that opposition was hardly Israeli nuclear project had been con- cerned about nuclear proliferation. translated into a coherent and well- ceived in 1955-57 and its physical In the spring and summer of 1963, defined policy of nuclear nonprolif- construction initiated in early 1958, these two interests came to a head- eration. During the 1950s, nuclear only in December 1960 did the de- on collision as Kennedy made his proliferation was not regarded by parting Eisenhower administration last ditch effort to curb Israel’s American policymakers as a global determine that Israel was in fact nuclear ambitions. Three months concern to be addressed by a global building a major nuclear facility in later, he was assassinated and the policy. It was under President John the Negev desert aimed at establish- torch was passed on to President F. Kennedy that the United States ing a nuclear weapons capability. Johnson. It was under Johnson, who “discovered” nuclear nonprolifera- The challenge of how to apply the in his first two years had other pri- tion as a foreign policy problem; it American opposition to the spread orities than nonproliferation, that a was under President Lyndon B. of nuclear weapons to the complex- special arrangement was crafted: Is- Johnson that the idea of a Treaty on ity of the Israeli case was left to the rael pledged not to be the first to in- the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear incoming Kennedy administration. troduce nuclear weapons to the Weapons (NPT) was endorsed as the President Kennedy was by far the Middle East, and, in return, the solution to the problem. most forceful American president in United States provided Israel with America’s experience in dealing dealing with the Israeli problem. He weapons to maintain Israel’s secu- with the Israeli nuclear program was recognized that the consequences of rity (tanks and planes). critical to both the discovery of the U.S. efforts to stem Israeli prolifera- Although Israel has long been problem and its solution. Israel was tion went far beyond U.S. policy to- viewed as a key state in the devel-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 1 Avner Cohen opment of U.S. nonproliferation ing the transfer of nuclear weapons, this American naiveté: policy, it has not been known how, or any nuclear technology defined Atoms-for-Peace was a sin- cere but yet almost desper- and to what extent, the Israeli expe- as “restricted data,” to other coun- ate effort to find some rience shaped the evolution of that tries. However, the record of the redeeming value in what policy. Most of the little that has Eisenhower administration shows seemed a uniquely Ameri- can engineering triumph. been written on this subject, deals that preventing nuclear proliferation This moral imperative pro- with the Israeli side of the story, that was not as high a priority as sharing vided a special incentive for is, how American pressure deter- the civilian-industrial benefits of the Atoms-for-Peace pro- 2 gram. Without it, Atoms- mined Israel’s nuclear policy. Al- atomic energy. for-Peace and Eisenhower’s most no research has been done on On December 8, 1953, President extraordinary dedication to the idea were not really un- how the experience with Israel Eisenhower unveiled his Atoms-for- shaped the evolution of American derstandable. At the same Peace program at the United Na- time, the sobering realities nonproliferation policy in the criti- tions. The new initiative sharply of thermonuclear warfare 3 made international control cal decade that led to the NPT. reversed the policy of nuclear denial Recently declassified archival ma- of the atom a matter of para- maintained since 1945, bringing an mount concern. The di- terial, and other new evidence, al- end to the decade of total nuclear lemma was that the two low us now to reconstruct some of 4 conflicting goals could not secrecy. In accordance with the new be separated.5 this history. initiative, the administration asked Based on this evidence, this study Congress in 1954 to amend the The geopolitics of the Cold War argues that lessons and insights Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to al- and the stalemate between the super- drawn from the experience with Is- low the United States to declassify powers regarding nuclear arrange- rael were critical in persuading and distribute a huge amount of sci- ments in Europe made it difficult for American policymakers that the bi- entific information, theoretical and the Eisenhower administration even lateral approach to nonproliferation experimental nuclear research data to conceptualize nuclear prolifera- may be insufficient. By the mid- as well as nuclear material. Re- tion as a foreign policy problem. 1960s, it became evident that the search reactors, previously prohib- The United States dealt with prolif- bilateral approach had failed with ited for export purposes, were now eration risks through its own Israel and might fail elsewhere. In- promoted as a necessary step to- nuclear-related legislation, bilateral stead, the United States should use wards the future. Meanwhile, plu- safeguards agreements on nuclear its influence and power to create an tonium separation techniques were cooperation, and, most significantly, international nonproliferation norm declassified. by supporting the creation of inter- and to form a regime to embody and national organizations, such as the Atoms-for-Peace reflected the International Atomic Energy support that effort. The way to ac- expectation that nuclear energy complish this task was through a glo- Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM, as would be the third wave of the in- instruments to both promote and bal nonproliferation treaty to be dustrial revolution, and that Ameri- backed by the two superpowers. The safeguard nuclear cooperation can technology should lead the among nations. Promoting the Israeli case was an important expe- march forward. The distinction be- rience in obtaining this insight. peaceful atom became an important tween peaceful and destructive uses tool of American foreign policy, cer- of atomic energy, and the belief that tainly in Europe, where American THE EISENHOWER it was possible to promote the one support of EURATOM was the cor- ADMINISTRATION ON and to control the other, was at the nerstone of Eisenhower’s idea of a NUCLEAR heart of the initiative. In retrospect, “United States of Europe.”6 The NONPROLIFERATION Atoms-for-Peace was successful in United States was also committed to Every American president since promoting American nuclear tech- safeguarding its nuclear cooperation Harry S. Truman has opposed the nology, but less so in maintaining with other nations. Safeguards, how- proliferation of nuclear weapons. safeguards and control. Nuclear his- ever, are not sufficient to prevent The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 so- torians Richard G. Hewlett and Jack nuclear proliferation. lidified this opposition by prohibit- M. Holl wrote the following about

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The Eisenhower administration nuclear weapons, produced large it. The Eisenhower administration’s opposed the spread of nuclear weap- quantities of tactical nuclear weap- opposition was driven by concerns ons, but it recognized that sovereign ons, which it justified as a counter about allied nuclear deployments.10 nations had the right to pursue such to the rising costs of conventional A year later, when Ireland modified an objective on their own. This pre- weapons. It was predicted that tac- its resolution, introducing weaker sumption was embedded in the tical nuclear weapons would become language under which the nuclear IAEA founding statute (1956). The the future means of war-fighting, powers would “refrain from hand- objective of the IAEA was to pro- assets that any advanced, technologi- ing over control of such weapons to mote the peaceful use of nuclear cally capable, state should possess.8 any nation not possessing them,”11 energy and to set in place a safeguard The dilemma for America was the United States supported it, while system ensuring that such nuclear whether to provide the North Atlan- the French and Soviets abstained. In cooperation would not be diverted tic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1960, when the Irish proposal was to military purposes. The founding with nuclear weapons, making it un- amended further, calling on the statute, however, did not forbid a necessary for members to build their nuclear states not only to refrain member from acquiring nuclear own nuclear arsenals, or, alterna- from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons, nor did it require a mem- tively, to limit its security commit- weapons, but also from transmitting ber to accept safeguards on nuclear ment to Europe, or possibly to “information needed for their manu- materials and facilities acquired out- withdraw militarily from Europe. facture,” this time the Soviets voted side of IAEA assistance programs. The Eisenhower administration in favor of it and the United States The idea of a “no-weapons pledge” continued to abstain, citing verifica- chose to introduce nuclear weapons 12 was considered by American into NATO and have greater nuclear tion concerns. policymakers but rejected as unfea- sharing with its NATO allies.9 These shifts in position reveal the sible.7 Secretary of State John Fos- In 1958, the U.S. Congress conflict and confusion within the ter Dulles was convinced that it Eisenhower administration over the would be difficult, if not impossible, amended the Atomic Energy Act to accommodate the growing Ameri- merit of a nuclear weapons nonpro- for the United States to persuade liferation policy relative to other other nations to forego permanently can nuclear deployment in NATO. The revised act allowed the transfer goals and priorities. The Atoms-for- their right to build nuclear weapons Peace legacy was that preventing as long as the Big Three (the United of weapons-grade fissionable mate- rial and weapons design information nuclear proliferation was less of a States, the Soviet Union, and Great priority than sharing nuclear infor- Britain) continued to do so. In the to nations that had “made substan- tial progress in the development of mation and technology and the ci- absence of a nonproliferation norm, vilian-industrial benefits of nuclear the Big Three were not in a position nuclear weapons” (the reference was to Great Britain). The Eisenhower energy within NATO. America was to appeal to the rest of the world to undecided about what it could or abjure nuclear weapons. administration thus gave priority to nuclear weapons cooperation with should do to prevent nuclear prolif- By the mid-to-late 1950s, it had allies over efforts to stem nuclear eration. France and Israel posed di- become evident that technologically proliferation. lemmas for U.S. policy. advanced and politically determined In the case of France, the nations were capable of acquiring When the idea of an international agreement to prevent the further Eisenhower administration recog- nuclear weapons on their own. The nized its nuclear intentions but felt Soviets acquired the bomb in 1949, spread of nuclear weapons was in- troduced for the first time at the it had no political or moral grounds the British in 1952, and it was only to dissuade France. When EURA- a matter of time until France did the United Nations in 1958 by Ireland— calling for the Big Three not to trans- TOM was founded, with American same. Other West European nations, backing, its statute was written to such as Sweden, Italy, West Ger- fer nuclear weapons to any other 13 state and for all other nations not to allow France to acquire the bomb. many, and Switzerland, were delib- Thus, the United States did not erating whether to pursue the nuclear manufacture them—the Soviets sup- ported it, while the United States, launch an all-out diplomatic effort weapons option. The United States, against the French nuclear program, as part of its “New Look” policy on along with its NATO allies, opposed

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 3 Avner Cohen although such an effort most prob- Press.” After three days of silence, known to the U.S., led to a 14 tendency to discount rumors ably would have failed. on December 21, Prime Minister of Israeli reactor construc- Ben Gurion confirmed that Israel tion and French collabora- THE EISENHOWER was building a second nuclear reac- tion in the nuclear weapon area.21 ADMINISTRATION’S tor in Dimona, but insisted that it was INTELLIGENCE BLUNDER for peaceful purposes.19 Dimona had The report recounts in great detail ON DIMONA now become a matter of public how many pieces of information knowledge. from numerous sources available to The Israeli case was even more the U.S. nuclear intelligence system dramatic in highlighting the inad- The conclusions of the USIB re- since 1956 were either lost in the equacies of the Eisenhower port assert that “[t]he Israelis prob- bureaucratic shuffle or simply mis- administration’s nuclear nonprolif- ably made the decision to go forward interpreted. eration policies. In January 1961, with their nuclear program as early only days after President Kennedy as 1956, and collaboration with the One cannot escape the conclusion, was sworn in, he asked the United French on this project had been ini- however, that the roots of the States Intelligence Board (USIB) to tiated by 1957.” The report confirms Eisenhower administration’s intelli- prepare a “post-mortem” report on that “[i]nformation was available to gence blunder went deeper than the Israeli nuclear case, to explain some elements of the intelligence matters of intelligence oversight and “why the intelligence community community as early as April 1958 misjudgment. The Eisenhower did not recognize this development that could have alerted the atomic administration’s nuclear policies, earlier,” and to draw lessons from energy intelligence community to both on nuclear power (Atoms-for- this intelligence failure for the fu- Israeli intentions.” Furthermore, it Peace) and nuclear weapons ture.15 The “post-mortem” report states that: “if the atomic energy in- (“nuclear sharing” among allies), confirmed that it took the United telligence community had properly generated a climate that led to the States almost three years to deter- interpreted information available on breakdown of oversight. This cli- mine that Israel was constructing a Israeli reactor plans and promptly mate explains the administration’s major nuclear facility with strong and persistently sought additional failure to interpret properly the many military implications. This long de- information on this program, we be- signs and indications that Israel lay was due to a substantial Ameri- lieve that the ultimate secrecy or might be developing a nuclear weap- can intelligence failure. deception surrounding this develop- ons program. Some intelligence of- ment would have been detected and ficials even believed at the time that Only in early December 1960, Israeli intentions recognized at least President Eisenhower himself was weeks after Kennedy had been one year earlier.”20 reluctant to take political action elected, had the Eisenhower admin- against Israel, even when unequivo- istration realized that Israel was In its effort to explain this failure, cal evidence was presented to the building a second nuclear reactor in the report’s authors stress Israel’s president. They interpreted his fail- Dimona.16 On December 8, the Cen- deliberate efforts to deceive and con- ure to act as an indication that he was tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) is- fuse the United States through vari- tacitly permitting Israel to develop sued a Special National Intelligence ous public and private statements nuclear weapons.22 Israel deliber- Estimate (SNIE) about Dimona and about their future nuclear energy ately took advantage of this climate immediately notified the National plans. The authors also emphasize in its concealment efforts and was Security Council of the discovery.17 the fact that Israel was not classified successful in keeping the Dimona A day later, Secretary of State Herter as a serious proliferation threat un- project unidentified for almost three summoned Israeli Ambassador til the discovery of Dimona. The years after its initiation. Harman, presented him with the new report refers to a “general feeling” American findings, and asked for an that: The importance of the “post- explanation.18 Ten days later, Israel could not achieve this mortem” investigation of the Ameri- capability without outside can intelligence blunder in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) aid from the U.S. or its al- Chairman John McCone confirmed lies, and the belief that any case went far beyond Israel itself. publicly the discovery on “Meet the such aid would be readily The report’s conclusion stressed that

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“it is considered that nuclear devel- problem of nuclear weapons prolif- like Israel was on its march to the opments by other potential ‘N-th’ eration became more acute as bomb, how could the United States countries may also be shrouded in nuclear technology and knowledge persuade other nations, bigger na- secrecy and more than a routine became increasingly available and tions, not to follow the same path? overt collection effort will probably less expensive. He believed that it Success or failure in the Israeli case be required in some instances to ef- was a vital American interest to act would be fateful for the entire non- fectively predict them.”23 It was the decisively to stem nuclear prolifera- proliferation cause. Israel was the task of the incoming Kennedy ad- tion beyond the four powers (now awakening that led Kennedy to dis- ministration to assure that such an including France) that already pos- cover nuclear proliferation as a glo- intelligence blunder would not hap- sessed such weapons. He came to bal U.S. concern.27 pen again. office with the intention to place Kennedy pressed Israel on the nuclear arms control and nonprolif- matter of Dimona during the first KENNEDY, eration in the center of the Ameri- 28 24 half of 1961. He made it clear to NONPROLIFERATION, AND can foreign policy agenda. In the his administration that he had a “per- ISRAEL: THE FIRST words of Glenn T. Seaborg, sonal interest” in the issue of ENCOUNTER (1961) Kennedy’s appointed chairman of Dimona and considered it a high for- the AEC, nuclear proliferation was 29 Just as the United States lacked eign policy priority. Within days Kennedy’s “private nightmare.”25 in 1960 a coherent global nonprolif- of taking office, Kennedy received eration policy, the international com- Kennedy’s nuclear arms control oral and written reports on Dimona, munity too did not consider a state’s agenda was derived, at least to some all stressing that the United States acquisition of nuclear weapons a extent, by his commitment to non- must either place Dimona under in- violation of an international norm. proliferation. He supported a nuclear ternational safeguards or ensure The reason is plain and simple: at test ban agreement—the first arms promptly an American inspection of that time there were no international control issue that his administration the site. In the absence of a nonpro- norms against nuclear proliferation. had to deal with—in part because he liferation regime, or a binding inter- As Secretary of State Dulles recog- saw it as a nonproliferation tool. national norm, the only political tool nized, there were no legal grounds Even before the 1960 presidential available to Kennedy was strong that allowed the United States to dis- elections, Kennedy was on record presidential pressure at the bilateral courage any other country, large or opposing the resumption of nuclear level. For these very reasons, Israel small, from developing nuclear testing because of the pretext it gave was reluctant to accept IAEA safe- weapons. Both the United Kingdom to other nations to acquire nuclear guards on Dimona. Israeli Prime and France, the only countries to weapons. The only example Minister Ben Gurion did agree, in develop nuclear weapons capabili- Kennedy used in order to make his principle, to an American visit to ties in the 1950s, considered their point was that of Israel.26 Dimona at some indefinite time in achievement as a matter of national When Kennedy took office, Israel the future. After persistent Ameri- prestige and pride, a confirmation of was the prime embodiment of the can pressure and a series of Israeli their great power status. There was “N-th” country problem. The issue delays, Ben Gurion finally agreed to a sense that other technologically of the Dimona nuclear reactor in- an unpublicized visit by two Ameri- advanced countries would follow the volved more than Israel or even the can scientists to the Dimona site. trend. Proliferation was seen as Middle East; it was about how the On May 18, 1961, two AEC sci- likely, perhaps even inevitable. United States could combat nuclear entists visited Dimona and con- John F. Kennedy was the first proliferation worldwide effectively. cluded that the unfinished reactor “is president who came to the White Israel showed that a small- to mid- of the scope and peaceful character House personally convinced that the sized state with scientific talent previously described to the United spread of nuclear weapons to new could secretly develop the bomb States.”30 Due to Israeli control of nations would create a more danger- (with European assistance), without the visit, the CIA doubted the verac- ous world and undermine U.S. glo- the United States even detecting it ity of the AEC report, a pattern that bal influence. He was aware that the for three years. If a small country persisted throughout the entire pe-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 5 Avner Cohen riod during which AEC scientists ever, under the conditions and mo- capability by 1968 (before China, visited Dimona.31 After December dalities for the visit, its effectiveness which was estimated to do so in 1970 1960, the intelligence community could be questioned. The CIA felt and 1972). Among these 16 nations, now held the consistent assessment from the very beginning that a one- as far as motivations was concerned, that Israel was aiming at the bomb day visit by two or three AEC scien- Israel was categorized (along with and would do everything possible to tists, under strict Israeli escort, was France and China) at the top of the advance its pursuit. The White not the way to detect secret activi- list: “The pressures for possession: House, however, had to endorse the ties, let alone intentions. Under those prestige, coercive and deterrent scientists’ report without questions. conditions it was very unlikely that value and military utility have over- This was probably not just for rea- the scientists would have found dis- ridden inhibitions, apart from the sons of political convenience, al- crepancies between what Israel had two superpowers, only in the cases though the report was no doubt told the United States and what was of the U.K., France, almost certainly politically convenient to the White actually going on. Many years later China, and probably Israel.”35 House in preventing a confrontation McGeorge Bundy (Kennedy’s na- The memo noted that in 1962, the with Israel, but primarily because the tional security advisor) wrote that cost of building a rudimentary White House was not in a position such visits “were not as seriously and nuclear weapon program (producing to reject its own scientists’ report af- rigorously conducted as they would 33 only a few bombs) would come to ter it had fought so hard to force Is- have had to be to get the real story.” about $150-175 million. The total rael to accept the U.S. visit. A testimony of the American in- bill, however, was expected to de- In any case, the positive report of telligence community’s thinking cline greatly over time due to the the AEC scientists assured that the about nuclear weapons proliferation, diffusion of weapons technology, meeting in New York between including its suspicions towards Is- wider distribution of research and Kennedy and Ben Gurion two weeks rael, appears in a top secret 1962 power reactors, and advances in later was successful. Ben Gurion study that the Pentagon prepared for technology resulting from continued affirmed that the purpose of Dimona the White House.34 Assuming the testing. As to the question of test- was peaceful, but he qualified it with technological trends continue, the ing, the subject matter of the memo, the phrase “for the time being.” study predicted that some 16 coun- it stated that unrestricted testing Kennedy, who explained his firm tries, excluding the four present would lower significantly the cost of commitment to the cause of nonpro- nuclear countries, would be able to acquiring nuclear weapons. While liferation, exerted no new pressure. acquire nuclear weapons and a de- the memo recognized that a test ban He asked Ben Gurion’s permission livery capability over the next 10 would be politically helpful to stem to pass the report’s conclusion to years. Among those states, China proliferation, it noted that even a others, and Ben Gurion agreed. The was considered “most certainly” to comprehensive ban would only slow confrontation with Kennedy that acquire nuclear weapons and Israel a determined proliferator. It stressed Ben Gurion had so much feared did was defined as the next most likely that a more important measure not take place. “Ben Gurion felt re- proliferator, preceding both Sweden would be the political pressure that lieved—the reactor was saved,” and India. Only in two of these cases, both the United States and the So- writes his biographer.32 China and Israel, did the study fore- viet Union were willing to employ.36 In retrospect, the visit and the cast when the state would acquire a The Kennedy administration rec- Kennedy-Ben Gurion meeting dem- nuclear capability, assuming that the ognized early on that the bilateral onstrated the weaknesses and inef- proliferation decision was already approach, as applied to the Israeli fectiveness of Kennedy’s bilateral made at the time of the study was case, had serious shortcomings and approach of dealing with Israel. written. It estimated that Israel could that the most promising method of Kennedy had insisted upon, and ob- conduct its first nuclear test in 1966- halting proliferation was through tained, an American visit to Dimona 67 (the projected date for China was superpower cooperation in crafting to verify Israel’s verbal pledges. 1964-65), and it would have a rudi- a nuclear nonproliferation agree- Thus, it would be awkward for him mentary aircraft and Intermediate- ment. This realization was probably to question the AEC report. How- Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) among the reasons for the change of

6 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen policy towards the Irish nonprolif- KENNEDY, ends, “we and others would probably eration proposal. In December 1961, NONPROLIFERATION, AND have to employ stronger incentives the Kennedy administration sup- ISRAEL: THE SECOND and sanctions than have seriously ported a revised Irish resolution call- ENCOUNTER (1963) been considered so far.”40 ing for a nonproliferation agreement The Cuban Missile Crisis of Oc- Weeks later the head of the CIA under which the nuclear powers tober 1962 was an exhausting and Office of National Estimates, would commit themselves not to re- sobering experience for Kennedy. It Sherman Kent, issued an eight-page linquish control of their nuclear highlighted the anxiety of living un- memorandum to CIA Director John weapons, nor to transmit manufac- der the shadow of the bomb and re- McCone on the consequences of Is- turing information, while the non- inforced Kennedy’s conviction that raeli nuclearization, particularly in nuclear states would undertake “not the spread of nuclear weapons was terms of greater Soviet influence in to manufacture or otherwise acquire a global danger that must be the region.41 It is evident that the control of such weapons.” The Irish stemmed. In the coming year, knowledge that within a few months resolution, adopted by the U.N. Gen- nuclear nonproliferation became the Dimona reactor would become eral Assembly in December 1961, even more central to Kennedy’s glo- critical drove U.S. concerns. If the was the first formal expression of the bal agenda. In a public speech in United States did nothing to halt the superpowers’ nonproliferation inter- late March of 1963, Kennedy ex- Israeli program, it would have to face est, which led to the NPT in 1968. pressed his sense of urgency about these consequences in a few years. The adoption of the Irish resolu- nuclear proliferation in the follow- Thus, if the United States was seri- tion by the U.N. General Assembly ing way: ous about halting nuclear prolifera- made the concept of a nonprolifera- Personally I am haunted by tion, it had to act forcefully with the feeling that by 1970, un- tion treaty the subject of superpow- less we are successful, there Israel before this time. ers discussions. The first round of may be ten nuclear powers Newly declassified archival docu- U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the is- instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty.... I see the ments show that in the second half sue started in Geneva in March 1962, possibility in the 1970s of of March 1963, the Israeli nuclear but it soon became evident that ma- the President of the United program was high on President jor disagreements over the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or Kennedy’s agenda. On March 25, States’ existing (NATO) and future twenty or twenty-five na- Kennedy discussed the Israeli (the idea of Multilateral Forces, or tions may have these weap- nuclear program with McCone, who ons. I regard this as the MLF) nuclear arrangements blocked handed him the CIA’s estimate of the any progress. The United States ad- greatest possible danger and hazard.38 consequences of Israeli hered to the language of the Irish nuclearization. After that meeting proposal that interpreted a ban as Kennedy did not name Israel in his speech, but in the spring of 1963, Kennedy asked National Security relinquishing “control of nuclear Advisor McGeorge Bundy to issue weapons,” while the Soviets insisted Israel was at the center of Kennedy’s nonproliferation effort. An updated a presidential directive to Secretary on banning direct or indirect “trans- of State Dean Rusk, CIA Director 37 version of the July 1962 study on fers” of nuclear weapons. Just as McCone, and AEC Chairman U.S. negotiators were more commit- “nuclear diffusion” was prepared for 39 Seaborg, requesting them to look for ted to protecting their European in- Kennedy in February 1963. This time the memo named only eight “some form of international or bi- terests over an agreement on lateral U.S. safeguards” to curb that nonproliferation, so their Soviet states as capable of acquiring nuclear 42 weapons and a crude delivery capa- eventuality. The result was Na- counterparts seemed more interested tional Security Action Memorandum in keeping nuclear weapons out of bility within the coming decade. Still, Israel was the most likely (NSAM) 231, titled “Middle East- NATO and Germany than in the ern Nuclear Capabilities,” which cause of nonproliferation. The idea proliferator after China. The memo projected 1965-66 as the date when stated: of a nonproliferation treaty was not The President desires, as yet ripe. Israel could conduct its first nuclear matter of urgency, that we test. “In some cases,” the memo undertake every feasible measure to improve our in-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 7 Avner Cohen

telligence on the Israeli rael with formal security assurances, Dimona as indicating a fundamen- nuclear program as well as other Israeli and UAR while in return asking Ben Gurion tal change in the special relationship [United Arab Republic] ad- to consider favorably American pro- between the United States and Is- vanced weapons programs posals for stemming nuclear and rael.45 and to arrive to a firmer evaluation of their import. ballistic missile proliferation in the Recently declassified U.S. archi- In this connection he wishes region. This quid pro quo formed val documents support Barbour’s the next informal inspection the background for John McCloy’s of the Israeli reactor com- point and suggest that, in the spring plex to be undertaken first mission to Egypt and Israel and summer of 1963, Kennedy promptly and to be as thor- planned for June-July 1963. The thought of Israel’s nuclear problem ough as possible.43 desire to curb the Dimona project in terms of his global nuclear agenda. Within days, NSAM 231 was put was at the heart of McCloy’s mis- At that time, Kennedy was preoccu- into motion. On April 2, the U.S. sion. pied with a complex and delicate Ambassador to Israel initiated a new Ultimately, Ben Gurion’s efforts global nuclear arms control agenda, request for an American visit to to dodge Kennedy’s pressure on particularly the linkage between the Dimona. At the same time, the State Dimona backfired. Ben Gurion re- issues of the nuclear test ban treaty Department formed an interagency luctantly accepted Kennedy’s de- and nuclear proliferation. Towards working group to develop a plan for mands for “periodic” U.S. visits to the final stage of negotiations on the action, using both carrots and sticks, Dimona. Shortly thereafter, Ben Partial Test Ban treaty (PTBT) in to curb the introduction of “ad- Gurion resigned as prime minister July, Kennedy explored some broad vanced weaponry”—nuclear weap- and the task of resolving the confron- policy ideas on how to link it with ons and ballistic missiles—to the tation with Kennedy was passed on the proliferation problem. In early Middle East. NSAM 231 was a test to Ben Gurion’s successor, Levi July 1963, in anticipation of Gover- of the bilateral approach to curb Eshkol. Kennedy, determined not to nor Averell Harriman’s mission to nuclear and ballistic missile prolif- allow Ben Gurion’s resignation to negotiate the PTBT in Moscow, eration in the Middle East. This bi- sidetrack his effort, quickly ap- Kennedy tried to bring together a set lateral approach was consistent with proached Eshkol on the matter of of international nuclear agendas. It the recommendation of the February U.S. visits to Dimona. In his appears that the Israeli case was an Pentagon study urging the use of strongly worded letter of July 5, integral part of his global nuclear “stronger incentives and sanctions” 1963, less than two weeks after agenda. to persuade Ben Gurion not to go Eshkol took office, Kennedy used nuclear. Since its outset, the Kennedy ad- the most powerful sanction that an ministration took the view that the The “battle of Dimona” between U.S. president could ever use against key to a nonproliferation treaty de- Kennedy and Ben Gurion followed Israel: if Israel did not allow Ameri- pended on a preliminary agreement between April and June 1963.44 can visits to Dimona, under with the Soviet Union. It was as- Beginning in early April, Kennedy Kennedy’s tough conditions, he sumed that nonproliferation was one pressed Ben Gurion hard on the im- threatened to deprive Israel of the of the few areas in which both portance of American visits to U.S. commitment to ensuring nuclear superpowers shared a com- Dimona and the dangers of introduc- Israel’s security. This brought U.S.- mon interest.46 In April 1963, the ing “advanced weaponry” to the Israeli relations to a state of crisis. United States gave the Soviet Union Middle East. Ben Gurion repeatedly In an effort to diffuse the crisis, its draft of the Non-Transfer Decla- attempted to dodge those efforts and Ambassador Walworth Barbour in- ration, in a sense the first American to discuss instead the issue of Ameri- terceded, telling Eshkol and other draft of a nonproliferation treaty. can security guarantees to Israel. leading Israelis that the question of According to the American docu- The Kennedy administration also Dimona was important to Kennedy ment, the nuclear powers were to studied detailed ideas on how it for global reasons, whose signifi- commit themselves: could respond positively to Ben cance went far beyond any bilateral not [to] transfer any Gurion’s security requests, includ- issues, and pleaded with them not to nuclear weapons directly or ing the possibility of providing Is- interpret Kennedy’s pressure on indirectly through a military alliance, into the national

8 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen

control of individual states his exploratory mandate, Harriman case and whether they would be currently not possessing such weapons, and that they was asked to find to what extent the ready to do something about it. If will not assist such states in two superpowers could extend co- the United States made efforts to the manufacturing of such 47 operation into the nonproliferation bring on board all the powers asso- weapons. area. The official National Security ciated with it, would the Soviets do Non-nuclear signatories would agree Council (NSC) instructions for the same? not to manufacture or acquire Harriman made Harriman’s mandate nuclear weapons. The United States Israel was not mentioned by name more open-ended and flexible: in that NSC document, but it is clear also provided the Soviet Union a On the exploratory side, you memorandum to the effect that MLF should canvass, in so far as in July 1963 that Israel and Germany would not be precluded by such an appears practical, the range were the only countries that the of issues involving peace United States was referring to in agreement. This the Soviet Union and security which divides firmly opposed, maintaining that the us from the Soviets. [ .] terms of its willingness to “take MLF idea constituted nuclear pro- You should continue to em- some responsibility with regards to phasize the relation between dissemination.” The NSC meeting liferation, and any acceptable non- the nuclear test ban treaty proliferation agreement must and our desire to control the took place only five days after preclude it. It particularly objected diffusion of nuclear weap- Kennedy sent his most threatening ons. In pursuing this sub- letter to Eshkol about Dimona. to any German role in MLF, since ject, you should be guided this would allow in practice German by the talks on non-dissemi- Harriman’s most sensitive instruc- control over nuclear weapons.48 nation of nuclear weapons tions were given to him verbally in between Secretary Rusk and a one-on-one meeting with Kennedy Thus, in early summer of 1963, the Ambassador Dobrynin. discussions on the NPT were at an You may indicate that the on July 10. We know that the ques- impasse. U.S. will endeavor to secure tions of China and Germany were adherence to or observation deliberately excluded from the NSC American policymakers hoped of any non-dissemination meeting.53 There are no minutes of that the final negotiations of the agreement by those powers associated with it, if the So- the Kennedy-Harriman meeting, so PTBT in July would be an opportu- viet Union is willing to un- we do not know if, and to what ex- nity to advance the cause of nonpro- dertake a parallel tent, the Israeli issue and the bilat- liferation.49 A memo produced by responsibility for those 51 eral approach to proliferation were the Arms Control and Disarmament powers associated with it. discussed.54 Agency (ACDA), titled “Political The NSC meeting minutes pro- Implications of a Nuclear Test Ban,” vide a better sense of the exploratory As it happened, Harriman’s ex- pointed out that: aspect of Harriman’s mission to ploratory mission with the Soviets although a test ban alone Moscow. In this meeting, Secretary concerning cooperation on a nonpro- would not offer an answer Rusk stressed that in his earlier talks liferation agreement yielded no re- in the most acute cases, such as that of Communist China, with the Soviets they had accepted sults. The Soviets cited their firm it would increase the lever- the American definition of the opposition to the creation of MLF age the U.S. might exert and nuclear powers as being four, the in Europe as the primary obstacle to would open the way for the development of new combi- United States, Great Britain, France, such an agreement. They considered nations of inducements and and the USSR.52 According to his the MLF as a device that would al- persuasions, possibly on an official instructions, Harriman’s low the transfer of nuclear weapons international scale, which are difficult to set in motion most sensitive mandate was to see to German control. The United as long as the U.S. itself how open the Soviets were to a joint States pushed the view that a non- 50 continues to test. U.S.-Soviet effort to ban prolifera- proliferation agreement would guar- Harriman’s mission to Moscow tion beyond the “big four.” Just as antee that MLF would not become took place just days after Kennedy the United States would work to pre- such a device. Nikita Khrushchev had sent his tough letter to Eshkol vent states associated with it from refused to talk about China, and ap- on Dimona. The mission to Moscow going nuclear, the United States parently Harriman had no chance was defined as having two aspects: wanted to know what the Soviets even to explore the Chinese nuclear negotiation and exploration. Within thought about the Chinese nuclear issue with the Soviets in the context

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 9 Avner Cohen of a nonproliferation agreement. policy. Kennedy’s sense of urgency on curb- The Harriman mission did not pro- Kennedy’s pressure on Israel did ing Dimona. Johnson had no grand vide the breakthrough on nonprolif- yield some tangible results. After vision of his own about proliferation, eration that some in Washington had at least not until after he was forced 55 weeks of intense deliberations and hoped for. consultations, Prime Minister to deal with the Gilpatric task force’s Even without progress on a non- Eshkol wrote Kennedy on August report. As to the matter of Dimona, proliferation agreement with the 19, accepting most of Kennedy’s Johnson followed Kennedy’s ar- Soviets, Kennedy continued to push demands concerning the visits to rangement through his aides forward his firm, aggressive nonpro- Dimona. In particular, Eshkol ac- (Kennedy’s team, most notably liferation policy, primarily focusing cepted Kennedy’s demand that McGeorge Bundy, Robert Komer, on the Israeli case. Israel was seen American scientists could conduct and Myer Feldman, remained intact in Washington that summer as the periodic visits to the Dimona site, until 1965-66) but without the per- most determined proliferator after including one before the reactor be- sonal interest that Kennedy attached China, and the most serious prolif- came critical, but left vague his re- to it. For a brief while there was a eration case among all Western ply on the matter of frequency sense that the Israeli nuclear case states. It was vital for Kennedy to (Kennedy specifically asked for could be contained through bilateral get a nonproliferation commitment “semi-annual” visits). In his reply means. The new president had more from Eshkol and to establish a long- of August 26, Kennedy wrote to the urgent issues to focus on, mostly do- term bilateral procedure that would Israeli leader: “Your letter of August mestic issues (including his own verify that Israeli commitment. In 19 was most welcome here.”57 The election campaign), and the issue of the absence of a treaty, the United crisis over Dimona was thus re- nuclear proliferation was put on the States had no choice but to push the solved by bilateral means. It looked back burner. issue via bilateral means. as if American diplomacy had won It was the imminence of the Chi- It is important to recognize the in the Israeli nuclear case: Israel ac- nese test that forced nuclear prolif- global impact of the Israeli case in cepted an arrangement by which it eration to the forefront of Johnson’s the eyes of U.S. policymakers at the committed itself, in words and policy agenda in 1964. In August time. If Israel were to detonate a deeds, to nonproliferation. The 1964, ACDA Director William Fos- nuclear device (underground) in the semi-annual U.S. visits to Dimona, ter discussed the proliferation issue next two or three years—as the U.S. as formulated in Kennedy’s letter, in a long position paper to Rusk. intelligence community believed it were designed to mirror IAEA safe- This paper is important because it could do—this would have devastat- guards. Strong presidential action outlined a view of the entire nuclear was able to establish some brakes on proliferation issue. The imminence ing effects on the delicate nuclear 58 equation in Europe, particularly in Israel’s nuclear ambitions. Per- of the Chinese explosion, he argued, Germany. Under these conditions, haps, the bilateral approach to pro- posed a problem to the United States: warned ACDA’s Deputy Director liferation was working after all. the Chinese test could happen any Adrian Fisher, the Germans would time and would place great pressure not remain content with MLF par- THE EARLY JOHNSON on the three or four states consid- ticipation, “for under such circum- ADMINISTRATION: THE ered technically capable to produce stances there would be strong forces CHINESE TEST, THE nuclear weapons to make their own to argue that Germany would remain GILPATRIC COMMITTEE, national decision, either for reasons a second class nation so long as she AND ISRAEL of security or national prestige. Due to regional conflicts, a national de- had less independent nuclear capa- On November 22, 1963, President cision by any of these states could bility than Israel or Sweden or In- Kennedy was assassinated and force others, countries that were still dia, however small that capability Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as 56 technically less qualified, to make a might be.” The conclusion, then, president. For President Johnson, similar decision to initiate an all-out is that Israel’s national decision nuclear proliferation was not as im- effort to acquire nuclear weapons could have negative effects upon the portant an issue as it had been for either. As Foster argued: “Once this objectives of the American MLF Kennedy; he certainly lacked

10 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen process starts it may be impossible ongoing active nonproliferation pro- of ten or twenty.”65 The paper pro- to halt.”59 The American dilemma, gram only in the Middle East, i.e., posed that the United States also then, was “how to prevent it from Israel. This included the bilateral engage in a third track based on mul- starting,” or, more specifically: U.S.-Israeli arrangement concerning tilateral efforts “to develop political [H]ow to develop political the Dimona visits and the U.S. ef- inhibitions against the creation of inhibitions against the de- velopment of further na- forts (the two McCloy missions, further national nuclear capabili- tional nuclear capabilities 1963 and 1964) to maintain an arms ties.”66 which are sufficiently control dialogue with Egypt.62 The strong to stand the shock of On October 16, 1964, in accor- the Chinese nuclear detona- paper recommended that this bilat- dance with U.S. intelligence predic- tion. If we do not solve this eral program must continue and tions, China detonated its first problem—either because of should be expanded on a case-by- mistake or because of de- nuclear device; coincidentally, a day lay—we will soon be faced case basis. To be effective, the pro- later, Khrushchev was removed from with a world in which there gram should consider the desirability office. These two events together are ten and then possibly of some form of security arrange- provided a sober reminder of the fra- twenty states having na- ment, in which U.S. participation or tional nuclear capabilities. gility of the nuclear age. President This would be a world of assistance “may represent a princi- Johnson emphasized this point in a greatest danger and insecu- pal source of the incentive to acquire 60 speech to the nation. He noted that rity. 63 nuclear weapons.” As to timing in recent years Khrushchev had In laying out the proliferation and tactics, the paper warned that: shown himself “aware of the need problem, Foster’s paper distin- ...the estimates as to when these various countries for sanity in the nuclear age.” He guished among the following could detonate a nuclear also pointed out that Communist courses of action: 1) discouraging device is not a true measure China lacked experience as a major individual states on a case-by-case of the time available to us. The critical time is the time power and argued that “its nuclear basis; 2) impeding the spread of of national decision to de- pretensions are both expensive and technical capabilities; 3) negotiating velop nuclear weapons. cruel to its people.” The Chinese with the Soviets on a nuclear non- Once made, such a decision may be hard to change, even explosion dramatized the fears of proliferation agreement open to ac- though the actual nuclear global nuclear proliferation: cession by all states; and 4) trying detonation may not occur Communist China’s expen- for some period of time af- sive and demanding effort to develop the widest possible po- 64 litical consensus against prolifera- terwards. tempts other states to equal folly. Nuclear spread is dan- tion, even before such an agreement The paper also suggested that the gerous to all mankind. would come into effect. While dis- success of the bilateral approach What if there should come cussing efforts to discourage indi- may be intimately tied to progress to be 10 nuclear powers, or maybe 20 nuclear powers? vidual states from embarking on a towards a global nonproliferation What if we must learn to nuclear weapons program, the report agreement, which in itself is condi- look everywhere for the re- named Israel, India, Sweden, Japan, tioned on a global agreement be- straint which our own ex- ample now sets for a few? and the Federal Republic of Ger- tween the two superpowers. China [. ] The lesson of Lop Nor many as the nations with the techni- would not join any nonproliferation is that we are right to recog- cal capability to support a national agreement, and if the Unites States nize the danger of nuclear spread; that we must con- decision to produce nuclear weap- were to insist on such a pact, oppor- tinue to work against it, and ons. “The development of a national tunities for a treaty would be fore- we will. [. ] We continue nuclear weapons capability by any closed. For this reason, it to believe that the struggle against nuclear spread is as one of these countries would exac- recommended that the United States much in the Soviet interest erbate international tensions and should not delay its nonproliferation as in our own. We will be tend to induce additional states to efforts until the Chinese problem ready to join with them and 61 all the world in working to follow suit.” was resolved. “Even if the Chinese avoid it.67 were to develop a nuclear capabil- Among these five states, the re- The Chinese explosion also high- port noted, the Unites States had an ity, a world of five nuclear powers would be far preferable to a world lighted the change in the outstand-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 11 Avner Cohen ing proliferation cases’ priority and questions that were posed before the prospect of controlling the spread of urgency in the eyes of the adminis- Gilpatric Committee: Is nuclear pro- nuclear weapons. The technology of tration. In 1962-63, Israel was con- liferation really inevitable? If inevi- the mid-1960s, especially atomic sidered the most serious and urgent table, is proliferation always bad for energy programs, made access to proliferation case after Communist America? How high should America knowledge, and nuclear equipment China, but in the wake of the rank its nonproliferation policies and materials much easier to gain. Kennedy-Eshkol nuclear arrange- over other foreign policy consider- For this reason, the Gilpatric Com- ments and Eshkol’s subsequent visit ations? mittee recommended that vigorous in June 1964, the sense of urgency The mandate of the Gilpatric task and comprehensive steps be taken surrounding the Israeli case greatly force was broad. Although there was “to discourage further acquisition of diminished. In 1964, there was a a diversity of opinion among its nuclear weapons capabilities, .... sense in Washington that the Israeli possibly beginning within a matter members, the task force unani- 71 nuclear problem was contained, at mously reached the opinion that pre- of months.” least politically, and probably could venting further proliferation “is Third, success in preventing the remain so as long as the United clearly in the national interest de- future spread of nuclear weapons States met Israel’s conventional ar- spite the difficult decisions that will required a concerted and intensified maments needs. On the other hand, be required,” and that the United effort. Although U.S. foreign policy the Chinese explosion raised the pos- States must, as a matter of great ur- always opposed proliferation, the sibility of a proliferation chain re- gency, “substantially increase the United States needed to intensify its action, particularly on behalf of 68 scope and intensity of its nonprolif- efforts, both through multilateral India, Japan, and Pakistan. None- eration efforts, if it wants to have any agreements and by affecting the theless, these countries’ status were hope of success.”69 Specifically, the motivations of specific states. The not upgraded on the proliferation Gilpatric task force reached the fol- committee noted that actions affect- watch list. lowing conclusions. First, nuclear ing proliferation relate to a broad About a month after the Chinese proliferation “poses an increasingly range of U.S. interests and activities explosion, President Johnson ap- grave threat to the security of the under the responsibility of various pointed a special task force, consist- United States.” In saying so the agencies. In order to ensure effec- ing of 10 distinguished Americans committee took a universal stance on tive efforts to halt proliferation, it with experience in nuclear affairs all cases of proliferation, without recommended that the United States and arms control and chaired by categorizing proliferators as friends unify its nonproliferation policy at former Undersecretary of Defense or foes. Any additional nuclear ca- the highest level. The report also rec- Roswell Gilpatric, to study the prob- pabilities, however primitive and ognized the importance of the par- lem of nuclear proliferation and how regardless of who developed them, ticipation of the Soviet Union as the United States should combat it. “will add complexity and instability a partner in these efforts.72 The task force’s appointment meant to the deterrent balance between the Finally, the Gilpatric Committee not only recognition that the world United States and the Soviet Union, noted that coordinated nonprolifera- situation after the Chinese explosion [and] aggregate suspicions and hos- tion efforts could be successful. The required fresh thinking about prolif- tility among states neighboring new Committee recommended that the eration, but also that the U.S. non- nuclear powers.” Nuclear prolifera- United States undertake its nonpro- proliferation policy was tion would also reduce the influence liferation efforts along three distinct substantially and institutionally frag- of the United States worldwide: “our tracks: 1) negotiation of a formal mented. It was recognized that the diplomatic and military influence multilateral nonproliferation treaty; United States lacked a coherent and would wane, and strong pressures 2) the application of U.S. influence well-coordinated global nonprolif- would arise to retreat to isolation to on individual nations’ decisions con- eration policy, based on a clear un- avoid the risk of involvement in 70 cerning nuclear weapons acquisi- derstanding of national priorities and nuclear war.” tion; and 3) leadership by example, missions regarding nuclear prolifera- Second, the world was fast ap- showcasing nuclear policies and ac- tion. There were some preliminary proaching a point of no return in the tions in the areas of arms control and

12 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen weapons policies. The task force was treaty. Such a treaty would greatly tists released by opinion analyst unanimous in determining that such strengthen the domestic forces that Louis Harris in August 1965 ranked efforts should be made. “The re- were opposing nuclear weapons pro- Israel as the next nation to detonate wards of long-term success would be grams, particularly in India and Swe- a nuclear device. India was pre- enormous; and even partial success den. On the other hand: dicted to follow Israel in exploding would be worth the costs we can If the government[s] of a nuclear device by a two to one 73 these four countries could 80 expect to incur.” be brought to accept a com- margin. The Gilpatric report also issued prehensive nuclear test ban and non-proliferation ar- THE LATE JOHNSON policy recommendations concerning rangement the chances that specific non-nuclear states. Israel most other governments ADMINISTRATION: ISRAEL was one of those cases: would also sign would be AND THE EMERGENCE OF As long as Israel remains a very much brighter. Con- THE NPT non-nuclear power, we versely, if any one of these should continue to give Is- four governments decided The Gilpatric Committee was an rael assurances against be- to manufacture nuclear important milestone in conceptual- weapons, the problem gen- ing overrun by the UAR. izing and highlighting the impor- We should make clear to Is- erated by this decision rael that these assurances would make the outlook for tance of the NPT over other U.S. would be withdrawn if she non-proliferation by com- foreign policy objectives. The mon consent very black in- develops a nuclear weapons Johnson administration, however, capability and that we deed. In the cases of would be prepared to con- pro-nuclear decisions by In- was slow to adopt its policy recom- sider other measures as dia and Israel, Pakistan and mendations.81 It faced a dilemma well.74 the Arab states would inevi- tably insist that they, too, between its commitment to the cause The Gilpatric Committee’s report should be free to acquire of nonproliferation and the require- 77 and other relevant archival materi- nuclear weapons. ments of its existing and future als (in particular the working papers The task force’s conclusion nuclear arrangements with its Euro- that were submitted to the task clearly recognized this point: “We pean allies. In particular, the di- force), suggest the following points. should be prepared to bring strong lemma focused on the future of the First, Israel was among the four pressure on significant countries (in- long-standing MLF plan, which states, along with India, Japan, and cluding Germany, France, India, Ja- would have involved joint owner- Sweden, that were regarded as hav- pan, Israel, the UAR and Sweden) ship, manning, and command of a ing the technical capability to pro- to achieve their participation in such NATO strategic nuclear force. duce nuclear weapons and were an agreement.”78 viewed as actively considering Even before the Chinese test, whether to do so.75 Second, the Is- The Gilpatric task force report throughout 1964 ACDA leaders raeli case demonstrated the “severe was formally presented to President warned of the consequences of not difficulties” in attempting to deal Johnson on January 21, 1965. securing a nonproliferation agree- with the problem of proliferation on Though the report was highly clas- ment soon. ACDA’s chiefs, Direc- a strict country-by-country basis. sified, its recommendations leaked tor John Foster and Deputy Director These difficulties suggested the im- and soon became domestically po- Adrian Fisher, argued that the United portance of negotiating a nonprolif- liticized. Later in the year, Senator States should not hold its nonprolif- 76 Robert Kennedy advocated the cause eration policy hostage to the fate of eration treaty. Third, it was 82 recognized that there was a material of nuclear nonproliferation in a ma- the MLF negotiations. They main- linkage between the behavior of jor Senate speech along the lines of tained that leaving the nonprolifera- these four states and the prospects the Gilpatric report’s recommenda- tion agreement on hold until the for a nonproliferation treaty. The tions. He attacked the Johnson MLF issue was decided could be linkage cut both ways. On the one administration’s position on the detrimental to the cause of nonpro- hand, the success of efforts to dis- MLF issue, and asserted that India liferation. They made the point that suade these four states might well and Israel “could fabricate an atomic the three key states for the NPT— 79 be determined by parallel progress device within a few months.” A Israel, Sweden and India—were on a worldwide nonproliferation survey of American nuclear scien- soon to make their critical nuclear

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 13 Avner Cohen decisions. To further hold off on the resolution by a vote of 84 to 0. A to sour. Those written understand- nonproliferation agreement would month later President Johnson wrote ings between the two heads of state be to risk failing to secure the ad- to Senator Pastore, acknowledging were too vague; key issues were herence of these states to the treaty. that there was a strong domestic sup- open to different interpretations. In These efforts, however, came to port for the cause of nonprolifera- practice, however, the Israeli inter- naught as both the White House and tion.86 pretation prevailed. The U.S. visits the State Department remained com- By the summer and fall of 1966, at Dimona were never conducted in mitted to the MLF concept over the accordance with Kennedy’s initial 83 President Johnson moved to adopt NPT. new language for the first article of request (his letter to Eshkol of July The MLF died naturally from a a nonproliferation treaty that pre- 5, 1963). Israel strictly controlled lack of political support both in Eu- cluded the transfer of nuclear weap- the rules of conduct throughout those rope and the United States in late ons to any recipient whatsoever, as visits. Both sides grew uncomfort- 1965,84 but the Johnson administra- well as relinquishing control of such able and even began to resent this tion was still not ready to go along weapons. The new language did not secret bilateral nuclear arrangement. with a nonproliferation treaty that include the MLF or similar plans, but As the Israelis continued to erode the conditions that Kennedy had insisted would preclude nuclear weapons it preserved present U.S. arrange- 89 from a future European collective ments and commitments with its on, U.S. “periodic visits” to security arrangement. In addition, NATO allies. Soon after, the Sovi- Dimona became a political nuisance the Soviets objected to legitimizing ets dropped their own formulation for both parties. In mid-1965, Presi- the MLF plan through the NPT. that did not recognize existing dent Johnson sent a letter to Eshkol, Their actions clearly indicated that NATO nuclear arrangements. De- asking that Israel agree to place one of their principal interests in the spite probes of many of the NATO Dimona under IAEA safeguards; Eshkol did not even answer the NPT was to deny the Germans any allies, the German issue was the only 90 kind of nuclear capability. The long- country-specific issue that played a American request. The United held impasse over the MLF plan major role, either in internal discus- States appreciated Eshkol’s political obscured the more important issue: sions in Washington or during the commitment that Israel would not be whether the Soviets would accept a negotiation with the Soviets in the first to introduce nuclear weap- nonproliferation treaty that was con- Geneva.87 With these mutual con- ons, but also realized that this ver- sistent with existing NATO nuclear cessions, the path to serious nego- bal commitment was a very lean one. arrangements. tiations of the NPT was opened in It was a non-binding unilateral early 1967. By now, as a conse- pledge that Israel could always It took another year and a half af- change at a moment’s notice. ter the Gilpatric report was issued quence of President Johnson’s sup- port, the idea of a nonproliferation By 1965-66, the U.S. intelligence before President Johnson was ready 88 to follow through on it. In early treaty seemed politically feasible. community already recognized that the bilateral arrangement had failed 1965, Senator John Pastore intro- While lessons from the Israeli 91 duced a Senate resolution urging case were probably among the incen- to curb the Israeli effort. The “additional efforts by the tives for the new treaty approach, by American visits to Dimona did little President...for the solution of the mid-1960s, Israel did not play a to change this state of affairs, lead- nuclear proliferation problems.”85 prominent role in the Johnson ing instead to the realization that the The resolution led to a series of well- administration’s change of attitude Israeli program was unstoppable. publicized Senate hearings on the regarding the treaty (though Sena- The practice of U.S. visits to Dimona danger of further nuclear prolifera- tor Kennedy cited the Israeli and In- differed significantly from tion, in which Defense Secretary dian cases in his criticism of the Kennedy’s original intention of cre- Robert McNamara expressed his administration). Nevertheless, by ating a verification system mirror- opinion that the administration 1966, it became evident that the spe- ing as closely as possible the IAEA should do more to secure a nonpro- cial nuclear arrangement that Presi- safeguards system. All the U.S. liferation agreement. On May 17, dent Kennedy had crafted earlier in agencies involved in those visits, the Senate approved the Pastore his exchange with Eshkol had begun ACDA, AEC, Department of State and the White House, were aware of

14 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen their major shortcomings.92 When tions that: 1) Israel was a key state on these matters.94 They noted that Harriman and Komer came to Israel for the NPT; 2) it would require spe- Israel had signed the PTBT, and had in March 1965 to talk to Israeli lead- cial and laborious negotiations be- joined the Irish nonproliferation ers, one of the primary objectives of tween the United States and Israel resolution at the United Nations, but the mission was to persuade the Is- to make the latter sign it; and 3) with had refused to accept IAEA safe- raelis to replace the Dimona visita- the right mixture of rewards and guards on Dimona. Israel “has al- tion arrangement with a formal sanctions, Israel would probably ways avoided any commitment, safeguards agreement with the sign it. The American rationale ap- either private or public, which would IAEA. A year later, the United States pears in a long background paper on bind its hands with respect to pro- was ready to offer Israel a nuclear national attitudes towards adherence duction of nuclear weapons. It has desalinization plant in exchange for to a nonproliferation treaty prepared been, in fact, moving steadily into a Israel acceptance of IAEA safe- by the State Department for the position where it would have the guards on Dimona. Israel resisted all Gilpatric Committee. At the outset, capability to fabricate nuclear weap- those efforts. In the absence of a sub- the study’s authors stress that their ons.”95 Still, all these caveats not- stitute, the American visits to projections about how countries withstanding, the paper estimated Dimona continued. On the Israeli would react to the NPT had to be that Israel would probably sign the side, the Eshkol government, too, heavily qualified because of the NPT if certain conditions were met: was becoming increasingly uneasy uniqueness of the decision: 1) if the Arab countries signed; 2) if about this bilateral arrangement. Not only has no government the agreement contained escape ever been faced with the The practice of U.S. visits to Dimona need to make a decision to clauses similar to that in the PTBT; caused Eshkol political embarrass- renounce its right to acquire and, most significantly, 3) “if the Is- ment at home, exposing him as nuclear weapons, no gov- rael government received some as- ernment has ever had to take someone who compromised both Is- such a decision in the surances of aid from Western raeli sovereignty and national secu- knowledge that at least two governments in the event of an over- rity. other governments [France whelming Arab attack.”96 and China] of a similar Around 1966-67, elements in both power status are steadily During the negotiation of the NPT, sides quietly reached the conclusion proceeding towards a sig- U.S. officials thought that there was nificant nuclear strike force. that the Dimona arrangement had Thus, past UN votes, accep- a fair chance that the United States outlived its usefulness. Many in tance of IAEA safeguards, would be able to persuade Israel to Washington realized that the proce- and views expressed in dis- sign the treaty, with the right armament forums, cannot dures and findings of the Dimona now be construed as proofs tradeoffs between sticks and carrots, visits were lacking credibility. It was of how a government will once the treaty was ready and open react at the moment of concluded that the only possible 93 for signature. However, it appears long-term solution to the Israeli truth. the question of Israel’s signature was nuclear case would be through an in- The prospects for a favorable na- carefully avoided by both sides un- ternational treaty. If Israel joined tional decision on nonproliferation til Eshkol’s visit to Washington in such a treaty it would relieve the would be dependent on a variety of January 1968. By that time, the United States of an uncomfortable, factors that states would have to as- treaty was essentially completed. If and possibly suspect, bilateral ar- sess, such as a superpower agree- the Israeli factor were as important rangement, and would make the Is- ment, adherence to nonproliferation in solidifying American support for raeli nuclear program an by regional rivals, evaluations of the idea of the NPT in 1963-66, why international, rather than solely an strategic stability, and access to then were there virtually no discus- American responsibility. nuclear power technology. As to the sions with Israel on that matter until particular case of Israel, the first key January 1968? state in the study, the authors empha- WOULD ISRAEL SIGN THE There is more than one answer to sized that “neither public nor private NPT? this question. For one thing, the ex- statements by Israeli leaders suffice Since mid-1960, the U.S. govern- treme sensitivity of the matter to establish a clear Israeli position” ment has operated under the assump- caused both parties to avoid discuss-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 15 Avner Cohen ing it. Before a final draft was ready, about how to approach Israel on the Israel would eventually sign the NPT it was deemed unwise for the United NPT at the highest level. On May was not entirely unreasonable or States to pressure Israel, just as Is- 16, 1967, Harold Saunders, the NSC unrealistic before the 1967 war. On rael distanced itself from discussing senior staffer on the Middle East, the political side, the Eshkol govern- a non-existent treaty. From the out- wrote a memo to National Security ment was perceived in the United set, Israel was ambivalent about the Advisor Walt Rostow, titled “The States, and correctly so, as firmly proposed treaty and was reluctant to President’s Stake in the Middle committed not to nuclearize the make up its mind before the treaty East,” in which he elaborated on the Middle East conflict. On a more was ready. Recognizing Israeli sen- importance of the NPT for the technical level, there was a sense that sitivities and the problems with the president’s agenda in the region. The Israel could live with the treaty’s Europeans, the United States saw no memo states: safeguards provisions. It was be- reason or need in 1966-67 to con- He [the President] has a lieved that in exchange for a renewed stake in arms limitations. sult with Israel on a bilateral basis Israel must maintain quali- and more persuasive security pack- regarding the treaty. Israel was not tative superiority. But be- age with America, Israel could prob- included among the European allies yond that, the President is ably be persuaded to join the NPT. deeply committed to that the United States was obligated nuclear non-proliferation. While there were some intelligence to consult with; it was not a member The main hurdle in the indications that Israel might be tech- of NATO or a member of EURA- Middle East is Israel. Be- nically close to the bomb, those in- fore signing an NPT, Israel TOM. Furthermore, Israel was not may want assurance from dications included elements of a member of the Conference on Dis- the US and the USSR that uncertainty that allowed the State armament. During this period, Is- major arms suppliers will Department to discount their politi- rael was considered to be a keep the lid on the Arab cal reliability.98 arms inventory while the non-weapon state whose leaders had conventional balance is still As it turned out, these consider- in Israeli favor.97 pledged publicly (and privately) ations were obsolete in the post-1967 their commitment to its non-nuclear The Johnson administration, how- environment. On the eve of the 1967 posture. Also, the timing of the NPT ever, had no real chance to initiate war, Israel had secretly achieved a negotiations in Geneva and the cri- talks with Israel on the question of nuclear weapon capability; by late sis and war in the Middle East in the NPT in the summer or fall of May 1967, in the midst of the crisis, 1967 did not allow serious discus- 1967. The crisis, the war, and its Israel had improvised and made op- sions between Israel and the United aftermath changed the Middle East erational two nuclear devices.99 Is- States prior to 1968. Until early in very profound ways. New and rael was no longer a non-nuclear 1967, the contested issues at the NPT urgent political issues dominated the weapon state. Furthermore, had Is- negotiations between the superpow- American-Israeli agenda. Apart rael signed the treaty, it would have ers were about present and future from the war, Israel considered the had to renounce its ambiguous nuclear alliances in Europe. Those negotiations in Geneva focusing on nuclear policy. The Israeli commit- issues blocked the treaty’s progress, the relationship between IAEA and ment not to be the first to introduce but were irrelevant to the Israelis. At EURATOM safeguards to be largely nuclear weapons would have been that point there was no need for U.S.- irrelevant. The question of Israel reinterpreted in light of the NPT as Israeli consultations. and the NPT had to be put aside for a stronger and clearer commitment By spring 1967, as the NPT ne- a few more months. When the not to manufacture nuclear weapons. gotiations in Geneva proceeded in United States raised the issue dur- It was in 1968, the year the NPT was earnest, Israel’s response to the ing and after Eshkol’s visit in early concluded, that Israel was forced to treaty became more relevant to January 1968, the political and stra- respond to its nuclear dilemma. At American policymakers. From an tegic context had changed. On Janu- the end of that year, after another American perspective, it was essen- ary 18, 1968, the two superpowers clash with the United States over the tial that Israel sign and accept inter- presented identical draft treaties to NPT and the sale of the F-4s,100 Is- national safeguards. By that time, the Conference on Disarmament. rael remained stubborn in its reluc- the United States had started to think The American expectation that tance to sign the NPT. Officially the

16 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen

NPT was “under study”; unoffi- cisely because Kennedy did not want significant for having provided the cially, the United States understood to grant Israel’s nuclear program an incentive needed to craft a new U.S. that Israel would not sign it. exemption. In the coming years, nonproliferation policy: the shift however, both nations learned to find from bilateralism to multilateralism CONCLUSION a unique modus vivendi that granted that has lasted to this day. Israel a de facto special status but It is difficult to judge with cer- without publicly changing tainty which country contributed the America’s commitment to nonpro- most to the evolution of U.S. non- liferation. proliferation policy. Israel, however, should be high on any list. The Is- Nevertheless, it became evident raeli nuclear program was certainly that the United States had failed to a catalyst for the development of a stop the Israeli nuclear effort. The new American nonproliferation key Israeli decisions on nuclear ac- policy in the decisive decade from quisition had been made in the mid- Eisenhower to Johnson (1958-1968). 1950s and began to be implemented in the late 1950s. During that time, Israel was the first case of nuclear 1 This article is based on extensive historical re- the United States had neither pro- weapons proliferation in which the search conducted during the last eight years for vided reliable security guarantees my forthcoming book, Israel and the Bomb (New United States had to take action, nor developed a committed global York: Columbia University Press, 1998). I owe outside the nuclear legacy of World thanks to numerous individuals, but especially to nonproliferation policy. Part of the George Bunn, John Hadden, Richard Helms, War II. It was not an easy case. Is- problem was that Washington—due Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., Robert Komer, and Paul rael was a small, friendly state, sur- Warnke, who all played roles in this history. My to its intelligence failure—had no rounded by larger enemies, and friend and colleague Marvin Miller spent dozens sense that the Israelis were seriously of hours in discussing these historical issues with outside the U.S. sphere of contain- aiming at the bomb. When the prob- me. All errors are, of course, mine only. Financial ment. It was also a country with support had been provided by the W. Alton Jones lem was finally addressed directly strong domestic support in the Foundation. The paper was written during my under Kennedy, he tried to exert term as a Senior Fellow at the United States Insti- United States, with which it had an pressure, and finally got the visit ar- tute of Peace. Last, my deep personal thanks to implicit security guarantee. Unlike my research assistant, Joseph Kupsky, who helped rangements. In retrospect, however, me to prepare this manuscript. the Chinese and Indian cases, the 2 it was too little and too late. Israel’s Avner Cohen, “Most Favored Nation,” The Bul- Israeli case did not involve a coun- letin of Atomic Scientists 51 (January-February nuclear program had already been try attempting to parlay its nuclear 1995), pp. 44-53; Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Nuclear set in motion. History: The Untold Kennedy-Eshkol Dimona capability into great power status. Fi- Correspondence,” The Journal of Israeli History nally, Israel was deemed by some to Fortunately, it was not too late for 16 (Summer 1995), pp. 159-194; Zaki Shalom, be exceptional because of its birth the NPT. The lessons learned from “Kennedy, Ben Gurion and the Dimona Project 1960-63,” Israel Studies 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 3- out of the ashes of the Holocaust. In the Israeli case helped to shape U.S. 33. This is also the focus of my forthcoming book, sum, Israel was a special case for perceptions on the seriousness of the Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia Uni- threat of unrestricted nuclear prolif- versity Press, 1998). reasons that transcended consider- 3 The only book on this subject is still by investi- ations involving both domestic and eration and led to the decision to gative journalist Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson foreign policy. pursue—with the Soviet Union— Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American serious negotiations to bring a treaty Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, In the early 1960s, Israel’s nuclear 1991). to its successful conclusion. In this 4 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United program was an important incentive regard, while the “special deal” with States, 1953: Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washing- for the Kennedy administration’s ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. Israel (U.S. tolerance of Israeli’s search for a coherent global nonpro- 822. On the origins of the Atoms-for-Peace pro- nuclear capability in return for Is- gram, see Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, liferation policy. Israel was seen as raeli opacity in its official nuclear Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961 (Berkeley: the test for American resolve in curb- University of California Press, 1989), pp. 209- posture) became an established fea- ing nuclear proliferation worldwide. 270; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: ture of U.S. policy, the experience Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years In the spring and summer of 1963, (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 287-95. of trying (and failing) to deal with 5 the United States and Israel reached Hewlett and Hall, Atoms for Peace and War, Israel as a committed proliferator is 1953-1961, p. 307. a point of crisis over this issue pre-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 17 Avner Cohen

6 Ibid., pp. 320-21. 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 393-94. 126. 7 Ibid., p. 323. 19 “Ben Gurion Explains Project,” The New York 31 Former senior U.S. intelligence officer, inter- 8 Mark Trachtenberg, History and Strategy Times, December 22, 1960. view by author. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 20 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 32 Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion (in Hebrew), 160-168; Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The 21 Ibid., pp. 2-3. Vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1987), 1393. British Experience with an Independence Nuclear 22 This relates to the most intriguing episode of 33 Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 510. Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University the failure to disseminate intelligence data regard- 34 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memoran- Press, 1970), pp. 95-100. ing Israel’s nuclear activities—the fate of the early dum for the President, “Subject: The Diffusion 9 As early as 1953 American tactical nuclear aerial photographs of Dimona. I discuss the mat- of Nuclear Weapons with and Without a Test Ban weapons were stationed in Europe for use by ter in some detail in Chapter 5 of Israel and the Agreement,” July 1, 1962, Nonproliferation Col- NATO ground troops. Although the U.S. main- Bomb (forthcoming). Briefly, in early 1958 the lection, National Security Archives, Washington tained physical custodianship over its nuclear United States became aware, through CIA U-2 D.C. (hereafter referred to as NSA). weapons, the delivery means—artillery, aircraft aerial reconnaissance flights, of the extraordinary 35 Ibid., p. 2. and missiles—were owned and manned by the construction underway at the Dimona site. Arthur 36 Ibid., p. 1. NATO allies. This created a “two-key” system of C. Lundahl, the director of the CIA Photographic 37 Bunn, Arms Control by Committee, p. 66. control which required some level of sharing Intelligence Center (CIA/PIC), went personally to 38 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United nuclear defense information with its allies. brief President Eisenhower and other officials on States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: 10 Department of State, Documents on Disarma- the Dimona site in early 1958. According to Government Printing Office, 1964), 280; also, The ment, 1945-1959 (Washington, D.C.: Government Lundhal’s aide, Dino A. Brugioni, it was the ap- New York Times, March 23, 1963. Printing Office, 1960), pp. 11-86. pearance of a lack of reaction on the part of Presi- 39 “The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and 11 Ibid., pp. 1520-26; George Bunn, Arms Con- dent Eisenhower and Lewis Strauss, the AEC Without a Test Ban Agreement.” trol by Committee (Stanford: Stanford University chairman, that amazed Lundahl. CIA/PIC was 40 Ibid., p. 5. Press, 1992), p. 65. not asked for further photographs of the site or 41 Avner Cohen, “Kennedy, Ben Gurion and the 12 Bunn, Arms Control by Committee, pp. 64-65. for follow-up presentations. For an enthusiastic Battle Over Dimona: April-June 1963,” in Eyunim 13 Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy consumer of intelligence like Eisenhower, this was Bitkumat Yisrael, Vol. 6 (1966), pp. 110-146 (in in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton: quite unusual. Lundahl and Brugioni were left Hebrew). Sherman Kent, “Consequences of Is- Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 129-165. with the peculiar feeling that maybe President raeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability,” CIA 14 On this issue, see Dean Rusk’s testimony on Eisenhower wanted Israel to acquire nuclear weap- Office of National Estimates, Memorandum for proliferation before the Gilpatric Committee in ons (Dino A Brugioni, interviews by author, the Director, March 6, 1963, NSF, Country File: January 1965 (Department of State, Memoran- March 12, 1996, April 9, 1997, and July 11 and Israel, box 118, JFKL. dum of Conversation, “Secretary Meeting with 25, 1997). 42 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- the Gilpatric Committee,” January 7, 1965, NSF 23 “Post-Mortem,” p. 3. 1963 (hereafter FRUS), Vol. 18, Near East, 1962- Committee File, box 8a, LBJL. 24 The characterization of Kennedy as the non- 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 15 See “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implica- proliferation president repeated itself in all the Office, 1995), pp. 432-33, 435. tions of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear interviews I conducted with Kennedy’s principal 43 FRUS, Vol. 18, p. 435. Weapons Capability” (hereafter referred to as advisors: the late McGeorge Bundy, Myer (Mike) 44 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (forthcoming), “Post-Mortem”), January 31, 1961, Department Feldman, Carl Kaysen, and Robert Komer. Chapter 7. of State Lot Files, Special Assistant to the Secre- 25 Glenn T. Seaborg (with Benjamin S. Loeb), 45 See Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Nuclear History: The tary for Energy and Outer Space, Records Relat- Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (Berke- Untold Kennedy-Eshkol Dimona Correspon- ing to Atomic Energy Matters, 1944-63, Lot no. ley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 30- dence,” The Journal of Israeli History 16 (Sum- 57 D 688, 21.5 Country File: Israel, F. Reactor, 37. mer 1995), pp. 159-194; Zaki Shalom, “Kennedy, 1961, Part 1 of 2. 26 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ben Gurion and the Dimona Project 1960-63,” 16 It was Dr. Henry Gomberg, a University of Ban, p. 48. Israel Studies 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 3-33. Michigan nuclear scientist who had visited Israel, 27 In the pre-inauguration meeting between 46 The point was one of the themes the American that reached on his own the firm conclusion that Kennedy and President Eisenhower on January side prepared for the first Kennedy-Khrushchev Israel must be secretly engaging in building a sec- 19, 1961, a day before Kennedy took office, summit meeting in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961. A ond nuclear reactor with French assistance, in ad- Kennedy specifically asked questions about position paper for the summit states the follow- dition to the 1 MW, pool-type, American reactor nuclear proliferation. In response to his inquir- ing: that had been built in Nacahl Soreq. Gomberg ies, outgoing Secretary of State Christian Herter Nuclear Proliferation. Prime among these alerted the American embassy in Tel Aviv about cited two cases, Israel and India, and advised the problems is the threat of nuclear prolifera- his discovery, and on December 1 he was de- President-elect to demand inspection and control tion. Neither of our countries is anxious to briefed at length in Washington by representatives of the Israeli reactor to deny it the opportunity to see other nations acquire nuclear weapons. of the AEC, CIA, and the State Department. In introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East You express concern about West Germany; the wake of Gomberg’s reports the American in- at a later date (Reeves, Kennedy, pp. 32-33). we would regard a nuclear armed China with telligence community finally understood what that 28 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (forthcoming), apprehension. that is one reason that U.S. mysterious project near Beer Sheba was all about. Chapter 6; Cohen, “Most Favored Nation,” pp. attaches such importance to the test suspen- For additional details, see Cohen, Israel and the 44-53. sion negotiations. Whether these negotiations Bomb (forthcoming), Chapter 5. 29 The reference to Kennedy’s “personal interest” fail or succeed our two countries will still be 17 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meet- in Dimona appears in the cover note of a draft, faced with the problem. (President’s Meet- ing of the National Security titled “Memorandum to the President,” and ad- ing with Khrushchev, “Position Paper: Council, December 8, 1960,” Foreign Relations dressed to the Secretary of State (March 1, 1961, Progress towards a Viable World Order,” of the United States, (hereafter National Security Files, Country Israel: Box 118, May 26, 1961, NSA). FRUS), 1958-1960, Volume XIII (Washington, John F. Kennedy Library—hereafter referred to 47 “Briefing for Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. as JFKL). Non-Proliferation,” December 1, 1964, NSF, box 391-92. 30 Memorandum, Lucius Battle to McGeorge 4, LBJL. 18 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Bundy, “U.S. Scientists’ Visit to Israel’s Dimona 48 Ibid. Embassy in Israel,” FRUS, Reactor,” May 26, 1961, in FRUS, Vol. 17, p. 49 For details on this issue, see Seaborg, Kennedy,

18 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen

Khrushchev, and the Test Ban. 77 “Background Paper on National Attitudes To- Robert Komer and Spurgeon Keeny (NSC), Wash- 50 Memorandum, Foster to President Kennedy, wards Adherence to a Comprehensive Test Ban ington DC. 1993-1995. “Political Implications of a Nuclear Test Ban,” Treaty and to a Non-Proliferation Agreement,” 93 Department of State, “Background Paper on July 12, 1963, 2, NSF, box 255-65 (ACDA), December 12, 1964, 4, NSF, box 5, LBJL. National Attitudes Towards Adherence to A Com- JFKL. 78 “A Report to the President by the Committee prehensive Test Ban Treaty and to a Non-prolif- 51 National Security Council, “Record of Actions: on Nuclear Proliferation,” January 21, 1965, 7, eration Agreement,” December 12, 1964, NSF, 2468 Instructions Proposed for Honorable W. NSF box 5, LBJL. box 4, LBJL. Averell Harriman,” July 9, 1963, prepared for 79 “The Bomb: A Special Report,” p. 54. 94 Ibid. 515th NSC Meeting, NSF, box 255-265, JFKL. 80 Harris poll cited in “The Bomb: From 95 Ibid. 52 “Summary Record of the National Security Hiroshima to...,” Newsweek, August 9, 1965, p. 96 Ibid., pp. 5-6. Council Meeting, July 9, 1963: Harriman Instruc- 55. 97 Memo, Saunders to W. Rostow, “The President tions for Mission to Moscow,” 3, NSF, box 255- 81 George Bunn suggested to me the following Stakes in the Middle East,” May 16, 1967, NSF 65, JFKL. speculative explanation why Johnson did not re- box 7, LBJL. 53 Memorandum, Carl Kaysen to President spond to the Gilpatric report. LBJ thought 98 “Visit of Levi Eshkol Prime Minister of Israel Kennedy, July 9, 1963, NSF, box 265, JFKL. In Gilpatric had leaked the report to Robert Kennedy January 7-8, 1968: The Nuclear Issue and Sophis- this memo Kaysen, the Deputy National Security who used it in his Senate speech and later also in ticated Weapons,” Record Group 59, CFPF, 1967- Advisor notes that “neither China nor MLF was his presidential campaign. LBJ, of course, viewed 69, Box 2649 AE, National Archives. covered in this instruction. It seemed better to Robert Kennedy as a rival for the 1968 Demo- 99 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (forthcoming); leave this matter for your talk with Harriman to- cratic primaries. As a result, LBJ thought of the Avner Cohen, “Cairo, Dimona and the June 1967 morrow morning.” report as domestically tainted. This politicization War,” Middle East Journal 50 (Spring 1996), pp. 54 Carl Kaysen was Harriman’s deputy on this trip of the report may explain why LBJ ignored it for 190-210. to Moscow, and he was not informed of the Is- a while, and his decision to give the green light 100 Secretary Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary raeli developments. The Israeli issue was held to the negotiators. Spurgeon Keeny, who served of Defense Paul Warnke wanted to use the sale of very close in the White House, essentially lim- at the time at the NSC and worked on matters the F-4s as a way to press Israel to sign the NPT. ited to three senior staff members: Bundy, Komer, related to the NPT, suggested another explana- During these November 1968 negotiations be- and Feldman (Carl Kaysen, interview by author, tion to me. In 1964-65, Secretary Rusk had res- tween Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin and Paul August 3, 1995). However, Harriman signed on ervations about the NPT, and he expressed his Warnke, the nuclear issue and the NPT played a the cables to Israel concerning the Dimona issue. doubts in his testimony before the Gilpatric task very important role. But Israel refused to accept 55 Kaysen, interview. force. President Johnson was not ready to over- the any linkage, and was reluctant to discuss the 56 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, “Non- rule his own secretary of state. This changed in nuclear issue beyond its traditional policy line proliferation of nuclear weapons and the MLF,” the summer of 1966, when both Congress and (“Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear June 15, 1964, NSA. the Pentagon (McNamara) expressed support for weapons into the Middle East”). Based on the 57 FRUS, Vol. 18, 691-692. the treaty. Conversation with Spurgeon M. Keeny, declassified minutes of those negotiations it was 58 For details, see Cohen, “Israel’s Nuclear His- January 25, 1998. a real confrontation, but Warnke blinked first and tory,” pp. 159-194. 82 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, “Non- backed off, on instructions from the White House. 59 ACDA, “Draft U.S. Position Paper: Non-Pro- proliferation of nuclear weapons and the MLF,” liferation of Nuclear Weapons,” August 14, 1964, June 15, 1964, Non-Proliferation collection of the NSF boxes 12-13, LBJL. National Security Archives. 60 Ibid., p. 2. 83 See Glenn T. Seaborg (with Benjamin S. Loeb), 61 Ibid., p. 10. Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson 62 Ibid. Years (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), Chap- 63 Ibid. ters 10 and 12. 64 Ibid., p. 11. 84 On the MLF’s demise, see Bundy, Danger and 65 Ibid., pp. 15-16. Survival, pp. 492-498. 66 Ibid., pp. 27-29. 85 Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, p. 180. 67 Address of the President, October 18, 1964, 86 Ibid. Office of the White House Press Secretary. 87 Conversations with George Bunn, ACDA 68 “The Bomb: Special Report,” Newsweek, Au- Counsel in 1966-68 and a principal negotiator of gust 9, 1965, pp. 52-57. Indeed, on October 24, the NPT; also, conversations with Spurgeon M. the chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commis- Keeny, NSC senior aide who worked on matters sion stated that India might be compelled to manu- related to the NPT, May and August 1995 and facture nuclear weapons unless some important January 25, 1998. See, also Bunn, Arms Control and tangible steps are made towards general dis- by Committee, pp. 75-80. armament. 88 Bunn, pp. 72-82. 69 “A Report to the President by the Committee 89 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (forthcoming), on Nuclear Proliferation,” January 21, 1965, NSF Chapter 10. box 5, LBJL. The report appears now also in 90 “Visit of Levi Eshkol Prime Minister of Israel FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, pp. 64-71. January 7-8, 1968: The Nuclear Issue and So- 70 Ibid., pp. 1-2. phisticated Weapons,” Record Group 59, CFPF, 71 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 1967-69, Box 2649 AE, National Archives. 72 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 91 Interviews with a former senior official who 73 Ibid., p. 6. was directly involved on this matter. Former CIA 74 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol XI, p. 67. director, Richard Helms, confirmed the essence 75 “Briefing For Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear of this allegation. Telephone interviews with Ri- non-Proliferation,” December 1, 1964, 1, NSF box chard Helms, October 1997. 4, LBJL. 92 Interviews with Myron Kratzer (AEC), Michael 76 Ibid., p. 3. Sterner and Joseph Sisco (State Department), and

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 19