Avner Cohen ISRAEL AND THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY: THE CRITICAL DECADE (1958-1968) by Avner Cohen1 Dr. Avner Cohen is a Senior Fellow in the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. He was a lecturer in philosophy at Tel Aviv University from 1983 to 1991 and has held visiting posts at several American universities. He has also served as co- director for a project on nuclear arms control in the Middle East at the MIT Center for International Studies. He is the author of many works on proliferation issues, including the forthcoming book Israel and the Bomb: A Political History (1950-1970) (Columbia University Press, 1998). ver since the Baruch Plan a powerful testimony to the wards Israel and even beyond (1946), the United States has Eisenhower administrations failure American interests in the region. opposed the spread of to come to grips with the reality of While he was committed to the se- Enuclear weapons. Until the 1960s, nuclear proliferation. Although the curity of Israel, he was also con- however, that opposition was hardly Israeli nuclear project had been con- cerned about nuclear proliferation. translated into a coherent and well- ceived in 1955-57 and its physical In the spring and summer of 1963, defined policy of nuclear nonprolif- construction initiated in early 1958, these two interests came to a head- eration. During the 1950s, nuclear only in December 1960 did the de- on collision as Kennedy made his proliferation was not regarded by parting Eisenhower administration last ditch effort to curb Israels American policymakers as a global determine that Israel was in fact nuclear ambitions. Three months concern to be addressed by a global building a major nuclear facility in later, he was assassinated and the policy. It was under President John the Negev desert aimed at establish- torch was passed on to President F. Kennedy that the United States ing a nuclear weapons capability. Johnson. It was under Johnson, who discovered nuclear nonprolifera- The challenge of how to apply the in his first two years had other pri- tion as a foreign policy problem; it American opposition to the spread orities than nonproliferation, that a was under President Lyndon B. of nuclear weapons to the complex- special arrangement was crafted: Is- Johnson that the idea of a Treaty on ity of the Israeli case was left to the rael pledged not to be the first to in- the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear incoming Kennedy administration. troduce nuclear weapons to the Weapons (NPT) was endorsed as the President Kennedy was by far the Middle East, and, in return, the solution to the problem. most forceful American president in United States provided Israel with Americas experience in dealing dealing with the Israeli problem. He weapons to maintain Israels secu- with the Israeli nuclear program was recognized that the consequences of rity (tanks and planes). critical to both the discovery of the U.S. efforts to stem Israeli prolifera- Although Israel has long been problem and its solution. Israel was tion went far beyond U.S. policy to- viewed as a key state in the devel- The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 1 Avner Cohen opment of U.S. nonproliferation ing the transfer of nuclear weapons, this American naiveté: policy, it has not been known how, or any nuclear technology defined Atoms-for-Peace was a sin- cere but yet almost desper- and to what extent, the Israeli expe- as restricted data, to other coun- ate effort to find some rience shaped the evolution of that tries. However, the record of the redeeming value in what policy. Most of the little that has Eisenhower administration shows seemed a uniquely Ameri- can engineering triumph. been written on this subject, deals that preventing nuclear proliferation This moral imperative pro- with the Israeli side of the story, that was not as high a priority as sharing vided a special incentive for is, how American pressure deter- the civilian-industrial benefits of the Atoms-for-Peace pro- 2 gram. Without it, Atoms- mined Israels nuclear policy. Al- atomic energy. for-Peace and Eisenhowers most no research has been done on On December 8, 1953, President extraordinary dedication to the idea were not really un- how the experience with Israel Eisenhower unveiled his Atoms-for- shaped the evolution of American derstandable. At the same Peace program at the United Na- time, the sobering realities nonproliferation policy in the criti- tions. The new initiative sharply of thermonuclear warfare 3 made international control cal decade that led to the NPT. reversed the policy of nuclear denial Recently declassified archival ma- of the atom a matter of para- maintained since 1945, bringing an mount concern. The di- terial, and other new evidence, al- end to the decade of total nuclear lemma was that the two low us now to reconstruct some of 4 conflicting goals could not secrecy. In accordance with the new be separated.5 this history. initiative, the administration asked Based on this evidence, this study Congress in 1954 to amend the The geopolitics of the Cold War argues that lessons and insights Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to al- and the stalemate between the super- drawn from the experience with Is- low the United States to declassify powers regarding nuclear arrange- rael were critical in persuading and distribute a huge amount of sci- ments in Europe made it difficult for American policymakers that the bi- entific information, theoretical and the Eisenhower administration even lateral approach to nonproliferation experimental nuclear research data to conceptualize nuclear prolifera- may be insufficient. By the mid- as well as nuclear material. Re- tion as a foreign policy problem. 1960s, it became evident that the search reactors, previously prohib- The United States dealt with prolif- bilateral approach had failed with ited for export purposes, were now eration risks through its own Israel and might fail elsewhere. In- promoted as a necessary step to- nuclear-related legislation, bilateral stead, the United States should use wards the future. Meanwhile, plu- safeguards agreements on nuclear its influence and power to create an tonium separation techniques were cooperation, and, most significantly, international nonproliferation norm declassified. by supporting the creation of inter- and to form a regime to embody and national organizations, such as the Atoms-for-Peace reflected the International Atomic Energy support that effort. The way to ac- expectation that nuclear energy complish this task was through a glo- Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM, as would be the third wave of the in- instruments to both promote and bal nonproliferation treaty to be dustrial revolution, and that Ameri- backed by the two superpowers. The safeguard nuclear cooperation can technology should lead the among nations. Promoting the Israeli case was an important expe- march forward. The distinction be- rience in obtaining this insight. peaceful atom became an important tween peaceful and destructive uses tool of American foreign policy, cer- of atomic energy, and the belief that tainly in Europe, where American THE EISENHOWER it was possible to promote the one support of EURATOM was the cor- ADMINISTRATION ON and to control the other, was at the nerstone of Eisenhowers idea of a NUCLEAR heart of the initiative. In retrospect, United States of Europe.6 The NONPROLIFERATION Atoms-for-Peace was successful in United States was also committed to Every American president since promoting American nuclear tech- safeguarding its nuclear cooperation Harry S. Truman has opposed the nology, but less so in maintaining with other nations. Safeguards, how- proliferation of nuclear weapons. safeguards and control. Nuclear his- ever, are not sufficient to prevent The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 so- torians Richard G. Hewlett and Jack nuclear proliferation. lidified this opposition by prohibit- M. Holl wrote the following about 2 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Avner Cohen The Eisenhower administration nuclear weapons, produced large it. The Eisenhower administrations opposed the spread of nuclear weap- quantities of tactical nuclear weap- opposition was driven by concerns ons, but it recognized that sovereign ons, which it justified as a counter about allied nuclear deployments.10 nations had the right to pursue such to the rising costs of conventional A year later, when Ireland modified an objective on their own. This pre- weapons. It was predicted that tac- its resolution, introducing weaker sumption was embedded in the tical nuclear weapons would become language under which the nuclear IAEA founding statute (1956). The the future means of war-fighting, powers would refrain from hand- objective of the IAEA was to pro- assets that any advanced, technologi- ing over control of such weapons to mote the peaceful use of nuclear cally capable, state should possess.8 any nation not possessing them,11 energy and to set in place a safeguard The dilemma for America was the United States supported it, while system ensuring that such nuclear whether to provide the North Atlan- the French and Soviets abstained. In cooperation would not be diverted tic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1960, when the Irish proposal was to military purposes. The founding with nuclear weapons, making it un- amended further, calling on the statute, however, did not forbid a necessary for members to build their nuclear states not only to refrain member from acquiring nuclear own nuclear arsenals, or, alterna- from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons, nor did it require a mem- tively, to limit its security commit- weapons, but also from transmitting ber to accept safeguards on nuclear ment to Europe, or possibly to information needed for their manu- materials and facilities acquired out- withdraw militarily from Europe. facture, this time the Soviets voted side of IAEA assistance programs.