The Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Abstract
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Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission The Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative “Over the years, and in line with its progressive character, NATO’s MD [Mediterranean Dialogue] has gradually taken strength.” – NiCola de Santis, Head of Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries SeCtion, NATO PubliC DiplomaCy Division, Brussels (Santis, 2010: p. 3) Abstract This paper examines the usefulness of NATO’s two partnership programs in the Middle East and North AfriCa (MENA) – the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – both from NATO’s point of view and the partners’ point of view. SinCe the Cold War, NATO has been foCusing on more broad seCurity Challenges, such as internal instability, terrorism and dispersion of WMD’s, and thus NATO is bound to have great interests in MENA from where these threats often emanate. The Arab Spring, bringing the problem of internal stability of MENA states to the forefront, and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, showing NATO resolve to engage in MENA, both illustrate the importanCe of MENA to the seCurity of NATO states. At the same time, the events may have profoundly changed the environment that NATO has to deal with in MENA. This paper examines the possibilities for NATO to utilize its partnerships in the region in a useful way [POWER OF PARTNESHIPS SKIP THIS]. Though the activities of the two partnerships have expanded widely through the years, it will be argued that four challenges severely limit the usefulness of these partnerships. These Challenges are: laCk of NATO vision for MD & ICI; lack of incentives for partners to engage in the partnership programs; MENA weariness and suspiCion of Western Powers; and Internal NATO divisions plus the Israel issue. Thus Santis view of partnerships as strengthened, will be somewhat rebutted. Lastly, the paper examines whether and in what ways the Arab Spring and OUP, an operation directly spawned by the Arab Spring, have changed the MENA region that NATO has to engage with and whether the two events have strengthened or limited the usefulness of partnerships in the future. 1 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission The Mediterranean Dialogue & the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative The “Mediterranean Dialogue” (MD) and “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” (ICI) are the key partnership frameworks for NATO in the Middle Eastern and North AfriCan geographical region (MENA). The MD was established along with the Partnership for PeaCe (PfP) in 1994 as part of NATO reinventing itself after the end of the Cold War.1 The MD Comprises seven partiCipants around the Mediterranean seaboard – Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, MoroCCo, Tunisia (all joined in 1994), Jordan (sinCe 1995) and Algeria (sinCe 2000). Though it is not Clear what goal the MD is supposed to fulfill, there seems to be three main purposes of the partnership program: 1) to Contribute to regional security and stability; 2) aChieve better mutual understanding; 3) dispel any misConCeptions between NATO and the partner Countries (NATO, 2004a). The MD takes shape of both bilateral meetings (NATO + 1) and multi-bilateral meetings (NATO + 7) (Santis, 2010: p. 3). At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO deCided to deepen the MD and make it into a more full-blown partnership (more resembling the PfP) instead of a more loosely based dialogue-forum, by enhanCing the level of Cooperation, especially by “promoting greater political cooperation, enhancing the Dialogue’s political dimension, assisting in defence reform, cooperation in the field of border security, achieving interoperability2 and contributing to the fight against terrorism, while complementing other international efforts” (NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launChes Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004)3. SinCe then, the level of activities has risen. NATO states: ”Since the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, an annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) focusing on agreed priority areas has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011. While the MDWP is essentially military (85 percent of the activities), it comprises activities in a wide range of areas of cooperation including Military Education, Training and Doctrine, Defence Policy and Strategy, Defence Investment, Civil Emergency Planning, Public Diplomacy, Crisis Management, Armaments and Intelligence related activities.” However, it is not easy to gain knowledge of what many of the 700 activities are. Some concrete examples of interoperability and cooperation between NATO and MD partners are available though: partiCipation of Israel and MoroCCo in NATO’s Operation ACtive Endeavour and Jordan’s partiCipation in Operation Unified Protector (OUP). 1 How and what NATO has Changed into after the Cold War and what NATO wants to beCome in the future is not Covered here, since vast amounts of literature is already written on this subjeCt and it would be too comprehensive to cover here. For this paper’s purpose it suffiCes to argue that after the Cold War, NATO’s raison d’être as a seCurity allianCe against the Eastern BloC had disappeared. In turn, NATO had to search for a new role in international relations. 2 Meaning that the partners forCes will be better equipped to partiCipate in and working with NATO forCes 3 Hjemmeside, 29 June 2004 2 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission Established at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the ICI, Comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (all offiCially joining in 2005), was an initiative to reaCh out more broadly to the MENA region and establish Closer bilateral Cooperation. The aims are similar to those of MD: “enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region” (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004), primarily by aiding in defense-, planning- and budgeting- reform, Civil-military relations, military-to-military Cooperation and through that, interoperability, fighting terrorism, prevention of WMD proliferation, maritime Cooperation in the realm of piraCy fighting, and fighting illegal traffiCking (NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004)4. NATO states that “Whereas in 2007, the offer of cooperation to ICI countries included 328 activities/events, the 2011 Menu of Practical Activities now contains about 500 activities.” (NATO website: topiC: ICI). However what these activities and events entail more precisely is not Certain. An example of direCt ICI Contributions to NATO is Qatar and UAE’s Contribution of jets to OUP. As with the MD, the partnership is supposed to be mutually benefiCial and initiatives from the partner Countries are welCome. Further, Consultations may be both multilateral as well as bilateral, so that NATO Can take eaCh Country’s “diversity and specific needs” into aCCount (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004)5. Importantly, NATO aims to “avoid misunderstandings” (Ibid.) about the purpose of the ICI whiCh is not supposed to lead to NATO or PfP membership, provide seCurity guarantees or hijaCk the work of other forums that may handle some issues better. The ICI Can be extended to inClude other Countries, as Can the MD. What goes for both partnerships is the non-disCriminatory CharaCter – what is offered to one partner is also offered to the others within the same partnership program. At the same time, both partnerships plaCe much emphasis on “Self-differentiation, allowing a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our MD partner countries. Particularly Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested MD countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance” (NATO websites presenting the basiC prinCiples of the MD and ICI)6. The same is the Case for ICI. Lastly, it was deCided at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to plaCe more emphasis on partnerships and develop a more flexible partnership framework for all partnership programs – a task that the Foreign Ministers at their April 2011 meeting in Berlin was to elaborate on (Lisbon Summit DeClaration, 2010: p.7, paragraph 25-27). This produCed the NATO 4 Hjemmeside, 29 June 2004 5 Hjemmeside, 28 June 2004 6 On MD: http://www.nato.int/Cps/en/natolive/topiCs_60021.htm? On ICI: http://www.nato.int/Cps/en/natolive/topiCs_58787.htm? 3 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission document “Active Engagement in Cooperative SeCurity: A More EffiCient and Flexible Partnership PoliCy” (Berlin meeting, April 14-15, 2011), whiCh states in paragraph 11: ”The “28+n” formula provides a mechanism for consultations and, as appropriate, cooperation in flexible formats across and beyond existing frameworks. This mechanism can be thematic or event-driven and will develop through practice, as part of a process to enhance NATO’s partnerships. It will be used on