Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Please do not quote without permission The and Cooperation Initiative

“Over the years, and in line with its progressive character, NATO’s MD [Mediterranean Dialogue] has gradually taken strength.” – Nicola de Santis, Head of Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries Section, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels (Santis, 2010: p. 3)

Abstract

This paper examines the usefulness of NATO’s two partnership programs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – both from NATO’s point of view and the partners’ point of view. Since the , NATO has been focusing on more broad security challenges, such as internal instability, terrorism and dispersion of WMD’s, and thus NATO is bound to have great interests in MENA from where these threats often emanate. The Arab Spring, bringing the problem of internal stability of MENA states to the forefront, and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in , showing NATO resolve to engage in MENA, both illustrate the importance of MENA to the security of NATO states. At the same time, the events may have profoundly changed the environment that NATO has to deal with in MENA. This paper examines the possibilities for NATO to utilize its partnerships in the region in a useful way [POWER OF PARTNESHIPS SKIP THIS]. Though the activities of the two partnerships have expanded widely through the years, it will be argued that four challenges severely limit the usefulness of these partnerships. These challenges are: lack of NATO vision for MD & ICI; lack of incentives for partners to engage in the partnership programs; MENA weariness and suspicion of Western Powers; and Internal NATO divisions plus the issue. Thus Santis view of partnerships as strengthened, will be somewhat rebutted. Lastly, the paper examines whether and in what ways the Arab Spring and OUP, an operation directly spawned by the Arab Spring, have changed the MENA region that NATO has to engage with and whether the two events have strengthened or limited the usefulness of partnerships in the future.

1 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission The Mediterranean Dialogue & the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The “Mediterranean Dialogue” (MD) and “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” (ICI) are the key partnership frameworks for NATO in the Middle Eastern and North African geographical region (MENA). The MD was established along with the (PfP) in 1994 as part of NATO reinventing itself after the end of the Cold War.1 The MD comprises seven participants around the Mediterranean seaboard – , Israel, , , (all joined in 1994), (since 1995) and (since 2000). Though it is not clear what goal the MD is supposed to fulfill, there seems to be three main purposes of the partnership program: 1) to contribute to regional security and stability; 2) achieve better mutual understanding; 3) dispel any misconceptions between NATO and the partner countries (NATO, 2004a). The MD takes shape of both bilateral meetings (NATO + 1) and multi-bilateral meetings (NATO + 7) (Santis, 2010: p. 3). At the 2004 Istanbul , NATO decided to deepen the MD and make it into a more full-blown partnership (more resembling the PfP) instead of a more loosely based dialogue-forum, by enhancing the level of cooperation, especially by “promoting greater political cooperation, enhancing the Dialogue’s political dimension, assisting in defence reform, cooperation in the field of border security, achieving interoperability2 and contributing to the fight against terrorism, while complementing other international efforts” (NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004)3. Since then, the level of activities has risen. NATO states: ”Since the June , an annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) focusing on agreed priority areas has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011. While the MDWP is essentially military (85 percent of the activities), it comprises activities in a wide range of areas of cooperation including Military Education, Training and Doctrine, Defence Policy and Strategy, Defence Investment, Civil Emergency Planning, Public Diplomacy, Crisis Management, Armaments and Intelligence related activities.” However, it is not easy to gain knowledge of what many of the 700 activities are. Some concrete examples of interoperability and cooperation between NATO and MD partners are available though: participation of Israel and Morocco in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour and Jordan’s participation in Operation Unified Protector (OUP).

1 How and what NATO has changed into after the Cold War and what NATO wants to become in the future is not covered here, since vast amounts of literature is already written on this subject and it would be too comprehensive to cover here. For this paper’s purpose it suffices to argue that after the Cold War, NATO’s raison d’être as a security alliance against the Eastern Bloc had disappeared. In turn, NATO had to search for a new role in international relations. 2 Meaning that the partners forces will be better equipped to participate in and working with NATO forces 3 Hjemmeside, 29 June 2004

2 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

Established at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the ICI, comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (all officially joining in 2005), was an initiative to reach out more broadly to the MENA region and establish closer bilateral cooperation. The aims are similar to those of MD: “enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region” (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004), primarily by aiding in defense-, planning- and budgeting- reform, civil-military relations, military-to-military cooperation and through that, interoperability, fighting terrorism, prevention of WMD proliferation, maritime cooperation in the realm of piracy fighting, and fighting illegal trafficking (NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004)4. NATO states that “Whereas in 2007, the offer of cooperation to ICI countries included 328 activities/events, the 2011 Menu of Practical Activities now contains about 500 activities.” (NATO website: topic: ICI). However what these activities and events entail more precisely is not certain. An example of direct ICI contributions to NATO is Qatar and UAE’s contribution of jets to OUP. As with the MD, the partnership is supposed to be mutually beneficial and initiatives from the partner countries are welcome. Further, consultations may be both multilateral as well as bilateral, so that NATO can take each country’s “diversity and specific needs” into account (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004)5. Importantly, NATO aims to “avoid misunderstandings” (Ibid.) about the purpose of the ICI which is not supposed to lead to NATO or PfP membership, provide security guarantees or hijack the work of other forums that may handle some issues better. The ICI can be extended to include other countries, as can the MD. What goes for both partnerships is the non-discriminatory character – what is offered to one partner is also offered to the others within the same partnership program. At the same time, both partnerships place much emphasis on “Self-differentiation, allowing a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our MD partner countries. Particularly Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested MD countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance” (NATO websites presenting the basic principles of the MD and ICI)6. The same is the case for ICI. Lastly, it was decided at the to place more emphasis on partnerships and develop a more flexible partnership framework for all partnership programs – a task that the Foreign Ministers at their April 2011 meeting in Berlin was to elaborate on (Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010: p.7, paragraph 25-27). This produced the NATO

4 Hjemmeside, 29 June 2004 5 Hjemmeside, 28 June 2004 6 On MD: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_60021.htm? On ICI: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_58787.htm?

3 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission document “Active Engagement in Cooperative Security: A More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy” (Berlin meeting, April 14-15, 2011), which states in paragraph 11: ”The “28+n” formula provides a mechanism for consultations and, as appropriate, cooperation in flexible formats across and beyond existing frameworks. This mechanism can be thematic or event-driven and will develop through practice, as part of a process to enhance NATO’s partnerships. It will be used on a case by case basis to enhance consultation on security issues of common concern and cooperation in priority policy areas, including related to emerging security challenges, without detriment to the specificity of existing frameworks and meetings in those frameworks and with individual partners. - NATO will consider requests from partners for consultations and cooperation in flexible formats; -The NAC [] will approve the subject of any such meeting and its participants; and will ensure transparency to other partners.” (Official NATO statement after Berlin meeting, paragraph 11)7 Thus after the Lisbon Summit, NATO is experimenting with whether a more flexible framework deepens partnerships. This policy of flexibility and at the same time deeper involvement with partners was echoed at the latest NATO Summit in Chicago, May, 2012. The Summit Declaration states: NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin in April 2011 approved a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy to enhance the effectiveness of NATO’s partnerships. We will continue to actively pursue its further implementation with a view to strengthening NATO’s partnerships, including by: reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and our relationships with partners across the globe, while making full use of flexible formats; further developing our political and practical cooperation with partners, including in an operational context; and through increasing partner involvement in training, education, and exercises, including with the NATO Response Force. (NATO Summit Declaration, May 20, 2012: Paragraph The following discussions will examine the usefulness of the MD and ICI, and discuss whether the new and more flexible framework, still under implementation, is bound to render the partnerships more useful for NATO in enhancing its own security or ability to deal with MENA.

7 NATO website: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415-Partnership- Policy.pdf

4 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission Two flightless birds?

The existence of both MD and ICI bear witness to the continued importance of the MENA region to the security of NATO member-states after the Cold War. But have the MD and ICI in 2012 finally become more than a “Diplomatic Talking Shop” (Malmvig, 2004) as Malmvig stated about the MD in May of 2004? This paper argues that though the activities of the partnerships have expanded over the years, essentially the partnerships are not effective in their current form – even the more flexible form adopted in 2010 – and do not give NATO the credibility or influence that NATO should like to have in MENA in a time where internal instability, terrorism and are some of the most eminent threats facing NATO states.

This paper identifies four stumbling blocks responsible for the unsuccessful partnership programs, each of which will be elaborated on in this section: 1. Lack of vision: what does NATO want out of its partnerships? What is the added value? 2. Lack of credible security guarantees: What is the added value for partners? 3. Weariness and suspicion of NATO intentions in MENA: Historical relations grow deep 4. Internal NATO divisions and the -Israel issue: Israel the pebble in the shoe

Lack of NATO vision: what does NATO want out of its partnerships? In order for any country to commit fully to a partnership, it needs to see a value added from being in that partnership. That goes for both NATO and the partners in MD and ICI. In their 2011 book NATO: The Power of Partnerships the authors frame the question of the usefulness of partnerships both for NATO and its members in the same terms. They argue that “In this study we propose to investigate NATO partnerships: Are they based on a policy, and if so, to what end? We will also present case studies from the perspective of the partner countries: What does partnership status bring? Hypotheses about both these questions evolve around the question of security […] Which political and military utility do the different forms of cooperation have for NATO? Which political and military utility do the different forms of cooperation have for the connected states?” (Edström et. Al., 2011: pp.2-4). After framing the usefulness in these terms, the book covers a wide range of cases of partners. But paradoxically, it does not cover any cases of partnership with MD or ICI countries. Thus their analysis of the utility of partnerships in terms of what end are they intended to serve and what do NATO and the partners stand to win from the partnerships has not been applied to either MD or ICI. This void will be filled in this paper.

5 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

The questions of what ends the partnerships are to serve and what NATO and the partners stand to gain is addressed in the two first reasons (listed above) for why the partnerships have never been overly useful. There is a lack of vision – or clear raison d’être – from NATO on what role it wants the MD and ICI to have, in turn making it hard to see what value the partnership programs add to NATO. This is also an issue Samaan points at when he argues that “Strengthening cooperation in the operational domain could have been effective if there had been a clear common perception of the ICI’s raison d’etre.” (Samaan, 2012: p. 6). Granted, NATO states clearly in its programs, that enhanced security and stability are aims as are fight against terrorism and prevention of WMD proliferation. But so far it has not been how and whether the partnerships actually contribute anything towards these stated goals or how they are intended to do so. In turn, we cannot answer: what does NATO see as the overarching purpose for the MD and ICI? Obviously, being a security alliance, NATO’s prime objective is security, and thus gaining security would be the easy answer to the question. But that does not answer the question in a meaningful way in which we have gained a clear understanding of how the MD and ICI provide additional security for NATO member states. Thus the lack of a clear vision of how the partnerships could contribute to handling the above mentioned security threats to NATO will give the impression that there is no clear added value from having partnership frameworks, which could not have been added through simple bilateral meetings and partnerships on an ad-hoc basis. Further one can ask: what is the purpose and added value of having a partnership program instead of a purely bilateral framework along with meetings with local organizations such as the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)? Might NATO not get the same or more out of consulting and partnering with these already established local organizations and through that save the resources of running two partnership programs with no clear reachable goals?8 If we cannot answer the first question by showing a clear added value or the second by showing that NATO gains more security from its partnerships than without them, then it is not clear what value MD and ICI add as compared to simple bilateral relations or relations with local organizations. In the PfP, comprising many Eastern European states, the vision for the partnerships was much clearer: eventual membership of the Alliance. But this is not a feasible or realistic vision for the MD and ICI. Thus there is no common objective or vision for NATO to reach with the membership countries in either MD or ICI, as was the case for many PfP countries, which also made it more obvious why the Eastern European countries should be grouped together in a common partnership program (PfP), grooming them for membership. These problems with stating a clear

8 The local organizations may not be willing to work bilaterally with NATO in a partnership. But as will be shown later, the present partnerships do not work well either. Hence trying a new partnership framework of partnering with already established local organizations rather than partnering through the MD and ICI does not mean that something very valuable will be lost.

6 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission vision for the MC and ICI members, as opposed to PfP members, is also addressed by François who states “The region south of the Mediterranean is far from homogeneous. In fact, the MD and ICI have not resulted in vibrant cooperative frameworks in the past, in part due to their lack of common purpose and common approach to security challenges” (François, 2011: p. 9).9 In short, the partners may have such different needs and expectations of the partnership programs, that it seems odd to group them together since it will be hard for NATO to invent a common vision or purpose for all partners within each framework. This fundamental problem is also pointed out by Moore, who states that ”Ultimately, the issue that NATO has yet to resolve revolves around the fundamental purpose of the partnerships […] NATO will first have to clarify the longer-term function that partnerships are intended to serve” (Moore, 2012: p. 57). A discussion on the issue that NATO does not have a clear vision with its partners must also touch upon the core values that NATO stands for, since the spread of those values could be a potential long-term vision. Both the Preamble to the Washington Treaty and the Strategic Concepts throughout the years place key emphasis on “the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, 2010: p. 6 under the heading “Core Tasks and Principles”). When NATO was dealing with many of the Eastern European states after the Cold War, it was easy to identify a more clear vision and purpose of the partnerships: aide in democratization, the rule of law and civilian control of the military and as stated, eventual inclusion in the Alliance. These were visions that some former Soviet states were also pursuing and hence were more realistic as visions for the NATO partnerships since they could be recognized by both sides of the partnership. When dealing with MENA states, there is much more discrepancy between NATO’s core values and the values of the regimes in the partnership states. These states are for the most part illiberal and non-democratic and the rulers stay in power primarily through the lack of democratic control of military forces. Thus NATO cannot place the same emphasis on its values as long-term visions, especially because an emphasis on these NATO values is bound to have an alienating effect on many of the ruling regimes in the partnering countries. Thus NATO needs to identify a more clear vision of what it wants its partnerships to be and find a way do let the MENA partners know that NATO’s core values are not part of its long-term vision for the partnerships. As long as there is ambiguity about this, a deepened partnership scenario is hard to imagine since the local regimes will be skeptical of NATO intentions. And it is hard to imagine how a more flexible framework is going to contribute to making the vision of NATO partnerships any clearer. In the last section on the Arab Spring and OUP, it will be discussed whether the Arab Spring might have brought an opening for NATO to make its core values part of the raison d’être of its partnerships in MENA.

9 So far we are addressing the issue of common purpose. The issue of security challenges will be addressed later in this section.

7 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

Lack of security guarantees for partners: what is the value added for partners? From the partners’ point of view, the value added of being in a partnership framework is even less obvious because what NATO can provide is not adequate to the partners needs. The largest problem is that NATO simply does not have much to offer to its MENA partners. What the partners need from NATO are two forms of security promises, both of which NATO is not willing to or capable of granting. The first is security from external regional threats; most obviously the Iranian threat posed primarily to the ICI partners. Strictly speaking, with NATO’s overwhelming military capabilities, NATO would be able to deliver this security guarantee. But, as stated earlier, one of NATO’s purposes is to avoid the misunderstanding that NATO is willing to provide security guarantees to its partners in MENA. Thus ICI countries cannot rely on NATO to engage militarily, when it comes to the Iranian threat, making it odd grouping them together in one partnership framework, when NATO does not offer them a common package that they would all want. It is a poor consolation that all NATO is offering in the security field is “military exercises and related education and training” (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 2004),10 primarily with the purpose of having the partners contribute to NATO missions. The partners’ militaries, especially in the ICI, and with Israel and Egypt being the notable exceptions, are vastly inferior to the Iranian threat they are up against. In turn, NATO does not have much to offer – besides military exercises, education and training – when it comes to securing MD and ICI partners against external threats. There is also the fact that within the MD, the primary external threat to most states, historically, is one of the MD’s own member states, Israel. Thus having a partnership program in which one state has historically been the main military adversary of the other members obviously makes a flourishing partnership program difficult. Of course Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Jordan gave up its claim on the West Bank in 1988,11 and the MD partners have been living in relative peace with each other since then. But much of the indigenous populations of the Arab states are still weary of Israel (Israel’s relations with its non-MD neighbors, Lebanon and Syria is still much strained). The second security issue, facing most of the partners in both MD and ICI is the internal threat to the regimes in power. This issue has become much more obvious as the Arab Spring spread throughout MENA. Most partners – with Israel, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring, arguably being the main exception – are illiberal nondemocratic regimes and the primary security concern for most of these regimes is internal opposition. As argued before about the lack of vision, NATO obviously cannot and will not make any promises on

10 Hjemmeside, 28 June 2004 11 Website: http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/18/world/jordan-s-west-bank-move-upsetting-daily- life.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm

8 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission intervening to save any of these regimes, like Saudi Arabia did in Bahrain during the Arab Spring, because these regimes raison d’être run counter to NATO’s core values. So partnership countries may see more value in relying on local partnerships/organizations, which recognize and are not opposed to the legitimacy on which the regimes rest. A good example is the Al Khalifa regime receiving military assistance from fellow GCC states (primarily Saudi Arabia), in order to crush the internal opposition to its regime in 2011. When it comes to receiving support as a ruler, these local frameworks will be much more supportive of the illiberal non-democratic regime-types since they are all of that kind.12 Further, the ICI states are bound to receive staunch support from Saudi Arabia due to religious reasons, such as was the case in Bahrain when the Sunni Muslim population is a minority but controls the country. A Shi’a Muslim country, and the Iranian (Shi’a) power penetration that would be a result thereof would pose a large threat to Saudi Arabia. Hence what the partners stand to gain from the MD and ICI is inadequate to their needs because NATO, cannot and will not bring the above discussed security guarantees to the negotiating table. One reason for why NATO has been a long time in realizing that the countries may not actually want to be partners may be because NATO sees the granting of partnerships as a gift or award to other countries like it did to many Eastern European states after the Cold War. Now NATO is in a situation where the countries offered partnership do not want deepened partnership programs unless they gain some security guarantees in return, which NATO, incidentally, is not committed to give. Therefore, NATO needs to think in new terms about what it can bring to the negotiation table in order to elevate the partnerships to something more meaningful than a mere “Diplomatic Talking Shop” for the regimes that it partners with. As with the lack of vision issue above, it is hard to imagine how the more flexible framework for partnerships will solve these problems as long as NATO is not more committed to deliver something more adequate to partners needs.

Weariness and suspicion of NATO and the West in MENA The third issue – one that NATO aims at eliminating through the partnerships but also one that hinders the deepening of the partnerships – is that partners are generally suspicious of NATO’s intentions in MENA (François, 2011: p. 12 and Malmvig, 2004: p. 5). This is generally a product of the historical relations between the West and MENA and the problem is deepened further by the fact that engaging in partnerships with the West is usually unpopular in the eyes of the indigenous populations. Throughout the history of West-MENA encounters, the relationship is one of imperialism (primarily Great Britain, , The Ottoman Empire (modern day Turkey), and some

12 Syria (at present time) and Libya (in 2010) in the Arab League are the most notable exceptions to this rule. They have not enjoyed support from the local organizations such as the Arab League

9 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission would argue, American imperialism as of recently), broken promises (e.g. the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916) and the West exporting its own problems to MENA (founding the state of Israel in 1948). From this record, a general skepticism is not surprising, and rebuilding trust between the two regions is a slow and sometimes futile process. Sometimes minor issues out of NATO states control, such as the 2012 film about the Prophet Muhamed, resulting in widespread hatred and rioting in several MENA states, will set back the discourse to square one and much patchwork of reconciliation has been lost. The problem of suspicion of NATO intentions is also brought up by Samaan who argues that “Several officials from GCC countries interviewed for this research paper expressed their “ignorance about NATO’s real objectives with the ICI” […] In some cases, local observers, keen to uphold conspiracy theories, questioned the ICI’s “hidden agenda” […] as being no more than a mechanism by which the West can continue to control the region” (Samaan, 2012: p. 6). Even though NATO may find some way of bringing useful bargaining chips to the negotiation table with its MENA partners (the problem discussed above), there is still the issue that the regimes may be very reluctant in deepening their partnerships with NATO (and the member-states which it represents) simply because it will be very unpopular with the population or groups in the population on which the regimes rely in order to stay in power. The image of a regime opposing the large imperial forces has long provided a centripetal effect of support for MENA regimes, such as much of the Arab World initially rallying for Nasser’s Pan Arabism and his opposition to Western influence in the Arab World. In order for NATO to elevate its partnerships in MENA to a level of mutual recognition and usefulness, NATO will have to remake its image and shed its current image as a tool of Western powers for influence in the Arab World, a task that may prove to be almost insurmountable or at least very difficult since it is an Alliance of Western and former imperialist powers. This argument is backed by Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations, arguing that after the Cold War, the primary lines of conflict will be between different civilizations, such as the Western and Arab. Thus NATO’s clear statement on enhanced and deepened partnerships after the Lisbon Summit and Berlin meeting may have the opposite effect than intended, since the MENA countries may be alienated in identifying more with the West than they are already doing. However, the emphasis on flexibility and the more individualistic approach that this entails may put the partners somewhat at ease, since it will give them the opportunity to go their own individual pace in framing the partnerships. But what does NATO do if this more flexible framework means that the pace comes almost completely to a halt? So far, nothing, it would seem. NATO is still letting the partners be the sole initiators of any deepened initiatives.

10 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission Internal division and the issue of Israel The last reason for the difficulties of the partnerships is the internal divisions in NATO, and the strained relations between some NATO members and partner countries. Initially, the Mediterranean region was primarily perceived as a regional problem of South Europe. In turn, MD was most heavily supported by the southern NATO states, having the largest security stake in the security and stability of the MENA region, while most NATO states were concerned with Eastern Europe after the Cold War (Malmvig, 2004: p. 4). This internal division has somewhat changed after terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the NATO states generally agree that MENA is important to the security of NATO states. Still, internal NATO frictions on the importance of MENA partnerships may occur between states that find this region much important to NATO security (Southern NATO states as well as states much influenced by the threat of terrorism, e.g. the US) and states that still see NATO’s old adversary – Russia – as the main security issue (primarily the newer members of Eastern Europe). This internal division may cause friction since NATO decisions are based on consensus. However, some of these issues have been overcome: the members agree that terrorism and nuclear proliferation, emerging from instable regions of MENA is a large threat to NATO states, as formulated in the 2010 Strategic Concept (Strategic Concept, pp.10-11 in the section: The Security Environment). But still, internal disagreements may still spell trouble for the partnership programs. The US, even though terrorism is still the big security issue, has turned more attention towards the eastern part of Eurasia (the landmass comprising Europe and Asia), mainly towards the challenge of a rising China. This refocus towards Southeast Asia, along with what some would argue, the relative military decline, 13 of NATO’s strongest power is likely to continue in the future. Within the coming decades, NATO may therefore begin to focus more on Southeast Asia, which means that less resources and attention can be allocated to MENA and NATO’s partnerships.14 This may bring with it an end to, or at least, less interest to the MD and ICI. Further creating a challenge for a useful partnership policy is especially the membership of Israel in the MD. Israel is the pebble in the shoe in two ways: first, Arab partnership states are reluctant to be associated with Israel because of the problem of internal stability within the countries as discussed earlier. Most indigenous Arab populations have sustained a deep hatred of Israel since its inception in 1948 and this makes a partnership program with Israel as a member a problem for other regimes in the MD. Israel’s “special” relationship with NATO’s strongest

13 Kubchan shows, in No Ones World, that the US power, especially economically, is declining quickly, clearing the way for rising powers such as China. Layne argues, in The Peace of Illusions, that the US, due to a poor Grand Strategy since the 1940s, is suffering the fate of most other hegemons, which is a decline in relative military and economic power. 14 One could make the counterargument that since the security threat and NATO’s focus moves to Southeast Asia, then NATO will be forced to rely more heavily on having local states handle the security challenges themselves, in turn relying more heavily on partnerships than earlier.

11 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission power may cause suspicion in the ICI countries as well, since they are all Arab and deeply religious and opposed to Israel. Second, internal NATO divisions on the Israel issue are also the reason for why MD has not made much progress since 2010. Some NATO states do not have issues with Israel and are generally very supportive (the US), while some have deep-rooted issues. Most importantly for the present day, NATO’s member closest to MENA, Turkey, has of late had a very strained relationship with Israel, escalating with the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla raid in which an Israeli Commando unit botched a raid on a flotilla headed for Gaza. The raid resulted in the death of nine Turks (Schleifer, 2011)15 and the worst diplomatic relations between the two states in many years. With deep diplomatic rifts between the NATO member closest to (and basically a geographical part of) the MENA region and the most powerful partner state militarily in the region, it is obvious that the MD as an overarching program for NATO partnership is bound to be ineffective and basically frozen, at least until Turkey and Israel ease their tensions. Even though other NATO states may see a deepening of the MD program as fruitful, the MD will not be a useful tool for NATO in MENA before Turkish-Israeli relations reach a more tolerable level. However, the strong emphasis on more flexibility may circumvent some of the troubles between Turkey and Israel, by letting the other partners deepen cooperation without Israel being involved. This may keep the MD alive until the Turkish-Israeli relationship eases up. But then we need to ask ourselves whether the MD makes sense as a unified program as long as Israel is part of it, since the program may operate with less friction if Israel was not part of it. These four somewhat interrelated challenges and limitations combine to provide a picture of two partnership programs that have only modest success at best. However, due to the lack of a clear vision for the programs, it is hard to evaluate how useful they actually are, in turn making it difficult to assess the value added. NATO may have some goals, but no long term vision of the partnership programs, which are modeled after a partnership program (PfP) with completely different and much clearer ultimate goals. It is not clear how the partnership frameworks are more favorable than strictly bilateral relations. Especially when MD is at a still and when the ICI states look in other directions – local partners such as the GCC and especially Saudi Arabia – for security and stability. The question that will be answered below is whether the Arab Spring and the OUP, other than having provided an example of direct military cooperation and thus usefulness of partners, have altered the usefulness of the partnerships and possibly provided a window of opportunity for deepened and more effective partnerships?

15 From Foreign Policy’s website: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/02/dead_in_the_water?page=0,0

12 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

Impact of the Arab Spring and Operation Unified Protector

The Arab Spring – a series of popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes in MENA – started in December 2010, in Tunisia and quickly spread throughout MENA, having various degrees of impact on different states. The partner countries most affected by the Arab Spring are Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain and the MENA country most affected – not a NATO partner – is Libya. Tunisia and Egypt, both part of MD, had their old leaders, whom NATO used to deal with in its partnerships, ousted within few weeks after the uprisings had begun. But only Tunisia has experienced a transition towards more democratic leadership while Egypt seems to be stuck half way between a transition to democracy and a military leadership – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – that does not want to completely transfer power to a democratically elected body. Bahrain experienced considerable uprisings in 2010 but the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa regime received military support from other GCC countries (primarily Saudi Arabia) and managed to crush the protests, largely led by Shi’a Muslims, and stay in power. The rest of the partnership states’ regimes have experienced scattered protests at the most and none of them have been close to being ousted. The Arab Spring also brought with it direct NATO involvement in MENA in the shape of NATO leadership of OUP – a UN mandated humanitarian intervention in Libya under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework. This is the first time that NATO has taken the leadership in a military operation in MENA, if one does not take into consideration NATO’s command of ISAF in Afghanistan since 2004. Thus it is clear that the Arab Spring has altered MENA and that it has affected NATO, since the Alliance assumed command of direct combat operations in OUP, but has this brought any changes or opportunities for NATO to utilize or deepen its partnership programs? The Arab Spring directly influenced one of the aims of the NATO partnerships, namely the stability of MENA, showing that the aim of regional security and stability is not realistic as a vision for partnerships since clearly the partnership programs did not affect the stability in any meaningful way. Though the authoritarian regimes that were overthrown had persisted for many years, they proved to be very unstable once popular uprisings reached a critical mass and Tunisia and Egypt’s membership in MD did nothing to change that. We can ask ourselves: is the Arab Spring a blessing for a new start and the deepening of the partnership programs? Has it had no impact? Or will it become harder for NATO to deepen its partnership programs as the NATO member states stated they would do after the 2010 Lisbon Summit? This will be examined by estimating the impact of the Arab Spring on the four reasons for unsuccessful partnerships, discussed above.

13 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

Lack of vision As such, the Arab Spring and OUP have not changed the fact that NATO does not have a clear vision on where the partnership programs should be headed or more clearly what purpose they are intended to serve, which could not be obtained through purely bilateral relations. However, it has opened a window of opportunity for NATO to use its core values more openly as a vision for partnerships with a few of the MENA states. NATO could state as a clear goal for partnering more deeply with Tunisia, and to some extend Egypt, that democracy, individual liberty and rule of law would be the long term vision for partnerships with these states. In this regard, NATO could bring in Libya in this partnership framework and aim to do the same in that state, creating a new partnership program with these Maghreb states with the overall vision of promoting NATO values. According to the liberal peace theory, democratic dyads are more reluctant to fight other democracies than are democracy-authoritarian dyads. Using NATO core values as the end vision for partners may also provide more security to the NATO member-states, which is the main raison d’être of NATO. Two issues need to be discussed in regard to partnership with the three Maghreb countries: first, the fact that Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are still very much in a period of upheaval, and; second, as already hinted at, the existing partnership programs may not be useful for the purpose of promoting values in the three Maghreb countries only. Elaborating on the first issue, the Arab Spring and OUP are still such recent events, that possibly all three states may yet relapse into anarchy or military authoritarianism. If SCAF in Egypt manages to establish itself as the ruling elite once again, then using NATO values as the ultimate goal for partnership will be unrealistic. The same goes for Libya, a state characterized by deep internal cleavages and a tribal society. It may yet be a long time before it will be clear which people or group of people (democratically elected or negotiated by clan-leaders) will represent Libya and whom NATO will actually be negotiating with in a potential partnership program. Only Tunisia seems to have had a fairly frictionless transition after Ben Ali’s ousting, but whether it holds is too early to tell. However, this transition provides an opportunity for NATO to promote its core values through a partnership, just like it did in Eastern Europe. This opens up for an elaboration of the second, that the current framework of partnerships is not fit to promote NATO’s core values, and in turn NATO states security. Since the Arab Spring and OUP has made the promotion of core values realistic in only one, or at the most three (if one includes Egypt and Libya) MENA states, a broad framework with groups of partners, such as MD and ICI, does not make much sense since many of these partners are at much earlier stages of a transition to liberal democracy and the rule of law. It could be argued that the more flexible framework lessens this problem in that it allows partners to go their own way with the partnerships, but generally it seems that strictly bilateral

14 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

(NATO + 1) partnerships would be just as feasible, especially in the case in which the relationships with one of the partners in a program more or less freezes the entire program (the Turkey-Israel issue). Alternatively, NATO could also restructure its partnership programs to a post-Arab Spring world and create and extend partnership invitations to the states most receptive to NATO’s core values. These states could be grouped together in one program with a clear ultimate vision. This also touches upon the second stumbling block for partnership programs, that NATO generally cannot offer something that is adequate to the partners needs, which will be discussed below.

Offering the partners a more useful package Neither the Arab Spring nor OUP have changed to any significant degree the fact that NATO cannot provide what the partners actually want. However, the OUP did show some initial success in the partnership programs. Especially OUP showed that some military interoperability has been reached between NATO and partners. Jordan, Qatar and UAE all participated in the OUP. This not only is evidence of a material success, but just as importantly it showed that some partners were willing to side with the West in a conflict within MENA. This may indicate that the partnerships have had some success in reaching some mutual understanding between partners. But this does not change the fact that NATO has not changed its mind in providing neither internal nor external security guarantees to its partners. On the contrary, it showed that NATO, and the West more generally, was very reluctant to support the regimes that it negotiates with. In both Egypt and Tunisia, the West ended up condemning the regimes and not aiding them in their hour of need (much in compliance with the Alliance’s liberal democratic values). This clearly shows the rest of its MENA partners, that NATO will not provide security guarantees from internal threats. In the case of Bahrain and its regime receiving support from the GCC and Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring sent a clear signal that the regimes do better in investing more in local partnerships, such as the GCC for the ICI Gulf States, since these local organizations support the authoritarian leaders and are willing to provide security guarantees backed by military support.16 As goes for the external threats, not much has changed since 2010. The prospects for security guarantees against external threats are still very limited as stated clearly in the NATO documents cited previously. Again, especially the ICI states do better in relying on each other and the Saudi military. What this adds up to is that NATO still cannot provide the majority of partners with what they want. The exception, as discussed in the previous section, may be Tunisia (and perhaps in the near future, Egypt and a possible partnering Libya),

16 In the case of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states had a clear interest in aiding Al Khalifa’s Sunni Muslim regime. The alternative is that the Shi’a majority would gain power and in turn that Iran would gain much more influence on the Arabian peninsula

15 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission which may want a more extensive partnership where NATO can provide much in relation to the transition to democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Are we at a critical juncture to overcome divisions from historical relations? At a glance, it seems that depending on what role NATO had taken during the Arab Spring and OUP, the third stumbling block could potentially have been overcome, since the two interrelated events provided a window of opportunity to change the Arab worlds perception of the West, at least in some MENA states. But it should come as no surprise that this is a double-edged sword. On one side, many Arabs may see NATO’s OUP as a sign that the West is on the people’s side against the authoritarian regimes of the region. This would provide some support from the indigenous populations of the Arab world but at the same time alienate the regimes in charge. On the other hand, had NATO done nothing, providing tacit support of the regimes vis-à-vis the populations, it may have alienated the populations but it may have been interpreted as a sign from the ruling regimes, that the West will not meddle with the Arab worlds business as it has done throughout history. Thus the Arab Spring and OUP did not provide a clear window for NATO to redeem the West’s image in MENA, which may also be the reason why NATO and especially the USA was so hesitant to support either side during the uprisings in for example Egypt.17 Thus no matter which side NATO took, it would be both praised and condemned depending on which side of the Arab Spring one focuses on.

Different internal priorities and the Israel issue There is no doubt that the next big challenge for NATO and the West more generally is the rising China, or more broadly, the rising Southeast Asia. In policy circles and IR literature, much focus is on this issue exactly.18 Especially the Alliance’s strongest member, the US, is turnings its attention towards this geographic region. No doubt that the Arab Spring and the connected OUP has brought attention back to MENA, as shown in the direct military operation. But in the longer run, there is not much doubt that the US will again redirect most energy on containing or dealing with China. But that is not to argue that many other NATO states, especially the southern ones, will still be much concerned with MENA because of the geographic proximity and the continued presence of threats – terrorism, nuclear proliferation and internal instability – emanating from that region. However in the long run, neither the Arab Spring nor the OUP may have made much difference in the overall scope

17 The US has been said to play on ”both horses” during the early stages of the Arab Spring. Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/AR2011013002239.html 18 See for example Brzezinski’s 2012 book ”Strategic Vision”, Kaplan’s 2011 book ”Monsoon” or Ikenberry’s 2008 Foreign Affairs article ”The Rise of China and the Future of the West”. The list goes on.

16 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission for NATO. As for the strained relations between Turkey and Israel, the Arab Spring may have provided an opening. Herzog & Cagaptay argue that both states have much interest in reconciliation in order to deal with their common neighbor Syria, which is in a state of civil war. They argue, “The two countries share grave concerns about their common neighbor and a desire to see the government of Bashar al-Assad out of power”.19 Assad’s regime, being Alawi, which is a branch of Shi’a Muslim Islam, is supported by both Turkey’s and Israel’s largest foe in the region, Iran which is also a Shi’a Muslim country. But whether this common interest in dealing with Syria is enough to bring reconciliation between the two countries is too early to tell. However, if it does, the Arab Spring may well have brought an opportunity for NATO to broaden its MD partnership at least in the sense that the Turkey-Israel issue may not be as large a pebble in the shoe in the future as it is at present time. However, as discussed earlier, it may make more sense once again to completely leave Israel out of the MD and pursue strictly bilateral (NATO + 1) relations with that state. This may well make the MD run more smoothly overall because of the general suspicion that most Arab states share towards Israel, which makes them reluctant to associate too publically with the Jewish state.

Where does this leave NATO and its MENA partnerships?

This paper shows, despite Santis’ optimism, that NATO’s partnership programs in MENA are not as successful as NATO, according to the Alliance’s repeated references to the role of strengthened partnerships, would want them to be. First of all, it is hard to evaluate the utility of the programs, because they have no clearly stated visions, the reaching of which they could be evaluated on. Secondly, and related to the first problem, there is no clear picture of an added value in having the partnership programs, neither from NATO’s perspective or from the perspective of the partner countries. Thirdly, due to the regime type of many partner countries and the indigenous populations hatred of the West, there seems to be a deep-rooted distrust of NATO’s motifs in MENA. Lastly, internal divisions on NATO’s role in MENA now and in the future, coupled with one NATO member state’s diplomatic disputes with a partner country, ensures that, at least for the moment, ICI but especially MD does not work as combined programs for dealing with MENA states. This is one of the same conclusions in the paper NATO in the Gulf: Partnership Without a Cause? Published in October 2012. The author argues “Eight years after NATO initiated its engagement with Gulf countries through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the results have been modest, not to say disappointing” (Samaan, 2012: p. 1).

19 , June 2012: ”How America Can Help Its Friends Make Nice”. Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/opinion/america-can-mend-israeli-turkish-relations.html

17 Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen Tentative paper presented at DSS PhD Student at the University of Southern Denmark Please do not quote without permission

Although OUP can be interpreted as a success in terms of having partners, generally neither the Arab Spring nor the derived OUP have played any noteworthy role in creating a more sustainable environment for deepened partnership programs. It is also not certain whether having the MD and ICI as overarching programs have contributed to some Middle Eastern states’ participation in the OUP. Having individual partnerships or simple bilateral relations between NATO and MENA states would have probably yielded similar results……..

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