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Zemmi Merchants in Safavid Isfahan: Shiʿite Feqh Meeting Social Reality

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Zemmi Merchants in Safavid Isfahan: Shiʿite Feqh Meeting Social Reality Journal of persianate studies �0 (�0�7) �58–�85 ASPS brill.com/jps Thou Shalt Not Enter the Bazaar on Rainy Days! Zemmi Merchants in Safavid Isfahan: Shiʿite Feqh Meeting Social Reality Sarah Kiyanrad University of Heidelberg [email protected] Abstract Many Muslim and non-Muslim merchants from East and West were attracted to Safavid Isfahan, the new “center of the world,” a city that also played host to its own mercantile communities, among them many zemmi traders—Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. As representatives of the newly-established Twelver Shiʿite theology, Safavid religious scholars felt the need to offer commentary on evolving issues on a theoretical level, sometimes writing not in Arabic but in New Persian. How did they regard the activi- ties of zemmi merchants? Were zemmi traders subject to religiously-motivated restric- tions? Or did they, on the other hand, enjoy exclusive rights? While my paper focusses on these questions, it will also compare the legal opinions of selected Safavid foqahāʾ on the social reality as reflected in travelogues and through historiography. Keywords Safavids – Isfahan – Shiʿite feqh – trade – non-Muslim merchants – zemmis Isfahan, the Safavid capital from 1598 until its fall in 1722, was a melting pot of people, cultures, and religions. In addition to foreign travelers who had been attracted to the city, Iran was home to its own religious minorities, prominently * I am greatly indebted to Professor Rudolph P. Matthee, who read an earlier draft of the manu- script and offered many valuable comments. He furthermore provided me with his unpub- lished, very helpful article about the “Confessions of an Armenian convert.” Of course, all remaining errors are mine. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi �0.��63/�8747�67-��Downloaded34�3�4 from Brill.com09/28/2021 01:11:28PM via free access Zemmi Merchants in Safavid Isfahan 159 Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, all of whom were considered zemmis. The Christian Armenians made their living primarily as merchants and, to a lesser extent, this was also true of the Jews and Zoroastrians. This paper will examine and limit itself to these groups of zemmis.1 In the following paper, I will investigate selected works of Safavid feqh con- taining rules for and views of zemmis, focusing especially on those regulations which possibly affected zemmi merchants. These authors should be considered as prominent and influential Shiʿite scholars in the Safavid era: Bahāʾ al‐Din Mohammad b. Hoseyn al‐ʿĀmeli, better known as Sheykh Bahāʾi (1547–1621) who wrote the Jāmeʿ-e ʿAbbāsi, Mohammad-Taqi Majlesi (1594/95–1659/60), renowned for his Ahkām-e ahl-e zemma, and his son Mohammad-Bāqer Majlesi (1627–1699) with his Savāʾeq al-yahud. The questions I will consider include: what were the most important points regarding trading with zemmis? Do the authors share a common view on this issue, even though it is well known that, for example, Mohammad-Bāqer Majlesi harshly criticized Sheykh Bahāʾi, calling him a Sufi (considered an af- front)? Were zemmi traders subject to restrictions in terms of their commodi- ties, their trading partners, or their trading places and times? On the other hand, did zemmi merchants enjoy exclusive rights? As feqh does not neces- sarily mirror social reality,2 the findings will then be compared to the social reality experienced by zemmi merchants in Isfahan every day (as reflected in travelogues and Safavid historiography). More than two centuries of Safavid rule cannot be regarded as a monolithic bloc. As such, I will specifically focus on the second half of Safavid rule from Shah ʿAbbās I (r. 1587–1629) onwards, when Isfahan was Iran’s capital and a new generation of foqahāʾ, often trained by immigrant scholars, started gain- ing power. Admittedly, even within this generation, diverging opinions can be observed. Majlesi the father, for example, should be considered as a traditional- ist Akhbāri ʿālem, but with a certain sympathy for Sufism, unlike the divergent opinions of his rationalist Osuli collegues.3 Sheykh Bahāʾi represents a rather 1 As non-Muslim Indian merchants in Isfahan were also obliged to pay a form of jezya (usu- ally translated as “poll-tax”), one may argue that they could also be regarded as zemmi mer- chants. I decided to not include them in my investigation and provide instead references for further reading: Das Gupta 1979; Dale 1994; Levi 1999; idem 2002; idem 2007; Markovits 2000; Matthee 2000a, 246–248. In addition to Armenians, there were also other zemmi Christians (Georgians, Syrians, Chaldeans) which I will not treat here. 2 While many researchers are skeptical of the correspondence between Islamic law and prac- tice in the medieval Islamic world, Udovitch (1970, 254), for example, argues that Hanafi law also mirrors customary practice. 3 “Akhbāri” refers to those Shiʿite ʿolemā who only accept the Qurʾan and the sunna as a source of law; they especially reject the possibility that certain ʿolemā (mojtaheds) can reach answers Journal of persianate studies 10 (2017) 158–185 Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 01:11:28PM via free access 160 Kiyanrad “unorthodox” point of view, his legacy being influenced by what is referred to as Sufi thought. Majlesi the son, being a strong opponent of Sufism and Sunnis, obviously tried to avoid siding too much with either Akhbāris or Osulis. While any encompassing study of opinions on zemmis/zemmi merchants in Safavid feqh would have to consider an enormous number of sources (see Moreen 1992, 178), the three selected olemāʾ and the samples of their works treated here can be regarded as a small, though not unimportant, part of a complex puzzle. Armenian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Merchants in Safavid Isfahan While the Armenian merchant community of Isfahan and its activities are quite well studied,4 the lack of (edited) sources and the modest information available in sources might be due to the fact that information on Jewish and Zoroastrian merchants in Isfahan is scarce. The rather low involvement, at least in comparison to the Armenians, of Jews and Zoroastrians in trade might be another factor. Armenians had established themselves as skilled silk merchants during the 15th and 16th centuries, exporting Iranian silk to the Mediterranean (Herzig 1996, 308). Their trade network soon expanded and Armenians could be found dwelling in all of the important trade centers across the world. Safavid shahs soon understood the importance of the Armenian merchants, especially for the trade of Iranian silk; both Tahmāsp I (r. 1514–1576) and Mohammad Khodābanda (r. 1532–1595) made use of them, granting freedom of trade and other privileges to some Armenian merchants (Eskandar Beg Monshi, I, 217; Herzig 1996, 315; Gregorian, 660). The same applies for Shāh ʿAbbās I who, in 1604, ultimately ordered the Armenian community of Julfa to be resettled to Isfahan—economic considerations apparently being the main reason for this. The resettlement of the Armenians, not only those from Julfa, was carried out in several stages; it seems that about 3,000 families were transferred to Isfahan (Jonābādi, 776; Eskandar Beg Monshi, II, 666, 680; Carmelites 1939, I, 99–100). Before the construction of their new quarter, later known as New Julfa, was to religious questions and thus new prescriptions by reasoning (ejtehād), while Osulis favor this option. On the distinction between Akhbāris and Osulis, see Newman 1992a; idem, 1992b. Newman also offers numerous further bibliographical references. 4 See, for example, Herzig 1991; idem 1993; idem 1996; Aslanian 2007; idem 2008; idem 2011; Aghassian and Kévonian; Matthee 1999; Baghdiantz McCabe. For are detailed study of “Minority Religions in Medieval and Early Modern Iran,” see Khanbaghi. Journal of persianateDownloaded studies from 10 Brill.com09/28/2021 (2017) 158–185 01:11:28PM via free access Zemmi Merchants in Safavid Isfahan 161 completed, the Isfahani Armenians dwelled in the gach-kunān caravansary (Tēr Hovhaneantsʿ, 44). Probably only rich Armenian merchants were trans- ferred permanently to New Julfa, while others were dispersed between differ- ent caravansaries and quarters of Isfahan (Pereira de Lacerda, 119; Bournoutian 1994, II, 30). The Armenians of New Julfa enjoyed religious freedom and were allowed to build their own churches. In 1619, New Julfa was granted to some rich Armenian merchants. It should be added that ʿAbbās II (r. 1642–1666) had settled another wave of Armenians from Yerevan and Nakhchivan in New Julfa (more precisely, close to it) (Aslanian 2011, 39); they were apparently not as rich as their counterparts originating from Julfa (Chardin, VIII, 102–103). After this measure, New Julfa hosted around 20,000 inhabitants. Of the other settlements of Armenian merchants in Isfahan, the Nakhjavāniyān caravansary, the Jolfā caravansary, the Jedda caravansary, and the neighborhoods Sheykh Bannā, Shamsābād, and ʿAbbāsābād are worth men- tioning (Homāʾi, 338; Chardin, VII, 326, 367; “Kārvānsarāy-e Esfahān,” 276–277; Falsafi 1963–1985, III, 207; Blow, 200). Armenian merchants traded their goods either in these caravansaries, at home, or in stores located in New Julfa or the city center (Abgar, 114; Tavernier, I, 445; “Kārvānsarāy-e Esfahān,” 276–277; Tēr Hovhaneantsʿ, 124). The range of products they sold encompassed European goods, such as clothes and fabrics, glass, telescopes, and watches (Tavernier, I, 467; Falsafi 1963–1985, III, 216; Aslanian 2004, 2). As Tavernier reports (I, 426), some Armenians would even sell turkeys from Venice. Apart from this, the cash they brought back with them was of great importance for the Safavid economy (Matthee 2000a, 233; see also Floor and Clawson). The history of Isfahan is inextricably linked to the history of Iranian Jewry. Originally consisting of two close cities, i.e. Jay (or Shahr/Shahrestān) and Yahudiyya (in the north-east of the old meydān), from the fourth century on these two settlements merged into one city which then grew.
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