A Study of Group Psychotherapy. an Empirical Study of the Whole Group

A Study of Group Psychotherapy. An empirical study of the whole group.

Peter Rob Gordon

Submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

July, 2001.

Department of Psychology. The University of Melbourne. 2

ABSTRACT The view regarding social units as entities in their own right disappeared from scientific consideration in the mid-twentieth century as much for political and ideological reasons as scientific ones. Yet group psychotherapy rediscovered these ideas. The problem to re-establish them scientifically is lack of empirical methodology for investigating whole groups. The study integrated theories of groups as psychic entities from sociology, social psychology and group psychotherapy to form hypotheses about therapeutic groups’ functioning. Four dimensions of whole-group function were derived: Structure, Cognitive Organisation, Affect, and Action Coherence. An observational instrument, the “Group Function Record,” was developed, categories defined for each dimension and a procedure established to rate minute-by-minute group function from videotaped psychotherapy groups. Therapists’ Interventions were also recorded. The instrument treats the group as the object of study and quality of collective functioning is rated irrespective of members present or their roles. Reliability was established and ratings were made of one latency and four adolescent yearlong groups. Results substantiated an eight-phase developmental sequence derived from the group development literature and outlined a theory of group formation. The most challenging, but creative state was found to be when the group is whole with all members in communication, though it is unstable and often managed by breaking into subgroups. A linear relation existed showing that the smaller the group, the better it functions. Groups also function best with one or two members missing, but more absentees threaten the group’s existence. More highly organized groups are more stable, but tend to destabilize when they become self-reflective. Homeostatic self- correcting tendencies and a close relationship between affective and action changes were evident. Change towards unpleasurable affect is associated with change from cooperation to conflict and vice versa. Crises tend to be precipitated by affective change, but correct themselves within the next minute or two. The effects of Therapists’ Interventions towards members, the group or both were analyzed. Group interventions initially tend to reduce functionality, followed by improvement after several minutes; member interventions have inconsistent effects; interventions to group and members in the same minute tend to produce immediate improved function. The findings and their implications for therapeutic goals and technique with

3 adolescents are discussed in relation to the theoretical background. Considerable merit is found in the collective mentality theories, many of whose postulates are validated. Indications for therapeutic technique are outlined from the findings. The method provides a different view of group process posing new questions and suggesting simple techniques are therapeutically potent. Further avenues of research are suggested.

DECLARATION This is to certify that (i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD, (ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, (iii) the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies, appendices and footnotes.

Signed: ………………………………… Date:……………..

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. Many people have assisted me to complete this project. I thank my family for their forbearance, faith and support, my supervisors, Drs. Charles Langley, Michael Kyrios, and Richard Bell for their interest, encouragement and assistance, Drs. Petra Steiger and Sabar Rustomjee, as well as Nic Cecic, Niloofa Patel and Anne Forbes who spent many hours helping develop, perfect and test the reliability of the Group Function Record; and to Sheila Park and Gabriel Ross for generously making available tapes of their group for the study. I am grateful to my many colleagues in the Australian Association of Group Psychotherapists, the Royal Children’s Hospital and other child and adolescent mental health agencies for their interest and support. I wish to acknowledge the late Dr Patricia Leaper for the initial stimulus to make this research a doctoral thesis. Finally, I acknowledge the boys and girls of my groups over twenty-five years, especially those in this study. They have been and continue to be my teachers.

CONTENTS.

TABLES. 15

FIGURES. 23

PREFACE. 25

PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND. 27

1: THE STUDY OF GROUPS 28 Background. 28 Purpose of the Study. 30 Structure of the Study. 30 The nature of groups. 31 The word “group.” 32 Group in psychology. 32 Group in sociology 33 Conclusion. 34

2: GROUP AS ORGANISM 35 Origins. 35 Spencer and Darwinism. 35 Functionalism. 36 Systems Theory 37 Conclusion 37

3: GROUP AS CROWD OR HERD. 39 Early theorists. 39 Le Bon. 39 Later theories. 40 The herd. 41 Conclusion. 42

4: GROUP AS SOCIAL MIND 44 Philosophical background. 44 British theorists. 44 American theorists. 46 Conclusion. 50

5: GROUP AS BEING. 51 The collective conscience. 51 Social solidarity. 52 Individuality and cooperation. 53 Social facts. 54 The social basis of thought. 55 Social gatherings. 57 Language and the social being. 57 Impact and evaluation. 57 Conclusion. 58

6: GROUP ENTITY IN SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 59 Reduction of the group entity. 59 Analytic definitions of group. 60 Re-emergence of group mentality. 61 Conclusion. 64

7: COLLECTIVE MIND IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 65 Burrow. 65 Foulkes. 67 Other Group Analytic Writers. 70 Bion. 71 The Group-as-a-whole. 74 Conclusion. 75

8: CRITICISM OF COLLECTIVE MENTALITY 76 Organism theories. 76

Crowd and herd theories. 76 Group mentality theories. 77 Freud’s critique. 77 Ginsberg’s critique. 78 Critique of Durkheim. 78 Critique of McDougall. 80 Later criticism. 81 Evaluation of objections. 84 Conclusions. 87

9: INTEGRATION OF THEMES. 88

A science of groups. 88

A theory of group mentality. 89 Defining collective mentality. 89

Group Organizational States. 96 The Aggregate. 96 The Organism. 97 The Psychic Group. 100 Collective Cognition. 102 Collective Affect. 104 Collective Action. 106 The Self-Reflective Group. 108

PART II. THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 110

10. GROUP PHENOMENA AS SOCIAL COMMUNICATION. 111

Group Function Record 111 The challenge of group membership. 111 Communication and social interaction. 112 Communication and social engagement. 114

Social communication and group status. 115 Communication and the group. 116 Communication in psychotherapy groups. 118

Group Function Record dimensions. 120

11. GFR DIMENSION 1: STRUCTURE 122 Structure and group size. 122 Structure in group dynamics. 125 Structure in psychotherapy groups. 127 Structure and the GFR. 129 Criteria for rating Structure. 129 Categories for Structure. 130

12. GFR DIMENSION 2: COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION 131 The nature of cognition. 131 Fundamental properties of cognition. 132 The group cognitive system. 133 Unorganized communication in the GFR. 136 Norms as cognitive elements. 136 Normative Organization and the GFR. 138 Rules as cognitive elements. 138 Systemic Organization and the GFR. 140 The group’s cognition of itself. 141 Representations as cognitive elements. 141 Representational Organization and the GFR. 144 Cognitive Organization in the GFR. 145

13. GFR DIMENSION 3: AFFECT 149 Affect and emotion. 149 Biological theories. 149 Cognitive theories. 151 Social and phenomenological theories. 152 Psychoanalytic theories. 153

A synthesis of affect theories. 155 Group affect. 155 Communicational phenomena as affective states. 156 Mapping group affect. 159

14. GFR DIMENSION 4: ACTION COHERENCE. 162 Definitions of action. 162 Psychological theories of action. 163 Action in contemporary social psychology. 163 Mead’s theory of action. 164 Parsons’ Theory of Action. 166 Harbermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. 167 Criticism of the Theory of Communicative Action. 170 Communicative action and goals. 170 Conclusions. 171

Characterizing group action. 173 Definition of Action Coherence categories. 174

15. GFR DIMENSION 5: THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS. 177 Types of interventions. 177 Therapists’ control of the group process. 180 Non-verbal interventions. 180

PART III. METHOD AND RESULTS. 181

16: HYPOTHESES. 182 1. Group Development. 182 2. Group Structure. 182 3. Group Dynamics. 184 4. Therapists’ Interventions. 186

17: METHOD. 188

Subjects and groups. 188

Data collection. 189

Reliability studies. 190 Intra-Rater Reliability Study. 191 Inter-Rater Reliability Study. 192 Validity. 193

Description and characteristics of the data. 195 Range and variety of states. 195 Incompatible Combinations. 195 Differences in frequency of categories for different groups. 197

Defining and classifying composite group states. 198 Condensed States. 198 Functional Bands. 200 Characteristics of each group. 200 Significant differences in frequencies of states. 201

Phases of Group Development 203 Studies of group development. 203 Collation of group development phases: 205 Describing group process in Collated Phases described by Functional Bands. 205

18. RESULTS 1: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 210 1.1. Stability of GFR Dimensions. 210 1.2. Quartile Development of Condensed States. 214 1.3. Phases of Group Development. 219 1.4. Condensed States in Developmental Phases. 230

19. RESULTS: 2 STRUCTURE 232 2.1. Group Function and Structure. 232 2.2. Group Function and Group Size. 244

2.3. Group Function and Completeness. 252

20. RESULTS 3: DYNAMICS. 257 3.1. Cognitive Organization and Group Function. 257 3.2. Effects of unstable affect and conflict on group function. 259 3.3. The relationship between changes in affect and action. 264 3.4. Crises in Group Life. 273 3.5. Crisis Sessions: 280 3.6. Stability and Quality Cycles. 282 3.7. Occurrence of Crises within Sessions. 287

21: RESULTS 4: THERAPISTS’ INTERVENTIONS. 289 4.1. Effect of Therapists Interventions on GFR Dimensions. 291 Characteristics of Interventions. 298 4.2. Effect of Limits. 299 4.3. Effect of Locomotion. 300 4.4. Year Differences. 302 4.5. Differentiating Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 302 4.5.1. Therapists Interventions with Limits. 303 4.5.2. Locomotion distinguished from Therapists Interventions and Limits. 304

PART IV. DISCUSSION. 307

22. DISCUSSION 1: THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 310 Structure. 310 Cognitive Organization. 313 Affect. 315 Action Coherence. 317 Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 318 The value of the GFR. 319

23. DISCUSSION 2. HYPOTHESES. 320 1. Group Development. 320 2. Group Structure. 321

3. Group Dynamics. 325 4. Therapists Interventions. 331

24. DISCUSSION 3: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 334 1. Convening. 334 2. Engagement. 335 3: Positioning. 336 4. Consolidation. 338 5. Idealization. 339 6. Disenchantment. 340 7. Working. 341 8. Separation. 341 Overview. 342

25. DISCUSSION 4: THEORY. 345 The Group Organism. 345 The Crowd. 347 The Social Mind. 349 Society as a Being. 354 Group Psychotherapy. 359 Integration of Themes. 360 Conclusion. 361

26. DISCUSSION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 362 Theory. 362 The GFR. 363 Group Development. 366 Hypotheses. 367 Conclusion. 368

REFERENCES. 369

APPENDIX 1. 415 Changing Definitions of the word “group.” 415

The Groups. 415

THE VALIDITY OF THE GFR. 420 Particular problems of the GFR. 421 Instrumental Validity of the GFR. 422 Methodological Validity of the study. 427 Functional Validity of the GFR. 429

APPENDIX 2: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS INSTRUCTIONS. 431

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS’ INSTRUCTIONS 432

GFR EXAMPLES 445

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD OUTLINE 449

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD – RATING SHEET. 450

APPENDIX 3: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD RESULTS. 452

Distribution of GFR Categories. 452 Group Development. 463

Tables for Structure Hypotheses. 468

Tables for Dynamic Hypotheses. 471

Graphs of Stability and Quality. 474

Tables for therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. 481

TABLES. Table 11.1. Possible relationships in different sized groups (adapted from Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989, p. 39). 124 Table 12.1. Analysis and comparison of cognitive organization categories. 148 Table 13.1. Definitions of Affect categories with examples. 161 Table 14.1. Action Coherence categories. 176 Table 17.1. Principal components analysis of three ratings of three sessions, showing factor loadings for each rating and total fit for all three ratings. 192 Table 17.2. Principal components analysis of a random sample of ten sessions by three raters, showing communality for each rater and total fit for all three raters. 193 Table 17.3. Category frequencies of all group dimensions. 194 Table 17.4. Frequency, percentages and ranks of the first 80% of group states. 196 Table 17.5. Frequencies of unlikely combinations of categories. 196 Table 17.6. Percentage of categories for each year, mean of adolescent groups and all groups. 197 Table 17.7. Division of GFR dimensions into positive and negative qualities. 198 Table 17.8. Classification of GFR categories into 9 Condensed States. 199 Table 17.9. Division of 9 Condensed States into Functional Bands. 200 Table 17.10. Percentage of time spent in Condensed states for each group. 200 Table 17.11. Key word descriptions for group developmental phases from the literature. 205 Table 17.12. Alignment of group development phases in various authors with phase names. 207 Table 17.13. Proportions of Functional Bands associated with phases of group development. 209 Table 18.1. Number of sessions in quartiles for each group. 215 Table 18.2. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1988. 215 Table 18.3. Percentage of Condensed States by quartile for 1990. 216 Table 18.4. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1992. 217 Table 18.5. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1993. 218 Table 18.6. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1996. 218 Table 18.7. Length of phases, mean period and percentage of the year spent in

each phase for each group. 229 Table 18.8. Percentage of Condensed States in each Developmental Phase for all Groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between states. 231 Table 19.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence categories in Structure ratings for all groups. 233 Table 19.2. Frequency of Affect categories in preceding and designated minutes associated with Structure Change for all groups. 234 Table 19.3. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories in preceding and designated minutes associated with Structure Change for all groups. 235 Table 19.4. Proportion of change in Group Action characteristics for all groups after five minutes. 239 Table 19.5. Percentage of Structure categories in each quartile for all groups. 240 Table 19.6. Percentage of Structure categories for year quartiles for each group. 241 Table 19.7. The percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in each Structure #2 category by quartiles for all groups. 241 Table 19.8. Proportions of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2 category in year quartiles for all groups. 242 Table 19.9. Percentages of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2 category in year quartiles for all groups. 243 Table 19.10. The proportion of Structure #2 categories for different sized groups. 245 Table 19.11. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in Structure#2 for all groups and different sized groups. 246 Table 19.12. Percentage of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all groups and for different sized groups. 247 Table 19.13. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in Structure#2 for all groups and for different sized groups. 248 Table 19.14. Stability of Condensed States for different sized groups. 249 Table 19.15. The percentage of Condensed States by group size for all groups. 250 Table 19.16. Total percentage of changes between Group Action states in different sized groups after 5 minutes (excluding percentage of stable minutes). 251 Table 19.17. Percentage of Condensed States in groups with different numbers of absentees. 253 Table 19.18. Percentage of Action Coherence in Structure #2 categories showing

the influence of group size and absentees. 254 Table 19.19. Absentees’ effect on Stability of Condensed States for all groups. 255 Table 19.20. Effect of absentees on percentage of stable minutes for Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence. 255 Table 20.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Affect categories for all groups. 257 Table 20.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Action Coherence categories for all groups. 258 Table 20.3. Percentage of stable minutes in each Affect category for all GFR Dimensions. 260 Table 20.4. Percentage of change in Group Dimensions associated with Action Coherence categories for the minute of observation and the following minute. 261 Table 20.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect#2 categories over three minutes. 262 Table 20.6. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Action Coherence categories over three minutes. 263 Table 20.7. Action rating at Affect Change, 10 minutes before and 5 minutes after for all groups. 265 Table 20.8. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes before, minute of negative Affect change and 5 minutes after. 266 Table 20.9. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes before, minute of positive Affect change and 5 minutes after. 267 Table 20.10. Proportions of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation Quotient) for Affect changes in associated minutes. 270 Table 20.11. Proportions of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation Quotient) for negative Affect changes in associated minutes for each group. 270 Table 20.12. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Structure Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions. 272 Table 20.13. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Cognitive Organization Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions. 273 Table 20.14. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Action Coherence Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions. 273 Table 20.15. Number of Sessions for each group in which destructive crisis

events occur, compared by quartiles. 274 Table 20.16. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups. 275 Table 20.17. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups. 275 Table 20.18. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups. 276 Table 20.19. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups. 276 Table 20.20. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups. 277 Table 20.21. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups. 277 Table 20.22. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups. 277 Table 20.23. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups. 278 Table 20.24. Group size for crisis sessions. 278 Table 20.25. Absentees for crisis sessions. 279 Table 20.26. The frequency and percentage of Condensed States in the five minutes leading to crisis events. 280 Table 20.27. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions in stability cycles for all groups. 282 Table 20.28. Percentage of GFR Dimension categories for peaks, troughs and preceding sessions for stability cycles in all groups. 283 Table 20.29. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions in quality cycles for all groups. 285 Table 20.30. Percentage of GFR Dimension Categories for peaks, troughs and preceding sessions for session quality cycles in all groups. 286 Table 20.31. Percentage of Affect and Action Coherence categories for session quartiles for all groups. 288 Table 21.1. Percentage of Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and Locomotion for each group. 289

Table 21.2. Quartile percentages for Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and locomotion for each year. 290 Table 21.3. Percentage of Structure categories for all groups from one minute before “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 292 Table 21.4. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for all groups from one minute before, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).” 293 Table 21.5. Percentage of Affect categories for all groups from one minute before, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, 295 “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 295 Table 21.6. Percentage of Action Coherence categories for all groups from one minute before, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” to five minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, “LEADS(ACTION,1-5).” 297 Table 21.7. Characteristics of Therapists Interventions and their effects of GFR Dimensions. 301 Table 21.8. Percentage of coincidence of Limits and Locomotion for all groups. 302 Table 21.9. Percentage of coincidence of Therapists Interventions with Limits and Locomotion for all groups. 303 Table 17A.1. Frequencies for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988. 452 Table 17A.2. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990. 453 Table 17A.3. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1992. 454 Table 17A.4. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1993. 455 Table 17A.5. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996. 456 Table 17A.6. Percentages of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988. 457 Table 17A.7. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990. 458 Table 17A.8. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1992. 459 Table 17A.9. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1993. 460 Table 17A.10. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996. 461 Table 17A.11. Frequencies and percentages of Group States for all Groups (shown as category values in the order Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect, Action Coherence). 463 Table 18A.1. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1988. 464

Table 18A.2. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1990. 465 Table 18A.3. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1992. 466 Table 18A.4. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1993. 467 Table 18A.5. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1996. 467 Table 18A.6. Means of percentage of stable minutes for Group Dimensions for each group. 468 Table 19A.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence in Structure categories for all groups in each year quartile. 469 Table 19A.2. Percentage of Condensed States for different absentees for all groups for year quartiles. 470 Table 20A.1. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1988. 471 Table 20A.2. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1990. 471 Table 20A.3. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1992. 472 Table 20A.4. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1993. 472 Table 20A.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1996. 472 Table 20A.6. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after negative Affect change for all Adolescent Groups, controlling for overlapping minutes. 473 Table 20A.7. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after negative Affect change for the 1990 Latency Group, controlling for overlapping minutes. 474 Table 20A.8. Frequency and Percentage of Condensed States in minute preceding destructive crisis. 479 Table 21A.1. Percentage of Structure categories associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 481 Table 21A.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with

Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNOG,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNOG,1-3).” 482 Table 21A.3. Percentage of Affect associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 483 Table 21A.4. Percentage of Action Coherence associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).” 484 Table 21A.5. Percentage of Structure Categories associated with Locomotion and No Locomotion by therapists for all Groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).” 485 Table 21A.6. Percentage of Cognitive Organization Categories associated with Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).” 486 Table 21A.7. Percentage of Affect Categories associated with Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).” 487 Table 21A.8. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories associated with Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).” 488 Table 21A.9. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1988 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 489 Table 21A.10. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in

the 1990 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 491 Table 21A.11. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1992 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 492 Table 21A.12. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1993 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 493 Table 21A.13. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1996 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(COND9,1-3).” 495 Table 21A.14. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with those without Limits for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the three minutes after. 497 Table 21A.15. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limit. Categories not shown had no differences. 498 Table 21A.16. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the three minutes after. 499 Table 21A.17. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion. Categories not shown had no differences. 500

FIGURES.

Figure 13.1. Qualitative and quantitative dimensions mapping six group affective states. 160 Figure 18.1. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1988. 210 Figure 18.2. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1990. 211 Figure 18.3. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1992. 212 Figure 18.4. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1993. 212 Figure 18.5. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1996. 213 Figure 18.6. Mean of percentage of stable minutes for GFR Dimensions for each group. 214 Figure 18.7. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1988 showing developmental phases. 220 Figure 18.8. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1990 showing developmental phases. 222 Figure 18.9. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1992 showing developmental phases. 224 Figure 18.10. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1993 showing developmental phases. 226 Figure 18.11. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1996 showing developmental phases. 227 Figure 18.12. Generic Graph of phases showing hypothetical percentages of Functional Bands. 230 Figure 19.1. Change between Group Action states over a five-minute period for all groups as a percentage of all minutes and as a proportion of all changes. 237 Figure 19.2. Net percentage change between Group Action states over a five- minute period for all groups. 238 Figure 20.1. Frequencies of cooperation and conflict for 10 minutes before, during and 5 minutes after Affect change for all groups. 269 Figure 20.2. Proportion of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation Quotient) for 10 minutes prior to 5 minutes after negative Affect change for each group. 271 Figure 20.3. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed States and percentage of

Constructive Condensed States for each session of 1988. 281 Figure 20A.1. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1988, crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31. 475 Figure 20A.2. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1990, crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30. 475 Figure 20A.3. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1992, crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37. 476 Figure 20A.4. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1993, crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30. 476 Figure 20A.5. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1988, crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31. 477 Figure 20A.6. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1990, crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30. 477 Figure 20A.7. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1992, crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37. 478 Figure 20A.8. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1993, crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30. 478 Figure 20A.9. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1990. 479 Figure 20A.10. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1992. 480 Figure 20A.11. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1993. 480

PREFACE. My training at the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne emphasized the group as the important therapeutic factor. Under the guidance of Drs. Bill Blomfield, George Christie and members of the Group Psychotherapy Training Program, phenomenology, anthropology, developmental psychology and psychoanalysis provided a body of theory to inform group phenomena. It indicated that formation of functional groups should help seriously disturbed children and adolescents unable to engage in individual treatment because of inadequate verbal skills, inability to express psychic states or anxiety about revealing themselves. They had usually never belonged to stable, supportive peer groups. In 1976 I began to conduct groups for adolescents and in 1979 groups for younger children. The phenomena of these groups were often confusing, alarming and chaotic. Some interventions were powerful, but others ineffectual. When the groups seemed at their worst, members would demonstrate surprising gains, sometimes only evident outside the group setting. Gradually over ten years, a reliable technique developed for successful group therapy, but its relationship to the existing theories was unclear. The group was regarded as an evolving entity; therapeutic goals were its preservation as a place where members could belong and enjoy themselves and maintaining the group until this was achieved. The technique came to rely on observing several dimensions of group function as the basis for its management, which were couched less in terms of the psychological content of events, but more in terms of the group’s structure and function. Psychological interpretations consistently tended to disrupt the groups. These constructs from clinical experience did not correspond closely to what the literature described. The “group-as-a-whole” perspective in psychoanalytically oriented group theory (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1974) often lacked applicability to these groups. Formulations in the literature were often couched in metaphors deriving from the family (Friedemann, 1974; Elliott, 1994) or intrapsychic structures (Coleman and Bexton, 1975; Hinshelwood, 1987). However, these seemed to be secondary to groups, which preceded the evolution of nuclear families or individuality (Freud, 1921; Mead, 1962). It seemed important to seek theory regarding groups as primary instead of secondary psychosocial entities formed by interacting individuals (Allport, 1924). The study was conceived firstly, to find and integrate theoretical sources giving

26 primacy to the group; secondly, to provide conceptual clarity and theoretical support for whole-group constructs forming the basis of the technique; thirdly to develop a methodology for accurately recording group function as it occurred, to examine the phenomenology of groups independently of therapists’ impressionistic memories and test hypotheses about group function. These aims are explored in the first three parts of the thesis. The last two parts discuss the results in relation to the theoretical material and provide references and appendices.

PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.

In Part I, the theoretical background to the group as an entity is explored. In Chapter 1, the concept of “group” and its development in psychology and sociology is analyzed. Chapters 2-5 review historical theories taking different approaches to conceptualizing groups holistically. The concepts are traced from their origins up to their contemporary expression. In Chapters 6 and 7, use of group entity concepts in contemporary social psychology and group psychotherapy is reviewed. Critical arguments against these views are analyzed in Chapter 8 and in Chapter 9 the theoretical material is integrated to form a conceptual framework for the study.

1: THE STUDY OF GROUPS

Background. This study establishes a method for studying groups as entities in their own right. Using adolescent and children’s psychotherapy groups, it develops a theory of the group as a psychic entity, defines dimensions of its functioning and identifies basic phenomena. It is hypothesised some findings may apply to group life generally. The study postulates that groups can be observed as social units whose activity is distinct from (though not independent of) their members’ interactions. Group and members represent distinct and separate levels of analysis requiring different observational methodologies (Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Whitaker, 1989). Abundant theory analyzes individual psychology in groups (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989; Forsyth, 1990), therapeutic effects of groups on members (Kellerman, 1979; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Yalom, 1985; Hinshelwood, 1987; Malekoff, 1997) and individual therapy within the group (Wolf, Kutash and Nattland, 1993). However, there is less theory about the group itself (although see Kissen, 1976; Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Whittaker, 1989; Neri, 1998; Dalal, 1988; Ettin, 1999). Several authors suggest theoretical advances are required before important problems in the science of groups can be resolved (Bednar and Moeschl, 1981; McCollum, 1995). Historically, groups were excluded from psychoanalytic theory when Freud (1921) challenged theories of the group or crowd mind and accounted for group phenomena as intrapsychic processes of identification and attachment among members (Ettin, 1999). There followed little interest in groups and those who pursued them were discouraged or ostracized (Galt, 1995). In social science the problematic status of groups is often resolved by pejorative dismissal (Catlin, 1936), as anachronistic (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948) or unfashionable (Watkins, 1973). However, there are repeated calls to grant social groups the status of entities worthy of study (Warriner, 1956; Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner, 1988); although unfashionable, the collective mind remains a scientific hypothesis (Steiner, 1986; Sandelands and St Clair, 1993). In group psychotherapy literature, “group-as-a-whole” is often discussed in interpersonal terms, using family metaphors (Wells, 1980) or systems theory (Agazarian and Peters, 1981) rather than as a discrete psychosocial entity with its own characteristics. Bion (1961), who is identified with the group-as-a-whole approach (Rutan and Stone,

1984), ultimately conceives groups in terms of members’ primitive psychic mechanisms and shared emotional “basic assumptions” (Dalal, 1998), or as a group in the mind of members (Hoggett, 1998). Foulkes (1964, 1990) fluctuates between a radical, undeveloped theory of the group entity and a conservative, elaborated theory of the group in terms of interpersonal and intrapsychic mechanisms (Dalal, 1998). There is limited development of a theory of the whole group beyond seeing it as the context or “matrix” in which the therapy occurs, rather than the object of treatment in itself, even though the theoretical implications of these ideas question some of the most fundamental assumptions of traditional psychoanalytic theory (Dalal, 1998). Definition of dimensions of group function relevant to outcomes is lacking. Studies of therapeutic factors concentrate on learning, insight, self-disclosure, catharsis, family reenactment and altruism (Bloch and Crouch, 1985; Yalom, 1995; Malekoff, 1997). Cohesiveness is the only group factor identified. There is no consensus of how to observe group situations as the therapeutic agent (Burrow, 1927b; Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1964, 1977) or patterns of small group behavior (Davis, 1977; Beck and Lewis, 2000). North American group psychotherapy has tended to view the group as where therapeutic individual experiences occur and members’ personal content is interpreted (Slavson, 1937, 1943, 1979; Durkin, 1964; Schiffer, 1971, 1984; Rutan and Stone, 1984). The British tradition has seen the group as matrix for unique social experiences (Foulkes, 1948, 1964; Abse, 1974; Dalal, 1998), or collective mentality as antithetic to therapeutic goals (Bion, 1961). There appears to be no attempt to reconsider the viewpoints rejected by Freud in spite of the principle spokesmen often using similar terms to McDougall (1920) such as “group mind” or “group mentality” (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1964, 1977). What is more surprising is the neglect in the psychodynamic group psychotherapy literature of the body of theory in other disciplines that develop these hypotheses with scientific integrity (Gazda, 1977a; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975; Brown and Zinkin, 1994; Yalom, 1995; Ettin, 1999); and with few exceptions (Allport, 1954; Turner, 1988) the same is true of social psychology of groups. It is as though having been rejected, the concept of the group as psychic entity in psychotherapy had to be rediscovered in isolation from all that had already been achieved in other fields. The theoretical part of this study sets out to re-examine the rejected sources and discover to what extent they offer a theory of the group for group psychotherapy and

30 formulate propositions about group function.

Purpose of the Study. The impetus for the study came from conducting groups with low functioning children and adolescents with varied emotional and social problems unable to benefit from individual therapy, but who responded to group treatment designed to assist them to form a group where they belonged with the other members, enjoyed themselves and could solve the problems of maintaining it. Successful technique for this work did not emphasize intra-personal psychodynamics, but focused on group events and the holistic state of the group (Gordon, 1989b; Malekoff, 1997; Tijhuis, 1998, 2000). The technique differed from other forms of adolescent group work directed at intra-psychic issues (Rachman, 1989; MacLennan and Dies, 1992) or personal skill development (Hazel, Sherman, Schumaker and Sheldon, 1985; Holmes, Heshel and Gordon, 1991). This theory forms the basis for a record of group process and an investigation of what happens in groups from one minute to the next and one session to the next without recourse to therapists’ memory. Such a record allows hypotheses about the process of therapeutic groups to be tested and important phenomena described. The technical implications of these findings provide recommendations for effective group psychotherapy with these patients. The thesis aims to renovate a venerable tradition in social theory, establish a methodology for systematic research of group entities and refine clinical technique.

Structure of the Study. The study is structured into five parts. Part 1: Theoretical traditions viewing groups as entities are reviewed and analyzed. Key concepts from this body of theory are integrated to form hypotheses of groups as psychic entities and their functioning, as the basis for a therapeutic theory. Part 2: Observable properties of groups are considered and four dimensions of holistic group function developed. Conceptual definitions and criteria for their observation are established and an observational instrument for systematic observation and recording of group function (The Group Function Record) is developed. Part 3: The observational instrument is employed to record videotaped weekly sessions of five yearlong groups of children and adolescents. These data are used to test

hypotheses about developmental phases, structural influences, dynamic processes and effects of therapists’ interventions. Part 4: The results and their implications for therapeutic technique are discussed in relation to the instrument and the theory. Concepts developed in non-therapeutic disciplines are examined for their relevance and adequacy to understand typical therapeutic group phenomena. Implications for further research are outlined. Part 5: This contains references and appendices describing the groups, discussion of validity, raters’ instructions for the rating system and additional results.

To introduce historical theories of the group-as-a-whole, the meaning of the word “group” and the concept’s use in contemporary psychological theory are investigated.

The nature of groups. The debate about groups (Allport, 1954) has been between the realists’ position that nation, race, class, family are entities in their own right, represented by McDougall (1920), who propounded a group mind, and nominalists arguing groups are names referring to the individuals comprising them, represented by Floyd Allport (1921). Current epistemology (Harre and Secord, 1972; Gadamer, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977; Giddens, 1982; Davidson, 1985; Gergen, Hepburn and Fischer, 1986; Ettin, 1999) sets this dichotomy aside. Asking whether groups are “real” tries to place them in the categories of “reality” or “fiction,” resulting in polemics defending different axioms without resolution. The question can be reformulated phenomenologically by asking: What sort of reality can be given to groups? Although lacking the criterion of falsifiability (Popper, 1972), such scientific investigation begins by defining the horizon (Gadamer, 1975) within which knowledge is gained, developing a method suiting the investigation, and acknowledging observations exist in an interpretive field. The word “entity” means “the existence as distinct from the qualities or relations, of anything” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). In this sense, groups are not simply qualities or relations of their members, they exist as “social entities.” To perceive an entity is to take a point of view towards it, like seeing a forest instead of trees. The view that groups are not observable to the senses (Ginsberg, 1921; Agazarian, 1993) also means neither flocks, forests nor molecules are observable (Steiner, 1983). Science does not progress by systematic accretion of facts of objective inquiry (Kuhn, 1962) and the lack of

32 recent investigation into the nature of groups is related to non-scientific factors such as fashion, funding and politics (Steiner, 1974, 1983; Sandelands and St Clair, 1993). However, the concept group needs to be accessible to scientific scrutiny if a dimension of group-specific processes is to be studied. To begin with, the meaning of the word itself must be reviewed.

The word “group.” Group is a recent concept (Anzieu, 1985). There is no ancient Greek word corresponding to the contemporary idea (Hatzidaki, 1991; Liddell and Scott, 1896). In Latin, undifferentiated masses of crowd, flock, ball, globe, sphere and mass were used for groups (Simpson, 1963). The English word derived from French and Teutonic words for knot, cluster or heap, was used first for people in 1748. It means: “an assemblage of persons, animals or material things, standing near together so as to form a collective unity; a knot (of people), a cluster (of things) … a number of persons or things regarded as forming a unity on account of any kind of mutual or common relation, or classed together on account of a certain degree of similarity” (Oxford English Dictionary). The transition from unorganized collection to collective unit formed by shared characteristics occurred in the 1960’s as evident in changing dictionary definitions (see Appendix 1). Since group has so recently acquired its present meaning, it is important to show how it has been taken up by the disciplines to be surveyed in the following sections.

Group in psychology. In psychology, group means a social unit of individuals with common qualities, in communication, influencing each other through interaction, with a feeling of group membership, varying from a loose mass to a compact unit (English and English, 1958; Chaplin, 1968; Drever, 1956, 1974). Groups are “two or more persons interacting with one another, who share a set of common goals, and norms which direct their activities, and who develop a set of roles and a network of affective relations;” they are distinguished from crowds where reciprocal influence is not possible; 90% of groups have less than six members (Harre and Lamb, 1983, p. 259). This notion of group as a small, structured unit with a set of self-created relations among members was acquired by psychology in the 1950’s. The first social psychology texts used “group” for large, undifferentiated units

(Ross, 1908; Ellwood, 1912; Klineberg, 1940; Maus, 1962), then for classes, associations or society (McDougall, 1912). “Group mind” referred to nations (McDougall, 1920; Levy- Bruhl, 1928). Many early social psychology texts make no mention of the word (Trotter, 1916; Tansley, 1920; Dewey, 1922), including the founder of group psychotherapy in the United States (Pratt, 1917; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975; Ettin, 199). In the following decades, groups indicate the individual’s immediate psychological environment (Bartlett, 1932) and become “sociological wholes … [whose unity] can be defined operationally in the same way as a unity of any other dynamic whole, namely, by the interdependence of its parts” (Lewin, 1948, p. 73). Group came to indicate the range of human social units whose members had a direct psychological relationship (Klineberg, 1940; Ross, 1946; Sherif, 1948; Krech and Crutchfield, 1948). Experimental work established groups in social psychology and it became a prominent topic from the 1950’s (Newcombe, 1950; Asch, 1952; Thouless, 1958; Brown, 1965; Watson, 1966).

Group in sociology In nineteenth century sociology, group meant classification (Darwin, 1958; Spencer, 1876; Giddings, 1896) or large undifferentiated units such as societies, nations, classes, clans, professions, tribes or communities (Spencer, 1876; Bosanquet, 1899; Giddings, 1896; Durkheim, 1893, 1895, 1912). Gumplowicz (1899) recognized society as a large group composed of smaller groups and studied relations between constituent groups rather than whole societies (Maus, 1962). The group concept lacked the internal integrity central to its modern definition (Fairbanks, 1901; Dealey and Ward, 1905; Ross, 1905; Small, 1905; Simmel, 1908, 1955; Wolff, 1950). It was “a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together” (Small, 1905, p 459; Olmsted, 1959, pp 20-21). Cooley (1909) called intimate, cooperative associations where individualities fuse into a whole “primary groups;” small, large and temporary groups were distinguished (Hayes, 1915). Specific social groups were studied in the 1920’s and 1930’s (Thrasher, 1927; Maus, 1956); studies of small groups began after that (Homans, 1951; Mills, 1967). Large and small social groups then became fundamental to sociology (Broom and Selznick, 1955; Johnson, 1961; Bottomore, 1962; Nisbet, 1970).

Conclusion. The concept of group has changed its early meaning and is no longer tied to specific social forms. Although describing diverse social structures with common properties, it usually indicates small units with structural and dynamic properties regarded as relatively invariant across a wide range of cultures and situations. The “small group” is a discovery of the mid-twentieth century, whose phenomena are thought to underlie social life (Lewin, 1948; Mills, 1967; Turner, 1988) but the assumptions underlying the concept are not explicit in social or psychological theory. A scientific theory of groups needs to establish how the small group can form the basis of the psychical functioning of individuals and groups. However before attempting this, the historical understanding of groups needs to be reviewed. Consistent with what has been found in the history of the word, historical investigations of groups began with whole societies (Durkheim, 1964). While far removed from small psychotherapy groups, these well-elaborated hypotheses about the nature of collective social entities make important contributions to conceptualizing small groups as functional units. In the following chapters, four different views of groups are described which, while not discrete schools, share common assumptions. Firstly, society is an organism, consisting of differentiated, specialized structures with ordered interchange and self-maintaining integrity. Secondly, collective action by crowds forms a primitive collective mind, fusing participants’ instinctive and affective drives, to submerge individuality and higher functions. Thirdly, common culture and shared psychological characteristics constitute a general, collective or group mind, incorporating language, tradition, technology and values, extending and enriching individual existence. Fourthly, societies and groups are beings in their own right. These complementary conceptualizations of groups address respectively, the organic corpus of society, undifferentiated unconscious drive states, differentiated conscious content of the social entity and its existential identity. The view of groups in contemporary social psychology and psychodynamic group psychotherapy completes the review as the basis for a theoretical integration.

2: GROUP AS ORGANISM

The first tradition investigating large groups and societies emphasized the intricate interconnections between their parts and conceived them to be organisms, best understood by their total functioning. This metaphor predisposed the investigation of whole-group characteristics analogous to anatomy and physiology. It culminated in identifying important self-maintaining processes for enduring social units.

Origins. Society has been compared to a living organism since ancient times by Plato, St. Paul and others (Mackenzie, 1963). Comte (1830) called society an organism whose institutions and relations were not created by individuals, but imposed by the group, defined by language, customs and values (Maus, 1965, Turner, 1978; Turner, Beeghley and Powers, 1989). Structural aspects of society were studied as interacting organs, called social statics (Comte, 1830). Families as fundamental units formed individuals, integrating them into the state through morality and submission to authority (Maus, 1965). Social dynamics described social development in progressive stages like individual minds, ultimately arriving at science and “positive” knowledge (Comte, 1830; Mazlish, 1967). Comte emphasized the state’s role in individual life, regarding everything human above physiology as derived from society as the “Supreme Being” of a positivist religion. Individuals are abstractions: “Society is no more decomposable into individuals than a geometric surface is into lines, or a line into points” (quoted in Nisbet, 1973, p. 59). Comte established social groups as entities with life processes.

Spencer and Darwinism. Spencer (1820-1903) introduced Darwinism into sociology. He saw societies as organisms evolving towards more perfect forms by adapting to environments (Spencer, 1860, 1876). The permanence of societies’ component relations, their individuality, the specialized functions fulfilled through division of labor and their growth and decay make them organisms (Spencer, 1876). They begin as small, unstructured aggregations, increase in mass and complexity acquiring interdependence. Each part depends on the whole, whose life is independent and more prolonged than that of its components. However, societies are different entities from individuals. Societies do not show organisms’

36 characteristics of living tissue being continuous, having definite form, organs in fixed position and specialized tissue endowed with feeling. In society, these are functions of communication (Spencer, 1860). Consciousness is situated in a small part of the individual, but diffused throughout society, which lacks a sensorium. Societies exist for their members, but organisms’ cells exist for their host (Spencer, 1876). Societies are “hyperorganisms” (Maus, 1965) of the natural world, living their own lives (Allport, 1954). Spencer’s inquiry was determined by his notion of organism and he did not question its appropriateness (Rex, 1961). Others developed the idea (Von Lilienfeld, 1873; Schäffle, 1875-8; Espinas, 1877; Worms, 1896). Although regarded with caution (Maus, 1965), the organism theory was axiomatic at the turn of the century (McKenzie, 1890; Small, 1905; Ross, 1905; Jordan, 1927). Darwinism presupposed societies and cultures evolved (Spengler, 1926; Toynbee, 1947; Childe, 1963). The terms ‘structure’ and ‘function’ in sociology implied a conception of society as an organism (Rex, 1961), and were understood by their contribution to the whole.

Functionalism. Analytical methodology and empirical research led to functionalism and its more integrated notion of organism (Martindale, 1964). Functionalist anthropology used organism as an analogy for social life (Radcliff-Brown, 1935, 1940, 1952); social institutions were explained by their group-maintenance functions (Maus, 1965). Society was conceived as an “integrated living whole” rather than Spencer’s aggregation of organs. The social organism was not the structure; it had structure with continuity surviving loss of members; its social life was the functioning and maintenance of its structure (Radcliff-Brown, 1952). However, functionalism was better suited to pre- literate societies than general sociology (Demerath and Peterson, 1967). To emphasize social organisms’ integrity Merton (1949) introduced Cannon’s (1932) functional principles from biology. The structure of society included the relations between parts; social activities and cultural items had functions for the whole social system, which all members fulfilled, and all were necessary. This “logic of procedure” established functional requirements for organisms’ survival and was adapted to a sociology using Freud’s distinction between latent and manifest functions. Functionalism defined group structures and processes by their combined role in the life and maintenance of the

37 whole group; they could not be understood in isolation.

Systems Theory Functionalism was overtaken by general systems theory, which studied open systems across many disciplines (Von Bertalanffy, 1955, 1975). System properties suggested common forms in different fields. Systems are “complexes of elements standing in interaction,” unifying disparate examples; they indicate relationships between biological organisms and “epiorganisms” such as societies: “Characteristic of organization, that of a living organism or a society, are notions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical order, dominance, control, competition” (Von Bertalanffy, 1955, p. 127). Systems theory incorporates teleology and directedness. Living organisms, individual behaviour and human society cannot be conceived of without including adaptiveness, purposiveness and goal seeking. Systems theory avoided the organismic approach’s pitfall of emphasizing characteristics peculiar to the organism rather than those inherent in generalized systems (Gouldner, 1959). It provided a paradigm for social sciences. Societies as systems were conceptualized in terms of part/whole relationships, gradients, integration, feedback, defenses against disintegration, ontology of activity and interface of subsystems. Biological and social systems are extended in space and integrate their parts across boundaries. The parts that developed from earlier states, represent organisms’ past; they have a relatively stable present state and a future of functional potentialities (Grinker, 1956). The self-creating property of “autopoiesis” connects organisms and social groups as life forms (Maturana and Varela, 1971) introducing creative uncertainty into their development. “Human societies are biological systems” and “any social institution is an autopoietic system” (Beer, 1980, p. 70). Systems theory de-emphasized literal correspondence between organism and society, but described essential organic characteristics for social groups. However, system oversimplifies the issue, neglecting incompatibilities between social and biological organisms (Rex, 1961) and ignores the complexity and variety of organisms (Merton, 1949).

Conclusion The organism hypothesis began with naïve analogies, but showed the varied phenomena of societies can be described as mutually interconnected and governed by their

38 relation to the whole. It provided a conception of social entities not reducible to their constituent members and described self-sustaining functions, which support their life and purpose. In functionalism and systems theory, the organism perspective initiated by Comte and Spencer matured rather than was superseded. Social organisms form when members develop ordered, systemic communication joining them into a whole, whose functions have similar integrity and purpose to bodily functions constituting the substrate for psychic life in individuals.

3: GROUP AS CROWD OR HERD.

The social organism hypothesis analysed structures and processes of large social groups as functional units. However, an explicit notion of collective mentality was developed in the study of the psychological characteristics of crowds and large groups. The social problems they posed for nineteenth century society emphasised their psychic unity and they were conceived as beings having primitive minds, an idea that can be traced to the present.

Early theorists. Sighele (1891) proposed that crowds formed a temporary mind, operating by laws different from those of individual minds. The price of collective unanimity was the antithesis of self-consciousness and loss of rational thinking, making crowds intellectually inferior, irresponsible, destructive and criminal (McLelland, 1989). They formed according to the law for all intelligent life that “representation of an emotional state brings the beginnings of the same emotional state in those who observe it” (Espinas, 1877, quoted in McLelland, 1989, p. 166). Mental processes need not be rational, deductive or abstract; collective thinking occurs outside the brain, through individuals’ susceptibility to others’ mental representations and suggestions, enabling many to act as one. Crowds can be creative and better than individuals, producing culture, language and revitalizing old social structures; the state is the institutionalized crowd (Sighele, 1901). Tarde (1903) saw crowd members as weak, primitive, irresponsible; the essential social tie was imitation by suggestibility, since “social man is a veritable somnambulist” (p. 76) and society is a set of suggestions causing mutual imitation. The common mental content in crowds is ignited by a “spark of passion,” forming “a single animal, a wild beast without a name” (Tarde, quoted in McLelland, 1989, p. 184). Crowds are criminal or heroic, imitating whatever suggestions are given them. They are credulous, excitable or docile to commands, influenced by images, exaggeration and appeal to emotions.

Le Bon. Le Bon’s (1896, 1913) influential crowd theory viewed social organisms to be as complicated as all beings, and visible social phenomena result from unconscious processes. In crowds, conscious personality vanishes, a collective mind or “provisional

40 being” is formed like a chemical compound; members think, feel and act differently than when individuals. Each sub-group “represents a single being” (1913, p. 113). Suggestibility and credulity allow ideas to circulate regardless of validity; opinions become truths, making crowds dictatorial and conservative. Crowds think in images; hallucinations replace facts. It is difficult to implant ideas in the crowd mind, but once done, they exert an irresistible power on members, only weakening slowly; society’s ideas form its content, but passing infatuations and images influence it. Contradictory ideas coexist without criticism or logical relations. It reasons by association, analogy succession, and generalization; images take precedence over logic. The sentiment of invincibility deriving from number dominates this being, which shows the impulsiveness, absence of reason and exaggerated of sentiments by contagion typical of “beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution” (p. 40). It can be heroic, generous, cowardly or cruel, allowing nothing to come between desire and its realization. It revolts against feeble authority, but is servile before strong ones. Images become motives for action; conviction is like religious sentiment involving worship, fear, submission, inability to discuss dogmas, but desire to spread them. Anyone not accepting them is an enemy, creating intolerance and fanaticism. Words evoke images lacking precise meaning and take on magical power. Illusions are not diminished by facts, since crowds do not want truth. Opinions are grafted on fixed beliefs, deriving from unalterable psychological elements of the race analogous to anatomical formations of living beings. Leadership provides organisation, direction, energy and the will to achieve goals. The leader’s prestige paralyses critical faculties. Crowds are dominated by this “ancestral soul” (Le Bon, 1913). Le Bon concludes that individual egoism weakens the race and loss of old ideals causes the racial genius to disappear, resulting in barbarism.

Later theories. Mussolini thought Le Bon’s work “excellent” and Hitler used his crowd terminology and manipulation techniques (Nye, 1975; van Ginneken, 1992). Y Gasset (1930) treats the crowd as an entity opposed to European culture with an analysis reminiscent of Le Bon, but more complex and balanced. The thesis that group experience is at a lower consciousness than individuality is found in Jung (1950) with acknowledgement to Le Bon. The crowd mind was applied to collective phenomena until

41 the 1960’s; social psychology texts usually contained a chapter on the crowd or “mob mind” with a synopsis of Le Bon (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948; Newcombe, 1950; Watson, 1966; Evans, 1969). The crowd as a psychic entity lost scientific credibility, except for social philosophers (Smelser, 1963; Lang and Lang, 1965; Shibutani, 1970). However, it persists. Canetti (1960) follows its historical relationship to power and culture, regarding it as a psychic entity. People surrendering to a crowd are absorbed into a circle of common touch; fear disappears and it takes on its own life. “As soon as it exists at all, it wants to consist of more people: the urge to grow is the first and supreme attribute of the crowd” (p. 17). Once people feel equal in a moment of discharge, the crowd is created and becomes a psychic entity associated with relief when the individual transcends their own person. Hierarchical organisation is lost, freeing the crowd to violence. A command is a “sting” in the members, as a tendency to obey and be vulnerable to influence. Crowds can be rhythmic or stagnating, slow or quick, and classified by the predominant emotion of the “single creature.” When it dissolves, small groups or “crowd crystals” remain around which it may reassemble. Social institutions are “domesticated” crowds. Canetti marks the transition from scientific theory to a literary, philosophical treatment of the crowd entity, which does justice to the human experience of the mass as a “social animal torn loose of its chains” (Muscovici, 1987) that can be predicted, analysed, but never reduced to a rational formula of individuals in interaction (Reicher, 1988). It is a precursor to contemporary research (Turner, 1988). However, its inherent conservative political assumptions and critical attitude to social entities had less relevance outside the tense social situation of late nineteenth century Europe.

The herd. Trotter (1916) applied biological theory to mass psychology, postulating a herd instinct to explain the rejection of reason and experience in favour of prejudice and dogma in society. Human psychology is always of associated members, since solitary individuals are unknown. Social phenomena have an instinctive quality and herd impulses enter the individual’s mind with the value of instincts. To introspection, they seem axiomatic, “an a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort needing no proof but its own evidence” (p. 20). The drive to associate in groups is similar to other primary drives sustaining life. The gregarious instinct enables other instincts to be denied, modified or

42 combined and the unit’s homogeneity compensates for loss of individual characteristics in members enabling them to act as one. Gregarious behaviour is “a normal instinct,” the source of opinions, credulity, beliefs, altruism, enthusiasm and power, since “the only medium in which man’s mind can function satisfactorily is the herd” (p. 42). The individual is more sensitive to the “voice of the herd” than other influences and feels an unanalysable sense of comfort in the presence of other members and discomfort in their absence. Herd approval or disapproval arise like conscience and acquire the same discomfort as physical separation. The herd forms “a gregarious mind” amalgamated by “intercommunication,” binding individuals and coordinating the unit into “a single creature,” a material, social, and psychological entity, which acquires the properties of a complex organism, subject to evolutionary development of which members partake. Gregarious units form collective mental entities. Individuals communicate with a common stock producing a communal mind with a quasi-independent existence, “the deep, still spirit of the hive that whispers in us all” (p. 205). It depends on “herd accessibility” or the sensitiveness of individuals to the presence of fellow members. The individual, dependent on tradition, is guided by influences outside the ego. It cannot live apart from the herd, is liable to loneliness; its loss means loss of self. Much individual personality is invested in the herd; deeper layers of individual minds are formed by it, tending toward homogeneity. “Socialised gregariousness is the goal of man's development. A transcendental union with his fellows is the destiny of the human individual, and it is the attainment of this towards which the constantly growing altruism of man is directed” (p. 167). The herd mind hypothesis goes beyond the crowd mind, attributing a more lasting role to social life, which pervades individuals with a power equal to other drives. The psychic organism of large social groups constructs, sustains and organises individual minds. It validates participation in the formation of “gregarious” groups having the power to reach the most fundamental structures of the individual psyche with the power of instincts. Trotter's theory supplied a social dimension to popular accounts of psychodynamic theories (Tansley, 1921, Peirce, 1922). However, it polarised individual and group, casting the latter in an essentially antisocial light.

Conclusion. The crowd and herd hypotheses propose that under certain communicational

43 conditions, members of large groups amalgamate psychically to constitute a primitive psychic entity (“animal” or “creature”). It dissolves higher constructive functions in individuals, developing an unpredictable, regressed mental life organized as a non-rational mind, where thought, emotion and action unify with little organisation. Action is impulsive, disregarding consequences and the group is subject to the influence of anyone who exploits it. In herd theory, the collective psyche provides individuals with an instinctive substrate, enabling them to acquire cultural and ethical values, support collective action, but with the conservative character of instinctive life. These ideas describe how the loss of structured communication overwhelms rational faculties assumed to lie within individuals, immersing them in the impulsive drive life of the social entity whose organic functions are elaborated in the organism tradition. Individuality and rationality are sustained by social communication structures.

4: GROUP AS SOCIAL MIND

In contrast to the view that organized large groups are organisms and under particular communication conditions form an instinctive primitive mentality, a third viewpoint considered the significance of organised cultural structures. It addressed specific mental or psychological characteristics of societies, which were seen to embody a mentality recognized as an entity in its own right, distinct from the individuals constituting it, but making possible and sustaining their mentality. Emerging from philosophy, these ideas were elaborated in sociology to become a psychological hypothesis of the inseparability of group and individuals.

Philosophical background. The notion of mind existing beyond the individual has a long philosophical heritage. Plato regarded the world as “wholes,” as living beings (Hamilton and Cairns, 1972). Plotinus said “every whole is at the same time a certain being” (Taylor, 1994a, p. 42) and intelligent beings participate in a world intellect (Taylor, 1994b). Hobbes (1651) called the state a “Great Man.” Hegel’s philosophy centred on “Geist,” meaning the highest form of mind, spirit, or moral consciousness (Murat-Sanders, 1900) as the Absolute, self-complete, universal “ethical substance,” created by coordinated action (Hegel, 1807). Spirit is a being, “actual and alive;” it is consciousness itself reflected in the minds of its members; its substance is a nation. Individuals are formed in the natural ethical community of the family, which is “immediate or natural mind” and incorporated into the universal family of the state (Hegel, 1807). Society is an “actual mind” that knows and thinks itself, existing immediately in customs, mediately through the self- conscious knowledge and members’ actions. It is intelligent substance expressed as particular aspects in members, losing its ethical character when individual interests rend its continuity. It is a self-knowing, self-actualising subjectivity, maintaining and guiding its members’ individuality into its own collective life (Hegel, 1821, 1830).

British theorists. Lewes (1879) conceived of a “General Mind” formed from the mental accumulations of individual mental processes integrated as tradition, arts, religion, and science by means of language (Giddings, 1896). An original philosopher, scientist and

45 champion of Hegel in Victorian England (Walker, 1910), he maintained mental life originates in the “Social Organism” and the social medium permeates mind. Individuals are units of collective life. The general mind evolves through language from common experiences, becoming an impersonal influence on individuals, matching Nature with Society as two orders whose laws must be obeyed. It is indicated by terms like common sense, collective consciousness, reason and spirit of the age. It transcends the limitations of individual minds and exists beyond individual experience or introspection; like language, it is simultaneously individual and social. Personal perceptions, appetites, sensations and volitions are transformed into sentiments, conceptions and ideas by impersonal social influences in collective life and connect people to constitute much of their system of thought. Like language, thought belongs to the community calling it into existence. “There are minds, and besides the individual minds there is the Human Mind” (Lewes, 1879, p. 162). Customs and laws restrain everyone; the community “is the medium of the individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond is the medium of a fish” (p. 165) and there is a “Social Mechanism analogous to that individual Mechanism which is modified by Experience” and accumulates as Civilisation. The “mental furniture” of prejudice, fashion and opinion derives from the community. “Conceptions once assimilated by the General Mind become ‘necessities of thought’ ... forces which coerce the individual” (p. 169). Self-evident truths derive from collective experience. The general mind is not independent of its constituent individuals. Lewes was a “thoroughgoing empiricist” (Kaminsky, 1967), with “more philosophical insight than Spencer, but he had not the latter's architectonic genius” (Sorley, 1965, p. 275). The social mind was elaborated by a group of social theorists influenced by Hegel including Green (1888), Bosanquet (1899) and Barker (1915) gaining popularity in sociological texts around the turn of the century. McDougall was the last exponent of social mind theory. He saw society as an evolving organism with “a mental life, which is not the mere sum of the mental lives of its units” (1920, p. 7). It is a collective or group mind, where mind is “an organised system of mental or purposive forces” (p. 9). Collective actions in a highly organised society “are conditioned by an organisation which can only be described in terms of mind, and yet is not comprised within the mind of any individual” (p. 9). A social system consists of “mental stuff” and mental forces. Individuals comprising it come to consciousness as

46 members, influenced “at every moment in every thought and feeling and action in ways which they can neither fully understand nor escape from” (p. 11). The common substance of uniting ideas means a group of minds becomes a group-mind, but cannot exist apart from the minds of the group members. For group minds to form, groups require continuity, an idea of their composition and functions, interaction with other groups, culture, organisation, differentiation and specialisation in highly organised and successful social structures. The group’s unifying ideals and demands appear in members’ minds with irresistible force. The bond of identification incorporating a member occurs when the “self-regarding sentiment” extends to the group “more or less completely, so that he is moved to work for its welfare, … by the same motives which prompt him to desire and to work for his own” (p. 79). The national will depends on the idea of the whole nation being present to the consciousness of individuals or it becomes a horde. National self- consciousness is a common idea “diffused through the minds of the people” and gives it a self so it is not “a mere agglomeration of individuals” (p. 163). Regardless of its quality, it enhances mental homogeneity and difference from other groups, acquiring strong sentiments and motives capable of overriding individual concerns. McDougall’s discussion is Anglophile, analogical, descriptive and lacks conceptual rigor. He denies the psychic unit has different qualities from the combination of individual mental forces and his definition of mind as “an organised system of forces” is vague, emphasizing culture and tradition. However, his personal influence and prestige made his theory paradigmatic for critics (Ginsberg, 1921; Allport, 1954; Turner, 1988).

American theorists. The idea of a superordinate mind supporting individual minds was common in early American sociology (Giddings, 1896; Small, 1905; Dealey and Ward, 1905; Gillette, 1916). Each tribe or nation was considered to have a unique “social mind” and a common, general “human mind.” The social mind is created by individual minds in organized interaction. It is not a separate, transcendental entity, but the “organic agreement” scattered among individual minds. It is the spontaneous, creative synthesis of individual minds, which are also its product. It consists of repetition of individual minds associating, reproducing and accumulating common mental content by rational discussion and cultural exchanges founded on feelings of association. The conscious, cognitive, social mind deliberates as rationally as the individual mind in contrast to the

47 unconscious, passionate crowd mind. Simultaneous thoughts in minds communicating in language create “social self-consciousness” (Gillette, 1916) when perceptions of the group are diffused throughout the group and “the community feels and perceives its unity” (Giddings, 1896, p. 140). The social mind is coercive and evaluative, providing unity and stability to group life. Although “groups are only relationships of individuals” (Small, 1905, p. 496) they create individuals as independent entities. There is no social mind without agreement and cooperation; as individuals think and feel alike, respect for the “public mind” keeps most members good; in collective action it acts through cooperating groups. Cooley (1909), influenced by organismic ideas (Timasheff, 1966), said life must be seen as “one human whole.” Social and individual are not two kinds of mind; “all mind acts together in a vital whole from which the individual is never really separate” (p. 1). The social mind’s influence is outside awareness; social consciousness develops inseparably from self-consciousness, because people think of themselves with reference to social groups and of groups with reference to themselves as a “complex personal or social whole” (p. 5). Individuals’ membership of groups is as apparent and verifiable as the uniqueness of their individual experience and they are aware of groups as immediately and authentically as of themselves. Most reflective consciousness is social since “self and society are twin-born,” known equally intimately. “A separate and independent ego is an illusion” (p. 5). Self-consciousness emerges from social consciousness or awareness of others at two years of age as two phases of the same experience, inseparable from significant others; public consciousness organized by shared ideas reacting upon each other is a “group state of mind” aware of itself, though incomplete and forms a third phase. Cooley said individuals live in cooperation with others in “primary groups,” where fusion of individualities creates the self as “the common life and purpose of the group,” a “we” involving sympathy and identification, differentiation, assertion, passion, competition and love. “Human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a group-nature or primary phase of society … of the social mind” (p. 31, italics in original). Human nature is a trait of primary groups, created by their “comparatively stable and universal” structures, maintained in family, playground and neighborhood. It decays in isolation. The communal life of family and local groups are immediate facts rather than combinations of something else. Though Cooley’s view of

48 primary groups transmitting cultural values has been disputed (Bottomore, 1962), it became central in sociology (Timasheff, 1966; Broom and Selznick, 1968; Nisbet, 1970). In George Mead’s (1962, 1964) posthumous works (Morris, 1962) mind and thought as “phases of a more general, an Absolute, mind” (1936, p. 344) are worked out more systematically. Individuals are creations of the social organism (Mead, 1962). Social process exists prior to mind, thinking, consciousness or self, which arise through communication within the whole. Collective mental content is logically prior to individual content; social action supports communication as a “conversation of gestures” developing the “significant symbol” as “that part of the act which serves as a gesture to call out the other part of the process, the response of the other, in the experience of the [person] that makes the gesture” (p. 268). Gestures and symbols become the system of language. Mind results when the “empirical matrix of social interactions” takes on a reflexive character and “enters into or becomes present in the experience of the individuals involved in it. … Language as made up of significant symbols is what we mean by mind” (1962 p, 190n). Action in the social organism supersedes the body/mind split as reference point for all psychosocial ideas and is the context for understanding mind, consciousness, thought and self. “The field of mind must be coextensive with, and include all the components of, the field of the social process of experience and behavior…. If mind is socially constituted, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must extend as far as the social activity or apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends; and hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs" (p. 223n). Mind can only come into existence in a social environment; organized social relations and interactions create a universe of discourse presupposed by its nature. Mead’s “entirely social theory or interpretation of mind … must be clearly distinguished from the partially (but only partially) social view of mind” as a hereditary biological attribute of the individual, social only in its expression. The theory that social process is produced by minds is in direct opposition to his view “that mind presupposes, and is a product of, the social process” (1962, p. 223-4). Individuals initially experience themselves as objects through social relations and by means of experiential transactions with others in an organized social environment.

Thinking is internalised vocalisation arising from the system of symbolic gestures and language. “The laws of thought are abstractions of social intercourse” (Mead, 1962 p. 90). The locus of thinking is in the whole conduct of the individual, not restricted to neurological processes. “Getting an idea,” says Mead, “is a process of social intercourse;” experience “is not to be located inside the head, but as related to the whole act” (p. 106-7). Meaning is a consequence of social process; symbolization creates objects for the social world, since, language not only symbolises what already exists; “it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for it is part of the mechanism whereby that situation or object is created” (p. 78). The conversation of gestures and symbolic capacity are social process taken over into the conduct of the individual; mind arises through communication, not communication from minds. Meaning develops within the field of language when individuals take others’ perspectives and form a “universe of discourse” in a group participating in a collective social process. It is not primarily mental consciousness, since it only exists when “significant symbols are evolved in the process of human social experience” (p. 80); “implicit in the structure of the social act,” it confirms the primacy of social process for the development of minds, self-consciousness and selves. Self-consciousness is not a substance, but a function organised around the experience of self, taken over from action towards others. The essence of self “is cognitive, and like thinking is social” (p. 173). Self does not first exist then enter into relations with others; it is “an eddy in the social current and so still a part of the current … a process in which the individual is continually adjusting himself in advance to the situation to which he belongs” (p. 182). The self’s content is individual, and may be selfish, but its structure is inherently unselfish always belonging to groups; self refers beyond itself to the social relationships constituted by language. “So far as he is a self, he must be an organic part of the life of the community, and his contribution has to be something that is social.” (p. 324). Other representative Americans are Boodin (1913), Dewey (1922), Judd (1926), Alverdes, (1927) and more recently Warriner, (1956), Manis and Meltzer (1972), Steiner (1986) and Sandelands and St. Clair (1993). However, the hypothesis failed to influence psychology in the grip of behaviorism (Allport, 1954) and sociology becoming concerned with quantitative research (Martindale, 1964). Perhaps this can be understood as a result of their failure to operationalize or relate social mind to individualistic theories with

50 sufficient precision.

Conclusion. Social mind theories provide a coherent hypothesis about the primacy of group life and its inherent mentality as a collective system interpenetrating and sustaining personal minds. Self, thought, sentiment and action are all defined as effects of participation in organized symbolic communication, where group membership is the essential means of gaining access to the creative functions of the social mind and human psychology. The small (primary) group is the medium in which the larger social processes are rendered effective in creating individuals. Group life is the condition for the development of mind and self, as healthy group life is for healthy psychology. The social mind complements organism and crowd hypotheses providing a more detailed analysis of the context for rational social life and action.

5: GROUP AS BEING.

Durkheim (1858-1917), one of the founders of sociology (Lukes, 1975), developed different ideas to the sociological consensus (Gane, 1988). Rejecting animal analogies, he described society as “a being sui generis” meaning of its own genus. His theory of large groups integrates previous views of organic processes with collective psychic functions that engulfed individuals in primitive group states. He postulated social origins for thought, sentiment and action; he showed how the social being is held together with a psychic life and development within which individuals are formed as personalities, acquire mind and realize themselves.

The collective conscience. Durkheim said shared psychic ideas, sentiments and actions are “collective representations” in a communicating group. They exist in their own right with a life of their own and are not products of individual consciounesses. They are the means by which “the group conceives itself in its relations with the objects which affect it” (Lukes, 1975, p. 6). Social life “is constituted wholly of collective ‘representations’” (Durkheim, 1966, p. xli) constituting a “collective conscience.” Durkheim’s “conscience” condenses moral conscience, consciousness, conscientiousness, (Elwall, 1897) as the organ of sentiments and representations. It resembles “unconscious” in psychoanalysis more than the rational organ implied by “consciousness” (Simpson, 1933). Individualistic critics obscure this distinction (Catlin, 1936; Nisbet, 1973). Though lacking a specific organ, it permeates society connecting successive generations as a distinct reality, not dependent on the particular conditions of individuals. It is realized in individuals, who have two consciences, one common to the group, which “is not ourself, but society living and acting within us,” the other “personal and distinct, that which makes us an individual” (Durkheim, 1964, pp. 129-130). They have “one and the same organic substratum” (p. 106) and link individuals directly with society by communicating to individual action just as ideas are communicated to words. The collective conscience demands of the individual: “make yourself usefully fulfill a determinate function” (p. 42). Only the “collective personality” of society has the continuity and power to bind members beyond ephemeral relations, settle conflicts and assign limits (Durkheim, 1893). Rules are essential to constitute social units and confer

52 freedom; without them “anomie” (normlessness) results. “Common life is attractive as well as coercive;” individuals seek it passionately, coming together “for the pleasure of communing, to make one out of many … to lead the same moral life together” (p. 15). It is “a source of life sui generis,” its warmth animates and makes members human; “destroying their egotisms” (p. 26).

Social solidarity. Durkheim (1964) describes two types of solidarity binding society together at different stages. “Mechanical solidarity” is created by sympathy, when images of similarity unite and reinforce each other into collective representations, while contrary representations weaken each other. Members are attached to each other and to the group without intermediary as material objects are connected with each other. “Organic solidarity” results from the division of labor. Members are linked by recognition of differences and preserve their distinctness by symbolic relationships forming boundaries like the relationship of organs, expressed in regulative and restitutive rules governing their relations. Repetition of different human endeavours and the extension and growing complication of the social organism constitute organic solidarity. Social structure begins with mechanical solidarity and collective conscience based on similarities creating homogeneous societies or hordes (Freud, 1921); but it is inevitably replaced by organic solidarity as individual consciences grow more than the collective conscience; division of labor recognizes and values individual and group differences integrating them into larger organic units. Individuality and group membership are centripetal and centrifugal social forces, which cannot flourish simultaneously. Individuals have to be different, but mechanical solidarity exerts pressure towards collective identity making “the individual conscience … a simple dependent upon the collective type … as the possessed object follows those of its owner” (p. 130). Individuals are absorbed into a collective personality. In organic solidarity, individuals attain a personal sphere of action as an organ in the whole, organized according to their function. The collective conscience leaves the individual conscience open so functions may be established that it cannot regulate. “The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity” (p. 131). Individual conscience is strongest when the collective conscience envelops it; and the collective conscience’s power depends on its vitality compared to the individual

53 conscience. Physical uniqueness socializes the individual, who identifies with those similar while remaining dependent on the common society.

Individuality and cooperation. Individuality is not “congenital with humanity” (Durkheim, 1964, p. 195), but arises from cooperation in division of labor. Cooperation develops among individuals working for the organism as they become stronger and take personal initiative. In return, society has duties toward them. Increasing concentration and density of social interaction and communication “tighten the society” and lead to division of labor, variation, specialization, rules and resolution of conflict. Cooperating individuals do not form societies; societies bring individuality into existence; individuals are not self- sufficient monads, but organs with functions in the social organism for which “cooperation becomes not only possible but necessary” (p. 280). For social units to be differentiated, they must first be grouped by their resemblances, which are mingled in the “same individual collective conscience” for differentiation to begin. Complex organisms form by repetition of “simple similar organisms which are differentiated only if once associated. In short, association and cooperation are two distinct facts” (p. 278). Rules determine relations of the separate groups including moral rules binding members to one another. Consequently, “every society is a moral society” (p. 228). As society becomes an organism, collective sentiments are replaced by culture, which no individuals control; it becomes a reality sui generis. Psychic life is initially collective and identical for all, but with increased social complexity, individual diversities multiply and separate from social images, becoming collective representations. Psychic facts are the prolongation of social facts into individual consciousness; “if we do not accept this we will mistake the cause for the effect” (p. 349). They are products of and explained by group life. “Society does not find the bases on which it rests fully laid out in consciences; it puts them there itself” (p. 350). “The only power which can serve to moderate individual egotism is the power of the group; the only power which can serve to moderate the egotism of groups is that of some other group which embraces them” (p. 405).

Social facts. Durkheim’s (1966) methodology distinguishes psychology from social life, which is constituted wholly of representations” (p. xli). The study of society must recognize thoughts, actions and feelings as facts not traceable to individuals. Social facts are common in the mind of each member, not felt as owned by individuals. They are strengthened by repetition and only expressed fully in the whole community. For example, legal and moral standards, religious faiths, financial systems, social practices and currents, language, rates of marriage, birth or suicide are states of the “collective mind” (Durkheim, 1966, p. 8); but the French word “l’ame” is broader than mind, meaning soul, spirit, ghost; mind; feeling; essence; conscience; heart; core (Elwell 1897). Mind as the source of human experience and action has collective existence. Group phenomena are collective because they are imposed on all members, not because they are general. A collective fact “is to be found in each part because it exists in the whole, rather than in the whole because it exists in the parts” (p. 9). Social facts are not defined by their metaphysical status as ideas, since they cannot be known by mental activity, but must be discovered by observation like material things. The study of social facts rests not only on their collective origin or expression throughout society, but also on the coercion they exercise over individuals; their presence is shown by sanctions against individuals who violate them. Social facts are not derived from individual psychology and cannot be changed by efforts of will; “they are like moulds in which our actions are inevitably shaped” (p. 29). Society is not the sum of its individuals, but a system formed by association having a reality with its own characteristics. “Individual minds, forming groups by mingling and fusing, give birth to a being. Psychological if you will, but constituting a psychic individuality of a new sort” (p. 103). Society does not have a separate personal existence, but “thinks, feels, and acts quite differently from the way in which its members would were they isolated” (p. 104). The laws of individual mentality do not govern group mentality; understanding individuals does not help understand groups. The laws of group mentality can only be studied by accepting that “we are absolutely ignorant of their nature, and that their characteristic properties, like the unknown causes on which they depend, cannot be discovered by even the most careful introspection” (p. xliii). When studied thus, they

55 show “qualities of consistency and regularity that are symptomatic of their objectivity” (p. 28). They exist in collective consciousness that consists of different representations to those of individual consciousness. The causes of collective mentality states should be sought in social facts preceding them, not among the individual consciousnesses in which they express themselves. The origins of social processes are to be found in the internal constitution of the group. The break in continuity between psychology and sociology is the same as between physicochemical sciences and biology. The continuity is between societies; other groups form groups, rather than individuals.

The social basis of thought. Durkheim (1954) asserts the categories of thought and framework of human intelligence are not abstract ideas, but formed from social life. They are defined groups of ideas “between which internal relationships exist, similar to those of kindred;” they are “social affairs and the product of collective thought” (p. 10). Empirical knowledge is composed of individual experience deriving from the psychic nature of the individual; but categories are collective representations showing the mental states of the group and reflect its organization, morphology and institutions. “To make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge” (p. 17). Collective thought forms two mental domains: an individual one with its foundation in the organism and its activities, and another social being representing society, “the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation.” Ideas are general relations and if people did not agree upon them, “all contact between their minds would be impossible” (p. 19). A person freed from collective forms of thought is not considered normal. The authority of reason is that of society itself and forms of thought are “priceless instruments” or “intellectual capital” which “human groups have laboriously forged through the centuries” (p. 19). Society’s organization is the template for the psychological organization of members. The moral order cannot be reduced to utilitarian motives any more than reason can to individual experience. It is the force binding members to society. Respect for moral authority is inspired, “when the representation expressing it in the mind is gifted with such a force that it automatically causes or inhibits actions, without regard for any consideration relative to their useful or injurious effects” (p. 207). It is elaborated in

56 common by all those subject to it and forms the collective features of social imperatives. The power of this social pressure is psychical; it does not act wholly from without, but since society cannot exist except in individual consciousnesses, it penetrates and organizes itself within the members. Whatever is not absorbed into the system of collective representations attracts only individual sentiments and lacks the strength, respect and persuasiveness of what is. Representations expressing individual experiences are different from those aroused by collective influences. They form two sets of mental states, “just as do the two forms of life to which they correspond” (p. 212). Social thought makes members see things in whatever light it pleases, because it has power and efficacy individual thought cannot have. Individual consciousnesses are closed to each other if left to themselves and only communicate by sign systems; but by acting in unison with common signifiers, individuals feel themselves in unison. Collective representations impose a homogeneity “that gives the group consciousness of itself and consequently makes it exist” (p. 231). Collective sentiments become conscious by being attached to objects and actions and demonstrate that “social phenomena are born, not in individuals, but in the group” (p. 231). Durkheim contrasts individual characteristics derived from the unique sensations of the body, with impersonal content derived from society common to all members, such as reason and cultural representations by which “we are freed from our senses and able to think and act with concepts” (p. 272). If reason is not impartially shared, it is not recognized. One determinism is imposed on the psyche by the body, another by society that leaves the actor with the impression of liberty. “The only way we have of freeing ourselves from physical forces is to oppose them with collective forces” (p. 272). Individual experiences may be intense, but restrictive - “passion individualizes, yet it enslaves.” Although what is essential in the personality is social, “there can be no social life unless distinct individuals are associated,” so the personal and social have a reciprocal relationship that defies simplistic division. The characteristics of human nature come from society, but society only lives in individuals. Individuals get their distinct character, intellectual and moral culture from society; if they no longer shared beliefs, traditions and aspirations their group would die.

Social gatherings. Energy, vitality and moral forces are created and maintained through individual participation in the collective conscience. Collective events are stimulating, arousing and make the collective conscience dominate individuality. The function of gatherings is to enact group representations and invigorate them by the “collective effervescence” of energies. Communal ritual maintains and regulates society’s life and shows the efficacy of the collective conscience. The source of moral life is from “the society of our fellow beings;” moral forces are sustained and increased by those obtained from others, “beliefs are active only when they are partaken by many” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 425). Authority is built on the regularity and establishment of practices.

Language and the social being. Language is the system of the collective conscience expressing the social being’s thought. Its concepts are collective representations belonging to the whole group; “they correspond to the way in which this very special being, society, considers the things of its own proper experience” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 425). Speakers have access to the whole domain of the language in spite of not knowing more than a portion of its words. Although society is universal for individuals, it is also an individuality with its own physiognomy and idiosyncrasies; “it is a particular subject and consequently particularizes whatever it thinks of,” but it gives “the germ of a new mentality” individuals could not otherwise have attained, culminating in “a stable, impersonal and organized thought” (p. 445). The social being’s activity provides the individual mind with its structure, which can only be based on what it receives from the social mentality, since, “impersonal reason is only another name for collective thought.” Thought “is possible only through a group of individuals.” The social being’s contribution is not just intrapsychic, “there is something social in all of us, and since social life embraces at once both representations and practices, this impersonality naturally extends to ideas as well as to acts” (p. 446).

Impact and evaluation. Durkheim’s approach was criticised when it appeared (Tarde, 1895) and throughout the century (Ginsberg, 1921; Lukes, 1975; Nisbet, 1973; Fenton, 1984;

Lehmann, 1993). Yet he greatly influenced twentieth century sociology (Merton, 1949; Parsons, 1951, 1968; Giddens, 1982), stimulating research in ancient (Cornford, 1957) and modern social processes (Mauss, 1979; Jodelet, 1989) and social psychology (Doise and Moscovici, 1983; Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Tajfel, 1984; Fraser and Gaskell, 1990). Postmodern thought has brought renewed interest in his ideas, especially individuality and subjectivity as produced by social processes (Matustik, 1993). While Mead and Durkheim prompted a “paradigm shift” in sociological thought, concepts of collective conscience and collective representations were criticized as tending to “seduce us into personalizing society” (Habermas, 1989, p. 50). Contemporary reviews of sociological theorists show little consideration of the central hypothesis that once constituted, societies and groups are beings or “hyperorganisms” with their own characteristics (Lukes 1975; Turner et al., 1989), without which, collective representations, collective conscience, group solidarity, rules, the social basis for individuality and psychic functions are vitiated.

Conclusion. Durkheim integrates organism concepts, engulfing of individuality in crowds and the collective mentality of socio-cultural functions in the hypothesis of the social being sui generis. He offers a theory of the social origin of self, collective emotional currents, religion, law, social institutions and cultural tradition; it suggests thought, reason, structures of sentiment and action are produced in individuals by society, which becomes creative for its members when sufficiently complex and integrated to constitute a being by its communicative solidarity. These ideas will be shown to identify the therapeutic capacities of groups. However, experimental social psychology provided a different approach to the nature of small groups and is considered next.

6: GROUP ENTITY IN SMALL GROUP RESEARCH

Small group research in social psychology replaced theoretical studies of large groups in social psychology (Swanson, Newcomb and Hartley, 1952) and sociology (Mills, 1967) concentrating on interpersonal processes within groups and their influence on behavior, rather than their nature. Group research proceeded without development in metatheory (Turner, 1988; Forsyth, 1990). Three themes can be observed in the field. Firstly, group entities are acknowledged, but redefined in reductionist terms; secondly, analytic definitions of groups remove the holistic perspective altogether; thirdly, the group entity with a mental life is recognized.

Reduction of the group entity. Although rejecting group mentality, small group researchers wrestled with the problem, but it infiltrated their work as they avoided it. Lewin (1939) said group mind was an unnecessary “mystical Gestalt quality,” but emphasized groups’ dynamic properties are “sociological wholes” whose unity is operationally defined by the interdependence of their parts instead of as psychical concepts, which “takes mysticism out of the group conception and brings the problem down to a thoroughly empirically and testable basis” (p. 73). Cattell (1948) described “dynamic, temperamental, and ability traits of the group” (p. 109) as “syntality,” the group’s “abstract entity” or “personality,” measured by it’s functioning. It determines “the organism’s reactions when the stimulus situation is defined” (Cattell, 1951, p. 16). He did not regard personality as a “mental” structure, which would imply groups with personality also have mind. However, dimensions of group function need to be identified that are distinct from measurable variables. Asch (1952) argued members of functional groups are “social individuals” and have “a place in the social order as a child, a husband, or a worker” (p. 257). He acknowledges the problem, but only conceptualizes the individual in the group context, not the group itself. However, “group action is real, having laws that are often not reducible to those of its components taken singly” (p. 263). “Internal group relations” and “interaction” between members lead to new relations and properties, which may be consequences of the group as much as other causes. From the 1950’s, interest in interpersonal relations replaced the nature of groups.

Researchers “had little to say about what actually happened within a group;” they “varied the size or composition of the groups and observed what happened to the group product. Instead of observing process, scholars speculated about it” (Steiner, 1974, p. 98). Many texts make no mention of the nature of groups (for example, Cartwright and Zander, 1958; Zaleznik and Moment, 1964; Watson, 1966; Hollander and Hunt, 1971). However, it is returning. Weick (1979) used Allport’s (1924) notion of “collective structure” to include “everything that is in a group;” it “is assumed to be the basic building block for the creation of larger collectivities” and “does not overlook the fact that groups are unique” (p. 97). This uniqueness is not found in individuals, but in “repetitive interstructured behaviors” (p. 97). While not mystical, such language is no less vague. Wells’ (1980) review of group-as-a-whole mentions without defining the “group’s life and mentality” and “élan vital of the group.” The idea that “a group life exists distinct from the individual group members” is regarded as “helpful but often confusing.” He rejects such ideas that “leave too many unresolved and knotty theoretical issues which cloud rather than clarify” and offers, “an alternative heuristic concept (projective identification motif) by which to understand the group-as-a-whole phenomenon” (p. 169). Avoiding the group mentality controversy, he uses intrapsychic concepts, restricting him to metaphors of group-as-mother, role-differentiation, scapegoating and interpersonal phenomena losing the group altogether. Self-categorisation theory defined groups as categories and treated them as entities: “social groups are reflexive in that they can act upon and change themselves” (Wilder, 1986, p. 295). Nevertheless, criteria for groups’ existence are reductive: self- definition by members, common fate, self-categorisations in relation to non-group others (Brown, 1989), perception of membership, psychological significance to members, acquisition of norms and acceptance of membership (Tajfel, 1981; Fraser, 1986; Turner, 1988). In social constructivist thought, the group is a construction of the investigator (Becvar, Cranfield and Becvar, 1997).

Analytic definitions of group. Groups are defined by members’ psychological relationship (Kretch and Crutchfield, 1948) interaction, proximity or satisfaction of needs, (Watson, 1966). The focus of early studies was cohesiveness, standards, pressures, goals, structure and

61 leadership (Cartwright and Zander, 1958); dyads formed the basis for understanding larger groups (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis documented members’ exchanges and considered the group does not act, only individuals. He advises raters to memorise members’ names so as not to “fall back on some vague, amorphous conception of a team, a hoard (sic.), a gang, a crowd, or that thinnest of all such abstractions, a ‘group’” (Bales, 1970, p. 64). However, Hackman and Morris (1975) acknowledge that because of inadequate behavioural categories, lack of analytic models, difficulty in handling inconsistencies and limitations of research settings, “research based on the existing methodological and conceptual paradigms has not yet succeeded in determining how group interaction process mediates between input and output states” (p. 12). They identify the lack of a theory available to understand the context of interaction. Coleman (1975) uses “group consciousness” unrelated to groups to describe a developmental phase before children form a separate identity. Later writers resort to earlier definitions such as Small’s (1905) (Barker, Wahlers, Watson and Kibler, 1987), listing members’ characteristics or describing what individuals require to be a group while ignoring the group itself (Alderfer, 1995). The group is seen as “a distinct phenomenon whose characteristics are created by the shared unconscious and conscious experiences of members as well as by the context of the group” (Gillette and McCollom, 1995, p. 7). Group dynamics are distinct from, but interact with individuals’ activities and larger systems; they “begin and end at the group level” (p. 7). Although avoiding the question of the group as an entity, it becomes an object of research.

Re-emergence of group mentality. Even in the most anti-collective period, Campbell (1958) maintained groups exist in their own right and encouraged behavioural scientists to read Spencer. While not as solid or stable as physical objects, groups as entities could be defined by criteria adapted from Wertheimer’s principles of perceptual organisation of “entitativity” by proximity, similarity, common fate, pregnance (good organizational integrity) and boundaries. They make possible “a science of social groups per se” and “in the end this is an empirical matter not to be decided on a priori grounds” (p. 24). The limits of group dynamics became evident during the 1970’s when, “lack of a nourishing theory” of the group as a whole system (Steiner, 1974, p. 101) meant there

62 was abundant theory about individuals and large social systems, but not the group itself. Studies of the whole group and its processes, “were frighteningly difficult to conduct, required lots of subject time, and were often too big to be undertaken by one or two persons. Time from inception to conclusion promised to be long, and there was no guarantee that all those efforts would ever bear fruit. It was easier and less risky to deal with a fragment of the process. … No graduate student in his right mind would have elected to undertake a thesis that might have kept him busy until his own children were graduate students, especially when there were lots of easier projects that could be completed in a few months” (p. 102). There were no new ideas since the classic studies of the 1950’s (Steiner, 1983). At the end of his life, Allport acknowledged his criticisms of group entities equally applied to individuals or atoms. He concluded wholeness was a product of interdependence of parts. Social psychology failed to clarify continuity or reciprocity of action in groups. It observed parts, but was “loath to construct unobservable wholes from observed parts,” while believing in larger wholes not registering on the observer’s direct experience (Steiner, 1983, p. 277); it assumed “social behavior is produced by individuals, not groups” (p. 280). Observation of units larger than dyads was rare. Study of individuals in social situations should be “combined and coordinated with the almost nonexistent social psychology of collective behavior” (p. 285). However, no theorists of group mentality maintained groups existed apart from individuals; they were constituted by part of the individual psyche governed by the group. If the individual is observable, the group entity must be; a framework was required to differentiate observable collective and individual phenomena. By the 1980’s, a field of study was defined between the extremes of “super- individuals with their own minds” and “cumulative characteristics of group members” (Back, 1981, p. 321). Common fate and resistance to intrusion make groups’ unity “just as ‘real’ as that of any other object” and is “the source of power above and beyond the power of individuals composing it. In this sense the group has an individuality, a separate meaning for its members” (p. 338). Steiner (1986) contrasted the demise of Durkheim’s perspective with the tendency for contemporary theorists to regard individualistic explanations as incomplete. An unassailable point of Allport’s (1924) individualism is that what is observable “is the individual and his actions. Groups do

63 not ordinarily constitute a strong Gestalt; they rarely register in our direct experience as entities or things” (p. 256). This sets the limits of differentiating an observational field rather than implying anything about what is observed. Social psychology’s emphasis on cognitivism (Eiser, 1992) with its individualistic assumptions failed to provide a “supportive intellectual environment for the study of groups” (Steiner, 1986, p. 285). A science of groups requires dialectic between individuals within group settings and groups’ effect on them. Systems theory treats groups as living organisms (Barker et al., 1987), assuming they are composed of “elements that function together and engage in exchange relationships with their environments … parts that hang together, that work together, and are interdependent even though specialized in their function” (Sampson and Marthas, 1990, p. 95). The organism metaphor implies “the whole has properties that no element necessarily has. And these properties or characteristics of the whole affect the behavior of each of the elements of the system” (p. 97). Collective mentality theory is re-emerging. Sandelands and Stablein (1987) propose the “organisation mind – the idea that organizations are mental entities capable of thought” (p. 135). Organizations consist of behaviors not individuals and roles participate in the social system rather than individuals. Criteria for minds “must not be confused with individual minds” and “the concept of mind admits varying degrees of complexity.” Scientific analysis of mind requires criteria to be “observable or predict observables; this clearly marks the question of the existence of organization mind as one to be decided empirically, not by formal argument” (pp. 149-150). Without evidence, they suggest “the question remains to be settled”. Based on “reasonable criteria for the existence of a non-reified and non-anthropomorphic mind” it is possible to develop a “true study of organizational behavior, not just the behavior of organization members” (p. 157). Sandelands and St Clair (1993) propose an empirical approach to studying group entities. In ordinary language, groups are treated as either single entities, or “multiples” (collections) of individuals. Groups are defined as multiples of individuals and this “bias towards the individual has limited the development of the theory of groups” (p. 425). Both points of view must be researched. Individualistic research promotes reductionism, avoids reification, but lacks “an orienting view of the group entity,” like studying anatomy and physiology without knowing the animal. To

64 understand groups, “it is not enough to know about people, or even to know about their interactions and networks of communication and sentiments. It is necessary to know also how these things relate to the nature and conduct of the group entity” (p. 431). Evidence for group entities is gained from reports by members experiencing them as entities, from multiples with qualitatively different dynamics from entities and cultural recognition of entities. A group entity is “a form of life” directly perceived, a “process” rather than a “thing” (p. 447) known to participants directly by feeling. Groups are social facts invisible to the senses, but social science “lacks a genuine concept of group entity” (p. 452). Until this is rectified, “there can be no theory of groups unless there are entities to theorize about” (p. 452).

Conclusion. The nature of groups is being questioned again after a period in which research stagnated. The group as a psychic entity had barely been abolished before it re- appeared in social psychology albeit as a minority view. A methodology is required to integrate group and members. Even reductionist writers refer to groups as entities and their indexes list group characteristics as though describing properties of things like: “action patterns, beliefs, functions, identifications, ideology, morale, rigidity, structure, tensions” (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948, p. 632). An implicit entity exists in the science of groups, with consensually agreed attributes and a psychic character, but ill defined as a system, group-as-a-whole, or collective structures. The limitation is the lack of formulation of a theory for research without individualistic bias. This is the task of the present study and will be approached in Chapter 9. Before doing so, the conception of the group mentality within group psychotherapy will be reviewed.

7: COLLECTIVE MIND IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY

Educational principles were initially applied in groups of medical patients (Pratt, 1917, 1953, Marsh, 1935), children, adolescents and other patient groups, emphasizing individuals (Slavson, 1948; Rosenbaum and Berger, 1975). The group as entity was not recognized. Small group process was adapted for therapeutic purposes in encounter and T-group movements emphasizing interpersonal interactions (Mowrer, 1964). Three theorists recognized the group as an entity. Trigant Burrow (1875-1950) was the first to practice group psychotherapy (Berne, 1963); his work inspired Foulkes to develop Group Analysis during the 1940’s (Foulkes, 1948); at the same time, Bion initiated what became the Tavistock model (Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and Geller, 1985). Collective mentality was central to their therapeutic techniques, though the body of social theory reviewed above is not acknowledged. They conceptualize the meaning of psychological disorders as phenomena of collective mentality and are examined for their contribution to a comprehensive theory of the group entity.

Burrow. Burrow trained in psychoanalysis, but questioned its axioms (Galt, 1995). He developed “group analysis” with patients, students and colleagues in which the group was the therapist. He saw body-mind-society as “one tissue” (Galt, 1995); social groups are integral wholes whose individuals form an “instinctive racial unity” binding members into “an organic principle of consciousness” expressed biologically, socially and psychologically (Burrow, 1927a; 1953, p. 176). He called the socio-biological entity a “phyloorganism” (phylo- means large group) affiliated with racial or national group characteristics (Burrow, 1953). The “common, organic consciousness” is the “matrix” of mental life. Normal consciousness unites individuals in “social polity” to form a “collective social mind” that provides “active images” and “gestures of self-reflective actuality” as real as the “passive sensory images of the individual mind” (p. 88). Its images restrict individual self-expression and it preserves itself against separation by creating unities. Individual and social unconscious are incorporated in the organic unity of social consciousness and interchanges between them cause individuals’ oscillating moods. The “secret illusion” of separateness underlying responses to collective mentality is an “affective fallacy.”

Burrow saw organic consciousness as a societal continuum, manifesting in the continuity between individual personality and the “societal organism” (p. 151). Disrupting the continuity dissociates individuals from it. “One’s individual organism is a replica of the social organism, the dissociation of the social mind is identical with the dissociation of the individual mind” (p. 151). Thought is represented as a whole in organic life. Affects are residues of collective biology woven into a “collective personality of the social consensus” and are as neurotic and restrictive as they are enhancing of members. The individual unconscious is split from the collective by the images of good/bad, hope/fear and praise/blame surrounding children from birth. Unconscious adaptation is followed by conscious, self-reflective adaptation to the “organic continuity of consciousness that unites the individuals of the species into a confluent whole” (p. 61). It is sustained by collusion between members of the phyloorganism as a self-perpetuating, self-protective system constituting a “social unconscious.” The resistance towards it is as tenacious as resistance within individuals. Individuals begin as “corpuscles in a homogeneous tissue” as undifferentiated from the social context as from their maternal organism (p. 115). The personality is formed from an “inclusive societal consciousness” rather than “circumscribed individual consciousness” (p. 109). Normative values and others’ demands interpret this social continuity creating “a fallacy of a self over against other selves” (p. 119). The pure individual as “a separate and dissociated part” only becomes a “conscious, unified whole” by accepting “an integral, confluent part in the common, societal personality” (p. 126). The self is an element in “the consolidated unity of this common societal entity” (p. 127). The separate, autonomous self is not the problem; its failure to develop an “encompassing organismic point of view” separates it from the societal and disruption in the biological continuity between them manifests in “functional” illnesses. Neurotic conflict is between part and whole embodied in what is organically inseparable. Unconsciously asserted self-will opposes integration into the “confluent life of the organism as a whole” (p. 129) forming “lesions” in the psychosocial continuity. Just as physical pain results from organic lesions or separation of elements in the body, neurotic pain is due to lesions separating the individual from the organic whole of the societal aggregate. Normality is “merely unconsciousness on a co-operative basis” (Burrow, 1927, p. 27) or “the neurosis of the race” (Syz, 1960 p. 175).

Individuals disrupt the social organism; taking them out of context destroys it, “as truly as we destroy the integrity of the organism composing a flower when we isolate its petal or leaf in order to examine it apart from its structural continuity with the whole” (Burrow, 1927, p. 165). Treating individuals ignores the societal organism of which they are part; without it, they cannot maintain a coherent life. When individuals threaten the integrity of the encompassing social aggregate, they struggle in unconscious collusion with the disruptive process they embody. Neurotic phenomena are not located within individuals even though neurotics, through self-interest, promote their impairment by acting against the social aggregate. “But the separateness of the part is its own destruction, concomitantly the confluence of the whole is its own conservation” (pp 152- 3). Individual neurosis reflects neurosis within the social mind as a societal lesion, since it is produced by and creates separation from the surrounding social continuum. Therapists cannot cure neurosis when they are part of the pathological mentality. “The individual’s ‘symptoms’ may only be corrected through the analysis of the social processes constituting latently the individual’s collective medium” (p. 236). Burrow’s group analysis is the group’s analysis of members. “Group” here is a “phyletic principle of observation” applied equally to individual and aggregate (Burrow, 1953, p. 237); it means the social constellation “throughout the community at large, the immediate group being a constituent of this larger unit” (Burrow, 1928, quoted in Pertegato, 1999, p. 11). Burrow’s method developed into weekly hour sessions for about ten people. When he published papers in psychoanalytic journals, he was expelled from the American Psychoanalytic Society in 1933 (Galt, 1995). He continued to publish, corresponding widely with scientists in many fields (Burrow, 1953). Neglect of his work is consistent with antagonism to the collective perspective in the mid-century. It was subject to censorship by individual psychoanalysis and group analysis in spite of “widespread ransacking of ideas” from him seldom with credit by Carl Rogers, neo-Freudians and Foulkes (Pertegato, 1998). However, he formulates the problem of neurosis from a socio- centric point of view and shows it as a disruption between the individual and the collective mentality.

Foulkes. Inspired by Burrow’s papers, Foulkes (1948) began group analysis. His inconsistent and fragmentary theorizing does not do justice to his originality (Foulkes,

1948, 1965, Dalal, 1995). The group as an entity in its own right and intermediary between individuals with historical and cultural processes was central to his therapy. Social nature is “an irreducible basic fact.” The group or community is primary and the individual “helplessly compressed into a mere particle of social groups and masses” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 24). The existence of individuals requires explanation rather than that of groups. Individuals develop as much from community as family. Individuality implies a social instinct integrating individuals into groups. Mental processes in groups are a “concerted whole,” not a summary of individual processes. The group-as-a-whole is “a psychological entity,” (Foulkes, 1964, p. 70), a unified structure, a “psyche group” (pp. 75-76) with structures similar to individuals. Foulkes postulated a group mind on the same basis as an individual mind. “The ‘Group as a Whole’ is not a phrase, it is a living organism … it has moods and reactions, a spirit, an atmosphere, a climate” (Foulkes, 1948, p. 140), which must be observed and treated. Groups form both self and neurosis. Neurosis is attributed to social situations rather than individuals (Foulkes, 1964). “Mental sickness is a disturbance of integration within the community at its very roots – disturbance of communication” (p. 24). Health is inconceivable without “being a respected and effective member of the group” (p. 27). Group analysis treats the social network of disturbance through the member’s transference to other members as part of the social world (Foulkes, 1964). Dalal (1998) discerns two distinct discourses in Foulkes’ writing. A “conservative” discourse retreats from the individual as abstraction of the social entity into intrapsychic accounts of group events. The need to belong to groups is seen as a residue of primitive states of the social instinct. The social unconscious consists of automatic, routinized behaviours. A “radical” discourse asserts the “interconnected nature of existence itself” (Dalal, 1998, p. 35). Culture is neither inside nor outside, it permeates the individual. The social entity thrusts into the individual’s biological roots as “the very structure of the psyche itself, … the container as well as the contained” (pp. 48- 49). Personal psychic processes start outside in the social world and are then internalised as inner psychological events. The person is a function of communicational networks in social environments. Communication is the instrument for holding communities together, mind itself derives from the need to communicate and language creates mind in individuals. Mind is “reframed as an interpersonal phenomenon” (p. 55) and “mind that

69 is usually called intrapsychic is a property of the group” (Foulkes, 1974, pp 278). Some of Foulkes’ radical concepts are examined. The Group Matrix: The group-as-a-whole forms a “psychological medium” for communications and interactions called “a common matrix inside which all other relationships develop” and “common ground of operational relationships” (Foulkes, 1964 p. 110). Participation in groups reawakens an irresistible need to re-establish deeply rooted modes of group behaviour. Groups take hold of isolated individuals and evoke ancient tribal feeling that “permeates them to the very core and all their subsequent interactions are inescapably embedded in this common matrix” (p. 235). Individuals emerge from the common matrix where group and individuals coalesce. Members are in “in a state of interaction, in a common field, in interpenetration and communication. They speak now through one mouth, now through another” (p. 259). “Active group currents” are “personified” in members. Processes in the matrix are “transpersonal” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 26) or “suprapersonal” (Foulkes, 1964, p. 70), not restricted to intra-psychic, individual effects. Group events are composed of all members, whether directly involved or not, like the “figure” of participants against the “ground” of the group (p. 110) and manifest in communication. Individual defenses are displayed within the matrix as communicational phenomena, but are no less intrapsychic because of this. Communication occurs with consciousness and translates individual unconscious material into common symbols and group expressions. “This work in communication is the operational basis of all therapy in the group” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 28). The therapist focuses on the matrix as the “total interactional field” where unconscious reactions manifest and are translated into conscious representations within group communication (Foulkes, 1964). The group “conductor” observes all communication, promoting all events to “the rank of communication.” Every event has meaning within the total communicational matrix (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965) as ideas or phantasies “in the group’s mind” (p. 257). The conductor must balance destructive and constructive energies in the matrix. Interpersonal relationships and events do not occur in, but between individuals and exist through interaction. The matrix, like the network in the brain, constitutes a complex unit defining the meaning, intensity and location in time and space of communications. It is the operational basis of the group’s mental processes, like the lines of force of a magnetic field passing through members as nodal points “suspended in it” (Foulkes and

Anthony 1965, p. 259; Foulkes, 1964, p. 70). Group consciousness: Consciousness in the group is what can be communicated and represented by being spoken of (Foulkes, 1964, pp. 116-7). Anything that can be voiced, but is not is preconscious; what cannot be spoken is unconscious for the group, even if consciously represented in each member individually. Group productions are similar to individual free associations and are meaningful in the “total group matrix.” The social unconscious: Individuals are as compelled and modeled by these forces as by their personal unconscious and defend as strongly against their recognition without being aware of it. There is a “social or interpersonal unconscious” of such social relationships not open to conscious reflection (Foulkes, 1964, p. 52). The collective unconscious is the reservoir of members’ pooled ideas and may be suddenly discharged as the “condenser phenomenon” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 151).

Other Group Analytic Writers. Van der Kleij (1982), who calls the matrix the “common ground” between conductor and members, and identifies four “levels.” 1. The current physical and social situation, which Foulkes calls the “allosphere.” 2. The “transference level” of members’ interactions expresses past object relationships in the social network. 3. Members’ projected “bodily and mental images” include unintegrated, part- object relationships defensively displaced onto each other. 4. The “foundation matrix” contains primordial images of Jung’s collective unconscious and histories of groups from which members come (Foulkes, 1964). The second and third levels constitute the “personal” or “dynamic” matrix, analogous to the transitional object since it “belongs to nobody and yet to everybody” (Powell, 1994, p. 15). Its mental processes penetrate, transgress, link members and form group events. It de-centres the discrete subject within the body (van der Kelij, 1982), making members like “words of a sentence, none of which can express their meaning – except as objects – unless belonging to each other” (p. 224). The fourth level is the common ground of culture or race, normally felt as “innermost self, the intrapsychic as against the external world” (van der Kleij, 1982, p. 221). It exists as collective images that can be put into language and are “already shared” (p. 221). It links the group to the

71 macrocosm (Powell, 1994) and individuals with a common non-differentiated collective entity (Kaës, 1987; Le Roy, 1994). The matrix’s boundary conditions, rules and common understandings unite members and provide the transformative medium of communication and language. When past and present co-exist and situations become “transparent,” the medium becomes “communion;” this enables members to change rather than the conductor’s interpretations (van der Kelij, 1984). The matrix holds historical elements, nourishes emotional and cognitive aspects and is regarded as either “a group-work creation” (Ahlin 1985) or already present (van der Kleij, 1985; Powell, 1994). The intrapsychic “is not only shareable, but is in fact already shared” (van der Kleij, 1985, p. 220) and the matrix makes society internal, penetrating the “innermost being of the individual” (Pines, 1994, p. 49). Matrix and mind have been considered “synonymous” (Powell, 1994) and separation from the matrix is separation from essential aspects of mind. Foulkes is often explicit about the existence of group mind and his view of groups as living organisms has not been integrated with psychoanalytic theory (Powell, 1994), but the individual as node in a communication network is close to Freud’s (1895) metapsychological account of the ego as network of neurones constantly invested with energy (Powell, 1994). Foulkes rediscovered many ideas already reviewed in earlier collective mentality theorists, but adapted to the small psychotherapeutic group context, they account for psychological disturbance and guide therapeutic technique.

Bion. Bion treated the group-as-a-whole and made no interventions to members (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). His theory of the group psychic entity relies on well-established Kelinian individual psychoanalytic concepts without which, he doubts “the possibility of any advance in the study of group phenomena” (Bion, 1961, p. 8; Dalal, 1998). The failure to develop these ideas may account for their “deification” of him (Pines, 1987). Bion’s groups were experiential rather than psychotherapeutic (Bion, 1961). His concept of the group entity emerged out of its unified response to his refusal to accept the role of leader and made it a subject against him. “Group transference” is “what the group really wants” (Bion, 1961, p. 33). The group expresses by it “saying nothing,” ignoring or excluding him (p. 34), having a mood, insisting on its view (p. 35), having a desire about what it does and interpreting or being disturbed by his statements (p. 36). Members talk

72 to the group as a subject itself (p. 41). The group attitude coalesces into a common mode of functioning opposed to what the group is intended to achieve, though the members remain committed to it. The essential role of group membership in individuality is shown by the fact that anyone in contact with reality consciously or unconsciously estimates groups’ attitude towards themselves. The “efflorescence or decay of the social life of the group” depends upon this assessment, which is as important as the individual’s “sense of touch” (p. 43). Bion develops several concepts. Group Mentality: Members contribute anonymously to a “group mentality,” preventing issues being confronted and avoiding personal responsibility. It ensures consistency of contributions contrasted with the diversity of individual thought. Group mentality is the unanimous expression of the group’s will. Members unconsciously contribute to it and it causes aversive reactions whenever they think or behave at variance with it. It is the machinery of “intercommunication” designed to govern group life by assumptions. Individuals cannot keep pace with group process since a “matrix of thought” lays within the confines of the group mentality “not within the confines of the individual” (p. 19). It is both refuge and obstacle, providing unity, but restricting what can be said. It is the means of attaining goals and source of frustration as members contribute to and oppose it (p. 53). The source of this frustration is failure to take individual responsibility for contributions. Some members overtly express group mentality, others tacitly. Basic Assumptions: Three group mentality states embody different assumptions that members behave as though they share: firstly, any contact between a pair of members has a sexual purpose; secondly, only fight or flight preserve the group, which must survive even at the expense of the members; thirdly, the group is dependent, meeting to obtain security from an individual, who is to protect it as an “immature organism.” Basic assumptions are phenomenological descriptions of group emotional structures or “emotional atmospheres” (p. 83). They unify the group like “religious” beliefs, forming a common identity like the “herd,” but creating conflict between personal functioning and group membership. Members submerged in the basic assumption group, achieve a “sense of vitality” and their “inalienable inheritance as a group animal” is stimulated (p, 19). The interface between individual and group involves changes in awareness; assumptions are tacit, members seem to behave as if they are conscious of them as individuals, but

73 unconscious of them as group members. The group has no consciousness and is not articulate; “it is left to the individual to be both” (p. 94). Significant emotions for group members are determined by the assumptions. Individuals avoid this by splitting from the group and their own “essential ‘groupishness’” (p. 95), but then they have difficulty thinking for themselves. Members’ personal contributions and symptoms derive from “being at one with the other members of the emotionally reinforced group” (p. 95). Participation in basic assumptions is unavoidable, ensuring emotions are shared. Their occurrence and transitions between them are unpredictable. They alternate as products of group states rather than conflicting with each other. Conflict occurs at transitions to the work group. Basic assumptions are “group diseases” or modes of dysfunction affecting the group rather than individuals. The “spontaneous instinctive co-operation in the basic assumptions” is called “valency” to distinguish it from co-operation which he associates with conscious or unconscious activity in the work group. Therapeutic groups oscillate between assumption states and instability spreads to other groups outside them until there is enough “inert material” of outsiders not sharing the emotional situation to form a new, larger group that ceases to vibrate. The “violent and disagreeable mass oscillation” then ceases (p. 125). If this is not achieved, oscillations create sub-groups that engage in “platitudinous, dogmatic, and painless” communication, become dependent or exclude newcomers. Basic assumptions recognise neither time nor development, but tensions provide vitality to participants. Proto-mental Phenomena: Bion postulates prototypic group mentalities where physical and psychological are undifferentiated as “proto-mental” phenomena expressing themselves only through the group, not individuals. Phenomena exist in the proto-mental sphere long before they are demonstrable. It is a “matrix” where basic assumption emotions “reinforce, pervade, and dominate the group’s mental life” physically and mentally (p. 132). When an assumption manifests, the others remain in the proto-mental system, converting into different states according to circumstances. In the proto-mental sphere, members meeting together “has no significance whatsoever in the production of group phenomena” (p. 132); meeting is only needed to receive interpretations from the therapist. In the proto-mental sphere, they are already united, their responses being created from a common base. Groups allow aspects of individual psychology to be studied that are alien to non-group situations.

The Work Group: The work group is an inherently group state achieved by organization and structure giving stability and resistance to basic assumptions. Basic assumption groups need neither structure nor organization since the unity is in the common emotion. Members believe the group is distinct from the aggregate of members who regress to achieve commonality. Symbolic verbal communication is a function of work groups, whereas the ‘language’ of basic-assumption groups is debased and used as a mode of action instead of thought. “The ‘language’ of the basic-assumption group lacks the precision and scope that is conferred by a capacity for the formation and use of symbols: this aid to development is therefore missing, and stimuli that would ordinarily promote development have no effect” (pp. 185-186). Bion derives group mentality from an undifferentiated, proto-mental level. It is as much a product of individuals as their own psychic functioning; the group situation brings it into expression. He suggests an instinctive basis for this valency or attachment to groups, but avoids saying what group mentality or proto-mental states are, or relating them to the individual mind. Bion’s work has been influential in the “Tavistock” approach (Rice, 1965; Rioch, 1970; Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and Geller, 1985) and seminal to many group therapists (Gazda, 1977a; Rosenbaum, 1978; Rutan and Stone, 1984). His vagueness and criticism of McDougall, Le Bon and Trotter led followers to deny the group entity. “Although Bion thinks and speaks of instincts, he does not postulate a herd instinct or a group mind” (Rioch, 1970, p. 22). Yet, Bion clearly invests the group with a mental life and existence of its own. Others confirm that he sees groups as organisms and group mentality as inherently collective (Lipgar, 1998). Bion’s mentality is composed of what is rejected by members; what joins them is regressive and destructive, but this may be a function of his method (Pines, 1987; Brown, 1996).

The Group-as-a-whole. Other therapists postulate holistic phenomena, such as “common group tension” (Ezriel, 1950a, 1950b) or “group focal conflict” (Whitaker and Lieberman, 1964). The group-as-a-whole has been central to psychotherapy using group dynamics (Whitaker and Leibermann, 1964; Whitaker, 1989) and systems theory (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). Groups are not thought to have moods since “a group is not an organism capable of feeling. Yet … there are times when particular moods or atmospheres develop in a group which are undeniably detectable and in some sense belong to the group as a whole”

(Whitaker, 1989, p. 33). Agazarian and Peters (1981) regard the group-as-a-whole is an object of thought, a conceptual tool deduced from observations and its phenomena as “invisible” since they cannot be seen. For Agazarian (1993), “systems do not really exist in the real world, like people do. They exist only as ideas in your head. Each system comes into existence only when you think and it disappears again when you don’t” (pp. 4- 5). The term “group-as-a-whole” is often used to demarcate the Tavistock approach’s exclusive focus on the group, which has been found of limited therapeutic use (Kibel and Stein, 1981). It is also seen as a holistic expression of group phenomena, variously regarded as gestalt, universal, group-in-the-mind, metaphor, construct or superordinate structure (Ettin, 1999), allowing knowledge of the group to be gained while avoiding definition of its ontological status beyond saying it is neither fantasy nor reality (Durkin, 1989).

Conclusion. The organism is central to both Burrow and Foulkes’ thought, linking individuals to groups by an “instinctive” bond. Individual, self and mind are secondary products of the continuity of social mentality; they emerge through communication in the social organism. Psychological disturbance is a consequence of discontinuity between individual and group. Communication is the common matrix for bridging the gap between discrete selves. Many of the social mentality theorists’ ideas are re- invented to serve therapeutic theory. However, Bion does not recognize the Work Group as engaged in collective mentality, which are regressed, de-individualizing basic assumption states, similar to phenomena described by crowd theorists. Like them, he attributes their union to identification processes. His collective phenomena are counter- therapeutic, although he implies much more with his concepts of proto-mental phenomena. The ideas common to these disciplines have been regarded as curiosities in social science. The critique needs to be examined and they must be integrated into a common body of theory for the empirical task at hand. These are the subjects of the next two chapters.

8: CRITICISM OF COLLECTIVE MENTALITY

Theories of the group entity faded from the social sciences in the second quarter of the twentieth century. By mid-century small-group research in social psychology replaced it as the dominant paradigm except in the relatively discrete field of group psychotherapy. The reasons will be shown to be as much ideological as scientific. In considering their contribution to group psychotherapy, it is essential to review the critique.

Organism theories. Spencer’s organism theory was criticized as descriptive and analogical, rather than analytical (McDougall, 1920) and suffered from ideological axioms that all knowledge be systematized in evolution theory (Timasheff, 1966). However, organism theory successively transformed with changing paradigms. Systems theory, its current form, is accepted in orthodox social science, though somewhat disguised.

Crowd and herd theories. Although mentioned in most social psychology texts, the crowd mind was not subjected to empirical research. Allport (1924) dismissed collective mind as lacking demonstrable, material basis and declared there was no group psychology, only psychology of individuals in groups. His prestige and experimental work relocated inquiry around problems suitable for behaviorist investigation (Turner, 1988). The general critique of instinct theory also undermined it (Murphy, 1964) and the assumption that large groups debased their members was also attacked (Mannheim, 1940, 1943). Crowds were taken as the exemplars of group mind theories in later literature (Newcomb, 1950; Wrightsman, 1972), but their specific functions and social mind theories were ignored. Scientific criticism was supported by ideological rejection. Although Trotter was democratic and liberal, crowd theorists were elitist and conservative (Nye, 1975) and became contaminated with fascist and Marxist ideologies, which asserted the precedence of nation, race or class over individuals. Mussolini proclaimed, “All for the State; nothing outside the State; nothing against the State” (Y Gasset, 1930, p. 72). Mass psychology was one of Nazism’s most important weapons (Reich, 1942; Mannheim, 1943; Meerloo, 1944; van Ginneken, 1992). After World War II, crowd

77 phenomena were explained by suggestion, imitation, social facilitation and dissociation of consciousness (Young, 1946; Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1947) and replaced by small group psychology (Sherif, 1948; Lewin, 1948; Asch, 1952). Study of crowd psychology made way for classification, prediction and etiology in sociology (Turner and Killian, 1957; Lang and Lang, 1961; Smelser, 1963; Evans, 1969; Shibutani, 1970).

Group mentality theories. Cycles of individualism and collectivism have alternated in social thought since Plato (Nisbet, 1973). Emphasis on individuality (Jordan, 1927; O’Neill, 1973; Heller, Sosna and Wellbery, 1986) made collective mind theories seem fanciful and politically dangerous (Ginsberg, 1927) and encouraged ethnocentric polemics idealizing Anglo- Saxons, vilifying Germany and criticizing other European nations’ inferiority (McCabe, 1915) that science could only oppose. The unity of a system of social forces was seen not to correspond to the mind’s unity and group behavior was determined by influences on individual minds (McIver, 1917). Sociological research moved to “unit ideas” such as community, authority, status, stratification and alienation (Nesbit, 1973; Collins, 1985). Collective mentality became “old fashioned” (Allport, 1954). Objections often amounted to paradigm differences and alternative approaches often describing social concepts in terms similar to group minds (Asch, 1952; Allport, 1964). However, science itself does not progress by scientific method (Kuhn, 1962) and the political debate was between ideologies valuing individuality versus those subordinating it.

Freud’s critique. Freud (1921) explained crowds’ uncontrolled, “primitive” characteristics as unconscious impulses freed from repression by the conditions in large groups rather than creating mental entities. Group organisation equipped with the individual’s attributes preserved the characteristics extinguished by membership. Members identified with each other through common love for the leader, creating suggestibility and contagion. Loss of the leader-follower relation produces panic and breakdown of the group. Individual psychology explained group mind and herd and left no room for collective mentality. Psychoanalytic theory continues to be individualistic and considers group dynamics in terms of identification, projection and projective identification (Rice, 1965; Menzies-Lyth, 1970; Colman and Bexton, 1975; Colman and

Geller, 1985; Hinshelwood, 1987; Jaques, 1990). However, psychoanalytic group therapists proposed collective mentality theories similar to those discredited.

Ginsberg’s critique. Ginsberg (1921, 1932, 1954) attacked collective mentality for thirty years. He claimed the rationality, integration and unity of collective entities and individual personality are exaggerated and “no coherent and self-consistent account has been offered of the way in which the unity of social groupings is to be conceived” (1921, p. 47). Social institutions are not the result of a mind and do not embody rational purposes; they embody conflicts, their unity often suppressing vital demands of most members. They appear to be “‘trial and error’ experiments, groping attempts at finding solutions for the problems and dis-harmonies of life” (p. 44). It is false to oppose individual to society; the intrinsic social relations said to constitute individuals have no existence outside social groupings. Individuals retain something “unique and incommunicable,” yet their development is development of sociality. Although relations holding members of society together are mental, social mind hypotheses are “exceedingly dangerous,” giving society a “fictitious unity which it does not posses;” it belittles individuality and minorities, opposing the good of society to that of individuals. Social mind theories idealize society with higher and lower qualities than individuals. Regarding the social mind as more enlightened and rational than individuals encourages submission and conservatism. Personification of the whole means something can be good for it, but not its members, allowing autocracy or aristocracy to masquerade as democracy. Someone has to speak for the social mind no matter how infallible it may be. Ginsberg (1921) distinguished two types of theory. Durkheim’s maintained “a collective consciousness in which the mental processes of individuals are fused and compounded” (p. 51) forming the self from collective mental processes that gains continuity and unity from society. McDougall’s proposed a “general will” formed by the essentially social character of mental content and the self, owing its nature to relations with others.

Critique of Durkheim. Ginsberg attacked Durkheim’s concept of collective representations. Since there

79 is no continuity of substratum in society like that of individuals’ brains, the fusion of individual representations into collective representations is meaningless. He concluded, “it is doubtful, therefore, whether the conception of interaction between minds has any validity;” individuals’ influence on each other can only be through indirect symbolic communication. “Perhaps such terms as fusion or interaction have really no meaning at all when applied to minds” (p. 58). He cannot imagine how elementary processes constitute representations. Yet Durkheim’s (1964) view that richness of communication and collective effervescence in groups provide continuity is compatible with contemporary cognitive theory, which understands higher order mental representations as forming out of the complexity of associated cognitive elements (Von Eckardt, 1993; Cummins, 1995). Ginsberg did not address common ideas operating on individuals as a non-personal constraint and adopted a skeptical, empiricist method presupposing the individual’s primacy, which does not touch the import of Durkheim’s argument. Ginsberg considered consistent application of Durkheim’s theory would result in “complete disappearance of the individual and his absorption into the social mind” (p. 58). Durkheim’s distinction of personal and collective content in individual minds leads to a position that “there can be no such thing as individual presentations, and therefore no individual minds” (p. 58). While content is universal, process can only be individual. Durkheim’s view is called the result of a “hypostatization” (a common pejorative term in discussions of collective mentality, meaning “to make into or treat as a substance,” Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990) of the contents of the social system at the expense of mental process. However, Durkheim (1964) took great pains to avoid this simplicity by balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces on individual and group. Ginsberg objected to categories of thought being socially derived by declaring they are already inherent in ideas of society and it is uncertain which is primary. His view was that since the social character of general ideas was as “functional principles, as ways in which the mind organizes its experience, there is no difficulty in conceiving of them as essentially part of the structure of the individual mind” (p. 59). The difference in the behaviour of individuals in or out of groups is due to special conditions such as organisation and deliberation. He proved his point by an appeal: “surely the phenomena referred to do not need a super-individual mind to explain them” (p. 59). He criticized the group mind’s superiority. There is no way of finding out what such a being might think and the “tissue of mental forces operative in society” exhibits “little

80 unity of purpose or clear perception of ends such as we find in the best or greatest individual minds” (p. 60). Popular idealism does not compare with the “clear-eyed vision and steadfast devotion” in great personalities. Such phraseology reveals his ideological partiality for the individual as reference point.

Critique of McDougall. Ginsberg objected to McDougall’s (1920) view of mind as “an organised system of mental or purposive forces.” A system of minds is not a mind itself, as a house built of bricks is not a brick. He found two simultaneous group mind concepts in McDougall. The first is “esprit de corps,” each member having a similar idea of and strong emotional attachment to the whole group. Ginsberg said it is “out of harmony with the facts” for nations and does not allow for complex, conflicting and discordant views. The second concept is of group interests, ideas and values not attributable to individual minds. He regarded this as a “dangerous” idea, confusing unity of content and process. Groups rarely arrive at superior decisions to individuals; superior public decisions show collective deliberation rather than collective mind. Complex group structures lack the unity and concreteness of individual minds, which possess a core of being not exhausted in groups. Intellectual or moral institutions are nothing in themselves; they must be reinterpreted by each generation. The idea that society has a mental life greater than the sum of its units is purely verbal since units cannot exist apart from social relations. “The idea that we can get a ‘mere sum’ of isolated individuals and contrast them with a concrete social entity is a gratuitous assumption” (p. 64). Psychological phenomena of social wholes are “unities of mind” (p. 66), but he rejected group mind or organism explanations as confusing content with process. “The problem of the relation of the individual to the social wholes to which he belongs is more complex than the theory of the social mind allows for” (p. 68). He reasoned that since it is counter-intuitively for him, the theory cannot be valid. Finding assertions “gratuitous” is irrelevant to their validity and declaring the hypothesis too complex is unscientific. Ginsberg (1954) tackled the nominalist fallacy that “to assign characteristics to groups is by no means the same as to consider them as entities which exist independently of the individuals which compose them” (p. 152). Applying will, mind, purpose or other individualistic concepts to society implies a “new kind of whole which

81 stands outside individuals or in which they are merged.” The complexity of multiple intersecting, changing social structures and groups of which individuals are simultaneously members allow no analogy to physical organisms. “Minds in relation to each other do not constitute a mind in the sense in which each individual has a mind. They are “relational complexes” of a peculiar kind, with characteristics of their own” (p. 158). He gave opinion with exhortation, but cited no evidence against the view. A mixture of assertion and value judgment obscures the possibility of sui generis entities. Political misuse of ideas is no argument against their validity, any more than misuse of technology is an argument against its existence. However, he was a champion of individual rights and a major influence in the scientific rebuttal of prejudice and pseudoscience common in the first half of the twentieth century (Ginsberg, 1956, 1960, 1961).

Later criticism. Earlier criticisms were repeated in the middle of the century. Moore (1969) equated the “group mind fallacy” with the “reductionist fallacy” overlooking that although the latter is a methodological problem the former is a theoretical one. Krech and Crutchfield (1948) typify the mixture of arguments from fashion and authority: “Today the term group-mind is in disfavor, but the concept still plays an important role in the thinking of … many social philosophers, and even some social scientists. Despite its burial at the hands of F. H. Allport and others, the group-mind concept still seems to lead a ghostly life in the thinking of many social psychologists for the simple reason that in doing away with the group- mind, the social psychologist seems to have been left with only the individual as his unit of analysis, and so no social psychologist can get along without some larger unit than the individual. Thus we find the use of such terms as group gestalten¸ dynamic social fields, etc. – all modern terms, but frequently misused” (p. 20). Uncritical promulgation of such attitudes led to the idea being dismissed in passing: “Historically, there have been social theories that developed the concept of an emerging group mind, but these have largely fallen into disrepute” (Lana, 1976 p. 118). Parsons (1968) called the group mind, “merely a metaphysical assumption; its employment is

82 scientifically unsound” (p. 357). Although Durkheim never reified social being as group mind, Parsons claimed it is implied by giving reality to society’s mentality and is due to the theory’s incompleteness (p. 363). Other criticisms misinterpreted and reified collective mentality. The group mind was “once used to refer to an extra-natural mind, or psyche, of a group of people” and was “the view that groups, societies, and peoples think, feel and act as entities in themselves, quite apart from the thinking, feeling, and acting of the individuals making up the group” (Zadrozny, 1959, p. 141). Asch (1952) repeated this error, accusing group mind theorists of the “anthropomorphic fallacy,” introducing, “a profound cleavage between group forces and the individual and to fix the relations between them in a particular manner. The group swallows the individuals who become mere recipients of group forces…. The upshot of the group-centered view is that men are the agents of outside conditions - that their aims, their ways of thinking and feeling, and their very character are dictated to them by forces over which they have no control” (p. 254). Durkheim’s qualifier sui generis was ignored; no group mentality proponents suggest it exists apart from the members. Political connotations were ever-present. Klineberg (1940) says group mind theory encourages a “romantic and mystical concept of the nation” exploited in “recent fascist literature” (p. 330). Crowd theories were cited, ignoring more rigorous social mind theories (Newcomb, 1950). Asch (1952) said the relationship of group to individual, “has a direct bearing on political questions of the relation of the state to the individual. … The group-centred view, when carried to its conclusion, becomes the basis for the proposition that the society – or its representative, the state – has a will and a personality, that its interests are supreme, and that the individual exists for the state. This proposition was in fact an explicit part of the legal doctrines of the Nazi and fascist regimes” (p. 259). He supported this emotional argument with fascist quotations: “‘Not the individual, only the community has rights; there is no Magna Carta. The individual has only duties, the violation of which constitutes a crime. The plans for the criminal law foresee the breaking down of the primacy of the individual, and establishment of the superiority of the community.’ (Nationalsozialistische

Leitsätze für ein neues deutsches Strafrecht, 1935, p. 6.) ‘Fascism conceives of the state as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived in their relation to the state.’ (B. Mussolini, The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism, International Conciliation, 1935, p. 13.)” (Asch, 1952, p. 259, note). He accused Durkheim of hypostasizing group mentality “into an autonomous entity, working through individuals but not determined by them” (p. 255), although Durkheim (1954, 1964) said neither individual nor society can be autonomous; society operates from within individuals as though expressing their own desires. Group mentality appears in sociological and psychological dictionaries till the early 1960’s (Zadrozny, 1959; English and English, 1962) then disappeared (Chaplin, 1968; Mitchell, 1969; Harré and Lamb, 1984). It was no longer discussed from the 1960’s (Johnson, 1961; Brown, 1965; Watson, 1966; Nisbet, 1970; Bottomore, 1971; Wrightsman, 1971) indicating uncritical acceptance of consensus judgment. Brodbeck, (1973) refered to “the scientifically disreputable past of social science – its closet cluttered with ‘group minds’ and other suspect entities” (p. 110) as reason to condition the consciousness, “or better” the unconscious of social scientists with “Methodological Individualism.” Watkins (1973) glibly dismissed it: “is the behaviour of a number of individuals ever regulated by some super-individual mental entity? … In general, ‘group-minds’ are very rightly out of fashion” (p. 153-153). Refuting a caricature of the carefully considered theories of Durkheim, Cooley, Mead and Trotter they only reiterated fashion without reading the authors. Gellner (1973) mentioned the “holistic subject” in historical explanation it as “equivalent to a ‘group mind’ theory,” adding “I take it no one is advocating this seriously” (p. 251). Later, he said, “of course, societies not being endowed with group minds, the question doesn’t arise for ‘the totality’” (p. 259). The idea was dismissed rather than refuted. Even Durkheim’s admirers were reluctant to accept the group being, saying he did not mean it and expressed himself badly (Goldstein, 1973). It was dismissed as, “some mystical concept of a ‘group mind’” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 128) and became a historical curiosity displaced by interpersonal processes between members. The nature of groups themselves is ignored between the early 1960’s and the late 1980’s (Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner, 1988).

Evaluation of objections. Objections to collective mentality can be condensed into four types and evaluated for their relevance to empirical investigations.

1. Epistemological Objection: Groups cannot be perceived and are observers’ constructs since they do not exist. Only individuals can be observed and group properties are emergent, nominalist reifications.

At the end of his life, Allport conceded this argument applied equally to atoms and other phenomena (Steiner, 1986). The perceptual “invisibility” of groups is naïve. A tree is not perceived as a whole yet is an entity because of the perceptual field’s structure. Although not objects like physical persons, groups are perceptible. Perception and cognition are constructive activities (Berger and Luckman, 1973; Rose and Kuhlwein, 1996) and in some respects, all entities are constructs (Maturana, 1988). Individuals themselves are constructs of varied states. The idea that group entities are emergent is simplistic, since individuals are already elements of pre-existing groups, which are re-organised in new groups. Groups are no more “emergent” than individuals are; both always co-existed. Groups did not emerge from nothing any more than individuals born from other individuals are emergent; the members forming groups always already belonged to other groups. Groups’ do not exist because they are named, but because they are consensually validated structures of the perceptual world. Reification is the fallacy where abstract relationships or properties are regarded as having independent existence (Bullock and Stalleybrass, 1986). Group entities were never claimed as independent of their constituent individuals, but equally real. They are constructions of interacting individuals. Groups are reified when defined as relationships between members, but not if described as observable phenomena.

2. Functional Objection: Groups are not like people; fictitious unity is attributed to them devaluing individuals. Although consisting of the same stuff as individual minds, group minds lack properties of personal minds and should not be called mind. They lack the intelligence and wisdom attributed to them and

are subject to error and evil. Groups exhibit trial and error rather than guidance by a mind.

Group beings do not have the same mentality as their constituent individuals; they are sui generis (Durkheim, 1964), but this does not refute their existence. Group entities co-exist with individuals, but have different functions from individual minds and perhaps should not be called “mind” with its individualistic associations. They are not formed by the same stuff as individual minds, or not all the same stuff. A portion of individuals’ minds constitutes group mentality and there is no assumption it should function like an individual’s mind. A relation of analogy between individual and group is denied by all theorists. Groups being subject to stupidity, error and evil only demonstrates that they are as fallible as individuals, but the error and evil of individuals may also be accounted for by groups. Collective dynamics have been used to explain communal violence and genocide (Turner, 1985, 1987).

3. Collective Subject Objection: Collective representations and collective consciousness formed by symbolic communication cannot constitute a being that thinks and acts. If group mentality only speaks through individuals, it gives power to those who speak for it.

This objection assumes a collective subject is proposed that can speak, desire or act. However, no proponents assert analogical attribution of individualistic subjectivity to groups, which leads to untenable notions. Durkheim (1954) speaks of collective conscience in which members are embedded, resembling Burrow’s (1927b) collective consciousness, Foulkes’ (1948) matrix and Bion’s (1961) proto-mental dimension. Only Hegel (1807) possibly describes a collective person. The collective subject is sui generis, different from individuals, its character and expression to be determined by observation. Regarding it as a collective person misinterprets all versions of the idea. Durkheim never confuses collective conscience with the being of society; collective functions are activities of the social being. Individual subjects arise within groups under circumstances not applicable to groups themselves.

Collective consciousness only arises with organised communication forming common propositions and values that define common cognitive objects, affects and action patterns for members. This is similar to theories of individual consciousness. In psychoanalysis, individual consciousness occurs when word presentations are added to thing presentations (Freud, 1919), making it a product of language and communication. Mead (1962) regarded consciousness as produced by a “universe of discourse.” Contemporary cognitive theory sees consciousness arising from complex parallel processing, inseparable from linguistic representation (Gregory, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1988). Consciousness arising out of communication is no longer controversial, but collective consciousness refers to members’ shared content. Consciousness mediated by collective representations unites individuals to respond as members of the collective entity rather than as individuals. Attributing it to a collective subject misunderstands and reifies the concept as a separate entity, which no theorist supports. Political misuse of the idea has no bearing on scientific investigation; on the contrary, its power potential may assist in managing criminal and destructive groups.

4. Structural Objection: A social mind would consist of multiple intersecting minds with bewildering complexity, making members part of many “minds” simultaneously; but groups also do not possess the complexity of personal minds and differ structurally from biological individuals.

The complexity of the brain, neural representations and cognitive processes (Rummelhart and McLelland, 1989; Macdonald and Macdonald, 1995; Port and van Gelder, 1995; Kelso, 1995) make this objection less significant than when it was made. Individual minds have a complexity, which is only now becoming understood. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1988; Hogg, 1988) shows individuals map themselves within complex interconnecting social identifications. Tribal social structures are complex without constituting a problem for members (Durkheim, 1964; Levi-Strauss, 1969) and aboriginal people’s relationships and identity extend throughout the community (Elkin, 1979). Collective entities are organised differently to individuals; collective mentality is not a duplicate of individual mentality and may be more complex in some aspects and less complex in others. It is an empirical task to describe these differences.

Conclusions. Although critics raise important theoretical problems, many arguments distort key elements making the group mentality hypothesis untenable and they refute their own versions. Critiques conform to fashionable deductive, empiricist methodologies and the weight of argument is from authority, ideology and directed at political rather than scientific implications. Objections identify it with individual human subjects, invalidating its uniqueness and ignoring the qualifications collective mentality theorists make to avoid this. With the breakdown of behaviorism and advent of phenomenological and hermeneutic methodologies it is becoming respected as a contribution to the unsolved problems of social science (Warriner, 1956; Steiner, 1983, 1986; Tuner, 1988; Sandelands and Stablein, 1987). While not an empirical hypothesis, it structures the perceptual field as a way of observing groups rather than being falsifiable. Falsifiability is a criterion of positivist empirical science (Popper, 1972), but not so crucial to humanistic or hermeneutic science (Schotter, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977; Davidson, 1985). Group mentality is a metapsychological proposition defining the field of observation. Its existence is an epistemological or metaphysical issue and not the subject of this study. Scientific investigation requires a methodology for observing and interpreting phenomena defined as social or group mentality. The scientific question is whether the hypothesis facilitates systematic study of group phenomena, reveals regularities and informs therapeutic technique (Gregory, 1996). Its scientific merits must rest on a coherent theory and a body of reliable observations. The criticisms can be interpreted as responses to ambiguities of the concepts. The following chapter integrates the ideas reviewed into a comprehensive notion of collective mentality as the foundation for specific concepts of group psychic life to be operationalised and studied empirically.

9: INTEGRATION OF THEMES.

A science of groups. A science of groups considers them objects in their own right, constituted by interacting members, who are studied in another discipline (Social Psychology); each requires appropriate methodology. This study presents a methodology for studying group psychical entities. The influence of society is mediated by peer groups (Cooley, 1909; Durkheim, 1966; Cotterell, 1996; Harris, 1998) and group psychotherapy provides opportunities to observe collective psychic functions and how collective mentality is constituted in interpersonal interaction. Many objections to collective mentality can be avoided by defining a clearer relationship between concepts of group and individual. Although it requires theoretical discussion beyond the scope of this study, axioms can be postulated to accommodate the criticisms and set the study’s boundaries. These propositions are intended as heuristics to define the field of study of group entities. 1. Group entities are not like persons, who are defined by their body, capacity to act and use of language; groups cannot act or speak as subjects. Their characteristics have to be determined by observation not analogy (Durkheim, 1966). 2. Group entities must exist with organic organization, continuity and a life cycle before developing mentality (McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1964). 3. The group entity’s manifestation and materiality is communication in the widest sense; its mentality is communication, organization and content (McDougall, 1920; Burrow, 1927b; Mead, 1962; Foulkes, 1964). 4. The group entity is coexistent and co-temporal with its members (Durkheim, 1954). Groups existed from the beginning and individuals emerged within them (Freud, 1921; Harré, 1993); group mentality is not derived from individual minds, but a different order preceding and co-existing with them (Durkheim, 1966; Mead, 1962). 5. The group entity cannot exist apart from its members, who serve individual and group mentality at the same time (Durkheim, 1954). It does not only exist when members are physically gathered (Bion, 1961).

6. Groups and individuals are complementary; individuals do not develop outside membership of groups; groups cannot exist without members. Lack of appropriate group involvement deforms personality; lack of appropriate members deforms groups (Cooley, 1909; Burrow, 1927B; Mead, 1962; Foulkes, 1964; Harris, 1998). Their relationship is between symbiosis and parasitism (Blomfield, 1982). 7. Distinguishable domains of individual and group mentality exist within the person (Durkheim, 1954). The same content may have one status for the individual and another for the group (Bion, 1961; Foulkes, 1948, 1990). 8. Group entities have lives of their own, which are not necessarily consistent with members’ welfare (Bion, 1961; Durkheim, 1964). 9. Group entities to which individuals belong, provide a creative tension of supports and constraints on personal existence (Durkheim, 1954, 1964). 10. Group entities are vulnerable to the same vicissitudes, accidents, failures and errors as individuals. They are no wiser or more capable than individuals, but differently organized (Burrow, 1927b; Bion, 1961; Durkheim, 1966). With these axioms, findings on group entities are summarised and integrated into a theoretical framework.

A theory of group mentality. A theory of group mentality is proposed that enables whole group phenomena to be systematically observed and their therapeutic effects investigated. The theory first establishes what types of mentality are collective as distinct from individual, then describes group conditions enabling this to exist and defines group dimensions of cognition, affect and action. In the following chapters, these phenomena are theoretically defined and criteria for their observation in psychotherapy groups are described.

Defining collective mentality. All theorists affirm collective mentality is fundamentally different from individual mentality and it remains scientifically unusable unless distinguished. The first question is whether the term “mind” is appropriate to designate collective mentality. The concept mind: Mind means memory (bear in mind); intention, desire, wish;

90 seat of consciousness, thoughts, volitions, feelings; incorporeal subject (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). As the seat of consciousness representing the subject, mind is an individual concept indicating bodily and sensory content of psychic life. Philosophically, mind is an “abstract version” of individual functions such as thinking, perceiving or feeling, rather than something in its own right, (Morton, 1995). It is associated with sensation and consciousness (Scruton, 1996); it involves mental changes, but if it is only the collection of changes, it leaves out “precisely what ties them together into the mind” (Shaffer, 1967, p 337). Using mind for collective psychic functions raises linguistic problems since it evokes individual, sensory activities. The alternative term “psyche” is no less individualistic. In Greek philosophy, psyche means breath, soul or spirit (Matthews, 1995) and indicates living entity, conscious self or principle of individuality (Kerferd, 1967a). To avoid the individualistic bias of mind, individual and collective mentality must be contrasted and an alternative term suggested. The individual mind: The body and its functions, definitive in time and space determine the individual’s mental content. The body individualizes; its functions, sensory experiences, pleasure, voluntary movement and conscious representation belong only to one person. Most of what is defined as mind derives from sensory and bodily content such as sensation, consciousness, memory, thought, affect and volition, which is subjected to mental operations. This can be called the “somatosensory mind” including sensory experience, states of arousal and motor activity. To analyse the boundary between individual and collective mentality, somatosensory content must be distinguished from what is not sensory. Mental functions not dependent on sensory or bodily content include rational structures and processes that go beyond the specifics of an experience and relate it to forms common to members of a culture. They derive from social experiences provided through communication and language (Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962; Toulmin, 1972). Concepts and rational operations are collective because they cannot be reduced to specific sensory instances, presuppose a common culture and are the same for all who have them. Other functions include collective representations, sentiments and ritualized action patterns (Durkheim, 1954). Collective Mentality: Collective mentality is therefore the framework of concepts, categories, ideas, logical and rational operations, relationships, rules,

91 assumptions and values constituting the system within which specific sensory mental content is given meaning common to members of a cultural group. Individual sensory experience is given meaning by shared products of thought and knowledge. Collective mentality denotes a framework that gives collective meaning to individual experience; it is indicated by all that remains constant in a given human mental activity when the specific somatosensory content changes. For example, if a person’s conversation about their job is compared with another conversation about their family, common features organize the different sensory content showing their mental structures. Comparing this person’s conversation with another’s in the same culture shows common cultural structures organizing their sensory contents. Comparison with someone from a different culture shows other, more fundamental structures. Such comparisons can be taken by substituting different somatosensory content to reveal the commonalities of structure and function underlying them. Eventually, any human beings have in common certain fundamentals of rational consciousness that are the core of human mentality. An alternative to Mind. Since mind or mentality has a strong individualistic, bodily meaning, another word may help define collective mentality more clearly without individualistic connotations. In Greek philosophy, “nous” denoted mental operations not dependent on the senses. It referred to the rational, intellectual, knowing part of the mind (English and English, 1958), principles beyond the manifest phenomenal world (Jones, 1995) related to eternal truths, implying a universal, cosmic or world mind (Rhode, 1987). It was cosmic reason and rationality (Kerferd, 1967b, p 525). It indicated thinking, ordering, planning, and universal order; it expressed the consciousness of organisms’ life through the inherent connectedness of their organs. It is intellectual activity analogous to perception for ideas and consciousness (Gadamer, 1998). It denotes mental functions not dependant on sensory content, whose principles and processes are the same for all people. It may be used to define collective mentality. Collective mentality can more correctly be called collective nous. The ideas, principles and operations constituting nous only exist collectively. No person embodies more than a fragment of the interconnected system. Traditionally, philosophy and psychology privilege individual awareness by acknowledging only what individuals express. Another point of view can focus on the system of functions defined by nous. Logic, reason and other forms of thought exist for everyone who understands

92 them to form a self-sustaining cultural system. Individuals join such a world of thought in the same sense they join a language community. Nous exists as the medium of a specific set of conditions of individual minds, including communication, being subject to collective and individual interactions and being part of a social entity and cultural milieu. The collectivizing function of nous: The body divides people from each other. Nous functions link people in communicational-mental-social structures through language. To have a place in social life or in nous, sensory content must be converted into words or other semiotic forms and rendered as linguistic products. Sensory experience is formed in the rational structures and operations of these communications. Mental representations form when conceptual forms structure sensory data, when word presentations are attached to thing presentations (Freud, 1919). Individuals’ memory images are unique, but take on cultural significance when communicated to others. Instead of the images themselves, their verbal representations are transmitted through social communication and subjected to organizing structures and processes independent of sensory content. This is the functioning of nous. Images become active in nous when freed from their specific somatosensory forms and take communicable form (Durkheim’s, 1964, collective representations). The sensory images are re-created by other communicating individuals, each giving them personal colouring within the common forms. Communication and its structures exist through individuals’ participation in organized, rational thought and expression with common values of truth and consistency. It is co-extensive with cultural forms, inseparable from social and communicational forms that make social organization and ordered mental processes possible. Nous exists in its own right since no individual sustains it; each comes into and leaves forms existing independently of them as individuals, though they may leave their marks on it. This is also characteristic of groups to which they belong. People are born into social forms that pre-exist and succeed them. The individual mind’s point of contact with nous is wherever communication occurs within any rational structure. Initially, this is in small social groups (Cooley’s, 1904, primary groups). For large groups, mass media, culture and ritual are the institutionalized forms for exchanges that are spontaneous in small groups. Individuals who cannot become part of such groups are deprived of contributing to or being structured and supported by nous.

Personal and collective nous: Using the criterion of somatosensory content, two domains of nous can be defined to differentiate personal and collective mental content. When somatosensory experiences are represented mentally, they can be represented in language, communicated and subjected to logical or moral principles. The resulting manifest mental content consisting of personalized concepts, values and actions constitutes personal nous. A person may think rationally about their life, make decisions and evaluate their experiences using nous functions in their personal mind. They may be unaware how this is structured by the organization of culture, gender, history, moral attitudes and prejudices of their society that reflect collective nous working through personal nous and somatosensory content. To take its place within a wider system of meanings and values incorporating membership of society, this personalized organization must be subject to the meanings and values of the culture that constitute collective nous. While personal nous forms and organizes representations within the personal mind, collective nous links them to collective representations values, meanings and functions common to society members. There is no clear boundary between the two, but rather a series of gradations from collective to personal. Within collective nous, various domains can be distinguished, like other social structures. Part is common to humanity, then large-scale cultures such as occidental and oriental, national, class, family and eventually peer group structures. Each provides essential elements in the organic complexity of the whole nous organism. There are also different degrees of organization of nous. The crowd mind, Burrow’s collective neurosis and Bion’s basic assumption group mentality are all organized around shared sentiments, emotions and attitudes. They show only limited logical operations, subject to cultural norms. The systemic functions are limited to simple conjunction and disjunction of normative values. The emotive content debases the logical system of nous. In orderly discussion reaching a consensus, cooperative problem solving and decisions, the personal nous activity of each member becomes an element in a common rational structure with respect for reason, ethics, culture, history, language and forms of action. These operations of collective nous support and organize sensory-personal content. They lack specific content, but comprise shared structures and operations allowing communication to have effects. This is shown in language. The choice of words and construction of sentences and topics discussed are personal and specific, but

94 rules, structures and idioms expressing them are common to all speakers and logical operations are common to educated people. They are the same whatever the topic or sensory content. If members fail to become part of the collective nous system, no comprehensive order exists and no collective thought or action can take place. Alternatively, protagonists may belong to contending groups and give collective organization to their views and actions along “party lines.” Since language is only sustained as a collective function, nous’ structure and functions are linguistic (in the widest sense of the term as distinct from speech, Whorf, 1995); speech is produced by individuals and is personal, but language with its rules is collective. Group mentality theorists have not satisfactorily answered the question of where collective nous is located. Placing it in a transcendent domain departs from empirical science. However, it is similar to asking where language, culture or social structures are located. They undoubtedly exist – but where? They are not confined to functions in individual minds, but suspended between all those involved in them. Theoretical developments in the categories of thought may be required to answer this. No adequate language exists to discuss entities not identified with coherent physical objects. It is not helpful to say that because this question cannot be answered the theory should be abandoned. It can only be answered by more intense consideration of relevant phenomena and ideas. The individual and the group: For groups to become organisms and develop psychic functions that support nous, individuals need to be integrated and fulfill their own needs as well as the group’s. Since the medium of group nous is communication, this means being “membered” into the communication process. The quality of membership determines the quality of the group psychic life. Only in primitive social organisms, capable of primitive functions does authority of a leader determine the structure. The greatest cultural achievements are in societies with a high degree of individuality and a strong collective life integrated by active communication and differentiation. Personal initiative is expressed and takes on social value within the collective organizing context of nous. Collective mentality theorists describe the individual’s mind as sustained in the matrix of nous. The quality of individuals’ membering into the group and ability to serve functions in the collective organs of thought, affect and action determine the quality of their individual psychic life. According to axiom 4 above, individual and

95 group mentalities are co-existent, co-temporal and complementary. The personal psychic development of people unable to member themselves into the communicational life suffers by failing to participate in the nous functions. They lack the capacity to enter organic communicational structures necessary for the group to develop psychic capacities. Participation in a group’s organic integrity and functioning to meet the needs of its existence constitutes an important therapy for members. Psychopathology and individuals’ relationship to nous. Nous provides the form for sensory experience. Individuals with a relationship to society feel bound by its constraints. If a contradiction is pointed out or something is shown to be untrue, they feel bound to take account of this, not because someone has pointed it out, but because it is felt as a contradiction in the self. Individuals value their relation to nous as though it is part of the self. The forms of language create a structure imposed on individual content that demands it be modified. The individual has to account for the contradiction or untruth in their thought, emotion or action. Psychological defence mechanisms confirm the valuing of nous since their aim is to appear to uphold it. The anti-social individual swamps the nous with somatic affects and disrupts the communicational organism, subjecting it to personal content. When nous is encountered, it is respected enough to manipulate and impose its restrictions on others to advantage by denying or exploiting logic, truth, morality and rights. Subjugation of nous to somatosensory interests is also illustrated by lack or remorse of criminals; they are pure individuals, unincorporated into domains of collective nous that unite people into social, moral or cultural structures. Therapeutic potential of group life. Individuals’ integration into groups that develop a collective psychic capacity subjects them to nous and provides developmental opportunities. They are subject to collective representations and affects within an organized structure and participate in collective action and routines that establish cognitive categories and logical relations. Membering into the communicational fabric of groups assists in developing communication capacities and encourages participation in nous functions. They can exercise these capacities in a developing group culture. Participation in a group that becomes a psychic organism is a therapeutic modality in itself and works with fundamental structures and functions necessary for a person to become a socially effective being. This is different from the focus on the internal psychic life working with the personal mental content. The two are complementary.

Group Organizational States. A number of organizational states of groups need to be distinguished for their capacity to sustain nous. These are described below. Group mentality theorists’ contribution is summarized, and interpreted in terms of the nous theory as an expression of collective mentality. Finally, the sequence of organizational states of psychotherapeutic groups that progressively make this possible is described. A series of states is postulated by which groups come into being as organisms and attain the organization required to sustain collective functions of nous.

The Aggregate. The initial group state is an aggregate, a number of people brought together by circumstances external to the group itself. It exists before interactions have occurred; membership is extrinsic, motivated by factors outside the group. Members are bound by the idea of the group rather than to each other. This has been called the “group to join” (Long, 1992), “series group” (Sartre, 1991) collection, aggregate or multiple (Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993). The prototype is a bus stop queue of people united by interest in the bus who interact as individuals. It can be called the Nominal Group

(abbreviated as “Gn”), because being named forms the group. Its members are bound by their identification as members of the named group. In psychotherapy groups, members identify with each other’s wish for treatment. The reality of social forms whose members know nothing of each other except they are members of a group was established experimentally by the “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel, 1981; Hogg and Abrams, 1988). This is not enough to form intrinsic bonds or constitute group action. Although associated, members exhibit their own tendencies within the group context. Gn is a collection of individuals who relate to each other, but are not a functional unit or entity.

Although a preliminary stage, groups also revert to Gn when members lose their common identity. It ceases to function as a unit and becomes a collection of individuals. Since it lacks entitativity (Campbell, 1958), the Nominal group cannot support collective mentality and consists of the interpersonal interactions. Transition from Nominal Group to entity is the initial task.

The Organism. A social entity forms when members communicate, develop common experience and a shared culture of thoughts, emotions, actions, history and traditions. This organizes their activity to constitute a group life no longer a summation of interactions. Members experience the group as a social entity or organism to which they belong, distinct from (though not independent of) them as individuals; their relationship to it may conflict with individual relationships. It is indicated when members speak on behalf of the group and place demands on each other for it rather than for themselves, such as when encouraging members to attend meetings or remain in the group. The group is felt as part of them (Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993) and evokes loyalty and commitment (Campbell, 1958). This condition corresponds to the “group to form” (Long, 1992) or “fused group” (Sartre, 1991). Members’ interactions create a social organism and experience of belonging, not dependent on anything outside the group. Members identify with common characteristics evoked by the group life. Membership is “intrinsic,” related to the mutual bonds, in contrast to the Nominal Group’s

“extrinsic” bond, though both may co-exist. It can be called the Organic Group (“Go”) and responds to events impacting upon it, re-creating itself (Maturana and Verula, 1980) as an entity with its own life, a unit of the social world, a psychosocial organism (Durkheim, 1966). Group processes (Cartwight and Zander, 1958; Forsyth, 1983) involve members in interactions determined by individual factors and stereotypic forms common to other groups. It preserves itself against threats, develops structures and regulates its states. It corresponds to an informal recreational group. Go can manage the problems of its existence and undertake collective action in responding to demands from outside the group. The social organism. Early sociologists identified large social units as hyper- or epiorganisms with specialized functions, growing and decaying in complexity (Comte, 1830; Von Lilienfeld, 1873; Spencer, 1876; Espinas, 1877; McKenzie, 1890; Small, 1905; Ross, 1905). They lack continuous living mass, sensorium, specialized feeling organs and motor apparatus. Communication coordinates their functions. The functionalists (Radcliff-Brown, 1935; Merton, 1949) showed societies were integrated living organisms whose structures have functional significance for the whole rather than parts. The organism’s life is the function of its structure. Systems Theory (Gouldner, 1959;

Grinker, 1956; Maturana and Varela, 1971; von Bertalanffy, 1975; Beer, 1980) applied characteristics of living systems such as wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical order, control, adaptiveness, purposiveness and goal seeking to groups. Communication processes such as feedback, integration, gradients, selective boundaries, defences against disintegration and autopoiesis are evident in social units. Durkheim (1954, 1964) described societies as organisms either held together by images and sentiments of similarity leading to agglutination and loss of differences (mechanical solidarity), or by valuing complementary differences, forming collective representations and leading to division of labor (organic solidarity). Mechanical solidarity becomes organic solidarity as collective representations express differences and sub-systems form like organs. Organic solidarity follows from communication between members as the essential condition of culture, solidarity and coherence. Groups require regulation that dominates members in return for cohesion and limited freedom. The individual’s value is in becoming an organ rather than an absolute monad. Trotter (1916) likened the collective entity to an animal with an instinctive character. Burrow (1927b) called groups “phyloorganisms” held together by an instinctive “inner organic bond,” as much biological as social or psychological; Foulkes’ (1948) group-as-a-whole is a living organism also with an instinctive basis. Both emphasize organized communication as the essential condition for constituting the group. Conclusion: When communicational interactions attain sufficient organization and richness, members become interconnected in processes that maintain temporal continuity and ensure every event affects all other events in the group’s life. Feedback and homeostatic features develop like those of biological organisms such as maintenance of activity against entropy and within limits (Goldstein, 1995). Social organisms adjust internal and external states and preserve themselves, even at the expense of structures or functions. Events are only understood by reference to the whole of the group’s ongoing life. Groups become organisms when they are self-maintaining and coherently respond to circumstances consistent with their purpose. Organized communication between members is the condition for this organic character. Organism and nous: What is inherent in organisms is inherent in nous. Every element must have implications for every other element, just as every organ in a body relates to other organs. This is denoted by “integrity,” which means, “having no part or

99 element wanting; unbroken state; material wholeness, completeness, entirety,” from the Latin integer meaning “whole, entire” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). It is not just that group members need to be in communication; organic integrity is illustrated by the fact that it is inadequate for only most ideas of a discussion to be subject to the laws of logic or most of a person’s actions to be subject to moral principles. All must be equally affected by insertion into the system of operations; otherwise, they lack logic, meaning, value and morality and threaten the integrity of the whole. Nous’ systemic nature is shown by the need for consistency in its functions, which is taken for granted just as the completeness of operation of the rules of language is accepted. Ungrammatical utterances are given meaning in relation to these rules if possible, or else ignored. The coherence of communication is its “organic quality.” Organic integrity is shown when members cannot be ignored and are communicatively inter-dependent. In this circumstance, what can be called the “Watzlawick Principle” comes into force. Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson (1967) said, “behavior has no opposite … there is no such thing as nonbehavior … one cannot not behave. Now if it is accepted that all behavior in an interactional situation has message value, i.e., is communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one cannot not communicate” (pp. 48-49).” In the communicational organism, lack of participation or silence is a communication just as talk. Integrity is demonstrated by participants existing for each other in a communicative medium demanding interaction. They are bound by communicational reciprocity; isolated personal decisions are not possible since other members provide the context for what is decided. Connectedness or “solidarity” (Durkheim, 1964) is implied by this situation; each member is vital to the others. Solidarity means “the fact or quality, on the part of communities, of being perfectly united or at one in some respect” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). It comes into effect when communication is established in a group. What members communicate has effects not completely determinable by them, but is constrained by a range of possible meanings within the social code. The possibilities are endowed with significance by the social organism. This “communicational organism” comes into being whenever the Watzlawick Principle is present as a criterion of organicity. Communication develops an organic integrity and supports nous functions of rational organization with logical, moral and emotional significance. The content of communication (and hence of members’ minds) is

100 organized and integrated by the collective forms of nous. The communication process has similar structural characteristics, irrespective of the personal, sensory content, whose place in the communicational organism is defined by the collective nous system. The Watzlawick Principle governs the necessity to communicate, but not the content. Members may hope for one sort of communication rather that another, but the organism preserves integrity provided any communication occurs. Nous organizes the content within a collective communicational organism once all members are drawn into its integrity. An illustrative example follows. An intelligent, withdrawn adolescent girl has been in a group for six months, rarely speaking except to complain about how hard she had to work for her last prize. She distains the boisterous play of non-academic members. Eventually, she can contain herself no longer and after warning the group, the following week she criticises their immature behaviour and lack of interest in their problems. They are all embarrassed, attempt to justify themselves to her, but are resentful. Her intervention stimulates sporadic problem talk over the next few sessions. She remains in the group and begins to join in some of their fun. Members are bound together and cannot ignore communicational inadequacies. The girl can neither ignore the others nor leave the group without comment and the boys can neither ignore her nor simply reject her. They are bound in communicational solidarity that demands they interact towards a common culture.

The Psychic Group. To become effective, the group must be more than an organism, it must organize itself to achieve psychic functions, perform tasks and solve problems posed by its developing states. This comes about through the coordinated social process and is called the Sociable Group (Gs). Depending on their organization, social organisms manifest holistic psychic functions. Le Bon (1896) said a primitive, holistic, collective psychic organism forms in crowds by suggestion from members’ common characteristics. Trotter (1916) asserted a gregarious instinct binds nations together by “intercommunication” making it seem wrong to question collective psychic content, which enters members’ minds with the persuasiveness of instinct. For Lewes (1879), society is the medium permeating the individual mind; the product of feeling, it organizes the faculties as a general mind.

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Communication and language integrate experience into culture; generalities are condensed out of differences and actions, desires and opinions gain a common stamp, but impersonal direction. McDougall (1920) said mind is an organized system of purposive forces in groups and forms in groups when communication provides continuity, an idea of the group, culture, organization and interaction with other groups. Cooley (1909) said mind is a whole expressed through language, institutions and culture as social mind; individuals are never separate from it. Mead (1962) said the empirical matrix of social institutions, language and social process creates mind, which functions in communication through the conversation of gestures within the social group. For Durkheim (1954), social phenomena are born in the group not in individuals. When members are united in a whole communicating group, psychic functions emerge from collective representations of shared ideas, sentiments and action. As common property, they are no longer like products of individual consciousness, but form a collective organ of sentiments and representations – a “conscience.” Individual minds fuse and express the social being’s thinking through language and communication. Individuals have a group conscience alongside their personal one; thoughts, sentiments and action have an inherent social existence from which individual content derives. Burrow (1953) said group unity created “an organic principle of consciousness” as the matrix for individual mental life. The communicational continuity between individual and group provides a “functional solidarity” within which images and gestures form a “collective social mind” as real as individual minds. Personality is not based on circumscribed individual consciousness, but inclusive societal consciousness. Foulkes’ (1971) group processes are suprapersonal, not restricted to intrapsychic events; group communication forms a common matrix within which relationships develop, psychic functions occur and the group’s mind is constituted. Individuals are nodal points in this communication network and mind is a property of the communicational matrix. Bion (1961) said collective attitudes intended to evade tensions coalesce and constitute a group mentality formed by “intercommunication” to which members contribute anonymously. It has uniformity, restricts members, provides functional unity and is both means and obstacle to attaining goals. Group mentality does not require continuity and influences members between sessions. It is neither conscious nor articulate, and reflects a “debased” language as a mode of action instead of symbolic communication; symbolic communication is characteristic of the work group.

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Conclusion: Once social organisms form, the collective communication life is organized by common representations to form a mental system incorporating images, ideas and sentiments. If poorly organized, it is unconscious, emotive, primitive, governed by suggestion, impulse and defensiveness. If well organized, it forms culture becoming the creative matrix of individual mentality. Shared communication becomes common property that members experience from within to develop collective consciousness. Personal psychic functioning takes meaning from its place within the group.

Three functions of collective mentality can be defined for Gs, indicating its capacity to perform psychological processes. The subject of these functions is a group entity, not individuals’ psychological functions transposed to a collective unit. Groups’ psychical characteristics are different from those of individuals and forms of cognition, affect and action need to be defined as group functions.

Collective Cognition. The capacity to form representations, create information and perform operations on or “process” it is analogous to individual cognition. Performing cognitive operations requires members to coordinate their ideas and interactions around common topics subject to the logical operations that allow problems to be solved. Groups are capable of cognitive functioning. Sighele (1891) said as people think with the whole nervous system, so the whole group thinks. Tarde (1903) emphasised the uniting function of common ideas. Le Bon (1896) described crowds’ thinking as a function of their organization, characterised by contradictions, fantasy, lack of critical evaluation or reality; ideas are dominated by their emotional value and become persistent sentiments linked by association. Trotter (1916) said rationality counteracts gregariousness, but the herd’s thoughts become dogma, little affected by reason. Mead (1962) maintained thinking derives from social intercourse and lives in social acts, not the head. Meaning is a social process created through the conversation of gestures. Durkheim (1954, 1964) said social communication is the basis for collective thought. Categories of thought form from social and religious rituals. Collective representations result from cooperation within social structures, creating shared categories for sensory and psychical content that encounter and reinforce or counteract each other in the collective conscience. Regulation and organization by laws is necessary for thought. Burrow (1927b) said thought is represented as a whole in organic life. For Foulkes

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(1948), the group’s mind has the same structure as the individual’s since it is formed from communication. Ideas must be capable of communication to be conscious; what cannot be communicated is unconscious. Defence mechanisms occur in group communication as in individual minds. Bion (1961) said organization allows groups to think and resist basic assumptions. In the work group, language becomes a mode of thought. Conclusion: As communication is organized by structural differentiation, rules and rituals, the circulation of psychic representations and other functions constitute cognitive processes that are not the property of individuals, but exist in the whole organism. In holistic, unorganized crowds they are primitive, emotive judgemental, incapable of learning. Ordered group life enables members to differentiate into subgroups and develop logical processes internalised as the framework for individuals’ thought. Cognition and nous: In the organism, organized communicational processes allow ideas to undergo operations that go beyond those sustaining the communication organism itself. Cognitive functions of the collective nous consist of operations of thought, including the interpretive framework for perceptual functions. The communicational organism must become organized to make logical operations possible, make decisions, reach agreements and initiate activity. Operations require norms or rules to organize the communicational organism. Norms impose regularity on the content; rules ensure operations are performed on it. The communicational field is permeated with collective, socio-linguistic and cultural structures. Cognition becomes collective the more it is subject to higher order, abstract principles that organize all members. The following example illustrates this. A group of inarticulate boys discuss the plight of a member’s acquaintance, who is systematically victimised at a railway station after school. They elaborate a fantasy of him being pushed under a train. Their hilarity is followed by vivid descriptions of the imagined mutilation and a series of exclamations of how much pain and horror this would involve. This leads to anecdotes about their own conflicts with peers, which are responded to with mutual advice and support. Here, the group submits the sensory content of a fantasized case to common elaboration in a series of verbal representations of images and hypothetical actions. The consequences are represented in language and allow identification with the victim. Members’ experience is then substituted into the cognitive structure created, allowing them to think together about their own situations and consider solutions. The cognitive

104 sequence is sustained as a spontaneous group process and is a function of a collective cognitive structure (nous), specific for their membership and experience of this group. The Watzlawick Principle can be modified: “Once the communicational organism forms, it is impossible not to communicate and impossible for members’ communication not to take on some form of organization.”

Collective Affect. The group’s ability register qualitative states, adapt to events and register their impact on its welfare is analogous to individual affect. For continued existence, it must regulate arousal or energy within a compatible range. In Gs, this energy motivates advantageous states reducing tension, creating comfort or creates disadvantageous states increasing tension and discomfort. Energy states are regulated and controlled in Gs for the performance of other group functions. Groups have an affective life. Le Bon (1896) said in crowds, members’ affective states spread by contagion, undermining individual thought and functions; they are intolerant, conservative and exaggerated by imitation without modification. Images carry emotional power within groups. Trotter (1916) said being part of a larger group being gave comfort and difference is felt as wrong. The instinctive bond to the group manifests in members’ affect. Durkheim (1954) shows members gain pleasure in associating. Collective sentiments sweep through members and are replaced by differentiated states. Collective events are arousing and affects associated with collective representations influence individuals from outside with psychical force felt from within. Collective sentiments are socially organized affects attached to objects and actions. Sentiments fuse through the collective effervescence of communication. The collective part of the “soul” dominates the individual, liberating energy and moral force. Burrow (1927b) saw affects as residues of collective biology. For Bion (1961), basic assumptions are responses to shared emotional states; being submerged within group mentality gives members vitality. Conclusion: The group’s affective life follows from the vitality, arousal and pleasure of being together. Communication and collective representations carry aversive or rewarding energy, transmit emotions, motivate members and fuse ideas. Collective affects are socially organized, seem to come from within individuals and exert power like conscience, though they may be disruptive or contribute to culture and support individuals.

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Affect and nous. The energy of communication is also collective. Personal arousal becomes collective energy when affect is communicated. The somatosensory mind includes physiological expressions of emotions with their hedonic qualities. Arousal occurs at the interface between the experiences of body and mind; it is given meaning as emotion when communicated into a social context (Harré, 1988). The energy state and its significance are altered and meaning is found within group states. Emotion can be directly transmitted from one person to another as “contagion,” because affective signals take cultural, collective forms; or it may be converted into social energy through communication within collective-rational forms. If members communicate their anger in critical argument that is understood by and convinces others, it evokes similar affective responses in them. The collective rational structure and cultural context determine the communication’s affective significance and validate the original communicator’s affect as common. Nous manifests in communicated aspects of affect. The affect’s content derives from individual sensory experience and somatic arousal. Emotions have social forms that are also semiotic (collective linguistic) forms. What someone is happy or sad about is personal, but the emotion’s form, expression and responses to it are collective representations within a communication process. When someone describes an emotional experience, the linguistic medium allows the recipient of the communication to reconstruct the emotion, evoking a shared state with its own energetic properties. Not only is the emotional form collective, but the energy also becomes collective affect as a consequence of communication. The important affective life is not restricted to bodily manifestations, but is shared between people with collective significance if communicated. Psychic energy can be defined as psychic vigor, being capable of having psychic effects or exerting psychic force; it has affective character and aversive or rewarding qualities for the communicational organism. Individual activity alters the energy of the group state quantitatively and qualitatively because of the solidarity of the communicational organism. The Watzlawick Principle can be expanded: “Once the communicational organism is formed, it is impossible not to communicate and impossible for the energy of members’ communication not to affect each other.” This is illustrated in the following example: Three adolescent girls were talking while waiting to disembark from a plane

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returning from an overseas school trip. One laughingly recounted an incident from the trip. The others smiled; they exchanged other anecdotes, each escalating the humor. They looked at each other laughing, associating to other memories until all three were doubled over laughing with flushed faces and tears in their eyes. There was a pause when they were in a common affective state of rapport for a moment; the laughter gradually subsided and they left the plane talking quietly and smiling in a mood of contentment. The affect begins as a state of arousal in one girl and as it is communicated to others, escalates because of the reciprocity of the anecdotes; the accompanying energy escalates the pleasure, which is collective, not confined to any individual. The humor was built by each communication complementing the preceding story within the organization of their shared culture and values. Without the nous function organizing their communication, there would have been three disparate states lacking integrity. A communication process permeated by the organizing functions of collective nous sustained the collective affective state.

Collective Action. Groups’ capacity to integrate impulses and act in a coordinated manner as a unit is analogous to individual action. In order for Gs to act, members’ activity is coordinated and individual actions reconciled. The group acts as a unit in relation to demands and needs or it cannot ensure its development. Collective action requires resolution of differences, decisions coordinated and energy regulated. Its essence is cooperativeness of members’ actions within a common purpose or goal. Groups are capable of collective action. Le Bon (1896) said crowds’ shared ideas and sentiments transform into acts. Increased size and lack of structure lead to impulsivity and irascibility. Crowds’ action is unified by leaders, who appeal to emotion by suggestion. For Durkheim (1964), the individual’s value is as an active organ in the whole. Undifferentiated, whole groups impose action on their members, reducing freedom; differentiated groups integrated by organic solidarity engage in collective action toward common goals by cooperative communication. Thought results from cooperative action forming collective representations enabling the group being to represent itself in ritualistic actions. Acting in unison makes members feel in unison. Burrow (1953) saw neurosis as conflict between the individual and the surrounding social mind. The pain of

107 neurosis is the group encroaching on the individual; neurotics seek destructive separateness by acting against the social. Bion (1961) said conflict between members occurs at the point of contact between the individual and the group. In basic assumption groups, language is a mode of action rather than thought. Conclusion: Organic processes need to be regulated to the purposes of the whole, or disorganization threatens self-maintenance. For group organisms, members’ action is integrated by cooperation or coercion. Cooperativeness enables collective goals to shape action, while coercion means collective action is organized under a leader or subgroup that subjugates members in return for unanimity; individuals participate as functional units in organized action. Members’ action expresses group action when referred to the whole organism. The individual feels pain in conflict with the group and pleasure in concord. Action and nous: The somatosensory mind provides volitional, motoric actions as well as sensations and images. Individual action lacks value unless inserted into the social context that creates the opportunity for and motivates action. It is determined by the way it corresponds to others’ goals and group goals. The integrity and reciprocity of the communicational organism means personal action is also social. Group action, on the other hand, concerns somatosensory content organized to meet collective goals and individuals acting within a system whose goal is only identifiable for the group. Members cooperate in common action. Individual actions are organized into collective forms to serve shared goals and achieve things individuals could not. Cooperation presupposes rational communication, common culture and values organized independently of individual sensory experiences. The greater the cooperation is, the more collective the action. While cooperation brings about group action, aggression may not be equivalent to individual action, since it may express a group situation, but jeopardizes the integrity of group solidarity. There is mutuality to conflict or tension within a communicational organism and rules order the conflict. Aggression and coercion may represent assertion of an individual’s impulses over others, disrupting or destroying the collective rational form; but inter-group aggression or organized conflict within a group may express collective rules (Bion, 1961). Another addendum can be made to the Watzlawick Principle: “Once the communicational organism is formed, it is impossible not to communicate, and impossible for members’ actions not to be structured by the logic of the organism.”

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A group of boys is anxious about being together. Everyone seems paralyzed. The therapist sustains sporadic talk. One boy restlessly moves around the room, then begins making paper planes. Following facilitatory comments by the therapist, others join in. There is no communication between them except observing each other as they do this. After a time, they throw them around the room and comment on each other’s achievements, verbalizing intentions. “I’m gunna make a bigger one.” “Mine’s gunna have a twist in it.” Then they express interest in each other. “Hey look at that one!” “That’s a beauty!” Finally, the boy who started the activity throws his plane at the half open window saying “I bet I can get it out first.” The others join in the competition and take turns throwing and retrieving their planes. When one boy finally gets his out the window, there is a collective roar of jubilation; the organism has formed. The game becomes a regular feature of the group life. Initially, there is no communicational organism to support group action. One boy acts individually in response to the group tension; others join the action. By his personal action, he has intervened in the structure of group action and created a possibility of which others take advantage. When they share common activity, the integrity of the group communicational organism results in increasing mutuality of action, so their individual activity builds a group action culture, converting individual goals into group goals. An encompassing framework of meaning, intention and value is provided in which individual actions can be inserted. Finally, the group plays a game whose meaning depends on it being common. However, it only has this character because of the group action within organizing functions of nous.

The Self-Reflective Group. When groups regulate and coordinate their activity, they can apply their functions to representing their own states and working out problems. This is a specialised condition of Gs. The group entity forms collective representations of itself, its members, states and events. Representations are subjected to a system of operations by the group enabling problem-solving, decision-making or planning. The minimal requirements are shared representations or symbols of things and events in the group’s life, representations of the group and members, and a system of operations to relate them. This state is called the

Functional Group (Gf) and is the ideal state for a psychotherapeutic group to resolve

109 members’ emotional problems. In the following section, these dimensions of group function are analysed and a theoretical basis developed to define categories for observing them.

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PART II. THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD.

Part II, describes the observational instrument upon which the study is based. In Chapter 10, the function of social communication as the concrete observable element in social phenomena is explored. In Chapters 11-14, the four group process dimensions of structure, cognitive organization, affect and action coherence applied to collective entities are derived from relevant theoretical background with categories for each dimension. In Chapter 15, observational categories for therapists’ interventions are developed. Together, they constitute the Group Function Record.

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10. GROUP PHENOMENA AS SOCIAL COMMUNICATION.

Group Function Record Four dimensions of the group entity have been identified: groups are integrated organic units, capable of cognition, affective phenomena and action. Chapters 11-15 provide the theoretical basis for a set of observable categories for each dimension constituting the “Group Function Record” (GFR) enabling trained observers to rate group function by assigning numeric ratings to describe each minute of group process from videotaped sessions. The resultant record enables patterns and relationships between dimensions to be evaluated. The GFR does not differentiate which members occupy a role in a structure or interaction. Members are regarded as agencies of the group’s nature (Gordon, 1989); their activity is taken collectively as a description of the group. Observational categories enable whole-group phenomena to be studied in contrast to interpersonal interactions, and stages by which groups acquire functions are observed and defined.

The challenge of group membership. In groups of adolescents with social and emotional difficulties, the Organic

Group (Go) repeatedly forms and collapses into the Nominal Group (Gn) as members come into conflict and stop associating or expel members. The GFR observes the formation of organism (Go) and Sociable Group (Gs) by rating the group’s functional capacity. Transitions from Gn to Go represent members’ attempts to be part of a social structure. Gs only comes into being when Go is sufficiently organized to attain the functions. When Gs becomes self-reflective, it achieves the Functional Group (Gf). The GFR structures observations to define and record group process functions.

It shows the formation of Go or when this is incomplete, the presence of the Gn or sub- units of Go. The observed quality of collective cognitive, affective and action functions are described as Gs or Gf whenever attained. It also records therapists’ interventions to the group, individuals or both, when limits are set and their movement around the room (locomotion). Membership in functional representational groups is a criterion of psychological health; it integrates individuality into social structures and acquires culture (Cotterell

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1996). External circumstances lead a person to become a member of Gn; social pressures create membership of Go and organization for Gs. However participation in

Gf requires members to commit themselves to a system that never fully meets individual needs, but gives collective significance to membership if they reveal themselves and their experience of the group. Loss of individual autonomy is compensated by group identity through achieving Gf. Participation in Gf is the condition for individuals to contribute to society and benefit from self-representational community life (Durkheim, 1964; Mead, 1962; Harbermas, 1984). A framework to define social phenomena for observation has to recognize the complex social reality. To do this, the essence of interpersonal and social interaction must be analyzed.

Communication and social interaction. Group life is inconceivable without communication (McDougall, 1920; Mead, 1962). The condition for a higher order entity and the presence of nous is members being in communication. Communication in all its variety provides the material for social encounter and group observations. Interpersonal communication can be defined individualistically considering members’ contributions as part of deterministic linear sequences. This view of communication does not reflect social communicational phenomena as the complex, multilevel and multi-determined fabric of social interaction. In natural social situations, communication cannot be controlled by any member and develops its own sequences and rhythms; events from the immediate and distant past interact with cultural structures and personal factors to create a psychosocial field in which participants are immersed. Communication has traditionally been conceived as autonomous senders transmitting messages to receivers (Schramm, 1977; De Vito, 1985; Beebe and Masterson, 1989). Exclusive focus on transmitting messages takes communication out of context, history and social conditions supporting it (Sigman, 1987). It oversimplifies the situation, obscuring organic phenomena pointing to the group entity. However, Social Communication Theory conceives communication as the medium for sociality itself (Corner and Hawthorn, 1980; Sigman, 1987). Communicational episodes are embedded in a complex, multi-modal context. The group’s history frames the structure of communication episodes largely determined by past and present social factors outside the control of individual participants. Communication becomes “depersonalized” in the

113 sense of Social Identity Theory; it is a product of the social situation itself, not restricted to the individual (Turner, 1987; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) rather than the psychiatric meaning of feelings of unreality about the self (Freedman, Kaplan and Sadock, 1977). Communication as a depersonalized, collective construction is a social process enmeshing members who determine and are determined by it. Only in a hypothetical sense can members be outside the communicational situation, just as no one can be outside language or have another basis to grasp the meaning of their situation. In Social Communication Theory, any message manifests the group’s whole context and history. Its meanings and effects may be different from the sender’s intentions and is viewed in terms of its effects on the whole social setting as much as on the intended receiver. Irrespective of content, messages signal involvement of sender and desire towards the receiver; their circulation creates group identity and involvement. Messages are multi-leveled, have syntactic meaning, affective significance, embody cultural characteristics and are part of historical events whose importance is not known until accomplished in the future. They are relevant or irrelevant to preceding messages, can duplicate or add information, be incomprehensible yet convey a host of significations. Messages make participants known to each other in ways that have nothing to do with their content. The message in Social Communication Theory is a mode of social relationship. A communicational act takes its significance from its total context within the social system; the act itself is part of a historical sequence of explicit connotations and implicit insinuations influencing past or future communications pro- and retroactively. It is the means for participants to become known and encounter each other and their social environment. Communication is the medium of social interaction and the purpose and means of interaction. “Communication” derives from the Latin “communare” meaning “to share” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Social communication is the means by which people share themselves, forming communal life. It occurs through mutually recognized acts of encounter engaging participants with each other, irrespective of whether their meaning is understood (Mead, 1962; Joas, 1996). Individuals in an aggregate become members of an organic unit (Go) by sharing communication and constitute it as a functioning social entity (Gs) when collective nous manifests. Information transmitted in communicational acts is as much the medium for social contact as its end; properties of the communication process other than content are

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significant for nous achieving Gf.

Communication and social engagement. The act of communication involves contact and exchange between participants and holds them in interaction while it occurs. A social structure comes into existence consisting of participants and the multilevel historical and cultural contexts that confer order on their encounter. Communication has structural properties, even if only momentary (Sanders and Cushman, 1984). The presence of communicational structures defines events as social and in turn, social forms are defined by their communicational structures. A community is a group of people in communication with each other, even if not continuously, who have an ongoing expectation or readiness to communicate. Social communication has a preparatory or readiness property even when messages are not being transmitted. Communication is not restricted to continuous sequences, but is recognized by communicators having membership of a common communicational context redefined in multiple ways from time to time. Communication is more than sending and receiving messages; it is the material, observable expression of relationships. “Communication is a name for the overall system of relations people develop between each other and with the community and habitat in which they live” (Harre and Lamb, 1983, p. 104). In communication, what is shared is not just a message, but information broadly conceived in Bateson’s (1972) definition as “any difference which makes a difference” (Sigman, 1987). Communication shares the differences within a community resulting in common understanding and allows them to function in a coordinated manner (Harbermas, 1984, 1989). Information in this sense is mediated as much by qualities and mode of transmission as content. A message can be silence, withholding or “not communicating” just as readily as communicating something. Parties to communication must attend to each other (even if separated in space or time). Their mutual involvement is distinguished from their attitudes, content or consequences of the communication; initially it indicates openness to the sharing that is fundamental to communication. The parties’ involvement embraces them in a depersonalised unit, as shown when members of a social situation feel they encounter a collective otherness (“the group”) different from the personal otherness of the individuals involved (Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993). The social involvement itself is as significant

115 as the content in changing participants or recognising differences, since it creates a relation for each to the mutual otherness of the social unit. Involvement in communication and the formation of the embracing context that constitutes a social form can be called an “engagement.” To emphasise the centrality of communication in the engagement constituting social interaction, the unit formed can be called a “communion” and its members “communicants.” Social communication forms communions rather than transfers messages. As long as the contact is maintained, communication brings a social organism into existence even if not organized into syntactic messages. In this state, the Watzlawick Principle applies, that it is impossible for the communicants not to communicate as long as the communion exists (Watzlawick, et al., 1967). Social Interaction. Although there is a long tradition recognizing social interaction as the primary social phenomenon (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964; Argyle, 1974; Rosenburg and Turner, 1981), the centrality of communication makes interaction a consequence rather than cause of communication. Interaction is a derivative of social communication and is meaningless if its communicational aspect is ignored. Interaction only has social meaning if it has significance for participants. If communication is documented, interaction is described. Communication is cause and product of interaction as well as the medium in which it takes place. The impossibility of not communicating means there can be no interaction without communication.

Social communication and group status. These concepts are applied to group states as they form an organic entity.

Communicational engagement creates a communion as a social form (Go) and consists of participation in a communication process which includes: • Giving and receiving messages; • Monitoring for messages; • Readiness to give and receive messages; • Observation of others’ communicational activities; • Participation in the communal context supporting the communication. Social communication is a reciprocal process including mutual attention and acknowledgment between communicants. It is not systematically determined by the preceding situation, as assumed in Markov chain analysis (Doreian, 1970), but is

116 rhythmic and historical. Events from any point in the group’s past may determine communication in a specific moment. It embodies any or all levels of personal and social experiences. To communicate is not so much to send or receive messages, as to join the ongoing, complex texture of communicational sociality.

Communication and the group. Social communication is the fabric of group life and of sociality itself, transforming the aggregate, Gn into an organic entity, Go. In the aggregate state (Gn), communication is individualized, sporadic and episodic. The group does not develop a life of its own. As it becomes continuous and consistent, Gn becomes Go. As a social form, Go is defined by all members embedded in the integrated communicational activity serving the purposes of group life. When the communicational life of Go becomes ordered and performs group functions rather than individual acts, Gs comes into existence and the group is an entity sui generis in the social world and can manifest collective nous. Social communication is the medium ordered as nous so it can function cognitively, respond affectively and act in response to environmental and internal demands. When communication consists of representations of itself or its members, it becomes Gf. Transitions between states are described by their communicational characteristics. Fluctuations can be recorded as changes in communication characteristics. Observation of groups’ communication establishes their status and records of successive group states describe whole-group processes. Common processes are not merely the summation of individual activity; their meaning is only understandable when considered in relation to the functioning group entity. Communication in such groups forms a common culture. Statements, anecdotes, events and names are carried from one session to another regardless of who originated them. Games, episodes, effects of conflicts and losses become common group property, accessible for any member regardless of their role in the events; new members are incorporated into these structures and take on the values as though they had participated in them. The role of particular members in these communicational events is referred to, but any member may bring them into the situation. What is communicated from one member to another is also received by other communicants expressing the common structure. Simple, dyadic communication of

117 sender transmitting messages to receiver no longer accounts for group processes, because all other communicants are also engaged in whatever happens; it also has a significance for them, though it may be different to that intended in the message. For instance, a member may tell another a joke as a message of companionship between sender and receiver, but for members listening, it may be a message that they are excluded and considered of lower status. Simple interchanges between members may assert in-group/out-group boundaries, make status claims and establish prestige hierarchies. All communications within the communion have significance for all members, irrespective of their role in the overt interchange. The common psychological life is shared in communication. All members are incorporated in multiple roles in a communion, which differ for each member as long as they remain in contact. Communication and interaction are not dependent on any one set of determinants, since the group consists of members with a communicational history extending into their common past and incorporating present events. Communication is not the property of sender or receiver in the communion; it is a multidimensional state of the whole group involving sender, receiver, active observer and incidental bystander. The boundary between acts of interpersonal communication and subjective psychological experience is blurred, since personal experience flows from and is organized by communicational phenomena. Inter-personal and intra-psychic events are inextricably joined within the communicational field. It is impossible to distinguish a simplistic boundary between internal personal experiences and external social events, since no communication can be located only between particular members. This describes collective mentality as nous. The meaning of communications may be created by communicators’ past actions, even if they are unaware of the relevance of this to observers. For example, a member who has teased others previously, may be interpreted as teasing and criticizing even when not intending to. Participants’ different meaning contexts have to be recognized, not the boundaries of inter-personal interaction. The meaning context is a property of the communicational structure where external-interpersonal and internal-intrapsychic domains are merged. If the communicational field replaces the body as unique reference point for interpersonal phenomena, communicational events are facts of the group’s life, regardless of which particular members render them observable.

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The causal stimuli of the complex fabric of communication are incompletely definable and not restricted to sender and receiver. Each communication is expressed by a member, but has as much or more significance for members outside the dyad. Group observation is not restricted to individuals’ behavioural expressions, but observes the group’s communicational phenomena. Facts of the communicational field are recognized by their effects on the communion. Durkheim’s (1966) social facts are communications, forming a domain distinct from those of individual psychology. They have a different substratum, evolve in a different milieu and depend on different conditions; they are “mental” since they consist of thinking or behaving, but different from individual consciousness, being “‘representations’ of another type” (1966, p. xlix). The communion is a social fact in the observational field. Each member is constrained and affected by group and members, subject to and acting within the group. They are affected by whatever occurs while they are part of it, as indicated by the Watzlawick Principle. Communication cannot be ignored in the communion. Group experience exists as facts of members’ history. The communicational field is likewise a fact, since it reveals the existence of the group organism. Communion membership may be the most powerful effect of group life irrespective of content or outcome of activities since it gives access to collective nous. Participation has irresistible effects on participants as a consequence of their “common fate” (Campbell, 1958).

Communication in psychotherapy groups. While communications must affect members, they may be inaccurate. What is transmitted may not be what is received and bystanders may interpret something else. Nevertheless, communication constrains members within a total communicational field determined not by members, but by the total content of past and present group phenomena. Communication is a “social fact” to which members are subject, constituting them as “organs” of a social organism. In a communion, communication constitutes a common field of psychological activity, explicit and implicit messages and contexts are cross-referenced in a multidimensional fabric of changing meanings, which is described as collective nous. Each member is inserted into this field in their own unique way, determining and being determined, constraining and being constrained.

This communication organism constitutes a sociable system (Gs). Once a group functions in a given manner (such as forming pairs, scapegoating members, avoiding

119 certain topics, remaining silent, depending on a leader) norms develop, often persisting for the life of the group, giving it a personality (“syntality,” Cattell, 1951). Consistency and continuity in functioning indicate the systemic nature of the communicational organism and the presence of nous, observable as characteristics of the group's communication. The nous system may not be reducible only to communicational phenomena, however it is expressed in the communicational field and is where the group’s psychic integrity as an entity is observed. For groups to constitute themselves as sociable entities supporting nous, the communicational field must be organized to perform functions essential for their maintenance as living organisms, such as: • Define membership and maintain boundaries with the environment; • Form collective representations of members and group; • Form collective representations of the group’s purpose and nature, common values, attitudes and expectations; • Represent and communicate with the external world; • Define and regulate affective states; • Provide feedback on the basis of the rewarding or aversive nature of events; • Organize for cooperation and group action. The communicational system is the medium for collective nous functions equivalent to the individual’s psychological apparatus. As for any organism, functions may fail, its integrity be breached and result in malfunction, loss, mutilation of organs or death. Failure to acquire these functions leads to anti-therapeutic group cultures, loss of members or dissolution. Such groups are unviable organisms of the genus and deprive their members of crucial development and social education obtainable from belonging to viable groups (Mead, 1962). Adolescents lacking access to membership of viable groups are seriously disadvantaged (Collett, 1996). A therapeutic aim is for the group’s communication process to constitute a viable organism manifesting collective nous functions. If the qualities of this process are observed and degrees of its adequacy defined, therapeutic techniques that assist (or inhibit) the process can be examined. Members’ ability to participate in a sociable communicational system indicates therapeutic progress. In a communion, collective functions derive from and contribute to members’ psychic functions through communication. The group can be observed as a functioning entity and its fluctuations judged in terms of how well they allow the communicational system’s ability to fulfill

120 the requirements of group life. The minimal characteristics for a psychic entity with nous functions can be defined as three sets of communicational characteristics: 1. To gain knowledge and perform cognitive functions (cognition); 2. To differentiate psychic energy into affective states and regulate them (affect); 3. To act as individuals and as a group (action). If the system of communication phenomena is observed as the concrete expression of the group's psychical character, the task is to define processes of cognition, affect and action as properties of the communion rather than aggregations of members’ interactions. However, the phenomenal field of communication is complex and several aspects need to be differentiated. Analyses of groups’ communication processes have concentrated on defining interpersonal interactions rather than properties of the whole group (Hackman and Jones, 1965; Bales, 1970; Shaw, 1978; Beck and Lewis, 2000). The Group Function Record treats the group as the unit of observation and the totality of communicational phenomena is analyzed.

Group Function Record dimensions. The GFR defines five dimensions of communication phenomena to record changes in groups’ functional status. First, Structure records the presence of communication between members constituting a communion, marking the establishment of the Organic Group (Go) out of Gn. A communion may include all or only some members. Gs then exists as the whole or parts of the group (sub-units are one or more Go units within Gn). Structure indicates the presence of communication and hence the pervasiveness of a social unit.

Once Structure shows Go exists, three other dimensions of social communication indicate attainment of the Sociable Group (Gs). Observations are made of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence characteristics of communicational phenomena. The psychical functions are characteristics of the communicational life of a communion described by the category of Structure. Each dimension specifies different aspects of the same phenomena of the communicational field; the GFR assesses these characteristics in each minute. The final dimension describes Therapists’ Interventions in each minute. Since they constantly intervene to alter the group, a comprehensive description of group function must include their activity. The GFR documents the life of the group and quality

121 of the communication process rather than its content; therefore, therapists’ verbal interventions are categorised in terms of the object they are directed to in the communion rather than their content. Records are also made of Limits set and therapists’ Locomotion round the room. These five dimensions describe group communicational structure, minimal requirements for group cognitive capacity, affect, action and therapists’ interventions. They do not record completed functions, but the appearance, interference and loss of conditions for them. In following chapters, essential attributes of each dimension and associated psychological processes are discussed. Their group-communicative aspect allows differentiation of communicational structure, cognitive functions, affective states and actions within the communicational field of the communion, rather than locating them within individual members.

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11. GFR DIMENSION 1: STRUCTURE

The entity observed is the structure of the communicating unit. The GFR follows aggregates of individuals changing into social units, including the whole group or subgroups. The development of communions out of Gn is a function of the organisation of the relationships between members (McDougall, 1920; Ettin, 1999) and corresponds to the group’s communication structure. “Structure” means “mutual relation of the constituent parts of a whole as determining its peculiar nature or character” and “organised body or combination of dependent parts or elements” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). In psychology, structure is: “any enduring arrangement, grouping, pattern, or articulation of parts to form a whole,” contrasted to function or process, it “usually implies stability of the component parts” (English and English, 1962). Group structure is “a nonrandom configuration or arrangement of elemental parts into an organized whole; some sense of innate, evolving or patterned construction is implied” (Ettin, 1999, p. 212). For the GFR, structure reflects members’ communicative relation.

Gs is a unit consisting of all members as parts of the whole, but the definition of group lacks clarity. Quantitative criteria of distance between members or time spent in association have been used (Martin and Bateson, 1996); however, they lack flexibility for the present purpose.

Structure and group size. Numerical size imposes structural properties on groups (Simmel, 1950). Designating a number to indicate group size does not refer to separate individual elements, but “their synthesis” which is “a new concept emerging from the synthesis of these elements” (p. 107). The individual is not an isolate and “involves the somehow imagined, but then rejected, existence of society.” Isolation is “society’s effect at a distance – whether as lingering-on of past relations, as anticipation of future contacts, as nostalgia, or as intentional turning away from society” (p. 119); it is more intense in the presence of others than alone. Members of a dyad preserve contact with each other; mutual dependency is more likely, since loss of either destroys it. Dyads are not groups, which can exist even if particular members are missing. They are more vulnerable than groups, since losing one individual destroys them. Immediacy of interaction and absence of other factors makes

123 dyads liable to become trivial; but they are intimate and inclined to form around what only the two share (Simmel, 1950; Northen, 1988). Each member of a triad can be an intermediary for the others, uniting or separating them (Simmel, 1950). It is more difficult to maintain since the third person disrupts the collusion that allows dyads to ignore differences in favour of commonalities (Northen, 1988). The independent factor introduces an inherently social element. Group culture and collective identity develop in groups more than dyads. The character of the group alters when it is large enough to form subgroups and members cannot readily remain in contact with all others. Large groups must divide into subgroups and add or subtract components to move from simplistic mechanical solidarity towards more flexible organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1964) . Forming subgroups is therefore inherent to maintaining larger groups. A structurally secure number for forming subgroups of large social or political groups is between five and seven members (Simmel, 1950). Consequently, the average membership of most groups is between 2.4 (James, 1953; Forsyth, 1990) and five members (Harrè and Lamb, 1983). Groups gravitate towards dyads (Hare, 1976; Forsyth, 1990). The power of groups to create conformity rapidly increases from two to four members. A majority of three to one is enough to induce conformity, forming a ceiling effect with more members (Brown, 1989; Forsyth, 1990). Increasing group size encourages de-individuation, increased aggressiveness, lowered personal responsibility or empathy with target individuals and heightened emotionalism or arousal (Durkheim, 1964; Main, 1985; Forsyth, 1990). The power of groups to distort judgements increases with size, but negative emotions and aggressive interactions are more likely to occur if the dispute is between subgroups (Asch, 1953). As size increases, quality of performance, productivity, disagreement, giving directions, opportunity for self expression and tension release increase, though participation and tension are reduced; antagonism is greater in odd-numbered groups (Thomas and Fink, 1966; Brown, 1989; Forsyth, 1990). The structural effect is indicated by possible relationships with increasing size, as shown in Table 11.1. If a three person group is taken as the defining group situation (defining a dyad as not a group), the challenge of group situations can be estimated using its six relationships as a “factor of increase” in the larger groups as shown in the third column. The factor increases massively in six person groups, which are more likely to reduce stress by forming subgroups. The factor of increase in complexity constitutes a

124 measure of difficulty or “social demand quotient” indicating size is an important structural factor to be considered in observing group function.

Group Number of Factor of Size Relationships Increase 2 1 3 6 X 1 4 25 X 4 5 90 X 15 6 301 X 50 7 966 X 161

Table 11.1. Possible relationships in different sized groups (adapted from Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989, p. 39).

The larger the group, the more demanding it is for social cognition, affective control and coordination of action. Size is a major factor for groups to solve problems and maintain stability; the capacity to manage interactions limits viable size or causes qualitatively different processes (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Mann, 1990). Though dyads give greatest opportunities for intimacy, they create more tension since there is no one else to relate to in a dispute (Hoffman, 1978; Northen, 1988). Triads are more likely to exclude one person and undermine self exteem; communication is likely to be smoother in odd numbered groups, while satisfaction and opportunity for participation reduce above a threshold of five members. Dependency increases, while emotional attachement, initiative and motivation reduce in larger groups (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Five people is optimal for some types of problem solving (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Assertive members have a disproportionate effect in larger groups, since most members are more likely to allow others to lead; the larger the group, the more inhibited some people are and the less likely to voice dissent (Hoffman, 1978). Small groups are more attractive than larger ones, where there are reduced intimacy, sense of personal significance or personal identification and greater heterogeneity of interests (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Members participate less in larger groups and there may be more “social loafing” with a few dominating the interaction (Hoffman, 1978).

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Structure in group dynamics. Structure is the “framework within which the elementary [group] processes … take place” (Brown, 1989, p. 51) or the “underlying pattern of stable relationships among group members” (Forsyth, 1990, p. 110). Lasting group interactions develop structural properties (Sherif, 1948). Stability and differentiation create relatively homogeneous “distinguishable parts” (Cartwright and Zander, 1953, p. 416). Structure develops as the first crisis for group life, but whereas group identity is a personal experience, structure is a property observable as recurrent actions accepted by members (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). It involves ordered arrangements, definition and regulation of behaviour, patterned constancy and stability independent of members coming and going, (Sampson and Marthas, 1990). It describes the arrangement of parts, constraints and pattern of roles and relationships ordering interactions; it provides stability by its independence of the specific individuals in positions. Structural properties emerge and stabilize over time (Brown, 1989). Bales (1980) developed a system of mapping group structure based on dimensions of activity (task/socio- emotional), status (dominant/submissive) and attraction (friendly/unfriendly) (Forsyth, 1990). However, he recorded individual interactions, not the group as an object. In group dynamics, structure emphasizes stability and continuity of group functions in relation to operational factors. The GFR defines the communicational unit as the object and differentiates the aggregate of members (Gn) not in communication from those forming a communicating unit (Go). Other structural properties are reviewed. Roles: Members’ roles tend to differentiate out of groups and form a hierarchy of influence as soon as they stabilize (Forsyth, 1990). Roles are used for examining members’ actions toward each other since they can be considered “structured behavioural acts” (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). Bales (1970) observed members’ roles in communicative action to analyse structural properties of groups and distinguish between those related to tasks and those with socio- emotional significance (Brown, 1989). Roles emerge from interactions as products of communication, yet prescribe members’ actions and relationships within the group and constitute a pattern. Therefore, roles only occur once Go forms. Status, Power and Authority: Other structural influences are status and authority (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). The emergence of personal prestige and power is

126 spontaneous, recognized by group members and sustained by interactions (Sampson and Marthas, 1990). Those in higher status positions tend to be nominated as leaders, regardless of suitability (Brown, 1989). Assertive members are most likely to lead unstructured groups, but structure reduces this effect (Hoffman, 1978). Power relations create a pattern of relationships and communications. Status and power are only expressed and recognized by being communicated and are derivatives of communication in Go. Interaction: Interaction is considered in terms of quantity, direction and content. The more interaction there is, the greater the influence; more interaction is directed toward higher status members (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). Most groups form subgroups of two or more members who interact with each other more than with remaining members (Hoffman, 1978). Structure organizes the group’s life, whereas interaction is its content and derives from communication (Forsyth, 1990). Attraction: Attractiveness is an important cause of status differentiation and subgroup formation; attraction relations in groups are a stabilizing factor (Forsyth, 1990). Attraction among members has been regarded as directly observable, (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964), but depends on an individual perspective. Research on attraction as a structuring influence on groups uses sociometric or other questionnaires (Jones, Bell and Aronson, 1972), but does not reveal a communicational entity. Communication structure: Communication structure is an important structural dimension (Cartwright and Zander, 1953, Barker, Wahlers, Watson and Kibler, 1987; Forsyth, 1990; Sampson and Marthas, 1990). Structure is restriction of communication. In peer groups, affiliation and authority restrict communication (Brown, 1989), favoring communication within and between cliques; members sustain such structures even to their own disadvantage (Whyte, 1973). Patterns of communication maintain structural organisations (Sampson and Marthas, 1990) and affect groups’ performance. Centralized hierarchical structures are better for solving simple problems. Planning, solving complex problems and members’ morale are better with decentralized structure. Satisfaction is related to richness of communicational opportunities; members central to communication structures are more likely to become leaders (Barker, Wahlers, Watson and Kibler, 1987; Brown, 1989). Communication structure is annulled by superimposed organizational structures (Shaw 1978b). Communication structure refers to constraints on members in relation to specific performance criteria of communication already

127 occurring. However, these approaches do not record the development of communication and the extent it incorporates the whole group. Subgrouping: Subgrouping and patterns of interpersonal sentiment are also structural influences (Zaleznik and Moment, 1964). Roles differentiate in-group and out-groups, which include or exclude members (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Sherif, 1948). Subgroups reduce conformity pressures and facilitate tolerance of differences, but may increase intra-group conflict (Durkheim, 1964; Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976) and are a common response to absence of leaders (Kissen, 1976a). Forming subgroups is an important structuring phenomenon, but criteria used to define boundaries between them are unclear. They are an intermediate stage in the formation of whole-group entities and need to be recorded and defined by communicational boundaries since the essential observational basis for the entity is communication.

Structure in psychotherapy groups. Structure is relatively neglected in group psychotherapy. While the major concern of psychoanalytic theories is with dynamic content and members’ intrapsychic structures (Foulkes and Anthony, 1973; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Hinshelwood, 1987; Halperin, 1989; Etting, 1999), a number of concepts refer to group structure. The “group matrix” (Foukes, 1964; Powell, 1994), “basic assumptions” (Bion, 1961) and “structure” as arrangements and plans for conducting groups (Whitaker, 1989; Ettin, 1999) are structural, but are not defined and treated as contextual factors for dynamics and technique. Development of Structure: Learning or experiential groups begin with little organisation and structure attaches to circumstantial events, often in finding a leader. Lack of structure is associated with reduced control, impulsive actions and suspicion of new members (Rice, 1965). Developing a stable structure is a criterion for group formation; when it has occurred, the group is referred to as a “working group” rather than a “group formation” (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). This concept is closer to the transition between Gn and Go although observable phenomena indicating structure are not specified. Prior Assumptions: Groups are also structured by members’ assumptions before joining (Gazda 1977a). Structures form around prescribed roles (Northen, 1988), planning and preparation (Rutan and Stone, 1984; Whitaker, 1989; Malekoff, 1997).

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These essential structural elements are located in members’ pre-group contacts with therapists in Gn, outside the group entity. Relationships: Established relationships, interaction and attraction patterns are structural elements (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). They are interpersonal events, which presuppose social communication and are formed after Go is constituted. Intrapsychic Structures: Group structure has been compared to individual psychic structure (Kellerman, 1979), although it is also disputed as misleading and unhelpful (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). This is not relevant to the structure of the collective entity and is not specified in the GFR. Communication: Communicational patterns define group structure and determine group character (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). However, they are conceptualised in individualistic terms, and do not define observable structure of group entities. Spatial and temporal boundaries: Structure has been conceptualised as spatial and psychological boundaries between group, leader, environment, group size and physical proximity of members (Berne, 1963; Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Malekoff, 1997). Organisation of arrangements to suit members has been called “the logistics of caring” (Malekoff, 1997, p. 68). This structural property defines the presence of the members in the same place and time. Without this, social communication is not active and Go cannot come into being. All members need to be present to be included in the structure. Subgrouping: Forming subgroups restricts involvement, allows acting-out, avoids therapeutic challenges and undermines therapeutic goals (Kellerman, 1979; Yalom, 1995). They help members explore issues not confronted in the whole group, allow them to identify commonalities, enlarge affective expression and manage needs for control (Northen, 1988; Yalom, 1995). Subgroups enhance group cohesiveness and express personal choices, although not always consciously or constructively (Northen, 1988). They indicate the group’s inability to confront tasks and threaten its integrity (Bion, 1961), although they are generally accommodated and integrated (Northen, 1988). It is more difficult for groups to make decisions when they polarize into subgroups (MacLennan and Dies, 1992). In documenting the emergence of a group organism, subgroups represent transitional states between Gn and Gs and must be defined and recorded as expressions of social communication.

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Structure and the GFR. The GFR observes group structure as communication structure or the presence of a communion as Go. When reciprocal social communication links members of Gn, the group becomes Gs, enabling other dimensions to be observed. If all members are included, Go corresponds to Gn. If all members are not in communication, Go does not correspond to Gn. It is usual in groups, especially of adolescents, for sub-groups to form. One or more Go structures are then formed as portions of Gn.

If the Nominal Group (Gn) consists of five members, when they interact as a trio and pair, Go is fragmented; or a trio may form as Go, while two members remain isolated. Such states are transitional between Gn and a comprehensive Go including all members. Combinations of individuals, sub-groups and whole-group fluctuate. The quality of the process in the structural units is rated to determine how functional the group is, or to what extent Go becomes Gs. Structure is the first dimension of group function to be observed by the GFR and records the communicating units, (communions) formed and disbanded from time to time. Criteria for rating formations of Go are given below.

Criteria for rating Structure. Changes in Structure are recorded when members join or leave communicating units. Members are rated as part of a group or sub-group (Go) when in communication with each other. The existence of communions is rated. Communication: Two or more members are in communication when at least two communication criteria are met. They discount unintentional contact without communicational significance. Social communication involves not only sending or receiving messages, but joining the stream of communicational activity, which is not necessarily a defined, causal sequence, but may be a fabric of multi-determined interactions, not confined to a single time reference. Whenever two or more of the following criteria are met, communication is deemed to be occurring: 1. Proximity: A member is so close that it comprises an intentional selection of others in preference to random placement within the room. 2. Looking: The member looks at or keeps another in view or eye contact. 3. Listening: A member obviously listens to or maintains auditory monitoring of one or more others.

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4. Talking: A member talks to, or engages in other form of verbal communication with one or more others. 5. Gesturing: A member exhibits body language or non-verbal communication by providing some form of movement or positioning perceived or intended as meaningful by others. 6. Engaged: A member is engaged in a common activity or shared enterprise, such as parallel play or continuing to perform a common task.

Categories for Structure. Four possible ratings indicate the group’s structure. • Whole Group (W): All members are in communication. • Subgroups (S): All members are in communication with other members, but comprise groups smaller than the whole group. • Subgroups and Individuals (SI): One or more subgroups exist and one or more members are not in communication with anyone else in the group.

• Individuals (I): No member is in communication with any other (Gn).

Detailed rating rules and criteria are provided in the Raters’ Manual in Appendix 2.

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12. GFR DIMENSION 2: COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION

Collective cognition is a central function of collective mentality or nous. To document its emergence, an empirically viable concept of whole-group cognition must be developed from reviewing and adapting individual cognition to group entities.

The nature of cognition. Cognition is the application of “intelligence and its computational processes” (Simon and Kaplan, 1989, p. 2). Intelligence is a stable characteristic, but cognition is “the action or faculty of knowing, perceiving, conceiving, as opposed to emotion and volition: a perception sensation, notion, or intuition” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990) and denotes the domain of mental activity lying between perception and sensations on the one hand and actions on the other (Honderich, 1995). It is, “the way human beings perceive and learn, how they reason and think, even how they remember and imagine; and how their ‘minds’ work in the ordinary day-to-day activities” (George, 1962, p. 11), including, “all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used” (Niesser, 1987, p. 4). It is also regarded as knowledge (Glass and Holyoak, 1986), coming to know, states of knowing, wanting and decisions “insofar as they are guided by knowledge” (Macnamara and Reyes, 1994, p. 3). Many texts do not define cognition, but discuss perception, attention, meaning, memory, problem solving, reasoning, mental representation and language (Anderson, 1985; Eysenk and Keane, 1990; Stillings, Weiser, Chase, Feinstein, Garfield and Rissland, 1995). Cognitive science is often defined in information processing terms (Eysenk and Keane, 1990; Carroll, 1993; Stillings et al., 1995), which excludes non-computational processes (Lakoff, 1987; Leiser and Gillerion, 1990; Gibbs, 1994). Cognition is obtaining knowledge of objects (Brentano, 1874/1995; Macnamara and Reyes, 1994), perceiving an environment, preserving representations and forming propositions relating them (Posner, 1989). Non-informational aspects such as context, motivation, emotion and metaphor are also essential ingredients (Hoffman and Palermo, 1991). It is knowledge of something definite (Follesdal, 1994), of self (Guidano and Liotti, 1983) and enables organisms to organize experience as active, self-regulating participants in an environment (Zivin, 1979).

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Groups lack a unified sensory system for object knowledge, so cognition needs to extend beyond personal phenomena as in Maturana’s (1970) comprehensive account: “Living systems are cognitive systems and living … is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system. If a living system enters into a cognitive interaction, its internal state is changed in a manner relevant to its maintenance and enters into a new interaction without losing its identity… Although the nervous system expands the domain of interactions of the organism by bringing into this domain interactions with pure relations, the function of the nervous system is subservient to the necessary circularity of the living organization” (Maturana, 1970, p. 8). Essential characteristics of cognition need to be described and circumstances defined when cognitive capacity is achieved. The GFR records the emergence of cognitive capacity out of confusion by progressive organization.

Fundamental properties of cognition. Piaget’s genetic epistemology provides a starting point for defining organization. Although it has been criticised for not making meaningful contact with specialized cognitive theories (Halford, 1978; Scandura, 1978), a rapprochement is occurring (Leiser and Gillieron, 1990). Genetic epistemology describes the genesis of epistemic function. Piaget analyses structures of cognition rather than computational processes by which it is conducted. Operational structures and the “overall coherence” of behaviour are emphasized rather than data structures (Leiser and Gillieron, 1990, p. 4). Cognitive content, function and structure are differentiated (Flavell, 1964). Ideas, memories or representations for performing cognitive processes are the content. Function is the system of intelligent processes common to all cognitive beings. “Every act of intelligence presupposes some kind of intellectual structure, some sort of organization within which it proceeds” (Flavell, 1964, p. 46). It confers wholeness on the system, defining boundaries, allowing transformations of content. The cognitive system is self- regulating and self-maintaining (Piaget, 1973). Cognitive acts are distinguished from the infrastructure organizing the cognizing system. Cognitive structures interpose between function and content as “organized properties of intelligence, organizations created through functioning and inferable from behavioral contents whose nature they

133 determine;” or “mediators interposed between the invariant functions” and “variegated behavioral contents” (Flavell, 1964, p. 17). Figurative processes of perception, imitation and imagery do not transform objects, but form representations. They are distinguished from operations, which transform elementary, concrete sensorimotor and internalised actions into increasingly abstract relations and meaning structures by linguistic and logico-mathematical processes (Fraisse and Piaget, 1969; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). There is no simple relationship between operations and structures; “operational structures” organize the whole context of the processing (Leiser and Gillieron, 1990). Distinctions between content, function and structure are evident in the organization of language, which consists of elements such as phonemes, words, sentences organized into structures through grammar and syntax. Common rules and their organization make the act of communication possible and provide the first manifestation of collective mentality as the structures of nous (see Chapter 9). The organization of the individual’s cognitive system makes memory, perception, attention, learning, thinking and problem solving possible. An initial state of the “intellectual organization” is postulated to account for language and cognitive structures developing (Chomsky, 1976). Perceptions, mental images, words, ideas, intellectual skills, memories, statements and complex meaning structures are subject to sequential operations, re-combining or transforming them to constitute cognition. A state of organization makes cognition possible. When organization of the cognitive system is damaged, as in intoxication, dementia or psychosis, content and operations may be intact, but productions are not valid. In a group’s cognitive capacity, the role of the mediating organizational structure is fundamental to cognitive function.

The group cognitive system. Groups engage in cognitive processes as defined by Maturana and Piagetian structuralism and as a function of collective mentality or nous (discussed in Chapter 9). Elements such as words, gestures, reports, actions, emotions, activities, memories and traditions are subject to operations when members communicate, reach conclusions and transformations affecting each member. Verbal cognitive processes, non-verbal functions, behavioural mannerisms or rituals may be incorporated into and transform group life. Operations organize group culture, becoming operational structures as in the

134 following example. A group member reported a news item of an adolescent killed riding on top of a train that went under a bridge. Other members asked for clarification and confirmation; information was contributed about the line where the accident happened and the likelihood the victim was unaware of the bridge. There were horrified, mirthful and empathic comments about the victim and speculations about his experience. Then jokes elaborated the theme and a consensus emerged that he was “an idiot.” The unstated implication was they would not do it. Other memories of train-related experiences were shared, including how to open doors when trains are moving. A member humorously reported how an acquaintance was pushed out of a moving train, sustaining a broken arm. Another member expressed horror at this action, saying it was stupid, “he could have been killed!” The reporter was scornful and abused him. The conversation degenerated into trading insults and eventually an exchange of blows. A period of confused activity followed without common theme or shared activity (Adolescent Group, 1993). Cognitive elements include news reports, memories, facts, opinions, attitudes, speculations, jokes and value judgments related in coherent sequences allowing the accident to be evaluated against adolescent values, eventually arriving at a consensus judgment. The group provides the framework for a collective cognitive process affecting everyone. Each member participates in cognitive operations transforming the elements. Associating to other risk-taking activities facilitates further evaluative operations. A difference of attitude between two members generates hostile affect, organization is lost and operations interrupted. The group’s organization cannot integrate the contradiction and fails to regulate the affect. It disorganizes, preventing further collective cognitive activity. Group cognition and the GFR. The group’s capacity for cognition depends on achieving an organization within which operations can be performed that are collective, not the function of individuals. The organization needed is a state of the communicational field; collective cognition is a function of the organization of group communication processes (Lewes, 1879; Cooley, 1909; McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1954). The dimension for rating groups’ cognitive capacity is defined by the GFR as “Cognitive Organization” rather than specific cognitive content or operations.

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Cognitive activity depends on relevant ideas following each other in logical order and relations of meaning predominating over non-logical relations such as similarity or affective value. Higher order cognition is expressed in language and linguistic structures. The two central requirements are maintaining the topic or theme, (preserving a norm) and functioning within logical operations (abiding by the operation’s rules). These features can be defined for group communication. Verbal productions, non-verbal gestures or other actions must preserve a commonly accepted theme to constitute normative organization. Then they need to form sequences allowing common relations, operations and meaning expressed through a set of explicit or implicit rules. Finally, they must embody representations of the group and members if cognition is to be applied to the group itself.

The Dimension of Cognitive Organization. The formation of Go means the group can reconcile and integrate members’ communicational contributions to attain a collective function. Cognitive function underpins the group acting as a unit, even if tacitly (Polanyi, 1962). Making decisions and reconciling differences indicates structuring of communicational content to produce shared conclusions. The decision to play cards involves proposing an idea, communicating it, ensuring it is understood, gaining agreement, finding cards, arranging seating, agreeing on rules, assigning roles and depends on organization of communications between members. Norms and rules are only achieved with a shared framework for tasks. The conversation about the boy riding a train consists of information and opinion that become common property of all members. The judgment that he was “an idiot” is an operation conferring value on the information. Although pronounced by one member, it becomes a shared value. It is predisposed to recur by association in later conversations and becomes an operational structure of the group’s communicational life, where impulsive, risk-taking behaviour is considered “idiotic.” This occurs because of all members participate in communications organized to provide sequential description, evaluation of reports and incorporate the member’s value judgment. This is collective cognition and characteristic of nous, since no individual performs the function, but each contributes in communication to what becomes a common result. Group cognitive development is observable in different degrees of organization. The first is an unorganized state, without consistency or sequencing. The second organizational level allows acquisition of common ideas, symbols and elements with

136 simple concrete operations expressed as norms such as agreement, disagreement, comparison and association. At the third level, rules govern how elements are related; complex operations such as analysis, deduction, conclusions, evaluations, judgment and opinion can be performed. At the fourth level representations of the group, members and their lives are formed; self-reference and self-regulating functions can occur. These states are described in more detail.

Unorganized communication in the GFR. There is no capacity to engage in collective cognition when members contribute their own communications without reference to each other’s contributions and their actions are not coordinated by shared goals or purposes. There are only heterogeneous elements without common order evident in periods of confusion, breakdown or transition between more organized activities, or in sporadic conversation where comments are made without building on previous contributions, each communication being sufficient to itself. Unorganized Cognitive Organization describes states without communication between members described in the Nominal Group (Gn) or the group as an unorganized organism (Go).

Norms as cognitive elements. When groups emerge from unorganized states, norms enable some cognitive organization of communication. Norms are standards or “shared definitions of desirable behavior” (Harré and Lamb, 1983) regulating interaction (Wilke and Van Knippenberg, 1989). They promote conformity, are endorsed by members and control action (Fraser, 1986); they describe regularities in behaviour and promote coordination of communication (Forsyth, 1983). Norms are described as simple rules for group conduct (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Harre and Lamb, 1983; Forsyth, 1983; Brown, 1989) or for linking behaviors to consequences (Sanders and Cushman, 1984). Norms define what all members accept (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959), though participants may only notice their violation (Forsyth, 1983). Members’ attitudes converge towards an average that becomes a norm (Wilke and Van Knippengerg, 1989). They give communication a degree of organization and define acceptable knowledge for the group (Asch, 1952). They “are the basis for mutual expectations amongst group members” (Brown, 1989, p. 42), frames of reference (Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall, 1965; Cancian, 1975) and depict

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“a shared social reality” (Sampson and Marthas, 1990, p. 73; Baron, Kerr and Miller, 1992). Groups accomplish goals, sustain themselves and define their relationship to their surroundings with common attitudes, behavioural sanctions and organizing features of group life highly resistant to change (Wilke and Van Knippenberg, 1989). Any collective cognitive activity requires members to agree on topic, activity, procedures, values and regulation of interaction. With normative organization, members can maintain common topics and related attitudes in a conversation without logical or operational outcome. Norms maintain themes, common values and meaning contexts as the organizational framework for cognition and a framework with action implications; cognitive norms create a collective content and style not restricted to the summation of individual contributions. Norms are idiosyncratic (Brown, 1989); they represent a particular cognitive environment and identity of cognitive style and conduct. They are the first indications within cognitive organization of whole-group functioning and the emergence of Gs. Norm systems confer collective structures on cognitive organization such as: • All members participate in activities; • When some members start an activity others continue it; • If someone talks others listen; • If a topic is introduced other contributions are relevant; • If communications are not understood members ask for clarification; • If a member has a complaint, it is expressed. Norms of communicational reciprocity underpin complex group processes. However, they may interfere with cognitive activity. Adolescent norms are often contravened by expressing attachment, care or admiration (Malekoff, 1997); they disrupt serious conversation after a short time; boisterous games may constitute a narrow range of normative activities, restricting cognitive achievement. Groups need suitable norms to promote collective cognition as the most elementary organization permitting nous to manifest. Cognitive norms ensure common content and non-systemic organization in an otherwise unorganized communicational field; they do not form a rule-based system, but operate idiosyncratically, without reference to other norms or rules. Norms provide shared order rather than transformations of cognitive elements. Since they lack logical

138 relationships to each other, they may be inconsistent, contradictory or incompatible (Homans, 1951). Peer group norms may discourage members from talking about problems, but personal experience norms may urge discussion of common problems. They do not constitute a logical system.

Normative Organization and the GFR. In the GFR, Normative Cognitive Organization is present when norms organize the group’s communication into common themes, shared activity, similar, parallel activity or other common elements, but abstract cognitive operations are not performed. Cognition requires norms to ensure common content, but commonality is possible without logical operations. In a conversation about cars, if contributions are related only by the theme of cars no operations are performed. Personal recollections or fantasies about cars may be given as a series of associations not organized to draw conclusions or form a logical argument. Normative organization describes members flying paper planes or having shots at a target without rules to define procedure, scores or winner; operations are absent. The category following Normative Organization describes rules permitting logical operations. However, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by rules before describing it.

Rules as cognitive elements. In the GFR, “rule” defines a feature of cognitive function qualitatively distinct from norms. Rules govern cognitive operations, denoting a higher state of organization of the common content established by norms. Rules may define classes and social practices; they regulate behaviour, indicating permitted, prescribed or proscribed actions (Collett, 1977; Harré and Lamb, 1983). A rule is: “A principle regulating the procedure or method necessary to be observed in the pursuit or study of some art or science” (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). There are constitutive, generative and regulatory rules. They confer unity on the perceptual field; orderliness in succession of events is created by the sequence following a rule; concepts are rules in rationality (Kant, 1976). Rules operate in individuals, but evolve socially (Wittgenstein, 1953; Collett, 1977; Bloor, 1983; Arnold and Frandsen, 1984) and “are social inventions, by and for persons who are oriented to the same conditions. Their power rests on their real or presumed

139 relevance” (Asch, 1953, p. 351). “Rules necessarily imply social or inter-individual relation. ... Rules are a regulation imposed by the group and their violation carries a sanction” (Piaget, 1972, pp. 112-3). Social exchange leads to the formation of rules (Bochner, 1984). They indicate how individual cognitive structures are formed and sustained by group membership (Luria, 1976; Vygotsky quoted in Collett, 1977). Social life rests on rules (Simmell, 1950), which restrict individuals, but confer a shared code (Arnold and Frandsen, 1984) and make social action comprehensible to others (Sanders and Cushman, 1984). Rules in cognition constitute implicit or explicit propositions specifying mental or behavioural activity. A rule is part of a systemic or symbolic structure reciprocally related to other rules as parts of a system. A rule unrelated to other rules is a norm. Rules indicate an underlying organization or “deep structure” such as guides manifest behaviour in speech production (Chomsky, 1965). Several levels of rules govern complex language; basal rules create abstract phrase structures while transformational rules arrange elements into surface structures (Chomsky, 1980). Meaning is not possible without rules (Bochner, 1984); semantic meaning is created by grammatical rules relating symbols to each other and their referents (Cronkhite, 1984). Rules forming individuals’ language preserve continuity with rules governing interpersonal communication, which is only possible when similar rules apply to the form and content of messages (Sanders and Cushman, 1984). They are essential to language, communication and social structures, but also exist for other group behaviour such as conversation (Noftsinger, 1976; Harré, 1977; Bruner, 1977; Duncan and Fiske, 1977) and violence is a paradigm for rulefulness in apparently disorganized social interaction (Reicher, 1988; Cotterell, 1996). Fighting is rule- governed; the rules are unconscious, but obeyed like those of language (Fox, 1977). The rules of “the turn system” in conversation consist of “transition-readiness states” determining sequence, coordination signals, “moves” to be undertaken, units to punctuate interactions and rules to operate these elements forming a complex system providing the activity’s social structure and meaningfulness (Duncan and Fiske, 1977). Unless speakers finish their statements, their interlocutors do not know what they intend to say and discussions lack logical development. In a card game, rules determine actions and sequence of play catering for all eventualities and designate winners. In a dispute, logic determines who wins and loses, even if members do not abide by the outcome.

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Contrasting Norms and Rules. Rules are systemic and refer to social relations, whereas norms only relate to specific situations. Rules are more abstract and general than norms, requiring categories and concepts for their application; they are conventional, but “not merely so” (Asch, 1953, p. 352). They define, generate and regulate meanings necessary for organized communication and action, giving a framework for individuals to participate in collective processes. The distinction between norms and rules parallels that between conventions sustaining structures in a concrete, static way and principles preserving organization and permitting operations and transformations in cognitive structures. Rules of human conduct in situations evolve, but ensure action occurs “within frames of reference delimiting the goals that can be attained and the means of pursuing and attaining them” (Sanders and Cushman, 1984, p. 231). Rules support each other systemically. Social situations are determined by systems of rules having neither inconsistent nor contradictory logical relations. Rules cannot act alone, whereas norms may. A rule standing alone is arbitrary or idiosyncratic to the group and is a norm or convention (Searle, 1970). Rules constitute a system with the elements they govern, such as lexical elements in language, moves in a game and actions in social life. The rule system enables “socio-rational” transformations of cognitive elements into meaningful structures (Chomsky, 1957; Fraisse and Piaget, 1969; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). Rules do not indicate commonly held ideas, themes or understandings, but common principles determining how ideas relate to form collective cognitive products characteristic of nous. They are equally effective whether implicit or explicit (Fox, 1977; Harré, 1984).

Systemic Organization and the GFR. Rule-based communication and action indicate a change in organization from the conventionality of norms and is called Systemic Organization. Normative Organization enables the group to undertake simple activities and functions, share information and experiences, cooperate in shared tasks or common activities. Systemic Organization enables members to coordinate activities with implicit rules such as conversations, discussions and arguments, or undertake activities with explicit rule systems such as debates, problem solving or games. In Systemic Organization, each participant has a role and transformations of cognitive elements are contributed to the

141 common communicational field so the group generates cognitive products or sustains collective cognitive activity.

The group’s cognition of itself. To function as self-sustaining organisms, groups must develop self- representations and evaluate their own welfare. Norms and rules do not specify the content of the communications they organize; but cognitive elements organized into higher-level reflexive structures form collective representations. To function as Gs, a group must manage the problems of its existence, plan and undertake self-maintenance, regulate, recognize and understand itself. It needs to know its membership, where and when it meets, its purpose, functions and history. The group makes itself the cognitive content of communication when members talk about each other’s lives, their problems, time and place of meeting, past events or former members. Cognition of the group itself is related to content rather than form of cognitive activity, so another Cognitive Organization category is introduced for self-referenced, systemic operations. Systemically organized communicational states referred to the group, members, their lives, the group’s history or future are called Representational Organization. To clarify this term, it is necessary to discuss representations.

Representations as cognitive elements. For Kant, representation indicated the form in which a transcendental “thing-in- itself” was present to understanding (Toulmin, 1972). Subsequent accounts emphasize representations as elements upon which meaning develops in cognitive systems. They are a mental substitute for raw data of cognitive processes (Cummins, 1995). Cognitive psychology interprets them as internal states in a private world, identified with neurological states (Posner, 1991), structures of the cognitive apparatus (Hinton, McClelland and Rumelhart, 1989) or mental content (Mounoud and Vinter, 1982). They are the material basis for knowledge as images, words or other models of the world (Johnson-Laird, 1991). Psychoanalytic concepts define representation as “iconic or symbolically encoded meanings that are capable of conscious awareness or communicative expression” (Horowitz, 1988, p. 17). Piaget regarded representations as developing from the evocation of absent objects, allowing the subject to organize experience to perform cognitive functions and

142 enable mental experience to succeed actual experimentation (Piaget, 1963; Bronckart and Venouras-Spycher, 1979). Sensorimotor action is internalized as imitation or representation (Meltzoff, 1982). Representations are not copies; they have meaning as “signifiers” related to actualities or “signifieds,” evoking absent objects and forming new combinations. They confer unity on behaviour and are “capable of entering language to be transformed, with the aid of the social group, into reflective intelligence” (Piaget, 1963, p. 356). In social life, representations evoke what is outside the perceptual field and transform sensorimotor into conceptual functioning. Collective representations are shared signs, language, myths, rituals and culture (Durkheim, 1966). Language enables representations to form a “support system of usable ‘signifiers’ at the disposal of the individual” (Piaget, 1972 p. 273). Action requires preliminary representation (Mounoud and Vinter, 1982). To develop a collective cognitive capacity, groups depend on common representations. Durkheim considered “everything which is social consists of representations and therefore is the product of representation” (quoted in Lukes, 1975, p. 234). Social institutions form collective representations, as common content shared throughout the social organisms allowing them to become self-conscious (Durkheim, 1954; Deutscher, 1984). Social (collective) representations are necessary for a collective thought life (Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1984). Collective representations form in interactions between member and group (Leyens and Codol, 1993); once created, they “lead a life of their own, circulate, merge, attract and repel each other, and give birth to new representations” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 13; Durkheim, 1966). Collective representations conventionalize and model group objects and processes by providing common signifiers of them. They also restrict and proscribe activity, imposing themselves on members, forming a cognitive environment in which social thought and history create group culture. They regulate and integrate psychic or social tensions, forming boundaries, make the unfamiliar familiar, organize information, control individual behaviour and “canalise the flow of emotions and of fluctuating interpersonal relationships” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 60). Group action is only possible with shared, conscious representations formed in a social context with norms, rules and values which are all social representations of a lower order (Farr and Mocovici, 1984; Von Cranach and Valach, 1984). While psychic

143 representations are internal mediating functions between subject and environment (Mounoud and Vinter, 1982), social representations are part of a circularity formed by observation, continuing through communication, becoming the context for the observation and providing the structure with its meaning. The social eventually takes precedence over the psychic in cognitive functions, since social and public processes were gradually interiorized as psychic processes (Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962). “It is as though our psychology contained our sociology in a condensed from” (Moscovici, 1984 p. 65). Giving primacy to the collective use of representations displaces the private, mental concept (Toulmin, 1972). The personal, inner representation is encapsulated in the German “Vorstellung” related to the mental image or sensory representation placed before the self. It symbolizes something in an individual’s mind. An alternative German word, “Darstellung” denotes public representation, such as exhibiting an idea in public (Toulmin, 1972). Representation in this sense is collective, existing in the relation between public entities. Language represents experience publicly in open demonstration (Wittgenstein, quoted in Toulmin, 1972). Meaning as the collective use of words and representations poses the problem of “how the personal thoughts and concepts of an individual concept-user are related to the communal or collective uses of concepts” (Toulmin, 1972, p. 197). If collective representations are seen as behavioural accompaniments to inner thoughts, which alone have rational significance, ideas and personal representations are detached from their expression as collective or social representations. Representations are thus located in the social-communicational domain and not exclusively intra-psychic. Public expression of representations is not derived from privileged personal reality, but the primary social reality from which personal constructs are internalized (Moscovici, 1984). Communicated representations develop group culture and identity; they define boundaries and relationships to other groups. Social representations create collective thought and a “support system of usable signifiers” (Piaget, 1972, p. 273) enabling members to derive their own cognitive life. A member’s private mental image of an event does not effect group history until it is communicated to others, evoking reciprocated images, creating shared symbolic reference. Words, gestures or symbols become collective representations as group cognitive elements, but affect members as external to themselves (Durkheim, 1954; Moscovici, 1988). Two types of social representations can be distinguished. One type is

144 formed of anything within language in the communicational field; everything beyond sensation is represented in symbolic elements or signifiers by a social environment of language and communication. Being in a group gives members representations of themselves, their lives and experiences through the richness of communicational opportunities. Another type of representation formed within the communicational process is of the group, members, history, states, processes and relations with entities outside itself. They are collective as members contribute to and are incorporated into collective thought processes developing a collective self-awareness from systemic cognitive organization of group communication (Moscovici, 1984). Representations of the group make it an object of cognition and subject to regulating processes. Group representations are “psychic organizers” of group life (Kaës, 1984, p. 374). Groups are founded on collective representations of purpose as the identification defining membership. This “emblematic representation” has a similar function to leadership and “guarantees the possibility of communication and exchange. It is a nucleus of identification for members distinguishing the group from the non- group” (Kaës, 1984, p. 375).

Representational Organization and the GFR. In the GFR, representations are formed by communications about members, their lives, experiences, families, friends, problems, therapists, the group and where it is conducted. Communications about such content forms social representations, promoting collective cognition and group self-awareness. Social representations must be connected and systemically organized, understood and incorporated into a common discourse to become shared social constructs. If enacted, they must be recognized or participated in by all and relate to current communication becoming “signifiers” of the group. Whenever members talk about or convey figurative representations about themselves in a rule-based system, they function in a higher cognitive state than Systemic Organization characterised by systemic communication of representations of members or group called Representational Organization. It does not indicate communication of fully formed social representations, but processes exist that enable them to form (Moscovici, 1984). Regardless of cognitive complexity or whether fully formed, representations are assumed to be coalescing provided communication includes the requisite information.

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Whenever these subjects are expressed in systemic organization, representations are forming, although not necessarily complete or stable. In Representational Organization, members recognize each other as participants in a communion. It is different to consciousness of membership, since it is possible to be in a communion without having representations of it. However, being conscious involves representing the group, one’s relation to it and the other members. When consciousness and shared understanding develop, individuals consider each other as members having similar interest in the group (Asch, 1952). Members and group become discrete cognitive objects collectively and individually. Shared figurative forms and language specific to the group support common ideas and images with the “subtle interplay of presuppositions and semantic potentialities” constituting intersubjectivity as a common awareness and group culture (Rommetveit, 1984, p. 336).

In the Nominal Group, Gn is defined externally and members lack representations of their involvement. Communication joins members forming the social organism, as the Organic Group, Go. When representations of common interest form, but group or social representations are not in evidence, the group is Social (Gs). When a common culture creates group representations and members’ communications about themselves and each other form social representations, Representational Organization forms the Functional Group (Gf).

Cognitive Organization in the GFR. The hierarchy of Cognitive Organization begins as unstructured and confused; it is ordered by norms governing behaviour, but not allowing decisions, plans or group representations. The group’s activity needs to be governed systemically, beginning with norms and common propositions, developing logical operations such as decision-making, compromise, conversations, games and planned activities. Finally, operations on representations of group and members are attained with talk about themselves. Cognitive Organization observes the formal cognitive characteristics of group communication that reveal norms, rules, operations and collective representations as the basis for shared cognition. The four categories of organization of group communication enable group functioning to be located on an ascending order of complexity and functional integrity, summarized below. The complete rating instructions and criteria are in the Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2.

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Unorganized: Members’ communication lacks common themes, shared topics or system. Individual cognition occurs, but is unorganized for the group because common propositions or operations are lacking. Behaviorally, it consists of disorganized behaviour, “milling” or “time out behaviour” (Cotterell, 1996), chatter or aimless talk with sporadic, disconnected comments, confusion following conflict or transitional states when forming or breaking up without organized communication. Normative Organization: The second category describes simple relations of routine and habit with content organized by similarity of theme. The communicational field has shared topics without rule-based operations. It describes relations based on common acceptance and established custom rather than logical rules. Verbal communications include anecdotes, reports, descriptions, which may be shared or elaborated without logical development or operations; members swap stories or jokes without analysis or discussion. Behavioural engagement includes shared activities or games without systemic rules, such as throwing games, play fights, simple competitive activity, building a cubby house, setting up or tidying the room. Communicational norms or guidelines do not constitute an articulated system, but cover specific situations; there may be prescriptive rules such as telling others what to do or behaving in an authoritarian manner without interrelated rules. It includes incomplete, inadequate or unsuccessful systems whose rules are rejected, failing, breaking down or violated. Issues are not followed through; elements of the system may be present, but it wholly or partially fails, such as a game or discussion failing from inadequate rules, dissension or cheating. Systemic Organization: The third category is where communication is organized by rules, such as logic, morality, games or social conventions of conversation, etiquette or custom. The rules are interconnecting principles existing as abstract ideas instanced in various concrete situations. Rules systemically predetermine, create and maintain relations between communicational contributions, enabling cognitive operations to be performed by the group. Wide variation in sophistication of operations is possible maintaining the system, however the condition is that rules interrelate to each other. It is present in card games, conversations about why a team won, games of chess or “tiggy,” debates about politics or deciding what to do. Group activity needs to be effectively organized by the system and may consist of conversations, games or motor activities. The group is successfully governed by rules. Systemic organization does not

147 indicate the activity’s content or sophistication, but the group’s capacity to develop regulatory processes by applying rules. Representational Organization: The fourth category describes systemic functioning that includes social representations of the group and members. These may not be fully developed, but are implicit in the content of systemically organized communications. There is a system of organized terms and relations effectively governing or organizing communication and behaviour, representing the group or members, their lives, other people or events of personal significance or their problems. It includes figurative representations such as acting, or drawing. All members of the group or communion share in the content of their communicational field. If someone talks about themselves or the group, but others are not listening, the systemic character of communication fails and it is not Representational Organization. Table 10.1 compares the four characteristics of Cognitive Organization of the communicational field in each of the four categories and provides examples of conversation and activity for each category.

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Definitions UNORGANIZED NORMATIVE SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATIONAL ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION TERMS Any common elements No common terms, in- Common themes, terms Common terms elaborate Common terms refer to self, allowing ideas, topics, consistent themes or and topics shared and common ideas or experiences, group, family, member's life or themes to be shared or topics; individual promote communication. creation of group culture; other psychologically relevant common actions to be topics. ideas, values, memories. topic. undertaken MEMBERS’ Communicative acts, Basic ideas Guided and bound by Themes elaborated by logical Contributions elaborate systemic CONTRIB- utterances, actions, undeveloped; individual themes, descriptions, argument or structure, have representations and themes in an UTIONS responses contributed and inconsistent narratives, reports; ideas purpose and relevance to ordered, logical systematic way. by members to the declarations, comments, lack development; a sequence; bound by rules and communication process anecdotes. member dominates group. logical operations. RELATIONS Relations of No consistent relations Similarity, comparison, Logical, sequential, Logical and associative relations BETWEEN contributions in of communicational agree/disagree, question/ developmental order and preserve the topic, and advance MEMBERS’ communication; contributions, norms, answer, norms; rules are relevance; rules are consistent the purpose of communication. CONTRIB- operations undertaken prescriptions of conduct in-complete, inconsistent, and guide process, but may be The group elaborates the theme. UTIONS by the group or rules of actions. ineffective, lack of logic. implicit.

SYSTEM Overall goals, purpose, Lack of systematic Overall purpose, meaning, Goal oriented, elaboration of Goal oriented to develop meaning or purpose, goal- connectedness present, but theme together to gain understanding or sharing of directedness of directedness, or ineffective; group information, solve problems, experience, personal problem communication meaning; information functions for itself, not undertake actions, plan, solving, about self, life or group. processes. not processed. performing tasks. prepare or carry out projects.

Examples Sporadic talk, not res- General conversation; Rule-based games, cards, Talking about self, group, ponded to; mucking chatter; motor games, ball gross motor games, family, life, school in a manner around; aimless, disorg- throwing, war games, discussion, problem solving, that increases psychological anized activity; collapse tiggy; cheating; games not informing, debate, logical awareness and problem solving. of organized activities; working; collapse of rules; argument, advice or sharing Caring for each other or helping. transition states: start or a member dominates; experiences; more than one end of session, between question/answer; agree/dis- member active. activities, break-down agree; listening to or end of game. therapist; argument, abuse. Table 12.1. Analysis and comparison of cognitive organization categories.

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13. GFR DIMENSION 3: AFFECT

Collective mentality theorists describe an affective life in social organisms. Membership provides affective stimuli of comfort (Trotter, 1916) or joy (Durkheim, 1954), whereas isolation or conflict causes pain (Burrow, 1927b). Communication of personal emotions establishes common affective states in members and collective affect in the organism (Le Bon, 1896; Durkheim, 1954). Describing collective affect presupposes a description of individuals’ affect and applying this validly to groups. Collective entities must have something in common with individual psychology, but transferring individualistic concepts obscures their uniqueness. Individual affect is reviewed to develop a concept of group affect.

Affect and emotion. Dictionaries refer definitions of affect to emotion and emotion to affect (English and English, 1962; Chaplin, 1968; Harré and Lamb, 1983; Gregory, 1987). The two terms are often equated (Brenner, 1980; Livesey, 1986; Jones, 1995). Rather than defining them, essential attributes are often listed, including: temporary response pattern, physiological changes, overt expression, endogenous perception of changes, personal interpretation or appraisal (Lewis and Rosenbuam, 1978; Lazarus, Kanner and Folkman, 1980; Mandler, 1984; Denzin, 1984) adaptive function (Weinreich, 1980) and changes in “action readiness” (Frijda, 1993). Emotion has received less attention in contemporary psychology that motivation, perception and cognition (Lazarus et. al., 1980; McCarthy, 1989). It is defined as inherently social, individualistic, “social convention” (Averill, 1980a), “collective representations” (McCarthy, 1989) or “social representations” (Farr and Moscovici, 1984). Affect tends to refer to motivation and arousal to distinguish it from emotions or feelings, although the literature lacks clear differentiation.

Biological theories. Affect is a product of neurological arousal, activating patterned brain activity (Schore, 1994) associated with “subjective” or feeling aspects (Livesey, 1986). It evolved as cognitive control by reward or punishment of action registered by “immediate, inbuilt percepts of sensations and danger signals” (Livesey, 1986, p. 250).

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Affects amplify basic drives (Tomkins, 1962; Livesey, 1986) and have four functions (Young, 1961): • Energizing behaviour; • Sustaining or terminating involvement in activity; • Regulating action according to aversion or pleasure; • Organizing future action by learning. Primary affects are sensations of need, reward or punishment; secondary affects generate expectancies from cognitive interactions, creating emotions. Affects register internal states as the result of actions providing organisms with motivational information. Drives generate distress signals at the “site of the consummatory act” rather than the tissues, ensuring the organism acts to redress the problem; signals are amplified as affects to ensure motivation in “drive-affect assemblies” (Tomkins, 1962, p. 88). Affect is an innate biological motivating mechanism (Izard, 1979), more urgent than drives (Tomkins, 1979) involving awareness of bodily-visceral responses. Basic affects of interest or excitement, enjoyment or joy, surprise or startle, distress or anguish, fear or terror, shame or humiliation, contempt, disgust, anger or rage are distinguishable (Tomkins, 1980) across cultures (Ekman, 1992). Rhythms of discharge, refractory period when energy is recouped and readiness for further discharge regulate affect (Freud, 1920, 1924, 1938; Tomkins, 1962). Affective quality is governed by differences in increase, maintenance and decrease of the density of stimulation; increasing density produces startle, fear and interest; decrease creates joy; maintenance or lack of relief causes anger and distress (Tomkins, 1980, p. 144). Qualities of arousal organize different emotions (Grastyan, 1974; Plutchic and Kellerman, 1980, 1990). Two dimensions have been empirically derived: an “arousal continuum” of emotional energy of the system ranging from low to high (Mandler, 1984; Plutchik and Kellerman, 1989; Stein and Oatley, 1992) and a “hedonic continuum” of states from positive, pleasurable to negative, unpleasurable conditions (Young, 1961; Tellergen, 1988; Clark and Watson, 1991). A third dimension of dominance-submission or engagement-withdrawal has been proposed (Russell and Mehrabian, 1977; Watson and Tellergen, 1985; Russell, 1989) integrated in a circumplex model (Plutchik, 1962; Kellerman, 1979; Watson and Tellergen, 1985; Russell, 1989). These dimensions are found in Freud’s account of affect as consisting of quantitative aspects of “particular motor innervations or discharges,” hedonic aspects

151 of “direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure” and the dominance-engagement factor as “perceptions of the motor actions that have occurred” of feeling (Freud, 1917, p. 395). Emotions, while not clearly distinguished from affects, mediate appraisal of action outcomes. Little cognition is needed to arouse affects, whereas emotions are generated by expectancies from learning and experience (Livesey, 1986). Cognitive or social constructs, action plans, goals, expectancies and social signaling generate emotion. It “acts in a communicative setting enabling animals to read each other’s emotional expressions” (Livesey, 1986 p. 237). Emotions result from interruption of current states or conflict between competing states (Mandler, 1980). However, “fundamental emotions” are “motivators and organizers of behavior, not merely responses to an appraisal process” motivated and directed by emotion (Izard and Bleuler, 1980, p. 168). Basic emotions evolved as “action dispositions” meeting survival needs (Stein and Oatley, 1992) related to drive characteristics (Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980a, 1980b). Emotions have positive or negative hedonic qualities considered as approach- withdrawal (Davidson, 1992), attraction-repulsion, active-passive, pleasure-unpleasure (Dahl, 1991) hedonic-agonic (Chance, 1980), excitement-calmness or tension-relaxation (Nathanson, 1996a). Emotions are a function of the whole body (James, 1890; Cannon 1932; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Papanicolaou, 1989) with functional significance for organic needs (Young, 1961; Thayer, 1989). The quantitative dimension describes the intensity of autonomic activity while quality is characterised by cognitive aspects. However, physiological theories of emotion have been criticised as too little related to human experience (Averill, 1980a). Biological theories and the GFR. Once groups have achieved organism status as

Go, the communication system is activated; social organisms develop integrity analogous to biological organisms and are subject to energy characteristics like biological aspects of affect; activity is sustained or terminates and rewarding or aversive with rhythms of discharge, refractory period and accumulation.

Cognitive theories. Affect provides the energy source for cognition (Green, 1977; Decarie, 1978) since “no stimulus can evoke a psychological response unless it first triggers an affect” (Nathanson, 1996a, p. 3). Emotions have logic and cognitive meaning (Calhoun and

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Solomon, 1984); their laws, reducible to “laws of empirical psychic life” (Scheler, 1916, p. 220) are always directed towards something, therefore an extension of cognition (Brentano, 1898). Cognitive theory describes emotions as a holistic and abbreviated mode of perception, information processing, evaluation or interpretation of actual or expected outcomes of interactions with the environment (de Sousa, 1991; Frijda, 1993). Emotions are “cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions” (Lazarus et al., 1980, p. 198). They prompt action plans, lack propositional content, syntactic structure, informational value, but function as signals for goals and coordinate group behaviour (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992). Emotions are related to social norms, values and modes of interaction; they express “non-instrumental” behaviour as “action tendencies” (Frijda, 1993). Cognitive theories and the GFR. Emotions as primary appraisals imply a cognitive capacity only possible in Gs. Group emotions can be conceptualised as elementary collective cognitions lacking propositional content or syntactic structure that organize groups and provide energy to collective mentality. Emotional states redistribute resources, manage priorities and presuppose a degree of integrity of communication evident as nous in Gs.

Social and phenomenological theories. Social theorists criticize the “reifying tendencies” of biological and cognitive theories (Averill, 1980a; Harré, 1988b; McCarthy, 1989). Emotions “can be fully understood only on a social level of analysis” (Averill, 1980a, p. 309). All aspects of emotion are influenced by socio-cultural factors; they are socially constructed responses, “transitory social roles” or improvisations based on interpretations; they are cognitive structures incorporating social norms like grammar (Averill, 1980a). Their appraisals are personal meanings bestowed on spontaneous activity; they are passive states that happen to the subject (Averill, 1980a; Harré, 1988b). Emotions place the person in a world of social interaction; they are sensations in the lived body felt in relation to others, “lodged in social acts” and embodied mental states (Denzin, 1984, p. 50). They are social acts, felt by the self and referred to others with a communicational structure. “Emotionality is a circular process that begins and ends with the transactions and actions of the self in the social situation” (p. 58). The affect system mediates all social relatedness; “affect is biology, while emotion is biography”

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(Nathanson, 1996a, p. 13). Emotions are affects associated with socially constructed experience. Basic emotions are reifications, since emotional terms indicate culturally specific social norms (Wierzbicka, 1992). They cannot be identified with specific behaviours within the social process (Averill, 1980b) and have been called articulations of intentions, “vocabularies used to define situations” (Perinbanayagam, 1989, p. 77). Emotions’ arousing intensity is a function of their perceived value in a social context (Swanson, 1989). Symbolic Interactionism denies there are unsocialised emotions. Emotional stimuli arise from individuals, act upon others, yield responses and are inherently socially positive or negative. They are “emergents” within acts in the social world like mind, and actions in the world like spoken words, as much “outside” the body as “inside;” yet they develop in social relations constituted by group process (Mead, 1962; McCarthy, 1989; Coulter, 1988). Their stability and impersonality comes from their universality as collective representations (McCarthy, 1989). Affect is socially constructed into distinct emotions. Emotions are “intentional” and involve a “local moral order” (Harré, 1988b, p. 8). Affect qualities have been disputed by constructivism (Armon-Jones, 1988), but they are complex and socially structured along a variety of dimensions (Plutchic and Kellerman, 1980, 1989, 1990). Social and phenomenological theories and the GFR. Emotions emerge from the forces constituting the collective organisation of the social entity. Their linguistic structure locates them in the communicational field as elements of collective mentality and they mediate attachments consolidating the social entity. Emotions are expressed in communicational phenomena and their arousing function underpins social value. They belong as much to the group as within its members. As collective phenomena of social communication, they are applicable to groups, and identified by the GFR.

Psychoanalytic theories. Freud described affect as the quality of psychic energy capable of transformation into pleasure or unpleasure, depending on its distribution in the psychic apparatus. Affect is memory plus energy produced by endogenous excitation (Freud, 1895). It regulates the energy of the apparatus by discharge (Freud, 1900). Psychic energy occurs in two conditions. It is “bound” by being invested in psychic functions and maintains activity level in a controlled state. Thought is activated by energy bound to

154 representations; steady release of energy provides the motive for thought, while sudden discharge is restricted by its investment in the functions. It can also be “free” or unbound from specific representations and seek “uninhibited discharge,” no longer harnessed and expressing itself in affect (Freud, 1895). Affect qualities result from “tension” within the psychological apparatus (Freud, 1895). Pleasurable hedonic quality occurs with decrease in tension and unpleasure with increase. Tension refers to the distribution rather than either quantity or the bound/free state of energy, where some parts of the system (or representations) have a relatively higher investment of energy compared to others. Pleasure is reduced tension through free distribution of energy throughout the system. Unpleasure is increased tension, with energy unevenly constrained in some areas, while released from others. Drives manifest in consciousness as affects; ideas allow drive impulses to develop into affect (Freud, 1915). Affects are internal perceptions arising in consciousness independently of sensory perceptions and memories (Freud, 1923). Affect quality is not directly related to excitation; it is a signal related to meaning and quantity related to energy as a force (Freud, 1938). Affective life fluctuates rhythmically in strength and pleasurable quality (Freud, 1920, 1924, 1938) In psychoanalysis, affects are synonymous with emotion (Brenner, 1980; Jones, 1995). Emotions are the experience of non-symbolic information processing that is the central control mechanism for human behavior (Jones, 1995), a dimension of ideas rather than a separate phenomenon. The dominant affect is anxiety (Stein, 1991). Psychoanalytic accounts emphasise its relationship to language as fundamentally representational, carrying meaning when adapted to discourse, but also disrupting meaning structures creating pleasure or pain (Plutchik and Kellerman, 1980, 1990; Green, 1977). There are two thresholds of quantitative intensity. Above the first, affect reaches consciousness, enlivens and enlarges the field of perception being “invested” in psychic functions. Above the second, it is disruptive, experienced as unpleasurable, loosed from ideas and discharged. The thresholds activate chains of association crucial to energising communication as well as determining content. Affect has the function of “punctuating the signifier” (Green, 1977). Psychoanalytic theories and the GFR. Affective processes of energy within a system of representations are applicable to collective representations (communications)

155 in a social entity. Bound and free energy, rhythm and tension as uneven distribution within the system can be applied to the communicational field observed by the GFR. The more highly collective mentality is developed, the more organized affective energy is likely to be and its qualities differentiated. In Gs and Gf it is likely to be a significant motivating and qualitative feature of collective mentality.

A synthesis of affect theories. General statements about affects can be applied to social organisms.

1. Affect refers to energizing functions of organisms and amplifies drives. Below one threshold, the organism has low energy; above it energy is bound to representations and invested in activating psychic functions; above a second threshold, arousal disruptively discharges energy from representations and investments. The quantitative aspect manifests the organism’s collective psychic (nous) energy state. 2. Affects have an aversive or rewarding qualitative dimension, structured by social meaning and the impact on the organisms’ well being. Unpleasure is the accumulation of different relative levels of energy in various subsystems creating tension; pleasure is equable distribution of the energy throughout the system. Quality is the increase, maintenance or reduction in density of arousal and a function of collective representations and meaning. 3. Affect has rhythmic sequences of tension accumulation, discharge, refractory period and accumulation. 4. Affect emerges within acts as an abbreviated, holistic mode of interpreting action; it motivates and coordinates action and is essential for learning. 5. Affect is inherently social and no more located “inside” organisms than are spoken words. It has a grammar of structured social roles and collective representations.

Group affect. Group affect is the tension and distribution of energy throughout the social system. It has three states: low inactive energy, medium activating energy and high, unstable discharging energy. Affect regulates group states. Action evokes affect as

156 impulsive tension discharge or sustained arousal organizing action tendencies. It is not “inside” the members, but in the organized social communicative domain as a characteristic of collective mentality (nous). The formation of Go entails affect as the collective activity of the communicational process. Group affect is not members’ emotional states, but the state of the whole social system. Since communicational phenomena are the material basis of the collective entity, affect is represented in communicational phenomena. Energy is located biologically in individuals, but transmitted via communication creating collective group activation. Individual affect becomes collective affect when communicated. If a member is hostile to others, all are affected. All members may not feel the same, but anger expressed in the communicational process affects the group. Only expressed or communicated affective states produce group affective states. In the GFR, affect is not inferred from members’ emotional state and interpersonal interactions (Kellerman, 1979; MacKenzie, 1990; Karterud, 2000), but rated by observing the activity level and hedonic quality directly observable in non-cognitive, non-action aspects of communicational phenomena. Communicational phenomena as affective states. Attributing specific emotions to groups treats them as persons by analogy. However, collective affective states can be described by reference to quantitative and qualitative properties of energy within the communicational process. Two dimensions of quantity or activity level of energy and hedonic quality are defined in the communicational process. 1. Quantitative Phenomena of arousal or energy indicate the affective state within the communion, though not necessarily the whole group. It may refer to the energy of one or more members, but not all. The criterion is that it is expressed in communication to others. There are three conditions. 1.1. High, Unstable Energy. When energy exceeds the scope of current communication, it becomes “unbound” from the activities it energizes, falls outside homeostatic mechanisms, cannot be integrated and current communicational activity is disrupted or terminated. Energy is then not a qualitative feature of the communication content, but expressed in new modes of communication or discharged. Communication cannot consistently be maintained for transmission of meaning. The affective state itself is

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communicated, rather than a message; the signifier is “punctuated” (Green, 1977). Non-syntactical communicational phenomena occur and overflow into proxemic and paralinguistic events such as interpersonal distance, sounds, and gestures. Members move impulsively, physically interact and generate discharge phenomena such as physical blows, cries, laughter or tears. The communicational organism is integrated by communication of the affect itself. Affect is unable to represent other representations, but is communication by the group to itself about itself. 1.2. Medium Stable Energy. When energy in the communicational process is within a stable range it remains bound, serving the functions expressed in communication. Variations remain integrated so functions activated by the energy adjust to change without disruption. Social and biological processes are rhythmic; affect’s stability is homeostatically preserved within a range of variability and becomes unstable when this is violated. Stable communication processes do not demand change; engagement is maintained by members in stable communication, even if its quality or coherence of content fluctuates. Continuity of communication and content are needed and may or may not involve syntactic communication. 1.3. Low, Inert Energy. In the low energy condition communication is stable, but inert. Little is communicated, though the communion remains passively intact. Communication may subside while members remain in contact. They may be passive, listening, observing or ready for communication rather than giving messages. Little overt affective energy is observable; the communicational process may fail for lack of energy. The state is stable and terminating. 2. Qualitative Phenomena. This dimension concerns qualities of positive and negative hedonic states as pleasure/unpleasure, reward/aversiveness or positive/negative as reasonable observers would identify them. Qualities need to be defined for the communicational domain. Psychodynamics of overt or latent emotional content, such as embarrassed laughter representing overt pleasure and covert unpleasure, refer to individual states and lose the whole-group perspective so are ignored. The social entity’s affects are expressions within the communicational process. Operational definitions like approach or avoidance are inadequate since people may avoid pleasure and approach unpleasurable experiences. Hedonic quality is pleasure or unpleasure in

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the group organism and expresses the disposition or tension of energy throughout Go. Tension is independent of quantity of energy or whether it is bound or discharged. In high tension, energy does not circulate freely, but is dammed up to some extent in members or subgroups. It is defined as the degree members participate in the communicational organism and their contributions are accepted and circulate. It is complemented by overt communications of pleasure or unpleasure. When communication brings Go into existence, increasing tension threatens or damages its integrity; relaxation and free expression in communication enhance integrity so the whole can more fully express itself, whatever the quantity of energy. 2.1. Unpleasure - Negative Hedonic Quality (high or increasing communicational tension) is constrained communication that may be socially construed as fear, anger, disgust or distress. Others observe the communication from one angry member to the recipient of the anger, who may or may not respond. There is a constraint in angry or unhappy members not engaging in the monitoring and mutuality of pleasurable states. With anxiety, communication is restricted, members disengaged from common themes while others do not take account of

them, creating tension. Unpleasure occurs in Go when tension is expressed in conflict, misunderstanding or disagreement impairing communication. In

unpleasure Go suffers reduced wholeness. Tension is impairment of free flow of communication; the process itself is disrupted or the meaning (message) is impaired by rejection, denial or abuse. Unpleasure takes precedence over pleasure; when both are present in communication mixed quality is regarded as unpleasure. 2.2. Pleasure - Positive Hedonic Quality (low or decreasing communicational tension) is reduced tension. Communication flows freely and its functions are performed, transferring from one member to another or creating an exchange

network connecting them. For Go pleasure results in enhanced collectivity through successful communication; it is low tension and free flow of communication without impediments. Members talk freely, contribute as they wish, when one talks, all listen or laugh together. Pleasure does not imply the system is in equilibrium, which is quantitative, it means the system reduces tension by free flow of energy.

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Mapping group affect. In Figure 13.1, affect states are mapped on a two dimensional graph. Arousal or activity level is shown on the vertical axis ranging from high unstable activity at the top, medium stable activity in the middle, to low inert activity level at the bottom. The horizontal dimension represents the hedonic continuum, ranging from aversive, unpleasurable on the left to rewarding, pleasurable on the right. Six general affective states are described. At the top, states of high activity are shown. On the left, negative or unpleasurable side of the hedonic continuum, a state of high aversive affect leads to energy discharge, called “Distress,” common to any aversive affect reaching sufficient intensity to become unstable and discharge including anger, grief, fear, pain, disgust or horror. There is high tension and high energy in verbal or non-verbal communication. It manifests as unpleasurable messages in both symbolic and non-symbolic content of communication. If pleasure is also evident, Distress is rated as long as one unpleasurable discharge occurs in the interval. On the right side, “Joy” denotes a high intensity, positive or rewarding state. It refers to any pleasurable emotion of intensity leading to discharge including joy, mirth, pleasure or affection. It is high, unstable pleasurable energy and causes discharge of pleasurable affect in low tension. It is observed in communication by non-symbolic elements expressing the discharge in laughter, shouts of mirth or joy, gestures and actions such as a slap on the back. Intermediate activity states are in the center. On the left side of the hedonic continuum are emotional states expressing aversive affect without discharge or termination. They are stable states with bound energy or sustained activity, including unhappiness, annoyance, frustration, disappointment and apprehension called “Discontent.” Tension evident in communication expressed as unpleasurable affects, preventing free flow of communication defines Discontent even if overt unpleasurable affects are not evident. Discontent is rated if there is evidence of pleasure and free flow of some aspects of communication mixed with unpleasure. The presence of tension is enough to rate negative affect even if pleasurable affects are also present. On the positive hedonic side of the graph are found medium bound or stable pleasurable states called “Interest, with low tension that sustain activity, including interest, enjoyment, curiosity and satisfaction. It is likely to occur in stable states when communication flows freely to fulfill requirements of the current activity. There are no discharge

160 phenomena.

High DISTRESS JOY

Intensity or activation continuum .

DISCONTENT INTEREST

Hedonic continuum . Negative, Positive, Aversive, Rewarding, Unpleasure Pleasure.

BOREDOM Low CONTENTMENT

Figure 13.1. Qualitative and quantitative dimensions mapping six group affective states.

At the lower end of the activity dimension are two inactive states. On the aversive hedonic side, the affect is called “Boredom,” referring to boredom, sullenness, apathy, depression and lethargy. It is low, stable inert energy level with tension, expressing stability through inertia and unpleasurable or mixed affects. Members may not be in active exchange but passively participating in a communion. On the positive hedonic side, “Contentment” refers to placid states of low activity with positive hedonic quality. It is expressed by inert energy level and low tension. It is a state of ease with no evidence of tension; members are in a state of communion, but not necessarily active communicational exchange. This is likely following discharge of pleasure or in transition states between other, more aroused activities.

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The categories, definitions and examples are summarized in Table 13.1. Detailed rules and criteria for rating Affect are given in the Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2.

PLEASURE UNPLEASURE

Definitions Rewarding hedonic quality, Aversive hedonic quality, increased togetherness, increased interpersonal tension, shared emotional states, separateness, unshared emotional decreased interpersonal states; anger, unhappiness, tension, happiness, displeasure: cries, facial enjoyment, pleasure: grimaces, gestures; gestures, smiles, pleasant voice modulations. UNSTABLE Emotional energy fluct- JOY: Pleasurable, unstable DISTRESS: Unpleasurable, HIGH uates, involving discharge, energy, exultation, happi- unstable energy, unhappiness, ENERGY reduction and increase; ness, excitement, glad-ness, anger, grief, sadness, excitement, unable to be maintained in mirth, delight, enjoyment intensity, fluctuations in energy communication, interrupts expressed intensely, fluc- and disruption in syntactical syntactical messages; tuations in energy, disrupts communication by paralinguistic paralinguistic communication with non- phenomena. communication. syntactical contributions. Examples Jokes, laughter, boisterous, Anger, tears, shouting, abuse, excited talk and play cries of pain, rage, frustration, exclamations of pleasure, blows, jeering, teasing, mocking gestures, back slapping. laughter. STABLE Emotional energy remains INTEREST: Pleasurable DISCONTENT: Unpleasurable MEDIUM stable for more than half energy, maintained, stable, energy, maintained, stable, ENERGY the minute without motivates continuing motivates continuing or discharge or marked involvement or increased increasing engagement though fluctuation; maintains engagement in syntactic with tension, frustration or current state of the communication or current dissatisfaction. Communication communication process. activities. maintained or increased. Examples Pleasant conversation, Complaints, arguments, modulated interaction in disagreements with tension and talk, game, other activity, aversive emotion; teasing, interest shown by attention, criticism, talk about worries and questions to ensure contact. unhappy experiences with Talk of interests, satisfaction empathic responses. of curiosity INERT Energy low, emotion not CONTENTMENT: BOREDOM: Unpleasurable, LOW overtly expressed, lack of Pleasurable states with little inactive states, little overt ENERGY arousal, minimal commun- expressed emotion, main- communication; communion is ication, lack of syntactic taining communion, without maintained, without significant messages, contact is significant overt exchange. energy or overt exchange. maintained. Examples Quiet, unemotional states, Boredom, frustration, paralysis group in contact, not inability to tackle problems or actively exchanging communicate about issues, sad following a satisfying moods, anger, disappointment experience. Table 13.1. Definitions of Affect categories with examples.

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14. GFR DIMENSION 4: ACTION COHERENCE.

Collective action is an essential characteristic of group functionality and requirement for members’ solidarity (Durkheim, 1964). However, action is even less considered than affect in social psychology, having been replaced by analysis of the “causes” or “units” of behaviour (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960; Rosenblith and Allinsmith, 1966), although it was retained in Gestalt Psychology (Koffka, 1950). Empirical psychology views action as the expression of internal states rather than a category in its own right. It is absent from indexes of social psychology texts over fifty years (Sherif, 1948; Asch, 1952; Wrightsman, 1972; Rosenberg and Turner, 1981; Napier and Gershenfeld, 1987; Hewstone, et al., 1988; Forsyth, 1990; Gillette and McCollom, 1995). Cooperation, conflict, performance, decision-making and collective behaviour are discussed instead. “Behavior” concerns the determining effect of situations as the objective basis for observation. Its reductionist assumptions proved arid and it was superseded by cognitivism, which include action referring to behaviour and its mental concomitants (Apter, 1982). However, concepts of human action as studied in sociology, philosophy and phenomenological social psychology are reviewed to develop a concept of collective action.

Definitions of action. Action is “human conduct devised by the actor in advance … ‘act’ shall designate the outcome of this ongoing process” (Schutz, 1953, p. 304), or “action, an objective performance of consciousness, is at the same time the precondition for the construction of the social world,” (Schutz and Luckmann, 1983, p. 5). Actions are social when others appear in their purpose (Schutz and Luckmann, 1983). Social action is expressed in the goals of social relations, which originate in the reciprocity and continuity of social action. Action theory is “the study of human goal-directed behavior and its social basis” (Harré and Lamb, 1984, p. 5). Action is socially steered and controlled consciously goal directed, planned, motivated, deliberate behaviour, accompanied by emotions (Harré and Lamb, 1984). Execution and modification of plans in the light of results of goal-directed action have been studied (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960; Clark and Crossland, 1986). Action expresses the image of the act, cognitive act, hierarchy of instructions and

163 evaluation of results. It is “behavior over which an agent has exercised discretion, so that it is goal-directed and specific to immediate situations” (Sanders and Cushman, 1984, p. 246). Social action is performed by actors understanding and adjusting to each others’ rules with reliable interpretations. Empirical investigations concern linguistic, anthropological and experimental interaction (von Cranach and Harré, 1982); action is integrated by communication into social contexts (Sanders and Cushman, 1984).

Psychological theories of action. Systemic approaches investigating coordination of social action and perception postulate “action systems” consisting of components dealing “semi-autonomously with a limited aspect of the problem” (Turvey, 1977, p. 221). Actors’ intentions organize each hierarchical level to evolve acts, analogous to the neurobiology of physical action (Weimer, 1977). Yet, natural events require methodologies not reducing phenomena to abstract elements (Jenkins, 1977). Hermaneutic psychology regards human behaviour as action or “text-analogues” open to interpretation with a similar stucture to language (Shotter, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977; Clarke and Crossland, 1985). Actions involve bodily movements guided by actors, who have criteria of success or failure and its observation involves interpreting intentions.

Action in contemporary social psychology. Harré and Secord (1972) proposed a methodology of intentional agents. Social meaning is acquired by performing acts defined by social convention. Roles are determined by expected actions; actors’ accounts of actions reveal their meanings and are organized into cooperative or competitive act-structures, routines, games, ceremonial rituals or entertainments (Harré and Secord, 1972). Action is a means towards an identified end (Harré, 1982), distinguished from behaviour by occurring in social situations that are a “spatio-temporal unity” (von Cranach, 1982, p. 38) and provide meaning. Goal-directed action is the framework for empirical (von Cranach and Harré, 1982a) and theoretical studies (von Cranach and Valach, 1984). Action contributes to the fabric of social life, has social origins and social consequences. It is behaviour guided by partly social cognitions; society guides and controls members’ actions through their cognitions and social structures. It is regulated by social conventions and rules, proceeds from decisions of an ordered series of

164 individual cognitions in which knowledge and value are criteria. However, “group psychology is concerned with group goals and group actions; but until now these collective actions have not been investigated in detail” (von Cranach and Valach, 1984, p. 297). A goal is an “imagined state aspired to as the outcome of the action;” since cognition is assumed to direct behaviour, “action theory is therefore cognitive theory” (von Cranach 1982, p. 40). Goal-directed action is fundamentally social and “the behaviour of a human actor which is consciously and purposefully aimed towards a goal,” but has been considered as “above all individual” (Von Cranach and Valach, 1984, p. 285), placing goals outside the observable field. It studies individuals in social interaction (von Cranach and Harré, 1982). However, individuals’ actions are essentially actions with others and their “intended public performance” is defined by the body and social situation; effectiveness is determined by skill and knowledge, which are not only individual, but distributed throughout groups. “Group action” integrates body and social situation. In social events, individual actors’ intentions are transformed by others’ understanding in the medium of language (Harré, 1993). Psychological theories of action and the GFR. If individuals’ actions derive meaning in social environments, groups must provide their context. Goals cannot be observed if regarded as personal cognitions, but if individual action is only complete when integrated into group action, the communicating or linguistic structure of the act locates goals beyond the privacy of the individual mind, making them available for observation.

Mead’s theory of action. Action theory was central to Mead’s “social behaviorism” (Mead, 1962). The object of action is “in the life-process of the group, not in those of the separate individuals” (p. 7n). Individual acts involve larger social acts only understood with reference to the group, which in turn is understood in terms of the “social whole of complex group activity, into which we analyze (as elements) the behavior of each of the separate individuals composing it” (pp. 6-7). Individual conduct is “the organized conduct of the social group;” rather than accounting for group conduct by individuals, “the whole (society) is prior to the part (individuals), not the part to the whole; and the

165 part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part” (p. 7). The act is “the fundamental datum of both social and individual psychology” (p. 8). Cooperation is possible even if individuals neither understand nor accurately interpret each other’s communications. A group member’s gesture “calls out the proper response” in others or provokes responses without common meaning (pp. 55-56), consequently, social action is a dimension of psychic activity, analysable without reduction to cognition. A collective act may be constructed by individuals with differing (even incompatible) motives, understanding or goals. “The unit of existence is the act, not the moment” and unfolds successive phases, synchronising social, personal and historical dimensions (Mead, 1972). Action becomes a social object with a significance independent of the goal. A game of cards with a goal of winning may cause a fight that changes the group’s social structure, though the game is successfully completed. It is part of a sequence of actions for the group and cannot be considered as a single goal-directed event. A theory of action in groups must acknowledge the act’s significance for the group’s history rather than actors’ intentions. Group boundaries are defind by action, “the boundaries of social things and of the individual as a social being are determined by contacts in social conduct” consisting of members’ actions and their group consequences (Mead, 1972, p. 362). Action and selves: Mind and self are products of (social) action. Identification of self with specific acts isolates and renders it definite. Action “has a social pattern only from the standpoint of the group … not from the standpoint of the physiological organism” (Mead, 1972, p. 446). Participants in co-operative activity show by socially established gestures what others are to do. Others’ actions form a “generalised other” that becomes the representative of the self viewed from outside and the means of acquiring values and morality. Acting towards oneself (even in imagination) permits individuals to allign with others in cooperative ventures. Social objects and consensual meanings result from cooperative actions rather than causing them (Denzin, 1972). To form selves, actors adjust to others’ roles, as in games, where all understand the common goal by participating in a common action pattern. Participation in activity with common goals is the condition for forming selves (Melzer, 1972). Action and cooperation. Cooperation as the condition for human action requires attaching common meaning to gestures, imagining corresponding intentions and

166 achieving consensus. In common action, cooperation precipitates ideas in individuals rather than deriving them from common ideas. Action as a phenomenon of communication and self-communication allows construction of cooperative actions; consequently, groups’ functionality is specified by the degree they cooperatively integrate actions (Blumer, 1972b). When shared meanings and definitions do not allign, coordination fails and collective action becomes contentious or anatagonistic. Individuals’ actions adjusted to others’ are not behavioral responses, but interpretations of intentions. Intra-psychic events are covert stages of action (Swanson, 1972). Social action imaginatively incorporates others’ conduct; psychological functions are integrated in the “complete span of action” comprising initial impulse, actor’s constuctive organization and terminal objective (Meltzer, 1972). Interpretation of others’ progressively constructed gestures as actions unfold in a shared social context is essential for forming and regulating stable definitions of group situations. Objects do not pre-exist around individuals, they are constructed by on-going activity. The act is the unit of study; its meaning is formed by the relation of its phases and is not a “psychical addition” to it (Troyer, 1972). Human society and its life consist of acting people and their actions; culture consists of conventionalised understanding, acts and artifacts as premises of common modes of action for members (Shibutani, 1972). Mead and the GFR. Mead shows action is not dependent on prior cognitions, but observable in communication. Group culture and cognition are consequences of acts. A common reality is formed through action independent of individual’s intentions. Mind, self, body, value, sense of others and psychosocial boundaries are formed in action, whose essential condition is coordination by cooperation. For the GFR, cooperation is a central characteristic of social action.

Parsons’ Theory of Action. Weber first used social action as a theoretical construct (Mitchell, 1968), distinguishing rational, expedient, affective and traditionalist forms of action; bureaucracy converted community action into rationally ordered social action (Gerth and Mills, 1967). Parsons’ theory of action included the act, intelligent actor, goal, context changed by the act, and relationship between the elements as the unit of observation. An act is a process subject to error or failure in relation to norms and choices. Actors act within a social milieu and system of norms, rules and values that are imposed from society and

167 constraining actors from within as moral obligations to preserve society (Durkheim, 1954; Parsons and Shils, 1962; Parsons, 1968). The key ideas of society manifest in collective actions repeated within temporal structures having meaning for the whole society rather than individuals. This “ritual attitude” (Parsons, 1968, Vol. II, p. 712) strengthens solidarity, since each member contributes similarities (mechanical solidarity) or complementary differences (organic solidarity) to common action. Common affective experiences are provided by supporting common purposes that enact the social being’s values. The social organism sustains itself by action. Action elements are not “phenomena” in the space-time framework, they constitute their own human, purposive structure for empirical observations (Parsons, 1968, Vol. II, p. 733). Theory of action divides science into natural sciences and sciences of action for which space-time is irrelevant, but include means-end schemata and “the indispensability of the subject” (p. 764). Parsons’ work established social action as central to cultural studies and continues to stimulate discussion, but has been criticised as “fatally flawed” by being too reliant on rationality, altruism and self-expression (Joas, 1996, p. 24). Theory of Action and the GFR. Action is the observable matter of groups existing in the “field of action” structured by the social organism, sustained by cooperation. Actions reflect the organizing effects of the collective consciousness in members, are not phenomena in space time, but created by goals, social significance and unanticipated social effects. Observation of action in the GFR needs to take account of goals in addition to cooperation.

Harbermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. For Habermas (1984, 1989) action is the fundamental category for analyzing social life. He criticised the “philosophy of consciousness” polarizing subject-object, reason-sensation, mind-body and self-other, giving insufficient recognition to language. Action is part of pre-existing structures of social interaction, not equated with communication, though language is the medium for understanding, coordination and consensus. Communicative action involves understanding all that ensures actors coordinate. In Durkheim and Mead’s paradigm, individuation is socialization. Personal motivations, intentions, desires, feelings and repertoires of behaviour are not private, but formed through language and culture. What is available in society is encountered through action. Rationality is a pattern of social action mediated through cultural

168 processes rather than private cognitive representations. Identity is recognition of self under conditions of “a communicatively shared intersubjectivity.” Communicative action and rationality. In social action, individuals know and act by joining the common fund of implicit knowledges. Rationality is “less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge” (Habermas, 1984, p. 8). Goal-directed actions are only possible with the “central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech” (p. 10). Communicative action coordinates cooperative action that creates group solidarity, forms personal identity and constructs internal behavioural controls. The objective world is established by being regarded the same by a community of speaking, acting people. The act of communication develops common experience. Explicit knowledge implies background knowledge uniting communicants while consciously and unconsciously coordinating their activity. Actions regulated by norms, self-representations and evaluations form a communication practice that sustains a consensus of common values. Communicants embrace norms of action as the background for evaluating actions; “intuitive” awareness of norms of action makes actions “rational.” Subjectivity arises from privileged access to phenomena that cannot be attributed to the shared world; but the shared world also provides the system of ideas evaluating phenomena as true or false and actions as cooperative or oppositional to the consensus. The normative reality must be autonomous in relation to individuals to have this evaluative function. If separation into internal and external worlds is not achieved, there is no clear demarcation between actions, intentions and feelings. Intentions and motives are as inseperable from actions and consequences as feelings and emotions are from the their expression. Meaning in everday life derives from action against the background of common interpretations, implicit beliefs, assumptions, values and cultural practices that are the medium for communicative action. It is not a subjective construction, but a collective formation, an extension of “objective mind” (Kögler, 1995). Communicative action is the interaction of subjects capable of speech who strive for understanding about situations and their plans, to coordinate actions by agreement and common interpretations (Habermas, 1984). The linguistic medium links communicative action, Social Communication Theory and collective mentality. But communicative practice is “a diffuse, fragile,

169 continuously revised and only momentarily successful communication in which participants rely on problematic and unclarified presuppositions and feel their way from one occasional commonality to the next” (Habermas, 1984, p. 100-101). Actors have individual goals ranging from cooperation to conflict. Communicative action is “coordinated through speech acts and does not coincide with them” (Habermas, 1984, p. 101). It does not infer actors’ intentions, but observes the structure of their expressions in relation to discernable goals. Society is not a “reification of consciousness,” but the result of communicative action and self regulating systems. Objective behaviour is contrasted with objectified action symbolically expressed in a cultural context, recognising actors’ goals. Communicative action achieves understanding among actors, coordinates goal-directed activities and develops common social reality (Harbermas, 1989). Meaning is “objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act,” not a psychical addition to it nor “an ‘idea’ as traditionally conceived” (Mead 1962, quoted Habermas, 1989, p. 8). Communicative action regulates the energies of social solidarity by communicative acts communicating collective consciousness as a normative consensus established in community rituals, which confer collective identity and define members as of the same social group. Communicative actions regularized into rituals and normative action patterns create a collective identity expressed in the sense of belonging. The condition for this identity is coordination of goals into cooperative action that socializes and regulates energies. Stability in society is maintained by socially integrated actions forming a self-sustaining system. Communicative action emerges in two stages: first a medium of communication specific to the situation develops enabling expressive gestures to be translated into common symbols; second common behavioural norms develop that regulate behaviour. Then communicative action directly restructures group action (Harbermas, 1989). Communicative action and the GFR. Communicative action develops an implicit fund of social knowledge that interprets, coordinates and integrates individual action. Coordination of action enables members to achieve understanding, cooperate and form personal and collective idenity. Communicative understanding is an effect of action, not a cause. Communicative action and the fund of knowledge is Gs. For the GFR, the group- forming effects of action are in the field of communicative phenomena.

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Criticism of the Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas has been criticised for lacking a coherent theory of society, inadequately accounting for irrational and conflictual social life and neglecting individuals’ richness (Honneth and Joas, 1991; Schnädelbach, 1991). However, he established communication as a “space” for complimentary experiences of “I” and “we.” Communications exist simultaneously for individual and group, constituting a “common referential space” that is neither inner nor outer and devlops common meaning. “We” predates “I,” since language is founded in discourse towards others, only later forming individual consciousness. Consensus in communicative action allows participants to recapture the “we” that repairs incompatible individual goals. In conflict, “overarching common ‘we’-perspectives” of the discourse must exist, since “we always share other norms which are not yet contested and a common background knowledge” (Taylor, 1991, p. 28). Conflicts are resolved by rational speech identifying other commonalities (p. 30). Harbermas’ theory is really of communicative rationality. However, language is also a medium for self-representation, and this contributes nothing to norms and rationality; as the sole framework for the investigation of communicative action rationality inadequately accounts for emotional and non-rational action (Joas, 1996). Habermas agrees “language is the constitutive organ not only of thought, but also of both social practice and experience, of the formation of ego and group identities” (1991, p. 221). Social pathologies are manifestiations of systematically distorted communication; social repression or other pathologies “take root unobtrusively in the pores of processes of reaching understanding” and damage intersubjective forms (p. 226; Burrow, 1927b).

Communicative action and goals. Action is socially structured like cognition and affect. Collective goals and value structures are integral to it. The group is an action matrix as much as a thought matrix. The view that action emanates from independent individuals oriented toward personal goals is inadequate. Pre-existing norms and a common implicit knowledge fund are resources for action decisions. Action theory includes normative reference points, values, energy or “effort,” with the same status as energy in physics and dynamics in the psychoanalytic sense (Joas, 1996, p. 17). Rational or normatively oriented action is teleological, has explicit goals and end-purposes, assumes actors have control over their body and are autonomous individuals.

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However, Wundt’s “law of the heterogeneity of purposes” that all actions produce more consequences than entailed in their motives and that consequences never coincide with motives, complicates matters. Actors constantly evaluate actions in progress and contract or extend them. A comprehensive action theory must consider creative, non-rational action where actors are not causative agents of sequences, ends and means, goals and methods. The effects of action are uncertain as in play, where goals are precise, but develop and change in response to the unfolding situation. They become means when superseded by new goals. This applies to work considered in relation to a broader “ends in view” that does not specify the goals by which it will be attained (Joas, 1996). Action theory places cognition in reciprocal relation between actor, goal, developing means by which it is attained and alteration in the light of experience. The alternative to a cognitive, teleological action theory is “to conceive perception and cognition as not preceding action, but rather as a phase of action by which action is directed and redirected in its situational contexts” (Joas, 1996, p. 158). Action emerges from the preceding situation, which is the pre-existing relationships between humans and objects, implicitly understood by the protagonists as the context of their action. It is continuously revised, reorganized and redefined in response to changes in the situation. Actors’ pre-conceived plans and goals do not account for what is observed and the results cannot adequately be traced to intentions. Goals are emergent characteristics, interpreting action as the social situation unfolding in response to actors’ activity; each carries its own tacit contexts reaching beyond the situation. Goals are not internal cognitive representations of intended actions within the personal mind of the subjects; they are implicit or explicit intentional structures in social situations that organize action and self-reflective control over them. They are organizing structures of action, evident in the communicational phenomena and observable elements of action. Since social action is manifested through communicational phenomena, goals are observable organizing structures of the communicational field.

Conclusions. Action theory provides a concept of group action. Action is inherently social and results from the selection and organization of environmental features. It is only

172 understood in a social context and ‘reality’ is formed by common actions. Sense of self and other and boundaries between individuals and groups are defined through action. Cooperation based on a consensus of common meanings integrates other psychosocial functions into action; social meaning results from action. Acts are constructed from ongoing action by communication and group action fits individual acts together in shared meanings and common purposes. Action is a central dimension of group mentality and coordinates nous functions. Action theory is a comprehensive theory of society. Social organisms sustain themselves through action. Acts are units of observation and include actors, rationality, goals, context, relationships and process in time. Norms and rules of the social milieu sustain action and constrain actors. Ritualistic action creates social, cognitive and affective structures through collective representations. Communicative action is fundamental to social life. Based on language rather than consciousness, it is socially coordinated within pre-existing structures of interaction that underpin values and purpose; language is the medium for understanding and coordinating it. Individuality, motives, intentions, desires and behavioural repertoires are not private ‘internal’ events, but formed by language and culture through action. Rationality, expressed collectively in nous, is a pattern of social action mediated by culture, not a set of cognitive rules. Ego identity is self-recognition in intersubjectively shared communication. Communicative action regulates social life, facilitating coordination, cooperation and group solidarity through norms and the common fund of implicit knowledge. Socially integrated action preserves the stability of society and communicative practice creates a common world. Communicative action forms boundaries between internal and external worlds, individual and group, actions, intentions and feelings. Goals are a phase of action, directing it in the situational context; they express social relationships and are observable characteristics of action, rather than actors’ internal states. Communication creates coordinated cooperation and common goals observable as structures of action. It is a dimension of psychosocial life, expressed and observed in communicational phenomena of group life and the condition for collective mentality (Small, 1905; Durkheim, 1964). Social communicative action integrates individual intentions within a body of shared knowledge, norms and values to regulate and stabilize group life and manifest nous.

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Characterizing group action. The degree to which the group is capable of acting as an entity has to be documented to show movement from Gn to Gf. Characteristics of members’ actions as they influence the development of communions need to be recorded. Dimensions important to the study of action include meaning (Harré and Secord, 1972), interpretation in the social context (Habermas, 1984, 1989), acts performed (Harré, 1993), goals and cooperation (Parsons, 1968; Harbermas, 1989). They resolve into two observable features of the communicational field: cooperation between protagonists and whether goals are common or individual. Once a communion is formed and the group has achieved Gs, action is coordinated through communication with all members cooperating in shared goals, regulating their contributions to compliment each other. In this state, the group nurtures mind, self, identity, cognition and rationality, self- regulation, morality and culture. Group action describes how well the group undertakes collective action, defined as: action each member is agreed upon (even if tacitly), undertaken collectively with a common goal. Participating, supporting or vicariously observing it implicates all members. The primary collective action is communication, which constitutes the group and provides conditions for higher order action oriented to non-communicational goals dependent on it as a medium. In a group, the first act is to talk or acknowledge each other by non-verbal communication. The result may be group actions to play cards, skittles or “hang out.” They cannot occur without members participating and only have meaning if all participate. Communication as action is the means by which an individual’s intention is collectively embraced and initiates common acts. The extent to which the group acts or individuals act has to be defined. The quality to be recorded is the degree to which members act in a coordinated, cooperative way or in an uncoordinated, uncooperative way. The degree to which the action hangs together is a quality of “action coherence.” Action Coherence is a dimension of group function, which records the degree to which action is coordinated and integrated. “Coherence” means “action or fact of sticking together; cohesion, logical connection; congruity; consistency, harmonious connection of the several parts of a discourse or system, so that the whole hangs together;” the verb “cohere” means to cleave or stick together, unite or remain united in action (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Action Coherence describes the social integrity of the

174 communion as a quality of communication. It records the extent members reciprocate communication and cooperate to produce common action. Action Coherence describes the extent members stick together as a unit and involves two conditions: first, cohesion or the closeness of bonds; second, ordered, systematic relations. The dimension of cooperation-opposition embodies both of these characteristics. High coherence involves unanimity among members creating closeness, while low coherence involves opposition and less closeness. Action Coherence describes how unified the communion is and how strongly members function as an acting unit. Although this is the group’s task, it does not suggest they remain in high coherence for a long time. They fluctuate as they deal with internal tensions, but need to unify and undertake group action if group life is not to collapse.

Definition of Action Coherence categories. Action Coherence describes whether group action is the manifestation of a collective will in which the group acts as one (even if in different or complimentary roles), or a set of individual and disparate acts which take place in the group environment. Structure defines the formation of the group or sub-group based on participation in a communicational field. Once the unit is a communion, the coherence of its action can be considered. Categories describe degrees of coherence in observed communicational phenomena and the group action it reveals. Four categories of group action are described. The names of these categories provide a vocabulary to differentiate qualities of action coherence. Concord from Latin, “of one mind,” means, agreement, state of peace and amity, harmony (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). All members of the communion act as one, even if in different roles, to form the collective action. Members are in agreement and mutually aware of their participation in collective action. They are in a state of unanimity in pursuit of a common goal, expressed as a common activity or concurrent activities in which each plays a cooperative role. It is observed within the communicative process as agreement, common purpose, common or coordinated action. Accord from the French, “to bring heart to heart,” means to cause to agree, attune to, reconcile (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). In this condition, members cooperate in different, but compatible goals. They cooperate, but not in a unified common activity. Common action may be incompletely or ineffectively achieved. It is rated by observing

175 the communication process for evidence of common purpose, not fully understood or realized or with different, though compatible purposes. Several actions may occur concurrently, such as a game and a conversation involving players and non-players unrelated to the game. Common action for a unified goal may occur with differences of opinion, misunderstandings or confusion when members are not in agreement, but without overt conflict, such as cooperative differences of opinion about a game’s rules. Communication may not fulfill its function, in spite of members trying. In a game, they may participate reluctantly, hesitantly or watch without joining. In conversation they talk over each other, misunderstand, or disagree about a common topic, while maintaining a cooperative attitude. Discord means absence of concord or harmony, dissension, disagreement, diversity, dissonance, confused noise (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). This is expressed in the communicational field when members demonstrate diverse, incompatible goals and engage in uncooperative activities disrupting each other or the common goal. They communicate uncooperatively or without common purpose; communication fails to be achieved or fulfill its function. Members do not try to understand or listen to each other; communications are disagreed with or not received; there is dissension about suggested common purposes that cannot be undertaken as shared action. While difference of opinion is present in Accord, it becomes dispute in Discord, which records failure to undertake group action. It may occur through difference, disorganization or failure to manage the task. Members may refuse to participate, disagree or repudiate the common purpose or action. Conversation lacks agreed or consistent topic and there is disagreement without resolution. It may describe diversity, dissension or failure to coordinate individual purposes to a common goal through communication. Active opposition or overt conflict between members is lacking. It describes confused and disorganized action, but not intended to damage each other. Contracord is coined to describe an additional category. It derives from Latin “contra,” meaning “against;” as a prefix it means against, in opposition to, opposite, in the opposite direction (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1990). Contracord therefore means - “against or opposed to the heart or mind,” intended as a general term to cover conflict, disunity, hostility or antagonism. Common action is not achieved because of members’ active opposition to a common purpose. Members have incompatible goals and adopt an

176 oppositional attitude to group, therapist or other members. They compete, act in rivalry and oppose common action. They counteract a common action and try to impose their purpose or action on others. It is the least unified condition of the group, involving coercion, hostility or aggression. Opposition and hostility are expressed in the communicational field, which becomes a medium for disunity. There is antagonism of members against each other, whereas in Discord, there is loss of unity or failure to achieve common purpose. The antagonism in Contracord may be hostile, aggressive, or coercive, against the wishes of other parties to the communicative acts. Hostility is harming another, antagonism intends to counteract or go against their action. Members may passively resist or disrupt another's activity without actively attempting to harm the other. Contracord is antagonistic communication. These criteria are summarized in Table 14.1, which compares categories goals, quality of cohesion or cooperation and example activities. Full details of rating criteria and rules are given in the GFR Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2.

GOALS COOPERATION ACTIVITY

CONCORD Members share a Members cooperate fully and There is a common, shared common goal enabling coordinate with unanimity in activity involving all them to coordinate collective action. Cohesion members of the with each other’s and mutual engagement are communion coordinated action to achieve it. high. by a common goal. ACCORD Members’ goals are Members cooperate loosely, The activities are diverse, different but but do not coordinate well and compatible or similar, but compatible. While not allow different involvement or not shared. They do not shared, they do not communication. Cohesion is interfere with each other conflict with each low with loose engagement. and coordinate, but with other. different goals. DISCORD The goals are different, Members are uncooperative Activities are diverse, with but incompatible though not oppositional. incompatible goals and though not directly They disagree, misunderstand, interfere with each other conflicting with each fail to coordinate. Cohesion or fail to achieve other. is low and engagement loose cooperation. Members do not oppose each other CONTRA- Goals are Members may be highly Activities may be diverse CORD incompatible; members cohesive and intensely or common, but within coerce or impose goals engaged, but in opposition or them members actively on others or oppose antagonism to others. oppose each other with their goals. Cohesion is variable, antagonism. engagement high.

Table 14.1. Action Coherence categories.

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15. GFR DIMENSION 5: THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS.

Since therapists profoundly affect groups, the GFR records their activity. They intervene throughout the life of the group assisting members to sustain pleasurable group experiences and help their identified problems. In addition to making psychotherapeutic interpretations (all therapists in the study had psychodynamic training), they conversed with patients, gave instructions, set limits and gave information.

Types of interventions. Interpretation, confrontation and clarification are the main forms of intervention in psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy (König, 1991). Other therapeutic models place stronger emphasis on education, information, advice and other involvements (Upper and Ross, 1985). Other forms of intervention do not involve symbolic content of the patient’s discourse (Etkin, 1995). For group psychotherapy of children and adolescents with poorly developed verbal skills, a number of types of verbal interventions have been discriminated (Dalal, 1995; Gordon, 1997). 1. General Interpretations are statements about events in the group providing new meaning. Often interpretations point out significance not evident to participants or that they do not wish to acknowledge. The overall effect of interpretations is to change understanding, add new information or link unconnected ideas. 2. Group Interpretations are offered to the group-as-a-whole or all members. They tend to intensify the sense of identification between members, strengthen the group process and may stimulate interaction between isolated members. 3. Member Interpretations are to one or several individuals. They may deal with intra-psychic issues, individual behaviour, intensify members’ sense of individuality and increase differentiation from the rest of the group. 4. Facilitations promote interaction without interpreting, including questions about members’ activities, drawing interactions to their attention and assisting them feel at ease. 5. Logical Implication. Often activity has a limited perspective, not taking account of the welfare of the whole group. Logical implication enunciates its consequences or places logical alternatives before the group. For example, when

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a member is persecuted, it can be pointed out that if he is driven from the group, another victim will be selected until only one person is left. Alternatives can be placed into discussion or as interventions in a sequence of behaviour, such as saying “instead of hitting him, you could ask him to stop.” 6. Questions. Often therapists can initiate a new train of thought or place a conversation or activity in perspective by posing questions that engage members. If someone is being coerced, the therapist could ask, “do you want to do what he says?” throwing doubt on a member’s assertions and prestige or stimulating members to develop their own views. 7. Punctuation. Repeating what is said or done helps members become conscious. Therapists may repeat a phrase like “Oh really?” or move into the midst of a scuffle which is becoming aggressive, interrupting the process so reflection can occur. 8. Naming an action or behaviour for its social significance may include saying a member is “teasing” or “bossing” another or labelling affects as anger, fear or sadness. 9. Representation. Describing the existing state of the group, members’ disposition, cognitive organisation, affects and action without interpretation facilitates recognition of their function in the structure and encourages their representation in the group. Representation consists of verbal descriptions of situations, narratives of events or group history. Members are often unable to provide a verbal account of what is happening since they are immersed in it. Description without interpretation is often a powerful stimulus. 10. Limits. It is often necessary for therapists in child and adolescent groups to remind members of the rules or re-establish boundaries. These limits are intended to reiterate circumstances that define and maintain the therapeutic situation. Limits serve a symbolic function of reminding members of their contract (Anzieu, 1984). 11. Locomotion. Therapists’ movement around the room is a significant intervention. The presence of the therapist next to scuffling members restrains them.

All interventions play a part in managing the group process to sustain Go. They are used to shape and direct the spontaneously expressed life of the group. In the present study, it would have been valuable to examine the effect of each form of

179 intervention on group function. However, in early versions of the GFR, definition of verbal characteristics of interventions was complex and prevented consistency of ratings. A significant research project would be required to establish such a system. Inclusion of complex judgments increases the difficulty of gaining acceptable intra- and inter-rater reliability. However, a crucial theoretical question concerns to whom the intervention is directed rather than its content. Comments can be addressed to individuals, subgroups, the whole group or all three. Followers of Bion (1961) consider the group the object of treatment and therapists should exclusively make group interpretations (Talamo, Borgogno and Merciai, 1988). At the other extreme are those who believe group psychotherapy is the treatment of individuals in a group context and interventions should be directed to individuals (Slavson, 1979; Wolf, Kutash and Nattland, 1993). Between, are those advocating both group and individual interventions (Foulkes, 197; Abse, 1974) and subgroup interventions (König, 1991). In child and adolescent psychotherapy, it is essential to clarify whether group, individual or both should be interpreted and what interventions are effective. Although the form of intervention is difficult to define, the objects to which they are addressed can be defined from the object of the sentence or physical intervention. Therapists can talk to the whole group, individual members or both the group and particular members (König, 1991). This distinction evaluates the effect of interventions directed at group or members and assists reliability of ratings. Four types of intervention are defined in the GFR. Therapists may direct interventions to the whole group (“Group”), to one or more, but not all individuals (“Member”) or to both individuals and the whole group (“Group and Member”) in the rating period. A category of “No Intervention” is included to record when therapists do not intervene. They are described below. Group Intervention: The group is addressed or all members are addressed individually. The group is addressed if general comments are made without referring to anyone in particular, or if a member is talked about in the third person (“Bill is feeling angry”), since this is a comment to the group about the member. Member Intervention: One or more, but not all members are explicitly identified in the comment or by non-verbal cues. Group and Member Intervention: Both the above interventions are made within the minute. This is rated if an intervention includes both group and references to individual

180 members. No Intervention: Therapists do not speak during the minute.

Therapists’ control of the group process. Limits. Psychotherapy usually involves accepting the patient’s behaviour and not exercising judgment or evaluation. Providing any sort of direction or limit is expressly excluded from some group approaches (Schiffer, 1971, 1984). In other cases, firm consequences are advocated to maintain a safe therapeutic environment (Slavson, 1979; Malekoff, 1997). The turbulent nature of group therapy with adolescents requires therapists to depart from a purely verbal psychotherapeutic relationship to the group. Instructions, reprimands, reminders of rules, threats to terminate sessions or the group and occasionally physical restraint may be required (Gordon, 1989; Malekoff, 1997). These interventions have implications for outcomes and managing the groups. Observing their impact requires them to be recorded. Whenever therapists use speech or action to set limits to the activity of the members, reinforce rules or issue prohibitions a “Limit” is rated. “No Limit” is rated whenever no limit is set.

Non-verbal interventions. Locomotions. It is also important to record therapists’ non-verbal interventions. In child and adolescent group psychotherapy, aggressive or destructive events may lead to injury or damage. In such instances, therapists intervene physically by moving around the room to be close to disruptive members or use restraint. The effect of these interventions needs to be examined. Therapists may also move around the room for other purposes, although these actions are harder to evaluate. “Locomotion” is rated whenever therapists moved from their chair during the minute; “No Locomotion” is rated when there is no change. Details of rating criteria and rules are given in the GFR Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2.

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PART III. METHOD AND RESULTS.

In Part III, the study’s empirical section is described. In Chapter 16, a set of hypotheses is described defining questions the study aims to investigate. Chapter 17 describes the method, reliability studies and characteristics of the data. In Chapters 18 to 21 the results of the data analysis for hypotheses related to group development, structure, dynamics and therapists interventions are given.

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16: HYPOTHESES.

The GFR records changes in whole group function dimensions and explores four areas: developmental process, structural conditions, dynamics or relationships between dimensions, and the effects of therapists’ interventions. The hypotheses are described below.

1. Group Development. Developmental phases in psychotherapy groups are important to understand various stages of treatment, planning, deciding about new members and managing groups. Literature of group development is reviewed in Chapter 17. Group development is examined in several ways using GFR ratings. 1.1. Development of Stability. Stability is an indicator of group progress. It is hypothesised stability indicates the degree groups regulate their processes. The first hypothesis examines change in stability over the group’s life. H1.1. Stability of sessions will change systematically over the group’s life and will be defined as part of a developmental sequence. 1.2. Development of Functional Quality. Development is also indicated by change in the quality of GFR states over the course of the year. Development over the treatment is expected to change from lower to higher functioning and include greater conflict in the middle period. H1.2. A developmental sequence will show lower quality early in the year, increase in conflict and dysfunction in the middle and increased high quality function at the end of the year. 1.3. Developmental Phases. Group development postulates identifiable phases expressing developmental tasks. This hypothesis examines whether phases are discernable in the data. H1.3. Definable phases of group development will be discernible throughout the group’s life.

2. Group Structure. Three sets of structural hypotheses concern wholeness, size and completeness.

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2.1. Effect of Subgroups. Research discussed in Chapter 11 suggests for groups above three members, formation of subgroups is important. Subgroups are associated with constructively maintaining stability (Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976; Northen, 1988; Yalom, 1995) and destructively avoiding problems (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Sherif, 1948; Kellerman, 1979; Yalom, 1995; MacLennan and Dies, 1992). The first structural investigation examines the significance of subgroups for therapeutic goals. The GFR dimension of Structure differentiates whole group, subgroups and individuals. It is predicted that functional status on other GFR dimensions will change according to structural category. H2.1. The group’s functioning will alter according to its Structure. The functional quality of the group is expected to differ according to whether it is in whole or subgroup structures: H2.1.1. The distribution of GFR categories for Whole will differ from Subgroup Structures. It is also hypothesised that if functional quality differs according to structure, transition from one structure to another will be associated with change in other dimensions of group function. The complexity and greater relationships in whole structure and the dynamics of using subgroups to avoid conflict suggest change from whole to subgroups improves functioning. H2.1.2: Movement from Whole to Subgroup Structures will be associated with reduced unpleasure and conflict categories; movement in the opposite direction will be associated with increased unpleasure and conflict categories. The aim of therapy is to assist members to manage group life more effectively. Towards the end of the year, groups are expected to manage more constructive functioning in whole structure. It is hypothesised the effect of structural categories will change depending on the stage of the year. H2.1.3: In early stages of group life, more therapeutically desirable states will occur in Subgroup Structure; in the later stages, they will occur in Whole Structure. 2.2. Effect of Size. As discussed in Chapter 11, size significantly alters group function. In psychotherapy groups, size cannot be decided from clinical considerations alone. It is often decided by availability of suitable members and who attends. It is

184 important to demonstrate whether it significantly influences group functioning. H2.2. Group functioning will alter according to Size. This suggests the distribution of GFR categories will differ according to group size. H2.2.1. Different sized groups will show different distributions of GFR categories. Smaller, less complex groups are likely to be more stable and show less fluctuation. H2.2.2. The smaller the group, the lower will be the amount of change in categories from one minute to the next. Smaller groups should show higher quality functioning indicated by greater frequency of higher functional categories than larger groups. H2.2.3. Sessions of smaller size will function at higher quality compared to other sessions. The tendency for groups to resolve conflict by moving from whole to subgroups is likely to be greater in larger groups than smaller. H2.2.4. The tendency to move from Whole to Subgroups to resolve conflict will be more likely in larger groups. 2.3. Effect of Completeness. Adolescent groups are often incomplete because of absenteeism. Groups with a large nominal membership may be small in some sessions because of absentees. Groups can avoid dealing with problems by attributing them to absent members and creating an alliance against them. If this is so, groups should function better when members are absent, because they are smaller and problems can be projected onto absent members. H2.3. Groups’ functional quality will alter according to their Completeness. Both quality and stability of group functioning in terms of GFR categories can be examined in two subsidiary hypotheses. H2.3.1. The more incomplete the group, the higher will be its functional quality in GFR categories. H2.3.2. The more incomplete the group, the more stable it will be as shown by the amount of change in GFR categories in consecutive minutes.

3. Group Dynamics. The theoretical development of GFR categories was based on three relatively

185 independent dimensions of group function in addition to Structure. Although some combinations are likely to be more common than others, a few are contradictory and should not occur. They are discussed in Chapter 17. However, combinations of categories in Cognitive Organisation, Affect and Action Coherence, express changing group states and identify crucial aspects of group function. Relationships between these dimensions are examined. 3.1. Cognitive Organisation: Since the group is more likely to exhibit control, self-regulation and self-representation in higher Cognitive Organisation categories, they should reflect higher pleasure affect states and cooperative action states. H3.1. Low quality Cognitive Organisation categories (Unorganised, Normative) will be more likely to be associated with Dysfunctional categories of Affect (Discontent, Distress, Boredom) and Action Coherence (Discord, Contracord). Conversely, high quality categories of Cognitive Organisation (Systemic, Representational) will be more likely to be associated with higher functional categories for Affect (Joy, Interest) and Action Coherence (Concord, Accord). 3.2. Affect and Action Coherence: The fluctuations of high energy, unstable states exceed the group’s capacity to bind and are expected to reduce organisation and cooperation. Similarly, conflictual Action Coherence categories are likely to cause disorganisation. H3.2. High, unstable Affect (Joy, Distress) and conflictual Action Coherence categories (Contracord, Discord) will be associated with instability and change on the other dimensions in the same or succeeding minutes. 3.3. Effect of Affect on Action Coherence: Unpleasurable emotion is often associated with conflict. The GFR makes it possible to examine the relationship between them. Since adolescent groups often have high pleasurable energy (Slavson, 1977; Malekoff, 1997), conflict can be sudden, destructive and short-lived, yet have a lasting effect on group culture. It is important to identify impending conflict. Adolescents are often reluctant to reveal unpleasurable affects in groups and tolerate conflict or hostility for some time before expressing unpleasurable affect. It is likely changes towards unpleasurable affect may be preceded by changes toward conflictual action. H3.3. Changes from positive to negative Affect will be preceded by changes

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from positive to negative Action in the preceding 1-3 minutes. 3.4. Crises: Adolescent groups often experience crises of hostility, distress or conflict. They threaten the group’s survival, increase absenteeism and are stressful to therapists and agencies conducting groups (Malekoff, 1977). They are identifiable by GFR categories of Distress and Contracord and can be examined to identify patterns and predictors. H3.4.1. The group’s function will alter before and after the appearance of specific crisis categories or combinations. This is further refined to examine specific states associated with crisis categories in Affect and Action Coherence. H3.4.2. Distress and Contracord will have identifiable precursors in the preceding 2-5 minutes, which will predict their occurrence. It is important for therapists to know whether crises occur at different stages of sessions. More conflict is expected in the middle of sessions than at the beginning or end since there is a “warm up” at the start and towards the end members often disengage. The occurrence of crisis categories is examined at different stages of the session. H3.4.3. Crisis points, particularly Distress and Contracord will be more likely to occur in the middle quartiles of sessions than the first or last quartiles.

4. Therapists’ Interventions. Therapists are expected to effect group process therapeutically. The objects of Therapists’ Interventions are discriminated. The theory of the group entity suggests Group Interventions are most likely to lead to improved functioning. H4.1. Group Interventions will lead to higher GFR categories in the succeeding minutes. Limits should be followed by reduced conflict and unpleasure in the following minutes if they are effective. H4.2. Limits will be associated with decreased destructive categories in the same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes. If therapists use Locomotion as an additional means of managing the group, it should also reduce dysfunctional categories in following minutes. H4.3. Locomotion by the therapists will be associated with decreased

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destructive categories in the same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes. Effects of therapists’ interventions should be independent of Limits or Locomotion. H4.4. Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion will be independent in their effects.

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17: METHOD. Subjects and groups. Four adolescent groups (aged thirteen to seventeen) and a latency group (aged nine to eleven) conducted in the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service of the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne were analysed for the study. Four adolescent groups in 1988, 1992, 1993 and 1996 and a latency group in 1990 were videoed and rated. The groups, members and outcomes of their treatment are briefly described in Appendix 1. The groups were similar in that members were referred because they were not responding to individual psychotherapy and lacked peer relations; attendance was inconsistent. All groups had membership changes, reflecting the circumstances of such psychotherapy groups. The investigator conducted the 1988 group alone and had a co-therapist in the other adolescent groups; two colleagues conducted the latency group. They were all conducted as part of the clinical service. There was no policy for the groups to have all boys, but girls were not referred for group psychotherapy during this period. Referrals were from the Mental Health Service and other hospital units. Each boy was assessed by the therapists before entry; some were also treated individually by group therapists, others were referred by their treating clinician. Conditions for joining the groups were that members acknowledged a problem, wanted help with it and were willing to try the group. The groups were conducted weekly during school terms. Members were seen with parents periodically to review progress. Parents were encouraged to contact therapists whenever they had concerns. Rules: Agreement with the following group rules was gained at assessment: 1. Sessions are confidential. 2. No one will be hurt, including feelings hurt by verbal abuse. 3. The room will not be damaged. 4. Members remain in the room for the session. 5. Any mess that can be cleaned up at the end of the session is permitted. 6. The members will not spend time together outside the group. The rules were explained as enabling them to gain what they want from the group; infringements were pointed out and consequences for the group explained (Anzieu, 1984). Sessions. The adolescent groups were held in a meeting room at 4 or 5 pm; the latency group was conducted at 10 am. They lasted an hour. The video was activated as

189 they entered. However owing to a various human and technical factors, some sessions were not recorded. The sessions were unstructured, except for the beginning when therapists facilitated introductions. Members were encouraged to talk about themselves and enjoy being together. The therapists had psychodynamic training and orientation, but did not emphasise intrapsychic issues, since most members were referred from unsuccessful individual treatment using these techniques. The room had toys and games in the cupboards. Cards, puzzles, paper, coloured pens and stationary were provided. Although talking was encouraged, they often played games. Therapeutic technique. Maintenance of the group by encouraging communication and managing conflict was the first goal. The next goal was for all members to be included in enjoyable, meaningful communication, express themselves freely and belong (Gordon, 1983, 1989b; Tijhuis, 1998). They were encouraged to talk about their lives, families and problems. Therapists facilitated rewarding interaction, since the boys had little experience of healthy peer groups. Interventions were made to manage tensions or antisocial activity. Therapists moved around the room to maintain control of boisterous activity, but did not intervene in enjoyable, controlled activity.

Data collection. All patients were told about the video recordings and the purposes for which they would be used and parents signed a release in accordance with University of Melbourne and Royal Children’s Hospital ethics protocols. Sessions were recorded by a camera mounted in the room on VHS video. On several occasions, members asked to watch the recordings and were permitted. They grew bored after a few minutes and returned to the group. On several occasions, they became self-conscious and briefly covered the camera lens although apart from this, it did not seem to alter the quality or content of the sessions. The procedure for rating sessions is specified in the GFR Rater’s Manual in Appendix 2. The rater watches the session for the first half of the minute and then makes ratings for Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence during the second half-minute and for Structure and Affect in the last quarter using the GFR Rating Sheet shown in Appendix 2. Rating sheets were converted into data files substituting numbers for categories, adding year, minute, attendance, absentees and year for each minute. They were collated and loaded into SPSS (Norusis, 1993) for analysis.

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Reliability studies. Intra-rater reliability is required to show that definitions and criteria enable consistent observations of the same session to be made; inter-rater reliability is required to show other trained raters can make consistent observations of the same sessions using the GFR. Statistical techniques for establishing reliability often rely on correlating repeated ratings of the same material to measure agreement. The GFR furnishes categorical data for which parametric techniques such as analysis of variance cannot establish reliability. The data are repeated observations of the same subjects and not independent, precluding non-parametric techniques (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Techniques for estimating rater reliability for categorical data often compare each rater with the other raters and the average of all raters (Hall, 1974; Koslowsky and Bailit, 1975; Cicchetti, 1976; Fliess, 1981, Beck and Lewis, 2000). However, the GFR records variability of the group as a unitary field of observation with discriminable dimensions representing functions of a collective entity and reliability can be defined as the accuracy with which raters agree with the actual hypothetical variability of the dimension, rather than each other or their average (Overall and Magee, 1992). Ratings are compared with a “common factor” underlying raters’ performance. Reliability is the extent to which all raters agree with the hypothesised common factor that is the group function dimension. The common factor is estimated in the same way factors are identified by factor analysis, where the “communality” between raters (proportion of variance accounted for by the presence of a factor common to the sets of data) is estimated by squaring the value of the factor loading. Individual performances are compared with this yielding two measures of reliability: (a) The score indicating each rater’s agreement with the common factor hypothesised as the actual dimension (factor loading) is squared, giving a measure of communality; (b) The score representing percentage of variance common to all raters (total fit). Because the ratings are of categories, ordinary principal components (requiring interval data) cannot be used. Instead, scores are obtained using a nonlinear Principal Components Analysis (PRINCALS in SPSS). PRINCALS enables optimal scaling transformation of the data so the principal components can be estimated using an alternating least squares technique to reveal the major dimensions of variation within a set of variables (Van de Geer, 1993). The variables are each rater’s ratings of GFR

191 dimensions. Each dimension is compared for each rater and factor loading and its total fit computed. The factor loading is the amount that each rater’s ratings of a dimension contribute to the overall variability of the data set. Total fit is the proportion of the variance of the combined data pool for the dimension common to all raters, or the proportion of agreement. These figures are presented as a proportion of the data set.

Intra-Rater Reliability Study. After the rating system was developed, training was undertaken with sessions from similar groups of years not used in the study. When repeated ratings of sample sessions achieved acceptable consistency, the formal Intra-Rater Reliability study was undertaken by the investigator. Method. Intra-rater reliability needs to sample the full range of categories with frequent changes to test the accuracy of rating changes as well as categories. For these reasons, random sampling was not used; instead, three sessions exhibiting frequent changes of rating, high variability and the full range of categories were selected. These sessions were rated consecutively three times by the investigator over a six-week period to minimise memory of previous ratings. Rating sheets were encoded and analysed using PRINCALS. Reliability Criterion. There are no firm criteria for what constitutes acceptable reliability (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). The size of the score depends on what it measures. In this case, communality scores indicate the proportion of ratings corresponding to a hypothetical ideal rating of the dimension. Given approximately 55 ratings per session (minutes in an hour therapy session), a reliability of 0.7 means 16 ratings differ from the ideal; 0.8 means 11 ratings differ. Reliability in clinical studies is often accepted from 0.6 upwards, while above 0.8 is common for studies involving observers (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997); instruments designed to measure process in group psychotherapy accept reliability measures of between 0.54 and 0.95 (Beck and Lewis, 2000). Consequently, 0.8 was considered acceptable for the reliability studies. Results. Factor loadings and total fit for each set of ratings are shown in Table 17.1 for each GFR dimension. One Affect rating, two Limits ratings and all Locomotion ratings are below the criterion for communality scores. However, all are above 0.7. All figures for Total Fit exceed the reliability criterion.

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GFR 1st Rating 2nd Rating 3rd Rating Total Fit, Dimension Communality Communality Communality all 3 ratings. Structure .92 .92 .96 .96 Cognitive Organisation .92 .88 .96 .96 Affect .85 .85 .77 .90 Action Coherence .85 .85 .85 .92 Therapists Interventions .81 .81 .85 .91 Limits .77 .92 .77 .89 Locomotion .72 .72 .72 .85

Table 17.1. Principal components analysis of three ratings of three sessions, showing factor loadings for each rating and total fit for all three ratings.

Affect is the most inconsistent group dimension, which may reflect it having a quarter minute rating time, while the others have a half-minute (see Rater’s Manual, Appendix 2). Ratings of Therapists’ Interventions are least reliable by Communality indicating definition of categories requires further development. However, it would be a substantial project in itself to develop such a system and current definitions achieve acceptable reliability. Limits are ambiguous when therapists make comments that include other interventions. Locomotion presents difficulties of definition when therapists make small movements or move across the minute boundary and it is understandable that its reliability would be lower; while not meeting the criterion, they are acceptable. Conclusion. The GFR can be reliably applied on successive occasions by the same rater.

Inter-Rater Reliability Study. A GFR Rater’s Manual, other resource documents (see Appendix 2) and training video were prepared illustrating each category with criterial specimens of group process, written descriptions and rating criteria. Rater Training. Two experienced adolescent group psychotherapist raters were recruited. With the investigator and then independently, they rated all categories in representative stable and unstable sessions not included in the research sample. When they had gained competence, conjoint sessions were held with all raters and discrepancies discussed. When 80% agreement with the investigator’s ratings for the training sample was reached, the reliability study was undertaken.

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Method. Ten of the 119 sessions from the research groups were randomly selected. Three substitutions were made to replace sessions of two members or short duration ensuring a robust sample. Raters rated them over several months independently of each other or the investigator. Rating sheets were coded and analysed using PRINCALS. Results. Communality and total fit for each of rater are shown in Table 17.2 for each GFR dimension. As in the Intra-Rater Reliability study, Affect has the lowest reliability of all group function dimensions. Limits is the only dimension to fall below the criterion of 0.8 for total fit. It may be more difficult to rate reliably since interpretation is ambiguous or rater’s instructions may need further refining. Lower total fit and higher communality may indicate that although each rater had a similar proportion of ratings, they did not always agree. Raters 1 and 2 were similar whereas Rater 3 had a higher score.

1st Rater 2nd Rater 3rd Rater Total Fit, all GFR Dimensions Communality Communality Communality 3 raters. Structure .92 .88 .90 .90 Cognitive Organisation .88 .85 .85 .86 Affect .85 .81 .77 .81 Action Coherence .90 .83 .87 .86 Therapists Interventions .90 .90 .81 .87 Limits .72 .71 .81 .74 Locomotion .90 .87 .87 .87

Table 17.2. Principal components analysis of a random sample of ten sessions by three raters, showing communality for each rater and total fit for all three raters.

This discrepancy would manifest as a reduction in the total fit even though Rater Three’s score was higher and therefore closer to the hypothetical dimension. The conclusion may be that Rater 3 was slightly out of step with the other two in definition of Limits. The accuracy of this method may be reflected by the fact that Rater 1 is the investigator and has higher communality than the other raters, suggesting his ratings reflect the underlying group dimensions more closely than the trainees. Conclusion: Acceptable inter-rater reliability is obtained for the GFR.

Validity. The validity of the GFR is discussed in Appendix 1.

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AFFECT 0 Contentm 3 5 ent 1 Joy 2 Interest Discontent 4 Distress Boredom Count Count Count Count Count Count STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 10 44 286 33 1 1 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 8 31 177 55 2 Discord 3 33 55 1 3 Contracord 4 5 3 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 19 166 681 22 1 COHER. 1 Accord 1 41 249 15 2 Discord 22 52 42 2 1 3 Contracord 6 4 3 8 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 10 82 1 COHER. 1 Accord 3 131 467 46 4 25 2 Discord 53 68 90 8 3 Contracord 5 7 11 12 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 4 1 1 COHER. 1 Accord 90 192 19 1 13 2 Discord 127 71 105 14 1 3 Contracord 15 9 23 27 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 2 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 3 13 2 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 51 6 61 3 COHER. 1 Accord 3 7 42 2 2 Discord 2 3 3 Contracord 1 1 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 2 COHER. 1 Accord 14 67 5 2 Discord 1 11 5 3 Contracord 1 2 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 12 23 COHER. 2 Discord 4 4 5 2 3 Contracord 1 5 3 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 7 40 9 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 9 51 38 2 Discord 6 3 15 3 Contracord 1 2 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 58 28 267 7 1 1 COHER. 1 Accord 16 148 2 2 2 Discord 4 36 19 1 3 Contracord 1 1 2 4 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 23 COHER. 1 Accord 2 72 398 30 1 12 2 Discord 4 31 41 1 3 Contracord 9 5 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 1 COHER. 1 Accord 44 169 14 3 6 2 Discord 36 57 58 11 2 3 Contracord 6 3 21 6 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 97 20 3 14 ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1 4 8 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 67 11 46 COHER. 2 Discord 8 10 6

Table 17.3. Category frequencies of all group dimensions.

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Description and characteristics of the data. The characteristics of the data yielded by the Group Function Record are summarized.

Range and variety of states. Table 17.3 shows frequencies of categories of four group dimensions for each possible state in the whole data set. Of 384 possible states, 180 (46.9%) ocurred, indicating the GFR is sensitive to a wide range of group conditions. Many states have low frequencies, the greatest being 10.7%. The frequencies of states for each group are shown in Appendix 3 as Tables 17A.1 – 17A.5 and percentages in Tables 17A.6 – 17A.10. There is considerable variation across groups, but the range is similar. Each state was represented by a four-figure number identifying the category of each GFR dimension. The frequency, rank and percentage of these states are shown Table 17.4. Sixty percent of states occur less than 3% of the time. Eleven states (6% of possible combinations) account for 50.4% of ratings, 33 states (18%) account for 75.7% of ratings and 41 states for 80.5% of ratings. Percentages less than 0.1% are recorded as “0.0%.” This 80% samples all categories except Boredom in Affect and Contracord in Action Coherence. These categories first occur at the 51st and 52nd ranks and occur 0.4% of the time. Percentages for all states are given in Table 17A.11 in Appendix 3. Fifty seven percent of all states only occur between 1 and 5 times in the whole sample. This suggests the GFR is too sensitive and categories were combined later in the analysis.

Incompatible Combinations. A number of combinations are contradictory: Individual Structure associated with high-level categories of Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence; Contentment Affect associated with Discord and Contracord in Action Coherence. These combinations were not found. Table 17.5 sets out the frequencies of unlikely, though not incompatible combinations. These are Boredom with Contracord, Discontent or Distress with Concord. They may occur because the different time interval for rating Structure and Affect compared with Cognitive Organisation and Action Coherence. Dimensions rated at different times within the minute may produce

196 implausible combinations. Boredom only occurs once with Contracord; Discontent or Distress does not occur with Concord.

State No. State Frequency. % Rank Cumulative % 1 0120 681 10.7% 1.0 10.7% 2 0221 467 7.4% 2.0 18.1% 3 2221 398 6.3% 3.0 24.4% 4 0020 286 4.5% 4.0 28.9% 5 2120 267 4.2% 5.0 33.1% 6 0121 249 3.9% 6.0 37.0% 7 0321 192 3.0% 7.0 40.0% 8 0021 177 2.8% 8.0 42.8% 9 2321 169 2.7% 9.0 45.5% 10 0110 166 2.6% 10.0 48.1% 11 2121 148 2.3% 11.0 50.4% 12 0211 131 2.1% 12.0 52.2% 13 0312 127 2.0% 13.0 54.0% 14 0332 105 1.7% 14.0 55.7% 15 3221 97 1.5% 15.0 57.2% 16 0232 90 1.4% 16.5 58.6% 17 0311 90 1.4% 16.5 60.0% 18 0220 82 1.3% 18.0 61.3% 19 2211 72 1.1% 19.0 62.4% 20 0322 71 1.1% 20.0 63.5% 21 0222 68 1.1% 21.0 64.6% 22 1221 67 1.1% 22.5 65.7% 23 3321 67 1.1% 22.5 66.8% 24 1120 61 1.0% 24.0 67.8% 25 2100 58 .9% 25.5 68.7% 27 2322 57 .9% 27.0 70.5% 28 0031 55 .9% 28.5 71.4% 29 0032 55 .9% 28.5 72.3% 30 0212 53 .8% 30.0 73.1% 31 0122 52 .8% 31.0 73.9% 32 1100 51 .8% 32.5 74.7% 33 2021 51 .8% 32.5 79.5% 34 0231 46 .7% 34.5 76.2% 35 3351 46 .7% 34.5 76.9% 36 0010 44 .7% 36.5 77.6% 37 2311 44 .7% 36.5 78.3% 38 0132 42 .7% 38.5 79.0% 39 1121 42 .7% 38.5 79.7% 40 0111 41 .6% 40.5 80.3% Table 17.4. Frequency, percentages and ranks of the first 80% of group states.

GFR Dimension Categories Categories Affect Contentment, Boredom Discontent, Distress Action Coherence Contracord. Concord Frequency 1 0

Table 17.5. Frequencies of unlikely combinations of categories.

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Conclusion: Contradictory states were not recorded and the low frequency of improbable combinations indicates the GFR has internal validity.

1988 1992 1993 1996 Mean 1990 Total Total Adols. Frequ % STRUCTURE Whole 73.0% 46.9% 70.9% 76.1% 66.7% 40.9% 3821 60.3% Subgroups 1.3% 5.4% 1.3% 2.0% 2.5% 18.0% 374 5.9% Subgp+Individs 20.3% 40.6% 23.2% 17.3% 25.4% 40.1% 1850 29.2% Individuals 5.4% 7.1% 4.6% 4.7% 5.5% 1.0% 295 4.7% COGNITIVE ORGANISATION Representational 26.3% 11.2% 13.5% 10.0% 15.3% 7.7% 956 15.1% Systemic 43.5% 8.3% 8.3% 62.9% 30.8% 43.8% 2115 33.4% Normative 16.4% 54.2% 41.1% 18.1% 32.5% 23.8% 1911 30.1% Unorganised 13.8% 26.2% 37.0% 8.9% 21.5% 24.7% 1358 21.4% AFFECT Contentment 0.2% 0.0% 5.2% 2.9% 2.1% 6.2% 157 2.5% Joy 15.9% 18.6% 25.5% 13.0% 18.3% 10.7% 1032 16.3% Interest 63.0% 60.5% 49.8% 74.6% 62.1% 68.9% 4024 63.5% Discontent 16.6% 14.6% 13.5% 8.2% 13.2% 11.8% 866 13.7% Distress 1.4% 2.5% 3.4% 0.4% 1.9% 2.1% 124 2.0% Boredom 2.9% 3.7% 2.7% 0.9% 2.6% 0.0% 137 2.2% ACTION COHERENCE Concord 50.9% 9.15% 11.3% 46.4% 29.4% 27.4% 1936 30.5% Accord 32.4% 69.85 56.9% 43.0% 50.5% 43.3% 3037 47.9% Discord 14.4% 18.6% 26.9% 9.8% 17.4% 22.3% 1147 18.1% Contracord 2.3% 2.4% 4.8% 0.7% 2.6% 7.0% 220 3.5% THERAPISTS INTERVENTIONS Group 10.4% 8.45% 7.0% 7.1% 8.2% 9.8% 567 8.9% Member 38.9% 59.0% 48.6% 59.7% 51.6% 39.4% 3016 47.6% Group & Member 13.9% 14.1% 31.1% 13.0% 18.0% 18.3% 1079 17.0% No Intervention 36.9% 18.5% 13.3% 20.2% 22.2% 32.5% 1678 26.5% LIMITS No Limit 89.0% 80.4% 69.4% 94.9% 83.4% 75.1% 5213 82.2% Limit 11.0% 19.6% 30.6% 5.1% 16.6% 24.9% 1127 17.8% LOCOMOTIONS No Locomotion 90.9% 82.6% 61.9% 98.5% 83.5% 58.1% 5018 79.1% Locomotion 9.1% 17.4% 38.1% 1.5% 16.5% 41.9% 1322 20.8%

Table 17.6. Percentage of categories for each year, mean of adolescent groups and all groups.

Differences in frequency of categories for different groups. Table 17.6 compares percentages of categories rated for each dimension in each year and the percentage and frequency for the whole data set. The total number of minutes rated is 6,341 in 199 sessions. There is a pattern of similarities and differences between the groups. The pattern of Structure states is similar for 1988, 1993 and 1996, whereas 1992 and 1990 are different. Cognitive Organisation is similar for 1992 and

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1993, and to a lesser extent for 1988 and 1996. For Affect, 1988 and 1992 are similar and to a lesser extent so are 1990 and 1996; 1993 is different. For Action Coherence 1992 and 1993 are similar while 1988, 1990 and 1996 are different. Therapists Interventions is similar in 1992, 1993 and 1996, while 1988 is similar to 1990. The GFR differentiates groups according to their GFR characteristics, though there is no consistent pattern. These are explored further in the results sections.

Defining and classifying composite group states. To identify patterns and test hypotheses, categories were combined according to how closely they approached the therapeutic goal of a sustained, cohesive group cooperating in well-organised pleasurable activity. Categories of each Group Dimension were coded from 0 to 3, (0 to 5 for Affect) and divided into “positive” categories 0-1 (0-2 for Affect) supporting therapeutic goals and “negative” categories 2-3 (3-5 for Affect) as shown in Table 17.7.

Group Dimension Quality Categories Codes Name Structure +ve Whole, Subgroups 0, 1 Whole Structure -ve Subgroup+Individuals, Individuals 2, 3 Sub/Ind Cognitive Organisation +ve Representational, Systemic 0, 1 Organised Cognitive Organisation -ve Normative, Unorganised 2, 3 Disorganised Affect +ve Contentment, Joy, Interest 0, 1, 2 Happy Affect -ve Discontent, Distress, Boredom 3, 4, 5 Unhappy Action Coherence +ve Concord, Accord 0, 1 Cooperative Action Coherence -ve Discord, Contracord 2, 3 Uncooperative

Table 17.7. Division of GFR dimensions into positive and negative qualities.

Condensed States. To reduce the proportion of low frequency ratings, individual states were grouped by combining states with some common categories until the total percentage was significant. When the frequency was too low to usefully differentiate states, positive and negative categories in Cognitive Organisation, Affect or Action Coherence were included in the same state. Groupings were made for 25 “Comprehensive States” and 9 “Condensed States.” The Comprehensive States yielded no clearer findings than Condensed States so only the latter are presented. Condensed States were ranked in order of the degree to which they approach the ideal of group function with Whole Structure, Representational Cognitive Organisation,

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pleasurable Affect and cooperative Action Coherence as the optimal state and Individual Structure with any combination of the other three Dimensions as the least beneficial. Structure is the most important indicator of functionality, because unless all members are involved, the value of the process is reduced. The next most valued dimension is Action Coherence indicating cooperation or conflict. Cognitive Organisation is valued next, describing collective cognition. Finally, Pleasurable Affect states are more constructive than Unpleasurable states. Rankings consider these aspects.

Condensed State Structure Cognitive Affect Action Frequency Total % Code and Name categories Organisation categories Coherence categories categories 0 Functional 0 0 0,1,2 0,1 556 8.8% 1 Limited Functional 1,2 0 0,1,2 0,1 296 4.7% 2 Sociable 0 1,2,3 0,1,2 0,1 2137 33.7% 3 Limited Sociable 1,2 1,2,3 0,1,2 0,1 1346 21.2% 4 Unhappy Cooperation 0,1,2 0,1,2,3 3,4,5 0,1 380 6.0% 5 Happy Conflict 0,1,2 0,1,2,3 0,1,2 2,3 749 11.8% 6 Productive Turmoil 0,1 0,1 3,4,5 2,3 121 1.9% 7 Dysfunctional 0,1,2 2,3 3,4,5 2,3 460 7.3% 8 Nominal 3 0,1,2,3 0,1,2,3,4,5 0,1,2,3 295 4.7%

Table 17.8. Classification of GFR categories into 9 Condensed States.

The ratings comprising Condensed States are shown in Table 17.8 with names, category codes, frequencies and percentages. They are used to analyse many aspects of the group process. The most valued state “Functional” shown in the table is Whole Structure, Representational cognition, pleasure and Concord. Next, “Limited Functional” is the same state with less than Whole Structure. When the Cognitive Organisation is less than Representational, Affect pleasurable and Action Coherence cooperative, it is called “Sociable;” the same state in less than Whole Structure is called “Limited Sociable.” Then come states with combinations of negative categories. The most valued of these is “Unhappy Cooperation” including any Structure above Individuals any Cognitive Organisation, unhappy Affect, but cooperative Action Coherence. “Happy Conflict” is the same except for happy Affect and conflict in Action Coherence; then “Productive Turmoil” has Whole Structure, positive Cognitive Organisation, unpleasure and conflict. “Dysfunctional” consists of any Structure above Individuals with negative categories for all other Dimensions. Finally, “Nominal” is

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Individual Structure and any category of the other Dimensions.

Functional Bands. Condensed States were further condensed into three “Functional Bands.” These are: first, Functional and Limited Functional combined into “Functional States;” Sociable and Limited Sociable into “Sociable States;” and all other states into “Unsociable States.” They are shown in Table 17.9.

Condensed States Functional Band 0 Functional Functional States 1 Limited Functional 2 Sociable Sociable States 3 Limited Sociable 4 Unhappy Cooperation 5 Happy Conflict 6 Productive Turmoil Unsociable States 7 Dysfunctional 8 Nominal

Table 17.9. Division of 9 Condensed States into Functional Bands.

Characteristics of each group. Table 17.10 compares the percentages of Condensed States of each group showing their different character; each column shows the proportion of minutes in each Condensed State for the year for each group.

YEAR 1988 1990 1992 1993 1996 Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % 9 Condensed Functional 16.2% 3.2% 5.4% 8.6% 7.2% States Limited Functional 2.2% 12.4% 3.6% 1.7% 2.3% Sociable 39.1% 21.3% 25.5% 32.6% 57.6% Limited Sociable 12.3% 31.6% 31.0% 15.2% 13.0% Unhappy Cooperation 9.4% 1.3% 6.9% 5.7% 4.7% Happy Conflict 8.4% 17.6% 9.3% 19.9% 6.4% Productive Turmoil 3.2% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 2.7% Dysfunctional 3.6% 10.5% 10.2% 10.7% 1.5% Nominal 5.4% 1.0% 7.1% 4.6% 4.7%

Table 17.10. Percentage of time spent in Condensed states for each group.

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1988: The group spent 67% of its time in Functional, Sociable and Limited Sociable states and all other states were represented above 2%, indicating it was constructive. 1990: There are high incidences of Limited Functional, Sociable and Limited Sociable (65.3% altogether) and Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional (28.1% together), suggesting considerable fluctuation and correspondingly less time in Unhappy Cooperation, Productive Turmoil and Nominal. It functioned in either a limited constructive manner or destructively with limited capacity to support mixed states. 1992: A high incidence of Sociable and Limited Sociable (56.5% together) and Dysfunctional (10.2%) occurred. It spent significant time in Unsociable states. The only low incidence state was Productive Turmoil (1.1%). This group was unable to maintain high Cognitive Organisation in unhappy Unsociable states. 1993: There is high incidence in Sociable and Limited Sociable (47.8% together), Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional (30.6% together). The low incidence was in Productive Turmoil. The group divided its time between limited achievements of Sociable and the Unsociable states. 1996: There is high incidence of Sociable and Limited Sociable (70.6%) and the only low incidence was Dysfunctional, showing achievements in social activity without being able to represent their own functioning, but avoiding Unsociable states.

Significant differences in frequencies of states. The amount of change considered significant for this analysis needs to be defined. The highest percentage Condensed State for all groups is 57.6% Sociable in 1996. Over half the states are below 10% and a third below 5% per year. For an average session length of 55 minutes, 1% change would account for half a minute or one rating per session. For an average year quartile of 6 sessions, it would mean 3 events. The findings of Chapter 20 indicate threats to the group from hostility and unpleasurable emotion generally only occur in a 1-2 minute time frame. In percentage terms, this means changes of 0.5-1% frequencies may indicate such a crises in the session. Small changes in percentage, especially of Contracord and Distress indicate important events in the life of the group. Similarly, Representational may only occur in a low frequency, yet each 0.5% indicates a minute when the group considers themselves.

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The nine Condensed States cover all combinations of categories. If equally divided, each state would account for 11.1% of minutes. For such an analysis, 10% significance determines the scale of changes likely to occur. Where the null hypothesis predicts equal distribution of 11% for all Condensed States, a significant change of 1% in one state is in fact 10% change from the null hypothesis prediction. Since the rating system and condensation covers such a large number of possible states, relatively small percentage changes do represent significant alterations of group functioning. GFR Dimensions have four or six categories. Four categories would account for 25% of randomly distributed observations if equally divided; six categories would account for 16.7%. Changes of 1% in frequency of GFR categories mean 4% changes for any one of four categories and 6% for each of six categories according to the null hypothesis. The observed percentage change could be multiplied by 10, 4 or 6 to be expressed as a proportion of expected percentage of a random distribution. One percent is confirmed a realistic criterion for significant change. Quantitative changes also have qualitative significance. Small percentage changes may indicate significant change in session quality. A percentage shift from Sociable to Limited Sociable does not indicate great change for group functionality, but change from Sociable to Happy Conflict shows a great change in atmosphere. The group may be threatened by a short episode of disorganized conflict and break into subgroups or a member may isolate himself for several sessions after a single disappointment. It is common to find changes following an event are only reversed when discussed later and resolved although the event may have represented a small percentage of time. Small percentage changes in Unsociable or Functional States are all that is likely to occur in group-building processes. Significant change may consist of the qualitative implications of small percentage changes. Condensed States are ranked in terms of the degree to which they approach the functional condition of Gf. However, change from positive to negative categories in each GFR Dimension signifies a change from more to less functional, whereas changes within the positive or negative ranges signify change in degree rather than quality. Groups also spend much of their time in states persisting over a number of minutes. Once some changes occur, groups remain in that state for a time. The moment of change, or disruption of a continuing state is the significant event. Although the size of percentage changes is important, small changes are also indications of important

203 qualitative events. A change of 1% is significant in the case of all Unsociable Condensed States except for Happy Conflict, which has relatively high frequency. The analysis examines percentage changes on the understanding they have both qualitative and quantitative significance.

Phases of Group Development A topic of importance in any study of group psychotherapy is whether phases of group development exist. In order to examine whether phases occur in the groups, a conceptual scheme of developmental phases was needed. Many schemes of group development proposed in literature were reviewed and integrated into a hypothetical series of phases to be investigated with the GFR.

Studies of group development. Bennis and Shepard (1956) identified a preliminary phase of Dependence with subphases of Dependence-flight, Counterdependence-flight, Resolution-catharsis followed by a second phase of Interdependence with subphases of Enchantment-flight, Disenchantment-fight and Consensual Validation. Agazarian and Peters (1981) developed a variation consisting of six phases of Flight, Fight, Power-Authority, Enchantment, Disenchantment and Interdependent Work. Martin and Hill (1957) gave six phases: individual unshared behavior in an unshared structure; reactivation of fixated interpersonal stereotypes; exploration of the interpersonal potential within the group; awareness of interrelationships, subgrouping and power structures; responsiveness to group dynamics and problems; the group as an effective integrative social instrument. Foulkes and Anthony (1965) described the natural history of therapeutic groups as an Initial therapeutic honeymoon, followed by an Intermediate Phase of group process as encapsulated society, then a Terminal Phase where members work through departure. Day (1967) identified stages in the natural history of training groups of Fantasied Familiarity, Transient Victimization, Focused Victimization, Perfect Unity and Individualization. Although not developmental phases, Mills (1967) identifies purposes that groups must fulfill as: Immediate Gratification, To Sustain the Group, To Pursue a Collective Goal, Self Determination and Growth. Sarri and Galinsky (1974) proposed seven phases including Origin; Formative;

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Intermediate; Revision; Intermediate II; Maturation; Termination. Tuckman and Jensen’s (1977) fivefold sequence is Forming, Storming, Norming, Performing, Adjourning (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). Lacoursiere (1980) proposed five general stages: Orientation, Dissatisfaction, Resolution, Production and Termination. Janosik (1982) proposed an Initial Stage consisting of Inclusion and Power phases; the Middle Stage includes Intimacy and Work Phases with Primary and Secondary Tasks, Problem- Solving Methods, Restrictive Solutions, Collusive Defenses and Enabling Solutions; a Final Stage includes Separation, Disengagement and Dissolution phases. Rutan and Stone (1984) offer a three-phase model of Group Formation followed by Reactive Phase and Mature Phase. Northern (1988) proposed four stages of Orientation-Inclusion; Dissatisfaction and Power Conflict; Mutuality-Work; Separation-Termination. Schambaugh (1989) began with Negative Orientation, followed by Positive Orientation, Dissatisfaction, Enchantment, Disenchantment, Production and Termination. MacLennan & Dies (1992) described four stages in adolescent groups of Initial Relatedness, Testing Limits, Working on Self and Moving On. Alderfer (1995) resolves Bennis and Shepard’s system into four phases of Group Formation; Influence; Intimacy; Termination. Yalom (1995) suggests three formative stages: first, Orientation, Hesitant Participation, Search for Meaning, Dependency; second, Conflict, Dominance, Rebellion; third, Development of Cohesiveness. Becvar, Canfield and Becvar (1997) propose Planning, Orientation, Organisation, Process or Work, Termination. Malekoff (1997) suggests Preaffiliation, Power and Control, Intimacy, Differentiation, Separation. Others (Whitaker, 1985; Ahlin, 1995) maintain pre-established phases in a fixed sequence are unlikely. Groups deal with the same issues repeatedly in increasing depth and adequacy in cyclic approach-avoidance of issues. Linear developmental models have been criticised as unsuited to the complexity of social phenomena (Kellerman, 1979; Ahlin, 1995). McCollum (1995) questions the comparability of studies and points to the failure to identify the environmental demands on groups studied, leading to a difference of focus between structure, emotional climate or relationship to the leader. The studies can be distinguished by their approach. Some developmental systems are oriented towards group process phenomena (Bennis & Shepard, 1956; Foulkes & Anthony, 1965; Day, 1967; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977; Lacoursiere, 1980; Malekoff, 1997). Others are related to the psychological content of interpersonal

205 interactions (Martin & Hill, 1957; Sarri & Galinsky, 1974; Janosik, 1982; Schambaugh, 1989; Yalom, 1995; Alderfer, 1995). Some are based on clinical groups (Agazarian and Peters, 1981; Rutan and Stone, 1984; Foulkes and Anthony, 1965), others on experiential or training groups (Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Sarri and Galinsky, 1974; and Lacoursiere, 1980). Some consider children or adolescents (Northern, 1988 and Malekoff, 1997), others adults (Mills, 1967 and Yalom, 1995).

Collation of group development phases: Some phases of this list seem out of sequence with the consensus (Schambaugh, 1989; Janosik, 1982). Others are ambiguous, such as Martin and Hill’s (1957) “fixated interpersonal stereotypes.” However, they can be placed within a common framework, with each writer identifying some parts of a sequence that collectively has considerable consistency, but is not fully described by any author. This alignment indicates generalized phases to be tested using GFR data. Eight phases can be identified and summarized with key terms as shown in Table 17.11. The phases are shown in Table 17.12 with references, a summary of the phase character and a set of tentative names describing them.

PHASE KEY WORD DESCRIPTIONS

1 Individualized behaviour, origins, orientation, group formation.

2 Forming, orienting, fantasied familiarity, dependency, flight, artificial togetherness, avoidance, fixated interpersonal stereotypes, therapeutic honeymoon, inclusion and power. 3 Conflict, dissatisfaction, counter-dependency, testing, fight, power struggles, encapsulated society, transient victimization, immediate gratification, storming, reactive phase. 4 Resolution, catharsis, power, focused victimization, norming, authority exploration, establishing structure, to sustain the group, revision, primary and secondary tasks. 5 Enchantment, flight, independence, interrelationships, subgrouping, power structures, perfect unity, to pursue a collective goal, intimacy, avoidance, functioning, problem solving. 6 Disenchantment, fight, conflict, responsive to process problems defensiveness, rebellion, self- determination, restrictive solutions, collusive defenses. 7 Consensus, consensual validation, independent work, mature, performing, cohesion, production, integrative-creative, instrumental, enabling solutions, individualization. 8 Termination, adjourning, disengagement, dissolution, separation

Table 17.11. Key word descriptions for group developmental phases from the literature.

Describing group process in Collated Phases described by Functional Bands. The processes of each phase can be translated into relative proportions of

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Functional Bands of Condensed States to allow quantitative and qualitative testing of phases against data.

1: Convening. The group forms; members are tentative and unclear about how the group will operate; they are formalized and constrained, following the therapists, functioning individualistically. This would result in high percentages of Functional states as they talk about the group, some Sociable as they search for a basis to communicate and low Unsociable states, since they do not yet have reason for conflict or emotional expression. 2: Engagement. Members’ interactions create increased involvement. Initially, mutual dependency develops discouraging conflict, promoting superficial harmony to avoid problems. There are less likely to be Functional states as they find it more threatening to go beyond superficial discussion of themselves. A higher percentage of Sociable states is likely as they communicate about “safe” subjects, while Unsociable states would remain low, as there is not enough involvement to cause conflict. 3: Positioning. Gradually, the group becomes emotionally significant; members experience dissatisfaction with it, conflict develops; they become counter- dependent, test limits and struggle for power. They seek influence, but are unwilling to resolve problems. Functional states would remain low due to the attempt to use power, but high levels of Unsociable are likely as conflict and anxieties express themselves, interspersed with periods of Sociable, expressing the developing common culture. Conflicts are likely to produce fluctuations and variations to Unsociable and make the process unstable and erratic. 4: Consolidation. For the group to continue, power relations need to be resolved by developing norms, group culture and an agreed structure enabling the group to make decisions and establish roles. It is unlikely to be socially mature and may be hierarchical or dysfunctional for the long term depending on how the conflicts are resolved. However, the group stabilizes, suggesting high percentages of Sociable and low or fluctuating Functional and Unsociable states.

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AUTHORS PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6 PHASE 7 PHASE 8 Bennis & - Dependence: Couterdependence- Resolution- Independence: Disenchantment- Consensual - Shepard, 1956. Dependence-Flight Flight Catharsis Enchantment-Flight Fight Validation Agazarian & - Flight Fight Power-Authority Enchantment Disenchantment Independent - Peters, 1981. Work Martin & Hill, Individual - Fixated inter- Exploration of Interrelationships, Responsive to Integrative- - 1957. behavior in an personal stereotypes interpersonal subgrouping and process problems creative unshared structure potential in group power structures instrument Foulkes & - Initial: therapeutic Intermediate phase, - - - - Terminal phase Anthony, 1965. honeymoon encapsulated society Day, 1967. - Fantasied Transient Focused Perfect unity - Individualiz- - familiarity victimization victimization ation Mills, 1967. - - Immediate To sustain the To Pursue a Self Determination Growth - Gratification Group Collective Goal Sarri & Galinsky, - Origin, Formative Intermediate Revision - Intermediate II Maturation Termination 1974. Tuckman & - Forming Storming Norming - - Performing Adjourning Jensen, 1977. Lacoursiere, Orientation - Dissatisfaction Resolution - - Production Termination 1980. Janosik, 1982. - Inclusion and Power Intimacy and Work Primary and Problem Solving Restrictive Enabling Separation, Secondary Tasks Methods Solutions, Collusive Solutions Disengagement Defenses and Dissolution Rutan & Stone, Group Formation - Reactive Phase - - - Mature - 1984. Northern, 1988. Orientation- - Dissatisfaction and - - - Mutuality-Work Separation- Inclusion Power Conflict Termination Schambaugh, Negative Positive Orientation Dissatisfaction - Enchantment Disenchantment Production Termination 1989. Orientation MacLennan & - Initial Relatedness Testing the Limits - - - Working on Self Moving On Dies, 1992. Alderfer, 1995. Group Formation - Influence - - - Intimacy Termination Yalom, 1995. Orientation Hesitant Search for meaning Conflict Dominance Rebellion Cohesiveness - Participation Dependency Becvar, Canfield Orientation - - Organisation - - Process or Work Termination & Becvar, 1997. Malekoff, 1997. Preaffiliation - Power and Control - Intimacy - Differentiation Separation Collated Phase Convening Engagement Positioning Consolidation Idealization Disenchantment Working Separation Name Table 17.12. Alignment of group development phases in various authors with phase names.

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5: Idealization. If Consolidation is successful, the group develops limited intimacy, encouraging idealization of the group and members, avoiding problems by collusion with existing power structures and norms irrespective of their appropriateness for therapeutic aims. In adolescent groups, this is expressed as play and shared activity, promoting idealization and pseudo-mature functioning based on unrealistic unity. This situation cannot last long since it neither measures up to expectations nor manages the social life. However, it enables the group to function well in areas not threatening the status quo. High levels of Functional are likely as they communicate about themselves and the group, medium to low levels of Sociable and low levels of Unsociable states. This phase will be short. 6: Disenchantment. Tensions develop from idealization, since social issues are not resolved. Disenchantment follows and conflict emerges from members’ unmet needs. Rebellion against the existing structure and preoccupation with group process problems are likely. This would be shown by high percentages of conflictual Unsociable states, medium to low percentages of Functional states as the problems are confronted and low levels of Sociable states since this method of avoidance no longer works. Tension is also expressed by fluctuation in percentages from one session to another. This stage will also be short and tumultuous. 7: Working. If the group passes the crisis, more realistic expectations and sharing of power enable it to support members and work on problems. Cohesion is more evident and the difficulties of the group process are tackled. Conflicts continue, but are accompanied by discussion of issues and constructive solutions. The full range of group activity and a mixture of states will occur. There will be high percentages of Functional and medium to high levels of Unsociable and Sociable states as the group engages in enjoyable cooperative activity. However, states will fluctuate in relation to each other and show cyclical variation. 8: Separation. The end of the group raises the need to disengage and prepare for losing it. In some groups, it is a pause until the following year, but with uncertainty about membership. Anxieties increase Unsociable states as conflicts emerge and if the group is unable to address these issues, low percentages of Functional states are expected, but medium to high levels of Sociable states expressing the

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enjoyment of being together.

In Table 17.13, predicted proportions of Functional Bands for phases are summarized.

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8 Functional Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid- Idealiz- Disench- Working Separation Bands ing ment ing ation ation antment Functional High Low Low Low Medium Low to High or Medium or High Medium Varied to High Sociable Low High Medium High or High Low Medium High or to High Varied Varied Unsociable Low Low High or Low to Low High or Medium High or Varied Medium Varied Varied

Table 17.13. Proportions of Functional Bands associated with phases of group development.

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18. RESULTS 1: GROUP DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter, group development hypotheses are tested against the data.

1.1. Stability of GFR Dimensions. Group development was first examined with GFR Dimensions.

H1.1. Stability of sessions will change systematically over the group’s life and will be defined as part of a developmental sequence.

Stability of each Group. A measure of group stability is the percentage of minutes in which groups remained in the same category as the previous minute in each GFR Dimension. Figures 18.1 - 18.5 show graphs of the percentage of minutes in each session when groups remained stable for successive minutes on each Dimension. Categories are not discriminated. All groups except 1988 have missing sessions so the slope of the line between points adjacent to missing sessions may be misleading. The percentages are given in Appendix 3 as Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5.

Stability of Group Dimensions 1988 100

90 % in (0,0)

60 Struc

50 Cogn

40 Aff

30 Act 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31

SESSION

Figure 18.1. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1988.

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Figure 18.1 shows waveforms with a period of between 3 and 5 sessions for 1988. Each Dimension has similar features somewhat out of phase with each other. Stability oscillates between highs of 100% for Structure, around 90% for other Dimensions and lows of 40-60%. The regularity and synchronisation of these fluctuations is explored in later hypotheses.

Stability of Group Dimensions 1990 100

90 % in (0,0) 80

60 Struc

50 Cogn

40 Aff

30 Act 1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31

SESSION

Figure 18.2. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1990.

Figure 18.2 shows less regular wave fluctuations for 1990. Allowing for missing sessions, it has a period of 2 to 5 sessions. Several stages are suggested. Sessions 1 to 7 are characterized by differences in stability of Dimensions; sessions 8 to 18 fluctuate within a narrower range; sessions 19 to 22 suggest a crisis of instability with a short period of synchronisation from session 23 to 25; the discrepancy increases from session 26 to 31. Figure 18.3 shows more sessions missing in 1992, but a wave period of between 3 and 5 (recorded) sessions. The discrepancy in stability between Dimensions varies from small (sessions 13, 16, 23, 31 and 38) to great (sessions 12, 15, 19 and 36), suggesting rhythmic alternation between degree of stability and synchrony between the

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Dimensions.

Stability of Group Dimensions 1992 100

90 % in (0,0)

60 Struc

50 Cogn

40 Aff

30 Act 3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38

SESSION

Figure 18.3. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1992.

Stability of Group Dimensions 1993 100

90 % in (0,0)

60 Struc

50 Cogn

40 Aff

30 Act 1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29

SESSION

Figure 18.4. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1993.

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In figure 18.4, more sessions are missing in 1993 and cautious interpretation is needed. However, fluctuation of stability and degree of synchrony between the Dimensions is suggested. In spite of missing sessions, the period of the waveforms is still 3 to 5 (recorded) sessions. Sessions 1 to 5 are relatively stable, then in sessions 7 to 11 there is discrepancy between Dimensions. Sessions 11 to 17 are more synchronous, followed by high stability in sessions 18 and 21, then unstable episodes at sessions 22 and 25 and discrepant states at the end of the year.

Stability of Group Dimensions 1996 100

90 % in (0,0)

Struc 60 Cogn

50 Aff

40 Act 1 4 7 11 13 18 29 35

SESSION

Figure 18.5. Percentage of unchanged minutes for GFR Dimensions in 1996.

Figure 18.5 for 1996, has even more sessions missing making it difficult to interpreted. Similar rhythms between stability and synchrony of Dimensions are evident. At session 1, the group is synchronous and at session 3 is unstable with high discrepancy between Dimensions. There is cyclical alternation throughout the year ending in a stable and synchronous session at session 35. The fluctuation for all groups is within the same range. Points of instability occur within the first 6 sessions. Sessions 7 to 9 show greater stability, with greater synchrony and stability around sessions 22 to 24. There are peaks of stability in one or more Dimensions at sessions 25 to 27, and for all groups except 1996 there is a crisis of instability several sessions before the end of the year.

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Stability of all Groups. Groups were compared by calculating the mean of the percentages of stable minutes for all Dimensions for each group. They are plotted together in Figure 18.6, with lines broken at missing sessions. Points of synchrony are evident. Sessions 3, 10, 18, 26-28, and 30-31 are closely related for most groups. While values differ, the slopes are at times closely related, although there is sometimes a lag between groups. Examples are at sessions 5-6, 10-12, 17-19, 22-25 and 29-32. These relationships are explored in later hypotheses. The means are provided in Table 18A.6 in Appendix 3.

100

M88 70 M90

M92 60 M93

Value 50 M96 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37

sessions

Figure 18.6. Mean of percentage of stable minutes for GFR Dimensions for each group.

Summary 1.1: There is rhythmical fluctuation in stability of GFR Dimensions in all groups, but no systematic developmental change as hypothesised.

1.2. Quartile Development of Condensed States. Condensed States integrate the four Dimensions and are used to examine group development hypotheses.

H1.2. A developmental sequence will show lower quality early in the year,

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increase in conflict and dysfunction in the middle and increased function at the end of the year.

Year quartiles are used to examine groups’ development. Table 18.1 shows the number of sessions in each quartile for each group, which vary because of missing sessions. Since 1992 continued for five sessions later in the year than other group, these were included in quartile 4 to allow other quartiles to describe consistent periods as other groups.

Quartiles: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1988 sessions 8 8 8 9 1990 sessions 5 5 8 7 1992 sessions 5 6 5 11 1993 sessions 5 2 6 5 1996 sessions 5 6 1 4

Table 18.1. Number of sessions in quartiles for each group.

Tables 18.2 - 18.6 show quartile percentages for Condensed States in each group. Group development can be examined considering changes greater than 1% as significant (see Chapter 17).

Year Quartiles for 1988 1 2 3 4 Col % Col % Col % Col % Functional 6.7% 7.6% 27.1% 23.0% Limited Functional 2.8% 1.5% 3.4% 1.4% Sociable 43.7% 50.1% 34.5% 29.2% Limited Sociable 24.5% 13.0% 3.8% 8.2% Unhappy Cooperation 4.1% 6.1% 6.3% 19.8% Happy Conflict 8.9% 13.7% 7.4% 4.1% Productive Turmoil 1.7% 2.6% 5.2% 3.5% Dysfunctional 3.5% 5.0% 1.1% 4.7% Nominal 4.1% .4% 11.1% 6.2%

Table 18.2. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1988.

1988: Table 18.2 shows percentages of Condensed states for each quartile of

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1988. In quartile 1, Sociable states dominate; little conflict occurs except with pleasurable affect. There is limited Functional capacity. In quartile 2, Whole Functional and Sociable states and all Unsociable states increase indicating greater engagement is accompanied by increased conflict. In quartile 3, Functional increases fourfold, but the group compensates by increased separation into individuals. In quartile 4, Functional and Sociable decrease somewhat, Dysfunctional increases, but the group cooperates more in spite of unpleasurable affect (Unhappy Cooperation). Over the year, Limited Sociable and Nominal states change toward increased whole group Sociable and boisterousness (Happy Conflict), which are then converted into increased Functional, reduced Unsociable but increased Nominal states. Then most Unsociable states reduce and cooperation in spite of unpleasurable affect increases (Unhappy Cooperation). Maintaining cooperation with unpleasurable affect is essential for sustaining groups.

Year Quartiles for 1990 1 2 3 4 Col % Col % Col % Col % Functional 3.3% 3.9% 2.1% 4.1% Limited Functional 12.2% 7.7% 18.7% 9.1% Sociable 10.8% 45.6% 11.4% 23.8% Limited Sociable 47.4% 32.3% 26.4% 19.1% Unhappy Cooperation 2.7% .7% 1.0% .6% Happy Conflict 12.5% 6.0% 24.6% 25.4% Productive Turmoil .5% 1.1% 1.0% 1.3% Dysfunctional 7.0% 2.8% 14.8% 16.3% Nominal 3.5% .3%

Table 18.3. Percentage of Condensed States by quartile for 1990.

1990: Table 18.3 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1990 quartiles. It begins with highest percentages in subgroup and conflict states. In quartile 2, they reduce in favor of a fourfold increase in Sociable. In quartile 3, self-reflection in subgroups (Limited Functional) and Unsociable states increase; then in quartile 4, whole states (Functional and Sociable) and conflict increase. The group makes only limited progress. Limited Functional is the main early strength and the group stabilizes in Sociable states, but while Limited Functional is reduced, conflictual states increase fourfold. This is maintained to the end of the year though the capacity to be whole

217 increases. 1992: Table 18.4 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1992 quartiles. In quartile 1, the group is predominantly in Limited Sociable, but unreflective. In quartile 2, whole Sociable and Unsociable states increase. In quartile 3, conflict is unchanged, but Limited Sociable replaces whole states and Unhappy Cooperation. By quartile 4, the group achieves a modest capacity for self-reflection, improved whole sociability, cooperation and reduced conflict, but increased separation into individuals. The middle quartiles show increased conflict and the group only achieves functional capacity in the last quartile. Increased Unsociable states accompany reduced whole states.

Year Quartiles for 1992 1 2 3 4 Col % Col % Col % Col %

Functional .4% 1.6% .7% 11.9% Limited Functional 4.5% 2.8% .7% 5.1% Sociable 12.7% 37.0% 19.5% 27.8% Limited Sociable 56.0% 19.6% 46.2% 18.8% Unhappy Cooperation 3.4% 10.9% 1.4% 8.8% Happy Conflict 8.6% 10.9% 10.1% 8.3% Productive Turmoil .3% 3.2% 1.0% Dysfunctional 7.5% 15.8% 15.9% 5.6% Nominal 7.1% 1.2% 2.2% 12.5%

Table 18.4. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1992.

1993: Table 18.5 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1993 quartiles. This group spends almost half the first quartile in Unsociable states, but has some capacity for whole group and self-reflection (Functional). The two sessions in quartile 2 show increased Sociable states, but reduced Functional and Unsociable. By quartile 3, Functional self-reflection increases accompanied by reduced conflict and more time in whole states. In quartile 4, Unsociable increases similar to quartile 1, while Functional is also reduced. The group improves whole Functionality in quartile 3, but loses it at the end of the year. Quartile 3 is the most constructive but conflict increases in quartile 4 along with loss of whole states.

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Year Quartiles for 1993 1 2 3 4 Col % Col % Col % Col % Functional 5.6% 2.2% 15.4% 5.9% Limited Functional 4.8% 1.1% .4% .4% Sociable 26.4% 32.2% 46.7% 22.5% Limited Sociable 11.3% 18.9% 10.7% 22.9% Unhappy Cooperation 5.6% 2.2% 7.4% 5.1% Happy Conflict 29.0% 22.2% 9.2% 22.5% Productive Turmoil .9% .4% 2.5% Dysfunctional 14.3% 2.2% 5.5% 16.5% Nominal 2.2% 18.9% 4.4% 1.7%

Table 18.5. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1993.

1996: Table 18.6 shows percentages of Condensed States for 1996 quartiles. Almost three quarters of quartile 1 is Sociable. In quartile 2, the group is more Functional, with Unsociable similar to quartile 1. Only one session is in Quartile 3. In quartile 4, Sociable accounts for three-quarters of time with reduced Unsociable; Functional is maintained. The group achieves self-reflection; conflict increases then reduces.

Year Quartiles for 1996 1 2 3 4 Col % Col % Col % Col % Functional .8% 8.1% 32.6% 8.3% Limited Functional 1.2% 3.3% 2.9% Sociable 58.0% 47.6% 58.7% 71.8% Limited Sociable 15.6% 17.9% 5.3% Unhappy Cooperation 3.5% 6.5% 2.2% 3.9% Happy Conflict 3.9% 10.1% 5.3% Productive Turmoil 5.1% 2.3% 1.0% Dysfunctional 2.3% 2.0% Nominal 9.7% 2.3% 6.5% 1.5%

Table 18.6. Percentage of Condensed States by quartiles for 1996.

Summary 1.2: The proportions of Condensed States change over the year for all groups. Although percentage changes are small, their qualitative effects on session climate suggest important group events. A number of generalizations can be made:

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1.2.1. Functional states increase towards the end of the year, suggesting all groups make therapeutic progress. 1.2.2. All groups increase their ability to unite in Sociable activity during the year. 1.2.3. Increased Whole Sociable states are associated with increased Unsociable states, suggesting Whole group states are more demanding and provoke increased tension and conflict. 1.2.4. Increased Limited Sociable states are associated with decreased Unsociable states, suggesting division of groups reduces tension and conflict. 1.2.5. For less successful groups (1990 and 1993), when subgroup Sociable states increase, there are increased Unsociable states, suggesting conflicts are carried into subgroups towards the end of the year, having established relatively stable dynamics. 1.2.6. Successful groups (1988, 1992 and 1996) manifest greatest conflict and tension in the middle quartiles of the year. Their best functioning is in the last quartile. 1.2.7. The less successful groups (1990 and 1993) function best in quartile 3, but it is lost in quartile 4. A more complex pattern of development is found than postulated by hypothesis 1.2.

1.3. Phases of Group Development. The next question is whether discrete developmental phases can be identified.

H1.3. Definable phases of group development will be discernible throughout the group’s life.

Using the scheme described in Chapter 17, the eight phases were described in terms of their expected proportions of Functional Bands (see Table 17.13). The hypothesis was tested by computing graphs of percentage of time spent in each Functional Band per session for each group and examining whether the phases can be identified. Allowance must be made for the “noise” of natural fluctuations in

220 therapeutic groups. Therefore criteria for the phases may only be met in a general sense. Each group is examined below.

1988: In Figure 18.7, percentages of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands are shown for each session. The x-axis shows the percentage of minutes of each session spent in each Band.

Phase: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

YEAR: 1988 100

40 Cond9

% Func 20 % Soc

0 % Unsoc % minutes 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32

SESSION

Figure 18.7. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1988 showing developmental phases.

1. Convening (Session 1): The group begins with relatively high Functional, lower Sociable and medium Unsociable percentage. However, after one session Sociable increases dramatically and the others fall, indicating the group quickly moves beyond superficial focus on problems. 2. Engagement (Sessions. 2-8): From session 2 there are six sessions with high Sociable except for dips at sessions 4 and 7 in response to rises in Unsociable states, which otherwise remain low. Functional remains low fulfilling criteria for phase 2 between sessions 2 and 9, for seven sessions. Oscillations of Sociable peaks and troughs alternating with Unsociable suggest the group may have repeated the dynamic of phase 2 three times before moving on. It is a

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phase of common activities that do not confront the problems of group life. 3. Positioning (Sessions 9-11): At session 9 Unsociable rises, Sociable falls and percentages of all states fluctuate until Sociable dramatically increases at session 12. The rise in Functional is not predicted however. This indicates instability and conflict for three sessions, consistent with the power struggle of this phase. 4. Consolidation (Sessions 12-16): At session 12 the increase in Sociable may indicate resolution and formation of norms. The fall in Sociable and rise in Unsociable at session 13 is reversed in the next three sessions. Phase 4 consists of five sessions 12 to 16. 5. Idealization (Sessions 17-19): Session 17 initiates a drop in Unsociable and rise in both Sociable and Functional, reflecting cooperation and communication consistent with criteria for phase 5 of idealizing the group. This lasts for three sessions, 17 to 19. 6. Disenchantment (Sessions 20-21): The high Unsociable in session 20 is consistent with disenchantment and the increased Sociable of session 21 represents possible avoidance. Unsociable peaks again at session 22. Phase 6 lasts from sessions 20 to 21. 7. Working (Sessions 22-33): The next stage has fluctuating Unsociable, Sociable and Functional percentages as the group works productively. Towards the end of the year, Unsociable rises and Sociable falls although Functional also rises, suggesting conflicts are worked with for eleven sessions between 22 and 33. 8. Separation: There is no phase 8 for this group since it lingered past session 33 with only two members and recording was suspended.

Regular, rhythmic oscillations with the changes in proportions of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Bands suggest the group may have repeated tasks for each stage several times. The high Functional peak at session 23 may be a second, more intense Idealization, followed by a second Disillusionment in Sessions 24-26 before a productive Working phase sets in.

1990: In Figure 18.8, values of Functional Bands for 1990 are shown. This group shows different characteristics to 1988, but has missing sessions.

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1. Convening (Session 1): The orientation phase is shown in the initial high Sociable and Functional with low Unsociable states in session 1. 2. Engagement (Sessions 2-5): Then Functional falls, Sociable and Unsociable rise from sessions 2-5, fulfilling criteria for phase 2. The group avoids problems while finding common activity, but conflict grows. This phase lasts four sessions until session 5. 3. Positioning (Sessions 6-7): At session 6, Unsociable and Sociable stabilize then fall while Functional remains low, indicating conflict and disorganization for two sessions to session 7.

Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 YEAR: 1990 100

40 Cond9

% Func 20 % Soc 0 % Unsoc 1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31 % minutes 2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30 SESSION

Figure 18.8. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1990 showing developmental phases.

4. Consolidation (Sessions 8-16): From session 8, Sociable increases and remains high for nine sessions; Functional and Unsociable remain low with some fluctuation consistent with resolving conflict to develop norms for group functioning. It lasts until session 16. 5. Idealization (Sessions 17-18): From session 17, Functional rises sharply and Sociable and Unsociable fall for two sessions consistent with idealization lasting

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two sessions, until session 18. 6. Disenchantment (Sessions 19-23): Unsociable rises sharply as Functional falls for five sessions of high conflict and fluctuating Sociable consistent with disenchantment of phase 6. Its length suggests the group has difficulty resolving its developmental tasks. It lasts from sessions 19-23. 7. Working (Sessions 24-31): At session 24, there is a rise in Functional and then Sociable, leading to productive work. This group’s productivity falls towards the end of the phase as Unsociable rises from session 27 onwards. However, work with the conflict is suggested by Functional and Sociable rises. This fulfils to some extent the criteria for phase 7, which lasts for seven sessions. 8. Separation: Final sessions for the year were not recorded.

This group has a long period in Consolidation, possibly due to missing sessions, which make interpretations tentative, although Idealization seems evident. Working shows the same rhythms as 1988 and it may have extended further if later sessions were recorded.

1992: Percentages of Functional Bands for 1992 are shown in Figure 18.9. Convening is lacking, since session 3 is the first recorded. In contrast to 1988 and 1990, it was not a new group; a number of members attended the previous year so a clearly defined Convening Phase may not be present even with complete records.

1. Orientation: Initial sessions are missing. 2. Engagement (Sessions 3-7): Session 3 shows high Sociable and low Functional indicating avoidance of group issues. Sociable falls towards session 8, when Unsociable increases, indicating tensions leading to phase 3. Phase 2 lasts five sessions. 3. Positioning (Sessions 8-12): The conflict from session 8 leads to fluctuating Unsociable complemented by high Sociable with low Functional, expressing the power struggles of this phase, which lasts five sessions until session 12. 4. Consolidation (Sessions 13-24): At session 13, Unsociable is medium, but rises at session 14, then falls as issues are worked at; Sociable falls, then rises for the next 11 sessions with a dip between sessions 17-19. This is consistent with

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formation of norms and resolution of phase 3 conflicts. The phase is long (12 sessions), suggesting the group was fixated and had difficulty stabilizing and achieving Idealization.

Phases: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 YEAR: 1992 100

40 Cond9

% Func 20 % Soc 0 % Unsoc 3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38 % minutes 4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37 SESSION

Figure 18.9. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1992 showing developmental phases.

5. Idealization (Sessions 25-26): At session 26, there is a spike in Functional, while Sociable falls. This moment of engagement in the group process is not sustained, since it falls in conjunction with a peak in Unsociable at session 29. Idealization leads to the next phase though only lasting two sessions. However, sessions 27 and 28 are missing and may have added to Idealization or Disenchantment. 6. Disenchantment (Session 29): Idealization is replaced by high Unsociable and low levels of other Bands at session 29. This lasts one session since Functional and Sociable again rise in the next. However, the previous two sessions may have been part of this phase. 7. Working (Sessions 30-35): At session 30, Functional and Sociable rise, fluctuating with variable Unsociable, consistent with productive work, since conflict is

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accompanied by reflection on the group and constructive activity in the same or next session. This phase lasts six sessions. 8. Separation (Sessions 36-38): The group’s records include the last session and show a drop in Functional, and Unsociable and rising Sociable similar to the avoidance of phase 2, suggesting the group fails to engage the issues of separation. However, several members were continuing the following year, so perhaps termination was not occurring. This phase lasts two sessions.

There is ambiguity about phases 3 and 4, but this may be a reflection of missing sessions. The long period in phase 4, Consolidation, indicates it had difficulty resolving issues of this phase.

1993: Percentages for Functional Bands in 1993 are shown in Figure 18.10. This group continued from 1992 with some new members and has missing sessions, making identification of phases tentative.

1. Convening (Session 1): In session 1, there is high Functional similar to 1988, but it drops immediately and by session 3 is replaced by high Sociable and rising Unsociable. The orientation phase lasted for one or possibly two sessions (since session 2 is missing). 2. Engagement (Sessions 3-4): The pattern of common activity is indicated by high Sociable and low Functional. However, it is shorter than other groups, since the level of conflict shown by Unsociable rises sharply. It lasts till session 5, a total of two sessions, and may reflect resumption of processes from the previous year, although session 4 is missing, making interpretation uncertain. 3. Positioning (Sessions 5-10): At session 5, Unsociable is high, while Functional and Sociable are low. This is consistent with power struggles, continuing for six sessions till session 10. 4. Consolidation (Sessions 11-20): At session 11, there are signs of more stable functioning. Although Functional remains low, Sociable rises and Unsociable falls until session 21. Phase 4 lasts for ten sessions, although sessions are missing. 5. Idealization (Sessions 21-23): At session 21, Unsociable is high, but Functional

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begins to rise, continuing till session 23, a fall in Unsociable and increase in constructive Sociable representing a focus on the group. This phase lasts three sessions.

Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 YEAR: 1993 100

40 Cond9

% Func 20 % Soc 0 % Unsoc 1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29 % minutes 3 7 11 17 21 23 25 28 30 SESSION

Figure 18.10. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1993 showing developmental phases.

6. Disenchantment (Sessions 24-25): Session 24 sees a high point in Sociable, which falls in conjunction with a rise in Unsociable indicating disenchantment, loss of Functional and a fall in Sociable. This phase lasts two sessions. 7. Working (Sessions 26-30): At session 26, Functional rises and fluctuating productive work begins. This group’s records do not include the end of the year, so it is impossible to determine the course beyond four sessions. Unsociable rises, Sociable fluctuates, however, increased Functional means some self-reflection accompanies conflict. This phase lasts four sessions. 8. Separation: The end of the group is lacking.

Allowing for missing sessions, 1993 shows similarities with 1992 especially in

227 phases 4 and 5. More session records may have allowed a more adequate mapping. The peak of Functional at session 23 is placed in phase 5, but it corresponds to similar peaks at session 34 in 1992, session 24 in 1990 and session 23 in 1988, all in phase 7.

1996: The percentage of Functional Bands for 1996 is shown in Figure 18.11. This group continued from the previous year and more records are missing than other groups. The group does not seem to go through phase 1, although session 1 is recorded, since all members had been together before. Six sessions are lost between sessions 18 and 25, so the session axis does not provide even spacing for the time scale through the year. With the data available, possible phases can be examined.

Phases: 2 3 4 5 6 7 YEAR: 1996 100

40 Cond9 %Func 20 % Soc

0 % Unsoc 1 3 4 6 7 10 11 12 13 15 16 18 25 29 31 35 % minutes SESSION

Figure 18.11. Percentage of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable Functional Bands for sessions in 1996 showing developmental phases.

1. Convening: Initial elevation of Functional characteristic of this phase is lacking, due to members being together the previous year. 2. Engagement (Sessions 1-2): The record starts in session 1 with high Sociable and low Functional and Unsociable consistent with common activity and avoidance

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of problems. After two sessions, Unsociable rises in session 3.

3. Positioning (Sessions 3): At session 3, Unsociable rises as avoidance breaks down and power issues emerge, but is also short-lived as expected in an experienced group. At session 4, Unsociable drops and Sociable rises indicating the next phase. It lasts one session. 4. Consolidation (Sessions 4-7): At session 4, there is a rise in Sociable and fall in Unsociable indicating constructive activity, while Functional remains low indicating little self-reflection. This lasts until Sociable falls and Functional rises at session 8 (inferred since the record is lacking). The Consolidation phase lasts four or five sessions. 5. Idealization (Sessions 8-10): The peak in Functional at session 10 is associated with lower Sociable, consistent with Idealization. This lasts two to three sessions (since records are incomplete). Perhaps this is less intense and occurs earlier because of the continuation from the previous year. 6. Disenchantment (Sessions 11-14): Disenchantment occurs as Functional falls and Unsociable rises, indicating emerging conflict, which continues until session 15 with low Sociable indicating group disorganization. This phase lasts four sessions. 7. Working (Sessions 15-35): The fall in Unsociable at session 16 indicates a period of low Unsociable, with fluctuating Sociable and Functional consistent with the working phase. This phase is somewhat hypothetical owing to the high number of missing sessions (14 sessions between sessions 16 and 35) and is longer than in other groups (a total of 19 sessions), but may be valid because its experience may have allowed it to move into Working earlier. It continues till the end of the year and Separation is not defined since the last session is missing. 8. Separation: This is not recorded.

Although many sessions are missing and 1996 is more regular than other groups, phases can be tentatively distinguished. Groups continuing into a subsequent year may traverse early stages more rapidly spending more time in Working.

Summary of Developmental Phases. Table 18.7 summarizes the length, mean

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period and percentage of the year for each phase in each group. If these results can be generalized, similar groups may spend one session in Convening, about four in Engagement and Positioning, but twice as much time in Consolidation. Idealization and Disenchantment seem to require only a few sessions each, then about a third of the year is spent in Working. When Separation occurs, it occupies a couple of sessions. The number of groups is too small for this to be more than suggestive. The groups vary as expected from their nature. Some groups start treatment (1988 and 1990), others continue from the previous year (1992, 1993 and 1996). The only one with complete continuity of personnel and therapists from the preceding year was 1996, which may explain its rapid movement through early phases and longer Working (although there are missing sessions which may have shown different phenomena).

Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8 Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid Idealiz- Disench- Working Separat- ing ment ing -ation ation antment ion 1988 1 7 5 5 3 2 11 - 1990 1 4 2 9 2 5 7 - 1992 - 5 5 12 2 1 6 2 1993 2 2 6 10 3 2 4 - 1996 - 2 1 5 2 4 20 - Mean 1 4 4 8 2 3 10 2 % Yr 3% 12% 12% 24% 6% 9% 30% 3%

Table 18.7. Length of phases, mean period and percentage of the year spent in each phase for each group.

Finally, a hypothetical generic graph of developmental phases is shown in Figure 18.12.

Summary 1.3: Eight group developmental phases were identified from an integrated scheme from the group literature. Expected percentages of Functional Bands were defined and identified in all groups.

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Phases: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

100

0 1 3 5 7 9 11131517192123252729313335

Functional Sociable Unsociable

Figure 18.12. Generic Graph of phases showing hypothetical percentages of Functional Bands.

1.4. Condensed States in Developmental Phases. Developmental phases should be identifiable by the proportion of Condensed States occurring in them. Sessions were coded for their phase and frequencies and percentages computed. Percentages are given because of the different number of sessions in each phase. In some cases, there is only one session per phase and some years lack one or more phases, however the comparison may be suggestive. Percentages of Condensed States are given for all groups in Table 18.8 with arrows showing percentage changes from one phase to another. The highest proportions of Functional and Limited Functional are in Convening, Idealization and Working (between 30% and 38% together). Highest proportions of Dysfunctional are in Positioning and Disenchantment (13% and 11%), but with moderate values for Consolidation and Working (7% to 12%). Happy Conflict has highest values in Positioning, Idealization, Disenchantment and Working (11% to 24%). Nominal is highest in Convening, Disenchantment and Separation (13% to 15%). Sociable and Limited Sociable are highest in Engagement, Consolidation, and

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Separation (over 60% together).

Developmental Phases for All Groups. Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 8 Phase 1 Engage Positioni Consol Idealisati Disench Phase 7 Separat Convening ment ng idation on antment Working ion Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col %

Functional 22.7% 2.4% 2.9% 3.0% 13.0% 9.8% 15.6% 3.2% Limited Functional 16.0% 3.3% 1.5% 4.4% 11.9% 1.6% 5.0% .6% Sociable 15.3% 34.1% 29.2% 41.1% 24.7% 33.5% 31.7% 58.3% Limited Sociable 24.5% 39.0% 19.0% 26.7% 22.7% 10.5% 13.8% 12.8% Unhappy Cooperation 1.8% 3.3% 6.1% 4.7% 6.4% 5.2% 8.6% 6.4% Happy Conflict 4.3% 8.9% 23.5% 8.5% 12.2% 16.0% 11.4% 1.3% Productive Turmoil 1.0% 2.6% 1.8% 1.1% 3.5% 2.1% 1.3% Dysfunctional 2.5% 4.5% 12.9% 7.3% 3.5% 10.7% 7.2% 1.3% Nominal 12.9% 3.6% 2.2% 2.5% 4.6% 9.1% 4.4% 14.7%

Table 18.8. Percentage of Condensed States in each Developmental Phase for all Groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between states.

Table 18.9 summarizes percentages of the Functional Bands for each phase. These fluctuations in values provide an underlying structure to an otherwise confusing process. Arrows show the flow of a “floating” 20-30% of time that moves between bands to show the changing process. From Convening to Engagement, it moves from Functional to Sociable, then into Unsociable in Positioning, to Sociable again in Consolidation and to Functional in Idealization. It falls to Unsociable in Disenchantment and up to Functional in Working; finally, Functional and Unsociable combine into Sociable in Separation. Although very generalized, it indicates the gross movement which therapists may expect as groups move through the phases of therapy.

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8 Total all Groups Functional Conven- Engage- Position- Consolid- Ideal- Disench- Working Separat- Function- Band ing ment ing ation isation antment ion al Bands Functional 9% 6% 4% 7% 25% 11% 20% 4% 14% Sociable 40% 73% 48% 68% 47% 44% 46% 71% 55% Unsociable 21% 21% 48% 25% 28% 45% 34% 25% 31%

Table 18.9. Percentages of Functional Bands for each Developmental Phase and for all groups; arrows show the flow of percentage between bands.

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19. RESULTS: 2 STRUCTURE

2.1. Group Function and Structure. The first thesis is that quality of group process and functional level depend on structure. It is hypothesised that Whole is a demanding state. Groups are expected to be less cognitively organized, more unstable, unpleasurable and conflictual until they learn to manage themselves; then Whole states should be more creative and higher functioning. This leads to the general hypothesis:

H2.1. The group’s functioning will alter according to its Structure.

Three hypotheses derived from this were tested. H2.1.1. The distribution of GFR categories for Whole will differ from Subgroup Structures.

The total incidence of Structure categories in Table 17.6 is:

Whole: 60.3%, Subgroups: 5.9%, Subgroup+Individuals: 29.2%, Individuals: 4.7%.

Because of their small percentages, all three subgroup and individual states were combined to form a category called “Subgp/Ind” in tables or “Subgroups” in the text, totalling 39.8% in a Dimension called “Structure #2.” The null hypothesis predicts the frequency of other categories in different Structures would follow proportions of 60%, 6%, 29% and 5% in Structure categories. Table 19.1 shows percentages of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence categories for Structure categories for all groups. Taking a criterion of 10% difference from the expected frequency, categories with relatively higher frequency in Whole structure are: Representational, Joy, Concord. This suggests whole groups are more likely to be self-reflective, have unstable, pleasurable affect and unite in common goals. Using a 5% difference criterion, categories with lower than expected frequency

233 in Whole Structure are Normative and Unorganized Cognitive Organization, Contentment and Boredom for Affect and Accord in Action Coherence. Subgroups are more likely to be stable, cognitively less organized, have inert affect and cooperate with compatible goals. Individuals are likely to be bored.

Structure for All Groups. Whole Sub Subg Individ Grp groups p+Ind uals Row Row Row Row % % % % Cognitive Representational 78.5% 2.4% 19.1% Organisation Systemic 63.1% 8.6% 28.3% Normative 53.5% 5.8% 33.0% 7.7% Unorganised 52.5% 4.3% 32.3% 10.9% Affect Contentment 26.1% 35.0% 38.9% Joy 72.5% 4.8% 22.7% Interest 59.2% 5.7% 30.8% 4.3% Discontent 60.7% 3.7% 30.4% 5.2% Distress 66.1% 5.6% 25.8% 2.4% Boredom 29.9% 16.1% 54.0% Action Concord 70.4% 6.6% 23.0% Coherence Accord 51.6% 6.4% 33.5% 8.5% Discord 65.2% 3.2% 28.3% 3.2% Contracord 64.5% 6.8% 28.6%

Table 19.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence categories in Structure ratings for all groups.

There is little difference for other categories; rule-based Cognitive Organization, stable Affect and conflict are relatively constant for all structural conditions. Unpleasurable Affect, conflict and aggression are likely to occur in any structural condition. When groups are divided, stable Affect and cooperation are more likely, but cognitive operations or common goals are less likely. Whole is associated with increased chance of therapeutically advantageous categories. It supports the therapeutic goal of encouraging Whole structure. Subgroups are more emotionally stable.

Summary 2.1.1. There is a greater tendency for groups in whole states to function with rule-based or self-reflective organization, exhibit unstable affect and cooperation in common goals. Whole groups are more likely to function well or to be organized but unstable and conflictual. Subgroups are more likely to be disorganized

234 with inert affect and cooperate in compatible goals. They are stable but less productive. Stable affect is constant for both structures. Individuals are likely to be unorganized and bored.

The effect of change into and out of the Structure categories is explored in hypothesis 2.1.2.

H2.1.2: Movement from Whole to Subgroup Structures will be associated with reduced unpleasure and conflict categories; movement in the opposite direction will be associated with increased unpleasure and conflict categories.

Structure Change for All Groups. Negative No Positive Change Change Change Affect Contentment Subtable % 1.7% 2.7% 1.0% Rating in Joy Subtable % 14.9% 16.8% 12.5% Preceding Interest Subtable % 57.5% 64.0% 64.0% Minute Discontent Subtable % 20.5% 12.8% 16.2% Distress Subtable % 2.9% 1.9% 1.5% Boredom Subtable % 2.5% 1.9% 4.8% Affect in Contentment Subtable % 1.7% 2.7% 1.0% Minute of Joy Subtable % 12.5% 16.6% 17.1% Structure Interest Subtable % 61.4% 64.0% 59.8% Change Discontent Subtable % 16.4% 12.9% 18.3% Distress Subtable % 1.9% 2.0% 1.5% Boredom Subtable % 6.0% 1.8% 2.3%

Table 19.2. Frequency of Affect categories in preceding and designated minutes associated with Structure Change for all groups.

2.1.2a. Effect of structural change. To test whether structural change manages affect and conflict, a variable called “Structure Change” identified all minutes with changes to greater or to lesser structure from the previous minute or no change. Table 19.2 gives the percentage of Affect categories associated with Structure Change. The proportion of Affect categories in the minute before is compared with the minute of structural change. The percentage of each category for each structural change condition is given. “Negative change” is from Whole to Subgroups, “positive change” from

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Subgroups to Whole. Negative structural change reduces Joy (2.4%), Discontent (4.1%) and Distress (1%), while Interest and Boredom increase, stabilizing pleasure and reducing unpleasure. There is negligible affect change without structural change. Positive change reduces Interest (4.2%) and Boredom (2.5%), and increases Joy (4.6%) and Discontent (2.1%). The proportion of pleasure/unpleasure changes by 1.5% for negative change and 0.4% for positive change. Affect provides weak support for Hypothesis 2.1.2. It is interesting that change towards decreased structural integrity stabilizes both pleasure and unpleasure (since Boredom has lower energy than Discontent) and change towards greater structural integrity destabilizes pleasure, (in the form of increased Joy), but stabilizes unpleasure. Change towards subgroups reduces affective intensity, whereas change towards whole stabilizes unpleasure, but destabilizes pleasure. Percentages of Action categories associated with structural change are shown in Table 19.3 to test the hypothesis for Action Coherence.

Structure Change for All Groups Negative No Positive Change Change Change Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 17.4% 33.0% 18.7% Rating in Accord Subtable % 52.5% 46.3% 59.4% Preceding Minute Discord Subtable % 24.3% 17.6% 17.1% Contracord Subtable % 5.8% 3.1% 4.8% Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 20.3% 33.0% 16.2% Accord Subtable % 56.9% 46.2% 55.8% Discord Subtable % 19.5% 17.5% 23.3% Contracord Subtable % 3.3% 3.4% 4.8%

Table 19.3. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories in preceding and designated minutes associated with Structure Change for all groups.

Negative structural change is associated with movement from conflict to cooperation of 7.3% (Concord 2.9%, Accord 4.4%); in positive structural change, cooperative categories decrease and Discord increases (6.2%). For unchanged Structure, there is no change. This supports Hypothesis 2.1.2, indicating change towards Subgroups increases cooperation and change towards Whole increases Discord.

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Summary 2.1.2.a: Movement from Whole to Subgroups is associated with increased cooperation, stabilized pleasure, reduced unpleasure, conflict and aggression; movement from Subgroups to Whole is associated with increased unstable pleasure, stabilized unpleasure and conflict.

2.1.2b. Probabilities of changes in Group Action states. The hypothesis can also be tested by evidence that when in Whole, groups have lower quality Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence, while movement to Subgroups stabilizes and raises the process’ quality. Transition from Whole-unstable-low quality to Subgroup-stable-high quality should be more frequent than the reverse. This can be examined by considering Action Coherence with Structure change. A variable, “Group Action” was computed showing the incidence of change between Whole-Cooperation, Whole-Conflict, Subgroup-Cooperation and Subgroup- Conflict within a five-minute period. For all groups there were 61.6% unchanging states and 38.4% changes. The percentage of stable states is:

Whole-Cooperation: 28.9%; Subgroup-Cooperation: 26.7%; Whole-Conflict: 4.5%; Subgroup-Conflict: 1.5%. Total unchanging states: 61.6%.

Conflict is largely responsible for instability. Cooperative groups, regardless of structure, are more likely to be stable. Whole is marginally more stable than Subgroups. To magnify this effect, stable minutes were excluded and each change as a proportion of all change was computed. Changes in each direction between states are combined to give an overall probability of transition between the two states within the five-minute period. Figure 19.1 shows change between states as a percentage of all minutes and a proportion of all change. The highest movement is between Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup- Cooperation (14.2%, or 0.37 of all change). The next highest is between Whole- Cooperation and Whole-Conflict (8.8%, or 0.24 of all change); then Subgroup-

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Cooperation to Subgroup-Conflict (5.9%, or 0.15 of all change); between Whole- Conflict and Subgroup-Cooperation is 4.5% or 0.12 of all change between Whole- Cooperation and Subgroup-Conflict is the same as between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup-Conflict at 2.8%, or 0.06 of all changes. Hypothesis 2.1.2 predicts movement between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup- Cooperation would be greater than the opposite direction. It does not comment on the movement between Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup-Cooperation, nor Cooperation and Conflict within the Whole- or Subgroup- conditions. While there is support for the hypothesis, the greatest change indicates rhythms between Cooperative whole and subgroups and between cooperation and conflict in unchanged structure.

Whole- Whole- Cooperation 8.8%, .23 Conflict

2.5%, .06

14.2%, .37 2.5%, .06

4.5%, .12

Subgroup- 5.9%, .15 Subgroup- Cooperation Conflict

Figure 19.1. Change between Group Action states over a five-minute period for all groups as a percentage of all minutes and as a proportion of all changes.

Summary 2.1.2b: The probabilities of movement between Group Action states shows that in whole states, conflict is most likely to be managed within the whole; if it moves to subgroups, it is twice as likely to become cooperative as remain in conflict. In subgroups, conflict is most likely to be managed in subgroups and it is equally likely to remain in conflict or become cooperative if it changes to whole. There are important

238 oscillations within whole states and between whole and subgroup cooperation.

Figure 19.2 shows the net percentage changes when the percentage of change in each direction between each pair of states is subtracted from each other. Although small, they show there is a small tendency for groups to move out of Subgroup- Cooperation into any other state and to drift through Whole-Cooperation and Subgroup- Conflict to end in Whole-Conflict. This suggests an underlying tendency for groups to become whole and conflictual (see chapter 21).

Whole- Whole- Cooperation .6% Conflict

.1%

.2% .1%

.3%

Subgroup- .5% Subgroup- Cooperation Conflict

Figure 19.2. Net percentage change between Group Action states over a five- minute period for all groups.

2.1.2c. Group Action change as a proportion of stable states. Stable Whole- Cooperation and Subgroup-Cooperation (28.9% and 26.7%) are the most frequently occurring states. However, they are also most unstable since they have the most movement between them (14.2%). To compensate for this, the probability of change was weighted in relation to the amount of time spent in the states. This was done in two ways. (a) The percentages associated with all three changes for each state shown in Figure 19.1 were added, forming the total probability groups will depart from, or arrive

239 at that state. (b) The amount of time spent in each state was allowed for by dividing these percentages by the percentage of stable states, to describe changes as a proportion of the total number of those states, giving a comparative indication of the likelihood that the group will move out of each state. These are shown in Table 19.4. Conflict states are four times more unstable in whole and eight times more unstable in subgroup than Cooperation states. Subgroup-Conflict is more than twice as unstable as Whole-Conflict. This is understandable since subgroups are smaller and the effects of conflict more disruptive. However, smaller groups function better and are more attractive to their members (see Chapter 11), suggesting subgroups are not the same as small whole groups. It also shows group stability in cooperation is similar irrespective of structural state. Although a low incidence of structural change is associated with subgroups, it is significant as a proportion of its incidence. However, the move from Subgroup-Conflict to Subgroup-Cooperation is greater than to Whole- Cooperation suggesting that remaining in subgroups is also effective to control conflict.

Group Action State Total percentage Percentage Change as a departure/arrival of Stable proportion of from state States Stable minutes Whole-Cooperation 12.9% 28.1% 0.44 Whole-Conflict 7.4% 4.5% 1.64 Subgroup-Conflict 5.3% 1.5% 3.53 Subgroup-Cooperation 12.8% 26.7% 0.48

Table 19.4. Proportion of change in Group Action characteristics for all groups after five minutes.

Summary 2.1.2c: In proportion to the number of occasions it occurred, Subgroup-Conflict is the state most likely to change; the next most unstable is Whole- Conflict, with cooperative states of similar stability, regardless of structure.

Conclusion 2.1.2: Groups use movement from whole to subgroups to resolve conflict, stabilize pleasure and reduce unpleasure. Though they also resolve these problems within the structural state, they are four and eight times (for whole and subgroups respectively) more likely to change structure when conflictual than when cooperative. Important transitions occur between whole conflict and cooperation and between whole and subgroup cooperation states.

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H2.1.3: In early stages of group life, more therapeutically desirable states will occur in Subgroup Structure; in the later stages, they will occur in Whole Structure.

This hypothesis concerns change in these relationships over the groups’ life. Small trends may obscure more definite patterns specific to time of year. Change in structural conditions over year quartiles are examined. Table 19.5 gives the proportion of Structure categories for each quartile for all groups. There is an increase in Whole and decrease in other categories after quartile 1.

Structure for All Groups. Whole Subgro Subgp+I Individu Grp ups nd als Row % Row % Row % Row % Year 1 48.7% 7.4% 38.8% 5.1% Quartiles 2 65.5% 4.2% 28.3% 2.0% 3 61.0% 8.4% 25.7% 4.9% 4 65.5% 4.0% 24.4% 6.1%

Table 19.5. Percentage of Structure categories in each quartile for all groups.

The proportions of Structure categories occurring in each quartile are shown for each group in Table 19.6. Whole is lowest in quartile 1, and then is similar for other quartiles in 1988; it is lowest in quartile 1, next lowest in quartile 3 and higher for quartiles 2 and 4 for 1990 and 1992; while 1993 and 1996 had the lowest Whole in quartile 2, the highest in 1 and 3, probably because they continued from the previous year. The percentage of Whole increases by 11-17% in the last three quartiles, suggesting groups are more able to manage this state as they develop. This is achieved quickly in quartile 2, which is understandable otherwise the group would disintegrate. Although the years differ in proportions, they conform to this format except for 1993, which had more inconsistent attendance (see Appendix 1). Table 19A.1 in Appendix 3 shows quartile percentages of all categories for all groups for each Structure category. Representational, Discontent and Discord show a linear increase in each quartile. Others are consistent or fluctuate. This does not support the hypothesis that groups gradually develop the capacity to manage Whole structure. They acquire it quickly in

241 the quartile 1.

Structure Whole Subgr Subg Individ Grp oups p+Ind uals Row Row Row Row % % % % YEAR 1988 Year 1 61.3% 2.4% 32.3% 4.1% Quartiles 2 77.2% 1.5% 20.8% .4% 3 77.0% .2% 11.7% 11.1% 4 76.5% 1.0% 16.3% 6.2% 1990 Year 1 22.8% 14.6% 59.1% 3.5% Quartiles 2 56.8% 14.0% 29.1% 3 38.6% 28.0% 33.4% 4 50.5% 13.2% 36.1% .3% 1992 Year 1 19.0% 16.4% 57.5% 7.1% Quartiles 2 60.9% .6% 37.3% 1.2% 3 41.9% 3.2% 52.7% 2.2% 4 54.3% 4.1% 29.0% 12.6% 1993 Year 1 74.9% 3.9% 19.0% 2.2% Quartiles 2 37.8% 43.3% 18.9% 3 80.5% .7% 14.3% 4.4% 4 68.6% 29.7% 1.7% 1996 Year 1 70.8% 19.5% 9.7% Quartiles 2 68.7% 3.9% 25.1% 2.3% 3 93.5% 6.5% 4 89.8% 1.9% 6.8% 1.5%

Table 19.6. Percentage of Structure categories for year quartiles for each group.

Cognitive Organisation for All Groups. Represen Unorgan tational Systemic Normative ised Row % Row % Row % Row % Year 1 Structure Whole Group 8.5% 45.4% 27.9% 18.1% Quartiles #2 Subgp/Ind 4.3% 34.9% 38.1% 22.7% 2 Structure Whole Group 10.6% 50.2% 24.7% 14.5% #2 Subgp/Ind 8.7% 41.5% 28.7% 21.1% 3 Structure Whole Group 27.1% 21.4% 30.5% 21.0% #2 Subgp/Ind 7.2% 24.5% 37.4% 30.9% 4 Structure Whole Group 28.4% 26.0% 25.0% 20.6% #2 Subgp/Ind 13.5% 23.3% 35.0% 28.1%

Table 19.7. The percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in each Structure #2 category by quartiles for all groups.

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Table 19.7 shows change in Cognitive Organization in each structural condition for year quartiles. Systemic dominates in the first quartile (45.5%), but negative organization accounts for almost half the incidence (46%). In quartile 2, Representational and Systemic increase at the expense of negative organization (by 2.1% and 4.8% respectively); in quartile 3, Systemic falls and Representational increases (by 16.5%), but so does Normative (5.8%) and Unorganized (6.5%). In quartile 4, both higher categories increase (Representational 1.3%, Systemic 4.6%) at the expense of lower categories. There is no simple linear relation however; Whole favors increased Representational and reduced Normative and Unorganized through the year. For Subgroups, only 4.3% is Representational in quartile 1. In quartile 2, both higher categories increase at the expense of lower categories (Representational by 4.4%, Systemic 6.6%). In quartile 3, this trend reverses; Normative increases (by 8.7%) and Unorganized (9.8%). In quartile 4, all three categories contribute to increased Representational (6.3%). There is greater increase in higher functional categories in Whole over the year; for Subgroup, Representational increases.

Summary 2.1.3a: For Cognitive Organization, the hypothesis is not supported, but Representational increases in both structures through the year and there are rhythms present the hypothesis does not reveal.

Affect #2 for All Groups. Joy Interest Discontent Distress Row % Row % Row % Row % Year 1 Structure Whole Group 14.9% 65.8% 18.2% 1.0% Quartiles #2 Subgp/Ind 15.7% 60.3% 21.5% 2.5% 2 Structure Whole Group 12.8% 71.8% 14.1% 1.3% #2 Subgp/Ind 13.0% 65.8% 18.2% 3.0% 3 Structure Whole Group 16.6% 69.5% 12.4% 1.5% #2 Subgp/Ind 21.0% 61.9% 16.4% .7% 4 Structure Whole Group 18.8% 63.6% 14.4% 3.1% #2 Subgp/Ind 17.0% 67.5% 13.2% 2.2%

Table 19.8. Proportions of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2 category in year quartiles for all groups.

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Table 19.8 shows percentages of Affect #2 categories for structural categories in each quartile. In quartile 1 for Whole, two thirds of the time is Interest and 1% Distress. In quartile 2, Interest increases at the expense of Joy and Discontent (11.5%), Distress remains stable; in quartile 3, Joy increases (3.8%) at the expense of Interest and Discontent, Distress remains stable. In quartile 4, Interest reduces in favour of all other categories suggesting Whole groups spend more time in pleasure in quartiles 1-3, but are more emotionally turbulent at the end of the year. A similar movement occurs in Subgroups until quartile 4, when Interest increases, contrary to Whole.

Summary 2.1.3b: For Affective states, the hypothesis is not supported; both structures show a similar movement towards Interest then Joy until quartile 4 when there is more turbulence and unpleasure in Whole, but further stabilization in pleasure for Subgroups.

The percentage of Action Coherence categories occurring in Whole and Subgroups for each quartile for all groups is shown in Table 19.9. In quartile 1, 78% of Whole occurs in cooperative categories. In quartile 2, Concord and Discord reduce in favor of Accord (12.8%) and Contracord (1%). In quartile 3, this is reversed with increased Concord (6.3%) and Discord (1.1%). In quartile 4, both cooperative categories fall in favor of both conflictual categories (Discord 2%, Contracord 3.7%).

Action Coherence for All Groups. Concord Accord Discord Contracord Row % Row % Row % Row % Year 1 Structure Whole Group 38.9% 39.2% 19.7% 2.2% Quartiles #2 Subgp/Ind 24.1% 54.7% 19.0% 2.2% 2 Structure Whole Group 28.4% 52.0% 16.4% 3.2% #2 Subgp/Ind 26.9% 48.2% 20.4% 4.5% 3 Structure Whole Group 34.7% 45.4% 17.5% 2.4% #2 Subgp/Ind 25.4% 56.7% 16.0% 2.0% 4 Structure Whole Group 29.8% 44.6% 19.5% 6.1% #2 Subgp/Ind 35.0% 45.5% 15.7% 3.7%

Table 19.9. Percentages of Action Coherence categories in each Structure #2 category in year quartiles for all groups.

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For Subgroups, a similar proportion of cooperation to Whole occurs in quartile 1 (78.8%); In the remaining quartiles, the opposite tends to occur; in quartile 2, Accord reduces (by 6.5%) in favor of the other three categories; in quartile 3, this is reversed, Accord increasing by 8.5%, then in quartile 4, Concord and Contracord increase (by 9.6% and 1.7%) at the expense of Accord and Discord.

Summary 2.1.3c: For Action Coherence, the hypothesis is not supported. Whole increases Accord, then Concord and Discord, then both conflict categories; subgroups shows the opposite trends.

Conclusion 2.1.3: For Whole structure, as the year progresses, higher-level Cognitive and Affect categories increase, but Action fluctuates. For Subgroups, there is a more complex relationship with a rhythmic interchange between increases and decreases in the second category in each Dimension suggesting Subgroups is not unitary since it reflects three distinct conditions.

2.2. Group Function and Group Size. The total number of members present in each session was recorded as a variable called “Group Size,” including members arriving late or leaving the room. The only groups with six members were 1990 (four sessions) and 1992 (one session). These had the highest proportion of Subgroups (18% and 5.4%); remaining groups had 2.5% or less. For groups of less than six, Subgroups+Individuals predominates. This needs to be born in mind in the following investigations.

H2.2. Group functioning will alter according to Size.

Proportions of Structure #2 categories for group size are shown in Table 19.10. The larger the group, the smaller the proportion of time spent in Whole. The hypothesis is supported.

Summary 2.2: The smaller the group, the more time it spends in Whole. This supports the hypothesis that Whole is more difficult and demanding for groups to maintain and this increases with the size.

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Structure #2 for All Groups Whole Group Subgp/Ind Row % Row % Total members 2 73.4% 26.6% present. 3 70.2% 29.8% 4 58.7% 41.3% 5 53.0% 47.0% 6 25.4% 74.6%

Table 19.10. The proportion of Structure #2 categories for different sized groups.

H2.2.1. Different sized groups will show different distributions of GFR categories.

Differences in structural effects of group size were compared for other GFR Dimensions. Table 19.11 shows the relation of group size to the proportion of each Cognitive Organization condition in each structural condition. Groups of two members were excluded since the structure can only be a group of two or two individuals. Comparing all groups with different sized groups shows Representational is 5.3% greater for groups of three in Whole and 7.3% larger for Subgroup, but is progressively smaller in both structures for larger groups. The much higher relative proportion of Representational in Whole than Subgroups is consistent in all sizes, suggesting the larger the group the more difficult is self-reflection. Systemic in Subgroups is consistent for sizes above 3 (32%-36% compared with 31% for all groups). For groups of 3, (23.8%) a subgroup is two members. Whole is similar in three and four members (37.7% and 40.7% compared with 34.9% for all groups), but reduces in larger groups to 24.2% for five and only 4.6% for six members. It is more difficult for larger groups to develop rule-based Cognitive Organization, but it is also more difficult with only two, the optimum being three or four members. Normative increases for size in Whole (22.8% to 30.8% compared with 26.8% for all groups), except for groups of three (26.4%). It is smallest for Subgroups in groups of five and largest in groups of three (41.1% compared with 35.3% for all groups). The smallest figures are Whole (22.8%) in groups of four and Subgroups

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(26.4%) in groups of five, which usually means subgroups of four, since the most common structure in this category is Subgroups+Individuals. Unorganized shows greater variation. Whole increases with size from 11% for three members to 61% for six and Subgroups increases from 19.6% for three to 27.5% for five and decreases for six (24.6%).

Cognitive Organisation for All Groups. Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised Structure Whole Group Row % 19.6% 34.9% 26.8% 18.7% #2 Subgp/Ind Row % 8.2% 31.0% 35.3% 25.6%

Cognitive Organisation for Groups of different size. Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised Total 3 Whole Group Row % 24.9% 37.7% 26.4% 11.0% members Subgp/Ind Row % 15.5% 23.8% 41.1% 19.6% present. 4 Whole Group Row % 17.2% 40.7% 22.8% 19.2% Subgp/Ind Row % 7.0% 32.4% 34.8% 25.8% 5 Whole Group Row % 14.5% 24.2% 28.4% 33.0% Subgp/Ind Row % 7.4% 38.6% 26.4% 27.5% 6 Whole Group Row % 3.1% 4.6% 30.8% 61.5% Subgp/Ind Row % .5% 36.1% 38.7% 24.6%

Table 19.11. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in Structure#2 for all groups and different sized groups.

Summary 2.2.1a: The larger the group, the higher is the proportion of less organized states. This is most evident in Whole, but for Subgroups, the smaller the group, the easier it is for Representational to occur. Units of three to four members favor Systemic.

Table 19.12 shows percentages of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all groups and group sizes. There are linear increases for Joy and Distress with increasing size (except for Subgroups in groups of six). For Whole, Joy ranges from 11.5% to 46.2% compared to 19.6% for all groups and for Subgroups, from 3.6% to 23% compared with 11.3% for all groups; for Distress, the range for Whole is 0.5% to 9.2% compared to 2.1% for all groups and for Subgroups 0.4% to 2.5% compared with 1.7% for all groups. This emphasizes the importance of size.

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Affect #2 for All Groups. Joy Interest Discontent Distress Row % Row % Row % Row % Structure Whole Group 19.6% 63.4% 14.8% 2.1% #2 Subgp/Ind 11.3% 69.7% 17.3% 1.7%

Affect #2 for All Groups. Joy Interest Discontent Distress Total 3 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 11.5% 72.9% 15.1% .5% members Subgp/Ind Row % 3.6% 72.3% 23.8% .4% present. 4 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 22.0% 62.4% 13.4% 2.2% Subgp/Ind Row % 12.6% 72.5% 13.3% 1.6% 5 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 33.0% 44.4% 17.6% 5.1% Subgp/Ind Row % 14.2% 65.2% 18.0% 2.5% 6 Structure #2 Whole Group Row % 46.2% 40.0% 4.6% 9.2% Subgp/Ind Row % 23.0% 71.7% 3.1% 2.1%

Table 19.12. Percentage of Affect #2 categories in Structure #2 for all groups and for different sized groups.

Interest shows a linear decrease for Whole groups with increasing size (72.9% to 40% compared to 63.4% for all groups), while the proportion for Subgroups remains relatively stable (between 65.2% and 72.9% compared with 69.7% for all groups). The larger the group, the less time spent in constant affect when Whole and more time in unstable Joy; but formation of Subgroups preserves a stable proportion of stable pleasure (supporting Hypothesis 2.2.1.). The total value of pleasure for Whole is between 77% and 86% for each size. Groups maintain relatively constant proportions of pleasure/unpleasure. There is no linear relation for Discontent, but an increase in Whole up to five members (15.1% to 17.6%), then a decrease for six (4.6% compared to 14.7% for all groups). For Subgroups, Discontent tends to decrease with greater group size (from 23.8% to 3.1% compared with 17.3% for all groups), supporting it as a means of solving problems in larger groups. Distress shows a linear increase with group size in Whole (0.5% to 9.2% compared with 2-1% in all groups) and in Subgroups ups to groups of five (0.4% to 2.5%) with a similar level for six members.

Summary 2.2.1b: When groups increase in size, they exhibit more unstable affect, but the proportion of pleasure/unpleasure remains relatively constant. Subgroups

248 has a stabilizing effect with a more constant value of Interest and generally lower levels of unstable affect.

Table 19.13 shows percentages of Action Coherence categories for Structure #2 for all groups and different sized groups. Concord shows a linear decrease with increasing group size in Whole (from 46% to 1.5% compared with 35.7% for all groups). In Subgroups, five members has significant less (17.1%) than the other sizes (24.1% to 27.5% compared with 22.7% for all groups). Group size is crucial to achieving Concord. Proportions of Accord are stable for three to five members in Whole (39.6% to 37.8%) but increase for six (47.7% compared with 41% for all groups). Subgroups reduces from 64.1% to 5.3% between group of three and five, (compared with 58.3% for all groups), but increases for groups of six (60.2%).

Action Coherence for All Groups. Concord Accord Discord Contracord Row % Row % Row % Row % Structure Whole Group 35.7% 41.0% 19.6% 3.7% #2 Subgp/Ind 22.7% 58.3% 15.8% 3.1%

Action Coherence for All Groups. Concord Accord Discord Contracord Row % Row % Row % Row % Total 3 Structure #2 Whole Group 46.1% 39.6% 13.3% 1.0% members Subgp/Ind 24.3% 64.1% 10.8% .7% present. 4 Structure #2 Whole Group 39.2% 37.8% 19.3% 3.7% Subgp/Ind 27.5% 55.3% 14.8% 2.4% 5 Structure #2 Whole Group 16.2% 39.6% 35.0% 9.3% Subgp/Ind 17.1% 53.0% 22.8% 7.1% 6 Structure #2 Whole Group 1.5% 47.7% 40.0% 10.8% Subgp/Ind 24.1% 60.2% 13.6% 2.1%

Table 19.13. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in Structure#2 for all groups and for different sized groups.

Discord increases with group size for Whole (13.3% to 40% compared with 19.6% for all groups) and Subgroups, (10.8% to 22.8% compared with 15.8%) except for six members, (13.6%) which is comparable to groups of four, which would be their size. There is a similar linear increase for Whole in Contracord for increasing size (1% to 10.8% compared with 3.7% for all groups) indicating size is crucial for conflict.

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Subgroups reduces conflict (0.7% to 7.1% compared with 3.1% for all groups), except for groups of six whose subgroups will be three or four members. Conflict increases with size.

Summary 2.2.1c: As size increases, it is more difficult to maintain cooperation, but forming subgroups increases the proportion of cooperation in larger groups. The effect of group size is greatest on the most challenging states.

H2.2.2. The smaller the group, the lower will be the amount of change in categories from one minute to the next.

This hypothesis concerns stability for all dimensions, so Condensed States are used. A variable was computed comparing each minute with the preceding minute in each session (excluding first minutes) identifying whether the state remained the same, moved to a higher or lower value state. This allowed “positive change,” “negative change” and “no change” to be recorded. The stability of Condensed States for different size groups is shown in Table 19.14. Hypothesis 2.2.2 predicts the percentage of stable minutes decreases as size increases. This is confirmed for groups of two to five members (65.2% - 51.6%), but stability increases for six (58.6%), indicating the stabilizing effect of subgroups of two to four members. Positive and negative change increase with size up to five members and fall for six members.

Total members present for All 2 G 3 4 5 6 Col Col Col Col Col Stability Negative Change %17.8% %21.2% %22.0% %24.5% %19.1% Cfondensed No Change 65.2% 59.0% 56.0% 51.9% 58.6% States Positive Change 17.0% 19.8% 22.0% 23.7% 22.3%

Table 19.14. Stability of Condensed States for different sized groups.

Summary 2.2.2: The smaller the group, the greater is the stability, unless it is large enough to form subgroups without individuals when it functions like smaller

250 groups.

H2.2.3. Sessions of smaller size will function at higher quality compared to other sessions.

The influence of group size on the quality of group function can be examined by comparing the distribution of Condensed States. If larger groups are more unstable, their quality may be lower. Table 19.15 shows the percentage of all Condensed States for different sized groups.

Total members present for All Groups. 2 3 4 5 6 9 Functional Col % 11.2% 13.1% 7.4% 6.1% .8% Condensed Limited Functional Col % 2.7% 4.7% 6.4% 16.4% States Sociable Col % 48.8% 41.4% 34.8% 21.4% 11.7% Limited Sociable Col % 16.7% 24.2% 22.8% 46.1% Unhappy Cooperation Col % 8.8% 8.4% 5.4% 4.1% .4% Happy Conflict Col % 1.1% 6.3% 11.3% 22.2% 18.0% Productive Turmoil Col % 2.7% 2.3% 1.6% 2.1% Dysfunctional Col % .8% 4.2% 7.6% 12.8% 6.6% Nominal Col % 26.6% 4.7% 3.0% 2.1%

Table 19.15. The percentage of Condensed States by group size for all groups.

There are linear relationships for group size with every state except Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional. The proportion of Functional and Sociable decrease as groups become larger as do Unhappy Cooperation, and Nominal (which also lack conflict). By contrast, Limited Functional, Limited Sociable, Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional increase with size, except for six members.

Summary 2.2.3: There is a direct relationship between the proportion of higher quality states and group size. The smaller the group, the larger is the proportion of higher quality states, except that Unhappy Cooperation and Nominal behave like higher quality states (due to absence of conflict). The larger the group, the more likely it is to engage in conflict states.

H2.2.4. The tendency to move from Whole to Subgroups to resolve

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conflict will be more likely in larger groups.

Findings for Hypothesis 2.1.2 indicated groups were most likely to resolve conflict by moving to cooperation within the same structure, but Subgroup-Conflict was the most labile state, followed by Whole-Conflict. The effect of different sizes was compared for Group Action. Table 19.16 shows the percentage of changes between the Group Action states for groups of different sizes.

Group Action State Group Group Group Group All size = 3 size = 4 size = 5 size = 6 Groups Whole-Cooperation <-> Subgroup-Cooperation 16.3% 12.8% 9.9% 10.6% 14.2% Whole-Conflict <-> Whole-Cooperation 8.9% 9.0% 10.7% 3.2% 8.8% Whole-Conflict <-> Subgroup-Cooperation 3.5% 4.6% 6.1% 7.8% 4.5% Subgroup-Conflict <-> Subgroup-Cooperation 2.9% 3.7% 10.4% 2.9% 5.9% Whole-Conflict <-> Subgroup-Conflict 0.9% 2.1% 5.9% 2.8% 2.5% Subgroup-Conflict <-> Whole-Cooperation 2.3% 2.7% 2.5% 1.2% 2.5%

Table 19.16. Total percentage of changes between Group Action states in different sized groups after 5 minutes (excluding percentage of stable minutes).

There is a linear progression for all categories between groups of three to five, except Subgroup-Conflict and Whole-Cooperation and a change at six members reflecting the effect of subgroups. However, the linear relationship is increasing percentage from three to five members except for Whole-Cooperation <-> Subgroup- Cooperation, which is more likely to occur in a group of three than four or five (16.3% to 9.9%), but more likely with six (10.6%, with all groups 14.2%). Changes between cooperation and conflict within Whole are more likely from three to five members (8.9% to 10.7%) and least likely with six (3.2%). Movement between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup-Conflict increases from three to five members (0.9% to 5.9%) and falls for six (2.8%). Change within Subgroups from conflict to cooperation increases fourfold between three and five members (2.9% to 10.4%) and falls for six, similar to 3 members (2.9%). Change between Whole-Conflict and Subgroup-Cooperation increases from three to six members (3.5% to 7.8%) indicating more members are more likely to be in conflict when together. Change between Subgroup-Conflict and Whole- Cooperation is inconsistent, showing little change between three to five members (2.9% to 2.5%), but less for six (1.2%).

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Since six members does not represent a pure factor of group size, cooperative movement between whole and subgroup structures becomes less frequent with increasing size, because there is increased conflict. Movement into and out of conflict increases with size, but movement from whole to subgroups as a means of managing conflict increases with size, including six members. Movement from whole to subgroups as a strategy for resolving conflict is used more as size increases. The larger the group, the more likely it is to develop conflict in whole or retain conflict in the move to subgroups. However, the more members there are, the less likely it will move between whole and subgroup structures when cooperative. The likelihood of becoming cooperative in whole when there is conflict in the subgroups is relatively unchanged.

Summary 2.2.4: The effect of increased group size increases the likelihood of movements between whole group conflict and subgroup cooperation.

2.3. Group Function and Completeness. Another structural element of group process is the number of members missing from sessions. Absentees for each minute are recorded including late arrivals or members leaving the room

H2.3. Groups’ functional quality will alter according to their Completeness.

H2.3.1. The more incomplete the group, the higher will be its functional quality in GFR categories.

The effect of absentees on quality is indicated by comparing the percentage of Condensed states shown in Table 19.17. Functional and Sociable increase between no absentees and two, with a reduction at three. Limited Functional and Limited Sociable progressively reduce, since more members missing makes subgroups less likely. Unhappy Cooperation, Happy Conflict, Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional decrease between none and two absentees and increase for three, the opposite of Functional and Sociable. When groups are missing three members, they spend almost a quarter of their time as individuals in Nominal.

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Number of Members Absent 0 1 2 3 9 Condensed Functional Col % 8.7% 8.0% 10.2% 7.8% States Limited Functional Col % 6.5% 4.2% 3.2% .3% Sociable Col % 27.5% 34.4% 44.0% 30.1% Limited Sociable Col % 21.9% 24.1% 16.8% 16.8% Unhappy Cooperation Col % 6.3% 6.1% 5.3% 6.4% Happy Conflict Col % 16.1% 10.0% 7.9% 9.0% Productive Turmoil Col % 2.3% 1.7% 1.5% 2.0% Dysfunctional Col % 8.6% 7.5% 5.6% 3.8% Nominal Col % 2.2% 3.9% 5.5% 23.8%

Table 19.17. Percentage of Condensed States in groups with different numbers of absentees.

The effect of absentees is not linear. It confounds two influences: (a) loss of problems through loss of members and (b) threat to the group’s integrity and continued existence. Loss of one or two members reduces conflict and increases functional and sociable tendencies, although for the loss of one member this improvement is in Sociable not Functional. When absentees are great enough to threaten the integrity of the group, Unsociable and Nominal states increase.

Summary 2.3.1a: Absentees decrease Unsociable states and increase higher quality states until three or more absentees threaten group integrity, then higher quality states decreased and Unsociable and Nominal increase.

The quality of GFR categories is analyzed by comparing the effect of group size and absentees on Action Coherence, since conflict was found to be crucial for group function. Table 19.18 shows percentages of Action Coherence categories for group size and absentee for Structure #2. For groups of three or four members complete or with one absentee, there is no effect on Concord and little effect on Accord or Discord. However, when these groups are the remainder of larger groups with two or more absentees, there is about a 20% reduction in Whole Concord and a corresponding increase in Accord and Discord. Absentees greatly reduce the group’s capacity to be in Concord. Although there are

254 similar trends for Cognitive Organization and Affect, they are not as clear and systematic as for Action Coherence, which proves highly sensitive to structural factors.

Action Coherence for All Groups. Concord Accord Discord Contracord Row % Row % Row % Row % Total 3 Number 0 Structure Whole Group 55.5% 26.1% 16.5% 1.8% members of #2 Subgp/Ind 22.9% 61.5% 13.5% 2.1% present. Members 1 Structure Whole Group 53.1% 31.5% 14.6% .8% Absent #2 Subgp/Ind 10.5% 78.5% 10.5% .4% 2 Structure Whole Group 39.0% 48.4% 11.7% .9% #2 Subgp/Ind 35.8% 52.8% 10.8% .6% 4 Number 0 Structure Whole Group 46.0% 33.5% 18.3% 2.1% of #2 Subgp/Ind 34.1% 50.2% 12.3% 3.3% Members 1 Structure Whole Group 46.4% 33.7% 14.8% 5.1% Absent #2 Subgp/Ind 36.9% 46.0% 15.4% 1.7% 2 Structure Whole Group 17.8% 52.9% 27.4% 1.9% #2 Subgp/Ind 4.5% 79.5% 12.7% 3.3% 5 Number 0 Structure Whole Group 18.9% 40.6% 32.1% 8.4% of #2 Subgp/Ind 19.0% 50.8% 22.6% 7.5% Members 1 Structure Whole Group 33.7% 51.9% 14.4% Absent #2 Subgp/Ind 2.7% 69.3% 24.0% 4.0% 6 Number 0 Structure Whole Group 1.5% 47.7% 40.0% 10.8% of #2 Subgp/Ind 24.1% 60.2% 13.6% 2.1% Members

Table 19.18. Percentage of Action Coherence in Structure #2 categories showing the influence of group size and absentees.

Summary 2.3.1b: When small groups result from larger groups with absentees, their capacity to be in Concord is greatly reduced. The trend of the interaction of size and absentee for other GFR Dimensions is not so consistent.

H2.3.2. The more incomplete the group, the more stable it will be as shown by the amount of change in GFR categories in consecutive minutes.

Variables were computed for each GFR Dimension comparing each minute with the preceding one within each session to show the proportion of unchanged states and the extent to which they contribute to Condensed stability. Table 19.20 shows the effect of absentees on stability for Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence.

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Number Absent for All 0 G 1 2 3 Col Col Col Col Stability Negative Change %24.5% %20.3% %19.9% %21.7% Cfondensed No Change 51.4% 59.4% 61.3% 58.3% States Positive Change 24.1% 20.3% 18.8% 20.0%

Table 19.19. Absentees’ effect on Stability of Condensed States for all groups.

All GFR Dimensions do not contribute equally to the results for Condensed States. There is only 1% increase in stability for Structure with absentees. Cognitive Organization is similar with only 1% increased stability when two are absent, but reduced stability of 4% with three absent. For Affect, however, one absentee increases stability by 6%; loss of two gives an additional 6%, but loss of three reduces stability by 3%. For Action Coherence, the loss of one member increases stability by 11%, but there is little additional stability for two, and three increases stability by 1%.

Number Absent for All Groups 0 1 2 3 Stability of Structure Prestructure = Structure 79.0% 79.0% 80.9% 80.0% Stability of Cognition Precogn = Cognorg 73.9% 73.6% 74.0% 69.9% Stability of affect Preaffect = Affect 63.0% 69.7% 75.7% 71.9% Stability of Action Preaction = Action 63.8% 74.9% 74.6% 75.9%

Table 19.20. Effect of absentees on percentage of stable minutes for Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence.

The increased stability from absent members is a result of Affect and Action Coherence. One absentee has a pronounced effect on both Dimensions, two absentees alter Affect, with little impact on Action Coherence, whereas the third absentee (causing insecurity about the group’s future in 5-6 member groups) decreases the stability of Affect, but produces a marginal increase in stability in Action Coherence. The threat to the group’s survival is registered by increased affective instability, whereas the fewer members, the less conflictual tension is likely (see Table 19.13).

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Summary 2.3.2a: Absentees increase stability until there are sufficient members away to throw doubt on the viability of the group, then stability decreases. The effect is mainly derived from Affect and Action Coherence, with little change for Structure and Cognitive Organization.

Table 19A.2 in Appendix 3 shows the effect of absentees on Condensed States for all groups by year quartiles. The effect of absentees varies during the year (see discussion in Appendix 3). In quartile 1, absentees are disruptive as groups are trying to consolidate. In quartiles 2 and 3, absentees allow them to function better by avoiding tensions of all members together. They function better with up to two absentees, after which the group is threatened. In quartile 4, groups are most functional when everyone is present and do not function as well with absentees.

Summary 2.3.2b: Although absentees have a stabilizing and enhancing effect on the group process, this is clearest in the middle quartiles of the year. In quartile 1, they threaten the group when it is establishing itself and in quartile 4, groups function best with all members present.

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20. RESULTS 3: DYNAMICS.

Hypotheses about group dynamics investigate relationships between GFR Dimensions.

3.1. Cognitive Organization and Group Function. When groups achieve better cognitive function, it is hypothesised they are more likely to regulate Affect and manage conflict.

H3.1. Low quality Cognitive Organization categories (Unorganized, Normative) will be more likely to be associated with Dysfunctional categories of Affect (Discontent, Distress, Boredom) and Action Coherence (Discord, Contracord). Conversely, high quality categories of Cognitive Organization (Systemic, Representational) will be more likely to be associated with higher functional categories for Affect (Joy, Interest) and Action Coherence (Concord, Accord).

1.1. Proportions of Categories. The percentage of Affect and Action Coherence categories present in Cognitive Organization categories are shown in Tables 20.1 and 20.2.

COGNITIVE ORGANISATION Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised Col % Col % Col % Col % AFFECT Contentment 2.0% 6.2% .3% Joy 10.8% 14.1% 15.2% 25.0% Interest 63.8% 73.0% 66.1% 44.6% Discontent 22.6% 5.6% 13.6% 20.0% Distress .7% .9% 1.6% 5.0% Boredom .1% .1% 3.1% 5.4%

Table 20.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Affect categories for all groups.

The distribution of Affect categories for Unorganized shows 44.6% is stable pleasure, 45% divided between Joy and Discontent and 10.4% between Distress and Boredom. As Cognitive Organization increases to Normative, Interest increases,

258 showing additional stabilized pleasure of 22%. With Systemic, Contentment appears and stable pleasure increases by 11% from other categories. In Representational, all pleasure categories reduce for 17% increase in Discontent. Distress is only significant in Normative and Unorganized, while Joy shows a linear decrease with organization. Increased organization stabilizes Affect into Interest and self-reflection increases stabilized unpleasure, which is related to discussion of their problems rather that interpersonal tensions of lower organization.

Summary 3.1.1a: The hypothesis is supported with a linear relation of increasing pleasure and stable affect from Unorganized to Systemic, but Representational shows increased stable unpleasure.

In Table 20.2, Unorganized has negligible Concord, Accord 52.3%, Discord 38.4% and Contracord 8.8%. As groups become Normative, conflictual categories reduce to increase Accord 22% and Concord 6%. In Systemic, conflictual categories and Accord reduce for Concord 65%. But in Representational, Concord reduces to 46% in favor of Accord and Discord. Self-reflection is associated with increased conflict as members consider their problems.

COGNITIVE ORGANISATION Representational Systemic Normative Unorganised Col % Col % Col % Col % ACTION Concord 45.6% 64.9% 6.3% .6% Accord 40.6% 25.0% 73.8% 52.3% Discord 12.1% 8.7% 17.1% 38.4% Contracord 1.7% 1.5% 2.8% 8.8%

Table 20.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Action Coherence categories for all groups.

Summary 3.1.1b: The hypothesis is supported with increasing cooperation and reduced conflict from Unorganized to Systemic, but increased conflict for Representational.

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3.2. Effects of unstable affect and conflict on group function. The next hypothesis examines the relationship between unstable affect and conflict.

H3.2. High, unstable Affect (Joy, Distress) and conflictual Action Coherence categories (Contracord, Discord) will be associated with instability and change on the other dimensions in the same or succeeding minutes.

The null hypothesis predicts the proportion of stable minutes would be constant for each category of Affect and Action Coherence for the other Dimensions. The proportions of minutes for each GFR Dimension for all groups in Affect and Action Coherence categories were examined. Reduced stable minutes from the general frequency would indicate a selective effect associated with the indicated category. The percentage of unchanged minutes for each Dimension is:

Structure: 83.6% Cognitive Organization: 86% Affect: 83.5% Action Coherence: 81%

A difference of 5% could be considered a significant departure from these general rates (see chapter 17).

3.2.1. Affect. The percentages of minutes in which groups remained in the same category were calculated for each Affect category. The Hypothesis predicts a higher percentage of change for high, unstable Affect (Joy and Distress) than for other categories. The percentages are shown in Table 20.3. Those highlighted are higher or lower by 5% or more than unchanged percentages for all groups. In Structure, Contentment has 6% higher stability, but Discontent and Boredom are lower (5.4% and 9.9%); Cognitive Organization has 8% increased stability for Contentment. In Affect, increased stability is present for Contentment and Distress. In Action Coherence, Contentment is significantly more stable (15.1%) but Discontent and

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Distress are lower (by 7.2% and 14.9%), and there is reduced stability for Joy. Discontent and Distress reduce stability in Structure and Action Coherence tending towards conflict.

Summary 3.2.1: Contentment increases stability for all dimensions, but unpleasure decreased stability in Structure and Action Coherence.

AFFECT Contentment Joy Interest Discontent Distress Boredom Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Structure Change Whole to Subgroups 5.2% 7.5% 7.7% 10.9% 9.2% 19.5% No Change 89.6% 85.2% 83.9% 78.1% 83.5% 73.7% Subgroups to Whole 5.2% 7.4% 8.3% 11.0% 7.3% 6.8%

Cognitive Change Organised to Disorganised 1.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.3% 6.4% 12.8% No Change 93.5% 85.9% 85.9% 84.6% 89.0% 85.7% Disorganised to Organised 4.5% 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 1.5%

Affect Change Pleasure to Unpleasure 1.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.3% 6.4% 12.8% No Change 93.5% 85.9% 85.9% 84.6% 89.0% 85.7% Unpleasure to Pleasure 4.5% 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 1.5%

Action Change Cooperation to Conflict .6% 11.3% 7.5% 16.1% 18.3% 7.5% No change 98.7% 77.2% 83.6% 73.8% 66.1% 85.7% Conflict to Cooperation .6% 11.6% 8.8% 10.1% 15.6% 6.8%

Table 20.3. Percentage of stable minutes in each Affect category for all GFR Dimensions.

3.2.2. Action Coherence. In Discord and Contracord, members’ different or incompatible goals place group cohesion under stress and may decrease stability in other dimensions. Table 20.4 shows the percentages of stability for the rated and subsequent minutes of Action Coherence since the effect may only occur in the following minute. Increased stability of more than 5% is highlighted, and increased change is shown in italics. In Structure, stability increases in Concord for both the observed and following minutes (6.3%-6.8%). Stability reduces in Contracord for both minutes (5.2% and 9.9%), indicating a persisting effect. Cognitive Organization stability increases in Concord for both minutes (5.6%). For Affect, stability increases in Concord for both

261 minutes (10% and 8.1%), but reduces in Discord and Contracord for the observed minute (14.4% and 22.4%). For Action Coherence, stability increases in Concord for both minutes, (13.7% and 12.4%), but Discord has decreased stability in both minutes (28.2% and 27.9%) and Contracord (12.6% and 7.8%).

Summary 3.2.2: Concord increases stability in all Dimensions in observed and following minutes; Discord and Contracord decrease stability in all except Cognitive Organization. These effects continue into the following minute for Contracord in Structure and Action Coherence and Discord in Action Coherence. This supports the hypothesis, but shows Concord increases stability.

ACTION COHERENCE Concord Accord Discord Contracord Col % Col % Col % Col % Structure Change. Whole to Subgroups 5.5% 9.9% 9.0% 8.9% No Change 89.9% 80.4% 80.4% 78.4% Subgroups to Whole 4.5% 9.6% 10.6% 12.6% Structure Change 1 Whole to Subgroups 4.7% 8.6% 10.8% 14.2% minute after. No Change 90.4% 81.3% 81.7% 73.7% Subgroups to Whole 4.9% 10.1% 7.5% 12.1% Cognitive Change. Organised to Disorganised 1.4% 9.0% 9.8% 9.5% No Change 91.6% 82.9% 85.4% 84.2% Disorganised to Organised 7.0% 8.1% 4.8% 6.3% Cognitive Change 1 Organised to Disorganised 7.2% 6.4% 5.0% 7.4% minute after. No Change 91.6% 83.9% 85.1% 82.6% Disorganised to Organised 1.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0% Affect Change. Pleasure to Unpleasure 2.2% 5.4% 22.4% 29.5% No Change 93.5% 84.0% 69.1% 61.1% Unpleasure to Pleasure 4.3% 10.5% 8.5% 9.5% Affect Change 1 Pleasure to Unpleasure 7.2% 6.4% 5.0% 7.4% minute after. No Change 91.6% 83.9% 85.1% 82.6% Unpleasure to Pleasure 1.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0% Action Change. Cooperation to Conflict 47.2% 31.6% No Change 94.7% 84.1% 52.8% 68.4% Conflict to Cooperation 5.3% 15.9% Action Change 1 Cooperation to Conflict 6.6% 15.2% minute after. No Change 93.4% 84.8% 53.1% 73.2% Conflict to Cooperation 46.9% 26.8%

Table 20.4. Percentage of change in Group Dimensions associated with Action Coherence categories for the minute of observation and the following minute.

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3.2.3. Trends in Condensed States for Affect and Action Coherence. Changes for conflict in the minute after Condensed States’ occurrence are explored over a three- minute period. Percentages of Condensed States for each minute after the rating were computed and compared. Where there was a consistent trend for these values to increase or decrease in each of the three minutes, the value of the third minute was subtracted from the first and expressed as a percentage of change from the highest figure. It was positive if it was an increase and negative if it was a decrease. This value is a numerical indication of the trend for that Condensed State to change following the Affect or Action Coherence category concerned, indicating the dynamic properties of Affect and Action Coherence categories and their effect on the direction of the group process. No clear trend is indicated by the sign “~” and unchanged values are indicated by “=”. Computations are given for Affect#2 and Action Coherence separately in Tables 20.5 and 20.6. 3.2.3a. Affect. Joy shows no consistent trend for Functional or Sociable states, but increase for Unsociable states. There is a modest decrease in Interest for Functional and Sociable states and increases in all Unsociable states. The greatest increase is for Unhappy Cooperation. Increases are evident for Discontent in Functional and Sociable states and decreases in Unsociable states except for Happy Conflict which is inconsistent. There are increases in Distress for Sociable and Limited Sociable and decreases in Dysfunctional and Productive Turmoil, which is the opposite pattern to Joy. Joy Interest Discontent Distress Functional ~ -8% +34% ~ Limited Functional ~ -10% +41% = Sociable ~ -4% +20% +4% Limited Sociable ~ -3% +20% +25% Unhappy Cooperation +71% +26% -34% ~ Happy Conflict +18% +7% ~ ~ Productive Turmoil +36% +19% -26% -29% Dysfunctional +18% +14% -17% -30% Nominal +7% +7% +7% ~

Table 20.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect#2 categories over three minutes.

Summary 3.2.3a: In the following three minutes, pleasurable Affect is associated with increased Unsociable states and decreased Functional and Sociable states;

263 unpleasurable Affect is associated with the opposite trends, except Distress does not have trends for Functional or some Unsociable states.

3.2.3b. Action Coherence. Similar trends as for affective states are evident for action in Table 20.6. Cooperative action categories are associated in the following three minutes with decreased Functional and Sociable states and increased Unsociable states; conflictual categories are associated with increased Functional and Sociable states (except for Contracord) and decreased Unsociable states. Aggression in Contracord initiates movement away from Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional towards more constructive states.

Concord Accord Discord Contracord Functional -12% -8% +34% ~ Limited Functional -5% -10% +41% = Sociable -5% -4% +20% +4% Limited Sociable +4% -3% +20% +25% Unhappy Cooperation +15% +26% -34% ~ Happy Conflict +13% +7% ~ ~ Productive Turmoil ~ +19% -26% -29% Dysfunctional +26% +14% -17% -30% Nominal +38% +7% +7% ~

Table 20.6. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Action Coherence categories over three minutes.

Summary 3.2.3b: In the following three minutes, cooperative action is associated with increased Unsociable states and decreased Functional and Sociable states; Discord is associated with the opposite trends, Contracord increases Sociable states and decreases Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional states.

Condensed States show Affect and Action Coherence categories have a tendency to change towards the opposite pole of the Dimension. These results extend findings for hypothesis 2.2. Instead of general instability, both Affect and Action Coherence initiate trends towards the other pole of group states creating a cyclical group process. These results throw light on groups’ development of homeostatic regulation. Each Affect category is associated with a tendency to change to the other states: Joy has a strong tendency towards unpleasurable, conflictual states and away from pleasurable

264 cooperative states. Interest has less consistent trends to decrease constructive states, but stronger tendencies towards Unsociable states. However, Discontent and Distress tend toward constructive pleasurable states and reduced Unsociable states. In Action Coherence, the same pattern is evident. The more conflictual the category is, the stronger the compensatory tendency, indicating stabilizing, self-structuring group process, essential for preserving social life (Turner 1988). 3.2.3c. Group Differences. If groups differed in extent and pattern of these processes, it would suggest they indicate therapeutic progress. Groups were compared for these relationships over the year. In Appendix 3, Tables 20A.1 – 20A.5 show considerable variation of change in Condensed States in the three minutes following Affect and Action Coherence categories. Although there are consistent patterns for all groups, they differ from each other. The 1988 group shows the most comprehensive changes, but there are inconsistencies with positive changes for Joy and Accord. The 1990 group has fewer changes overall, but similar inconsistencies. The 1992 and 1993 groups differ from each other in details with considerable variability, while 1996 has a higher degree of stability. The pooling of data shows the overall trends, but specific groups are less likely to show them clearly.

Summary 3.2. Unpleasure and Conflict are likely to increase group instability in Structure, Affect and Action; however, there is a more general trend for Affect and Action Coherence states to be associated with a trend towards their opposite as expressed by changes in Condensed States over three minutes.

3.3. The relationship between changes in affect and action. Clinical observation suggests Action Coherence changes from cooperation to conflict often precede changes in Affect from pleasure to unpleasure. As groups move to lower Functional states affect follows action. The hypothesis examines how general this phenomenon may be.

H3.3. Changes from positive to negative Affect will be preceded by changes from positive to negative Action in the preceding 1-3 minutes.

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Affect Change in successive minutes. Pleasure Cooperation/Conflict Action Rating in to Unpleasure relation to Affect change. Unpleasure Unchanged to Pleasure Count Count Count Action 5 minutes after Cooperation 251 3338 268 Affect change. Conflict 149 899 128 Action 4 minutes after Cooperation 259 3366 254 Affect change. Conflict 141 871 142 Action 3 minutes after Cooperation 243 3390 267 Affect change. Conflict 157 847 129 Action 2 minutes after Cooperation 246 3416 257 Affect change. Conflict 154 821 139 Action 1 minute after Cooperation 239 3445 259 Affect change. Conflict 161 792 137 Action Rating at Cooperation 151 3518 300 Affect change. Conflict 249 719 96 Action 1 minute before Cooperation 295 3519 171 Affect change. Conflict 105 718 225 Action 2 minutes Cooperation 287 3463 245 before Affect change. Conflict 113 774 151 Action 3 minutes Cooperation 267 3485 252 before Affect change. Conflict 133 752 144 Action 4 minutes Cooperation 273 3484 252 before Affect change. Conflict 127 753 144 Action 5 minutes Cooperation 283 3474 264 before Affect change. Conflict 117 763 132 Action 6 minutes Cooperation 283 3479 282 before Affect change. Conflict 117 757 114 Action 7 minutes Cooperation 279 3473 282 before Affect change. Conflict 121 762 114 Action 8 minutes Cooperation 293 3455 282 before Affect change. Conflict 107 779 114 Action 9 minutes Cooperation 294 3431 293 before Affect change. Conflict 106 802 103 Action 10 minutes Cooperation 300 3433 281 before Affect change. Conflict 100 799 115

Table 20.7. Action rating at Affect Change, 10 minutes before and 5 minutes after for all groups.

3.3.1. Association between Action categories and change of Affect. A variable was computed comparing each Affect rating with the previous one, recording “negative change” from pleasure to unpleasure, “no change” or “positive change” from unpleasure

266 to pleasure. The frequency of conflictual Action Coherence states was compared with Affect change or stability for the ten preceding minutes and following five minutes. Hypothesis 3.3 predicts increased conflict for Action in minutes preceding Affect change. Table 20.7 shows the frequencies of conflict and cooperation for affective change or stability in the same minute, preceding 10 and subsequent five minutes. The first and last five minutes of each session were excluded to avoid overlapping across sessions. The figures for the row “Action Rating at Affect Change” are frequencies of cooperative or conflictual Action Coherence ratings in all minutes in which there is negative, positive and no Affect change. Most of the unchanged Affect is Cooperation (3518 or 69.9%) and Conflict (719 or 14.3%). Change accounts only for 15.8%.

3.3.1a. Negative Affect Change (Pleasure to Unpleasure): Although the difference is small for each category, cooperation decreases from 300 in minute 10 to 267 in minute 3 then increases to 295 in minute 1 before the change. Conflict mirrors this, increasing from 100 in minute 10 to 133 in minute 3 and decreasing to 105 in minute 1 before negative Affect change. In the minute of Affect change, there is a 49% decrease to 151 for cooperation and 137% increase to 249 for conflict. In minute 1 after the change this is reversed with 58% increase to 239 for cooperation and a decrease of 35% to 161 for conflict. Cooperation increases inconsistently but remains below pre- change values with 251 in minute 5. Conflict remains elevated over pre-change values, being 149 in minute 5 post-change, indicating a persisting effect on Action Coherence.

Average % for 10 Percentage in Average % for 5 minutes before minute of negative minutes after negative change. Affect change. negative change. Cooperation 71% 38% 62% Conflict 29% 62% 38%

Table 20.8. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes before, minute of negative Affect change and 5 minutes after.

Expressed as percentages, the range for conflict for the 10 minutes before Affect change is 25-33%, and 37-40% for the 5 minutes after the change. They are compared in Table 20.8 by expressing the average of pre- and post-change frequencies for

267 cooperation and conflict as percentages, and comparing them with the percentage for the minute of change. A massive change in action in the minute of change is indicated.

Summary 3.3.1a: The percentage of conflict increases slightly towards the minute of Affect change, then increases by 33% in the minute of change and reduces by 24% afterwards. The percentage of cooperation shows the reverse pattern.

3.3.1b. Positive Affect Change (Unpleasure to Pleasure): The same pattern is repeated for positive Affect changes (from unpleasure to pleasure). As the minute of change is approached in Table 20.7, cooperation falls from 281 at 10 minutes before, to 245 at 2 minutes before; conflict rises from 115 to 151 in the same period. In the penultimate minute, cooperation is 171, 30.2% below the previous lowest in minute 2 before and conflict 225, 49% above the previous highest in minute 2. In the penultimate minute, cooperation falls 41% below and conflict rises 49% above the previous highest values. At positive Affect change, cooperation increases by 75% to 300 and conflict falls by 57% to 96 in the minute of change. Five minutes after the change, values are similar to those of five minutes before - 268 for cooperation and 128 for conflict. There is a higher state of conflict in the minute before a positive Affect change, which is accompanied by a dramatic change in cooperation.

Average % for 10 Percentage in Average % for 5 minutes before minute of positive minutes after positive change. affect change. positive change. Cooperation 74% 76% 66% Conflict 26% 24% 34%

Table 20.9. Mean percentage of cooperation and conflict minutes of the 10 minutes before, minute of positive Affect change and 5 minutes after.

Mean percentages are given in Table 20.9 for the preceding 10 minutes, the minute of change and the 5 minutes after. There is little difference for the mean percentage for the preceding minutes and the change, but there is an increase of the mean by 10% for conflict after the change. However, if the penultimate minute pre- change is excluded, mean percentages are 68% cooperation and 32% conflict, showing a change toward conflict in the penultimate minute, reversed for positive Affect change.

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Summary 3.3.1b: The percentage of conflict increases by 49% in the minute before positive Affect change, decreases 57% in the minute of change and increases again in the following minutes. There is little difference between the mean of preceding minutes and the change but 10% increase in the mean for conflict following the change. Positive change may often be a response to negative action change in the preceding minute.

3.3.1c. No Affect Change: In the unchanged Affect column, Action has a similar pattern of change in minutes 10 to 2 before the change with cooperation from 3431-3485 and conflict 752-802. In the penultimate minute, these values are raised to 3519 for Cooperation (2.1% above the previous highest value at minute 3 pre-change) and lowered to 718 for Conflict (4.5% below the previous lowest value also at minute 3 pre-change). Values for the minute of change are almost identical, then in the five minutes after, they return towards pre-change values with Cooperation 3338-3445 and Conflict 792-899. Groups spend most of their time in unchanging Affect states associated with 83% cooperation and 17% conflict and there is minimal change before and after the minute.

Summary 3.3.1c: Conflict and cooperation proportions alter little when there is no Affect change. 3.3.1d. Graph of Affect changes. Figure 20.1 shows the data in graph form. The rhythmic nature of the values is evident with a symmetrical relationship between cooperation and conflict values.

In the minute preceding positive Affect change, the group is likely to be in an unpleasurable state, associated with increased conflict; but this is reduced when the change to pleasure occurs. At negative Affect change, there is increased conflict when the group enters unpleasure, but not in the preceding minute.

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350

300

250

200

150

100

9m prior 8m prior 7m prior 6m prior 5m prior 4m prior 3m prior 2m prior 1m prior 1m after 2m after 3m after 4m after 5m after 10m prior

Affect Change

Cooperation at -ve Affect Change Conflict at -ve Affect Change Cooperation at +ve Affect Change Conflict at +ve Affect Change

Figure 20.1. Frequencies of cooperation and conflict for 10 minutes before, during and 5 minutes after Affect change for all groups.

3.3.1e. Cooperation Quotients for Affect changes. The figures can be more efficiently described by forming a single figure by dividing the cooperation value by the conflict value to express the proportion of cooperation in relation to negative, positive and no Affect change. This is called the “Cooperation Quotient” (CQ). The higher this figure is, the greater the proportion of cooperation over conflict. CQ’s for figures in Table 20.7 are given in Table 20.10. Relatively consistent values occur before Affect change. At the change, the CQ decreases indicating negative Affect change is associated with increased conflict with and this continues for five minutes. Positive Affect change is associated with lower CQ in the previous minute and a four-fold increase at the change, returning to the values in minute 2 pre-change. Unchanged Affect is associated with a small increase in cooperativeness in the preceding and the observed minute.

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Proportion Cooperative Pleasure > No Change Unpleasure /Conflictual Action Unpleasure > Pleasure 5 mins after 1.7 3.7 2.1 4 mins after 1.8 3.9 1.8 3 mins after 1.5 4.0 2.1 2 mins after 1.6 4.2 1.8 1 min after 1.5 4.3 1.9 Minute of Affect change 0.6 4.9 3.1 1 min before 2.8 4.9 0.8 2 mins before 2.5 4.5 1.6 3 mins before 2.0 4.6 1.8 4 mins before 2.1 4.6 1.8 5 mins before 2.4 4.6 2.0 6 mins before 2.4 4.6 2.5 7 mins before 2.3 4.6 2.5 8 mins before 2.7 4.4 2.5 9 mins before 2.8 4.3 2.8 10 mins before 3.0 4.3 2.4

Table 20.10. Proportions of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation Quotient) for Affect changes in associated minutes.

Proportion Cooperative 1988 1992 1993 1996 1990 /Conflictual Action Latency 5 mins after 2.3 2.2 1.0 4.8 0.7 4 mins after 2.5 2.2 1.2 3.4 1.0 3 mins after 2.4 1.7 0.8 3.4 0.8 2 mins after 2.8 1.4 1.2 2.9 0.8 1 min after 2.7 1.6 0.7 4.0 0.6 Minute of Affect change 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.2 1 min before 4.8 3.5 1.5 16.5 1.2 2 mins before 4.1 2.7 1.1 7.8 1.7 3 mins before 3.2 2.5 1.3 6.0 0.8 4 mins before 3.5 2.6 1.3 4.8 1.0 5 mins before 4.5 2.3 1.5 6.0 1.2 6 mins before 3.4 2.6 1.9 7.8 1.2 7 mins before 2.9 2.7 1.3 7.8 1.4 8 mins before 3.5 2.8 1.9 16.0 1.7 9 mins before 4.8 3.1 2.2 7.8 1.1 10 mins before 4.3 2.8 2.4 34.0 1.5

Table 20.11. Proportions of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation Quotient) for negative Affect changes in associated minutes for each group.

The groups were examined for consistency with these findings. Table 20.11 shows proportions of cooperative and conflictual ratings in each group. Each group has different values and pattern over the period. All show significant reduction in CQ. Unpleasurable Affect change is associated with increased conflict ratings, persisting for

271 five minutes after the change. The 1996 group is more erratic, ranging from values of 6 to 34 before the change, stabilizing between 2.9 and 4.8 afterwards. The difference in values between adolescent and latency groups suggests a higher proportion of conflictual ratings for the Latency (1990) group, but a similar pattern. These figures are graphed in Figure 20.2, showing the similarity of pattern in the CQ over the time period. The discrepancy for 1996 suggests different patterns may occur in other groups.

[34.0] [16.0] [16.5] 10

7 s 6

1 Proportion of Cooperative/Conflictual Rating 0

1m after 2m after 3m after 4m after 5m after 10m prior 9m prior 8m prior 7m prior 6m prior 5m prior 4m prior 2m prior 3m prior 2m prior 1m prior Affect Change

1988 1992 1993 1996 1990

Figure 20.2. Proportion of cooperative/conflictual action ratings (Cooperation Quotient) for 10 minutes prior to 5 minutes after negative Affect change for each group.

3.3.1f. Controlling for overlapping data. The figures above were selected from within sessions. If two or more minutes showed Affect change within ten minutes, they would be counted several times in the tables shown above. A designated minute might be one minute before Affect change at minute x, but three minutes before another Affect

272 change in minute y, and five minutes before another Affect change in minute z. The results may be an artifact of not discriminating these minutes. To control for this, the data pool was split to differentiate Adolescent groups from Latency. Then only minutes with negative Affect change, but without change in the preceding three minutes were selected. Significant differences would be evident within three minutes before or after the change. The proportion of cooperation to conflictual minutes showing positive and negative Affect change was computed. These are shown for all adolescent and the latency groups in Tables 20A.7 – 20A.8 in Appendix 3. The same patterns were found, confirming the findings are valid in spite of the overlap in pooling data.

Time before / after negative Cognitive Affect Action Structure change Organization Coherence 5 mins After 0.8 3.7 3.0 4 mins After 0.9 3.3 2.9 3 mins After 0.8 3.8 2.6 2 mins After 0.8 3.2 3.1 1 min After 0.6 2.9 2.9 Minute of Change 0.7 3.1 3.2 1 min Before 0.8 2.7 2.2 2 mins Before 0.9 3.1 3.1 3 mins Before 0.8 4.0 3.9 4 mins Before 0.9 3.8 3.9 5 mins Before 0.8 3.5 3.3

Table 20.12. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Structure Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions.

3.3.2. Comparison of Affect change with other GFR Dimensions. Tables 20.12 – 20.14 show combinations among Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence showing proportions of positive and negative ratings for five minutes on either side of the change in the dimension examined. Negative change as the most variable function provided the basis for comparison. Action Coherence and Affect are the only Dimensions with a difference between the values in the minute of change, the preceding and subsequent five minutes. All others show no appreciable effect.

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Time before or after Cognitive Structure Affect Action Organization Change Coherence 5 mins after 2.4 4.5 3.2 4 mins after 2.4 3.2 2.7 3 mins after 2.0 3.7 2.9 2 mins after 2.1 3.6 2.8 1 min after 2.0 3.7 2.0 Proportion +ve/-ve 1.9 3.0 2.2 1 min before 2.6 5.7 4.4 2 mins before 2.6 4.2 3.7 3 mins before 2.2 5.0 4.0 4 mins before 2.3 3.6 3.7 5 mins before 2.0 4.5 3.7

Table 20.13. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Cognitive Organization Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions.

Time before or after Action Structure Cognitive Affect Coherence change Organization 5 mins after 1.6 0.7 3.4 4 mins after 1.8 0.7 2.8 3 mins after 1.5 0.7 2.9 2 mins after 1.4 0.6 2.7 1 min after 1.5 0.7 2.4 Proportion +ve/-ve 1.9 0.5 1.4 1 min before 1.4 0.8 8.9 2 mins before 1.5 0.7 3.3 3 mins before 1.4 0.8 3.5 4 mins before 1.5 0.8 3.7 5 mins before 1.6 0.8 3.5

Table 20.14. Proportions of positive/negative Ratings for negative Action Coherence Changes in associated minutes for the other GFR Dimensions.

Summary 3.3: Action changes tend to coincide with Affect changes, last for one minute and return to the previous state. This correspondence is absent from other GFR Dimensions.

3.4. Crises in Group Life. Crises alter groups’ functioning, potentially causing loss of members or breakdown of trust. Clinically, this is often only evident in retrospect. Identifying moments within sessions and the year, where stability changes indicate positive and

274 negative features of the crises or intervening periods may enable them to be managed.

H3.4.1. The group’s function will alter before and after the appearance of specific crisis categories or combinations.

3.4.1. Crisis Events within Sessions. Destructive crises were defined as states involving high, unpleasurable Affect (Distress) and aggression (Contracord). As shown in Table 20.15, crises for all groups occur within five periods separated by at least 3 sessions without crises (although gaps in the data influence these findings). Crises occur in each quartile, but each group has its own pattern. They tend to be later in quartile 1, in the middle of quartile 2 and earlier in the last two quartiles. The 1992 group continued longer so there were later events.

Session Nos. Sessions Sessions Sessions Sessions Sessions 3-8 11-14 17-22 25-31 35-37 1988 2 2 2 2 1990 1 1 2 4 1992 2 3 1 2 2 1993 3 2 3 1996 1 Range of Quartiles 1-8 9-16 17-24 25-32

Table 20.15. Number of Sessions for each group in which destructive crisis events occur, compared by quartiles.

It is curious that they occur in a remarkably consistent pattern of two to three sessions without crises, then five with, suggesting yet another rhythmic relationship.

Summary 3.4.1: Crises occur throughout the year, but in distinct periods within quartiles.

3.4.2. Distress crises. The characteristics of group process approaching Distress crises were also examined.

H3.4.2a. Distress will have identifiable precursors in the preceding 2-5 minutes, which will predict their occurrence.

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Structure #2 5 minute 1 minute Crisis pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Whole 63% 65% 66% Subgp/Ind 37% 35% 34% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.16. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups.

Percentages of GFR categories for five and one minutes preceding and at Distress crises are shown in Tables 20.16 – 20.19 to examine this hypothesis. Structure categories in Table 20.16 remain relatively constant approaching Distress incidents; 66% of Distress events occur in Whole, which increases slightly from the preceding five minutes. Distress is more likely to occur in Whole Structure. Percentages of Cognitive Organization categories approaching and at Distress crises are shown in Table 20.17. The groups’ cognitive functioning is more likely to become Unorganized in the preceding minute and Distress events are associated with increased probability of Unorganized (55%), indicating it is more likely with a loss of cognitive organization, although it occurs in all states.

Cognitive 5 minute 1 minute Crisis Organization pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Representation 8% 5% 6% Systemic 19% 15% 15% Normative 37% 33% 24% Unorganized 36% 47% 55% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.17. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups.

Percentages of Affect categories approaching and at Distress crises are shown in Table 20.18. Groups move out of pleasure and the preceding minute can be in any affective state indicating Distress is unpredictable, but likely (25%) to follow another Distress event. Percentages of Action Coherence categories approaching and at Distress crises

276 are shown in Table 20.19. Action Coherence moves steadily into increasing conflict with a sharp rise in aggression in the minute of the Distress event. Contracord doubles in the preceding minute of Distress, showing that sometimes (21%), it precedes Distress as suggested in Hypothesis 3.3.

Affect 5 minute 1 minute Crisis pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Joy 36% 26% Interest 37% 26% Discontent 23% 23% Distress 4% 25% 100% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.18. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups.

Action 5 minute 1 minute Crisis Coherence pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Concord 12% 6% 3% Accord 41% 33% 12% Discord 36% 40% 32% Contracord 11% 21% 53% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.19. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Distress crises for all groups.

Summary 3.4.2a: Distress is more likely to occur when groups are in Whole structure, deteriorating Cognitive Organization, any category of Affect and increasing conflictual Action Coherence.

3.4.3. Contracord Crises. In the same way, characteristics of the group process approaching Contracord crises were examined in Tables 20.20-20.23.

H3.4.2b. Contracord has identifiable precursors in the preceding 2-5 minutes, which should predict their occurrence.

The percentage of Structure categories associated with Contracord is shown in

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Table 20.20. In the preceding five minutes leading up to a Contracord event, there is a slight trend towards increased Whole Structure. Five minutes before it is 57%, one minute before it is 60% and in the minute of the crisis, it is 65%. Contracord is more likely to occur in Whole but may occur in any Structure.

Structure #2 5 minute 1 minute Crisis pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Whole 57% 60% 65% Subgp/Ind 43% 40% 35% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.20. Percentage of Structure #2 categories for 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups.

Percentages of Cognitive Organization categories approaching and at Contracord are shown in Table 20.21. Contracord is associated with deteriorating Cognitive Organization; it may occur in constructive states, but it is most likely in Unorganized.

Cognitive 5 minute 1 minute Crisis Organization pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Representation 11% 8% 7% Systemic 19% 15% 14% Normative 32% 28% 25% Unorganized 38% 49% 54% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.21. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups.

Affect 5 minute 1 minute Crisis pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Joy 27% 22% 16% Interest 42% 31% 18% Discord 24% 35% 37% Distress 6% 12% 30% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.22. Percentage of Affect categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups.

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Percentages of Affect categories approaching and at Contracord are shown in Table 20.22. There is a trend towards unpleasurable states, sharply increasing in the crisis minute; aggression is more likely with increasing unpleasure and deterioration in the minute of the aggression. Percentages of Action Coherence categories approaching and at Contracord are shown in Table 20.23. There is a significant probability that Contracord occurs over several minutes and is likely to be longer-lasting state than Distress. Action Coherence becomes increasingly conflictual until Contracord occurs, and may follow any state.

Action 5 minute 1 minute Crisis Coherence pre-crisis pre-crisis minute Concord 12% 8% Accord 30% 23% Discord 36% 34% Contracord 22% 35% 100% Total 100% 100% 100%

Table 20.23. Percentage of Action Coherence categories in 5 and 1 minutes before and in Contracord crises for all groups.

Summary 3.4.2b: Contracord crises may occur in any state, but are associated with deteriorating Cognitive Organization, increasing unpleasurable states and may occur over a period of minutes and be longer-lasting than Distress. Action Coherence becomes increasingly conflictual until Contracord occurs.

3.4.4. Group Size and Absentees for Crises within Sessions. Size and absentees of sessions in which crises occur are shown in Tables 20.24 and 20.25.

Group Size Crisis Sessions 6 3 5 12 4 12 3 4 2 1

Table 20.24. Group size for crisis sessions.

Crises are more likely in groups of four or more members when there are one or

279 no absentees. In the sessions following these with destructive crises, there were fewer members for 10 sessions, more members for 4 sessions, the same number of members for 10 sessions and in 6 instances there are no records or it was the last session of the year. There is a 30% risk some members will not attend following a destructive crisis.

Absentee Crisis Sessions 0 16 1 10 2 5 3 1

Table 20.25. Absentees for crisis sessions.

Summary 3.4.4: Crises occur more often in larger groups with one or no absentees, and there is a 30% risk of members missing the next session.

3.4.5. Functional Level of Crisis Sessions. Condensed States provide a means of examining the quality and stability of the crisis sessions.

3.4.5a. Session Quality. Graphs of the means of Condensed States for sessions are shown for each group except 1996 (which had few crises) in Figures 20A.1 – 20A.4 in Appendix 3. The crisis sessions are by no means the least Functional; there are sessions with high and low quality.

Summary 3.4.5a: Destructive rises may occur at any time and seem to be associated with specific events rather than of session quality.

3.4.5b. Session Stability. The relation of crises to session stability was examined for each group except 1996 in Figures 20A.5 - 20A.8 in Appendix 3. The stability of Condensed States is the percentage of minutes in each session that do not change when compared with the next minute. Although most crisis sessions have low stability scores and are often on the trough of a stability cycle, this is not always so. Destructive crises do not necessarily occur in unstable and disorganized sessions, but throughout the year and in a wide variety of situations. They reflect specific interpersonal situations and circumstances of the moment.

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Summary 3.4.5b: Destructive crises occur in stable and unstable sessions.

3.4.6. Minutes leading up to Crisis Events. A number of characteristics related to crises were explored, including states leading up to and minutes following crises, whether they are the culmination of a period of conflict, or break out suddenly and without warning; whether the group settles quickly or remains Dysfunctional for some time. The frequency and percent of Condensed States in the crisis minutes and for the preceding five minutes are shown in Table 20.26. The group was in conflict in the five preceding minutes 63% of the time. There is no simple pre-crisis situation and many states precede it. However, Happy Conflict is the single state most likely to lead to a crisis, probably because of affective instability associated with conflict. The next most likely are Dysfunctional and Sociable states (together they are the highest, 32.5%). Percentages for each group in Table 20A.8 in Appendix 3 are consistent with this.

Condensed State Frequency Percentage Functional 4 1.4% Sociable 49 16.6% Limited Sociable 47 15.9% Unhappy Cooperation 11 3.7% Happy Conflict 93 31.5% Productive Turmoil 11 3.7% Dysfunctional 80 27.1% Total 295 100%

Table 20.26. The frequency and percentage of Condensed States in the five minutes leading to crisis events.

Summary 3.4.6: Crises are most likely to occur within an Unsociable period especially after Happy Conflict, but there is a 55% chance of there being constructive states in the five minutes immediately before it.

3.5. Crisis Sessions: Crises can also be defined in terms of whole sessions challenging the group’s continuation and requiring homeostatic mechanisms to restore functionality. A pattern

281 in their occurrence may allow them to be anticipated and managed. Crisis sessions are defined in two ways: (a) low quality indicated by low percentage of Constructive Condensed States for the session and (b) the unstable Condensed States. The percentage of Constructive Condensed States for each session (taken as the percentage of minutes in which the group is in either Functional or Sociable states) and stability of Condensed States (taken as the number of consecutive minutes the group remains in the same Condensed State) are shown in Figure 20.3 for 1988. Quality Crisis sessions are defined as those with more than 50% Unsociable states or more than half the average of the data set. Stability Crisis sessions are defined as those with below 45% stability of Constructive Condensed States. Figures 20A.9 – 20A.11 in Appendix 3 show graphs for three other groups. Stable minutes show oscillation in synchrony with the percentage of Constructive states although which is the lowest varies. Using the <45% criterion, stability crises overlap but do not coincide with the quality crises and occur in sessions 4, 7, 11, 17, and 30. There are such clearly defined fluctuations, that it is tempting to see trough sessions as crises because of the relative change from previous sessions. In this case, sessions 9, 13, 19, 22 and 33 would need to be added.

YEAR: 1988 100

50 % Stable Mins 40 % Constructive 30 States 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 SESSIONS

Figure 20.3. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed States and percentage of Constructive Condensed States for each session of 1988.

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Quality crises occur in sessions 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 29 and 31. Other troughs are in sessions 4, 7, and 26. There is greater differentiation between these two dimensions in the second half of the year, suggesting crises become modified by only occurring on one dimension at a time. The crisis would be greater when Unsociable and unstable together. Figures 20A.9 – 20A.11 in Appendix 3, demonstrate similar patterns occur for all groups with individual variation.

Summary 3.5: Groups move through a series of crises that influence the process, but their structure is complex and there are different types of crises.

3.6. Stability and Quality Cycles. The character of sessions forming the peaks and troughs of stability or quality was examined. The position of each session within quality and stability cycles was computed.

Session Stability

Valid Cumulative Percent Percent Valid Trough 28.9 28.9 1 pre-trough 9.7 38.6 2 pre-trough 4.7 43.3 3 pre-trough 1.7 45.0 4 pre-trough .9 45.9 5 pre-trough .8 46.6 10 pre-trough .9 47.5 8 pre-peak .7 48.2 4 pre-peak .9 49.1 3 pre-peak .8 49.9 2 pre-peak 6.8 56.7 1 pre-peak 11.4 68.1 Peak 31.9 100.0 Total 100.0

Table 20.27. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions in stability cycles for all groups.

3.6.1. Session Stability. Table 20.27 shows the percentage of sessions forming peaks, troughs or other positions for stability cycles. Peaks and troughs constitute 60.8%

283 of the sample; including immediately preceding sessions, they form 81.9%. Two-thirds of sessions involve a change of direction and over 80% of sessions are in cycles only two sessions long. The percentage of GFR Dimension categories are shown for the positions of sessions in stability cycles in Table 20.28. Structure varies by less than 2%. This is surprising since it would be expected that stability troughs might show less Whole than stability peaks. For Cognitive Organization, the highest Representational is in troughs (19.3%) while peaks have the lowest (10.4%). Peaks have the highest Systemic (43.6%), 1 pre- trough has the highest Normative (33.8%) and 1 pre-peak has the highest Unorganized percentage (26.1%).

Session Stability for All Groups Trough 1 pre-trough 1 pre-peak Peak Structure #2 Whole Group Subtable % 61.8% 62.3% 60.9% 61.3% Subgp/Ind Subtable % 38.2% 37.7% 39.1% 38.7% Cognitive Representational Subtable % 19.3% 16.3% 18.3% 10.4% Organisation Systemic Subtable % 30.2% 26.8% 31.8% 43.6% Normative Subtable % 27.4% 33.8% 23.8% 30.5% Unorganised Subtable % 23.1% 23.0% 26.1% 15.6% Affect #2 Joy Subtable % 12.3% 14.7% 18.7% 19.3% Interest Subtable % 63.3% 74.3% 62.2% 66.8% Discontent Subtable % 21.7% 10.1% 16.5% 12.7% Distress Subtable % 2.8% .7% 2.6% 1.2% Action Concord Subtable % 29.4% 40.1% 31.4% 29.8% Coherence Accord Subtable % 43.6% 53.5% 48.5% 49.2% Discord Subtable % 21.9% 5.6% 17.6% 18.5% Contracord Subtable % 5.1% .8% 2.5% 2.5%

Table 20.28. Percentage of GFR Dimension categories for peaks, troughs and preceding sessions for stability cycles in all groups.

This suggests peak sessions are the end of a rising stability trend and the figures show the culmination of a constructive process most active during the upward trajectory, and the beginning of a reversal towards the other pole. The peak is not the culmination of constructive group function, but the end of a process that will not continue in the following session. The quality of peaks has the cause of the trajectory change inherent in them. Perhaps the combination of low Representational and high Systemic in peaks indicates groups become passive, less self-reflective and Systemic organization provides the stability. If this continued, the group would stagnate; therefore it destabilizes in the following session towards greater variety. The highest

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Representational in troughs indicates these sessions stimulate self-reflection. This confirms that instability is therapeutically desirable, but as part of a rhythm. Affect shows highest Joy in stability peaks (19.3%). Since Joy is unstable, this requires interpretation. Joy may be part of the mechanism destabilizing stability peaks. However, this does not happen in the session itself (or it would not be a peak). It is understood not as a goal state, but the end of a trajectory towards increasing stability. It achieves change in the following session (usually a trough), which has lowest Joy (12.3%) and highest unpleasure (24.5%), or a pre-trough, which has the highest Interest (74.3%). Percentages for Action Coherence show pre-trough has highest Concord (40.1%) and peaks and troughs share lowest Concord (29%). Concord is likely to occur after the group has been stable and is becoming less stable. In troughs, the highest percentage of Discord and Contracord (27% together) show instability is related to conflict. Highest Accord (53.5%) occurs in the pre-troughs, showing that they have the lowest incidence of conflict. When conflict is lowest, the group is nearest to a stability trough. However, peaks have high proportions of Accord (49.2%) and significant conflict (21%). There is less difference between peaks and troughs than other sessions. The only significant difference is that Contracord, although low, is doubled in troughs (5.1%), indicating the instability. The highest stability has significant conflict that is greatly reduced in the session before troughs. The most cooperative sessions are before the greatest conflict. When the group is on a falling stability trajectory it cooperates, but when it is going to change direction, conflict increases. Stability does not mean absence of conflict. It can be contained and managed by the presence of other dimensions such as in Systemic Cognitive Organization. Maximum cooperation is related to increasing instability and the expectation of a resurgence of conflict. Action Coherence is crucial to homeostatic process.

Summary 3.6.1: Troughs are the end of a trajectory of increasing instability and the beginning of a stabilization trajectory. The close relationship between pre-troughs and peaks indicates that after a peak the trajectory falls slightly in many instances and then descends sharply to the trough. Hence, pre-trough sessions are closer to peaks than troughs.

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3.6.2. Session Quality: Session Quality is the percentage of Functional and Sociable Condensed States. Although a crude measure, it represents absence of conflict and unpleasure and the presence of Representational and Concord. The frequency and percentage of sessions in Session Quality cycles is shown in Table 20.29.

Quality peaks or troughs constitute 65.6% of sessions, and 82.8% with the immediate preceding session. Only about 20 sessions (17%) out of 119 are not within this 3-session quality cycle. Figures are similar to session stability.

Session Quality

Valid Cumulative Percent Percent Valid Trough 29.0 29.0 1 pre-trough 10.2 39.1 2 pre-trough 4.8 44.0 3 pre-trough 1.9 45.8 5 pre-trough .8 46.6 6 pre-trough 1.0 47.6 10 or more pre-peak 1.7 49.3 8 pre-peak .7 50.1 7 pre-peak .7 50.8 6 pre-peak .7 51.5 2 pre-peak 5.0 56.4 1 pre-peak 7.0 63.4 Peak 36.6 100.0 Total 100.0

Table 20.29. Percentage of sessions forming troughs, peaks and intermediate sessions in quality cycles for all groups.

In Table 20.30, percentages of GFR Dimension Categories are shown for quality cycles. In Structure, the lowest proportion of Whole is in troughs (54.5%), the highest in pre-trough (68.6%). This is similar to peaks and repeats the pattern found in stability cycles that pre-troughs are closer to peaks than troughs, suggesting they are better considered as “post-troughs.” The higher proportion in pre-troughs indicates groups are most likely to be whole just before a trough when they are least likely to be whole. In Cognitive Organization, groups are most likely to be in Representational in pre-troughs or peaks (18% or 17%) and least in troughs (13%). The highest Systemic is in peaks (42.8%) and lowest in troughs and pre-troughs (27% and 29%). Peaks have the lowest proportion of Normative and Unorganized (26% and 14%). Highest Normative

286 is in pre-peak (32%) and Unorganized in troughs (29%). Groups are most likely to be in Systemic or Representational in quality peaks, but equally likely to be in Representational before a quality trough or after a peak. For Cognitive Organization, troughs are indicated by higher Normative and Unorganized. The highest quality is determined by Systemic and Representational. High Systemic leads to peaks, but Representational continues high after the peak. Peaks are closer to the subsequent session than the preceding. Troughs have the highest Unorganized, and the same proportion of Normative with pre-peaks (post-troughs). They are better understood as post-peaks instead of pre-troughs, emphasizing peaks and troughs as changes of trajectory having greater affiliation with later sessions than the preceding.

Session Quality for All Groups Trough 1 pre-trough 1 pre-peak Peak Subtable % Subtable % Subtable % Subtable % Structure #2 Whole Group 54.5% 68.6% 60.6% 66.7% Subgp/Ind 45.5% 31.4% 39.4% 33.3%

Cognitive Representational 12.7% 17.9% 13.3% 17.1% Organisation Systemic 27.1% 29.8% 35.4% 42.8% Normative 31.8% 29.2% 32.0% 26.1% Unorganised 28.5% 23.1% 19.4% 13.9% Affect #2 Joy 13.2% 21.1% 18.0% 17.5% Interest 65.7% 69.6% 64.2% 64.3% Discontent 19.3% 7.8% 15.8% 16.0% Distress 1.7% 1.6% 2.0% 2.1%

Action Concord 30.4% 43.2% 23.4% 27.9% Coherence Accord 50.7% 39.1% 57.2% 47.4% Discord 16.4% 15.5% 15.8% 20.2% Contracord 2.5% 2.2% 3.6% 4.5%

Table 20.30. Percentage of GFR Dimension Categories for peaks, troughs and preceding sessions for session quality cycles in all groups.

For Affect, highest Joy is in pre-trough (21%) followed by pre-peak (18%). Joy is significantly higher in peaks (17.5%) than troughs (13.2%), indicating that although Joy is unstable, it is more likely to occur in high quality sessions. Highest Interest is in pre-trough (69.6%) although is equally likely in all types of sessions. Lowest proportions of unpleasure are in pre-troughs (9.4%). Although Discontent is highest in troughs (19.3%) as expected, Distress is higher in peak and pre-peak (2%). This appears contradictory, but session quality is the percentage of Functional and Sociable

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Condensed States. In those sessions where the greatest proportion of time is in constructive states, a significant amount of time is spent in unpleasure. In high quality states, Affect is more likely to be mixed than Cognitive Organization. However, it supports peaks as being the beginning of a change of trajectory with Distress indicating increased unpleasure. Pre-troughs (or post-peaks) have highest pleasure and troughs lowest, again indicating change in trajectory. For Action Coherence, highest Concord is in pre-troughs (43.2%) followed by troughs (30.4%). Accord is highest in pre-peak (57.2%), followed by troughs (50.7%). The highest conflict categories are in peaks (20.2% and 4.5%). This seems to contradict them as high quality sessions until the measure of percentage of constructive minutes is remembered. The figures indicate sessions with high Functional or Sociable also have high conflict. Groups are more liable to conflict in their highest quality than in the other states. Quality peaks contain the basis of reduction in quality and change in the trajectory. The lowest conflict is in pre-troughs (post-peaks) suggesting they change trajectory from peaks.

Summary 3.6.2. Highest quality sessions are associated with significant unpleasure and conflict and there is evidence of homeostatic processes oscillating groups between peaks and troughs. This is understood as changing trajectories rather than attainment of goal states.

3.7. Occurrence of Crises within Sessions. Since crises are of short duration, their occurrence within the sessions can be examined.

H3.4.3. Crisis points, particularly Distress and Contracord will be more likely to occur in the middle quartiles of sessions than the first or last quartiles.

The percentage of Distress and Contracord in session quartiles is shown in Table 20.31.

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Session Quartiles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Affect Joy 13% 15% 16% 20% #2 Interest 70% 68% 66% 60% Discontent 16% 15% 15% 17% Distress 1% 2% 3% 3% Action Concord 23% 32% 37% 29% Coherence Accord 62% 48% 39% 42% Discord 14% 18% 19% 23% Contracord 1% 2% 5% 5%

Table 20.31. Percentage of Affect and Action Coherence categories for session quartiles for all groups.

Session lengths vary and quartiles are calculated so variability falls in the third quartile making it a larger than the others, but retaining the integrity of the first and last quartiles. Joy increases to quartile 4, while Interest falls. Discontent remains relatively stable, but comparatively, Distress becomes more frequent in the second half. Dynamics resulting in Distress take time to develop and tend to increase throughout the session. Concord is more frequent in quartile 3 and Accord decreases in quartiles 1-3, increasing again in quartile 4. Discord and Contracord increase in each quartile, suggesting that conflict increases with time, which has been found in other contexts and will be shown in relation to Therapists’ Interventions.

Summary 3.7: The hypothesis is not supported. Crises are more likely to occur in the second half of sessions with Contracord in quartile 4.

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21: RESULTS 4: THERAPISTS’ INTERVENTIONS.

Hypotheses concerning effects of Therapists Interventions were explored by analyzing their relations to GFR Dimensions. Percentages of Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion for each group are shown in Table 21.1. There is 3% variation for Group Interventions, 20% for Member and 18% for Group and Member Interventions. Limits vary by 25% and Locomotion by 40%. The pattern varies for each group.

YEAR 1988 1990 1992 1993 1996 Therapist Interventions Group Intervention Subtable % 10.4% 9.8% 8.4% 7.0% 7.1% Member Interventn Subtable % 38.9% 39.4% 59.0% 48.6% 59.7% Group & Member Int Subtable % 13.9% 18.3% 14.1% 31.1% 13.0% No Intervention Subtable % 36.9% 32.5% 18.5% 13.3% 20.2% Limits by set Therapists No Limit Subtable % 89.0% 75.1% 80.4% 69.4% 94.9% Limit set Subtable % 11.0% 24.9% 19.6% 30.6% 5.1% Locomotion by No Locomotion Subtable % 90.9% 58.1% 82.6% 61.9% 98.5% Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 9.1% 41.9% 17.4% 38.1% 1.5%

Table 21.1. Percentage of Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and Locomotion for each group.

Quartile percentages are shown in Table 21.2. Proportions of No Intervention, Limits and Locomotion show a complex pattern of changing levels of interventions for each group.

Size of significant changes. GFR Dimensions were used to analyse interventions’ effects. Changes of proportions in successive minutes range from 1-10%. Because both therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions are included in ratings, only a small proportion of them are likely to effect group function. Small percentage changes may represent the proportion of effective interventions. Pooling of data also means multiple interventions occur in some successive minutes and blur the search for effects, consequently, small effect sizes may represent net outcomes. A significant change in proportion of GFR categories in the intervention minute compared to the previous minute probably represents the situation to which therapists respond by making interventions. However, interventions may occur and are rated at any time

290 throughout the minute, whereas group function Dimensions are rated from a 15 or 30 second sample of the minute; hence, the relationship between group state and intervention is unclear. The data are therefore “noisy,” obscuring and reducing significant relationships to small percentages. Trends are described, assuming they point to effects that would be larger and more significant with a more sensitive rating system.

YEAR 1988 1990 1992 1993 1996 Year 1 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 9.5% 6.0% 10.1% 7.8% 4.3% Quartiles Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 35.3% 46.1% 50.0% 53.2% 69.6% Group & Member Int Subtable % 22.5% 7.9% 17.5% 23.4% 11.3% No Intervention Subtable % 32.7% 40.1% 22.4% 15.6% 14.8% Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 87.4% 86.7% 78.7% 64.5% 91.1% Therapists Limit set Subtable % 12.6% 13.3% 21.3% 35.5% 8.9% Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 89.0% 65.3% 82.5% 64.1% 99.2% by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 11.0% 34.7% 17.5% 35.9% .8% 2 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 11.7% 10.2% 8.7% 16.7% 11.1% Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 36.9% 30.5% 61.2% 46.7% 54.7% Group & Member Int Subtable % 15.0% 8.8% 14.0% 27.8% 14.7% No Intervention Subtable % 36.4% 50.5% 16.1% 8.9% 19.5% Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 80.9% 89.5% 71.7% 82.2% 95.8% Therapists Limit set Subtable % 19.1% 10.5% 28.3% 17.8% 4.2% Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 81.8% 69.8% 79.2% 65.6% 98.0% by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 18.2% 30.2% 20.8% 34.4% 2.0% 3 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 13.5% 13.0% 6.9% 5.9% 6.5% Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 39.5% 35.8% 60.6% 54.0% 78.3% Group & Member Int Subtable % 10.2% 25.9% 14.8% 32.7% 13.0% No Intervention Subtable % 36.8% 25.4% 17.7% 7.4% 2.2% Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 93.5% 63.2% 71.5% 73.5% 100.0% Therapists Limit set Subtable % 6.5% 36.8% 28.5% 26.5% Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 95.3% 46.6% 70.4% 55.5% 100.0% by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 4.7% 53.4% 29.6% 44.5% 4 Therapist Group Intervention Subtable % 7.2% 10.0% 8.3% 3.8% 4.9% Interventions Member Interventn Subtable % 43.4% 44.2% 61.1% 38.6% 50.5% Group & Member Int Subtable % 8.4% 29.8% 12.2% 38.1% 12.6% No Intervention Subtable % 41.1% 16.0% 18.3% 19.5% 32.0% Limits by set No Limit Subtable % 93.8% 63.0% 90.2% 64.4% 97.1% Therapists Limit set Subtable % 6.2% 37.0% 9.8% 35.6% 2.9% Locomotion No Locomotion Subtable % 97.1% 53.0% 90.3% 65.7% 98.1% by Therapists Locomotion Subtable % 2.9% 47.0% 9.7% 34.3% 1.9%

Table 21.2. Quartile percentages for Therapists’ Intervention, Limits, and locomotion for each year.

The percentage of categories for each GFR Dimension was computed for each type of intervention for the minute before, minute of intervention and following three minutes for all groups. They are shown in Tables 21.3 – 21.6. The percentage for each minute was compared with the preceding minute to show changes in distribution.

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Change greater than 1% is considered significant. Groups spend more time in categories showing increase at the expense of decreased categories. Several patterns can be defined for change associated with interventions. • “Drift” is a similar change in category percentages for consecutive minutes indicating a persisting effect, such as reduction in cooperative and increase in conflictual categories. • “Reversal” describes a similar sized change to the previous minute, but reversing the previous change, indicating the effect is short acting. • “Oscillation” is a sequence of Reversals in consecutive minutes, indicating the intervention stimulates a counteracting effect to the change in the preceding minute destabilizing the process. • “Rebound” refers to a single Reversal occurring after a change maintained for several minutes, marking the termination of the effect. • Interventions may be long or short acting, indicating a deeper or more superficial impact. • The deeper the impact, the more the group is changed over time, leading to rebounds, oscillations or drifts. • Impacts may be immediate, short, acting, delayed or ineffective. Relationships between interventions and changes are described as causal for convenience, but they are actually relationships of association. They should be expressed as interventions associated with changes in following minutes. However, they are heuristics to support further clinical observation and research.

4.1. Effect of Therapists Interventions on GFR Dimensions.

H4.1. Group Interventions will lead to higher GFR categories in the succeeding minutes. Change in Dimensions for Therapists Interventions were examined for the five- minutes described.

Structure: Group Interventions shift from Whole to Subgroup+Individuals by 2% in the intervention minute, then a drift of 1% in the next two minutes is reversed by 1% in

292 minute 3 post-intervention. Group Interventions encourage subgrouping for 2 minutes, then tend to be reversed.

Therapist Interventions for All Groups. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 65.8% 57.2% 62.4% 62.4% Subgroups Subtable % 3.9% 5.9% 4.4% 7.6% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 26.6% 31.2% 27.8% 27.3% Individuals Subtable % 3.7% 5.6% 5.4% 2.7% Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 63.1% 57.0% 65.0% 62.2% Subgroups Subtable % 4.2% 5.5% 4.3% 8.2% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 29.3% 31.6% 25.6% 27.1% Individuals Subtable % 3.4% 5.9% 5.2% 2.6% LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 62.7% 57.2% 64.8% 62.2% Subgroups Subtable % 4.4% 5.6% 4.8% 7.6% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 29.7% 31.0% 25.7% 27.9% Individuals Subtable % 3.2% 6.2% 4.6% 2.3% LEADS(STRUCTUR,2) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.8% 58.1% 62.3% 62.7% Subgroups Subtable % 4.9% 5.6% 5.1% 7.3% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 30.7% 30.3% 27.4% 27.7% Individuals Subtable % 3.5% 5.9% 5.2% 2.3% LEADS(STRUCTUR,3) Whole Grp Subtable % 62.0% 57.9% 62.3% 62.6% Subgroups Subtable % 5.8% 5.5% 5.5% 6.9% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 29.5% 30.9% 26.6% 27.7% Individuals Subtable % 2.7% 5.7% 5.7% 2.8%

Table 21.3. Percentage of Structure categories for all groups from one minute before “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”

Member Interventions have no effect in the intervention minute nor minute 1 afterwards; in minute 2 there is 1% move from Subgroup+Individuals to Whole, tending to reverse in minute 3. Any effect of Member Interventions tends to be delayed two minutes then encourages greater Wholeness, but is short lived. Group and Member Interventions show 3% swing from Subgroup+Individuals to Whole in the intervention minute. This remains for minute 1 after, reverses in minute 2, then remains stable in minute 3. Group and Member Interventions encourage Whole Structure for two minutes, then it tends to reverse. No Intervention has no effect on Structure. Group Interventions tend to move groups from Whole to Subgroups+Individuals, while Member Interventions and Group and Member Interventions have the opposite tendency. Effects are short, lasting only a minute or

293 two, Member Interventions having a delayed effect. Without interventions there is no change. Structure is a stable, sensitive dimension but elastic with inertia; interventions tend to lose their effect after two minutes, returning to the previous state. To produce sustained change, successive interventions are required, allowing a two-minute latency time for their full effect.

Cognitive Organization: For Group Interventions, Representational and Systemic move 1% to Normative and Unorganized in the intervention minute; in minute 1 after, 1% of Normative changes to Unorganized; in minute 2, 1% from Representational to Systemic, then in minute 3, 1% from Unorganized to Representational. Group Interventions produce a drift to lower Cognitive Organization in the first two minutes, but in the third, delayed self-reflection emerges.

Therapist Interventions for All Groups. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 15.2% 16.8% 14.0% 12.6% Systemic Subtable % 30.2% 29.6% 18.3% 50.9% Normative Subtable % 27.9% 32.3% 30.1% 27.0% Unorganised Subtable % 26.8% 21.3% 37.6% 9.4% Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 14.1% 16.9% 15.4% 11.9% Systemic Subtable % 29.6% 28.7% 16.7% 53.6% Normative Subtable % 28.2% 33.1% 28.5% 26.5% Unorganised Subtable % 28.0% 21.2% 39.5% 8.0% LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 14.0% 17.0% 15.3% 11.9% Systemic Subtable % 29.7% 29.9% 17.1% 51.3% Normative Subtable % 27.0% 32.0% 29.6% 28.2% Unorganised Subtable % 29.3% 21.1% 38.0% 8.6% LEADS(COGNORG,2) Representational Subtable % 12.9% 16.2% 16.5% 12.8% Systemic Subtable % 30.0% 30.4% 17.8% 49.9% Normative Subtable % 27.9% 32.5% 29.3% 27.3% Unorganised Subtable % 29.3% 20.9% 36.4% 10.0% LEADS(COGNORG,3) Representational Subtable % 14.7% 16.0% 15.9% 13.1% Systemic Subtable % 30.6% 30.9% 18.1% 48.6% Normative Subtable % 28.1% 32.1% 30.9% 26.9% Unorganised Subtable % 26.7% 21.0% 35.1% 11.4%

Table 21.4. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories for all groups from one minute before, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).”

Member Interventions move Systemic to Normative by 1% in the intervention minute; this tends to oscillate for three minutes. Member Interventions’ initial effect is

294 cognitively disorganizing for the group, constructive effects follow a minute later. Group and Member Interventions split in the intervention minute with 1% change from Systemic to Representational and 2% from Normative to Unorganized. In minute 1 after, there is 1% reversal from Unorganized to Normative and Systemic; in minute 2, a further 2% from Unorganized to the higher categories. This drift continues in minute 3 with 1% change from Unorganized and Representational to Systemic and Normative. Computations for the next two minutes showed it remains stable in minute 4 and then Unorganized increases again in minute 5. If the group can cognitively integrate the intervention, it provokes self-reflection; if not, it increases Unorganized in the intervention minute; then there is a drift to higher organization for three minutes, Group and Member Interventions are stressful when groups are poorly organized. No Intervention shows 3% move to Systemic from the other categories in the minute of consideration. In minute 1 after, 2% reverses from Systemic to Normative, reversed in minute 2 towards Representational and Unorganized and continues in minute 3. Not intervening is associated with groups organizing themselves in Systemic, then organization deteriorating over three minutes. Group Interventions reduce organization for several minutes, with delayed self- reflection. Member Interventions initially lower organization, then groups oscillate between Systemic and Normative, similar to No Intervention, indicating Member Interventions, being directed to individuals, have negligible effect on group Cognitive Organization. The most stable organizations are Systemic and Normative; oscillation between these is the most likely natural state. However, Group and Member Interventions increase organization over three minutes, producing different effects to either alone. Cognitive Organization is sensitive to interventions. Changes persist, but do not necessarily return to the previous state. Constructive consequences only emerge after three minutes. Interventions may work for several minutes before further intervention is required. Too frequent interventions may cause confusion since groups cannot assimilate them, but need several minutes to cognitively “process” them.

Affect: Group Interventions in the intervention minute stabilize Joy and Discontent towards Interest by 3%. In minute 1 after, this is partially reversed with 1% change to Joy and Boredom; it then oscillates for two minutes. Group Interventions stabilize

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Affect in pleasure for a minute, then it oscillates. Member Interventions show no effect on Affect. Group and Member Interventions in the intervention minute change Interest to Joy and Discontent by 1%. In minute 1 after, Joy decreases, but Discontent reverses, increasing Interest by 3%, and continues a 1% drift in the next two minutes. Increased Discontent and Joy in the minute of Group and Member Intervention, leads to 4% drift to Interest over three minutes. No Intervention shows no effect in the minute under consideration, then Interest oscillates 1% with Discontent increasing in minute 1, Interest in 2 and Discontent in 3. Discontent continues to increase in minute 4 before stabilizing in minute 5 (not shown). No Intervention is associated with oscillation between Interest and Discontent.

Therapist Interventions for All Groups. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.1% 2.2% 1.4% 3.9% Joy Subtable % 23.8% 13.9% 22.9% 13.8% Interest Subtable % 55.4% 64.1% 52.8% 72.0% Discontent Subtable % 13.8% 15.7% 16.5% 8.1% Distress Subtable % 2.5% 1.9% 3.7% .6% Boredom Subtable % 2.5% 2.2% 2.7% 1.7% Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.1% 2.1% 1.2% 4.1% Joy Subtable % 22.6% 13.5% 23.7% 14.3% Interest Subtable % 58.0% 64.0% 51.0% 72.5% Discontent Subtable % 12.2% 16.6% 17.6% 6.4% Distress Subtable % 2.3% 2.0% 3.7% .7% Boredom Subtable % 2.8% 1.9% 2.8% 2.1% LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 1.8% 2.1% 1.3% 4.2% Joy Subtable % 23.5% 14.0% 22.4% 13.9% Interest Subtable % 58.3% 63.9% 53.6% 70.8% Discontent Subtable % 11.7% 16.1% 16.7% 8.0% Distress Subtable % 1.8% 2.0% 3.4% 1.1% Boredom Subtable % 3.0% 2.0% 2.5% 2.0% LEADS(AFFECT,2) Contentment Subtable % 1.6% 2.2% 1.4% 4.1% Joy Subtable % 20.6% 14.3% 22.1% 14.6% Interest Subtable % 59.1% 63.4% 54.3% 71.0% Discontent Subtable % 14.5% 15.8% 16.5% 7.7% Distress Subtable % 1.6% 2.1% 3.0% 1.1% Boredom Subtable % 2.6% 2.3% 2.7% 1.5% LEADS(AFFECT,3) Contentment Subtable % 1.2% 2.2% 1.4% 4.2% Joy Subtable % 20.7% 14.9% 21.9% 13.7% Interest Subtable % 62.4% 62.7% 54.9% 70.6% Discontent Subtable % 12.4% 16.0% 16.5% 8.2% Distress Subtable % 1.6% 2.0% 2.8% 1.5% Boredom Subtable % 1.8% 2.3% 2.5% 1.8%

Table 21.5. Percentage of Affect categories for all groups from one minute before, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” to three minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”

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Group Interventions stabilize pleasurable states, Joy increasing, then oscillating with Discontent. Member Interventions have little effect; but Group and Member Interventions have the opposite effect to Group Interventions; pleasurable states lead to stable unpleasure, then drift to stable pleasure for three minutes, indicating initial unpleasure and sustained stabilization of pleasure. No Intervention suggests Interest naturally tends to oscillate with Discontent. Affect is labile and responsive, destabilized by Group Interventions, stabilized by Group and Member Interventions for three minutes. Therapists need to distinguish background oscillation from interventions’ effects. Affect is sensitive, but less elastic than other dimensions.

Action Coherence: Table 21.6 shows the proportions of Action Coherence categories for Therapists Interventions for five minutes after the interventions. Group Interventions in the intervention minute show conflict reduced 3% and cooperation increased, which oscillate for two minutes. Group Interventions improve cooperation, which then oscillates with conflict. Member Interventions in the intervention minute show 1% Concord move to Accord, reversed in minute 1 after, then Discord moves 1% to Accord in minute 2, reversing in 3, and increasing Concord. This remains stable to minute 5. Member Interventions break the unanimity of Concord, but increase it for the next five minutes, while Accord and Discord oscillate. Group and Member Interventions show 3% increased Discord from cooperative categories in the intervention minute, reversing in minute 1 after, and maintained for three minutes. Discord decreased 8% in total from the intervention minute to minute 3 after, while Concord and Accord increase by 4% each. Group and Member Interventions have a lasting effect increasing cooperation. No Intervention shows increased Concord from Accord and Discord in the minute of consideration, then a persisting trend for Concord to reduce and Discord to increase by 5% over three minutes. No Intervention shows a drift towards increased Discord and decreased Concord for three minutes.

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Therapist Interventions for All Groups. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 26.6% 27.0% 16.3% 47.4% Accord Subtable % 45.9% 51.3% 49.4% 41.6% Discord Subtable % 22.4% 18.6% 27.6% 9.6% Contracord Subtable % 5.1% 3.1% 6.7% 1.4% Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 28.6% 25.5% 14.1% 50.8% Accord Subtable % 48.3% 52.1% 48.9% 39.6% Discord Subtable % 18.7% 18.8% 30.9% 8.4% Contracord Subtable % 4.4% 3.6% 6.1% 1.1% LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 26.9% 27.0% 15.3% 48.0% Accord Subtable % 47.5% 50.7% 52.6% 39.9% Discord Subtable % 21.7% 19.0% 25.9% 10.3% Contracord Subtable % 3.9% 3.4% 6.2% 1.7% LEADS(ACTION,2) Concord Subtable % 27.2% 26.9% 17.6% 46.5% Accord Subtable % 49.7% 51.4% 50.1% 39.5% Discord Subtable % 18.9% 18.2% 26.6% 12.2% Contracord Subtable % 4.2% 3.5% 5.8% 1.7% LEADS(ACTION,3) Concord Subtable % 26.1% 27.8% 17.9% 45.1% Accord Subtable % 50.4% 50.0% 52.3% 40.5% Discord Subtable % 18.6% 19.2% 23.6% 12.5% Contracord Subtable % 4.9% 3.1% 6.2% 1.9% LEADS(ACTION,4) Concord Subtable % 25.6% 27.8% 17.8% 45.3% Accord Subtable % 48.9% 50.3% 51.6% 40.8% Discord Subtable % 20.8% 18.6% 24.5% 12.2% Contracord Subtable % 4.8% 3.3% 6.0% 1.7% LEADS(ACTION,5) Concord Subtable % 25.4% 28.6% 18.4% 43.7% Accord Subtable % 49.7% 49.9% 51.1% 41.5% Discord Subtable % 20.6% 18.3% 24.4% 12.9% Contracord Subtable % 4.2% 3.3% 6.0% 1.9%

Table 21.6. Percentage of Action Coherence categories for all groups from one minute before, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” to five minutes after Therapists’ Interventions, “LEADS(ACTION,1-5).”

Group Interventions initially increase cooperation, which then oscillates with conflict for two minutes, indicating a short, constructive effect that destabilizes groups. Member Interventions reduce Concord to Accord, then increase it for five minutes and Accord oscillates with Discord. Like Group Interventions, an initial effect stimulates lasting change. Group and Member Interventions, increase Discontent, then drift towards cooperation for three minutes. The combined intervention is more potent in promoting cooperation than either alone. No Intervention shows a drift towards Discord out of Concord. Interventions immediately produce persisting effects in Action Coherence. It is inherently unstable, needing constant attention to counteract the trend, whereas other dimensions tend to oscillate. Group Interventions increase higher action categories, but in other Dimensions, they increase lower categories at first. It is affected for a minute, then drifts towards Discord or oscillates into and out of it. The tendency to reverse the

298 initial effect and then oscillate, suggests it is the most elastic but least sensitive dimension. Therapists need to constantly attend to it and expect interventions to have only a minute’s effect.

Summary 4.1: Therapists Interventions have varied effects on all GFR Dimensions and alter the functional quality of group process. Some changes persist for up to five minutes, but most tend to extinguish after three minutes. This could tentatively be regarded as an “effect period” for interventions.

Characteristics of Interventions. Generalizations about effects of interventions are also suggested. Group Interventions have a pronounced effect, increasing lower categories immediately, except for Action Coherence. For Structure, Cognitive Organization and Affect the full benefit does not occur for about three minutes. Properly timed Group Interventions are powerful agents of change, but demanding and temporarily disorganizing; benefits require several minutes to emerge, and may need time to work before being repeated. Member Interventions have no initial effect on Structure or Affect, and only slight perturbation of the natural background variation in Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence. Member Interventions alone are ineffective in changing groups. Group and Member Interventions are most effective, differing from either alone. For Structure and Cognitive Organization, higher categories are immediately increased, but Affect and Action Coherence respond to unpleasure and conflict, reversing them in the following minute. There is less oscillation after the initial change than with other interventions and more stable effects over three minutes. It is the most powerful intervention (Battegay, 1999), but should be allowed to work over several minutes. No Intervention allows the background “Brownian movement” of dimensions to be glimpsed. Structure is most stable, tending not to change in the short term. Cognitive Organization oscillates slowly between Systemic and Normative. Affect is the least stable, oscillating rapidly between Interest and Discontent, while Action Coherence drifts towards Discord. Cognitive Organization and Affect may have self- correcting tendencies; Structure has inertia and may need intervention to change it, but Action Coherence needs constant attention to avoid drifting into conflict.

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These indications are summarized in Table 21.7.

4.2. Effect of Limits.

H4.2. Limits will be associated with decreased destructive categories in the same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.

In considering the results for Limits, it needs to be remembered that although reliability was over 0.7 it was less consistent than for other dimensions, so findings can be taken with less confidence than for Therapists Interventions (see Chapter 18). Tables 21.1 and 21.2 show considerable variety in the percentage of Limits set in each group in each quartile. The effect of Limits on GFR Dimensions is shown in Appendix 3 in Tables 21A.1 – 21A.4, giving percentage of change for the penultimate minute, minute of limit and succeeding three minutes.

Structure: There is little effect on Structure indicating Limits are not set because of Structural change. In the minute after the Limit, there is a 1% change from Subgroups to Whole, which ceases in minute 2. Cognitive Organization: There is 8% increase in Unorganized at the expense of other categories in the minute of Limit, indicating conditions provoking Limits. The following three minutes drift towards higher organization. Representational and Normative increase by 3% in minute 1, Systemic by 1% in minute 2 and Normative by 2% in minute 3. Groups increase self-reflection following Limits, and Unorganized states tend towards Normative. Limits improve Cognitive Organization reducing Unorganized by 9% for up to three minutes. Affect: Unpleasurable states increase by 4% with Limits, indicating the situation requiring them. In minute 1 post-Limit, Affect is stabilized by reducing Joy and Distress, and also increasing Interest and Discontent by 2%. In minute 2, Joy and Discontent reduce, while Interest increases by 2%, another 2% in minute 3 makes an increase of 6% in Interest. Limits stabilize Affect towards pleasure for up to three minutes. Action Coherence: The situation requiring Limits shows 7% increased Discord

300 and Contracord. In minute 1 post-Limit, Accord increases 4%, with conflict reducing. In the next two minutes, a drift to cooperation is shown by reduced Contracord of 3% and Discord of 6%. Limits reduce conflict for up to three minutes. These findings are also summarized in Table 21.7.

Summary 4.2: Limits have a negligible effect on Structure, but produce higher Cognitive Organization, stabilize Affect, reduce Unpleasure and Conflict, persisting for up to three minutes.

4.3. Effect of Locomotion.

H4.3. Locomotion by the therapists will be associated with decreased destructive categories in the same or the succeeding 1-3 minutes.

Locomotion occurs when therapists move around the room. They may set Limits, assist members cleaning up and other activities or move towards members anticipating conflict. The incidence of Locomotion for all groups is 20.8%. Its effects on GFR Dimensions are shown in Appendix 3 in Tables 21A.5 – 21A.8. They are summarized below.

Structure: There is no change in Structure from Locomotion. Cognitive Organization: In the minute of Locomotion, Unorganized increases by 5% at the expense of higher categories, indicating why therapists move. In the next three minutes, there is a drift to higher Cognitive Organization of 1-2% in each minute. Locomotion is associated with higher Cognitive Organization. Affect: There is little change in the minute of Locomotion. Therapists do not move because of Affect changes. However, in the first two minutes post-Locomotion, Interest increases 2% with reduction in Joy, but little change in unpleasurable categories. Locomotion does not reduce unpleasure, but stabilizes pleasure for two minutes.

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STRUCTURE COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION AFFECT ACTION COHERENCE GROUP Increased Subgroups for 2 Lowering of organization then Stabilizes Interest then Increased Cooperation then INTERVENTION minutes then reversed increased Representation after 2 oscillates between Joy and oscillates after 1minute minutes Discontent after 1 minute MEMBER Increased Whole group after 1 Systemic oscillates with No effect. Breaks Concord then oscillates with INTERVENTION minute then reversed Normative (same as No increasing conflict after 2 minutes Intervention) and Concord increases GROUP & MEMBER Increased Whole group for 2 Split to increased Stabilizes Discontent then drifts Drift to increased cooperation, INTERVENTION minutes then reversed Representational and to Interest after 1 minute which lasts. Unorganized then drift to higher organization after 2 minutes NO INTERVENTION No effect, remains stable. Oscillation from Systemic to Oscillation between Interest Drift to Discord Normative, stabilizes at and Discontent for 5 minutes Systemic after 2 minutes LIMITS Minimal effect to increase Whole. Increased organization for 3 Increased stabilized Pleasure Reduced Conflict for 3 minutes minutes for 3 minutes LOCOMOTION No change. Increased organization for 3 Stabilizes Pleasure for 2 Reduced Conflict for 3 minutes minutes minutes DIMENSION Stable without intervention; Oscillates between Systemic & Oscillates between Interest & Drifts toward conflict without CHARACTERISTICS Changes delayed, last 2 minutes Normative without intervention, Discord without intervention. interventions, very sensitive and then reversed. Elastic but less stabilizes at Systemic; GI’s & Stabilized by GI’s and GMI’s, responsive. Affected then sensitive with inertia. GM’s constructive effects after a then oscillates. Sensitive but rebounds. delay of 2 minutes are retained. inelastic. THERAPEUTIC Will not change readily without Oscillates between Systemic and Oscillates between pleasure and Initial constructive effect but this TECHNIQUE interventions. GI’s reduce Normative, requires intervention unpleasure without only lasts 1min, sustained effect Whole, MI’s & GMI’s increase to achieve Representational. interventions. Interventions derived from GMI’s and constant Whole. Interventions work for 2 GI’s effective, but require GMI’s required to stabilize, but only intervention needed to prevent drift minutes then are reversed. for persisting effect. MI’s have last 1minute. MI’s have no to Conflict. Sustained change requires little effect. Maximum effect effect, GI’s stabilize for 1 repeated interventions at 2 minute achieved after 2 minute delay. minute then oscillate, GMI’s intervals. initially increase Discontent then stabilize Interest. Table 21.7. Characteristics of Therapists Interventions and their effects of GFR Dimensions.

Action Coherence: Discord increases 2% and Contracord increases 302 1% in the minute of Locomotion, stimulating therapists’ movement. In the minute after, there is 3% reduction in conflict and increase in Accord. This trend continues for two minutes with 3% increase in cooperation. Action Coherence is affected by Locomotion with 7% reduction in conflict over three minutes. These findings are summarized in Table 21.7.

Summary 4.3: Locomotion has no effect on Structure and it is not stimulated by change in Affect, but responds to increased cognitive disorganization and conflict; it increases Cognitive Organization and cooperation for three minutes and stabilizes pleasurable Affect over two minutes.

4.4. Year Differences. Although there are slight differences for each group, they the show findings for all groups are valid. The effects of Therapists Interventions on Condensed States for each year are described in Appendix 3, Tables 21A.9 – 21A.13.

4.5. Differentiating Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion.

H4.4. Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion will be independent in their effects.

Locomotion by Therapists No Locomotion Locomotion Limits by set Therapists No Limit Table % 73.2% 9.0% Limit set Table % 5.9% 11.9%

Table 21.8. Percentage of coincidence of Limits and Locomotion for all groups.

When Therapists’ Interventions, Limits and Locomotion coincide in the same minutes, it is not clear which is responsible for change. Table 21.8 shows 11.9% coincidence of Limits and Locomotion. Two-thirds of the time there is Locomotion when a Limit is set.

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Limits by set Locomotion by Therapists Therapists No No Limit Locomotion Locomotion Limit set Therapist Group Intervention Layer % 7.0% 2.0% 7.4% 1.6% Interventions Member Interventn Layer % 37.2% 10.3% 38.1% 9.5% Group & Member Int Layer % 10.5% 6.5% 10.8% 6.2% No Intervention Layer % 24.4% 2.1% 26.0% .5%

Table 21.9. Percentage of coincidence of Therapists Interventions with Limits and Locomotion for all groups.

Table 21.9 shows the percentage of Therapists Interventions coinciding with Locomotion and Limits. Only 2% of Locomotion and 0.5% of Limits are not associated with Therapists’ Interventions.

4.5.1. Therapists Interventions with Limits. The relative effect of Therapists Interventions and Limits was shown by comparing the effect of Therapists Interventions on GFR categories with and without simultaneous Limits. Results are summarized. Full tables and discussion are in Appendix 3, Tables 21A.14 and 21A.15. Structure: Limits intensify the effect of Group Interventions on Structure by an additional 3%. Adding Limits to Group and Member Interventions sustains the constructive effect. There is no effect for Member or No Intervention. Limits increase the effect of Therapists Interventions on Structure. Cognitive Organization: Limits magnify the effect of Group Interventions with immediate change, which then reverts to the normal pattern, indicating Limits’ capacity to change Cognitive Organization may only last 1 minute, but leaves an echo increasing the effect of other processes. Limits with Member Interventions magnify changes and extend the affected period for one minute. For Group and Member Interventions, Limits increase Representational throughout. Limits probably magnify Member Interventions because groups are more Unorganized in the intervention minute than for No Limits. However, Limits sustain interventions’ effect by a minute and the effects of the intervention operate again. This suggests a need to distinguish between a change and magnification of the pattern. Limits exaggerate the effect of interventions in

Cognitive Organization for all three minutes, but change the pattern for 1 304 minute. Affect. Limits with Group Intervention double the decrease in unpleasurable Affect from the intervention for three minutes. Limits with Member Interventions stabilize pleasure and unpleasure and reduce the Distress. They magnify Group and Member Interventions and reduce unpleasure three times as great as for the total data set. Limits magnify Therapists Interventions on Affect. Action Coherence. Limits magnify Group Interventions, stabilizing and reducing aggression, bringing the increase in Contracord forward by one minute to minute 2. Limits make a difference for 1 minute in the pattern of effect and stop the oscillation. Member Interventions with Limits are the most effective way of reducing Contracord (by 5%) over three minutes; they prevent oscillation between Discontent and Accord and increase a drift to cooperation. Limits increase cooperation by 14%, postponing the rebound of conflict at minutes 2 and 3 (although it is then more likely to be Contracord than Discord). Limits alter the pattern by postponing conflict by one minute. The effect of Limits for Action Coherence is two or three times greater (especially Member Interventions), but recurrence of conflict is more likely in minutes 2 or 3 presumably reflecting increased conflict associated with the need to set Limits.

Summary 4.5.1: Limits are a potent intervention and greatly enhance Therapists’ Interventions, in some instances altering their effect.

4.5.2. Locomotion distinguished from Therapists Interventions and Limits. In considering results for Locomotion, it needs to be remembered that reliability was less consistent than for the other dimensions, although it was over 0.7; but findings can be taken with less confidence than for Therapists Interventions (see Chapter 18). To ascertain the effect of Locomotion in its own right, changes for Locomotion with No Limits could be compared to Locomotion with Limits. However, Limits and Locomotion, have high unsociable functioning whereas Locomotion without Limits is more likely to contain varied states. A more effective comparison is with No Locomotion as a whole, to account for all states with No Locomotion. The comparison is between Locomotion/No Limits and No Locomotion on Therapists Interventions and Limits. Detailed results are shown in Appendix 3, Tables 21A.16-21A.17.

Structure: For Group Intervention, Locomotion increases the trend 305 from Whole to Subgroups threefold. Locomotion adds to the structural impact of Group Interventions. Locomotion occurs in association with Member Interventions when there are isolated individuals and helps integrate them. It magnifies Group and Member Interventions and stimulates groups to oscillate into and out of higher Structure categories. Locomotion is likely to integrate unattached individuals, but these Structures tend to oscillate. Cognitive Organization: Locomotion is more likely in states of lower organization. It magnifies Group Interventions, but changes the process, introducing oscillation from Unorganized to Systemic and Normative. It achieves higher organization faster, making Member Interventions more effective. There is only a 2- minute delay before the rebound to Representational instead of three. With Group and Member Interventions, it stops the oscillation and increases organization. Locomotion introduces oscillation instead of a drift to less functional states and reduces oscillation in favor of more persisting functional states. The effect of Locomotion without other intervention ceases after 2 minutes, but is more likely to preserve higher organization and assist in the appearance of delayed Representational at minute 2. Affect: Locomotion stabilizes Group Interventions’ oscillation and movement is between Interest and Joy or Discontent. It converts Joy to Interest and increases pleasurable states. It makes Member Interventions effective, stabilizing Joy into Interest. The oscillation initiated by Locomotion lasts for the full three minutes. For Group and Member Interventions, Locomotion damps down oscillation of dysfunctional states for two minutes and promotes oscillation in functional states, which are otherwise unchanging. Locomotion stabilizes Affect and makes the effect of Therapists Interventions longer lasting. Action Coherence: Locomotion with Group Interventions polarizes Discord into stable cooperation as Concord or to Contracord. Locomotion may act as a partial limit, but only for a minute and postpones rather than prevents conflict. This suggests Locomotion alone is ineffective in preventing crises. For Member Interventions, Locomotion is associated with increased conflict only in the intervention minute. Locomotion with Group and Member Interventions reduces fluctuation encouraging consistent cooperation. With Locomotion, the drift from cooperative categories towards conflict is replaced by oscillation between Discord and Concord, reiterating the

principle that Locomotion tends to convert a dysfunctional drift into an 306 oscillation with more functional categories.

Summary 4.5.2: Locomotion is an effective intervention, although it may only last a short time. It magnifies Therapists Interventions and initiates constructive processes in all dimensions. Locomotion tends to damp down oscillations with dysfunctional states and increase functional states. It promotes trends for dysfunctional states to oscillate with more functional states. However, it is ineffective in dealing with dysfunctional states unless accompanied by Limits.

PART IV. DISCUSSION. 307

In Part IV, the results are discussed in four sections. In Chapter 22, their implications for the Group Function Record are discussed and the usefulness of the dimensions evaluated. Then findings for hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 23, followed by a discussion of implications for developmental phases in Chapter 24. The findings’ implications for the theoretical background are discussed in Chapter 25. Finally, further research is considered in Chapter 26. However, before this, a synopsis of the results is provided.

Synopsis of Results. Groups were found to function rhythmically on all parameters with a wavelength of 2-3 sessions and less regularly within sessions, supporting their organic nature. Instead of a regression towards the mean, peak and trough sessions demonstrated a tendency towards starting the new trajectory rather than fulfilling the preceding one, suggesting change is an inherent property of extreme states. The higher the functionality of a state, the more likely it is followed by more dysfunctional states in the next few minutes and vice versa. Like organic homeostatic functions, stability is preserved by rhythmic alternation between limits. Instability is proportional to group size; one or two absentees tend to increase stability; more threaten group survival and decrease stability. Although clinically most members progressed well, increase in frequency of therapeutic goal states is relatively small over the year. They tend to occur in resolving dysfunctional states, allowing the group to resume enjoyable sociable activity and demonstrate regulatory functions. Changes in how states are managed are qualitative. Self-representation occurring briefly after each conflict enables problems to be resolved preserving the group. Learning to manage the pleasurable stimulus of social life means encouraging Whole states while allowing Whole-Subgroup rhythms until sufficient Systemic organization has developed. The greater the size, the more demanding is the group. An eight-phase developmental process was demonstrated in changes of the relative proportions of Functional, Sociable and Unsociable states over the year. Structure is a stable dimension, with groups tending to oscillate slowly between Whole and Subgroups. Therapeutic goal states are most likely in Whole, which is most

demanding and least stable. While more stable, Subgroups is less 308 constructive, representing avoidance. Moving to Subgroups resolves conflict when effective common rules are lacking; when they are present, conflict tends to be resolved within Whole. The Whole/Subgroup rhythm assists in regulating groups; as they become more stable, groups creatively use Whole states. Group Interventions increase the likelihood of Subgroups; Group and Member Interventions increase Whole. Cognitive Organization oscillates between Systemic rules and non-systemic organization (Normative or Unorganised). It is easier for smaller groups to achieve higher organization, especially Representational. The homeostatic regulatory mechanism comprises any shared system of rules; those of a game or conversation regulate tensions as effectively as social rules. Norms can also achieve this if they form a comprehensive “corpus” governing behaviour. Systemic rules manage affect, but deteriorating Cognitive Organization (from Systemic to Normative or Unorganised) is associated with increasing unpleasure, conflict and interactional crises threatening the group. Observing Cognitive Organization enables therapists to anticipate changes in both Affect and Action Coherence. Therapists Interventions act like organizational factors and Limits act as auxiliary rules. Affect is the least stable dimension, oscillating between pleasure and unpleasure from one minute to another. Unpleasurable states destabilize Structure and Action Coherence. Action Coherence change anticipates Affect change when groups are in Normative or Unorganised states and therapists following affective cues will lag behind the process. However, when groups are in Systemic organization with rules containing the process, unpleasurable Affect can be expressed before conflict breaks out. Groups recover from Affect crises within a minute or two. This does not seem to depend on Therapists Interventions, though they help. Dysfunctional states tend towards pleasure in succeeding minutes; while high functional states tend towards unpleasure. Therapists’ Interventions briefly stabilize Affect. Action Coherence tends to drift towards increasing probability of conflict with time. Therapists Interventions tend to reverse this; constant interventions are required to maintain cooperation. Conflict is particularly likely in Representational, but constant in all Structures and other levels of Cognitive Organization. It is proportional to size, larger groups showing more conflict. Conflict is resolved by a mutually accepted system of rules that provide guidelines for resolution of actions. Unsociable states tend towards

cooperation, Functional states toward conflict in the next few minutes. 309 Aggressive crises occur when Cognitive Organization deteriorates, impairing rules, loosening the regulating system holding action in a common frame. Systemic rules organize the numerous possible relationships into a single prescribed set. The most powerful means of therapists intervening is by verbal representation of Action Coherence states and their consequences. Therapists’ Interventions have a different “half life” for each dimension. Although any intervention may work, Group Interventions tend to last 1-2 minutes and encourage lower Structure and Cognitive Organization unless the group has good organization. They temporarily stabilize Affect, increase cooperation and seem to “pressure” the group and require the group to be in Systemic organization to be interpreted. Group and Member Interventions tend to last for 2-5 minutes and produce more sustained, uniformly constructive changes to Whole, higher Cognitive Organization, stabilizing pleasure and lasting cooperation after a delay of 2 minutes. Member Interventions have inconsistent effects, little different to No Intervention. Limits and Locomotion increase the effect of other Interventions. Locomotion responds to deteriorating organization or cooperation, and provides a stimulus to self-regulation.

22. DISCUSSION 1: THE GROUP FUNCTION RECORD. 310

The Group Function Record defined dimensions of group function observed independently of individual members. Although the membership and completeness of groups varied, whole-group states were recorded and features of group life not evident to clinical observation were demonstrated. The GFR can be said to have fulfilled its purpose although it was applied to only one type of group, and it is not clear whether the distribution of categories is specific to them or characteristic of groups in general. However, these preliminary findings enable some comments to be made about dimensions defined by the GFR. Where there are general implications for therapeutic technique, these are mentioned under the heading of “Technique.”

Structure. The structure of social communication (Sigman, 1987) is the primary dimension determining relationships and units to be rated. The findings showed Structure was the most reliable dimension and in defining the units to be rated, provided a valuable means of analysing group phenomena. Structure is a stable dimension, slow to react and changes tending to persist. A difference in phenomena was found between whole and subgroups, but little difference between subgroup/individual categories. Whole is the most creative structure. Subgroups are more stable, but less creative with predominantly normative or unorganised Cognitive Organization. Systemic organization, stable affect, unpleasure and conflict have constant proportions for all structures. Cognitive Organization and high-energy pleasure are related to wholeness, rather than size. Movement to subgroups helps groups leave whole unsociable conflictual states and stabilise unpleasure. Conflict is as likely in subgroups as in whole, but subgroups are more likely to change structure to avoid conflict and this effect is stronger for larger groups. Change in communication structure is an important self-regulating mechanism in managing unsociable states, but may only be effective for some types of conflict situations (see Chapter 23, Durkheim, 1964; Simmel, 1950; Northern, 1988). Conflict produced in Systemic organization (such as rule-based games) is not resolved by transition to subgroups, which would destroy the game, further destabilising the group. However, where conflict concerns decisions in Normative or Unorganised situations,

structure change terminates the activity and source of conflict. Structural 311 change may successfully avoid conflict when group organization is deteriorating or undeveloped; but within logical systems conflict can be resolved since common rules provide the means of reconciling problems distinct from personal sentiments (Collett, 1977). Rules need to be implemented or they will be devalued and rendered obsolete (Harré 1993). It can be concluded that movement to subgroups is likely to stop conflict and unpleasure in deteriorating organization; but common rules resolve conflict within systemic organization without structural change. Structural change is a self-regulating mechanism in the absence of common rules or systems for conflict resolution (Cartwright and Lippitt, 1976). Resolving conflict without breaking structure requires an agreed rule system establishing what is common, with shared values by which decisions can be made. Structural change disrupts communication to solve problems (Bion, 1961; Yalom, 1995). When communication is broken, the systemic organic nature of communication (organic solidarity) is replaced by normative or unorganised interplay of forces with a more mechanical quality (Durkheim’s, 1964 mechanical solidarity). Subgrouping splits communication, replacing collective representations with specific subgroup representations. For the group entity, collective representations become self- representational, but splitting structure sets aside self-representations temporarily since the whole is lost. It does not solve problems, which re-emerge in continuing tension as the new structure settles down. Subgroups are more readily stressed by conflict. Rhythmic structural restlessness therefore indicates groups’ failure to establish common adherence to systemic organization and collective representations capable of self- regulation. The collective organism seems most self-reflective when whole; stabilisation in subgroups is at the expense of self-representation (Kellerman, 1979). When individuals split and repress conflicts from consciousness, loss of awareness follows. Structural change in groups is likened to repression in individuals (Bion, 1961; Yalom, 1995). Therapeutic: Technique should promote common systemic representations, placing contending ideas within them; the logic of the system enables them to be reconciled.

Representational organization is less likely in subgroups, confirming their

repressive function. However, the move to subgroups may initiate systemic 312 organization (Northern, 1988), which can be transferred to whole and assist achieving Representational organization, since it is easier in small, whole groups less likely to split and more likely to confront problems systemically. This favours treatment of difficult patients in small groups. Movement to subgroups alleviates, but does not solve conflict and is a substitute for adequate organization. The larger the group, the more likely it is to self-regulate by this method (Forsyth, 1990). Higher levels of functioning occur in subgroups early in groups’ lives because the entity is immature and tends towards mechanism, not yet having achieved systemic organization. When it achieves “entitativity” (Campbell, 1958) from developmental phase 4, it functions better whole, using collective representations in circulation to address problems within systemic organization, with the flexibility of organic solidarity. However, rhythmic structural change persists and must be respected (Ettin, 1999), just as repression does not cease because of therapy, but is more integrated. Absentees do not affect structural change; they are stabilising in the middle of the year, but not early when the group is insecure or later when loss reduces it. When threatened, the group cannot address its problems and security takes precedence. Unpleasure tends to affect structure in the minute it occurs while conflict tends to have a more lasting effect into the following minute. Uniting in common goals stabilises structure, showing goals are collective representations that unite groups. Therapists’ interventions tend to change structure, but Limits and Locomotion do not, since they institute or strengthen rules by which the group addresses problems instead of repressing communications by structural splits. Technique: Movement from whole to subgroups splits communication and represses conflicts. This postpones, but does not resolve problems; therapists need to help groups solve problems by finding common themes to unite members.

Conclusion. Communication structure as defined by the GFR is a central and informative dimension of group process. Therapists can understand and manage groups by recognising structural rhythms and common themes in the whole or subgroups. Structure is a means of regulating unpleasure and conflict when a cognitive system for confronting problems is lacking; but like repression, it only postpones the problem. Systemic organization, pleasure and cooperation are

independent of it. 313

Cognitive Organization. Cognitive Organization defines four degrees of collective organization of the communication process to describe group cognitive function. It was the second most reliable dimension. It tends to alternate between Systemic and Normative organization before stabilising in Systemic. Normative and Unorganised organization are most likely in subgroups, Representational most common in whole and Systemic is constant. Representational is easier to attain in smaller groups, since integrating members into a common cognitive unit becomes more complex as numbers increase (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). It is unaffected by absentees. The rule system of Systemic organization is associated with the greatest stable, pleasurable affect, followed by Representational, then Normative, with Unorganised having the least. Self-representations challenge group function, while normative or unorganised groups disorganise easily and lose homeostasis. Systemically organised rules that manage social and psychic energies constitute social organisms’ self- regulating homeostatic system (Anzieu, 1984). However, only members’ commitment to rules makes them work (Harré 1993). Rules are collective representations of group identity and safeguard members’ mutually acknowledged need for the group (Durkheim, 1964). The power of rules belongs to the whole group, not the influence of particular members or therapists; they make all members equal and related to each other and apply to whatever happens (Wittgenstein 1953; Werhane, 1992). They are an impersonal representation of the group entity, since they cannot belong to any member, only to the whole (Durkheim, 1964; Collett, 77; Harré 1993). Groups need to be encouraged to make rules into a system of collective representations. Technique: Self-regulation involves a system of rules to organise members. Their condition for success is not their orientation towards psychological issues, but their common acceptance and expression of the group’s reason for existing. Therapists must articulate and promote these themes in discussion and avoid the impression they impose rules on the group.

Systemic organization also manages affect. Pleasure is maximised and organised by Systemic rules. Cognitive Organization is not influenced by group affect,

but Affect is influenced by organization. Unpleasure and distress are more 314 likely with deteriorating organization, which produces affective crises. Conflict is constant and expressed according to the type of organization. Contracord crises are also more likely in deteriorating organization, whereas cooperation or discord does not seem influenced by organization. Therapists’ Interventions and Limits seem to act like organizational factors. Limits are like additional rules, promoting higher organization. Setting limits reminds groups about rules necessary for therapy (Malekoff, 1997). Locomotion occurs with deteriorating organization, when rules are failing to organise. It recognises that rules and collective representations breaking down, leads to crowd psychology based on normative, arbitrary and situation-specific emotional representations (Le Bon, 1923; Reicher, 1987). In this sense, affective conditions are created as consequences of the type of cognitive organization. Members of unorganised groups function by personal, individual rules or norms that do not integrate collectively. Technique: Interventions must assist groups to retain rules when organization is deteriorating. Rules are needed to constitute groups; their importance emphasizes interventions need to be made in the dimension of cognitive organization to have the greatest effect on the group. They may be more powerful than interventions directed towards affective states.

Interventions around cognitive deterioration can precede action situations since it is a predisposing condition for crises. Although conflict may be associated with organizational deterioration, it is not caused by organization, but constant for all states. Members’ attachment to rules determines how strongly they retain organization or allow it to deteriorate. Loss of collective representations results in rules based on the common cause no longer being relevant and splits the group’s integrity; members tend to break the collective unity and operate separately (Durkheim, 1964). Departure from rules is the first step to abandoning them, which happens when they no longer effectively influence members. Wherever the entity is split, it tends towards loss of organicity and increased mechanism in the form of individualistic power dynamics (Durkheim, 1964). Deteriorating organization may lead to action change, which results in affect change. Technique: The first sign of impending crises may be when conflict is not maintained within the organizational level and collective representations are lost, reducing members’ attachment to rules. Therapists need to reassert collective

representations that have been undermined or instigate new ones 315 related to what is common in the current situation.

Sub-systemically organised groups (Normative or Unorganised) function like crowds and must be systemically organised before rationality can be expected (MacLennan and Dies, 1992). Le Bon’s (1923) guidelines for communication with collective entities unable to perform cognitive functions show how groups can be drawn into normative organization around the leader’s clear communication without requiring interpretation (Sampson and Marthas, 1990). Therapists’ interventions tend to increase organization and promote representational states. Technique: Normative or Unorganised groups act like crowds. Therapists need to communicate to them directly with clear suggestions and images not requiring interpretation to reassert therapeutic norms and systemic rules expressing members’ own goals and values.

Conclusion. Cognitive Organization as defined by the GFR is essential to understanding groups’ capacity for self-regulation. Rule systems create an organizational infrastructure to collectively process experience. However, the system need not be psychological in itself; any rule system will regulate. When organization is reduced to Normative or Unorganised, it is likely to provoke crowd psychology and therapists need to be clear and assertive; when groups cannot interpret, they will not respond to symbolic interventions. It may well be that interventions directed toward changing cognitive organization are crucial for achieving therapeutic goals.

Affect. The GFR defines Affect as the collective energy states of the communication process. It was the least reliable of the four group dimensions, being rated from a shorter time interval. Affect is inherently highly reactive, tending to oscillate between pleasure and unpleasure without stabilizing (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). The larger the group, the more unstable affect is, though the proportions of pleasure to unpleasure remain constant regardless of size or structure. One or two absentees stabilize affect, but more destabilize and threaten the group. Affect does not alter Cognitive Organization, but most stable affect occurs in systemic organization. Unpleasure is

most likely to cause instability in structure and action. Cooperation in 316 common goals tends to stabilize the current affective state. Affective instability seems to resolve into rhythmic fluctuations (Bion, 1961; Ettin, 1999). Unsociable groups are more likely to move towards pleasure and Sociable groups towards unpleasure. Affect and action form a functional pair of dimensions, with change in one reflecting change in the other. Their rhythms determined the fundamental dynamic of all groups studied. However, the rhythmic instability also means affective crises are often short and self- correcting. Any affective state may precede crises of distress, which are more likely in whole structure, deteriorating organization and conflict. Deteriorating organization seems the important indicator, since affect destabilises when the regulating system breaks down, provoking crises. However, the stimulus for the crisis often comes from action since what is done evokes affects. Although not shown in ratings, it appears deteriorating organization fails to regulate action, causing conflict to erupt and stimulate distress. Deteriorating organization may predict affect change better than action may, since affect is so closely tied to action that it changes within the rating interval, while change in organization may be evident a minute or more before. Although affect does not influence organization, it is affected by it, suggesting it is a consequence of cognition and action, consistent with cognitive theories of affect (see Chapter 13; Lazarus, et al., 1980; de Sousa, 1991; Fridja, 1993). Unpleasure is also associated with the highest quality sessions and inherent to group functioning. Therapists interventions tend to stabilize affect oscillations. Limits further stabilize affect, reduce unpleasure and increase self- regulation. Locomotion is not stimulated by affect Technique: Affect expresses effects of other dimensions. Affects are shown to be consequence rather than cause of group process. Therapists can anticipate and manage crises by observing and basing interventions on organization and action rather than affect. Intervening tends to stabilize affect.

Affective states may add to instability by stimulating action patterns. To be available for regulation, affects must be named and verbally represented so they can be understood and related to rules by entering communication. Groups need a vocabulary of affective experiences to talk about them before they can be managed (Malekoff, 1997).

Technique: Groups need a language to manage and regulate affective states 317 within systemic rules. Therapists need to promote a discourse naming affective states so they can enter the communication system as the precondition to interpreting them.

Conclusion. Affect as defined by the GFR is highly responsive, reflecting the impact of other dimensions on group energy, especially organizational states and action events. It is a consequence rather than cause of group process. Affect is inherently unstable and only regulated and managed by non-affective functions of Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence. While affects need to be named and articulated, since they are a consequence of other processes, they need not be the primary focus of interventions.

Action Coherence. The GFR defines Action Coherence as the quality of cooperation or conflict in the communication process. It is the third most reliable dimension and its inherent characteristics are sensitivity and responsiveness to events, with a tendency to drift steadily towards increased conflict. Action Coherence has an intimate relationship to structure of communication, which itself is a form of action (Harbermas, 1984, 1989; Harré, 1993). Conflict within inadequate organization breaks communication; consequently, promoting communication re-integrates structure. Conflict is likely to cause structural change by forcing issues out of communication and therefore out of group representation (Foulkes, 1964). Technique: Structure is defined by communication. Stimulating separated members or subgroups to communicate integrates groups and confronts conflict through action.

Cooperation is more difficult to maintain with increased group size; conflict is proportional to size (Forsyth, 1990). Action is the dimension most stressed by increased size and complexity of relationships, presumably because each set of relationships can cause conflict and the more members, the greater is the potential for conflict (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). The highest proportion of cooperation occurs in Systemic organization. Cooperation is reduced when the group is self-representational and

progressively less in Normative and Unorganised. Cooperation is based on a 318 system of rules for the group rather than individual guidelines in normative organization (Harré, 1993). Rules as collective representations form the common ground for cooperation (Flick, 1998). Conflict is likely when there are splits in communication fabric or collective representations fail to coordinate conflict. Technique: Conflict may occur between individuals about specific issues, however, since it represents failure of a guiding rule system in the group entity, interventions should aim to re-establish shared collective representations and rules as well as confronting individual actions.

Cooperation changing to conflict is associated with unpleasure. There is a reciprocal relationship between unpleasure and conflict so they invoke each other. Cooperation for common goals stabilises all other dimensions. The occurrence of conflict is constant for all types of organization. Cooperative states tend to produce Unsociable states in succeeding minutes, whereas conflict tends to produce Functional and Sociable states, pointing to action and affect as the dimensions in which homeostatic self- regulation is expressed. It seems likely that action stimulates affect. Contracord is associated with deteriorating organization and produces increasing unpleasure. However, conflict is also associated with the highest quality sessions. Therapists’ interventions increase cooperation, while Limits reduce conflict, acting like rules. Conclusion. Action Coherence as defined by the GFR is expressed in communication and a central dimension of group process. Anticipation and management of the inevitable crises of group life require recognition of their action characteristics and the most powerful interventions are directed toward this dimension. With time, groups drift towards conflict in all conditions, but it is related to size, complexity and organization. Splits in communication are related to conflict. Common goals and collective representations organised by systemic rules prevent and manage conflict. Action is most affected by working on the common basis for communication and limits are an important extension to make rules more effective.

Therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion. The GFR classifies Therapists Interventions according to the object they are directed towards. It is the least reliable dimension and needs greater precision and

definition. However, results show trends indicating their effects. Group 319 Interventions act as challenging stimuli to groups (Bion, 1961), often provoking initial regression towards lower categories (Agazarian and Peters, 1989) before leading to increased function after a couple of minutes. Member Interventions promote whole Structure and undermine Concord, but have little effect on Cognitive Organization or Affect. The most consistently constructive intervention is Group and Member, which tends to produce lasting higher functional categories in all dimensions (Ettin, 1999). Limits and Locomotion increase the power and effect of the other interventions. Technique: The most consistently constructive and reliable type of intervention is Group and Member. Interventions should where possible link members to group states, and articulate the effects of group states on members.

Conclusion. Even in the crude analysis provided, differences in the effects of Therapists Interventions indicate their impact on GFR dimensions. The difference in effect related to the object of intervention supports the notion that it is therapeutically advantageous to consider (or speak to) the group as an entity, but this is challenging unless members are also referred to.

The value of the GFR. The GFR allows four dimensions of whole group process to be differentiated and reveals a set of relations between them, which together provide an account of both structural and dynamic phenomena. These relations suggest therapeutic strategies to promote group goals.

23. DISCUSSION 2. HYPOTHESES. 320

In Chapters 19-21, results showed some hypotheses were supported fully or partially and some not. However, there were also indications of important group functions not hypothesized and worthy of discussion in relation to theory.

1. Group Development. Several implications of the findings for group development can be considered.

1.1. Rhythmicity. The results for H1.1 did not show progressive change throughout the year for any dimension. Instead, the rhythmic waveform was observed. The fact that a similar pattern is evident for all aspects of group function revealed by the GFR, suggests rhythmicity is a fundamental property of groups (Bion, 1961; Malekoff, 1997; Ettin, 1999). Continuity of progressive change between sessions was not supported as a criterion of therapeutic progress. The findings show group functioning is multidimensional, not linear (Kellerman, 1979; Ahlin, 1996) and must be evaluated rhythmically rather than against linear “progress.” It suggests that rather than attaining goal states, therapeutic achievements are associated with groups repeatedly entering and leaving states while maintaining functionality. Rhythmicity may be a general property of social entities, not restricted to these groups (Durkheim, 1964; Bion, 1961). If so, group process needs to be conceptualized in terms of its rhythmic character. If critical periods of rhythmic group development exist (Lewis et al., 2000), interventions need to be synchronized with developmental phases to make greatest use of the natural process. Allowing for missing data, the period in these groups is about three sessions. It may be valuable for group conductors to know whether they are on an ascending or descending trajectory of the natural rhythm in deciding upon interventions. The findings in relation to crises indicate natural rhythms help bring groups out of their difficulties. Therapeutically desirable states may also be self-limiting in spite of therapists or members efforts to shorten or prolong them, like the social organism’s natural breathing rhythm. Groups may progress in their own rhythm and therapists are likely to feel inactive or may intervene too much if they do not wait to see if

problematic states self-correct (Kennard, Roberts and Winter, 2000). 321 Technique: Groups’ rhythmicity may alter therapists’ understanding of events and interventions; allowing for natural rhythmic change may be an important support to resolve group problems.

1.2. Change through the year. In spite of the groups being successful and members progressing as assessed by referring clinicians and parents (see Appendix 1), changes in Condensed States throughout the year were modest as shown in results for H1.2. Percentages are small and the pattern of change complex. Given the patients had not been successfully treated by other methods, therapeutic progress was significant and seems to have resulted from qualitative rather than quantitative changes. This suggests groups need not spend long periods in harmonious self-reflection for members to develop. They need to solve problems so the group continues and membership is maintained, enabling them to learn to belong to natural peer groups (Gordon, 1983, Cotterell, 1996). Technique: Therapists need to watch for target states, even if only lasting a few minutes, as indicating therapeutic progress. They are effective even if only brief responses to crises followed by non-reflective, cooperative games. Quality of group function is more important than content.

Each group developed its own “personality” reflected in the pattern of states and changes. These characteristics may reflect the relationship between those individuals and the group experience they need. One group, for example (1993), may need to spend time in Unsociable states for members to resolve aggressive tendencies, while another such as (1996) may spend more time in Sociable for self-centered members to learn to play by rules. Groups’ progress may be best judged by its quality and members’ change relative to themselves, rather than independent criteria. Technique: Therapists need to consider the life of the group as a whole and be cautious of prescribing preconceived states as therapeutic.

2. Group Structure. Some findings for the effects of groups’ structure have implications for therapeutic technique.

2.1. Whole-Subgroup Structure. 322 Findings for H2.1.1 indicate a complex pattern of different group states for whole or subgroup structural conditions. Rule-based cognitive activity, stable pleasure, unpleasure, cooperation about different goals and conflict are constant for all structures, indicating groups are likely to encounter problems in both whole and divided structures and that all structural conditions demand therapeutic work. However, therapeutic goal states are less common in subgroups where less organized cognitive activity, cooperation with separate goals and inert affect are more likely. Nevertheless, high quality states occur in subgroups and may enable groups to become whole (Northen, 1988, Yalom, 1995). Increased unstable pleasure in whole reflects Durkheim’s (1954) hypothesis that “social effervescence” is a product of groups meeting together and the inherent pleasure of association in whole states seems to destabilize the structure. Perhaps socially troubled adolescents are unable to manage such pleasure and this is an important therapeutic goal for them. Technique: It is as important to help adolescents have pleasure and manage arousal, especially in whole structure, as it is to focus on their intra-psychic and antisocial problems.

Self-reflection and Concord were most likely in whole structure, but so was unstable, high pleasure. Whole is a demanding, but creative structure; groups need to move into and out of it to master it. Technique: While whole structure is most creative, groups must learn to manage it by movement into and out of it; inhibiting this dynamic may be counterproductive, causing repeated loss control and destructive states.

Groups were found likely to have less organized cognitive functioning in subgroups than in whole. Although more stable, subgroups are less likely to develop self-regulation skills and may be “rests” from “work” in whole structure. They may also be a “resistance” or refuge from therapeutic work when it is too threatening (MacLennan and Dies, 1992). They give stability at the expense of higher quality functioning. The similar proportions of unpleasure and conflict in whole and subgroups indicate therapeutic challenges are not escaped, but unstable pleasure and self-reflection are. Movement into subgroups seems to be defensive, but only works for a time; then

problems re-emerge (Yalom, 1995; Ettin, 1999). Nevertheless, the 323 combination of the two structures allows the group varied opportunities to manage its changing states. Movement between whole and subgroups may begin defensively, but become self-regulatory. In Chapter 11, the literature on subgroups showed they were thought to be both constructive and destructive (Kellerman, 1979; MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Yalom, 1995). Stable structure for long periods may stagnate or create tensions, only relieved by structural change. Enlivening, stimulating structural change may also occur. Further research is needed to develop criteria distinguishing constructive, self- regulatory processes from defensive flight into subgroups. Technique: Movement between structures is an important rhythm and may be both defensive and constructive. Therapists must work with this until groups have learned to manage their arousal rather than always encouraging them to remain whole.

Findings for H2.1.2 showed movement from whole to subgroups reduced unpleasure and conflict. It indicated structural change can reduce conflict, stabilize pleasure and reduce unpleasure. However, this is only one means of managing threats since groups also resolve problems within the same structure. Relative to the amount of time they spend in different structural states, conflict is four to eight times more likely to be associated with structure change than cooperative states. Perhaps this shows different types of group tensions are affected differently by structural change. On one hand, some types of group tension may be considered threats of engulfment for members, such as demands for conformity, which are helped by structure change. For example, two boys resisting the demand to play a card game initiated by a third, dominating member separated themselves from the game and established another of their own, causing the conflict to subside for a time (1988, session 3). On the other hand, tensions resulting from the clash of identities, such as interpersonal rivalries, power struggles or obtuseness may prevent structure changes from occurring or may persist in spite them. For example, conflicts about a game’s conduct or the interpretation of rules need to be resolved within the structure so it can continue; formation of subgroups would destroy the game. Structure changes when communication is interrupted between some members, which may solve some conflicts, but not others. Content analysis combined with GFR ratings would identify the types of

conflict resolution methods used in relation to structural change. 324 This study has shown that structural change is one method of managing conflict, but not every structural change reflects a conflict change. Movement to subgroups also stabilizes pleasure and reduces unpleasure, while movement to whole destabilizes pleasure and increases unpleasure. Hence, structural change manages affect as well. However, groups were more likely to resolve conflict within the structure in which it occurred than to change. Non-structural methods of solving problems are thus more likely. If the whole group in conflict moves to subgroups, it is twice as likely to become cooperative as remain conflictual. The most frequent oscillations are between cooperation and conflict within whole, the next most frequent is between whole and subgroup structures while remaining cooperative. These indicate group rhythms. Conflict states are more likely to change structure than cooperative states (see Figure 18.1). The results for H2.1.3 showed while there was not systematic change from subgroup to whole functioning during the course of the year, there was a linear relation between higher Cognitive Organization and whole structure. This was not found for Affect and the same conflict occurs in both structures. This suggests that structure is closely related to Cognitive Organization, but the relationship is more complex for Affect. Many hypotheses imply linear relationships, but the dynamics of affect and action do not reflect these relations and may need non-linear hypotheses to show the relationships (Kellerman, 1979; Ahlin, 1995).

2.2. Group Size. Results for H2.2 showed that in contrast to the prevailing wisdom, which recommends larger groups (MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Yalom, 1995; Malekoff, 1997), the larger the group, the greater the difficulty it has achieving high functional states and the more likely it is to have unstable affect, conflict and crises. The smaller the group, the more it attains self-reflective cognitive functioning, stable and higher quality states (Unhappy Cooperation and Nominal behave like constructive states indicating the centrality of conflict). Size has a linear relation to conflict. Larger groups are more likely to be stimulating and demanding, but treating difficult patients may be more successful in small groups of even two members, until the group develops self-regulatory capacities.

Technique: Group size is important in forming groups. Difficult patients may 325 be easier to manage and less conflictual in smaller groups; withdrawn patients may be stimulated in larger groups. Size can be increased as the group develops.

2.3. Group Completeness. Results for H2.3 showed absence of members makes it easier for groups to function at higher functional levels until the group’s survival becomes uncertain (MacLennan and Dies, 1992) and functionality is lowered (König, 1991). It is easier for a member or two to be away, but the whole group is important. The main effects of absentees are in affect and action, with little effect on structure or cognitive organization. Groups manage better without one or two members, demonstrating again that wholeness is the most challenging social experience. Members staying away for a session may be another self-regulation technique. There is 30% chance of absentees following crises, which compares with the overall dropout rate in adolescent groups of 20-40% (Holmes, 1983). When groups are securely established in the middle quartiles of the year, absent members help them function better, perhaps because they need not face problems when all members are not present. However, when establishing itself in the first quartile, or later in the Working phase, absentees are disruptive to groups, suggesting the organism is disturbed by lack of members. The implications are that absenteeism is not only likely, but may be an inevitable phenomenon of group process (rather than being considered as a failure or resistance, it may be conceptualized as another expression of the rhythmic interplay of disorganization and control (Slavson, 1979; MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Ettin, 1999).

3. Group Dynamics. The findings for hypotheses concerning dynamics showed several important features of group processes.

3.1. Dimensions affecting stability. In H3.1, Affect and Action Coherence showed a linear relationship with Cognitive Organization categories, except for Representational. More organized states were associated with increased stable pleasure and reduced conflict, while less organized states were associated with increased unpleasure and conflict. However,

Representational is systemically organized self-representational content and 326 more inclined towards conflict and stable unpleasure when members talk about themselves and the group. It includes argumentation, disputes and talk of problems as well as cooperative communications. The most stable states are present in Systemic, indicating groups governed by rule-based communication are most cooperative and emotionally stable. A system of rule-based logical relationships is essential to maintain stability and constructiveness even if it is not psychologically oriented. It is evident that much of the group organism’s development and functioning can happen without Representational organization. Encouraging self-reflection makes groups less stable and cooperative. Although it is required for psychological work, it is more challenging (Slavson, 1979; Azima, 1989). Technique: Groups must achieve self-regulation and resilience before being able to successfully manage Representational communication, or they are likely to become unstable and conflictual. While self-confrontation is necessary in psychotherapy, therapists must consider its demands, which may work against the group becoming an organism; too much psychology may overload and disorganize it, particularly in its early life. Psychological material is unlikely to be integrated successfully unless Systemic organization is maintained. Organizational resilience is therefore important to consider in making psychological interventions.

H3.2 examined categories associated with instability. Unpleasure was most associated with instability and tends to be associated with change in structure and action, while cognitive organization is relatively unaffected. Conflict and Concord were also associated with increased instability in structure and action. Unsociable states (conflict and unpleasure) cause instability in structure and action, but Concord is also unstable since it demands high quality integration that easily fails. These findings may allow therapists to anticipate disruption and focus their interventions on structure and action, which are most likely to be disrupted. Technique: Unsociable states are likely to change group structure and action states. Interventions can anticipate splitting or conflict and assist groups to manage the stress.

3.2.3. Self-correcting tendencies. 327 The matrices derived for H3.2.3 showed the tendency for affect and action states to change to categories of the opposite quality over three minutes. The higher quality the states, the stronger is the trend towards lower quality states and vice versa. This finding indicates rhythmic mechanisms are perceptible within the session over even short periods. The more extreme the affect and action states, the more strongly groups self-correct towards opposite states. Regression towards the mean would tend toward moderate categories, whereas the trend is towards the opposite extreme states. Rather than indicating a tendency towards a stable mean state, these groups functioned like a pendulum: the larger the amplitude away from the stable state, the greater the tendency toward the opposite extreme. Like organisms, it seems groups need to occupy all possible states. Homeostasis is not maintenance of a mean, but the organized rhythm of stimulus and correction (Goldstein, 1995), which at first over-corrects and does not remain static for any length of time. The better the group functions now, the worse it is likely to function soon. The matrices show this tendency within sessions and the graphs of stability and quality in Figures 18.1-6 and 20.5 show it over the year. The rhythmic, homeostatic tendency seems to permeate the fabric of the group at every level. It is the most reliable feature of groups’ functioning. If therapists assume its presence, they might direct their interventions not to counteract these tendencies, but to resonate with and modulate them towards the therapeutic goals (Azima, 1989). The fact that the same rhythmic characteristics are evident in all dimensions of group function within and between sessions for all groups, suggests that to interpret this fluctuation exclusively in causal terms from the interpersonal dynamics may obscure a more fundamental collective characteristic of the groups (Azima, 1989). The alternation seems to occur regardless of the content of interpersonal interactions. It may be that the establishment of such rhythms is an essential feature of group identity and that a therapeutic goal may be for therapists not to need to intervene for self-correction to occur. This may indicate the group’s progress towards becoming self-regulating. Technique: Rhythmic oscillation is inherent within and between sessions. Therapists should identify, anticipate and resonate with group rhythms, aiming to modify rather than counteract them, which would risk disrupting the group process. A further therapeutic goal may be to assist the group to undertake its own self-

regulation of these oscillations. 328

3.3. Effects of affect change. Although H3.3 did not show that negative affect change was preceded by conflict, there is evidence that action change does precede affect change in a proportion of instances. However, affect is rated from 15 seconds of the minute while action is rated from 30 seconds; consequently affect may be rated from a different portion of the minute than action, obscuring occasions when the hypothesized changes occurred. Two sorts of affect changes seem likely: one preceded by action changes and another not. An example of the first is a conversation or game in which a member begins to be teased and continues to laugh and tease in return; then after the teasing continues, the victim becomes angry or hurt and withdraws. The activity moves from cooperation to conflict while the affect remains pleasurable and only later does the affect change to unpleasure in keeping with the conflict. An example of the second is when a member participating in a game or conversation begins to express anger, boredom or unhappiness; when the others do not take any notice, he disrupts or withdraws from the game. In this case, the affect change signals an action change to come. It is possible that cognitive organization may distinguish these two patterns, since the first occurs in Normative or Unorganized organization, while the second is Systemic. Perhaps the presence of systemic rules enable affect to be expressed more openly, before conflict occurs. Clinical experience suggests this distinction is important in successfully managing groups, but a more sensitive rating procedure is needed to identify these instances. If therapists use affect as their main focus in observing group process and guiding interventions, they may fail to anticipate important moments in the process where action change precedes it. The consequences of not intervening at the time of the change may mean destructive crises occur before the affect registers and are completed before the therapist has intervened. Action and affect usually change within the same minute and are corrected in the next or subsequent minute. These events are generally short-lived and rhythmic tendencies provide inherent self-correcting processes. Although therapists’ interventions influence affect and action, the proportion is small. Therapists can recognize desired change and allow groups to continue, rather than intervening further

when it has been resolved. Sometimes groups can be left to manage the 329 problem, but other crises threaten the group’s existence and require intervention. Some therapists’ interventions tend to have their full effect a minute or more later, while others are immediate. To be successful, therapists need to make short- acting interventions within the minute of the problem that allow self-correction to occur in the following minute. Brief interventions would aim to respond to group circumstances, rather than personal psychological content. Member Interventions have little impact on affect and only change conflict after two minutes. Group Interventions tend not to reduce unpleasure or conflict, whereas Group and Member Interventions do so immediately. Brief interventions consisting of concise statements relating individuals’ actions to the group are likely to be most effective rather than psychological interpretations (Azima 1989; Rachman, 1989). Therapists who intervene too much may interfere with self-correcting processes preventing groups managing themselves (Kennard, et al., 2000). Technique: Therapists need to be aware of action as an important dimension to monitor group function. Negative changes in affect and action tend to self-correct in the following minute or two. Therapists intervene most effectively by making short Group and Member Interventions relating the actions of individual members to the whole group situation and allowing the group’s own homeostatic mechanisms to respond.

3.4. Crises and group processes. Crises of Distress and Contracord are most likely to occur in larger groups without absentees, but with deteriorating Cognitive Organization. Group organization is crucial to stability; moving from rule-based to normative to unorganized states predicts crises and instability; therapists may anticipate this. The cause of organizational deterioration may also produce the interpersonal crisis, but if organization and rules manage group states, effective interventions may try to re-establish higher organization, rather than focus on interpersonal emotional issues, which require psychological responsiveness from members. However, only increased organization enables the group to process these interventions and assert its capacity for self-regulation (Azima, 1989). Group Interventions and Member Interventions do not increase organization, but Group and Member Interventions tend to do so over three minutes and will promote the

group’s cognitive capacity to manage the problem and use the therapist’s 330 help. Crises emerge out of any state and there is 55% likelihood of others in the next three to five minutes. They do not come singly, but the group oscillates rapidly in and out of crises before stabilizing. Therapists can work for increased stability over a period using the interventions discussed. Technique: Deteriorating cognitive organization predicts crises of distress and aggression. Effective interventions may increase organization with Group and Member Interventions allowed to work over two to three minutes.

3.5-6. Cycles in group life. H3.5 and H3.6 concern cyclic alternation of stability and quality across sessions. Peaks and troughs were not the culmination of trends, but the beginning of new trajectories, directing the group process towards the opposite states. There is no evidence of random fluctuation; the regularity (allowing for missing data) is striking, showing homeostatic tendencies since the range of values (means for stability or quality) is consistent for all groups. It resembles fluctuation of physiological variables between limits. What parameter of homeostatic process is measured? If groups did not institute trajectory change, they would disband. Continued increase in either direction would make them dysfunctional. The values represent limit states of stability and quality compatible with continued functioning. Completely stable groups would be boring; members would leave, as nothing unexpected would happen. Constantly unstable groups would be equally dissatisfying and members would leave. The measure of quality is the percentage of constructive states (Functional and Sociable Condensed states). If it were close to 100% constructive for many consecutive sessions (the 1988 group achieves this on four occasions), members would lack opportunities to express their needs. It would be unvarying, unrewarding, and could not continue. If the quality were equally low, it would be chaotic, unpleasant and would not continue. Groups seem to “dose” themselves with states needed to achieve therapeutic goals. However, there is no guarantee that self-correction or limits will be successful. An analogy is an infection in a person; fever is induced to combat it, determined by homeostatic processes designed to preserve the organism. Yet, the fever may itself cause damage or death in the attempt to recover. It seems reasonable for similar

mechanisms and mishaps to occur in social organisms. A “rational” group 331 would work through conflicts and anxieties, then reach a state of harmony. An alternative is to visit various states in rhythmic sequence. Rhythm is a feature of organicity (Goldstein, 1995) and gives the impression of groups not only being organized within the session, but of “knowing where they are” on the wave so the next session continues the rhythm. Technique: Sensitivity to group rhythms enables therapists to map progress and identify self-correcting homeostatic processes. Stability and quality of sessions may be more determined by their sequence in oscillations than interpersonal dynamics within the session.

4. Therapists Interventions. Therapists’ interventions rest on slight proportions (1% or greater) of frequency change of categories in the three to five minutes following them. These net changes are clues to their global effects. Interventions are defined by the object they are directed to and vary from abstract psychological interpretations to simple descriptive statements. Some interventions change group states, others do not (Dalal, 1995). The net effect may be caused by only a small proportion of that intervention. The fact that Member Interventions do not appreciably affect ratings of whole group process validates the GFR, since it would not expect interventions to individuals to influence the whole organism. Talking to the group entity in Group Interventions changes it, though tends to initially lower functional levels. It affirms groups as psychic entities, since they respond to being addressed (Battegay, 1999). Further analysis of forms of intervention and content of group process may provide additional insight into this relationship. Group Interventions increased the probability of lower categories in Structure and Cognitive Organization; initially stable pleasure and cooperation increase, followed by oscillations. They stimulate the group when static or resistant to confront issues and challenge it to respond to its own states. Therapists talk about the group to the group (König, 1991), so the content is self-representational; therefore Group Interventions indicate how the group responds to Representational stimuli. Response to these interventions would gauge how well the group can handle collective representations and indicate therapeutic progress (Azima, 1989).

Technique: Group Interventions stimulate the group and challenge it when 332 resistant or stagnant. Responses to their self-representation indicate groups’ ability to confront themselves.

Member Interventions temporarily increase the likelihood of whole structure, do not affect Cognitive Organization or Affect and disrupt participation in common goals. Talking to a member brings that person to the attention of the group and unites everyone else around the common interest (Gordon, 1997). This may help integrate members into the group, providing all can hear it. However, talking to individuals in Concord singles them out, disrupting the common goal (Rutan and Stone, 1984; Azima, 1989). It is important not to talk to individuals under these circumstances, but address the group instead. Technique: Member Interventions bring individuals to the attention of the group and help integrate them, but addressing individuals in activities with common goals disrupts concord.

Group and Member Interventions are most effective in all dimensions (Battegay, 1999), continuing for up to three minutes. Presumably, this is due to relating the activity of members to the group. The therapeutic purpose is to enable members to form groups. It is in harmony with therapeutic goals by its form, irrespective of content. Individual members need to become “organs” of groups and therapists need to talk about this relationship. Group and Member Interventions are likely to articulate the relationship between member and group, facilitating communication. Therapists need to verbally represent the relationship, bringing it to consciousness so groups can work with it. The members lack experience of groups and are often unable to communicate their effect on the group or it on them. Many interventions may name events in relation to participants and group (Azima, 1989, Rachman, 1989; Gordon, 1997). Technique: Therapists need to articulate relationships between members and group to develop a language to understand the effects on individuals and the whole.

Limits and Locomotion are effective interventions managing the group and reducing destructive states. Limits added to Group and Member Interventions enhance their effects and last several minutes. Locomotion is a response to deteriorating cognitive

organization and conflict. Physical proximity turns out to be an effective 333 stimulus for the group to control itself regardless of what else happens (MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Malekoff, 1997). Technique: Close physical proximity is an effective intervention to maintain order and control in groups and indicates therapists need to move around the room.

The indications derived from the analysis of therapists’ interventions give the basis for a technique which is not restricted to content, but provides tentative directions for using both the object of the intervention and the therapists’ personal movement as additional dimensions to their intervention. Since these are already present in all interactions with the group, these principles allow for some systematic exploration of their relationship with content of intervention.

24. DISCUSSION 3: GROUP DEVELOPMENT 334

The majority of phases postulated in the literature review of group development were integrated into an eight-phase sequence. Evidence of phases was not found when single dimensions of group process such as stability and quality were examined, nor with Condensed States. However, when relative proportions of time spent in the three Functional Bands were examined, evidence of developmental phases was found. Hypothesised proportions likely to be associated with the characteristics in each phase could be identified. This finding remains tentative since the sample is restricted to five groups with similar characteristics and sessions are missing in some groups. However, it is significant in the light of the skepticism expressed about the notion of developmental phases (Whitaker, 1985; Ahlin, 1995) and confirms that development is not a unitary, linear process (Kellerman, 1975; Ahlin, 1995, Ettin, 1999). The finding is strengthened by the fact that the phases’ characteristics were derived from conceptual analysis of the literature and then identified in the data. In spite of their limitations, the results may provide a framework for analysis of other groups. Central to these findings is that GFR data allowed for simultaneous description of three aspects of groups as entities (Functional, Sociable and Unsociable states). The power of considering the group as an organism rather than a “multiple” of individuals (Sandelands and St Clair, 1993) is demonstrated by the GFR’s capacity to integrate the complexity of interpersonal interactions into a three-dimensional system which differentiated phases. However, in conceptualizing the phases hypothetically (see Chapter 18), the sequence of members’ interpersonal contributions to the group process was described. It remains to consider the phases as descriptions of the development of a collective organism.

1. Convening. The group initially belongs to the therapists, who set the agenda and bring members to treatment; it consists of individuals needing to establish communication and common understanding as the Nominal Group (Gn). Members depend on therapists creating the group and respond to their lead, functioning as an “extrinsic” group, whose reason, control and direction come from outside it. Tensions are avoided by external influences; individual behaviour is motivated to engage in the group (Lewis, Beck,

Dugo and Eng, 2000). 335 The group is the commonality among members, as a common idea (the “group to join,” Long, 1984) formed by getting to know each other and discussing rules and expectations, where the group itself is the focus. Members initially have in common only what therapists tell them. The therapeutic task is initially beyond their grasp and they must first seek commonalities to form a group (Ettin, 1999). They need to communicate, but lacking common experience, the content comes first from the therapist, then from the commonalities they find. When communication is established, individual experience is complemented by a common structure in the communicational dimension. Members seek Sociable activity to develop shared experience as group content and make the group their own. The therapists define the functional, self- representational content. This phase is short-lived if the group becomes an entity. If it persisted, the group would be didactic, reliant on therapists and fail the therapeutic task. The first stage requires considerable self-representation to find common content or the collectivity cannot form. This explains the high percentage of Functional. Where groups continue from the previous year, the tendency is reduced. The phase is called “Convening,” in reference to convening the tissue of communication that defines the group’s existence, enabling the Watzlawick Principle (see Chapter 9) to operate and establish dimensions of group function. Convening describes the formation of the material basis (communication) of the collective organism before any self-sustaining process has begun within it. Once continuity of self-sustaining communication is formed, the group becomes a Social Group (Gs) however rudimentary, marking the transition from Convening to the next phase of Engagement.

2. Engagement. From the interpersonal perspective, Phase 2 describes members taking flight from self-disclosure to avoid the anxiety of group membership (Bennis and Shepard, 1956). However, the term “avoidance” pre-supposes that members recognize problems, but lack successful group experience and do avoid them as threatening. “Flight” into predominantly Sociable activity facilitates shared experience and cooperation, but does not address their experiences. It also provides a body of non-threatening experience to create sufficient sense of belonging for members to accept therapy. Dependence

expresses their need for each other and the group. 336 Taking the perspective of the group being, this phase is the opposite of avoidance; it is “engagement” in non-conflictual activity by establishing spontaneous communication. If it does not occur, members become bored, leave and the group fails, or it becomes educational rather than therapeutic. The natural movement in the second phase is away from formal content, towards shared experience about whatever can be communicated. Social problems are communication problems (Sigman, 1987), but sustained social communication establishes the group and is therapeutic; therefore, avoidance of problems is also engagement in group-forming communication. Most communication is likely to be about familiar, shared experiences. “Therapeutic” self- referential material is less likely, since it is more problematic. The group’s social body forms of communication, common experience, shared events and history. The communication derives from awareness of others and the desire to engage with them in Sociable activity. As this occurs, the experience of the group changes from “otherness” defined by the therapist to “shared-ness” and “own-ness” as they contribute their content into the communication body. Communicational integrity forms in Engagement; members are incorporated into the tissue of social communication and begin to feel the group as a common, collective structure (Rachman, 1989). The indication for this is in each member recognizing the group as an independent entity to which they belong. This is implicit in members’ talk about the group, referring to other members as “we” and “us.” As they get to know each other, identifications form around commonalities, constituting the group being by mechanical solidarity based on similarities and common images binding members, but leaving little room for differences (Durkheim, 1964). This is expressed in high proportions of Sociable and low Functional and Unsociable states. In Engagement, the group entity assembles itself from members as “organs,” forming a communication body to unite them through common (Sociable) activity. The group has come into being, but lacks consensual (Functional) collective representations of itself. Conflict between members’ individual needs and the group’s requirements leads to the next phase.

3: Positioning. The third phase begins as members acquire ownership of the group and develop

conflicting expectations about it. They assert desires about their position. 337 Problems appear that have previously made group membership difficult and the capacity for constructive activity diminishes. Unsociable activity increases as members try to make the group what they want and resist each other or the group. When members express their desires in the group, it loses “otherness” and becomes an extension of themselves; but conflict is created between being individuals and becoming organs of the collective entity (Durkheim, 1964). The emerging sense of membership of a collective unit creates concern about the position each will occupy. “Positioning” describes members working out their place in the structure they are building. “Group-ness” forming from the common content in Engagement is felt to be their “own-ness.” If successful, it makes the group their own social structure in which they can express themselves. Members want the group as an opportunity to express their interests; enjoyment of it encourages satisfaction, but motivates conflict as personal drives collide (Burrow, 1927b). Social problems are evoked. If membership cannot be put before self-satisfaction, the group loses members. Feeling recognized and valued by the group motivates compromises. High proportions of Unsociable states indicate fragmentation, disorganization, unpleasurable affect and conflict. Positioning concerns members’ desire for belonging conflicting with their fear of engulfment, past painful social experiences and independence. Its dynamics manifest interpersonal tensions and struggles for dominance, motivated by attempts to gain power over the group to reduce anxiety. The conflict is between whether “the group exists for me or I exist for it.” Members want to make the group an extension of themselves or become part of it, but risk losing personal identity for an unknown gain in social identity. At this stage, members cannot make the group itself an object, because it lacks collective representations. Consequently the conflict manifests in the interpersonal dimension. Instead of the group being felt as the threat, other members are. When someone dominates, what they want becomes what the group wants, such as when a member insists the group plays a card game for several sessions. Joining the activity is joining the group, but this puts the member under the influence of the dominant individual who demands others do what they want and conflict develops. Others become dissatisfied; eventually someone resists the domination and refuses to play. For the group to progress, members must express differences and similarities in

their interaction. The mechanical solidarity of Engagement must change to 338 organic solidarity, with division of labor in the sense of recognizing each other’s different needs. Positioning expresses the conflict between mechanical solidarity asserting similarity interpreted by dominant members as membership criteria, and organic solidarity placing differences within a framework of the common need for therapy. The conflict is expressed in tension about what can and cannot be communicated and how the communicational tissue preserves its integrity (Malekoff, 1997). For the group to continue it must achieve tolerance for difference and relationships organised on another basis than power (MacLennan and Dies, 1992; Hopps and Pinderhughes, 1999). In Positioning, the group entity, having formed from members as heterogeneous organs, has to “shake down” into a working unit serving the whole rather than individuals. It establishes the possibility of being an organism. The group entity’s existence provokes tension between individuality, membership and collectivity. It has to cope with collective experiences that are not always gratifying and develop self- regulating processes to manage Unsociable states or there can be no change in group or members. Common communication has to provide an integrated body for members and the group. Consequently, although the proportion of Unsociable states is high, so is Sociable, whereas Functional is low because of the lack of collective representations.

4. Consolidation. In this phase, members achieve an agreed basis for functioning. They develop norms and rules, resolve problems and achieve shared group-maintenance activity. Self-representation (Functional) is less likely than Sociable activity, because the group cannot yet confront problems. Conflict and unhappiness (Unsociable) occur, but are resolved. The social unit is secured, allowing group building to continue to “consolidate” the group entity. The group becomes the members’ own place. Satisfaction arises from membership of the collectivity rather than personal gratification. Common experience creates norms and shared expectations. A developing common history forms a collective identity in which the group’s rules are expressed. If this does not happen, the group fails or members leave because they cannot achieve the compromise membership requires. Consolidation describes the group achieving security in collective identity

(Rachman, 1989.) The conflicts of Positioning may continue. Powerful 339 members may not relinquish their drive for power, subordinates may not exercise their rights, but the therapeutic process attains a mutual structure that may be a compromise or collusion depending on how Positioning is resolved. At the conclusion of Positioning, members accept the group not being what they want it to be and more than they expected. In Consolidation, they begin to experience organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1964), being organs of an entity greater than themselves, regulated to give satisfaction. Members accept the group’s sovereignty and conflicts resolve for the collective welfare, because the group becomes more important than personal desires. In Consolidation, the group organism forms collective representations consisting of shared ideas that give it psychic existence; group functionality is established and membership enjoyed. The collective entity consolidates itself. This requires a high proportion of Sociable and lower Unsociable, while Functional is also low since the group is only beginning to achieve collective representations by the end of this phase. The growing sense of security and satisfaction leads to a qualitative change in the group, arising from members achieving a collective identity, which introduces the next phase (Rachman, 1989).

5. Idealization. The hopes members brought to the therapeutic situation arise in the next phase. Consolidation must culminate in recognition of successfully constituting the group and be expressed as a sense of collective well-being. With the emerging capacity to enjoy a collective identity (perhaps for the first time), members hope it will provide all they want. However, because they expect more than it can give, these hopes are unrealistic. They relate to a common “imaginary group” consisting of each one’s ideal rather than a mutual, actual one (Agazarian and Peters, 1981). It alienates them from genuine collectivity. In this phase of “Idealization,” the group becomes an object in members’ experience because of their successful involvement, indicated by the high proportion of Functional self-reflective communication; Sociable may also be high, indicating common activity, but Unsociable is low. Idealization follows Consolidation. Members’ hopes are aroused by the “own- ness” forming high expectations because norms and group identity are successfully formed. The group entity’s self-awareness is indicated by Representational in the high

proportion of Functional states. Members readily refer to the group and its 340 consolidation is expressed in the Functional capacity. Idealization emerges quickly and lasts only 1-3 sessions since it is unstable. It occurs because limits have not yet been found; they belong to the next phase (Shambaugh, 1989). The imaginary group almost immediately fails to live up to expectations. In the previous phase, the group entity gained functionality from the Sociable activity. Because of the consolidation of the entity’s existence, Idealization describes a brief period in which it responds to the vitality associated with its own psychological functioning by high proportions of Functional self-representation states. Perhaps it could be said the entity “celebrates” its existence and this threatens members’ feeling of incorporation, stimulating them to regain personal identity against group identity introducing the following phase.

6. Disenchantment. The imaginary group of Idealization is unsustainable. Almost as soon as it forms as a tacit collective representation, it provokes disappointment. Conflict and tension erupt from unrealistic ideals of the group and members must confront problems preventing them accepting the group as it is. This is essential preparation for the Working phase and involves “Disenchantment” or dissolution of the idealized group (Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Schambaugh, 1989). It is inevitable that something unrealistic, fabricated from the hopes of the group’s early success must be lost in this phase if the group is to discover what is not possible and accept failures instead of swinging between idealization and rejection of social life. This may include losing control, testing limits and feeling frustrated. Disenchantment is a crisis likely to be expressed in rebellion or conflict; it has the highest proportion of Unsociable (44.5%) after Positioning (47.3%). For the group entity, this phase occurs when communication regulates members so they do not only utilize the group for personal satisfaction. Disenchantment indicates re-appearance of the tensions resulting from the group’s organs also being individuals who cannot give themselves completely to it. Failure to be disillusioned would mean increasing involvement and ultimately loss of identity. Resolution of Disenchantment requires members to convert hopes into clearer expectations and substitute limited satisfaction for idealized gratification. Group existence must be put before self, making the group more durable; reduced expectations form a shared identity compensating for

personal disappointments. Members can begin working, since the group 341 becomes safe enough to bring their problems into an environment that expects less, but feels theirs. However, this crisis may involve regression to Positioning and reworking the process if they cannot relinquish ideals. In Disenchantment, the group being confronts its conflicts and limitations and in doing so, shows it can successfully regulate disorganized, unpleasurable and conflictual states to maintain its life.

7. Working. In this phase, the group oscillates between Unsociable and Functional states with considerable Sociable activity. Members have achieved sufficient belonging to feel attached to each other and it is their group; they tolerate conflict, resolving problems threatening the group (Ettin, 1999). The group is resilient; as problems are worked on, conflict leads to Functional activity; periods of satisfying Sociable activity reward members for persisting in being together and motivate continuing involvement and problem-solving. “Working” involves fluctuations in all three bands of Condensed activity. The group is a shared space, neither “other” nor “own,” but “ours.” As

Functional Group (Gf) it offers members a new category of social experience. The full range of social phenomena occur with mutual acknowledgment and shared commitment to care for self, others and group in spite of hostility an conflict. It opens when the group successfully emerges from Disenchantment and enters a state where all conditions rhythmically alternate in a self-preserving and self-regulating entity. It manages harmonious, boring and conflictual states with homeostatic functions avoiding dismemberment. The group entity is stable, balancing group and individual needs through rhythmic interchange (see Chapter 23). Each state is complemented and compensated by others later in the session or subsequent sessions. The collective entity shows its life and integrity through the rhythmic fluctuation across the variety of states to develop a complex, creative existence. However, it is hard to acknowledge the end of the group, since this may be the first experience of belonging, and this introduces the final phase.

8. Separation. In this phase members confront loss and separation associated with the group

ending. In spite of conflicts, it should provide increased recognition of the 342 group’s role in members’ lives. However, adolescent groups are often unable to confront loss, since they may not have belonged before and do not know what it means to lose a group. Their avoidance of self-reflective Functional states in this phase is not only defensive, since high Sociable states also express shared cooperative and enjoyable activity that has been the core of the group (Wardi, 1989). Separation often celebrates and re-creates earlier phases of Engagement or Consolidation with similar proportions (Functional 3-7%, Sociable 67-73% and the lowest proportion of Unsociable 21-23%). In the face of ending, the group entity may try to maintain itself and avoid dismemberment by reverting to patterns similar to Consolidation, avoiding Representational, which would confront the reality of ending, but also conflict states that would threaten the group (Peternel, 1991; Etting, 1999). This phase is called “Separation” rather than termination, because members have to integrate the group so that it continues to affect them. If ending is threatening, it leads to denial or rejection and “disintegrating” rather than integrating the group (Wardi, 1989). It is not just a matter of mourning and loss, but re-constituting the group as a symbolic element in their experience and reference point for the future. There is insufficient data to draw conclusions about this phase other than suggesting it exists. There was never a full ending since all groups continued the following year. However, a tentative conclusion is that for the group entity, the high proportion of Sociable and low Functional and Unsociable in this phase may indicate the failure of collective representations to deal with the group’s disbanding. Consequently, the denial of termination is as though the group prefers to “fall asleep” in unrepresented Sociable activity, rather than confront its own demise and the grief that would provoke.

Overview. Developmental dynamics and vicissitudes of phase sequences are also possible (McCollom, 1995). Their order may vary if things go wrong, but they are hypothesised as an essential sequence for forming functional group entities. Vicissitudes may include not fulfilling phase requirements, becoming fixated, advancing and regressing within or between phases, jumping and aborting phases or traumatic events disrupting continuity of development (Ahlin, 1995). The sequence identified becomes a framework to identify such dynamics. It shows how the group entity forms, consolidates and settles to work on

its task. Such an overview may define strategies or tasks for each stage and 343 guide aspects to focus on at each phase. Relevance of development phases. The value of a developmental scheme depends on how it is used. Rigid application will obscure the unique individuality of each group and inhibit effective treatment. However, if a developmental sequence exists, its recognition is comparable to the role of understanding child development in individual psychotherapy. Although treatment may not aim to achieve developmental tasks, it is the context for understanding the problems; neglecting development is a failure in responsible treatment, but development is not the end in itself. The treatment outlined here aims to bring groups into existence; it cannot only follow the developmental sequence, but takes members’ experiences and the particular group events into account. The present system is more complex than others reviewed; none include all eight phases (however, see Lewis et al., 2000). Although more cumbersome for treatment, this sequence has been validated empirically, may be more discrete in its specification of phenomena and less suitable to simplistic programmatic use. Clinical relevance of the phases. It would be inimical to therapy if treatment pushed groups through preconceived developmental tasks. Knowledge of developmental phases provides a context to evaluate group phenomena and inform interventions. Understanding phases may enable problems in sessions to be interpreted as part of the natural oscillations of the therapeutic journey rather than failures. It may enable moments to be mapped in relation to the whole process. Therapists may focus interventions non-prescriptively around the phase tasks as a background to interpreting events (Lewis et al., 2000). It describes a group-building process, since the phases are identified in the whole group. The developmental phases may provide a framework to interpret group process longitudinally over the group’s lifespan, indicating a sequence of distinct dynamics to be negotiated (Ettin, 1999). Implications for length of treatment. A developmental sequence may also point to requirements for the length of treatments. A Group Forming Paradigm of treatment (Gordon, 1997; see Chapter 9) may necessitate groups having sufficient sessions to allow for the sequence of processes and relative length of these phases as part of a complete treatment. Too short a treatment may restrict the necessary group-forming processes and set them at cross-purposes with the formal aims of groups (Ettin, 1999). Treatment outcomes. If personal therapeutic attainments are associated with

being a functional organ of a group being, then treatment outcomes may 344 correlate with groups successfully completing these developmental phases.

25. DISCUSSION 4: THEORY. 345

This study began by surveying group-entity theories to formulate a theory of the group entity and the GFR as an instrument to observe it. The current meaning of “group” is barely half a century old (Anzieu, 1984) and theoretical advances are required to solve theoretical problems (Steiner, 1974, 1983; Turner, 1988; Bednar and Moeschl, 1981; Ahlin, 1995). The theories are re-considered here in light of the findings.

The Group Organism. Rhythms in GFR states suggest whole-group organic processes of growth, structure, continuity, order and control as discussed in social organisms (Spencer, 1860; Radcliff-Brown, 1952; Merton, 1949) and systems theorists (Grinker, 1956; von Bertalanffy, 1975; Maturana and Verula, 1980, Becvar et al., 1997). They are revealed by the whole group, whose members form its organs and their relationships its life processes. The GFR defines groups as units of individuals incorporated into a common communicational world organizing the social, cultural and psychological environment. Communication’s effects are independent of its informational content (Sigman, 1987). Its structure forms templates within which members come and go or change position. Organic processes within this social communicational organism are defined by presence of the Watzlawick Principle, that it is impossible for the members not to communicate with each other (Watzlawick et al., 1967; see Chapter 9). Organic processes rendering communication comprehensible and the group viable are independent of individual members or content and point to communication as the social entity’s “tissue.” Organisms consist of continuously connected tissue composed of discrete cells within boundaries; reciprocal influences connect every part to every other part. Connectedness can be called “Continuity,” giving members a common fate (Campbell, 1958). Reciprocal influence can be called “Integrity.” The group’s “materiality” is communication; its continuity and integrity are organized, creating patterns, regularities, directed change, a set of possible states and limit conditions signalling breakdowns (Goldstein, 1995). Processes organizing and maintaining tissues (metabolism) can be called “Order.” Three fundamental metabolic processes can be described for organisms and communicational systems.

Growth consists of irreversible, directed changes forming the mature 346 organism by creating structures that become the framework for later developments. Each organ is connected to all others and nourished by growth. Growth also occurs in communication. Talk is not random. Groups tend to maintain a set of topics; the longer they meet, the more the set consolidates. Members take roles in the structure; the same thing is not said repeatedly, each contribution stimulates some sort of development. If themes and content do repeat, they lead to new conclusions or structural consequences. These phenomena are independent of individuals or content. Topics, norms, values, ideas and other constant aspects form a developing identity. Adolescent values such as “nerdy” or “cool” and games form frameworks within which the group’s communication tissue grows, amalgamating members’ contributions. This growth is evident if communication quality is compared at the group’s start and end. Self-maintenance preserves viable conditions, initiating feedback and modification if the homeostatic range is exceeded. When tissues or functions are disrupted, the organism attempts restoration within existing functions or structures. Self-maintenance also occurs in communication. Continuity of topic is preserved until an appropriate point for departing from it occurs. Conflict and disruption threaten to break communication. Groups try to preserve discourse structure, bringing sanctions against changing roles or incompatible topics and attempt to repair it. The status quo is maintained in dialectical interplay between growth and maintenance. Self-creation or “autopoiesis” (Maturana and Verula, 1980) occurs when reference points for homeostasis are damaged or dysfunctional and the previous state cannot be re- established, so a new structure or homeostasis is created. Self-creation also occurs in communication. When aspects of the communicational organism are destroyed, there is vigorous, though not necessarily constructive re-creation of communicational integrity, changing the previous structure. When influential members are lost, role structures re- form. If aggression destroys a safety norm, inhibition against conflict or controversy may become normative. Autopoietic constancies maintain communicational integrity, but restructure it creating discontinuity with the past. Growth, self-maintenance and self-creation are implied by the GFR findings. Growth is evident in the systematic change through the year (as shown in quartile changes in Condensed states, Tables 18.2-18.6), with individual characteristics in each group. Rhythmicity and rebound from instances of Distress and Contracord within a minute or so

(Tables 20.5, 20.6 and Figure 20.2) suggest self-maintenance. Self-creation is 347 indicated by the characteristics of quality and stability peak and trough sessions (Tables 20.28 and 20.30). Technique: Establishing communication creates a social organism and brings members into communication, including them in its social growth, self-maintenance and self-creation processes, required for their development.

The organism concept provides a theoretical structure to describe whole group functions and reveal unique aspects of their processes. Systematic application of this theoretical material to the communicational social organism might yield important new concepts to understand social phenomena.

The Crowd. Crowd psychology describes homogeneous, poorly structured collective mentality lacking self-regulation reactive to impulse with unstable affect. Crowds are primal communicational organisms incapable of symbolic processing. In the GFR, this is whole structure, normative organization. Without systemic organization, cognitive integration is concrete and arbitrary; communication is unrestrained by systemic rules, it is governed by the values, emotions and impulses of the moment without regard to wider implications or consequences. Cognitive organization governs functionality essential to self-regulation. Crowds form around similarities (Le Bon, 1923) in mechanical solidarity (Durkheim, 1964) when communicational organisms stabilise from unstructured, disorganized states or when systemic entities deteriorate, replacing rules with sentiments. The group’s history provides normative organization as customs, but not systemic rules. Implanting ideas is difficult, but once done, they persist as stereotypic, uncompromising, non-logical sequences of images; they are uncritical of contradictions, influenced by emotional appeals, analogy, high-sounding phrases and images (Le Bon 1923). “Crowd mind” refers to the Continuity, Integrity and Order in this type of communicational organism and is specifiable as a set of GFR states and could be studied as such. Technique: Uncontrolled groups function as crowds. Their inability to reason means the cognitive capacity required by interpretive interventions is absent. Principles of managing crowds are effective for highly aroused normative or unorganized groups.

348 “Social instincts” (McDougall, 1920; Trotter, 1916) are expressed in the GFR as normative collective representations drawing individuals into cooperative action coherence. They act from within and are unquestioned because collective representations of their arbitrary origin are lacking. Self-representational cognition breaks the power of norms allowing independent thinking. Influential individuals or “crowd crystals” (Canetti, 1960) assert norms, defy rules, command members, instigating action and expressing normative justification for their actions. Activation of norms “stings” members subject to them into conformity because of the lack of systemic organization. For example: Bill laughs at Jim’s appearance for not doing what he demands, successfully pressuring others to join in humiliating Jim, who may then miss sessions or leave the group. Bill asserts the norm that leaders determine what members do and disobedience is punished. Therapists can relate norms to the therapeutic rules by Group and Member Interventions: “Bill you are bossing everyone to do what you say or be punished; is that what you others think too? This makes the group like school, but won’t help your problems;” or, “Bill, you were picked on yourself like you are doing to Jim, but you’ve all joined the group to help each other.” The GFR suggests this would tend to increase functionality, giving a moment of self-reflection and cooperation. Technique: Therapists need to articulate and challenge emergent norms to be replaced by rational, collective rules. Interpretation is ineffective for managing rule-breaking or norms activated in crowd states, because systemic cognitive organization is lacking. Describing actions, naming motives and articulating normative assumptions provide representations of the therapeutic purpose and self- representations (Gordon, 1997).

These concepts can be defined in observable terms within the GFR. In crowd states, normative ideas are selectively aroused and torn from their relationship to other norms governing group functioning. They act like prescriptive or proscriptive rules (Forsyth, 1983, see Chapter 12). Unless exposed as norms, they must be obeyed as a condition of membership. Non-reflective, aroused communicational organisms enact sentiments. In splitting or scapegoating, the normative idea is: one subgroup or person is the problem and must be rejected to solve it. The problem for crowd states is to regulate energy enough to move from norms to systemic rules.

Regulation of action derives from cross-referencing ideas within rule 349 systems. One member may feel hostile because his (normative) prestige is threatened, but is prevented from enacting hostility by other norms, such as group purpose or losing face. Affectively aroused norms must be cross-referenced to other elements in the norm “corpus” or they are immediately enacted. Cross-referencing is a product of the communicative continuity and integrity in social life, not personal cognitive development (Mead, 1962). The system of cognitive elements is synonymous with members’ communicational relationships, which convert cognitive relations into social actions with affective consequences. Continuity and Integrity ensure mutual respect (or power relations) and refer personal ideas to the normative corpus. Group Integrity and Order impose integrity and order on individual thought and action. Therapists promote this by articulating sequences leading to misunderstandings, responsibility for interactions, egocentric assumptions about the group being for personal enjoyment or understanding of scapegoat’s actions (MacLennan and Dies, 1992). Technique: Therapists must intervene in crowd dynamics when selective arousal of normative ideas begins and distribute arousal by verbalising links to other ideas in the normative corpus or rules. Enactment of one norm (collective representation) is modified by activating others.

The Social Mind. The “general mind” forms from the residue of common experiences and becomes objective or is a pre-existing field organising the individual mind (Lewes, 1879). The common residue theory suggests culture, tradition and history are mind-creating. Collective experiences become collective representations by being articulated. Groups are the medium of individual minds, social communication the tissue and social mind is organized communication (McDougall, 1920). Members’ actions form residues through communicative action (Habermas, 1985, 1989) and social action becomes mental organization when communicated. The GFR describes this as collective representations forming in systemic cognitive organization. It requires representational organization. Shared communicative actions create a residue of common mind, whose quality is determined by the collective cognitive organization. Cognitive processes in whole structure and cooperative action are mind-creating. Therapists promote collective representations by articulating what members share.

If mind is a pre-existent field in social organisms, participation in such 350 an entity immerses members in a mind-creating situation. Mind becomes active through language, peer culture and the therapeutic culture. Communicative enactment of mental elements activates and integrates them into members’ minds. The organization of the group’s mental life directly structures members’ minds. However, they must feel the group is theirs to participate in its mental life. “Belonging” entails “internalisation” and is a therapeutic function in itself (Yalom, 1985; Bloch and Crouch, 1985). Social mind as residue describes how content is acquired, while social mind as pre-existing field describes its organization. Normative accumulation of experiences in a social context forms the residue; systemic organization pre-exists and is activated by communicative action in the pre-existing linguistic (symbolic) dimension that includes reason, moral rules and social structures (Collett, 1977b). Content includes members’ peer culture, therapists’ therapeutic culture and common cultural fundamentals of the “foundation matrix” (Foulkes, 1964). The residue consists of collective representations; the pre-existent field is the collective mentality postulated as nous (see Chapter 9). McDougall’s (1920) “self-regarding sentiment” extended to the whole group is the condition for group mind. In GFR terms, this is reflected in whole structure, representational organization, pleasure and concord. Mind or cognitive organization is linked to action coherence since equally strong deliberative (cognitive) and executive (action) functions are needed. Rational discussion (as systemic cognitive organization and cooperative action) integrates the common content of the collective mind (Giddings, 1897). Social memory creates group identity from events represented in the communicational system; common mind forms by repetition, reproduction and accumulation between minds (Small, 1905) indicating representational organization is necessary for groups to become self-regulating. Social mind arises by agreement and cooperation where individuals think and feel alike (Gillette, 1916). These theorists affirm the mind-creating character of Functional and Sociable states. Technique: Attention must be given to cognitive and action aspects of groups or they become dysfunctional. Linking past and present events, developing collective identity, describing events or conversations forms common mind through sociable content even though this is not necessarily expressed in psychological terms. Agreement, cooperation, solidarity and mutual support must be represented verbally to accumulate into collective mind.

351 Self is formed in primary groups where people live a simple, rewarding social life in cooperation; it is interchangeable with group life as “we” consciousness (Cooley, 1909). It develops with common aims and cooperative actions, irrespective of content and purposes. Cognition and action unite in “significant symbols” calling out the other’s response (Mead, 1962). Significant symbols produced by a member have meaning for others; they evoke action, because they are constituted by a social environment. The response is conditioned as much from within the individual as from without. Linguistic, cultural and behavioural symbols form mind by becoming common property through actions articulating them. Cognitive function accounts for mentality when expressed as social action (Habermas, 1985, 1989); reciprocity between collective and individual mentality is inherent in cooperative action coherence in the GFR. The social becomes personal (Toulmin, 1972); the dichotomy between individual/group, subject/object is superseded by a dimension of communication bringing mind into being (Harré, 1993). Group therapy makes available a repertoire of significant symbols, for members’ and facilitates reciprocity independent of content. The act of communication itself is therapeutic (Foulkes, 1990) when the other understands what is intended and names the significant symbol. Technique: The therapeutic goal is to maintain continuity of meaningful, pleasurable group experience in which social and communicational facts are named for the individuals to the group. Communicational processes themselves must be differentiated from their content. Content becomes significant when organization is Functional.

Meaning, consciousness and self come into being through members taking the position of the other towards themselves, (Mead, 1962) making possible abstract, systemic relationships. Normative phenomena do not imply reciprocity and must become systemic. For example, normative leadership structures apply to one member who is the leader; other members feel they have no influence. However, when ideas of leading, following and influence are made reciprocal so everyone should be included in each situation according to a principle, such as who has the best idea, it becomes a systemic rule, allowing members to experience their own capacities and how they are seen. Self- forming occurs by verbally representing members’ impact on others and giving this

meaning within a framework of therapeutic values. Such interventions 352 promote meaning, consciousness, self-reflection and representational cognitive organization. Technique: Members must be helped to take the position of the other towards themselves. Therapists need to relate normative elements to each other, articulate logical relationships, inconsistencies, contradictions or lack of relationship to encourage systemic and representational organization within cooperative action.

The self as “an eddy in the social current,” (Mead, 1962, p 182) describes it coming into being through rhythmic group process. Eddies do not form in a viscous medium; only changing relationships allow members to meet self-forming needs. However, unorganized change is chaos; eddies form in the rhythms of a complex, organized medium. The group process must be flexible enough to constantly present new situations to members, but fluctuations must be part of a series where particular states regularly reappear as reference points for the rest of the process. For example, periods of stability lead to dissatisfaction and conflict and then restoration of cooperation and enjoyment. Socially immature individuals must learn by consequences of mistakes. Reverting to less functional group states can gradually be recognised as consequences of self-indulgent, anti-social acts and then can become the subject of interpretive interventions. Group instability and lability are inherent to therapeutic change. Technique: Therapists need to work within group process rhythms. Fluctuations can be used to demonstrate causes and consequences. Eddies in the social current of group process confer a sense of self on members when therapists articulate them with Group and Member interventions.

This confirms the importance of cognitive organization and systemic rules as the means of achieving the regulation that constitutes rhythmicity and enables self and mind to be nurtured. The rules of systemic organization interconnect, cover all situations, allow each person a place and enable the group to undertake logical processes. An intact corpus of norms may also achieve concrete integration. The communicational organism reciprocally relates each person’s contribution to all others forming a cognitive system resting on significant symbols as collective representations. Group thought is expressed as cooperative action coordinated by the system or corpus. In the social mind, there is no

purely “mental” process divorced from action as the inner experience of a 353 collective subject, since action is inherent to mentality (Mead 1962; Harbermas, 1989). Action places communication beyond individuals, in the intersubjective space (Merleau-Ponty, 1976; Gordon, 1985) where social phenomena exist. Individual contributions forming a residue of collective representations, within consensual rules or norms constitute social mind. The products are not inner mental events in individuals, but collective action in regulated group life (Durkheim 1954). An aroused idea or norm stimulates the system to reassert itself, re-connecting it to other ideas or norms, modifying its expression. Scapegoating in a systemically regulated group causes one or other member to intervene with something like: “come on, let’s get on with the game,” or “no, I don’t think he should leave.” Power hierarchy cannot over-ride individual judgements coordinated by common commitment to the collective purpose. The GFR’s differentiation of group function dimensions confirms the importance of cognitive organization for developing collective mentality. GFR categories allow the development of collective mental life to be differentiated according to the organizing principle of the collective cognitive functions. They can be understood as structural conditions that groups rhythmically move into and out of, rather than forming a linear sequence, which is not found by the GFR. Initially, groups emerge from an unorganized state. Normative structures organize contributions as similarities, asserting that everyone should be the same; complementary relationships such as leader/follower are specified. Differences threaten norms and evoke sanctions. For example, when the norm is leader/follower, the presence of a leader/leader structure results in power struggles. The collective normative corpus forms over time as norms are inter-related by being successively enacted within action coherence. The corpus integrates each norm with others so they are not torn from their context. This regulates arousal. Action is subject to the implicit goals of the corpus, which are concrete, contingent, imperative or prescriptive; they assert, “You must or must not do this.” When norms in a corpus are broken, they are replaced by new norms. If enough are broken, the group becomes unorganized. The normative corpus is the group’s initial cultural identity. Gradually, the symbolic system of rules allows flexible organization to develop in the paradigm of the rules of language (Whorf, 1995). Structure describes relationships; rules describe the actions conforming to it. They are abstract, non-contingent, logical and teleological, governing action flexibly towards goals; they specify meaning of sentences,

content of discussions or winners of games. They are not prescriptive, but 354 constitutive, allowing different means to achieve the same end (Collett, 1977a). Rules allow for differences, and specify pure relations such as how disputes are decided (Harré, 1977). They apply to any content as abstract nous structures in discourse, organising contributions and reconciling differences. Rules are usually implicit and only effective if no one owns them and all submit to them. The rule system comes from beyond the group and allows collective thinking to occur. It already exists and is invoked by someone obeying or transmitted by identification, suggestion or power relationships. Rule- following needs to become a norm. Whereas a normative corpus is conservative, rule systems are innovative, especially if there are rules about making rules. The game is an inadequate paradigm for human rule-systems (Wittgenstein, 1953) since a game’s end cannot be changed, whereas in culture, both ends and means change, but rule-fully (Harré, 1972, 1977). Rules distribute arousal to the whole system and activate additional rules to preserve goals; rather than prescribing actions, they create options defining actions according to circumstances. Breaking rules and displacing collective gaols by individual or sub-group goals activates other rule systems or destroys them, causing reversion to normative or unorganized states. The social mind’s collective system includes contingent norms organized as a corpus (culture and social structure) and teleological rule systems and is described as nous (see Chapter 9). It is the members’ mental infrastructure; nous or social mind is a development of the communicational organism upon which its Continuity, Integrity and Order depend. Dysfunctional communication is reflected in loss of social mentality. Technique: Before groups can think, regulate themselves or learn from experiences, they must attain communicational Continuity, Integrity and Order. Therapists need to promote these at every opportunity, since the social communication organism is the supportive medium of the social mind.

Society as a Being. GFR dimensions and categories can interpret phenomena discussed in Durkheim’s account of the social being. The totality of common ideas and sentiments forms a collective conscience (Durkheim, 1964) constituted by revealing what members have in common and their shared activity. Membership at least is common. Rules and enjoyment

are essential for social units, since the pleasure of communing is attractive and 355 coercive (Durkheim, 1954) demonstrated by increased unstable pleasure in whole structure. Coerciveness is indicated by the simultaneous increase in conflict. Whole states require systemic rules to be functional. Technique: Therapists should encourage implicit commonalities of problems, predicaments or attitudes to be articulated. Naming extends communication, helping form the collective conscience. Pleasure in whole structure needs containment with common rules to help members temper the arousal of associating.

Common life animates, warms, humanizes and destroys egotisms (Durkheim, 1954). Communication can be thought of as generating warmth in social organisms, like metabolic activity in the body. Whole interactions generate friction; inadequate homeostatic mechanisms lead to excess warmth (fever) expressed as social tension. Unregulated affective energy becomes conflict, but it is therapeutic to belong and experience the rewards of being subject to rules. Three technical principles follow. Technique: (1) Therapy is constituting the group, bringing members under a consensual system of rules. (2) Members must accept the coercion of group rules to get what they want. (3) Limits are essential to restrict excess warmth when groups cannot regulate themselves.

Division of labour resolves the tension between self-sufficiency and belonging by differentiating members’ contribution to group life, instead of normative prejudices producing power struggles or rejection. In mechanical solidarity, similarities unite into collective representations. Contradictory representations weaken each other, similar representations reinforce each other; this is whole structure, normative, concord. Organic solidarity places differences within higher order similarities integrated by rules, common values and purposes, expressed as whole, representational accord. Oscillating repetition of activities is essential to creating solidarity (Durkheim, 1964; Small, 1905) and integral to communicational integrity. Technique: Repetition of different human endeavours is essential to group-building. Therapists must avoid pre-conceived ideas of what the group should do to constitute itself.

356 Organic solidarity incorporates rule-governed relationships, such as games and rests on symbolic relationships rather than images, emotionally charged norms and associations. Repressive laws are associated with mechanical solidarity and restitutive laws with organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1964; Lukes and Scull, 1983). Rules determine how restitution is made for problems, ensuring fairness. Restitutive rules can be generative and constitutive (Harré and Lamb, 1984; see Chapter 12). They are homeostatic mechanisms influencing future action in relation to the past, regulating affects, determining whether something is fair and how to correct it. Their symbolic status denotes when actions violate them (Anzieu, 1984). Repressive rules are systemic, but restitutive rules are representational, reflecting group values and goals. Their effect is expressed by the efficacy of Group and Member Interventions, linking members’ actions to the group. Technique: Restitutive rules do not prescribe consequences for infringements, but show their effects and how to rectify them. They are more important than setting limits to antisocial behaviour, since they create the possibility for group cognition.

Mechanical solidarity is inherently possessive, promoting dependency, coercing participants to sameness and threatening individuality (Durkheim, 1964). Individuality is sustained by participation in mutually recognised relationships (Mead, 1962) and conflict is healthy when individuality is undervalued. Organic solidarity coerces members to be useful, differentiated organs of group purpose. The therapeutic relationship is “belonging to,” as opposed to “being owned by” the group. Belonging implies a useful function, valid role and acknowledged position. Members are needed by the group as much as needing it. In organic solidarity, members and their roles form a system. They are needed and valued as organs with differentiated roles serving group purposes. The dynamic of mechanical and organic solidarity is of difference and similarity. In the GFR, conflict may disrupt normative concord in mechanical solidarity, allowing differentiation into subgroups and facilitating experiences of belonging and having a valued role. The group’s inexperience may mean enjoyment of collective life enhances sense of self, leading again rhythmically to power struggles, coercion and mechanical solidarity. Technique: Therapists need to name the coercion to be similar or conform to norms in mechanical solidarity. Movement towards organic solidarity is by articulating

logical consequences of group tendencies and members’ 357 complementary functions. Dynamics of similarities and differences allow members to find complementary functions. The therapeutic goal is for everyone’s contribution to be valued in whole structure.

Cooperation creates mutual involvement and morality (Durkheim, 1964), extending systemic organization beyond pragmatic rules into abstract guidelines about future actions. Division of labour and differentiation are necessary for attachment, but integrative forces hold society together (Durkheim, 1964). Differences co-exist by dividing the unity of similarities, as shown by the GFR’s developmental phases. In the Engagement phase, members find commonalities and consolidate belonging around sameness. Differentiation begins in Positioning and is repeated often to form complex social units. Differences are integrated by repetition and rhythm. Cyclical movement between mechanical and organic solidarity organizes groups with complexity in Consolidation. However, Idealization and Disenchantment express the breakdown of similarities before a more stable organic solidarity is established in Working. Differentiation happens when individuals associate through cooperation (Durkheim, 1964). Rhythms of cooperation and conflict reflect the coercion to be like something and have a unique role in organic and mechanical solidarity. Cooperation is essential to division of labour, since all members are needed to serve a purpose. Technique: Rhythms between cooperation and conflict must be seen not just as interpersonal, intrapsychic tensions, but oscillations between simple and complex forms of organization as the group becomes an organic rather than mechanical entity.

Social facts are distinct from individual manifestations (Durkheim, 1966). Group phenomena do not occur because they are general, but they are entailed by membership, as group functions repeated in the individual, because they are in the whole. They are strengthened by repetition, but only in their totality in the whole group; the strength is not common, but collective in the group. Arbitrary norms become social facts. Events early in the history of groups such as aggressive outbursts or loss of members are coercive and have enduring effects. Anti-therapeutic norms develop easily such as leaving the room or

absenteeism, need to be changed by persistent, repeated interventions (Bion, 358 1961). Common patterns link the past to current sessions. Technique: Once tendencies are incorporated into the group as collective phenomena, they are only changed by persistent, repeated interventions by therapists. Articulating what is common to members individually and collective group structures distinguishes collective characteristics from individual manifestations. It helps groups develop collective self-representations allowing members to express themselves.

The categories and framework of thinking come from organized group action and rituals; collective representations form from rhythmic cooperation (Durkheim, 1956). Action unites members, imposing common structures on experience, taking members out of their “egocentrism” into a common communicative world. Relations between members, actions and group events are common as are ideas and general relations (Durkheim, 1956) and make communication possible. They are lawful (systemic), providing a framework for thinking, because all members are involved rather than their content or type of order. Normality is being in collective forms of thought, emotion and action (Durkheim, 1956); the group provides a microcosm for experiencing normality (Burrow, 1953). Technique: Therapists do not need to work for a specific order or set of rules; any effective rules will further the therapeutic goal and create the experience of normality.

The common frame of thought, sentiment and action is incorporated through collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1956) where members think, feel and act together because they enjoy it. The GFR expresses pleasure as common connection in Joy or Interest. Affect consolidates individuals’ incorporation into collective processes. Rhythms of affect reflect differing degrees of involvement. Affect must creatively bind members, but not overwhelm them. Technique: Members must enjoy the group to attach to and be affected by it. Pleasurable moments must be recognised for their binding function; even when joy is disruptive, it binds members more intimately to the group. Groups need to learn to manage pleasure.

359 Group Psychotherapy. The GFR defines communication as an observational field, developing a theory of communication for psychotherapy. There is no clear demarcation between intra-psychic and group functions (Foulkes, 1948, 1990); communicational phenomena are both. “Work in communication is the operational basis of all therapy in the group” (Foulkes and Anthony, 1965, p. 28). Group consciousness is what can be voiced, group unconsciousness what cannot (Foulkes, 1964). The communicational system is the medium for shared consciousness. Technique: Communication is the medium of therapeutic action; promotion to communication is the precondition to therapeutic action. Naming and verbal articulation are preconditions to other interventions. Promoting action into communication changes groups’ and members’ consciousness.

The subject is a node in a communication network (Cooley, 1909; Mead, 1962; Durkheim, 1964; Burrow, 1927b; Foulkes, 1964). Bringing members into communication is identity forming. The fact of communication rather than the content is therapeutic, provided it is relevant, meaningful and affectively significant. The GFR’s analysis of communication properties rather than content is a tool to observe this. Foulkes’ (1990) foundation matrix shows individuals do not externalise separate inner experiences, they are interpenetrated by social phenomena. “What is outside is always inside” (Ahlin, 1985, p. 113). Work on group process is work on intrapsychic process. Technique: Confronting personal experience presupposes the capacity for communication and incorporation in a social structure. Members who cannot yet do so are supported by a group. The effectiveness of Group and Member Interventions indicates the importance of relating the member to the group.

Unconscious group mentality obscures individuality; incorporating members into stereotypic structures like crowds, does not help individual problems. Talking about these processes disbands them by making them conscious and promotes representational cognitive function. The GFR demonstrates these forces oscillate with functional states and must be managed in cycles inherent to group function. Integration does not come through cognitive insight, emotional release or action until the cognitive infrastructure for

insight, regulation of emotion and cooperation develop. Until then, integration 360 occurs by oscillation between all possibilities in overlapping rhythms in the social communicative medium. Instability is contained by “inert material” not involved in group states, formed by therapists, intervals between sessions or members’ involvement in other groups and activities (Bion, 1961). Subgrouping, changing activity, therapist intervention, interval between sessions or other social involvements accumulate inert material. Interventions’ effects often only evident become or tendencies are rectified later in sessions or in following sessions rather than at the time (Bion, 1961), as described by the GFR’s peaks and troughs. Technique: The full effect of interventions often occurs later or between sessions. Therapists should wait till the following session before judging crises and interventions.

Integration of Themes. The GFR defines observable group phenomena constituting an order distinct from individual behaviour. It emphasises thinking in the whole system (Sighele, 1891; Mead, 1962), and group cognition as organization of action rather than “internal” processing of mental representations. Groups have no internal space in which this processing happens, they “think with their limbs.” Group mentality exists in action; thinking occurs in the act of communication. Technique: Therapy should focus on talking about the meaning of what is said and done as enacted cognitive process rather than members’ internal mental representations.

Affects are organized energy states where the group takes hold of members. Pleasure is essential for organicity and binds members symbiotically into the group, (Gordon, 1989b, 1991) but to become creative requires regulation of affect. If social experience is not enjoyable, socialization is distorted. However, it requires social competence to manage emotional arousal in groups. In the GFR, regulating unstable affect in whole structure allows members to participate in collective mentality. Sentiments translate directly into action when there is insufficient cognitive organization; but adaptation of common or compatible goals occurs through organization of communication, as does reconciliation of incompatible goals. Otherwise group action is impossible and the group is damaged.

Technique: Therapists must articulate how members’ goals relate to each 361 other and the group and show how they share fundamental goals like pleasure in being together and getting well as the basis of reconciliation.

Conclusion. The GFR allows these concepts to be operationalised into observational terms in the group context and made available for developing theoretical strategies and guidelines in therapeutic technique.

26. DISCUSSION 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 362

This study submits group psychotherapy based on the group entity approach to an empirical examination describing and testing hypotheses about processes. Some conclusions and suggestions for further research can be drawn from it.

Theory. Part I showed how the heritage of group entity theory lost currency against ideological threats of the twentieth century (Allport, 1954). Except for Burrow (1927b, 1956), most theory is philosophical or sociological and lacks applicability to practical social situations. The most important issue in the twentieth century has been protection of individuality (Jordan, 1927; O’Neill, 1973), which was seen as threatened by group entity theories (Ginsberg, 1956, 1960). Psychoanalysis and other individualistic theories gained precedence, even in sociology (Ginsberg, 1961) and succeeded in theorizing contemporary issues. Social theory moved from exploring the nature of social life and individuality towards social interaction (Mills, 1967) and empirical issues (Collins, 1985). In the twenty-first century the survival questions are protecting individuality, but also integrating individuals into groups, groups into societies and societies into global community (Matustik, 1993). The social organism, crowd mind, social mind and social being theories have much to offer to these questions; the relevance of their conclusions to empirical findings was discussed in Chapter 25. A gap remains between these theories and the dominant individualistic paradigm, although contemporary group entity theories in social psychology (Sandelands and Stablein, 1987; Sandelands and St. Clair, 1993) and group psychotherapy (Foulkes, 1990; Brown and Zinkin, 1994; Brown, 1996; Dalal, 1998) lie between them. Theoretical work is required to apply group entity theory to the small group situations it claims are central to communal life and individuality (Cooley, 1909; McDougall, 1920; Mead, 1962; Durkheim, 1964). Their therapeutic potential needs to complement individualistic theories (Ettin, 1999). In Chapter 9, an integrative theory of the collective mind proposed the term nous to refer to the inherently collective part of mentality. The difficulty with this notion for the present study is its philosophical formulation. While the philosophical and epistemological task of defining a field of collective mental phenomena precedes its

scientific investigation (Toulmin, 1972; Harré and Secord, 1972), the 363 concept remains theoretical. However it can become a clinical heuristic in individual and group therapy (Gordon, 2000). Personal and collective mentality needs clearer differentiation and a theory of their developmental relationship is required. This study is a starting point for these tasks.

The GFR. The GFR’s central concept is social communication. While continually emphasized in group entity theories, communication is rarely defined with precision. The conceptualizations of Social Communication Theory (Sigman, 1987) define communication with sufficient clarity to do justice to the complexity of group phenomena. Observable criteria for communication in Structure are only a beginning. Although its reliability is high, more can be done to describe this field of communication. Empirical studies of interpersonal communication (Duncan and Fiske, 1977; Siegman and Feldstein, 1979; Tronik, 1982; Goody, 1995) need to be reviewed to give greater rigor to the GFR. The theoretical base for other dimensions and categories were not derived from group entity theories, which were too general. They were conceptualized to preserve continuity between dimensions of individual psychic function and collective mentality (cognition, affect and action), since group entity theories argue for common psychic content in groups and individuals (McDougall, 1920; Durkheim, 1964). The GFR dimensions were specified by analyzing essential characteristics of cognition, affect and action and conceptualizing them in collective communication. The theory could be seen as an eclectic collection of convenient constructs and the GFR merely an observational tool. More rigorously establishing the theoretical dimensions may prove them more than an observational framework. A set of concepts describing group functions relevant to fundamental psychological constructs is needed to establish a group entity field of investigation. Without this, the group entity will not be integrated with individualistic psychology, will lack relevance and disappear again. Further theoretical work is needed to establish group function dimensions to be operationalised in observable communicational phenomena. To increase the GFR’s power, low frequency combinations need to be collated into more balanced states. However, too few categories may obscure some

relationships. Only 180 of 384 possible combinations of categories 364 occurred, none above 10% frequency. To reduce the possibilities in Structure, Whole and Subgroups/Individuals provided sufficient differentiation as Structure #2; in Affect, Contentment and Boredom were combined with Interest and Discontent with little loss as Affect #2, reducing possible combinations to 128. Remaining low frequency states (Representational, Distress, Concord and Contracord) are all important. Further reducing the number of states must be balanced with retaining sensitivity to infrequent, but influential states. To determine whether the low frequencies for some categories depend on these groups or the GFR, other groups must be rated. Combining categories into nine Condensed States reduced complexity. However, some important states were obscured; the crowd state (see Chapter 25) needs to be extracted as a separate state from Sociable (51% of states), since movement between crowd and more organized states may be as important as achieving Functional states (Slater, 1966; Kissen, 1976a, 1976c; Bennis, 1976; Gordon, 1985). Productive Turmoil (1.9%) could be combined with Dysfunctional (7.3%) with little loss. A limitation of the GFR is that ratings are made from different portions of the minute. Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence ratings are made from thirty seconds, but Structure and Affect from fifteen seconds, because thirty seconds proved too long for reliability. Findings could reflect time sampling differences of 50% for Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence and 25% for Structure and Affect. Ratings may also be made from different portions of the minute and not be simultaneous observations. In these groups, much happens in a minute and it can be asked how the rated portion of the group’s functioning relates to that not rated. Consistent application of rating criteria should ensure important phenomena within the minute are recorded (see GFR Rater’s Instructions in Appendix 2). This could be tested by comparing a sample of sessions rated every thirty seconds and each minute. Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence would be rated in fifteen-second criteria, consistent with Structure and Affect. The variability of time criteria may explain why some reported relationships represent small changes in proportions. Shorter time sample ratings may strengthen these trends by increasing the frequency of instances. More sensitive ratings seem unlikely to change some persistent features (for example, rhythmic oscillations). However, in examining relations such as between affect change and action, it may be

possible to demonstrate the clinical impression that action change precedes 365 affect change. Another problem is the GFR’s specialization for socially dysfunctional boys. Although these groups pose questions about fundamentals of social interaction and group formation, they did not develop sophisticated group function. The GFR is designed to record fundamentals, but lacks sensitivity for adults talking about their problems. It must be adapted for other social situations. Criteria for rating categories need to be re-defined for groups restricted to conceptual, verbal communication. This could all be considered “re-calibrating” the instrument and may require other categories to differentiate functional states. Structure may require differentiating degrees of involvement in whole group communication rather than only its interruption (Fuhriman and Burlingame, 2000). In Cognitive Organization, Unorganized may describe ideas not following in logical sequence. Normative may describe sequential conversation lacking conclusions. Systemic may describe logical conversation progressing toward a goal, and Representational reserved for psychological interpretations rather than mere reference to self of group. It could be analyzed into talk with different degrees of therapeutic value, such as conversation where anecdotes dominate from analysis, self-recognition or insight (Simon and Agazarian, 2000). In Affect, people with more highly differentiated emotional lives may require the pleasure/unpleasure distinction to be differentiated qualitatively rather than in terms of stability and quantity (Karterud, 2000). It may be necessary to differentiate socially structured emotional states, such as group climate (Ahlin, 1996) rather than simple energy categories. Action Coherence categories can be re-defined in terms of degrees of cooperation, difference or antagonism in conversation (Benjamin, 1999). Distinctions within Discord between constructive debate and defensive disagreement may be required. Cooperative conversation about daily events in Accord may need to be distinguished from coordinated contributions attempting to find common aspects of different experiences. Therapists Intervention dimensions including both object of the intervention (as categorized) and type of intervention would clarify their effects. The GFR could also be modified to evaluate committee meetings, social groups, informal peer groups, school classes, educational groups, team meetings or other work groups; structured, time-limited therapy groups could be compared with long-term

groups. Despite its limitations, the GFR has proved itself by answering 366 some questions, revealing phenomena and raising new questions that could not have been asked before.

Group Development. The identification of discrete developmental phases is significant, but only an initial indication. Theoretical and empirical research is needed to demonstrate group entities’ developmental processes more rigorously. Stages by which collective mentality emerges need to be researched, their communicational requirements understood and techniques for facilitating them identified. Are phases discrete periods in which developmental processes need to unfold, or group-constituting processes integrating members into organic units? If the latter is true, they may not be restricted to episodes. The relative uniformity of phases may be a product of the groups’ uniformity. Although developmental functions were recognized by examining discrete phases, once defined, they might be freed from the sequence and seen as group-forming processes to be sought in the content instead. A phenomenological account of group activity constituting functions of Convening, Engagement, Positioning, Consolidation, Idealization, Disenchantment, Working and Separation is needed, then sought in other situations. Theoretical work may enable more precise mapping of group conditions to identify therapeutic or counter-therapeutic states (Lewis et al., 2000). This would also allow more sensitive consideration of interventions promoting these processes. The generality of developmental phases and rhythmicity also needs to be established with other groups. Content analysis of sessions in each phase is needed to relate them to hypothesized processes, but may need interpretation since they are unlikely to demonstrate issues overtly. Questions to be addressed are: What typical Engagement phenomena constitute the group? How do they compare with Consolidation phenomena? What are session themes of Idealization Functional peaks and Disenchantment troughs? What are themes of peaks and troughs of stability and quality in Working? Characteristics of interpersonal process in peak and trough sessions and the role of rhythm in successful outcome are important to understand collective development. Interpersonal interaction may need examination in relation to themes of developmental stages and group the entity’s process (Davis, Budman and Soldz, 2000). Content analysis may show

how interpersonal themes serve the group entity’s development, since it is 367 expressed in the totality of interpersonal phenomena oriented towards a goal of entitativity. Phenomena at the boundaries between developmental phases and whether it is possible to detect qualitative and content differences in sessions need to be examined (Lewis et al., 2000). Whether they are phases or processes, forming a conceptual frame for their interpretation is important.

Hypotheses. Some hypotheses may benefit from re-formulation and re-testing. The association between Therapists Interventions and processes identified in Dynamics needs investigation. Interactions in the minute or two before various changes could be analyzed and compared with the content of successful and unsuccessful interventions. Size may be the most important factor for those patients whose treatment is unsuccessful or have difficulty remaining in groups and needs further investigation as a therapeutic dimension to be matched to patients’ needs (Ettin, 1999). Psychological work happens at a price of group function (illustrated by the turbulence of the Working phase); the goal of forming self-maintaining groups needs to be balanced against their psychological function. The therapeutic value of self-maintaining groups compared to psychologically oriented process needs clarification, perhaps with comparative studies. Patients may be more suited to either group-forming or psychologically oriented treatments (Gordon, 1997; Malekoff, 1997). Alternatively, these aspects may dominate different phases of the same group’s life. Structure and action dimensions were most sensitive to affective tension (unpleasure) and responsible for instability. Clearer conceptualization of interventions for managing communicational structure and action in the group and members is required. Better understanding of psychosocial processes constituting homeostatic mechanisms governing rhythms will enable therapists to coordinate with them. More sensitive GFR ratings can investigate affective and action change to provide better understanding of group crises and their management. Molar effects may camouflage powerful or ineffectual therapists’ interventions; they may be clarified by examining session content when identified phenomena occur and provide indications for therapeutic technique.

368 Conclusion. The study’s findings result from operationalising an unfashionable collective mentality paradigm. While intra-psychic and interpersonal views complement this view, the GFR takes up the challenge for theoretical advances to guide empirical work (Bednar and Moeschel, 1981, Steiner, 1986). The observational technique assumes the validity of submitting the social mentality thesis to scientific investigation. Its results affirm the group entity hypothesis’ value as a heuristic for group psychotherapy of children and adolescents. It can be applied to other populations, techniques and domains of social activity. If observed appropriately, groups - even of disorganized adolescents – demonstrate order and rhythmicity not evident in the complex phenomenological experience of therapists. This study is a beginning at constituting structural dimensions for observing the collective reality of human existence and understanding its therapeutic power.

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APPENDIX 1. 415 Changing Definitions of the word “group.” The following definitions show the transition of the meaning of group over the years: “A cluster, crowd or throng; an assemblage, either of persons or things; an assemblage of figures or objects in a certain order or relation, or having some resemblance or common characteristic, in painting or sculpture” (Library Dictionary of the English Language, 1872). “A number of persons or things standing near together, knot, cluster; a number of persons or things belonging or classed together or forming a whole” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1964). “A collection or assemblage of persons or things considered as a unit; aggregation, cluster. A number of persons or things having in common certain characteristics, interests etc.,” (Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary, 1980).

The Groups. A brief synopsis of the groups, their members and progress in the course of treatment is provided. All names and certain identifying details have been changed to protect confidentiality.

Adolescent Group, 1988. One of the five members had been in a previous group. All 33 sessions were recorded. Members finished at sessions 17 (Mick) and 30 (Sid). Their problems were: Bill: Social isolation, aggressive behaviour, school refusal. Dom: Epilepsy and social problems. Sid: Behaviour problems. Peter: Anxiety, previous history of psychosis, school refusal. Mick: Anxiety, school refusal, aggressive behaviour.

Sid dominated the group for the first half of the year, organising card games. Conflict escalated when Mick and Dom challenged his leadership. Bill and Peter were submissive. Mick had difficulty joining in and kept bringing sexual themes and conflict to the group. After he left, the group was more unified and talked about problems. When

Sid left in November, the remaining three spent whole sessions talking about 416 themselves and their problems. Mick’s mother brought him to the group each week from a country town 3 hours’ drive from the city, because of his aggression at home and school refusal. However, by mid year his behaviour had improved. He had recommenced at school and she no longer felt his condition warranted the weekly trip. Sid’s behaviour also improved although there were several crises during the year. He left when his family moved to the country. His mother was pleased with his progress and said his behavior problems at home had subsided. He had abandoned his attempts to control the group with card games and participated fully in the conversations. Bill, Dom and Peter became steadily more involved with each other during the year and spent the last few months together discussing a wide range of personal and adolescent life issues. Bill arranged to start at school the following year. Peter gained greater confidence and in the following year started at a technical college. Dom’s epilepsy continued to give him difficulties, but he became more socially adept, made friends at school and was happier. Bill and Dom continued in the group in the following year.

Adolescent Group, 1992. The group began with six members, three of whom were in the previous year’s group. Members left at sessions 4 (Jack) and 14 (Brad). New members started on sessions 19 (Ned) and 23 (Eddie). There were 38 sessions; 11 were not recorded. Members’ problems were: Brad: Genetic syndrome, behaviour problems. Ben: Genetic syndrome, mild intellectual disability, aggressive behaviour, social problems. Phil: Genetic syndrome, mild intellectual disability, behavior and social problems. Jack: Behavior problems. Jim: Behavior problems. Ernie: Emotional and behavior problems, sexual behavior problems. Ned: Juvenile offender, behavior problems. Eddie: Behavior problems, depression, peer relationship problems.

Ernie talked and joked incessantly avoiding problems and dominated this group.

The dynamics of membership were played out in war games led by Ernie for 417 much of the year. Some members wanted to discuss problems, but Ernie tended to derail conversations. Ned’s arrival in May unified the group and reduced Ernie’s power and Eddie contributed further to this. The group cared for the two intellectually disabled boys (Ben and Phil). Towards the end of the year school problems were discussed. By the end of the year, Ernie had become less extreme and avoidant, although he was still reluctant to communicate about his feelings. Brad had been in the group the previous year and left at session 14 when his parents moved to the country. His behaviour had improved and he was attending school regularly. Ben’s conflict with peers at school diminished and Phil’s uncontrolled eating and other behaviour problems also diminished. Ben and Phil were reluctant to engage with the others at the start of the year and tended to play together separately. By the end of the year, they were included and participated in the conversation. Jack’s family situation was very disturbed and he had no support to attend the group. He stopped after the 4th session. Jim was a depressed, isolated boy who was constantly teased by peers. In the group he took every opportunity to talk about his problems and family difficulties. Ned had charges pending for car stealing and other offences. He was isolated and his peer contacts were restricted to exploitative relationships with other offenders. During the group, he was protective of Ben and Phil and enjoyed the interaction and games with the others. However, he often engaged in hostile, belligerent talk designed to provoke the therapists. During the year, he became more cooperative and seemed more willing to acknowledge his personal problems. Eddie changed noticeably through the year. While at first tentative and detached, he soon relaxed and joined the games, laughing and enjoying the activity. He began to discuss some of his personal and family problems and this occasionally put him out of step with others. He took every opportunity to talk, although he was not very articulate. By the end of the year, he no longer had problems at school and was much happier. He continued the following year.

Adolescent Group, 1993. The six initial members were from the previous group. New members commenced at sessions 5 (Jay), 11 (Jake) and 27 (Aron). Brad returned at session 18. Ben ended on session 29. Several members had prolonged absences.

There were 30 sessions; 12 were not recorded. Members from the previous 418 year were: Brad, Ben, Phil, Ernie, Ned and Eddie. Other members’ problems were: Jake: Antisocial and aggressive behaviour problems. Andy: Behaviour problems. Jay: Anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, school refusal.

Ned attended from juvenile detention, was hostile, antagonistic and motivated by getting the time out of custody. Unlike the previous year, he was belligerent, attacked the intellectually disabled boys and was generally hostile, provocative and conflictual. In the first half of the year Ernie continued to instigate war games as he had the previous year. Ben and Phil were out of their depth in the increasingly conflictual group with reduced support. Ben’s behaviour deteriorated at school with increased fighting and defiance towards teachers, while Phil became more reserved. The decision was taken to finish Ben’s time in the group at session 29 since he was beginning to lose the achievements he had gained. Jake and Andy commenced during the year. They were highly conflictual, denigrated the other members and said they did not want to attend. Jake did not persist with the group, while Andy finished the year. Jay joined late in the year, having been in the 1990 Latency group three years earlier. When he entered secondary school, his behaviour had deteriorated, he became more anxious and was unable to attend. In the group, he was active and disruptive, tending to incite conflict. However, his anxiety reduced by the end of the year. Eddie attended less regularly in the last term and seemed frustrated that the rest of the group was not able to talk about themselves. However, he continued to manage well at home and at school. Towards the end of the year there was more conversation by group members about themselves. This group was not as successful as the previous year, largely because of Ned’s disruptive attitudes.

Adolescent Group, 1996. Three members had been in the group the previous year. Brad had also been in the 1992 and 1993 groups. There were 35 sessions; 19 were not recorded. New members commenced at sessions 4 and 29. In addition to Brad, there were: Bert: Socially withdrawn, mild intellectual disability.

Sam: Depression, bereavement, social isolation. 419 Geoff: Social withdrawal, behaviour problems. Tony: Anxiety disorder, social withdrawal.

Brad rejoined the group the previous year on a magistrate’s order following involvement in a burglary incited by peers. His parents had returned to the city and he was attending a technical college. During the group he turned 18, making him significantly older that the others; his behaviour stabilised, he established a relationship and went to live with his girlfriend’s family. He demonstrated insight into his problems and a decision to manage his life appropriately. Bert was highly restricted when first joining the group, but in the course of the year, he became more confident, joined the games and talked about himself. His mother reported considerable improvement and he began attending school; he continued in the group the following year. Sam had been in the group the previous year. He suffered from depression following the death of his mother and had been very isolated and bullied at school; in the group, he interacted sporadically. During the year, he became more outgoing and began to enjoy himself, taking a dominating role in organising activities and talking readily about various events in his life. He began to make friends at school. Geoff joined at the 4th session and was isolated and passive. By the end of the year, however, he was engaging actively in the sessions and interacting with the other members. His parents reported improvement at home and school. Tony was fearful and restricted in his interactions and refused active participation for the first half of his time in the group (he joined at session 19). Towards the end of the year, he began to interact, participate in games and joke with the other members. His parents reported great improvement in his participation in the family and his anxiety decreased. All except Brad and Geoff continued in the group the following year. Stable card games occupied most of the sessions. They were usually started by Brad, who functioned as an auxiliary therapist, keeping order and interpreting the others’ behavior like a good-natured older brother. They talked about their lives during the games and reluctant members gradually joined in. It showed maturity attributable to the second year of stable groups.

Latency Group, 1990. This group consisted of six boys, although two stopped at

sessions 11 (Isi) and 17 (Len) and two started at session 18, (Tim and Jay). 420 None had been in groups before. There were 31 sessions; 6 were not recorded. Isi: Chronic medical condition, social problems. Len: Social withdrawal, behaviour problems. Shaun: Behaviour problems. Ken: Physical handicap, anxiety disorder, mild intellectual disability. Bob: Behaviour problems. Don: Anxiety, social problems. Tim: Social problems Jay: Behaviour problems, anxiety disorder (subsequently in the 1993 group).

Members tended to play in subgroups. In early sessions, Isi was self-centered, controlling and created conflict. He was referred for social difficulties and lack of cooperation at home. He did not want to attend the group and constantly rejected the therapists’ attempts to show him the consequences of his behaviour. Finally he insisted to his mother than he no longer attend and terminated at session 11. After Isi’s departure, the group unified; then subgroups rivaled for dominance and tested the therapists by leaving the room. Ken was the scapegoat and his behavior invited rejection. However, by the end of the year he had become more aware of this tendency and was better able to participate in games with the others. Jay started on session 18 and encouraged the scapegoating. Over the year, Ken’s behaviour modified, but then aggressiveness increased again towards the end of the year encouraged by Jay. However, the members were more able to communicate experiences and began to talk about their families. The other members all demonstrated varying degrees of improvement in their presenting problems in spite of the general rebelliousness that developed at the end. The best level of functioning of this group was at the end of Term 3. The final term produced deterioration in the group’s function and increased rebelliousness towards the therapists.

The Validity of the GFR. The GFR was developed as an instrument to structure a field of observation, which previous instruments did not conceptualize (Beck and Lewis, 2000). Although the validity of the GFR has not been established, a number of considerations indicate

how this might be done. 421 The concept of validity is normally applied to psychological tests and other techniques to denote the degree to which they measure what they claim to measure (Gregory, 1996; Aiken, 2000) and to research methods to show the results are due to the factors attributed to them by the investigation (Shaunessy and Zechmeister, 1997). Three aspects of validity will be discussed in relation to this study. First, the validity of the GFR as an instrument is considered; second, the validity of the methodology of the study in which the GFR is used is discussed and finally, their functional validity (Gregory, 1996).

Particular problems of the GFR. Some specific characteristics of the GFR need to be mentioned before considering validity. As an observational instrument, the GFR is not a test or “measure” of group process, but describes group functionality; it yields descriptive rather than quantitative data by defining observational dimensions and categories that allow whole groups to be observed. It is more than a “system for analyzing change” in groups (Beck and Lewis, 2000), since its dimensions define the field of observation that the categories “measure” or rather record. Its validity depends on whether it is justified to describe the group-as-a-whole without discriminating individual interactions and whether the dimensions and their categories provide a valid description of the group. Perhaps the validity will only develop when the method provides new approaches to problems of group function that have been comparatively dormant following research in group dynamics (McCollum, 1995), since validity develops throughout the life of a technique according to its use (Anastasi, 1986, quoted in Gregory, 1996). The GFR’s group-entity focus makes it is not directly comparable with other instruments developed or adapted for group psychotherapy (Ahlin, 1996; Beck and Lewis, 2000) or other group contexts (Davis, 1977; Forsyth, 1990), since they record interpersonal interaction between nominated members. The GFR records conditions of the group’s communicational field. However, like some instruments, GFR dimensions yield qualitative categories ranked in ordinal scales of their hypothetically therapeutic value instead of quantitative measures. Instruments for recording group processes have generally not established adequate convergent or discriminant validity and are criticised for paying insufficient

attention to “the preliminary scientific steps of observation and 422 measurement;” they show “lack of articulation in conceptualization” and “vagueness and ambiguity about the theoretical concepts” (Greene, 2000, p. 38 and p. 39). Methods for establishing validity in group instruments include normative studies comparing different populations (Fuhriman and Burlingame, 2000), differentiating persisting members from drop-outs (Chambon, Tsang and Marziali, 2000), untrained observers comparing ratings of items’ face validity with other measures (Simon and Agazarian, 2000) and factor analyses of data (Benjamin, 2000). The GFR has defined the communicational field and its phenomena to articulate theoretical concepts upon which it is based and form unambiguous definitions of categories. Its success will depend on the findings’ repeatability and application to other contexts.

Instrumental Validity of the GFR. This form of validity is applied to psychological tests to ensure they measure what they claim to. In the GFR, instrumental validity refers to whether it actually records the collective states. The main types of instrumental validity are content, criterion-related and construct validity. These are discussed in turn.

Content Validity. Content validity refers to how adequately the domain to be measured by a test is represented in its items (Gregory, 1996). For the GFR, this means how adequately the definition of communication covers the domain of social communication and how adequate the Dimensions and their categories are to define group functions. The validity of the conception of communication needs to be considered. The GFR bases its observations on the fact of communication rather than its content (Simon and Agazarian, 2000), context (Davis, 1977), purpose or direction (Ahlin, 1996). While other techniques, document interpersonal “interaction” (Bales, 1980; Fuhriman and Burlingame, 200; Kelly, 2000), the GFR regards this as a derivative of communication. The description of communication adopted is that of Social Communication Theory (Sigman, 1987, see chapter 10). Validation of such a broad definition of communication and its presence or absence needs to be conducted by critically analyzing other conceptions of communication and comparing their definitions of communicative phenomena with those adopted. One approach would be to ask naïve

observers to judge the presence or absences of communication between 423 members from selected video segments and compare this with ratings defined by the GFR. This could be augmented by replication studies and by applying the GFR to other types of group. The content validity of the dimensions and categories depends on how adequately they represent the possible range of functional states within the dimensions. The GFR assumes the existing categories cover possible states on each dimension for adolescent groups. It is possible other types of groups may spend most of their time within one or two states as presently defined. For example, a group of articulate adults may remain in Functional Condensed state much of the time as they spend the sessions discussing their problems. This requires the validity of the present categories to be linked to the type of group and may mean that they would need to be re-structured to provide sensitivity to the functional states relevant for the group to be observed (see Chapter 26). Such requirements could be defined in relation to the therapeutic goals of the group concerned. Some comments about each dimension are provided below. Structure: The dimension of Structure will be validated by the existence of communication since it documents the existence and extent of communication within the group. Cognitive Organization: This dimension is based on the notion that communication is the fundamental context for the development of mind itself (Durkheim, 1954; Mead, 1962; Burrow, 1927b; Foulkes, 1974; Flick, 1998) and the dimensions are those of functional mind itself. Their validity rests on their relationship with the relevant domains of social science – cognition, affect and action. However, since the functionality of the mental dimensions is the object of observation rather than their content, the definition of the dimensions is rudimentary compared to their complex, sophisticated description in psychology, whose main concerns are with content and processes rather than their existence. This is shown by the lack of definition of cognition itself in texts describing its structures and functions (Newall, 1990; Posner, 1991). It is defined in a philosophical context (Gregory, 1987; Honderich, 1995). Whereas “cognitive science” is the blanket term subsuming cognitive phenomena in much contemporary thought (Posner, 1991; von Eckardt, 1993; Audi, 1999), the GFR is intended to detect the emergence of cognitive capability within the communicational field and so categories intend to differentiate states describing the

functional capacity of groups to undertake their therapeutic task. The 424 categories are defined from a review of theories of cognition to describe degrees of organization (see Chapter 12). To validate them, independent examinations of the fundamental organization of cognition would be required and they would then need to be operationalised for the group situation. Affect: The categories for Affect are derived from a review of emotion theory and are intended to define fundamental aspects of affective quality applicable to groups. Since they are affective properties of communication, they define the range of possible states of hedonic quality and quantity. The same problem exists as for cognition, that the literature concentrates on the content of affective states rather than their fundamental character (Tomkins, 1961; Stein, 1991; Fridja, 1993). Content validation would require independent analysis of the manifestations, interpreting them for the group communicational context and then determining if they are encompassed by GFR categories. Action Coherence: The dimension of Action Coherence describes properties of the field of group communication pertaining to cooperation or conflict. Rather than the content of group action, the GFR records the emergence of the preconditions for group action. As discussed in Chapter 13, the dimension of action is neglected in psychological theory (Shotter, 1975) and is more commonly used in social theory (Habermas, 1984, 1989; Joas 1991) and philosophy (Lennon, 1990). It has been used in phenomenological psychology, but not for communication as such (von Cranach and Harré, 1982). The content validity of this dimension of group communication needs to be established by ensuring the present categories adequately describe the possible range of coherence of communicational states. Like Cognitive Organization, it may be necessary to add differentiations for other types of groups. Therapists Interventions, Limits, Locomotion: Content validity should be adequate for these dimensions since they are restricted to describing presence of absence of various forms of communication by therapists.

Criterion-related Validity. Criterion-related validity describes the extent to which the GFR estimates performance on another criterion or measure. This might be conducted by rating the same sessions with other instruments and showing whether findings are consistent, or

predictive of GFR performance. The problems here is again that the GFR 425 records group function and validation would need to be by other techniques estimating group function. This may be done with test situations where more functional groups in GFR terms would be predicted to perform better on tasks, such as problem solving or other techniques from experimental social psychology (e.g., McLintock, 1972; Berkowitz, 1976; Eiser, 1986; Tajfel and Fraser, 1986; Hewstone, et. al, 1993). However, to show how well the GFR indicates group function towards therapeutic goals, it would need to be compared with other group instruments. The closest instrument to the intent of the GFR is the Matrix Representation Grid (Ahlin, 1996), which records dimensions of boundary character, communication flow, imagery, emotional climate, self-disclosure, acceptance, relating pattern and authority pattern, each with five ranked categories. Although it differs from the intent of the GFR, ratings of the same material with both instruments should provide points of comparison and validation. Other instruments for analyzing group change (Beck and Lewis, 2000) could provide helpful validation of some aspects of GFR function. Those analyzing communication are most likely to be helpful. The Group Emotionality Rating System (Karterud, 2000) records verbal statements in categories representing fight, flight, dependency, pairing, neutrality and mixed emotionality using Bion’s (1961) theory and is likely to identify some Affect and Action Coherence categories. The Group Development Process Analysis Measure (Lewis et al., 2000) may validate some GFR findings on group development. While it postulates nine stages, they are described in interpersonal interactional terms. The Psychodynamic Work and Object Rating System (Piper and McCallum, 2000) may intersect with the notion of functionality postulated by the GFR. Although it rates communication, it is content oriented towards specific verbal messages related to personal psychodynamic themes. The System for Analyzing Verbal Interaction (Simon and Agazarian, 2000), in spite of being restricted to interpersonal and verbal communication, may also validate some GFR categories. Another method of developing criterion-related validity would be by matching members’ outcome with GFR functionality of sessions and evaluation of members’ social functioning, capacity for cooperation and communication skills, using formal instruments and comparing the GFR findings. Finally, criterion-related validity can be demonstrated by detailed content analysis of sessions in parallel with the GFR ratings. Since the GFR describes group

states in terms of observable characteristics, narrative descriptions of the 426 events and interpersonal interactions will enable the character of the ratings to be matched with the events. This can be done with high or low functional minutes and sessions. Criteria of what independent therapists consider high or low quality function could be developed and judged in relation to the content and then matched that with GFR ratings. Criterion-related validity was demonstrated by the GFR to the extent that the progress of the groups were reflected anecdotally in members’ progress. The 1988, 1992 and 1996 groups were all associated with constructive outcomes for all members at the end of the year. However, the 1990 and 1993 groups, which showed deterioration in functional quality in the final term of the year and high levels of conflict were associated with loss of members and some members not achieving personal therapeutic goals.

Construct Validity. Construct validity concerns validity of theoretical constructs or the concepts the instrument purports to measure (Aiken, 2000). A construct is normally regarded as a quality or trait on which individuals differ and the instrument registers (Gregory, 1996). However, the GFR is not measuring, but recording the capacity for collective mentality as indicated in collective functioning of group entities. This characteristic of functional collective mentality is operationalised by GFR dimensions and categories. In tests, construct validity is normally established by comparing results of the test with other tests, procedures and findings to demonstrate convergent validity where similar characteristics produce consistent results, or demonstrate discriminant validity where different constructs or tests produce results that allow them to be discriminated (Gregory, 1996). GFR categories purport to provide an inclusive description of group structure, cognitive organization, affect and action coherence. Comparison of GFR findings with other group instruments (Beck and Lewis, 2999) should provide opportunities to establish both convergent and discriminant validity since some factors are similar and others are different to GFR measures. For example, there should be relationships between instruments rating content of communication and GFR ratings describing quality. Affect and Action Coherence on the GFR should be related to “Emotional

Climate” and “Boundary Character” on the Matrix Representation Grid 427 (Ahlin, 1996); conflict in Action Coherence on the GFR should be associated with “Fight” on the Group Emotion Rating System (Karterud, 2000). The constructs of GFR dimensions are derived from a diverse body of theory to articulate concepts for a collective mentality theory. The task is not only to compare the GFR with other instruments, but also to test them against as wide a range of theories as possible to determine if their phenomena, states or characteristics can be described with the existing categories or modifications that do not violate the integrity of the dimensions. A test of discriminant validity would be to apply the GFR to other types of groups and identify whether there were phenomena that could not be described by the dimensions and categories (allowing for their sensitivity to vary as discussed above). Rating other types of groups would test other factors likely to influence construct validity such as developmental stage, group differences and effects of interventions (Gregory, 1996).

Methodological Validity of the study. Validity also applies to the methodology or the study. If the procedure of the investigation is not valid the results are of uncertain meaning. The validity of the method is examined by considering threats to internal validity by compromising or confounding variables under investigation and its external validity by the generalizability of the findings to other situations (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997).

Internal Validity. Internal validity ensures that causal inferences can reliably be made from the results because of adequate controls for confounding of variables. The study is descriptive, not an experiment; the method is designed to make observations of the functionality of the social unit in adolescent psychotherapy groups and develop a methodology to define and record group phenomena, based on a body of theory. Threats to internal validity do not arise as they would in an experiment with independent and dependent variables (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). However, in the results, some analyses did show risks to internal validity and control procedures

were undertaken to ensure reliable inferences could be drawn. For example, 428 when considering the influence of change in Affect and Action Coherence over several minutes (see Chapter 20, hypothesis 3.3), the pooling of data necessarily counted overlapping minutes. This was controlled by excluding overlapping data and ensuring that the same trends were present in the modified data pool (which was the case, see Chapter 20, section 3.3.1f). Internal validity is often established by randomization, use of control groups and other procedures designed to restrict the variables present (Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). However, this study was designed to develop an empirical basis for a mode of observation to show that complex social situations could be rendered coherent. In the course of the groups, threats to internal validity were present. They included extraneous variables impacting on the groups such as change of building during 1996, failure of video records of sessions, loss of subjects, inconsistent attendance and continuity of membership from one year to another. Some of these factors could be controlled in the analysis by splitting the data pool to compare differences such as loss of members compared with size of intact group and with absentees (see results, Chapter 19, section 2.3.1b). This revealed differences of effect, which however, did not negate other findings. The internal validity of the GFR is supported by the fact that when the distribution of combinations was examined (see Chapter 7, section 4) no contradictory combinations were present. However, 204 of the possible 384 combinations of categories were not observed. These combinations need to be examined and compared with those that occurred to ensure internal validity was not compromised (see discussion in Chapter 26). It could be argued that the occurrence of less than half of the combinations suggests the GFR is more than twice as detailed as it needs to be. On the other hand this may be a function of the restricted repertoire of communicational function these groups demonstrated. Other groups may produce more or different combinations. This could only be ascertained by rating other types of groups. More work needs to be done to establish the GFR’s internal validity.

External Validity. External validity describes the extent to which findings can be generalized beyond the groups examined. Although little can be said about this from an empirical

point of view, the inclusion of a Latency Group (1990) in the study showed 429 that it demonstrated definite characteristics setting it apart from the adolescent groups and was successfully rated by the GFR. The differences shown by the GFR suggest it was sensitive to the different quality of groups of different age. However, this needs to be repeated on other groups of various ages, conducted by other therapists and non- therapeutic groups to establish its usefulness. It could also be used to rate appropriately recorded educational or recreational groups.

Functional Validity of the GFR. A wider concept of functionalist validity analyses of the study’s value implications, the usefulness of its findings, interpretations for applications and the social consequences of its use. A test is considered valid to the extent the inferences made from it are appropriate, meaningful and useful (Gregory, 1996). It can be argued that the GFR could be considered valid to the extent it reliably records change in a variety of groups and enables therapists or conductors to keep track of process, record the past and anticipate the future as an aid to more effective interventions. Differences recorded by the GFR were consistent across a number of groups and demonstrated rhythms and other regularities that could be predictive from one session to another. A study’s value implications are part of its functional validity (Gregory, 1997). The GFR does not discriminate individuals and protects them in its documentation. It does not assign value to the group state other than in its approximation towards the hypothesized therapeutic goal state. However, this may need to be reviewed in the light of developing knowledge. It is possible that certain types of conflict in association with Representational Cognitive Organization (e.g., the Condensed State of Productive Turmoil) may be considered more therapeutic than Sociable states because of the self- representations. This would mean that the order of states’ therapeutic desirability might change. The theory acknowledges the necessity of groups moving rhythmically through all the states as part of their development. The criteria of therapeutic progress are related to the proportions of time spent in the different states, their combinations and sequences rather than their simple incidence, presence or absence. Functional validity is also supported by evidence for an instrument’s usefulness and application (Gregory, 1997). The GFR will be useful if it can assist therapists to describe groups more effectively, provide indications for their general therapeutic

orientation and interventions in managing them. If it is demonstrated as 430 useful for other therapeutic groups, it may also provide valuable assistance (albeit in modified form) for other settings such as managing school and recreational groups. Its validity would be enhanced if it assisted teachers and youth leaders to understand and mange their groups. Finally, functional validity is demonstrated by the potential and actual consequences of its application (Gregory, 1997). These remain to be seen.

APPENDIX 2: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS 431 INSTRUCTIONS.

Four documents are included in this appendix. “Group Function Record – Raters’ Instructions,” is a detailed description of the criteria and definitions for applying the rating system. Each Dimension is described. This is the document used to train raters. “GFR Examples,” is a list of ambiguous and problematic situations likely to be encountered in rating video sessions with clear instructions on how they are to be interpreted and rated. “GFR Outline,” is a two-page outline of the criteria to prompt raters while they are doing the ratings. “Group Function Record – Rating Sheet” is a copy of the sheet used to rate the videos.

432 GROUP FUNCTION RECORD - RATERS’ INSTRUCTIONS Draft 10

Rob Gordon University of Melbourne

STRUCTURE Structure describes the communicating units within the group in a given minute.

CRITERIA: Communication occurs when a member does two or more of the following: Proximity: is so close that it is clear that this is an intentional selection of the other in preference to random placement. Looking: looks at or keeps another in view or eye contact. Listening: listens to or maintains auditory monitoring of another. Talking: talks to or engages in other form of verbal communication with another. Gesturing: provides some form of bodily movement or positioning, which is perceived as having meaning by the other (body language or non-verbal communication). Engaged: is engaged in a common activity or shared enterprise even if the other conditions are not met; e.g. parallel play or continuing to perform a common task when other communication has ceased.

Possible categories are:

WHOLE GROUP (W): all members are in communication. SUBGROUPS (S): all members are in communication with a number of other members in sub-groups, no one is isolated. SUBGROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS (SI): there are one or more subgroups and one or more isolated individuals not in communication with anyone. INDIVIDUALS (I): No members of the group are in communication with each other.

Include members in a communion who: * Sustain communication with a member of a unit for more than 15" continuous contact during a minute, * Play in parallel, wait to take a turn, or monitor others, * Share resources or space involving tacit communication, * Come and go within the minute as part of play, game or conversation, * Remain attached to a conversation or interaction, but contribute only periodically.

Exclude members who: * Break communication for the minute; or make only fleeting contact for less than 15" at a time, * Are in close proximity, but not communicating and undertake unrelated activity, * Ignore, don't attend or are indifferent to communication with or from a unit, * When members cannot be seen to be communicating, (eg, off camera, out of sight); unless there is clear auditory communication. Rate the highest Structure category that is evident for 15" in the minute.

COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION 433 Cognitive Organization describes the organization of the communication process according to the presence of shared themes or topics, the quality of the members' contributions to the communication, the extent to which norms, rules, relationships or system are present. These are discriminated at four different levels, which provide four categories. Norms: Shared standards, expectations or prescriptions of valued behaviour or interest that are also likely to regulate conduct. They may be the basis for sanctions to maintain the behaviour. A norm gives a simple binary relation, such as "this should or should not be done/said/thought", or "this is good or bad, cool or dumb, acceptable or not acceptable". It does not specify anything about the relations between the various elements that are covered by the norms, or its relationship with other norms. Norms are expressed in terms of actual behaviour, not as principles in themselves. Examples: Limit setting by members in a game (eg skittle wars), maintaining the topic of a conversation. Rules: Principles or propositions that determine the production and evaluation of conduct. Rules indicate what to do and give action a meaning in relation to the other possible things that could be done. Rules may be: regulative in that they give explicit value or meaning to the conduct in relation to a system of principles; constitutive which means they determine whether conduct is given a particular meaning or significance; or generative in that they determine how conduct will be produced or generated as speech, conversation, sentiment or action. Generative rules are evident when the conduct of the members or their communication is clearly governed by a purpose or goal and the contributions are articulated in relation to each other. This will be most easily observed in the order or succession of actions or contributions to the communication process. E.g. the rules of a game both prescribe the possible actions to be undertaken, but do not determine what the actor should do. Rules also enable to actor to evaluate the significance of his or her action in relation to the overall purpose of the game.

REPRESENTATIONAL ORGANIZATION: Consistent themes and representations of group or members of themselves, life, or their problems which can be processed at a systemic level. Examples: • Discussions about problems, • Decision making and planning about the group, • Discussion and debate about the group and its activities, • Complaints and emotional communication about the group, • Talking to therapist about themselves provided it is not just answering questions, • Discussion of issues of adolescent concern such as sex, sex education, violence, juvenile crime. SYSTEMIC ORGANIZATION: Common terms, ideas, symbols; contributions related to the topic, show logical structure, develop the ideas, build on previous contributions. Rules are understood or accepted and are consistent and govern the process enabling common activity, problem solving and information processing. Members understand their place in the system. Examples: • Rule based games, e.g., cards, hangman, • Discussion, ie not just one member dominating the conversation. • Shared anecdotes about movies, activities, joke sessions,

• When the group listens to the therapist or responds to the therapist's 434 intervention, • Debate, argument, problem solving, • Advice and sympathy, • Quiz or question and answer sessions involving knowledge or information. • More than 1 member is active in the process.

NORMATIVE ORGANIZATION: There is a common theme or topic, norms, a shared code promoting activity or communication. Contributions are bound by this but lack logical relationship. Descriptions, narratives or reports are inconsistent and do not develop ideas. Relations of similarity, comparison and sequence. Problem solving or consistent information processing not achieved. Rules or system may be present, but are inconsistent or ineffective. A game bound by norms rather than rules (eg skittles). Examples: • Only 1 member sustains the theme or activity and others are passive, regardless of the organization of the game or the conversation. • Conversations without development of themes, any common theme or topic of talk or action; • The therapist talking, but the group not listening. • Fighting or competitive games with only rudimentary rules. • Questions and answers, agreement and disagreements; comparisons • Failed or inadequate rules and system • Listening to the therapist • Rule-based games that are not properly undertaken or which do not work (cards). • Activity games, throwing, ball games, mucking around, skittle throwing.

UNORGANIZED: Common terms are not shared, inconsistent or not sustained for more than 30". Contributions are simple declarations or actions, lack development of ideas, have no sequential or constructive relation to others. Norms or rules absent; overall meaning or purpose absent. Tasks not undertaken; information not processed or responded to. Examples: • Talk in which members make comments which are not taken up or developed by others; no consistent theme or topic for > 30". • motor play, mucking around, uncoordinated activity lacking common theme; there is no agreed "game". • periods of confusion or disorganization • when more organized activities collapse Include: replies to comments lacking connectedness or sequence; Exclude: question and answer and agree- or disagreement.

General Criteria * Rate the highest functioning sub-group. * Rate the organizational level which best describes the communication for the minute or at least 30 seconds. * When organization fluctuates or no clear rating is possible, rate Unorganized. * If only 1 member talks and the others are not participating, rate Normative, regardless of the organization of the member concerned.

435 Cognitive organization describes four different levels of organization of the communication process. It presumes that members contribute to communications, which have some relation to each other and content in themselves. It is the extent of organization of the communication process itself. Four aspects of the communication structure are distinguished in order to evaluate the structural aspects. They comprise (1) common themes or terms; (2) the contributions which members make to the communication process; (3) the relations between these contributions; (4) the systemic aspects of the communication as a whole. Although these elements cannot be defined in detail for each observation, they are described in the table below to assist in observing and judging the process.

Definitions UNORGANIZED NORMATIVE SYSTEMIC REPRESENT- ATIONAL

TERMS & Terms include any No common Common terms and Common terms, Common terms THEMES common elements terms, inconsistent topics, shared by allow for elaboration refer to self or which allow topics, themes or topics; members of common ideas group ideas to be shared, members have and creation of a actions or themes of their own themes group culture communication, and topics.

CONTRI- Communicative acts Basic content, not Guided and bound by Themes are Contributions BUTIONS of the members: developed or topics. Basic, descriptive, elaborated in a elaborate self or utterances, actions, elaborated, narratives, reports not logical structure, group responses idiosyncratic and expressing development There is a point or representations inconsistent of ideas. One person relevance to the or refer to them. may dominate sequence; bound by rules and purposes

RELAT- Relations between No relations, or Relations present, but not Relations are logical, Logical and IONS contributions, only rudimentary logical structures or sequential, with a associative articulations related relatedness argument, only com- developmental order relations to each other or between parison, similarity, agree and relevance. allowing the operations that may contributions. /disagree, reply, sequ- Rules guide and theme to be be undertaken by the encing; rules and norms direct the process, elaborated for group. present but incomplete or may be implicit the whole group ineffective

SYSTEM Overall goals, No system, no Overall meaning and Goal oriented, Goal oriented to purpose, meaning purpose, direction connectedness, but not contri-butions to develop and and directedness of or overall problem solving, elaborate on each understanding, the communi-cation meaning. exchange and other to solve share or solve process as a whole. communication are problems, gain problems about reason enough. knowledge or the group or undertake actions. selves

436 AFFECT Affect describes the energy level and emotional quality within the group’s communication. The affect does not necessarily have to be observed in each member. One or two members may manifest a strong emotional state that influences the whole group even though not all the other members can be said to share the same emotion. Affect in this sense indicates the emotional state which is present within the group as a whole in each minute according to the criteria below. These record the general affective state of the group rather than attempting to describe the members’ specific emotions. Six categories for group affect are derived from the matrix of two dimensions of quantity of energy and hedonic quality as shown in the table below. Although specific emotional names are given, they are intended to indicate group-affective states rather than the emotions of individuals. The following table describes the energy level and hedonic tension in the communication process.

PLEASURE UNPLEASURE UNSTABLE Joy Distress STABLE Interest Discontent INERT Contentment Boredom/Apathy

The following definitions describe the basic dimensions of affect: Tension: This forms the basis for the distinction of hedonic quality between pleasure and unpleasure. Tension in the group is defined as: A strained condition of the mind, feelings or nerves, manifesting as a constrained condition of members of a group in which they are subjected to emotional forces motivating them away from shared emotions or rapport, tending to draw them apart, balanced by forces of cohesion drawing them together; the force or combination of forces acting in this way (adapted from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary). Tension is the description of the emotional influences of constraint or strain manifested in emotional differences or tendencies for the members to pull away from their participation in the communion. Pleasure: Rewarding hedonic emotional quality, expresses increased togetherness in the form of emotional states of low interpersonal tension among the members of the communion; moods of happiness, enjoyment, expressions of pleasure, demonstrated by gestures, smiles, pleasant modulations of the voice. Rate Pleasure when there is no significant tension lasting for more than 15 seconds within the minute, even if only expressed by 1 member. Unpleasure: Aversive hedonic emotional quality, expressed as increased interpersonal tension in the form of aversive emotions, separateness and different emotional states among the members of the communion, or between the communion, other members or therapists, including: anger unhappiness, displeasure, fear, expressed by cries, facial grimaces, gestures. Rate Unpleasure when there is significant tension or aversive emotions lasting 15 seconds or more within the minute, even if only expressed by 1 member. Mixed Quality: Where there is fluctuation in hedonic quality within the 15" rating interval, or throughout the if there are 3 or more moments of unpleasurable

tension, minute, this is viewed as mixed emotion and should be rated as 437 Unpleasure. Unstable Energy: The emotional energy level fluctuates, involving discharge, reduction and increase. The energy cannot be maintained within the communication process proper. It manifests in phenomena that disrupt the social structure of communication and the flow of syntactical messages resulting in paralinguistic communication or motor discharges. Rate Unstable when the energy level fluctuates significantly (including discharges) for more than 15 seconds within the minute, even if only 1 member demonstrates this. Stable Energy: The emotional energy level is maintained at a relatively constant level without discharge or marked fluctuations. It is expressed within the communication process and motivates maintenance of its current state and reflects a stable emotional state through stable communication. Paralinguistic phenomena are generally subjected to the requirements of syntactical messages. Rate Stable when there are no marked fluctuations of emotional energy level for more than 15 seconds within the minute. Inert Energy: The emotional energy level is low, and emotion is not expressed overtly; there is low arousal which involves minimal communication, lack of syntactical messages and little paralinguistic phenomena, while maintaining the contact between the members of the communion. Rate Inert when there is low arousal and minimal communication for 45 seconds or more in the minute, i.e. when no significant emotion occurs for more than 15 seconds in the minute. The six emotional states that are defined by these dimensions are described below:

CONTENTMENT: Pleasurable emotional states involving little expressed emotion but maintaining a communion which does not involve significant overt exchange. The mood present promotes togetherness. No significant emotion or tension for > 15". Examples: • Relaxation, • Following a satisfying experience, • Quiet and unaroused states in which members are in contact but not actively exchanging JOY: Pleasurable, unstable emotion, exultation, happiness, excitement, gladness, mirth, delight, intense enjoyment leading to marked fluctuations in energy level and motivation, and tending to disrupt communication with non-syntactical contributions (i.e. emotional discharges), but low interpersonal tension. Tension < 15"; Fluctuation > 15". Examples: • Jokes, • Laughter, • Boisterousness, • Excited talk and play, • Exclamations of pleasure, • Gestures, e.g. slapping on the back.

INTEREST: Pleasurable emotion or mood maintained at a stable level motivating continuing involvement with low interpersonal tension, or increased engagement in syntactic communication or the current activities. Fluctuations & Tension <

15". 438 Examples: • Pleasant conversation, • Talk of interest or satisfaction of curiosity, • Modulated, stable interaction in conversation or game, • Interest as shown by attention or questions to ensure contact. DISCONTENT: Unpleasurable or mixed pleasurable and unpleasurable emotion or mood maintained at a stable level, motivating continued engagement even though involving significant interpersonal tension, frustration or dissatisfaction. Give preference to Discontent when there is a combination of Joy and Discontent. Communication is maintained at existing levels or increased. Fluctuation < 15"; Tension > 15". Examples : • Complaints, • Talk about fears, • Teasing, criticism, • Passive unpleasure such as sadness, regret, nostalgia, • Arguments and disagreements accompanied by tension and aversive emotion, • Worries or grievances and unhappy experiences invoking empathic responses.

DISTRESS: Unpleasurable, or mixed pleasurable and unpleasurable unstable emotion, intense unpleasurable excitement, leading to marked fluctuation of energy levels or motivation and disruption in the syntactical communication process by paralinguistic phenomena (i.e. discharges of affect). Marked differences in emotion may be present among members leading to high interpersonal tension. Fluctuation & Tension > 15". Examples: • Hits or jeering, • Shouting, abuse, • Anger, tears, grief, • Unhappiness, sadness, • Teasing and mocking laughter, • Cries of pain, rage or frustration.

BOREDOM: Unpleasurable mood leading to an inactive state of the group with little overt communication or emotional expression; the communion is maintained but there is a lack of significant energy among the members. Interpersonal tension is present. No emotions > 30", Tension > 15". Examples: • Anger, • Boredom, • Paralysis, • Frustration, • Disappointment. • Moods of sadness, • Inability to tackle problems or engage in active communication about issues,

General Criteria: * Unpleasure is rated when there is a mixture of positive and negative emotion since this creates interpersonal tension.

* 15 seconds (quarter of a minute) is the minimum time for the presence of 439 unpleasure, instability or tension. This is best taken as a continuous period, but may be cumulative over the course of the minute. * Fluctuation needs to occur for more than 15 seconds for Joy or Distress. * Rate the most obvious affective state in the minute. * Rate Interest or Discontent when fluctuations occur for less than 15". * Rate Discontent or Distress when unpleasurable tension is manifested by at least one member. * Contentment and Boredom are demonstrated by the majority of members even if one member is more active.

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PLEASURE UNPLEASURE Definitions Rewarding hedonic quality, Aversive hedonic quality, expresses increased together- expresses increased inter- ness or shared emotional personal tension in the form of states, decreased interpersonal separateness and different tension, happiness, enjoyment, emotional states; anger expressions of pleasure eg unhappiness, displeasure eg, gestures, smiles, pleasant cries, facial grimaces, gestures; modulations of the voice; UN- Emotional energy level JOY: Pleasurable, unstable DISTRESS: Unpleasurable, STABLE fluc-tuates, involving emotion, exultation, happi- unstable emotion, unhap- discharge, reduction and ness, pleasurable excitement, piness, anger, grief, sadness, increase. This can't be gladness, mirth, delight, en- unpleasurable excitement maintained within the joyment expressed intensely, expressed with intensity, communication process. It leading to marked fluctuations leading to fluctuation and interrupts syntactical in energy and disrupts disruption in the syntactical messages, shown in para- communication with non- communication process by linguistic communication. syntactical contributions. paralinguistic phenomena. Examples Jokes, laughter, boisterous, Anger, tears, shouting, abuse, excited talk and play cries of pain, rage or exclamations of pleasure, frustration, hits or jeering, gestures, slapping on the back, teasing and mocking laughter STABLE Emotional energy is main- INTEREST: Pleasurable DISCONTENT: Unpleas- tained at a stable level for emotion maintained at a stable urable emotion at a stable more than half the minute level that motivates continuing level, motivating continued without discharge or involvement or becoming engagement even though in- marked fluctuations. It more engaged in syntactic volving tension, frustration or motivates maintenance of communication or the current dissatisfaction. Commu- the current state of the activities. nication is maintained at communication process. existing levels or increased. Examples Pleasant conversation, Complaints, arguments and modulated interaction in the disagreements accompanied by context of a talk, game or other tension and aversive em-otion; activity, interest as shown by teasing, criticism of a less attention or questions to ensure intense type, talk about worries contact. Talk of interest or and unhappy exper-iences satisfaction of curiosity involving empathic responses. INERT Energy level low, emotion CONTENTMENT: Pleas- APATHY: Unpleasurable not expressed overtly; lack urable states involving little emotions leading to inactive of arousal, may involve expressed emotion and state of the group with little minimal communication, maintaining a communion that overt communication; com- lack of syntactical does not involve significant munion maintained but lack of messages, but contact overt exchange. significant energy maintained. Examples Quiet and unemotional states Boredom, frustration, paralysis in which the group is in inability to tackle problems or contact but not actively engage in active exchanging such as following communication about issues, a satisfying experience. moods of sadness, anger, disappointment

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ACTION COHERENCE This describes the group's capacity to act as a group. Group action involves the capacity to adopt a common goal and to cooperate in achieving it. The categories indicate the stages from collective action where group members cooperate with each other through to adopting diverse or incompatible goals or become uncooperative or oppositional towards each other or the group goal. The ratings describe the condition of the combination of all activities occurring in a group or subgroup; e.g. a game of cards with a concurrent conversation. These processes are defined in terms of the observable acts within the communication process. Mixed Coherence: Where there are 3 or more fluctuations in the degree of coherence throughout the minute or 30" rating interval such that no category adequately describes the group's state, this is regarded as mixed coherence and is rated in terms of the lowest (or most incoherent) category of activity present. Fluctuations involve a change in coherence category to the lower category even though this may only last a few seconds.

CONCORD: All act as one in the pursuit of a common goal, expressed as a common activity or concurrent activities in which each plays a cooperative role. There is a clearly observable group action involving all members of the group or dominant subgroup. All concurrent activities must be have the same degree of coherence. This must occur > 30". Examples: • A closely coordinated discussion in which members maintain a theme and make cooperative contributions; • A game (irrespective of its organizational complexity - the cooperation and common goal are rated).

ACCORD: Members demonstrate diverse, but compatible goals which are not contradictory to each other. This must apply to all concurrent activities within the unit. They act in cooperation, but not with a common activity. Rate this category when the common goal or activity are failing or incomplete. There may be differences, but cooperation occurs. There is no conflict. This must occur > 30". Examples: • Conversation which lacks goal or common theme; • Games when there is a failure to maintain the goal or one or more members remains within the structural unit but does not participate in the activity or share the goal; • Lack of coordination where the group fails to achieve an end; members are engaged in different or unrelated activities but there is no particular uncooperativeness or conflict; debates or constructive arguments which preserve a goal or purpose. • Competitive games, eg fighting of skittles as long as they agree to play.

DISCORD: The members demonstrate diverse and incompatible goals, or engage in uncooperative activities which are disruptive (but do not intend to damage) each other or to the group achieving a common goal. The activity may be diverse or a common activity with incompatible goals and an actively uncooperative attitude. Rate as Discord when one activity is concordant or accordant (e.g. a game of cards) while another concurrent activity within the same unit is discordant. Where there are 3 or more fluctuations in coherence within the 30" time interval with moments

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of discord interspersed with higher coherence, this is mixed coherence and rated as Discord. This must occur > 30". Examples: • Competition for resources, role, position or space, • Disagreements about what to do or how to play a game, • Argument or teasing while engaged in a cooperative game, • Good natured teasing where the other is not really intended to be hurt, • Arguments or disagreements resulting in threatening or disruption to the conversation or activity with no active conflict or disagreements but a lack of common activity or cooperation.

CONTRACORD: A member or members act against others with incompatible goals and adopt an oppositional attitude to the group, therapist or other members. This includes aggression, hostility, antagonism. It involves active opposition towards others. This must occur > 5". Where there is mixed coherence with several moments of Contracord not extended for the minimum 5" it is viewed a mixed coherence and rated as Contracord. Examples: • Abuse, • Coercion and intimidation, • Fighting, hostile argument, • Forcing others against their will, • Verbal or physical threats of aggression, • Taking or commandeering resources or space by force actual or threatened, • Destructive behaviour, talk or action intended to hurt another or damage the group or activity.

General Criteria • Rate the largest or best functioning sub-group. • Rate the category which best describes the minute (more than 30 seconds) for Concord, Accord and Discord. • Rate Contracord when ever a significant episode (more than 10" duration) of opposition occurs within the minute • Rate Discord and Contracord when one or more members act in a disruptive of conflictual manner. • Where the degree of cooperation and categories fluctuate throughout the minute, rate it as Discord. • Consider all concurrent activities in making the rating. It should reflect the combined state.

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AIMS COHESION ACTIVITY CONCORD Members have a Members cooperate to There is a shared common aim which a high degree and activity, which enables them to act in present unanimity in involves all members relation to each other their combined action. in the communion. to achieve it. Cohesion and mutual engagement are high. ACCORD Aims are different but Members cooperate, The activities are compatible. They are loosely and allow for diverse but compat- not shared, but do not different involvement ible, or similar but interfere with each or communication. not shared. They do other. Cohesion is low with not interfere with loose engagement. each other. DISCORD The aims are different Members do not Activities are diverse and incompatible cooperate and are and incompatible and though not directly uncooperative though interfere with each conflicting with each not oppositional. other. other. Cohesion is low and engagement loose CONTRA- Aims are incompat- Members may be Activities may be CORD ible and one or more highly cohesive and diverse or common, members try to impose intensely engaged, but but within them their aims on others or in an oppositional members actively oppose the other's manner. oppose each other. aims.

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THERAPISTS' INTERVENTIONS The therapists' communications to the group or members are rated in terms of being addressed to the group as a whole or to the members as individuals.

GROUP INTERVENTION (G): The whole group or a functional sub-group is addressed, or all members of the group are addressed, even if individually. Assume the group is addressed if there are general comments without referring to anyone in particular, or if a member is talked about in the third person (e.g. “Bill is feeling angry”). MEMBER INTERVENTION (M): One or more members are addressed, but not all members of the group or sub-group. GROUP AND MEMBER INTERVENTION (G&M): Both the above interventions are made within the minute. Rate it if an intervention includes both group and references to individual members. LIMIT: Limits are set on members, rules are invoked, an attempt is made to verbally or physically restrict members' activity. Rate by checking the box for the minute. LOCOMOTION: The therapist changes position in the room during the minute. This is rated by checking the box for the minute.

General Criteria • The first three categories are rated mutually exclusively. • Limit and locomotion are checked for each minute in which one or more of these interventions occurs. The number of interventions is not recorded, only that at least one occurred. • Where an intervention overlaps a minute boundary, do not rate it in the second minute unless it lasts more than 30 seconds. • In the case of a dialogue between the therapist and one or more members, regard the separate comments as though they comprise one intervention, unless there is a 30 second break between comments. • If an intervention starts at the end of 1 minute, but only part of the first sentence is in that minute rate it in the next minute. • Where the therapist addresses both group and member in an interaction, rate both group and member intervention. • Where no member is specified, and the object of the intervention is unclear, rate as group intervention. • When the therapist talks about a member, mentioning their name, but not talking directly to the member, assume the group is being addressed about the member.

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GFR EXAMPLES

Draft 10. The following examples indicate the ratings to be given to typical phenomena in adolescent groups

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS STRUCTURE & AFFECT: Rate the 15" that shows the best Structure or the worst Affect. COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION & ACTION COHERENCE: Rate the first 31+" unless a clear rating is not possible, then start rating the second 30" and rate the greatest part of the minute.

STRUCTURE Rate the best structure that is observable for 15" in the minute. Absent members: when a member temporarily leaves the room, or is off camera and cannot be seen or heard, treat as an individual and rate as SUBGROUP + INDIVIDUAL. Late arrivals: when only some members arrive on time and others arrive after the group has started, rate those in the room at the time as though the group consists of them. Looking: When a member is looking at the group from a distance, rate as a separate INDIVIDUAL unless there is evidence of reciprocity in communication. If one member just glances across from time to time while otherwise looking away and is not otherwise involved or following the process, count them out of the communion as an INDIVIDUAL. Off Camera: when one member is off camera and there are no cues to their activity, count as separate from the Communion and therefore as an INDIVIDUAL. When there are two or more members off camera in the same part of the room and voices can be heard, assume they are communicating and form a communion or SUBGROUP. Same Activity - but separate: When a member separates himself from the communion physically but continues to engage in the common activity (such as to prepare something for the game) include him in the communion. This could be seen as parallel play Silence: When members are silent for the whole minute, rate as INDIVIDUALS unless there is observable non-verbal communication between them. Sitting together: If two or more members are close together, such as sitting on a couch, rate as being in communion and forming a SUBGROUP even if not actually communicating unless one member is talking to someone and ignoring the other who is obviously not attending to the other.

COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION Rate the best organization, which is evident for 30" in the minute. Rate the first 30"unless it is variable or ambiguous. If so, then rate as much of the second 30" as required to get a 30" segment to rate. Anecdotes disconnected: Where the anecdotes are not closely related and the members do not seem to associate to each other's anecdotes and the sequence is not connected, rate as NORMATIVE.

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Comparisons: of watches, clothing or other physical material, or of verbal material does not imply any logical operations therefore is rated as - NORMATIVE Conversations: when the members discuss or swap jokes, anecdotes about movies, stories or incidents and 1 member dominates for most of the minute, but he talks to the others and they respond to allow the topic to be maintained rate as - SYSTEMIC even though there may not be any actual analysis of the material. Fantasy discourse: spinning stories and fantasies which have a direction and development are rated as SYSTEMIC, since the contributions are part of an articulated logical sequence. The truth, cognitive accuracy or complexity are not relevant to the rating. Inaudible talk: When a communion is conversing, but the content is inaudible or unclear, rate as UNORGANIZED if there is no clear evidence of content or quality. Rate as NORMATIVE if the members are clearly all involved and there is evidence of maintaining a common topic even if this cannot be heard. Movie anecdotes: Where members swap anecdotes about movies and share incidents from the same movies, or they are consistent in theme or content, rate this as SYSTEMIC since it involves the sequencing and articulation of a shared content. Play with implements: Where members each use the same implements or materials even when the game lacks organization, it is rated as NORMATIVE since they are using common materials. Problem talk with therapist: When members talk about their problems with the therapist, but do not direct communication to other members, rate as NORMATIVE even though it about problems. Only rate REPRESENTATIONAL when they talk among themselves and the group sustains the communication. Questions: Questions forming a quiz or requiring the application of thinking or knowledge are rated as SYSTEMIC. Questions not directed to knowledge (E.G. "Do you like football?") are rated as NORMATIVE. Responding to therapist about themselves as a group: When the therapist talks to members about themselves and their problems as a group and more than one member participates, rate as NORMATIVE if they do not do more than answer therapist's questions. If they respond and converse with the therapists about themselves, rate as REPRESENTATIONAL. It does not qualify for REPRESENTATIONAL unless they are talking to each other about themselves at a SYSTEMIC level. Silence: When all members are silent for a whole minute, rate as a UNORGANIZED. Talking to Therapist as individuals: When a member is talking to the therapist as an individual and the others are listening but not participating, rate as NORMATIVE regardless of how well organized it is since the rating measures the group's functioning not that of individuals in relation to the therapists. Only rate SYSTEMIC for talk or activity between members. Therapist Interviews: When the therapists ask members questions and they respond to the therapist rather than each other, even if they do so in sequence on the same topic, rate as NORMATIVE.

AFFECT Rate the worst Affect evident for 15" within the minute except for JOY, which is given preference over INTEREST. Boredom: only rate this when members are showing BOREDOM by their expressions and actions, e.g. yawning, slouching, gazing around etc. Do not rate BOREDOM just because they are silent or inactive, this is rated as INTEREST if there is evidence

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of activity or may be CONTENTMENT. Discontent: When a member teases, criticizes or otherwise denigrates another member, rate as DISCONTENT when there is clear indication of unpleasurable affect as well as the conflict. Excitement: JOY is unstable, high-energy pleasure and should be rated when there is high, unstable emotional energy, even if actual pleasurable discharges are not present to criterion. Joy: A general guffaw including all or most members of the communion which lasts 5 or more seconds and involves the whole communion qualifies for JOY Noises: General noises such as car or missile noises or those accompanying play are regarded as high energy pleasurable discharges and count towards a rating of JOY. Silence: When all members are silent for the whole rating period (30") rate affect as BOREDOM or CONTENTMENT, depending on which seems most accurate. Songs playful noises and Cries: count as discharge unstable pleasure and can be rated as Joy.

ACTION COHERENCE Rate the worst Coherence evident for 30" in the minute. Rate the first 30" unless it is variable or ambiguous. Then rate as much of the second 30" is necessary to obtain a rating of 30". Brief Discord: To rate DISCORD there must be at least 3 expressions of discord over 30". Where there are brief moments of DISCORD lasting 5" or so, only rate as DISCORD if there are at least three in 30". Contracord: Examples of CONTRACORD include hitting, verbal abuse, swearing intended to denigrate or hurt, pushing, kicking or other aggressive words or action. Conversation: When talking together, CONCORD is rated when there is union in the activity in the form of well-coordinated turn-taking and maintaining the theme or a sequence of anecdotes on a common theme. This may include joke sessions, movie anecdotes, discussion of events etc. If there are discrepancies in theme, rhythm or sequencing, rate ACCORD. Individual: When only one member is visible and there are no observations possible of the others or there is only one member, rate as ACCORD Individuals: When there are only INDIVIDUALS, rate the COHERENCE as ACCORD, since they have individual goals, but since they are not communicating they must not be incompatible. Joking teasing: When there is teasing of one member by another, whether this is in a joking way or with animosity, rate as DISCORD, even when this is done in a conversational form. Misunderstandings: When these occur between members of a communion such that the communication is impaired, rate as DISCORD. Questions and discussion: When all participants contribute to the discussion and share in it, rate as CONCORD. Silence: When members are silent for the minute, rate as ACCORD since they have compatible goals. Topics: In conversations, when there is agreement in the topic and common degree of involvement (not necessarily verbal contributions though) rate CONCORD.

THERAPISTS' INTERVENTIONS Overlaps: Where an intervention overlaps the boundary of a minute, if it only lasts a

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couple of seconds in one minute, rate it in the minute that contains most of the intervention. Rate an intervention in the minute in which it originates. Non-verbal interaction: Do not count nods, "Mm-hm", looking while listening to a member. Only rate verbal responses.

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GROUP FUNCTION RECORD OUTLINE Draft 10 STRUCTURE: Units in the group communicating by two or more of: Proximity, Looking, Listening, Talking, Gesturing, Engaged. Contact is for > 15" continuously.

WHOLE GROUP All members are in communication. SUBGROUPS All members are in communication with a number of other members in subgroups, no one is isolated. SUBGROUPS & There are one or more subgroups and one or more isolated individuals not in INDIVIDUALS communication with anyone. INDIVIDUALS No members of the group are in communication with each other.

COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION: Common terms and system in the communication process. > 30"

REPRESENT- System of representations by the group or members of themselves, life, their ATIONAL ORGn problems which are processed systemically. SYSTEMIC ORGn Common terms, symbols, logical structure, rules govern common activity. NORMATIVE Common theme, norms, shared code promoting and ordering . ORGn UNORGANIZED Common terms not shared, inconsistent, not sustained for more than 30".

AFFECT: Energy level and hedonic tension in the communication process. > 15".

CONTENTMENT Inert, pleasurable, emotional states. Emotion & Tension < 15" High energy, unstable pleasurable emotion. JOY Fluctuation > 15"; Tension < 15" INTEREST Stable pleasurable energy. Fluctuation & Tension < 15" DISCONTENT Stable unpleasurable or mixed emotion. Fluctuation < 15"; Tension > 15" DISTRESS High energy, unstable, unpleasurable or mixed emotion. Fluctuation & Tension > 15". BOREDOM Low energy unpleasurable or mixed emotional states. Emotion < 15"; Tension > 15"

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ACTION COHERENCE: Collective or individual action as cooperation/opposition in the communication process. All concurrent activities are rated. CONCORD Common goal, cooperative action. Lasting > 30". ACCORD Diverse goals, cooperative action. Lasting > 30" DISCORD Diverse goals, uncooperative or mixed action. Lasting > 30". CONTRACORD Diverse goals, mixed or oppositional action towards each other. Lasting > 5".

THERAPIST INTERVENTIONS: Therapist's communications to the group or members.

GROUP The whole group or a functional sub-group is addressed, or all INTERVENTION members of the group are addressed, even if individually. MEMBER One or more members are addressed, but not all members of the INTERVENTION group or subgroup. GP & MEMBER Both group and one or more members are talked to within. INTERVENTION LIMIT A limit is set on the members, a rule is invoked or some attempt is made to verbally or physically restrict the members' activity. LOCOMOTION The therapist changes position in the room during the minute.

GROUP FUNCTION RECORD – RATING SHEET. A copy of the sheet used to rate video records is attached below. The rater sits in front of the video and watches it for the first 30”, noting the character of each dimension. In the second half minute, Cognitive Organization and Action Coherence are rated on the basis of the most appropriate category for 30 or more seconds. In the last 15” of the minute, the rater decides which category to rate for Structure and Affect. Therapists Interventions are marked as they occur and at the end of the minute a rating is made. Limits and Locomotion are recorded as they occur. Ratings are made by marking the horizontal line for the category chosen in the minute indicated on the time counter of the video. An example of a completed rating sheet is also provided as an illustration.

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APPENDIX 3: GROUP FUNCTION RECORD RESULTS.

Distribution of GFR Categories. The frequencies of states for each group are shown in Tables 17A.1. – 17A.5.

AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Count Count Count Count Count Count STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 34 208 30 1 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 7 53 30 2 Discord 11 36 1 3 Contracord 3 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1 103 365 12 1 COHER. 1 Accord 14 48 9 2 Discord 10 17 13 1 3 Contracord 4 3 1 4 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 3 42 COHER. 1 Accord 16 84 11 11 2 Discord 6 7 19 3 Contracord 1 1 4 2 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 1 COHER. 1 Accord 23 35 6 1 7 2 Discord 28 9 20 2 3 Contracord 1 2 4 3 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1 3 COHER. 1 Accord 1 3 1 2 Discord 1 1 3 Contracord 1 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1 3 COHER. 2 Discord 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1 COHER. 2 Discord 1 3 Contracord 1 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 17 9 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 3 11 18 2 Discord 4 8 3 Contracord 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 11 99 3 1 COHER. 1 Accord 11 45 1 2 2 Discord 2 13 7 3 Contracord 1 1 2 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 5 COHER. 1 Accord 1 38 9 1 2 Discord 1 5 3 Contracord 2 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 4 16 5 2 COHER. 2 Discord 4 10 4 1 3 Contracord 1 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 9 13 3 3 ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1 4 2 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 17 9 21 COHER. 2 Discord 6 9 5

Table 17A.1. Frequencies for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988.

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AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress Count Count Count Count Count STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 11 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 4 29 1 2 Discord 2 9 2 3 Contracord 2 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2 13 65 COHER. 1 Accord 1 4 73 1 2 Discord 2 11 8 1 3 Contracord 2 1 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 2 COHER. 1 Accord 5 58 1 2 Discord 6 15 17 3 Contracord 3 2 4 3 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 20 46 COHER. 2 Discord 35 28 33 4 3 Contracord 5 4 11 8 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 2 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 9 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 51 2 44 3 COHER. 1 Accord 3 2 31 1 2 Discord 2 3 Contracord 1 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 1 COHER. 1 Accord 9 38 1 2 Discord 9 2 3 Contracord 1 2 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 3 8 COHER. 2 Discord 3 3 3 1 3 Contracord 1 3 2 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 10 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1 13 1 2 Discord 2 2 3 Contracord 1 2 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 29 6 126 4 COHER. 1 Accord 76 2 Discord 2 17 9 1 3 Contracord 1 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1 91 2 1 COHER. 2 Discord 11 14 3 Contracord 6 5 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 3 38 1 COHER. 2 Discord 7 26 10 3 3 Contracord 4 2 16 1 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 9 1 ORGANISn 3 Unorganised ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord 1 COHER. 2 Discord 2 1

Table 17A.2. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990.

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AFFECT 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Count Count Count Count Count STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 8 31 2 1 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 13 26 14 2 Discord 8 8 3 Contracord 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 3 12 2 COHER. 1 Accord 4 26 2 2 Discord 2 3 6 1 3 Contracord 1 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 15 1 COHER. 1 Accord 61 181 14 3 5 2 Discord 13 26 42 7 3 Contracord 1 3 2 3 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 20 49 3 4 COHER. 2 Discord 16 10 19 3 Contracord 1 1 3 6 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 1 1 ORGANISn 1 Systemic ACTCOHER.ION 0 Concord 3 7 COHER. 1 Accord 3 6 2 Discord 1 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 COHER. 1 Accord 5 23 1 2 Discord 1 1 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 9 13 COHER. 2 Discord 1 1 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 5 10 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 4 14 11 2 Discord 2 1 2 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 4 10 1 COHER. 1 Accord 2 13 2 Discord 3 3 3 Contracord 1 2 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 16 COHER. 1 Accord 56 193 15 9 2 Discord 3 12 14 1 3 Contracord 1 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 21 85 6 2 3 COHER. 2 Discord 9 7 32 6 2 3 Contracord 4 4 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 42 1 9 ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 6 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 29 2 13 COHER. 2 Discord 1

Table 17A.3. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1992.

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AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Count Count Count Count Count Count STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 8 1 14 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 8 5 35 10 2 Discord 1 5 5 3 Contracord 1 2 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 14 COHER. 1 Accord 4 14 1 2 Discord 1 2 1 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 5 19 COHER. 1 Accord 3 46 96 14 5 2 Discord 26 14 8 1 3 Contracord 1 4 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 2 1 COHER. 1 Accord 22 45 8 2 2 Discord 45 21 33 8 1 3 Contracord 8 2 5 10 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 2 1 ORGANISn 1 Systemic ACCOTHEIORN. 1 Accord 1 2 Normative ACCOTHEIORN. 1 Accord 2 COHER. 2 Discord 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 2 Discord 1 1 COHER. 3 Contracord 2 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 3 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1 5 1 2 Discord 2 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 23 1 COHER. 1 Accord 7 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 11 51 2 1 COHER. 2 Discord 1 5 3 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 1 COHER. 1 Accord 11 19 1 2 Discord 15 11 10 1 3 Contracord 2 1 1 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 18 2 2 ORGANISn 3 Unorganised ACCOTHEIORN. 1 Accord 5 11 COHER.

Table 17A.4. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1993.

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AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Count Count Count Count Count Count STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1 22 1 ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 2 34 2 Discord 4 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 16 47 225 8 COHER. 1 Accord 15 88 2 2 Discord 7 19 14 3 Contracord 1 2 2 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1 4 COHER. 1 Accord 3 48 6 1 4 2 Discord 2 6 4 3 Contracord 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord 1 COHER. 1 Accord 5 17 2 2 Discord 3 3 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord 2 ORGANISn 1 Systemic ACCOTHER.ION 0 Concord 7 COHER. 1 Accord 2 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 3 COHER. 2 Discord 1 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord 8 7 ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord 1 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 6 7 31 COHER. 1 Accord 3 7 1 2 Discord 3 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 2 COHER. 1 Accord 2 3 25 2 1 2 Discord 2 5 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 5 11 2 1 COHER. 2 Discord 1 3 2 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 19 3 ORGANISn 3 Unorganised ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord 15 1 COHER.

Table 17A.5. Frequencies of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996.

The percentages are shown in Tables 17A.6. – 17A.10.

457

AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.8% 11.1% 1.6% .1% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .4% 2.8% 1.6% 2 Discord .6% 1.9% .1% 3 Contracord .2% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% 5.5% 19.4% .6% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .7% 2.6% .5% 2 Discord .5% .9% .7% .1% 3 Contracord .2% .2% .1% .2% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .2% 2.2% COHER. 1 Accord .9% 4.5% .6% .6% 2 Discord .3% .4% 1.0% 3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1% COHER. 1 Accord 1.2% 1.9% .3% .1% .4% 2 Discord 1.5% .5% 1.1% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .2% 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% .2% COHER. 1 Accord .1% .2% .1% 2 Discord .1% .1% 3 Contracord .1% 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .1% .2% COHER. 2 Discord .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .1% COHER. 2 Discord .1% 3 Contracord .1% 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% .9% .5% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .2% .6% 1.0% 2 Discord .2% .4% 3 Contracord .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .6% 5.3% .2% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .6% 2.4% .1% .1% 2 Discord .1% .7% .4% 3 Contracord .1% .1% .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .3% COHER. 1 Accord .1% 2.0% .5% .1% 2 Discord .1% .3% 3 Contracord .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% .9% .3% .1% COHER. 2 Discord .2% .5% .2% .1% 3 Contracord .1% 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .5% .7% .2% .2% ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .1% .2% .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .9% .5% 1.1% COHER. 2 Discord .3% .5% .3%

Table 17A.6. Percentages of all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1988.

458

AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .8% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .3% 2.1% .1% 2 Discord .1% .7% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.0% 4.8% COHER. 1 Accord .1% .3% 5.4% .1% 2 Discord .1% .8% .6% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .4% 4.3% .1% 2 Discord .4% 1.1% 1.3% 3 Contracord .2% .1% .3% .2% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.5% 3.4% COHER. 2 Discord 2.6% 2.1% 2.4% .3% 3 Contracord .4% .3% .8% .6% 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .7% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 3.8% .1% 3.2% .2% COHER. 1 Accord .2% .1% 2.3% .1% 2 Discord .1% 3 Contracord .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .7% 2.8% .1% 2 Discord .7% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .1% .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% .6% COHER. 2 Discord .2% .2% .2% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .2% .1% 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .7% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% 1.0% .1% 2 Discord .1% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.1% .4% 9.3% .3% COHER. 1 Accord 5.6% 2 Discord .1% 1.3% .7% .1% 3 Contracord .1% 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .1% 6.7% .1% .1% COHER. 2 Discord .8% 1.0% 3 Contracord .4% .4% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .2% 2.8% .1% COHER. 2 Discord .5% 1.9% .7% .2% 3 Contracord .3% .1% 1.2% .1% 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .7% .1% ORGANISn 3 Unorganised ACCOTIHEOR.N 1 Accord .1% COHER. 2 Discord .1% .1%

Table 17A.7. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Latency Group 1990.

459

AFFECT 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .5% 2.1% .1% .1% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .9% 1.8% 1.0% 2 Discord .5% .5% 3 Contracord .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .2% .8% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.8% .1% 2 Discord .1% .2% .4% .1% 3 Contracord .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord 1.0% .1% COHER. 1 Accord 4.2% 12.4% 1.0% .2% .3% 2 Discord .9% 1.8% 2.9% .5% 3 Contracord .1% .2% .1% .2% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.4% 3.4% .2% .3% COHER. 2 Discord 1.1% .7% 1.3% 3 Contracord .1% .1% .2% .4% 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .1% .1% ORGANISn 1 Systemic ACTCOHEIOR.N 0 Concord .2% .5% COHER. 1 Accord .2% .4% 2 Discord .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.6% .1% 2 Discord .1% .1% .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .6% .9% COHER. 2 Discord .1% .1% 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .3% .7% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .3% 1.0% .8% 2 Discord .1% .1% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .3% .7% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .1% .9% 2 Discord .2% .2% 3 Contracord .1% .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% 1.1% COHER. 1 Accord 3.8% 13.3% 1.0% .6% 2 Discord .2% .8% 1.0% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 1.4% 5.8% .4% .1% .2% COHER. 2 Discord .6% .5% 2.2% .4% .1% 3 Contracord .3% .3% 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.9% .1% .6% ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .4% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord 2.0% .1% .9% COHER. 2 Discord .1%

Table 17A.8. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1992.

460

AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord 1.0% .1% 1.7% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord 1.0% .6% 4.2% 1.2% 2 Discord .1% .6% .6% 3 Contracord .1% .2% .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 1.7% COHER. 1 Accord .5% 1.7% .1% 2 Discord .1% .2% .1% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .6% 2.3% COHER. 1 Accord .4% 5.5% 11.6% 1.7% .6% 2 Discord 3.1% 1.7% 1.0% .1% 3 Contracord .1% .5% 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .2% .1% COHER. 1 Accord 2.7% 5.4% 1.0% .2% 2 Discord 5.4% 2.5% 4.0% 1.0% .1% 3 Contracord 1.0% .2% .6% 1.2% 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .2% .1% ORGANISn 1 Systemic ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord .1% 2 Normative ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord .2% COHER. 2 Discord .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 2 Discord .1% .1% COHER. 3 Contracord .2% 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% .4% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .1% .6% .1% 2 Discord .2% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.8% .1% COHER. 1 Accord .8% 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 1.3% 6.2% .2% .1% COHER. 2 Discord .1% .6% .4% 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1% .1% COHER. 1 Accord 1.3% 2.3% .1% 2 Discord 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% .1% 3 Contracord .2% .1% .1% 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.2% .2% .2% ORGANISn 3 Unorganised ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord .6% 1.3% COHER.

Table 17A.9. Percentages for all Group Dimensions for Adolescent Group 1993.

461

AFFECT 0 Contentment 1 Joy 2 Interest 3 Discontent 4 Distress 5 Boredom Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % Table % STRUCTURE 0 Whole Gp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 0 Concord .1% 2.7% .1% ORGANISn COHER. 1 Accord .2% 4.2% 2 Discord .5% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord 2.0% 5.8% 27.6% 1.0% COHER. 1 Accord 1.8% 10.8% .2% 2 Discord .9% 2.3% 1.7% 3 Contracord .1% .2% .2% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .1% .5% COHER. 1 Accord .4% 5.9% .7% .1% .5% 2 Discord .2% .7% .5% 3 Contracord .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 0 Concord .1% COHER. 1 Accord .6% 2.1% .2% 2 Discord .4% .4% 1 Subgp COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACTION 1 Accord .2% ORGANISn 1 Systemic ACCOTHER.ION 0 Concord .9% COHER. 1 Accord .2% 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord .4% COHER. 2 Discord .1% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .1% 2 Sub+Ind COGNITIVE 0 Representational ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord 1.0% .9% ORGANISn COHER. 2 Discord .1% 1 Systemic ACTION 0 Concord .7% .9% 3.8% COHER. 1 Accord .4% .9% .1% 2 Discord .4% 2 Normative ACTION 0 Concord .2% COHER. 1 Accord .2% .4% 3.1% .2% .1% 2 Discord .2% .6% 3 Unorganised ACTION 1 Accord .6% 1.3% .2% .1% COHER. 2 Discord .1% .4% .2% 3 Individuals COGNITIVE 2 Normative ACTION 1 Accord 2.3% .4% ORGANISn 3 Unorganised ACCOTHER.ION 1 Accord 1.8% .1% COHER.

Table 17A.10. Percentages for all GFR Categories for Adolescent Group 1996.

Frequency, percentage, rank and cumulative percentage for all 180 states is given in Table 17A.11 below.

462

State State Frequency Percentage Rank Cumulative State State Frequency Percen Rank Cumulative No Percentage No tage Percentage 1 0120 681 10.70 1.0 10.70 91 3252 8 .10 90.0 0.0 2 0221 467 7.40 2.0 18.10 92 3322 8 .10 90.0 0.0 3 2221 398 6.30 3.0 24.40 93 0223 7 .10 94.5 0.0 4 0020 286 4.50 4.0 28.90 94 1111 7 .10 94.5 0.0 5 2120 267 4.20 5.0 33.10 95 2010 7 .10 94.5 0.0 6 0121 249 3.90 6.0 37.00 96 2130 7 .10 94.5 0.0 7 0321 192 3.00 7.0 40.00 97 0113 6 .10 100.0 0.0 8 0021 177 2.80 8.0 42.80 98 1110 6 .10 100.0 0.0 9 2321 169 2.70 9.0 45.50 99 2012 6 .10 100.0 0.0 10 0110 166 2.60 10.0 48.10 100 2313 6 .10 100.0 0.0 11 2121 148 2.30 11.0 50.40 101 2343 6 .10 100.0 0.0 12 0211 131 2.10 12.0 52.20 102 2351 6 .10 100.0 0.0 13 0312 127 2.00 13.0 54.00 103 3352 6 .10 100.0 0.0 14 0332 105 1.70 14.0 55.70 104 0033 5 .10 107.0 0.0 15 3221 97 1.50 15.0 57.20 105 0213 5 .10 107.0 0.0 16 0232 90 1.40 16.5 58.60 106 1231 5 .10 107.0 0.0 17 0311 90 1.40 16.5 60.00 107 1232 5 .10 107.0 0.0 18 0220 82 1.30 18.0 61.30 108 1332 5 .10 107.0 0.0 19 2211 72 1.10 19.0 62.40 109 1333 5 .10 107.0 0.0 20 0322 71 1.10 20.0 63.50 110 2233 5 .10 107.0 0.0 21 0222 68 1.10 21.0 64.60 111 0023 4 .10 115.5 0.0 22 1221 67 1.10 22.5 65.70 112 0123 4 .10 115.5 0.0 23 3321 67 1.10 22.5 66.80 113 0241 4 .10 115.5 0.0 24 1120 61 1.00 24.0 67.80 114 0310 4 .10 115.5 0.0 25 2100 58 .90 25.5 68.70 115 1312 4 .10 115.5 0.0 26 2332 58 .90 25.5 69.60 116 1322 4 .10 115.5 0.0 27 2322 57 .90 27.0 70.50 117 2112 4 .10 115.5 0.0 28 0031 55 .90 28.5 71.40 118 2143 4 .10 115.5 0.0 29 0032 55 .90 28.5 72.30 119 2212 4 .10 115.5 0.0 30 0212 53 .80 30.0 73.10 120 3232 4 .10 115.5 0.0 31 0122 52 .80 31.0 73.90 121 0012 3 .00 127.0 0.0 32 1100 51 .80 32.5 74.70 122 0043 3 .00 127.0 0.0 33 2021 51 .80 32.5 79.50 123 0133 3 .00 127.0 0.0 34 0231 46 .70 34.5 76.20 124 0201 3 .00 127.0 0.0 35 3351 46 .70 34.5 76.90 125 1011 3 .00 127.0 0.0 36 0010 44 .70 36.5 77.60 126 1101 3 .00 127.0 0.0 37 2311 44 .70 36.5 78.30 127 1123 3 .00 127.0 0.0 38 0132 42 .70 38.5 79.00 128 1130 3 .00 127.0 0.0 39 1121 42 .70 38.5 79.70 129 1343 3 .00 127.0 0.0 40 0111 41 .60 40.5 80.30 130 2022 3 .00 127.0 0.0 41 2232 41 .60 40.5 80.90 131 2323 3 .00 127.0 0.0 42 2020 40 .60 42.0 81.50 132 2341 3 .00 127.0 0.0 43 2031 38 .60 43.0 82.10 133 3241 3 .00 127.0 0.0 44 2122 36 .60 44.5 82.70 134 0142 2 .00 140.5 0.0 45 2312 36 .60 44.5 0.0 135 1020 2 .00 140.5 0.0 46 0022 33 .50 46.5 0.0 136 1030 2 .00 140.5 0.0 47 0030 33 .50 46.5 0.0 137 1031 2 .00 140.5 0.0 48 0011 31 .50 48.5 0.0 138 1131 2 .00 140.5 0.0 49 2222 31 .50 48.5 0.0 139 1220 2 .00 140.5 0.0 50 2231 30 .50 50.0 0.0 140 1233 2 .00 140.5 0.0 51 2110 28 .40 51.0 0.0 141 1342 2 .00 140.5 0.0 52 0343 27 .40 52.0 0.0 142 2033 2 .00 140.5 0.0 53 0251 25 .40 53.0 0.0 143 2131 2 .00 140.5 0.0

463

54 0333 23 .40 55.0 0.0 144 2133 2 .00 140.5 0.0 55 1321 23 .40 55.0 0.0 145 2141 2 .00 140.5 0.0 56 2220 23 .40 55.0 0.0 146 2201 2 .00 140.5 0.0 57 0112 22 .30 57.5 0.0 147 2352 2 .00 140.5 0.0 58 0130 22 .30 57.5 0.0 148 0040 1 .00 164.0 0.0 59 2333 21 .30 59.0 0.0 149 0042 1 .00 164.0 0.0 60 3231 20 .30 60.0 0.0 150 0050 1 .00 164.0 0.0 61 0100 19 .30 62.0 0.0 151 0101 1 .00 164.0 0.0 62 0331 19 .30 62.0 0.0 152 0140 1 .00 164.0 0.0 63 2132 19 .30 62.0 0.0 153 0152 1 .00 164.0 0.0 64 2111 16 .30 64.0 0.0 154 0230 1 .00 164.0 0.0 65 0131 15 .20 66.0 0.0 155 0320 1 .00 164.0 0.0 66 0313 15 .20 66.0 0.0 156 0330 1 .00 164.0 0.0 67 2032 15 .20 66.0 0.0 157 0341 1 .00 164.0 0.0 68 0342 14 .20 69.5 0.0 158 0352 1 .00 164.0 0.0 69 1211 14 .20 69.5 0.0 159 1041 1 .00 164.0 0.0 70 2331 14 .20 69.5 0.0 160 1133 1 .00 164.0 0.0 71 3251 14 .20 69.5 0.0 161 1200 1 .00 164.0 0.0 72 0351 13 .20 72.5 0.0 162 1212 1 .00 164.0 0.0 73 1021 13 .20 72.5 0.0 163 1223 1 .00 164.0 0.0 74 0243 12 .20 75.0 0.0 164 1243 1 .00 164.0 0.0 75 1311 12 .20 75.0 0.0 165 1313 1 .00 164.0 0.0 76 2251 12 .20 75.0 0.0 166 2000 1 .00 164.0 0.0 77 0233 11 .20 78.5 0.0 167 2023 1 .00 164.0 0.0 78 1222 11 .20 78.5 0.0 168 2043 1 .00 164.0 0.0 79 2342 11 .20 78.5 0.0 169 2113 1 .00 164.0 0.0 80 3331 11 .20 78.5 0.0 170 2123 1 .00 164.0 0.0 81 0000 10 .20 82.0 0.0 171 2140 1 .00 164.0 0.0 82 0210 10 .20 82.0 0.0 172 2142 1 .00 164.0 0.0 83 3332 10 .20 82.0 0.0 173 2150 1 .00 164.0 0.0 84 0323 9 .10 85.5 0.0 174 2210 1 .00 164.0 0.0 85 2011 9 .10 85.5 0.0 175 2241 1 .00 164.0 0.0 86 2030 9 .10 85.5 0.0 176 2243 1 .00 164.0 0.0 87 2223 9 .10 85.5 0.0 177 2252 1 .00 164.0 0.0 88 0001 8 .10 90.0 0.0 178 2320 1 .00 164.0 0.0 89 0143 8 .10 90.0 0.0 179 2340 1 .00 164.0 0.0 90 0242 8 .10 90.0 0.0 180 3222 1 .00 164.0 0.0

Table 17A.11. Frequencies and percentages of Group States for all Groups (shown as category values in the order Structure, Cognitive Organization, Affect, Action Coherence). Group Development. Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5 show the percentages of stable and positive or negative changes in categories in successive minutes. The calculations are made by computing variables for each dimension that compare each minute in each session (except the first minute) with the preceding one and assign it a value of –1 if there was a negative change (to a lower rated category), 0 if there was no change and +1 if there was a positive change (to a higher rated category). The graphs in Figures 18.1 – 18.5 were drawn using the

464 value of the 0 (no change) percentage as an indication of stability. Tables 18A.1 – 18A.5 show the percentages of stability and change for each dimension for each group.

Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action -1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 PrestructurPerestructurPerestructure1 PrecognPrecogn =Precogn > Preaffect0 Preaffec1t PreaffecPt reaction < Structure= Structure> Structure< Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action SESS 1 13.0% 72.2% 14.8% 14.8% 68.5% 16.7% 14.8% 70.4% 14.8% 9.3% 79.6% 11.1% 2 3.4% 91.5% 5.1% 15.3% 69.5% 15.3% 18.6% 62.7% 18.6% 13.6% 72.9% 13.6% 3 3.4% 91.4% 5.2% 12.1% 77.6% 10.3% 19.0% 63.8% 17.2% 15.5% 69.0% 15.5% 4 8.5% 81.4% 10.2% 23.7% 52.5% 23.7% 28.8% 45.8% 25.4% 28.8% 42.4% 28.8% 5 15.3% 69.5% 15.3% 16.9% 62.7% 20.3% 16.9% 64.4% 18.6% 18.6% 64.4% 16.9% 6 5.4% 89.3% 5.4% 8.9% 82.1% 8.9% 7.1% 82.1% 10.7% 16.1% 67.9% 16.1% 7 19.3% 63.2% 17.5% 12.3% 73.7% 14.0% 26.3% 49.1% 24.6% 26.3% 45.6% 28.1% 8 13.6% 74.6% 11.9% 8.5% 83.1% 8.5% 11.9% 76.3% 11.9% 6.8% 84.7% 8.5% 9 3.5% 89.5% 7.0% 5.3% 86.0% 8.8% 24.6% 54.4% 21.1% 22.8% 54.4% 22.8% 10 1.7% 96.6% 1.7% 19.0% 69.0% 12.1% 13.8% 72.4% 13.8% 8.6% 81.0% 10.3% 11 11.5% 77.0% 11.5% 19.7% 60.7% 19.7% 24.6% 39.3% 36.1% 23.0% 54.1% 23.0% 12 98.3% 1.7% 8.6% 82.8% 8.6% 17.2% 65.5% 17.2% 5.2% 87.9% 6.9% 13 14.8% 70.4% 14.8% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 29.6% 46.3% 24.1% 22.2% 53.7% 24.1% 14 12.5% 73.2% 14.3% 21.4% 60.7% 17.9% 17.9% 60.7% 21.4% 12.5% 73.2% 14.3% 15 3.4% 93.2% 3.4% 11.9% 78.0% 10.2% 11.9% 76.3% 11.9% 6.8% 86.4% 6.8% 16 100.0% 6.9% 86.2% 6.9% 19.0% 62.1% 19.0% 98.3% 1.7% 17 10.6% 76.6% 12.8% 19.1% 63.8% 17.0% 19.1% 63.8% 17.0% 25.5% 51.1% 23.4% 18 3.7% 88.9% 7.4% 9.3% 79.6% 11.1% 9.3% 77.8% 13.0% 3.7% 88.9% 7.4% 19 12.1% 79.3% 8.6% 12.1% 77.6% 10.3% 17.2% 69.0% 13.8% 13.8% 70.7% 15.5% 20 11.3% 79.0% 9.7% 17.7% 71.0% 11.3% 21.0% 61.3% 17.7% 11.3% 79.0% 9.7% 21 3.6% 91.1% 5.4% 10.7% 75.0% 14.3% 10.7% 76.8% 12.5% 8.9% 78.6% 12.5% 22 17.9% 67.9% 14.3% 16.1% 69.6% 14.3% 12.5% 73.2% 14.3% 16.1% 66.1% 17.9% 23 3.6% 92.7% 3.6% 3.6% 92.7% 3.6% 7.3% 85.5% 7.3% 1.8% 96.4% 1.8% 24 1.8% 92.7% 5.5% 3.6% 90.9% 5.5% 18.2% 65.5% 16.4% 10.9% 80.0% 9.1% 25 5.3% 89.5% 5.3% 19.3% 63.2% 17.5% 14.0% 70.2% 15.8% 5.3% 89.5% 5.3% 26 13.2% 73.6% 13.2% 9.4% 84.9% 5.7% 22.6% 58.5% 18.9% 5.7% 88.7% 5.7% 27 100.0% 19.3% 57.9% 22.8% 17.5% 66.7% 15.8% 15.8% 61.4% 22.8% 28 100.0% 19.7% 65.2% 15.2% 19.7% 62.1% 18.2% 9.1% 80.3% 10.6% 29 5.7% 88.7% 5.7% 5.7% 86.8% 7.5% 17.0% 67.9% 15.1% 15.1% 66.0% 18.9% 30 16.7% 65.0% 18.3% 23.3% 60.0% 16.7% 21.7% 53.3% 25.0% 26.7% 48.3% 25.0% 31 12.7% 76.4% 10.9% 21.8% 61.8% 16.4% 16.4% 69.1% 14.5% 20.0% 56.4% 23.6% 32 9.3% 79.6% 11.1% 16.7% 63.0% 20.4% 16.7% 64.8% 18.5% 16.7% 64.8% 18.5% 33 10.2% 79.7% 10.2% 13.6% 67.8% 18.6% 13.6% 72.9% 13.6% 15.3% 67.8% 16.9%

Table 18A.1. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1988.

465

Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action -1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 PrestructurPerestructurPerestructure1 PrecognPrecogn =Precogn > Preaffect0 Preaffec1t PreaffecPreaction < Structure= Structure> Structure< Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action SESS 1 12.1% 74.2% 13.6% 10.6% 78.8% 10.6% 1.5% 95.5% 3.0% 7.6% 86.4% 6.1% 2 12.9% 75.8% 11.3% 22.6% 53.2% 24.2% 9.7% 82.3% 8.1% 16.1% 64.5% 19.4% 5 4.8% 91.9% 3.2% 16.1% 72.6% 11.3% 11.3% 77.4% 11.3% 19.4% 64.5% 16.1% 6 14.3% 73.0% 12.7% 11.1% 76.2% 12.7% 17.5% 63.5% 19.0% 28.6% 42.9% 28.6% 7 12.1% 74.1% 13.8% 6.9% 86.2% 6.9% 15.5% 70.7% 13.8% 19.0% 63.8% 17.2% 8 8.6% 84.5% 6.9% 8.6% 79.3% 12.1% 3.4% 93.1% 3.4% 5.2% 86.2% 8.6% 9 3.8% 92.5% 3.8% 5.7% 86.8% 7.5% 9.4% 81.1% 9.4% 9.4% 81.1% 9.4% 10 9.1% 80.0% 10.9% 5.5% 87.3% 7.3% 7.3% 83.6% 9.1% 10.9% 76.4% 12.7% 11 11.7% 75.0% 13.3% 18.3% 61.7% 20.0% 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 15.0% 68.3% 16.7% 12 16.9% 69.5% 13.6% 1.7% 94.9% 3.4% 6.8% 84.7% 8.5% 10.2% 79.7% 10.2% 16 15.5% 69.0% 15.5% 10.3% 77.6% 12.1% 6.9% 86.2% 6.9% 8.6% 82.8% 8.6% 17 5.3% 89.5% 5.3% 7.0% 86.0% 7.0% 17.5% 59.6% 22.8% 19.3% 57.9% 22.8% 18 10.5% 78.9% 10.5% 3.5% 89.5% 7.0% 7.0% 87.7% 5.3% 3.5% 91.2% 5.3% 19 17.9% 64.1% 17.9% 7.7% 84.6% 7.7% 33.3% 38.5% 28.2% 17.9% 61.5% 20.5% 21 16.1% 69.6% 14.3% 17.9% 64.3% 17.9% 23.2% 55.4% 21.4% 28.6% 42.9% 28.6% 22 21.7% 56.7% 21.7% 18.3% 60.0% 21.7% 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 23.3% 53.3% 23.3% 23 16.7% 68.3% 15.0% 23.3% 55.0% 21.7% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 56.7% 23.3% 24 14.0% 70.2% 15.8% 12.3% 73.7% 14.0% 15.8% 71.9% 12.3% 14.0% 73.7% 12.3% 25 20.7% 60.3% 19.0% 22.4% 55.2% 22.4% 17.2% 65.5% 17.2% 17.2% 63.8% 19.0% 26 5.2% 89.7% 5.2% 10.3% 74.1% 15.5% 8.6% 84.5% 6.9% 13.8% 69.0% 17.2% 27 8.3% 83.3% 8.3% 13.3% 75.0% 11.7% 10.0% 78.3% 11.7% 20.0% 63.3% 16.7% 28 11.5% 75.4% 13.1% 14.8% 68.9% 16.4% 14.8% 68.9% 16.4% 21.3% 55.7% 23.0% 29 7.7% 84.6% 7.7% 12.8% 69.2% 17.9% 17.9% 66.7% 15.4% 17.9% 61.5% 20.5% 30 10.5% 84.2% 5.3% 21.1% 63.2% 15.8% 31.6% 36.8% 31.6% 26.3% 47.4% 26.3% 31 8.3% 79.2% 12.5% 12.5% 70.8% 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 70.8% 12.5%

Table 18A.2. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1990.

466

Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action -1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 PrestructurPerestructurPerestructur1e PrecognPrecogn =Precogn >Preaffect0 Preaffec PreaffecPreaction P < Structure= Structure> Structure< CognorgCognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action SESS3 16.0% 70.0% 14.0% 12.0% 78.0% 10.0% 100.0% 4.0% 94.0% 2.0% 4 3.5% 94.7% 1.8% 8.8% 82.5% 8.8% 15.8% 68.4% 15.8% 12.3% 77.2% 10.5% 6 11.1% 75.9% 13.0% 7.4% 83.3% 9.3% 13.0% 75.9% 11.1% 9.3% 79.6% 11.1% 7 18.9% 58.5% 22.6% 11.3% 77.4% 11.3% 26.4% 49.1% 24.5% 20.8% 58.5% 20.8% 8 18.5% 63.0% 18.5% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 11 7.4% 83.3% 9.3% 11.1% 77.8% 11.1% 20.4% 61.1% 18.5% 13.0% 74.1% 13.0% 12 3.9% 90.2% 5.9% 5.9% 88.2% 5.9% 25.5% 49.0% 25.5% 23.5% 51.0% 25.5% 13 25.0% 55.8% 19.2% 11.5% 76.9% 11.5% 21.2% 57.7% 21.2% 15.4% 69.2% 15.4% 14 18.5% 63.0% 18.5% 18.5% 61.1% 20.4% 25.9% 51.9% 22.2% 16.7% 68.5% 14.8% 15 5.1% 89.8% 5.1% 8.5% 84.7% 6.8% 30.5% 40.7% 28.8% 20.3% 61.0% 18.6% 16 15.4% 69.2% 15.4% 19.2% 65.4% 15.4% 7.7% 82.7% 9.6% 17.3% 63.5% 19.2% 17 13.8% 72.4% 13.8% 3.4% 93.1% 3.4% 17.2% 63.8% 19.0% 17.2% 65.5% 17.2% 18 10.3% 79.3% 10.3% 6.9% 84.5% 8.6% 13.8% 72.4% 13.8% 15.5% 70.7% 13.8% 19 10.9% 78.2% 10.9% 14.5% 69.1% 16.4% 23.6% 45.5% 30.9% 18.2% 60.0% 21.8% 22 14.3% 73.2% 12.5% 7.1% 87.5% 5.4% 7.1% 83.9% 8.9% 8.9% 83.9% 7.1% 24 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 8.0% 84.0% 8.0% 10.0% 80.0% 10.0% 6.0% 90.0% 4.0% 25 8.0% 84.0% 8.0% 8.0% 80.0% 12.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 12.0% 74.0% 14.0% 26 5.3% 87.7% 7.0% 10.5% 77.2% 12.3% 14.0% 68.4% 17.5% 14.0% 70.2% 15.8% 29 22.0% 55.9% 22.0% 20.3% 62.7% 16.9% 18.6% 61.0% 20.3% 8.5% 84.7% 6.8% 30 14.8% 68.5% 16.7% 14.8% 70.4% 14.8% 25.9% 50.0% 24.1% 22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 31 13.2% 69.8% 17.0% 15.1% 66.0% 18.9% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 13.2% 73.6% 13.2% 33 13.0% 75.9% 11.1% 13.0% 74.1% 13.0% 1.9% 94.4% 3.7% 7.4% 83.3% 9.3% 34 11.3% 75.5% 13.2% 13.2% 73.6% 13.2% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 13.2% 73.6% 13.2% 35 13.5% 73.1% 13.5% 19.2% 63.5% 17.3% 23.1% 53.8% 23.1% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 36 22.6% 56.6% 20.8% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 13.2% 71.7% 15.1% 100.0% 37 5.5% 87.3% 7.3% 5.5% 89.1% 5.5% 14.5% 72.7% 12.7% 5.5% 87.3% 7.3% 38 8.3% 85.4% 6.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Table 18A.3. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Sessions for 1992.

467

Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action -1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 PrestructureP restructureP restructure -1 Precogn Precogn = Precogn > Preaffect 0 Preaffect 1 Preaffect Preaction < Preaction = Preaction > < Structure = Structure > Structure < Cognorg Cognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action SESS 1 16.7% 59.5% 23.8% 26.2% 47.6% 26.2% 11.9% 76.2% 11.9% 16.7% 71.4% 11.9% 3 8.7% 82.6% 8.7% 8.7% 80.4% 10.9% 23.9% 54.3% 21.7% 8.7% 80.4% 10.9% 5 4.9% 90.2% 4.9% 9.8% 80.5% 9.8% 17.1% 65.9% 17.1% 19.5% 65.9% 14.6% 7 2.1% 93.6% 4.3% 17.0% 70.2% 12.8% 23.4% 53.2% 23.4% 29.8% 42.6% 27.7% 8 5.5% 89.1% 5.5% 9.1% 81.8% 9.1% 27.3% 49.1% 23.6% 21.8% 54.5% 23.6% 11 8.9% 84.4% 6.7% 17.8% 64.4% 17.8% 20.0% 57.8% 22.2% 8.9% 82.2% 8.9% 12 11.1% 75.6% 13.3% 13.3% 68.9% 17.8% 11.1% 77.8% 11.1% 13.3% 71.1% 15.6% 17 10.4% 79.2% 10.4% 10.4% 81.3% 8.3% 22.9% 54.2% 22.9% 12.5% 75.0% 12.5% 18 2.0% 96.1% 2.0% 15.7% 74.5% 9.8% 11.8% 76.5% 11.8% 3.9% 92.2% 3.9% 21 24.0% 56.0% 20.0% 12.0% 76.0% 12.0% 16.0% 68.0% 16.0% 100.0% 22 8.0% 82.0% 10.0% 16.0% 64.0% 20.0% 26.0% 44.0% 30.0% 30.0% 38.0% 32.0% 23 5.9% 88.2% 5.9% 15.7% 68.6% 15.7% 11.8% 78.4% 9.8% 19.6% 60.8% 19.6% 24 10.6% 78.7% 10.6% 21.3% 59.6% 19.1% 6.4% 85.1% 8.5% 8.5% 80.9% 10.6% 25 100.0% 19.1% 63.8% 17.0% 27.7% 46.8% 25.5% 14.9% 70.2% 14.9% 26 12.8% 78.7% 8.5% 12.8% 72.3% 14.9% 2.1% 93.6% 4.3% 6.4% 85.1% 8.5% 28 3.9% 90.2% 5.9% 13.7% 68.6% 17.6% 17.6% 66.7% 15.7% 21.6% 54.9% 23.5% 29 4.1% 91.8% 4.1% 12.2% 79.6% 8.2% 22.4% 57.1% 20.4% 16.3% 69.4% 14.3% 30 4.8% 90.5% 4.8% 11.9% 76.2% 11.9% 19.0% 54.8% 26.2% 14.3% 71.4% 14.3%

Table 18A.4. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1993.

Stability of Structure Stability of Cognition Stability of Affect Stability of Action Preac/action -1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 PrestructuPrrestructuPrrestructur1 PrecogPnrecogn =Precogn >Preaffect0 Preaffe1c PreaffePc reaction P < Structur=e Structur>e Structure< CognorgCognorg Ccognorg < Affect = Affect > Affect Action Action Action SESS1 15.7% 70.6% 13.7% 11.8% 74.5% 13.7% 5.9% 86.3% 7.8% 11.8% 74.5% 13.7% 3 3.8% 88.5% 7.7% 9.6% 80.8% 9.6% 19.2% 61.5% 19.2% 26.9% 46.2% 26.9% 4 11.3% 79.2% 9.4% 9.4% 83.0% 7.5% 17.0% 66.0% 17.0% 15.1% 71.7% 13.2% 6 13.2% 71.7% 15.1% 9.4% 81.1% 9.4% 15.1% 69.8% 15.1% 11.3% 77.4% 11.3% 7 12.5% 75.0% 12.5% 10.4% 77.1% 12.5% 2.1% 95.8% 2.1% 6.3% 87.5% 6.3% 10 11.8% 76.5% 11.8% 15.7% 66.7% 17.6% 7.8% 80.4% 11.8% 13.7% 70.6% 15.7% 11 10.4% 81.3% 8.3% 18.8% 64.6% 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 10.4% 77.1% 12.5% 12 4.3% 89.4% 6.4% 10.6% 76.6% 12.8% 19.1% 66.0% 14.9% 19.1% 59.6% 21.3% 13 9.4% 79.2% 11.3% 13.2% 71.7% 15.1% 17.0% 67.9% 15.1% 18.9% 62.3% 18.9% 15 15.7% 70.4% 13.9% 20.4% 60.2% 19.4% 14.8% 69.4% 15.7% 13.0% 74.1% 13.0% 18 4.3% 91.3% 4.3% 23.9% 54.3% 21.7% 2.2% 95.7% 2.2% 19.6% 58.7% 21.7% 25 100.0% 12.0% 78.0% 10.0% 16.0% 70.0% 14.0% 12.0% 78.0% 10.0% 29 100.0% 18.8% 66.7% 14.6% 10.4% 79.2% 10.4% 18.8% 64.6% 16.7% 31 12.0% 74.0% 14.0% 12.0% 76.0% 12.0% 8.0% 84.0% 8.0% 12.0% 76.0% 12.0% 35 5.2% 89.7% 5.2% 6.9% 87.9% 5.2% 6.9% 87.9% 5.2% 3.4% 93.1% 3.4%

Table 18A.5. Stability of Group Dimensions as percentage of Session for 1996.

468

Session Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 1988 1990 1992 1993 1990 1 80.18 83.7 63.7 76.5 2 74.15 69.0 3 75.45 85.5 74.4 69.3 4 55.53 80.7 75.0 5 65.25 76.6 60.9 6 80.35 63.9 78.7 75.0 7 57.90 73.7 60.9 64.9 83.9 8 79.68 85.8 60.2 68.6 9 71.08 85.4 10 79.75 81.8 73.6 11 57.78 66.1 74.1 72.2 72.4 12 83.63 82.2 69.6 73.4 72.9 13 59.28 64.9 70.3 14 66.95 61.1 15 83.48 69.1 68.5 16 86.65 78.9 70.2 17 63.83 73.3 73.7 72.4 18 83.80 86.8 76.7 84.8 75.0 19 74.15 62.2 63.2 20 72.58 21 80.38 58.1 75.0 22 69.20 62.5 82.1 57.0 23 91.83 60.0 74.0 24 82.28 72.4 83.5 76.1 81.5 25 78.10 61.2 74.5 70.2 26 76.43 79.3 75.9 82.4 27 71.50 75.0 . 28 76.90 67.2 70.1 29 77.35 70.5 66.1 74.5 77.6 30 56.65 57.9 61.1 73.2 31 65.93 71.9 67.9 77.5 32 68.05 33 72.05 81.9 34 71.3 35 60.1 89.7 36 72.7 37 84.1 38 96.4 Table 18A.6. Means of percentage of stable minutes for Group Dimensions for each group.

Tables for Structure Hypotheses.

469

Structure Whole Grp Subgroups Subgp+Ind Individuals Year 1 Cognitive Representational Row % 65.3% 4.0% 30.7% Quartiles Organisation Systemic Row % 55.3% 9.8% 35.0% Normative Row % 41.1% 6.1% 47.3% 5.5% Unorganised Row % 43.1% 6.2% 34.8% 16.0% Affect Contentment Row % 73.3% 26.7% Joy Row % 66.9% 6.5% 26.6% Interest Row % 43.0% 8.1% 42.8% 6.1% Discontent Row % 53.5% 7.1% 35.3% 4.1% Distress Row % 64.3% 35.7% Boredom Row % 8.3% 25.0% 66.7% Action Concord Row % 60.6% 7.9% 31.6% Coherence Accord Row % 34.7% 8.6% 47.0% 9.7% Discord Row % 62.3% 3.7% 31.5% 2.6% Contracord Row % 68.1% 6.4% 25.5% 2 Cognitive Representational Row % 69.9% 1.4% 28.8% Organisation Systemic Row % 69.6% 4.3% 26.0% Normative Row % 62.0% 6.0% 27.0% 5.0% Unorganised Row % 56.5% 2.4% 36.6% 4.5% Affect Contentment Row % 55.6% 44.4% Joy Row % 75.1% 2.6% 22.3% Interest Row % 65.0% 4.9% 28.0% 2.0% Discontent Row % 53.7% 3.2% 38.9% 4.2% Distress Row % 62.5% 8.3% 29.2% Boredom Row % 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% Action Concord Row % 74.3% 4.0% 21.7% Coherence Accord Row % 57.9% 5.1% 32.6% 4.4% Discord Row % 64.4% 2.0% 32.8% .8% Contracord Row % 71.0% 6.5% 22.6% 3 Cognitive Representational Row % 85.5% 1.5% 13.1% Organisation Systemic Row % 57.8% 18.6% 23.6% Normative Row % 56.0% 8.9% 29.6% 5.5% Unorganised Row % 51.4% 4.0% 32.2% 12.4% Affect Contentment Row % 25.6% 60.5% 14.0% Joy Row % 73.3% 6.7% 20.0% Interest Row % 61.7% 5.6% 29.4% 3.3% Discontent Row % 65.8% 1.5% 23.6% 9.0% Distress Row % 56.7% 10.0% 33.3% Boredom Row % 36.1% 63.9% Action Concord Row % 68.5% 14.4% 17.1% Coherence Accord Row % 53.7% 7.4% 30.7% 8.2% Discord Row % 65.3% 3.5% 26.0% 5.1% Contracord Row % 68.2% 2.3% 29.5% 4 Cognitive Representational Row % 80.0% 3.0% 17.1% Organisation Systemic Row % 67.9% 6.4% 25.7% Normative Row % 57.5% 2.5% 26.2% 13.8% Unorganised Row % 58.2% 4.4% 27.9% 9.5% Affect Contentment Row % 6.4% 6.4% 87.2% Joy Row % 74.8% 4.4% 20.8% Interest Row % 68.0% 4.2% 22.6% 5.2% Discontent Row % 65.8% 3.6% 26.7% 3.9% Distress Row % 76.2% 4.8% 11.9% 7.1% Boredom Row % 30.1% 21.7% 48.2% Action Concord Row % 78.2% 1.5% 20.3% Coherence Accord Row % 59.2% 4.9% 25.6% 10.3% Discord Row % 68.4% 3.5% 24.3% 3.8% Contracord Row % 59.2% 9.2% 31.6%

Table 19A.1. Percentage of Cognitive Organization, Affect and Action Coherence in Structure categories for all groups in each year quartile.

470

Number of Members Absent for All Groups. 0 1 2 3 Year 1 Functional Subtable % 5.8% 1.6% 3.7% Quartiles Limited Functional Subtable % 3.1% 5.9% 8.3% Sociable Subtable % 35.3% 29.4% 24.6% Limited Sociable Subtable % 22.7% 37.2% 38.1% 50.0% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.5% 3.9% 4.0% Happy Conflict Subtable % 14.3% 10.9% 8.6% 50.0% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.7% 1.0% .6% Dysfunctional Subtable % 5.5% 6.8% 7.2% Nominal Subtable % 7.1% 3.3% 4.9% 2 Functional Subtable % 4.4% 5.5% 6.9% 5.6% Limited Functional Subtable % 3.3% 4.8% 1.7% Sociable Subtable % 35.8% 47.5% 58.5% 55.6% Limited Sociable Subtable % 24.2% 16.4% 17.3% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.9% 9.5% 5.2% 3.7% Happy Conflict Subtable % 17.8% 9.0% 3.1% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.7% 1.1% .3% Dysfunctional Subtable % 7.7% 4.8% 6.2% Nominal Subtable % .3% 1.5% .7% 35.2% 3 Functional Subtable % 2.1% 16.8% 23.4% 7.5% Limited Functional Subtable % 15.1% 2.5% 3.2% Sociable Subtable % 23.6% 20.3% 40.9% 38.8% Limited Sociable Subtable % 23.4% 29.3% 7.3% 4.5% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 2.8% 2.3% 6.5% 7.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 20.2% 10.8% 9.9% 3.0% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.4% 4.1% 2.7% .7% Dysfunctional Subtable % 10.8% 11.6% 4.8% Nominal Subtable % .7% 2.3% 1.3% 38.1% 4 Functional Subtable % 18.4% 9.8% 6.5% 9.0% Limited Functional Subtable % 7.1% 3.4% .2% .6% Sociable Subtable % 16.5% 41.7% 52.3% 14.2% Limited Sociable Subtable % 18.5% 10.4% 7.8% 32.9% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 12.5% 9.2% 5.6% 6.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 13.6% 9.2% 8.7% 16.8% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.2% .8% 2.0% 3.9% Dysfunctional Subtable % 10.6% 6.8% 4.5% 8.4% Nominal Subtable % .5% 8.4% 12.5% 7.7%

Table 19A.2. Percentage of Condensed States for different absentees for all groups for year quartiles.

Table 19A.2 indicates the dynamic observed for Whole only emerges toward the middle of the year. In the early part of the year, Limited states show the trend most

471

clearly; Functional states decrease with loss of members and trends are generally opposite to those found overall and by the end of the year. This suggests several dynamics influence these figures. At the start of the year, the groups appear to function better when all are present and loss of members is a threat, creating increased Limited states but reducing whole group functioning and Unsociable states. This may be because the groups have not yet achieved a secure collective identity and are still trying to consolidate their existence. The effect of absentees in reducing conflict and allowing groups to function better is greatest in the middle two quartiles, suggesting the dynamic of removing problems by absentees is greatest then. However, by the end of the year, groups again are most functional with everyone present. Some groups had lost members and were smaller then, but their capacity for Functional activity is greater and they were more active and better able to perform with all members present.

Tables for Dynamic Hypotheses.

Joy Interest Dis- Distress Concord Accord Discord Contra- content cord Functional +9% -8% +40% -10% +11% +46% = L. Functional -29% ~ ~ = +10% = = Sociable -5% -3% +31% = ~ -6% +29% = L. Sociable +18% -9% +37% ~ ~ ~ +11% = Unhappy Coop ~ +32% -36% ~ ~ ~ ~ = Happy Conflict -6% ~ ~ ~ +30% ~ -30% = Produc Turmoil = ~ -36% = ~ ~ -33% ~ Dysfunctional +39% ~ -4% ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Nominal = +20% -18% = ~ = -25% -46% Table 20A.1. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1988.

Joy Interest Dis- Distress Concord Accord Discord Contra- content cord Functional ~ +12% = -30% ~ = ~ L. Functional +40% -12% +85% = -10% ~ +42% = Sociable ~ ~ -24% +40% -3% ~ ~ +60% L Sociable ~ ~ +24% ~ +6% -9% +9% +51% Unhappy Coop = +21% = ~ ~ ~ ~ Happy Conflict -11% +5% -13% +41% ~ ~ ~ ~ Produc Turmoil ~ ~ = = ~ ~ = Dysfunctional = +19% -14% -46% = ~ ~ -24% Nominal = = = ~ Table 20A.2. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1990.

472

Joy Interest Dis- Distress Concord Accord Discord Contra- content cord Functional ~ ~ +42% = -13% +18% ~ = L Functional +7% -15% = +10% -16% = Sociable -10% -4% +22% +63% ~ -6% +27% ~ L Sociable ~ -3% ~ +46% ~ -3% ~ +73% Unhappy Coop +36% ~ +27% ~ = ~ ~ = Happy Conflict -25% +7% ~ ~ ~ +11% -8% = Produc Turmoil = = = -22% = Dysfunctional +25% +14% ~ ~ = +22% -14% -53% Nominal = +8% = +63% ~ -30% Table 20A.3. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1992.

Joy Interest Dis- Distress Concord Accord Discord Contra- content cord Functional = -10% ~ -31% ~ ~ L Functional ======Sociable +10% -13% +39% ~ ~ -6% +23% = L Sociable ~ ~ ~ = ~ -11% +33% Unhappy Coop. ~ +21% -47% ~ = -19% ~ ~ Happy Conflict -24% ~ +30% ~ -60% -31% -26% ~ Produc Turmoil = = = = = ~ = Dysfunctional +7% +26% -32% ~ +60% +28% -13% -35% Nominal -4% = +87% ~ = Table 20A.4. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1993.

Joy Interest Dis- Distress Concord Accord Discord Contra- content cord Functional = ~ = +9% -9% = L Functional -6% = = = = Sociable ~ ~ ~ = -6% +9% ~ ~ L Sociable ~ ~ = = +16% -13% ~ = Unhappy Coop. ~ +13% ~ = ~ -25% +63% = Happy Conflict ~ ~ ~ = +5% -15% +18% = Produc. Turmoil ~ +20% = ~ ~ = Dysfunctional = ~ = +66% = = Nominal = -3% = +87% ~ = Table 20A.5. Percentage of change in Condensed States from Affect and Action Coherence categories over three minutes for 1996.

473

Affect change +/- Negative Affect change Action Change 3 Negative change 23 mins Previous No change 228 Positive change 34 Action Change 2 Negative change 18 mins Previous No change 238 Positive change 29 Action Change 1 Negative change 29 min Previous No change 231 Positive change 25 Action Change Negative change 91 No change 184 Positive change 10 Action Change 1 Negative change 15 min Following No change 203 Positive change 67 Action Change 2 Negative change 33 mins Following No change 218 Positive change 34 Action Change 3 Negative change 34 mins Following No change 223 Positive change 28

Table 20A.6. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after negative Affect change for all Adolescent Groups, controlling for overlapping minutes.

In Table 20A.6, the instances of negative Action change do not increase significantly in the three minutes before the minute in which there is Affect change towards unpleasure. However, there is a threefold increase in negative action change in the minute in which the affect change occurs, accompanied by a similar decrease in positive action change. However, this is reversed in the minute after the affect change when there is a decrease in negative and increase in positive action change. This suggests that in the pooled data of all adolescent groups, there is no support for the hypothesis that Action precedes Affect change. However, it confirms that Action change accompanies Affect change and the tendency is reversed in the following minute. This is not the same in the Latency group, indicated in Table 20A.7. Although the numbers are smaller since only one group is recorded, there is a twofold increase in

474 negative Action change in the minute preceding negative Affect change. This is followed by a further increase of negative Action change in the minute of Affect change and then reversed in the minute after the change. The Latency group provides some support for the hypothesis of Action preceding Affect change. However it is only limited since there is a further increase in the minute of change.

Affect change +/- Negative Affect change Action Change 3 Negative change 7 mins Previous No change 44 Positive change 7 Action Change 2 Negative change 7 mins Previous No change 33 Positive change 18 Action Change 1 Negative change 15 min Previous No change 37 Positive change 6 Action Change Negative change 24 No change 32 Positive change 2 Action Change 1 Negative change 4 min Following No change 37 Positive change 17 Action Change 2 Negative change 9 mins Following No change 35 Positive change 14 Action Change 3 Negative change 6 mins Following No change 41 Positive change 11

Table 20A.7. Frequencies of Action change three minutes before to three minutes after negative Affect change for the 1990 Latency Group, controlling for overlapping minutes.

Graphs of Stability and Quality. The values of Condensed States have been put in a negative form to allow the graph to place the highest-level states at the top (Functional = 0, Limited Functional = - 1, etc.).

475

YEAR: 1988 0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

-7 Mean 9 Condensed States 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33

SESSION

Figure 20A.1. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1988, crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31.

YEAR: 1990 -1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

Mean 9 Condensed States -7 1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30

SESSION

Figure 20A.2. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1990, crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30.

476

YEAR: 1992 -1

-2

-3

-4

-5

Mean 9 Condensed States -6 3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38 4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37

SESSION

Figure 20A.3. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1992, crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37.

YEAR: 1993 -1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6 Mean 9 Condensed States 1 3 5 7 8 11 12 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 30

SESSION

Figure 20A.4. Mean of Condensed states for each session for 1993, crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30.

477

YEAR: 1988 100

%in(0,0) Stability of Constate 30 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32

SESSION

Figure 20A.5. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1988, crisis sessions: 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 27 and 31.

YEAR: 1990 90

%in(0,0) Stability of Constate 20 1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30

SESSION

Figure 20A.6. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1990, crisis sessions: 5, 11, 19, 21, 28, 29 and 30.

478

YEAR: 1992 90

%in(0,0) Stability of Constate 20 3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38 4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37

SESSION

Figure 20A.7. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1992, crisis sessions: 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30, 31, 35 and 37.

YEAR: 1993 90

20 %in(0,0) Stability of Constate 1 3 5 7 8 11 12 17 18 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 30

SESSION

Figure 20A.8. Percentage of stable Condensed states for each session for 1993, crisis sessions: 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 25, 29 and 30.

In 1988, although session 7 has a low stability, sessions 8 and 21 have high scores. Only sessions 11, 13 and 31 have significantly low scores. In 1990, only sessions 19, 21 and 30 are low, but several others are on troughs: 11 and 19. In 1992, sessions 7, 12, 14, 19 and 35 are low. In 1993, only session 7 is particularly low, but sessions 17 and 30 are troughs.

479

Incidence in Preceding minute Limited Unhappy Productive Functional Sociable Limited Sociable Cooperation Happy Conflict Turmoil Dysfunctional Row Row Row Row Row Row Row Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % YEAR 1988 3 21.4% 1 7.1% 2 14.3% 2 14.3% 1 7.1% 5 35.7% 1990 1 5.9% 1 5.9% 3 17.6% 5 29.4% 2 11.8% 5 29.4% 1992 3 17.6% 2 11.8% 1 5.9% 5 29.4% 1 5.9% 5 29.4% 1993 2 12.5% 1 6.3% 6 37.5% 7 43.8% 1996 1 50.0% 1 50.0% Total 1 1.5% 9 13.6% 7 10.6% 3 4.5% 19 28.8% 5 7.6% 22 33.3%

Table 20A.8. Frequency and Percentage of Condensed States in minute preceding destructive crisis.

YEAR: 1990 100

30 %i Stability 20

10 % Constructive 0 States 1 5 7 9 11 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 6 8 10 12 17 19 22 24 26 28 30

SESSION

Figure 20A.9. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1990.

Adopting the <45% criterion for the 1990 group shown in Figure 20A.9, crisis sessions for stability occur at session 6, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 30. Other significant troughs of stability occur in sessions 2, 11 and 16. For quality of state, the crises occur only at sessions 21, 23, 28, 31 according to the strict criterion, but significant troughs also occur at sessions 6, and 7. The synchrony between these two dimensions seems to be in phase for most of the year except for a few points at sessions 2, 23, 29 and 31.

480

YEAR: 1992 100

50 % Stability

40 % Constructive

30 States 3 6 8 12 14 16 18 22 25 29 31 34 36 38 4 7 11 13 15 17 19 24 26 30 33 35 37

SESSION

Figure 20A.10. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1992.

YEAR: 1993 100

40 % Stability

30 % Constructive

20 States 1 5 8 12 18 22 24 26 29 3 7 11 17 21 23 25 28 30

SESSION

Figure 20A.11. Graph of percentage of stable Condensed states and percentage of Constructive Condensed states for each session of 1993.

In Figure 20A.10, the stability and quality for 1992 shows that according to the strict criterion there are stability crises at session 7, 8, 13, 15, 30, 31 and 35. Another

481 trough occurs at session 19. For quality, strict criterion crises occur at sessions 14, 29, and 35. Other troughs are at sessions 8, 12, 19 and 33. The synchrony is consistent except for two points at session 13 and sessions 30 and 31. The stability and quality of sessions for 1993 shown in Figure 20A.11 indicates that there are strict criterion crises for stability in sessions 1, 7, 21, 22 and 28. Other troughs are at 17 and 24. For quality, there are strict criterion crises at sessions 5, 7, 21, 28, 29 and 30. Another trough is at session 25. The synchrony is consistent except for three points at sessions 17, 24 and 30.

Tables for therapists Interventions, Limits and Locomotion.

Limits by set Therapists for All Groups. No Limit Limit set LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.1% 60.8% Subgroups Subtable % 5.9% 5.9% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.3% Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.0% Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 60.3% 60.1% Subgroups Subtable % 5.8% 6.6% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.2% Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.1% LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.1% 61.3% Subgroups Subtable % 5.9% 5.7% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.8% 31.0% Individuals Subtable % 5.2% 2.0% LEADS(STRUCTUR,2) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.2% 60.8% Subgroups Subtable % 6.1% 5.0% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.7% 31.5% Individuals Subtable % 5.1% 2.7% LEADS(STRUCTUR,3) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.2% 60.7% Subgroups Subtable % 6.0% 5.4% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.8% 31.0% Individuals Subtable % 5.0% 2.9%

Table 21A.1. Percentage of Structure categories associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”

482

Limits by set Therapists for All Groups. No Limit Limit set LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 16.6% 7.9% Systemic Subtable % 37.7% 13.5% Normative Subtable % 29.9% 31.3% Unorganised Subtable % 15.8% 47.2% Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 17.1% 5.9% Systemic Subtable % 38.1% 11.4% Normative Subtable % 30.5% 28.7% Unorganised Subtable % 14.3% 54.1% LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 16.5% 8.6% Systemic Subtable % 38.2% 10.9% Normative Subtable % 29.8% 31.6% Unorganised Subtable % 15.5% 48.8% LEADS(COGNORG,2) Representational Subtable % 16.4% 8.8% Systemic Subtable % 37.9% 12.3% Normative Subtable % 30.0% 30.8% Unorganised Subtable % 15.6% 48.1% LEADS(COGNORG,3) Representational Subtable % 16.5% 8.7% Systemic Subtable % 37.9% 12.3% Normative Subtable % 29.5% 33.3% Unorganised Subtable % 16.1% 45.7%

Table 21A.2. Percentage of Cognitive Organization categories associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNOG,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNOG,1-3).”

483

Limits by set Therapists for All Groups. No Limit Limit set LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .6% Joy Subtable % 13.6% 28.5% Interest Subtable % 66.9% 47.6% Discontent Subtable % 12.8% 17.8% Distress Subtable % 1.2% 5.1% Boredom Subtable % 2.5% .4% Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4% Joy Subtable % 13.8% 27.9% Interest Subtable % 67.6% 44.5% Discontent Subtable % 12.2% 20.6% Distress Subtable % 1.0% 6.4% Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .4% LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 3.0% .3% Joy Subtable % 14.1% 26.5% Interest Subtable % 67.1% 46.6% Discontent Subtable % 12.1% 21.0% Distress Subtable % 1.3% 5.2% Boredom Subtable % 2.5% .4% LEADS(AFFECT,2) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4% Joy Subtable % 14.4% 25.0% Interest Subtable % 66.7% 48.6% Discontent Subtable % 12.3% 20.1% Distress Subtable % 1.3% 5.0% Boredom Subtable % 2.4% .9% LEADS(AFFECT,3) Contentment Subtable % 2.9% .4% Joy Subtable % 14.7% 23.6% Interest Subtable % 66.2% 50.8% Discontent Subtable % 12.4% 19.4% Distress Subtable % 1.3% 4.8% Boredom Subtable % 2.4% 1.0%

Table 21A.3. Percentage of Affect associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”

484

Limits by set Therapists for All Groups. No Limit Limit set LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.1% 9.5% Accord Subtable % 48.2% 46.7% Discord Subtable % 14.5% 34.8% Contracord Subtable % 2.2% 9.0% Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 35.8% 6.2% Accord Subtable % 49.0% 43.0% Discord Subtable % 13.4% 39.8% Contracord Subtable % 1.8% 11.0% LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 6.9% Accord Subtable % 48.1% 46.8% Discord Subtable % 14.0% 36.9% Contracord Subtable % 2.2% 9.4% LEADS(ACTION,2) Concord Subtable % 35.5% 7.5% Accord Subtable % 47.2% 51.1% Discord Subtable % 14.9% 32.9% Contracord Subtable % 2.4% 8.5% LEADS(ACTION,3) Concord Subtable % 35.3% 8.7% Accord Subtable % 47.4% 50.1% Discord Subtable % 14.8% 33.5% Contracord Subtable % 2.6% 7.7%

Table 21A.4. Percentage of Action Coherence associated with Limits and No Limits for all Groups for the minute in which the Limit is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).”

485

Locomotion by Therapists for All Groups. No Locomotion Locomotion LAGS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 58.0% Subgroups Subtable % 5.5% 7.6% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.2% 33.1% Individuals Subtable % 5.5% 1.4% Structure Whole Grp Subtable % 61.0% 57.6% Subgroups Subtable % 5.3% 8.0% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.3% 32.5% Individuals Subtable % 5.4% 1.9% LEADS(STRUCTUR,1) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 58.1% Subgroups Subtable % 5.4% 7.9% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.4% 32.0% Individuals Subtable % 5.3% 2.0% LEADS(STRUCTUR,2) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.7% 58.9% Subgroups Subtable % 5.7% 6.6% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.3% 32.6% Individuals Subtable % 5.3% 2.0% LEADS(STRUCTUR,3) Whole Grp Subtable % 60.9% 57.9% Subgroups Subtable % 5.5% 7.4% Subgp+Ind Subtable % 28.3% 32.5% Individuals Subtable % 5.3% 2.2%

Table 21A.5. Percentage of Structure Categories associated with Locomotion and No Locomotion by therapists for all Groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(STRUCTUR,1)” and the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(STRUCTUR,1-3).”

486

Locomotion by Therapists for All Groups. No Locomotion Locomotion LAGS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 17.4% 6.3% Systemic Subtable % 37.5% 17.8% Normative Subtable % 30.1% 30.4% Unorganised Subtable % 15.0% 45.6% Cognitive Organisation Representational Subtable % 17.8% 4.9% Systemic Subtable % 37.7% 16.9% Normative Subtable % 30.7% 27.8% Unorganised Subtable % 13.8% 50.3% LEADS(COGNORG,1) Representational Subtable % 17.4% 6.4% Systemic Subtable % 37.5% 17.5% Normative Subtable % 30.3% 29.7% Unorganised Subtable % 14.8% 46.4% LEADS(COGNORG,2) Representational Subtable % 16.9% 8.2% Systemic Subtable % 37.4% 18.1% Normative Subtable % 29.9% 31.1% Unorganised Subtable % 15.8% 42.7% LEADS(COGNORG,3) Representational Subtable % 17.0% 7.9% Systemic Subtable % 37.3% 18.6% Normative Subtable % 29.5% 32.6% Unorganised Subtable % 16.3% 40.8%

Table 21A.6. Percentage of Cognitive Organization Categories associated with Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COGNORG,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COGNORG,1-3).”

487

Locomotion by Therapists for All Groups. No Locomotion Locomotion LAGS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.4% Joy Subtable % 14.2% 24.1% Interest Subtable % 66.5% 52.2% Discontent Subtable % 12.8% 16.9% Distress Subtable % 1.2% 4.8% Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .5% Affect Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.4% Joy Subtable % 14.3% 23.8% Interest Subtable % 66.6% 51.7% Discontent Subtable % 12.6% 17.5% Distress Subtable % 1.1% 5.3% Boredom Subtable % 2.7% .3% LEADS(AFFECT,1) Contentment Subtable % 2.8% 1.3% Joy Subtable % 14.7% 22.4% Interest Subtable % 66.0% 53.8% Discontent Subtable % 12.6% 17.5% Distress Subtable % 1.3% 4.6% Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .4% LEADS(AFFECT,2) Contentment Subtable % 2.7% 1.7% Joy Subtable % 15.0% 21.0% Interest Subtable % 65.7% 55.1% Discontent Subtable % 12.7% 17.2% Distress Subtable % 1.3% 4.5% Boredom Subtable % 2.6% .4% LEADS(AFFECT,3) Contentment Subtable % 2.6% 1.9% Joy Subtable % 15.0% 21.0% Interest Subtable % 65.5% 55.5% Discontent Subtable % 12.7% 17.3% Distress Subtable % 1.4% 4.0% Boredom Subtable % 2.7% .2%

Table 21A.7. Percentage of Affect Categories associated with Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(AFFECT,1)” and the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(AFFECT,1-3).”

488

Locomotion by Therapists for All Groups. No Locomotion Locomotion LAGS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.5% 11.8% Accord Subtable % 48.4% 46.2% Discord Subtable % 14.1% 33.4% Contracord Subtable % 2.1% 8.6% Action Coherence Concord Subtable % 35.7% 10.9% Accord Subtable % 48.8% 44.6% Discord Subtable % 13.6% 35.0% Contracord Subtable % 1.9% 9.5% LEADS(ACTION,1) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 11.3% Accord Subtable % 47.9% 48.0% Discord Subtable % 14.4% 32.1% Contracord Subtable % 2.1% 8.5% LEADS(ACTION,2) Concord Subtable % 35.6% 11.6% Accord Subtable % 47.3% 50.2% Discord Subtable % 14.9% 30.1% Contracord Subtable % 2.3% 8.1% LEADS(ACTION,3) Concord Subtable % 35.3% 12.6% Accord Subtable % 47.1% 50.8% Discord Subtable % 15.3% 28.7% Contracord Subtable % 2.3% 7.9% Table 21A.8. Percentage of Action Coherence Categories associated with Locomotion and no Locomotion by therapists for all groups for the minute in which the Locomotion occurs, the preceding minute, “LAGS(ACTION,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(ACTION,1-3).”

489

Therapist Interventions for 1988 Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention 9 Condensed Functional Subtable % 15.4% 14.9% 15.3% 18.0% States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 1.5% 3.1% 2.3% 1.4% Sociable Subtable % 43.1% 25.3% 28.7% 56.6% Limited Sociable Subtable % 9.2% 14.2% 11.1% 11.7% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 7.2% 13.8% 11.9% 4.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 16.4% 9.6% 12.3% 3.5% Productive Turmoil Subtable % .5% 6.0% 3.1% 1.2% Dysfunctional Subtable % 2.1% 5.2% 6.9% 1.2% Nominal Subtable % 4.6% 7.8% 8.4% 2.0% LEADS(COND9,1) Functional Subtable % 14.9% 15.9% 17.6% 16.5% Limited Functional Subtable % .5% 3.3% 2.7% 1.4% Sociable Subtable % 37.9% 27.9% 30.7% 54.5% Limited Sociable Subtable % 9.2% 14.0% 14.6% 10.7% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 7.7% 12.0% 11.9% 6.2% Happy Conflict Subtable % 19.0% 8.3% 8.8% 5.3% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.0% 5.3% 3.8% 1.4% Dysfunctional Subtable % 5.1% 5.2% 2.3% 2.0% Nominal Subtable % 4.6% 8.1% 7.7% 1.9% LEADS(COND9,2) Functional Subtable % 14.9% 16.0% 16.1% 17.0% Limited Functional Subtable % .5% 2.9% 3.4% 1.6% Sociable Subtable % 39.5% 29.5% 27.2% 53.5% Limited Sociable Subtable % 12.3% 13.1% 16.1% 10.1% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 8.2% 12.3% 10.3% 6.3% Happy Conflict Subtable % 14.9% 8.3% 9.6% 6.2% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.0% 5.5% 3.8% 1.3% Dysfunctional Subtable % 4.6% 4.2% 4.2% 2.5% Nominal Subtable % 4.1% 8.1% 9.2% 1.4% LEADS(COND9,3) Functional Subtable % 12.3% 15.7% 15.3% 18.5% Limited Functional Subtable % 1.0% 2.7% 3.1% 1.7% Sociable Subtable % 43.1% 29.5% 30.3% 51.4% Limited Sociable Subtable % 10.8% 14.4% 16.9% 8.8% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 7.2% 12.2% 9.2% 7.2% Happy Conflict Subtable % 16.4% 7.7% 8.0% 7.1% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 3.1% 5.6% 2.7% 1.0% Dysfunctional Subtable % 3.1% 4.8% 5.7% 1.7% Nominal Subtable % 3.1% 7.4% 8.8% 2.6%

Table 21A.9. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1988 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”

1988: In the minute of Group Intervention, there is a change of some 7% from Unsociable states to Sociable and Functional from the preceding minute. In the following three minutes, Functional remains stable but there is an oscillation from Sociable to Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional. The effect of Member Interventions is to bring about a decrease in Constructive states in the same minute in favour of Happy Conflict, Productive Turmoil and Dysfunctional, then a steady drift towards decreased Unsociable states and increased Sociable. Group and Member Interventions provide the clearest evidence of effect on the group. In the preceding minute, there is a polarisation

490 with a reduction in Sociable states and an increase in both Functional and Unsociable states. Then in the minute after the intervention, there is a decrease in Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional and an increase in Constructive states. In the second minute following, this trend is reversed with a move towards Unsociable states and then in the third minute, this in turn is reversed again with a move back to increased Constructive states. This seems to introduce yet another instance of oscillation or rhythm in the group’s functioning. Finally, for No Intervention from minute before the intervention there is a trend from Unsociable states towards Constructive states, but in the following three minutes there is a drift towards increased Happy Conflict and Dysfunctional. 1990: For the 1990 group, in the transition from the minute before the intervention to the minute of the intervention, there are changes for Group Intervention indicating increase in Functional, Limited Functional and Dysfunctional. In the following three minutes, after the intervention, there is at first a reversal of this with a reduction in Functional and Dysfunctional and an increase in Sociable. Then in the second minute, there is a reduction in Happy Conflict, while in the third minute Happy Conflict again increases showing the rhythmic oscillation. For Member Interventions, there is a slight increase in Sociable and Dysfunctional from the penultimate minute. Then in the first minute after the intervention, there is a movement from Sociable to Limited Functional, followed in the next minute by a reduction in Dysfunctional and increase in Happy Conflict with a further increase in this state in the third minute. As time passes, Member Interventions are associated with a drift towards increased conflict. For Group and Member Interventions, there is an increase in conflictual states and Functional and a decrease in Sociable states, leading in the next minute to a reduction in Happy Conflict and increase in constructive and Dysfunctional states. This then oscillates between conflictual and Sociable in the next two minutes. No Intervention is associated with a drift towards increased Happy Conflict in the following minutes.

491

Therapist Interventions for 1990. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention 9 Condensed Functional Subtable % 5.3% 3.2% 5.6% 1.4% States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 6.8% 12.3% 4.0% 18.8% Sociable Subtable % 20.3% 20.3% 17.3% 25.2% Limited Sociable Subtable % 30.1% 34.0% 18.9% 36.5% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 1.5% .9% 2.0% 1.4% Happy Conflict Subtable % 18.0% 16.2% 32.5% 10.7% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% .2% 1.6% 1.4% Dysfunctional Subtable % 15.8% 11.6% 17.3% 3.9% Nominal Subtable % .8% 1.3% .8% .9% LEADS(COND9,1) Functional Subtable % 2.3% 3.9% 5.2% 1.4% Limited Functional Subtable % 6.8% 13.1% 4.8% 17.5% Sociable Subtable % 24.8% 18.1% 19.3% 25.6% Limited Sociable Subtable % 30.8% 34.0% 18.5% 36.5% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 1.5% .4% 2.0% Happy Conflict Subtable % 18.8% 16.2% 30.1% 11.8% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% .7% 1.6% .7% Dysfunctional Subtable % 14.3% 11.6% 19.7% 2.9% Nominal Subtable % .8% .9% .4% 1.6% LEADS(COND9,2) Functional Subtable % 2.3% 4.3% 4.0% 1.4% Limited Functional Subtable % 9.0% 11.6% 7.2% 17.2% Sociable Subtable % 24.8% 20.1% 18.9% 23.6% Limited Sociable Subtable % 27.8% 34.7% 17.3% 37.2% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.0% 1.1% 1.6% .9% Happy Conflict Subtable % 16.5% 15.7% 30.1% 13.2% Productive Turmoil Subtable % .8% 1.3% .8% .7% Dysfunctional Subtable % 14.3% 10.4% 20.1% 4.1% Nominal Subtable % 1.5% .7% 1.8% LEADS(COND9,3) Functional Subtable % 3.8% 3.2% 4.0% 2.0% Limited Functional Subtable % 6.8% 11.6% 8.0% 17.5% Sociable Subtable % 27.8% 18.5% 20.9% 23.8% Limited Sociable Subtable % 27.1% 34.0% 18.9% 37.4% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% 1.1% Happy Conflict Subtable % 20.3% 17.9% 25.7% 11.8% Productive Turmoil Subtable % .8% 1.1% .8% .9% Dysfunctional Subtable % 12.0% 11.2% 20.1% 3.9% Nominal Subtable % 1.1% .4% 1.6%

Table 21A.10. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1990 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”

492

Therapist Interventions for 1992. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention 9 Condensed Functional Subtable % 7.3% 6.3% 2.9% 3.3% States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 5.7% 3.8% 2.9% 2.6% Sociable Subtable % 26.8% 25.1% 21.5% 29.0% Limited Sociable Subtable % 24.4% 29.9% 26.8% 40.9% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 5.7% 7.7% 7.8% 4.1% Happy Conflict Subtable % 9.8% 8.7% 14.1% 7.1% Productive Turmoil Subtable % .9% 3.4% .4% Dysfunctional Subtable % 15.4% 10.4% 13.7% 4.5% Nominal Subtable % 4.9% 7.1% 6.8% 8.2% LEADS(COND9,1) -1 Subtable % .8% Functional Subtable % 8.9% 5.4% 4.4% 4.5% Limited Functional Subtable % 4.1% 4.7% 2.9% .7% Sociable Subtable % 22.8% 25.6% 23.9% 27.1% Limited Sociable Subtable % 30.9% 28.8% 27.3% 41.3% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 7.3% 7.1% 8.8% 4.8% Happy Conflict Subtable % 10.6% 8.6% 12.7% 8.2% Productive Turmoil Subtable % .8% .7% 2.9% 1.1% Dysfunctional Subtable % 9.8% 11.4% 10.2% 6.3% Nominal Subtable % 4.1% 7.8% 6.8% 5.9% LEADS(COND9,2) -1 Subtable % .5% Functional Subtable % 4.9% 6.4% 4.9% 3.0% Limited Functional Subtable % 4.1% 4.0% 4.9% 1.5% Sociable Subtable % 23.6% 25.3% 25.4% 26.4% Limited Sociable Subtable % 28.5% 29.9% 25.9% 39.4% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 12.2% 6.9% 7.3% 4.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 7.3% 8.5% 11.2% 11.2% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.6% .9% 1.5% 1.1% Dysfunctional Subtable % 13.0% 10.5% 11.2% 7.1% Nominal Subtable % 4.9% 7.7% 7.3% 5.9% LEADS(COND9,3) -1 Subtable % .8% Functional Subtable % 7.3% 5.9% 5.9% 3.0% Limited Functional Subtable % 4.9% 4.2% 2.4% 2.2% Sociable Subtable % 22.0% 25.4% 26.3% 25.3% Limited Sociable Subtable % 32.5% 29.6% 29.3% 36.4% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 8.1% 6.5% 7.3% 7.4% Happy Conflict Subtable % 9.8% 8.7% 7.8% 11.9% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.6% 1.3% .5% .7% Dysfunctional Subtable % 8.1% 10.8% 13.2% 6.7% Nominal Subtable % 4.9% 7.6% 7.3% 6.3%

Table 21A.11. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1992 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”

In 1992, in the minute of intervention, Group Interventions show a move from Functional to Limited Functional and from Limited Sociable to Sociable and from Unhappy Cooperation and Happy Conflict to Dysfunctional. In the 1st minute after the intervention all of these changes are reversed. These changes indicate that the interventions bring the group together when they are in touch with their own states or encourage them to differentiate when they are Sociable. It also means that it encourages

493 them to become more constructive when in Dysfunctional. In the following minutes, there is oscillation into and out of Dysfunctional. Member Interventions show little change except for some oscillation between Limited Sociable and Dysfunctional. Group and Member Interventions show a move from conflictual states to constructive state and then oscillation between them. For No Intervention, there is a drift towards Happy Conflict.

Therapist Interventions for 1993. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention 9 Condensed Functional Subtable % 6.9% 9.7% 7.8% 7.3% States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 1.7% 2.5% .8% .9% Sociable Subtable % 48.3% 31.3% 29.1% 37.3% Limited Sociable Subtable % 20.7% 13.2% 7.0% 39.1% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 8.6% 6.9% 3.5% 4.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 8.6% 18.9% 29.8% 6.4% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% 1.2% Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.7% 9.9% 17.4% 2.7% Nominal Subtable % 3.4% 6.2% 3.5% 1.8% LEADS(COND9,1) Functional Subtable % 10.3% 9.9% 7.4% 5.5% Limited Functional Subtable % 3.4% 2.2% .4% 1.8% Sociable Subtable % 31.0% 32.3% 31.8% 36.4% Limited Sociable Subtable % 24.1% 11.7% 9.3% 37.3% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.4% 6.0% 6.2% 3.6% Happy Conflict Subtable % 15.5% 20.8% 25.6% 5.5% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.7% .8% Dysfunctional Subtable % 10.3% 8.4% 15.9% 7.3% Nominal Subtable % 1.7% 6.9% 2.7% 2.7% LEADS(COND9,2) Functional Subtable % 6.9% 7.4% 10.5% 8.2% Limited Functional Subtable % 3.4% 1.7% 1.6% .9% Sociable Subtable % 34.5% 34.0% 30.6% 31.8% Limited Sociable Subtable % 20.7% 11.7% 10.5% 36.4% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 5.2% 6.0% 5.4% 4.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 17.2% 20.6% 23.3% 10.9% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% 1.2% Dysfunctional Subtable % 8.6% 10.2% 14.7% 4.5% Nominal Subtable % 3.4% 6.9% 2.3% 2.7% LEADS(COND9,3) Functional Subtable % 1.7% 8.9% 10.9% 3.6% Limited Functional Subtable % 6.9% 1.7% .8% .9% Sociable Subtable % 36.2% 33.7% 30.6% 31.8% Limited Sociable Subtable % 25.9% 11.9% 10.5% 32.7% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 5.2% 6.5% 3.9% 6.4% Happy Conflict Subtable % 17.2% 19.6% 23.6% 13.6% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 1.5% .8% .9% Dysfunctional Subtable % 5.2% 9.7% 15.1% 7.3% Nominal Subtable % 1.7% 6.5% 3.9% 2.7%

Table 21A.12. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1993 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes, “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”

494

In 1993, in the minute of intervention, all constructive states reduce and there is an increase in all Unsociable states. In the 1st minute after, there are changes from Sociable to Functional and to most Unsociable states and this tendency increases in the 2nd minute. However, it reverses in the 3rd with a reduction in Dysfunctional and Nominal and an increase in Sociable states. In this year, it seems that Group Interventions initially increase unsociable functioning and then lead to stabilization after 2 minutes. For Member Interventions, there is a reduction in Sociable in the minute of intervention and the in the 1st minute after, this is reversed with Sociable continuing to increase for the next two minutes and then reversing in favour of Functional in the 3rd minute. Dysfunctional tends to oscillate between decreasing in the 1st minute then increasing in the 2nd. For Group and Member Interventions, in the minute of intervention there is little change but in the 1st after, there is a move from Unsociable to Constructive states which continues as a drift in the 2nd minute and then stabilizes in the 3rd. These interventions are clearly effective in producing constructive change in the group that is maintained for the three minutes. No Intervention shows a steady drift towards Dysfunctional from the minute of consideration onwards.

495

Therapist Interventions for 1996. Group & Group Member Member No Intervention Interventn Int Intervention 9 Condensed Functional Subtable % 5.2% 8.6% 10.4% 1.8% States #3 Limited Functional Subtable % 3.1% 1.9% 1.2% Sociable Subtable % 58.6% 55.0% 39.6% 76.4% Limited Sociable Subtable % 19.0% 13.6% 13.2% 9.1% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 3.4% 3.5% 8.5% 6.1% Happy Conflict Subtable % 10.3% 5.7% 13.2% 2.4% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 3.1% 2.8% 2.4% Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% Nominal Subtable % 1.7% 5.5% 8.5% .6% LEADS(COND9,1) Functional Subtable % 5.2% 8.8% 7.6% 3.0% Limited Functional Subtable % 2.5% 4.8% 1.2% Sociable Subtable % 58.6% 55.4% 42.9% 73.3% Limited Sociable Subtable % 15.5% 13.3% 15.2% 9.7% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 6.9% 3.3% 8.6% 5.5% Happy Conflict Subtable % 10.3% 6.4% 9.5% 3.0% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 2.9% 3.8% 2.4% Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.8% 1.8% Nominal Subtable % 3.4% 5.5% 7.6% LEADS(COND9,2) Functional Subtable % 10.3% 7.2% 14.4% 1.8% Limited Functional Subtable % 2.7% 2.9% 1.8% Sociable Subtable % 56.9% 56.9% 34.6% 74.5% Limited Sociable Subtable % 13.8% 14.4% 11.5% 9.7% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 5.2% 4.5% 8.7% 2.4% Happy Conflict Subtable % 5.2% 5.3% 12.5% 6.1% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 3.4% 2.7% 3.8% 1.8% Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.7% 1.8% 1.0% .6% Nominal Subtable % 3.4% 4.5% 10.6% 1.2% LEADS(COND9,3) Functional Subtable % 15.5% 6.8% 12.5% 2.4% Limited Functional Subtable % 2.5% 4.8% 1.2% Sociable Subtable % 56.9% 56.8% 44.2% 69.1% Limited Sociable Subtable % 8.6% 14.2% 13.5% 10.9% Unhappy Cooperation Subtable % 5.2% 4.9% 5.8% 3.0% Happy Conflict Subtable % 10.3% 5.8% 2.9% 9.1% Productive Turmoil Subtable % 3.1% 2.9% 2.4% Dysfunctional Subtable % 1.9% 1.9% .6% Nominal Subtable % 3.4% 4.1% 11.5% 1.2%

Table 21A.13. Percentage of Condensed States associated with Therapists Interventions in the minute of intervention and the following three minutes in the 1996 group for the minute in which the Intervention is applied, the preceding minute, “LAGS(COND9,1)” and the succeeding three minutes “LEADS(COND9,1-3).”

In 1996, for Group Intervention in the minute of intervention, there is a reduction in Functional and Limited Sociable in favour of Happy Conflict. This trend is maintained in the 1st minute with and increase in Unhappy Cooperation and then in the 2nd minute there is a split with moves from Sociable to Functional and Unhappy Conflict and Productive Turmoil to Dysfunctional. This movement is reversed in the 3rd minute, except that Functional continues to increase. For Member Intervention, in the

496 minute of intervention, Sociable increases from Limited Sociable and Unhappy Cooperation, but there is little change in the 1st minute. For the next two minutes, constructive states increase. In Group and Member Interventions, in the minute of intervention there are increases in Sociable and Happy Conflict and then in the 1st minute, movement from conflictual to constructive states. This then reverses in the 2nd minute and consolidates an increase in Sociable states in the 3rd minute. For No Intervention, there is a steady drift towards increased conflictual states over the three minutes. An overview of the effects of therapists’ interventions is gained by looking at the overall impacts. For Group Interventions, it appears that if there is an increase in Constructive states in the minute of intervention, this leads to an oscillation between these constructive states and Unsociable states in the following three minutes (this occurs in 1988, 1990 and 1992). Where there is an increase in Unsociable states in the minute of intervention (as in 1993 and 1996) this is followed by a drift towards increasing Unsociable states in the following three minutes. Group interventions seem likely to stimulate conflict, but this oscillates with constructive states where these are stimulated by the intervention. For Member Interventions, although the results are not as consistent, there appears to be an initial tendency for the minute of intervention to see an increase in some Unsociable states (for 1988, 1990 and 1992) followed by either a drift to increased Constructive states or oscillation between these and some Unsociable states. However, three groups (1990, 1993 and 1996) recorded an increase in Constructive states in the minute or intervention. There is also a stimulus to Unsociable states, but they seem to be often compensated by an increase in some Constructive states at the same time. Group and Member Interventions either seem to produce a stimulus to some constructive and some Unsociable states in the minute of intervention. When these Unsociable states are stimulated, there is an oscillation between constructive and Unsociable states in the following three minutes (1988 and 1990). Where there is an initial stimulus to increased constructive states this is followed by a steady drift to increased Constructive states in the next three minutes. There seems to be an overall trend for group and member interventions to be more constructive than the others. For No Intervention there is a consistent pattern of a drift towards increased Unsociable states. In most cases this is increased Happy Conflict.

497

Structure + Cognitive Affect + Limit Action Coherence + Limit Organization + Limit Limit Category W = Whole R = Representational C = Contentment Cn = Concord Code S = Subgroups S = systemic J = Joy A = Accord Si = Subgp+Ind N = Normative I = Interest D = Discord I = Individuals U = Unorganized Dt = Discontent Ct = Contracord Ds = Distress B = Boredom Group 0-2:W -> S 11% 0: R/S/N -> U 10% 0:C/J/D -> I/D/B 2%/5% 0:Cn/A->D/Ct 3%+2% Intervention 3: S -> W 4% 1: U/S ->R/N 6%/6% 1:C/D/B -> J/Dt 2%/3% 1-3:D/Ct-> A/Cn 21% 2: R/N ->U/S 5%/3% 2:J/Ds -> I/Dt/B 3%/3%/ (2: D-> Ct 2%) 3: U->N/S 3%/6% 1% 3:J/Dt -> I/B 3%/1% Member 0-2: S -> W 3% 0:R/S/N -> U 7% 0: J/I -> Dt/Ds 6%/1% 0:Cn/A -> D/Ct 10% Intervention 3: No change 1:U/S -> R/N 4%/3% 1: Ds -> J 1% 1-2:Ct/D-> A/Cn 7% 2: U -> S 1% 2: J/Ds -> I/B 2%/1% 3:Ct/A -> D/Cn 3% + 3: R -> N 1% 3: J -> I/Dt 2%/1% 2% Group & 0-1: S -> W 2% 0: R/S -> U 6% 0: I -> J/Ds 3%/1% 0:Cn/A->D 4% Member 2: W->S 2% 1:U -> R/S/N 1: J/Ds -> I 6% 1-3:D/Ct -> Cn/A 14% Intervention 3: No change 1%/1%/ 1% 2: J/Ds -> I/Dt 1%/1% (3: D -> Ct 2%) 2-3: U-> R/N 3%/3% 3: Dt -> J/I 1%/2% No Sample too Sample too small (31 Sample too small (31 Sample too small (31 Intervention small (31 mins) mins) mins) mins)

Table 21A.14. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with those without Limits for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the three minutes after.

Tables 21A.14 summarizes the results of the changes in GFR categories associated with Therapists Interventions from the minute of intervention through the following three minutes in association with Limits being set. The categories are indicated by the letter as indicated in the Category Code shown in the second row. The minutes are shown in the left of each row in the cells. Minute 0 indicates the minute in which the interventions were made and minutes 1-3 are the first to third minutes following the intervention. The percentages represent the percentage of change in the frequency of the category in the minute indicated compared to the previous minute. The symbol “->”means an increase relative to the previous minute. Where there are changes in several categories in the same interval the categories are listed in sequence followed by the percentage of change in the same sequence. For example, in the second minute after the intervention, Representational and Normative are reduced by Group Intervention in favour of Unorganized and Systemic, which increase by 5% and 3%

498 respectively. This is shown in Table 21A.14 as “2:R/N -> U/S 5%/3%.” In Table 21A.15, the effect of Therapists Interventions with Limits on categories is compared with those without Limits. A positive sign indicates that the addition of Limits to the Intervention increases the frequency of the category, while a negative sign means the presence of Limits reduces the frequency.

Group Member Group & Member No Intervention Intervention Intervention Intervention Whole +4% +14% -18% Sub+Ind +6% -8% Systemic -8% -17% Normative +5% -8% Unorganized +20% Joy -6% Interest +6% +13% -17% Concord -9% Accord +13% -14% Discord -5%

Table 21A.15. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists Interventions accompanied by Limits compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limit. Categories not shown had no differences.

Table 21A.16 summarizes the results of the changes in GFR categories associated with Therapists Interventions from the minute of intervention through the following three minutes in association with no Limits and Locomotion in the same format as Table 21A.14.

499

Structure + No Cognitive Affect + No Limits + Action Coherence + No Limits + Locomotion Organization + No Locomotion Limits + Locomotion Limits + Locomotion Category W = Whole R = C = Contentment Cn = Concord Code S = Subgroups Representational J = Joy A = Accord Si = Subgp+Ind S = systemic I = Interest D = Discord I = Individuals N = Normative Dt = Discontent Ct = Contracord U = Unorganized Ds = Distress B = Boredom Group 0:W -> S 7% 0: R/N -> S/U 0:J/Ds -> I/Dt 0:D/Ct -> Cn/A 3%/ 9% Intervention 1:no change 1%/1% 3%/3% 1:Cn/Ct -> D 10% 2:W -> S 5% 1: S/N -> U 11% 1:C/J/Dt/Ds -> I 7% 2:A/D -> Cn/Ct 3%/3% 3:Si -> S/W 3%/4% 2: R/U -> S/N 6%/ 2:I -> J/Dt 3%/9% 3:D -> A/Ct 4%/3% 8% 3:Dt -> C/ J/I/Ds 1%/ 3: S/N-> R/U 1%/ 3%/2%/1% 3% Member 0:S -> Si/I 2%/1% 0: R/U -> N 3% 0:Dt/Ds -> I 2% 0:D/Ct -> Cn/A 1%/6% Intervention 1:Si/I -> S 3% 1: N -> S 1% 1:C/I -> J/Ds 2%/1% 1:A/D -> Cn/Ct 1%/2% 2:S/Si -> W/I 2%/1% 2: S/U -> R/N 2:J -> I/Ds 1%/1% 2:Cn/A-> D/Ct 1%/1% 3:No change 3%/3% 3:I/Ds -> J/Dt 2%/1% 3:Ct -> Cn 1% 3: U -> S 1% Group & 0:Si -> W/S/I 6%/ 0: N -> R/S/U 2%/ 0:C/J/Ds -> I/Dt/B 0:Cn/D -> A/Ct 5%/2% Member 2%/4% 1% /5% 2%/2%/1% 1:A -> Cn/D/Ct 3%/1%/ Intervention 1:W/S/I -> Si 6% 1: U/N -> R/S 4%/ 1:J/Dt -> C/I/Ds/B 2% 2:I/Si -> W/S 1%/2% 4% 2%/4%/3%/1% 2:D -> A 2% 3:W -> S/Si/I 1%/ 2: U -> N 4% 2:Dt/Ds -> J/I 2%/1% 3:D/Ct -> A 8%) 6%/ 2% 3: R/U-> S/N 3%/ 3:I/B -> Dt 2% 1% No 0:Si/I -> W/S 3%/2% 0: N/U -> S 2% 0:C/Dt -> J 3% 0:A/Ct -> Cn/D 1%/2% Intervention 1:W/Si -> S/I/ 1%/ 1: R/S -> N 6% 1:Ds/I -> C/J/Dt 1%/ 1:Cn/D/Ct -> A 8% 5% 2: N/U -> R 4% 5%/3% 2:Cn -> D/Ct 3%/2% 2:S/I -> W/Si 5%/5% R/N -> U 3% 2:Dt -> C/I 2%/1% 3:D -> Cn 3% 3:W -> S/Si 4%/2% 3:Dt -> I/B 1%/1%

Table 21A.16. Effect of Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion for all GFR Dimensions from the minute of intervention to the three minutes after.

In Table 21A.17, the effect of Therapists Interventions with Locomotion on categories is compared with those without Locomotion. A positive sign indicates that the addition of Locomotion to the Intervention increases the frequency of the category, while a negative sign means the presence of Locomotion reduces the frequency.

500

Group Member Group & Member No Intervention Intervention Intervention Intervention Whole +12% -16% Sub+Ind +5% -4% Representation -6% Systemic +6% -12% Normative +4% -5% Unorganized +17% +17% Joy -4% Interest +11% -12% Concord -7% Accord +6% +12% -7%

Table 21A.17. Percentage of difference in GFR categories with Therapists Interventions accompanied by Locomotion compared with Therapists Interventions accompanied by No Limits and No Locomotion. Categories not shown had no differences.

Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s: Gordon, Peter Rob

Title: A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group

Date: 2001

Citation: Gordon, P. R. (2001). A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group. PhD thesis, Department of Psychology, The University of Melbourne.

Publication Status: Unpublished

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/39542

File Description: A study of group psychotherapy: an empirical study of the whole group

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