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Ukrainian Discourse on the Armenia–Azerbaijan Conflict
COMMENTARIES Volume 1 • Issue 2 • Winter 2020 Ukrainian Discourse on the Armenia–Azerbaijan Conflict Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun* When the conflict escalated in the Nagorno-Karabakh war zone in September 2020, different opinions emerged in Ukraine on how the clash should be understood and which of its sides Ukraine should support. Most Ukrainian commentators compared the legal situation of the occupied territories belonging to Ukraine to the occupied territories belonging to Azerbaijan. This is why Kyiv officially stands for Baku. Never- theless, Ukraine’s support is limited to a diplomatic declaration only. Apart from the official position, there are also individual voices in Ukraine demanding either Kyiv’s greater involvement in helping Azerbaijan or, on the contrary, support for Armenia. The Ukrainian discourse on the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict does not have to coin- cide with the assessments of the parties directly involved in the clash, because the Ukrainians interpret Caucasian events through the lens of the Ukrainian–Russian war. This paper highlights the Ukrainian discourse over the Armenia–Azerbaijan con- flict. The commentary focuses on both the Ukrainian mainstream political declara- tions and media perceptions of the Armenia–Azerbaijan clashes. Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh region, Donbas, Crimea, hybrid war, Armenia, Azer- baijan, Ukraine * Dr. Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun is Co-founder and scientific secretary of the Academy of the East – Inde- pendent Research Center (Warsaw, Poland). 143 CAUCASUS STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES Introduction When the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia intensified in September 2020, the world community reacted to it in a rather typical and predictable way. The majority of countries either remained silent or voiced their concerns and appealed for returning to negotiations on the resolution of the conflict. -
Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine by Timothy Snyder | the New York Review of Books Page 1 of 8
Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine by Timothy Snyder | The New York Review of Books Page 1 of 8 Font Size: A A A March 20, 2014 Issue Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine Timothy Snyder This article will appear in the coming March 20, 2014 issue of The New York Review. Valery Sharifulin/ITAR-TASS/Corbis The opposition leader Vitali Klitschko attending a protest rally in Maidan square, Kiev, December 16, 2013 The students were the first to protest against the regime of President Viktor Yanukovych on the Maidan, the central square in Kiev, last November. These were the Ukrainians with the most to lose, the young people who unreflectively thought of themselves as Europeans and who wished for themselves a life, and a Ukrainian homeland, that were European. Many of them were politically on the left, some of them radically so. After years of negotiation and months of promises, their government, under President Yanukovych, had at the last moment failed to sign a major trade agreement with the European Union. When the riot police came and beat the students in late November, a new group, the Afghan veterans, came to the Maidan. These men of middle age, former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, many of them bearing the scars of battlefield wounds, came to protect “their children,” as they put it. They didn’t mean their own sons and http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/mar/20/fascism-russia-and-ukraine/?... 20/02/2014 Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine by Timothy Snyder | The New York Review of Books Page 2 of 8 daughters: they meant the best of the youth, the pride and future of the country. -
Svoboda Party – the New Phenomenon on the Ukrainian Right-Wing Scene
OswcOMMentary issue 56 | 04.07.2011 | ceNTRe fOR eAsTeRN sTudies Svoboda party – the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene NTARy Me Tadeusz A. Olszański ces cOM Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing incre- ase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines tudies participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern s Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it astern refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist move- e ments, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition entre for parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its c independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will beco- me a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia. NTARy Me Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, ces cOM it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. -
Ukraine's Relations with the EU and Russia
Ukraine’s relations with the EU and Russia: Why geopolitics and domestic reforms are linked Iryna Solonenko1 Introduction After Ukraine’s former President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the country's Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in November 2013, a series of events unfolded that dramatically changed Ukraine’s relationship with the EU and Russia. The Euromaidan protests, or the “Revolution of Dignity,” which resulted in the transition of power from Yanukovych to the opposition, was followed by Russia’s military intervention, first the illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and then the rise of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region. Although Russia denies its role in the proxy war taking place in the Donbas, ample evidence points to Russia’s direct involvement; Ukrainians overwhelmingly perceive the situation as the result of Russia’s actions.2 Russia annexed Crimea within less than a month in March 2014, and wrested part of Ukraine’s border territory in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions from Ukraine’s control. By May 2015, the war had left over 6000 people dead and more than 1.5 million displaced.3 This situation has already had a defining effect on Ukrainian-Russian relations and will continue to do so for years to come. Ukraine used to vacillate between integration projects with the EU and with Russia, avoiding a definitive choice between the two. This balancing act was also reflected in the protracted post-communist transformation and the lack of reforms that would Europeanize Ukraine. The prospect of signing the AA with the EU on the one hand and pressure from Russia to join the Customs Union (which, as of 2015, has become the Eurasian Economic Union) on the other hand demanded a choice in favor of one. -
Presidential Election in Ukraine Implications for the Ukrainian Transition Presidential Election in Ukraine Implications for the Ukrainian Transition
Helmut Kurth/Iris Kempe (Ed.) PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINIAN TRANSITION PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINIAN TRANSITION KIEV – 2004 The following texts are preliminary versions. Necessary corrections and updates will be undertaken once the results of the election process are final. These preliminary versions are not for quotation or citation, and may only be used with the express written consent of the authors. CONTENTS Preface ................................................................................. 5 Timm Beichelt/Rostyslav Pavlenko Presidential Election and Constitutional Reforms in Ukraine ............................................................................ 7 Olaf Hillenbrand Consensus-Building and Good Governance – a Framework for Democratic Transition ........................... 44 Oleksandr Dergachov Formation of Democratic Consensus and Good Governance ....................................................... 71 Oleksandr Sushko/Oles Lisnychuk The 2004 Presidential Campaign as a Sign of Political Evolution in Ukraine....................................... 87 Iris Kempe/Iryna Solonenko International Orientation and Foreign Support of the Presidential Elections ............................................ 107 5 Preface Long before Kiev’s Independence Square became a sea of orange, it was clear to close observers that the presidential election in 2004 would not only be extremely close and hard fought, but also decisive for the country’s future development. Discussions -
Chamber of Local Authorities
Chamber of Local Authorities 27th SESSION Strasbourg, 14-16 October 2014 CPL(27)4FINAL 15 October 2014 Observation of pre-term local elections in Ukraine (25 May 2014) Monitoring Committee Rapporteur:1 Nigel MERMAGEN, United Kingdom (L, ILDG) Recommendation 359 (2014)..............................................................................................................2 Explanatory memorandum ..................................................................................................................4 Summary Following an invitation of 4 April 2014 from the Ukrainian authorities to observe pre-term local elections on 25 May 2014, the Congress deployed an election observation mission from 22 to 26 May 2014 and observed the vote in more than 120 polling stations around the country – except for some areas of the south and east where security issues prevailed. These pre-term local elections concerned some 300 vacant seats for mayor including in the capital, Kyiv, and all 120 seats for the Kyiv City Council. All of the seats will, however, be up for election again on 25 October 2015 when full-term elections are scheduled. Already prior to election day, the Congress welcomed the fact that the Ukrainian authorities had taken into consideration previous recommendations in respect of the election of the Mayor of Kyiv, the compilation of the voters’ list and more transparent procedures. Challenges for the election administration included not only questions of security, but also the managing of simultaneous presidential and local elections – particularly in Kyiv where 4 elections were held. Despite these challenges, election day was characterised by high voter turnout and a generally good atmosphere, to a great extent without pressure on voters. The Congress highlights that further improvements can be made regarding electoral legislation and the practical side of electoral management, in particular a more efficient counting procedure and training of electoral staff. -
Inside Ukraine 2
4 Borys Hrinchenko st., office 3, Kyiv, 01001, Ukraine | Phone (380 44) 279 88 23 | [email protected] | www.icps.com.ua March 14th, 2014 №2 (13) INSIDE UKRAINE 1. Political competition .......................................................................................................... 3 1.1. “Praviy sektor” enters the game ................................................................................ 3 1.2. Vitali Klitschko displays civil position and loyalty to Maidan’s ideals .................. 3 1.3. Petro Poroshenko shows presidential ambitions ...................................................... 4 1.4. Svoboda forms power vertical in its basic regions ................................................... 4 1.5. Batkivshchyna fails to launch election campaign brightly ...................................... 4 1.6. Party of regions will have primaries ......................................................................... 5 2. State decisions .................................................................................................................... 6 2.1. Combination of decentralization and centralization ............................................... 6 2.2. Need for macrostrategy in reforms ........................................................................... 6 2.3. Response to mistakes in HR policy ............................................................................ 7 INSIDE UKRAINE / March 14th, 2014 1 The International Center for Policy Studies (ICPS) restores issuing analytic paper «Inside Ukraine», -
Lessons from the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 17 Olexiy Haran
Between Russia and the EU: Lessons from the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 17 Olexiy Haran Tunisian and Egyptian people have succeeded with non-violent uprisings and regime change. But where will revolutions lead these two countries? Seven years ago, a similar peaceful revolution took place in Ukraine – ‘the Orange Revolution’- when for more than two weeks, beginning on the 22 November 2004, Ukraine was in the spotlight of international attention. Previously, the post-Soviet space was viewed by many policy-makers as a sphere of Russian influence, where post-Soviet, anti-Western political culture dominates and prevents movement to Europe based on democratic values. However, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians stood in freezing winter temperatures at Kyiv's central square - Maidan - displaying the fascinating people’s collective power. It prevented authoritarian Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma from bringing to office his chosen candidate and, in this way, to repeat the “Yeltsin–Putin scenario”. The revolution was non-violent, its participants demonstrated a high level of inter- ethnic and inter-confessional tolerance; hence, its importance as an example for divided societies. Many democratic movements made a reference to the Orange Revolution: from Belarus to Kenya, and from Taiwan to the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon. However, the high hopes and expectations of the Orange revolution have been thwarted. Paradoxically, the process of democratic elections, which started with the Orange Revolution, led to the 2010 electoral victory of the candidate, who lost the 2004 election in disgrace and who is now trying to revert the country back in many ways to where it had been in terms of democracy. -
PULSE of UKRAINE Forum Programme Day 1
PULSE OF UKRAINE Forum Programme Day 1 Friday, October 20, 2017 Location: Admiral Hall, Khreshchatyk 7/11, Kyiv 09:00-09:45 Registration Coffee and Tea 9:45-10:15 Welcome words Barbara Maria Monheim, Founder and Chairwoman of the German-Polish-Ukrainian Society Wolfgang Bindseil, Counsellor and Permanent Deputy Ambassador of Germany to Ukraine Opening speech Vitali Klitschko, Mayor of the City of Kyiv Marek Belka, Former Prime Minister of Poland, Founding Rector of the Democracy Study Centre 10:15-11:45 Panel Discussion I “Cyberspace security, propaganda, and fake news: the challenge for liberal democracy” CPT Tomas Tauginas, Chief of Analysis subsection, Lithuanian Armed Forces STRATCOM Department MSG Tomas Čeponis, Senior analyst, Lithuanian Armed Forces STRATCOM Department Harold Elletson, Senior Fellow of the Institute for Statecraft, former Member of the UK Parliament Oleksandr Danchenko, Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Informatization and Communication Quentin Peel, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, commentator for the Financial Times 11:45-13:15 Panel Discussion II “Building the economy. Strengthening the Mittelstand” Marek Belka, former Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Poland Jaroslawa Z. Johnson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Western NIS Enterprise Fund H. E. Roman Waschuk, Ambassador of Canada to Ukraine Maxym Nefyodov, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine Harald Braun, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation EVZ, former State Secretary of the German -
The Ukrainian Weekly 2008, No.37
www.ukrweekly.com INSIDE: • College students participate in mission to orphanages – page 4. • Ukraine readies Holodomor anniversary observances – page 8. • Ukrainian Independence Day in the U.S., Canada – pages 11-15 HE Published byKRAINIAN the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXVIT UNo. 37 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER W 14, 2008 $1/$2 in Ukraine European Union leaders delay Two scenarios emerge in Kyiv Ukraine’s integration efforts as coalition’s collapse is expected by Zenon Zawada by Zenon Zawada betrayal of the democratic coalition and Kyiv Press Bureau Kyiv Press Bureau Ukraine’s strategic course.” Ukraine’s citizens also don’t want pre- KYIV – European Union (EU) leaders KYIV – With almost no hope left for term elections, a view shared throughout the decided on September 9 to delay Ukraine’s pro-Western parliamentary coali- country, according to a Razumkov poll of Ukraine’s integration efforts by at least tion to mend its fences by a deadline extend- 2,379 respondents conducted on September half a year because of the conflict ed to September 16, politicians and observ- 4-5. between President Viktor Yushchenko ers began contemplating two likely scenari- In fact, 72 percent of Donetsk residents, and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, os for Ukrainian politics. and 68 percent of Lviv residents, oppose which has led to the expected collapse of Most widely suspected is that a new pre-term elections. The most support for a the pro-Western coalition government. coalition will emerge within a month pre-term election was in Dnipropetrovsk, Leaders and diplomats expected a new between the Party of Regions of Ukraine where 26 percent of respondents were in enhanced agreement on bilateral relations (PRU) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc favor. -
The Ukrainian Weekly, 2017
INSIDE: l WFUWO at U.N. Commission on the Status of Women – page 5 l Vitaly Portnikov: sober voice in post-Maidan Ukraine – page 8 l Our community: Miami, Boston, Philadelphia – page 14 THEPublished U by theKRAINIAN Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal W non-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXXV No. 21 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MAY 21, 2017 $2.00 Portugal wins Eurovision Song Contest, Poroshenko lauds closer ties with EU, Ukraine touts contest as great success admits ‘there’s much left to be done’ KYIV – Portugal was the top vote-getter inspired by the Soviet authorities’ mass in the 2017 Eurovision Song Contest, the deportation of Crimean Tatars to Central annual festival traditionally watched by a Asia in that year. The Crimean Tatar singer television audience of an estimated 200 returned to the contest this year, singing her million people. Some 4 million people new song “I Believe in U” as an interval act watched the contest’s grand final, breaking during the grand final on May 13. previous records, according to the official President Petro Poroshenko met with website of Eurovision 2017. organizers and hosts of the European Singer Salvador Sobral was declared the music contest and congratulated them on winner early on May 14 in the Ukrainian the successful completion of the contest. capital of Kyiv, giving Portugal its first victory “My sincere congratulations to you all. since it initially entered the contest in 1964. Eurovision 2017 was organized at a very The winner was determined by a combina- high level. This is the result of a very effi- tion of points awarded by national juries and cient coordination and interaction of your voting by telephone and text message from and our team,” he said. -
Elections, Revolution and Democracy in Ukraine
ELECTIONS, REVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE: REFLECTIONS ON A COUNTRY’S TURN TO DEMOCRACY, FREE ELECTIONS AND THE MODERN WORLD By Jeffrey Clark With Jason Stout October 2005 DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES: STRENGTHENING ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE PROJECT This publication was made possible through support provided by the Regional Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Agreement No. 121-A-00- 04-00701-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development. PREFACE A USAID-supported activity known as the Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project (SEAUP), administered by Development Associates, played a decidedly important role in facilitating Ukraine’s turn to democracy in 2004. The pages that follow provide evidence of that unequivocal conclusion, but just as importantly offer reflections on how the project was perceived and implemented of interest to promoters of free elections and democratization elsewhere. SEAUP’s success would have been unattainable without the unwavering support USAID gave the initiative and the trust placed in its professional staff. The Kyiv Mission granted considerable administrative flexibility that proved essential as political tensions increased and unplanned program inputs had to be devised virtually overnight to meet the challenges of a massively fraudulent vote and a court-ordered revote. The efforts of external players to foment anti-American sentiments further complicated the environment and imposed additional constraints on project implementers. USAID sponsored other implementing agencies actively supporting democratic consolidation in Ukraine, working directly with NDI, IRI, Freedom House, InterNews, and ABA/CEELI.