DOCSLIB.ORG

The Chomsky of Morality? a View of Morality As the Product of an Innate Mental Faculty — Rather Like Language

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Chomsky of Morality? a View of Morality As the Product of an Innate Mental Faculty — Rather Like Language Vol 443|26 October 2006 AUTUMN BOOKS The Chomsky of morality? A view of morality as the product of an innate mental faculty — rather like language. Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our a scene (“Omigod, he’s having GEE Universal Sense of Right and Wrong sex with a chicken!”) and then MA converge upon a moral judge- JOE by Marc D. Hauser Y B Ecco: 2006. 512 pp. $27.95 ment (“There should be a law against that.”). Paul Bloom & Izzat Jarudi TIONS A different concern is that TRA In Moral Minds, Marc Hauser makes an auda- languages are combinatorial US cious claim about moral thought. He argues symbolic systems. An English ILL that morality is best understood in much speaker, for example, knows the same way as Noam Chomsky described perhaps hundreds of thou- language: as the product of an innate and sands of words, and also knows universal mental faculty. For Hauser, moral principles of syntax that dictate intuition is not the product of culture and how these words combine with education, nor is it the result of rational and one another to form sentences. deliberative thought, nor does it reduce to the There are other combinatorial workings of the emotions. Instead, it is human systems in human cognition, nature to unconsciously and automatically such as number and music, evaluate the moral status of human actions: but it’s not clear that moral- to judge them as right or wrong, allowed or ity is one of them. Even if it is forbidden, optional or obligatory. distinct from emotion, moral As Hauser is careful to point out, he is not knowledge might be better the first to make the leap from a chomskyan characterized as a small list of theory of language to a chomskyan theory of evolved rules, perhaps simple morality: this analogy was proposed by the (such as a default prohibition political philosopher John Rawls, the legal against intentional harm), per- scholar John Mikhail of Georgetown Uni- haps complex (such as some versity in Washington DC, and by Chomsky version of the doctrine of himself. But Moral Minds is the first detailed double effect), but still very exploration of this idea. It is a trade book, different in character from highly accessible to a general audience and linguistic knowledge. drawing on diverse examples from literature, This combinatorial issue popular culture and history. But it is also a neuroscientific studies that support the exist- becomes relevant when it comes to differences deeply significant intellectual contribution: ence of innate principles of moral thought. in morality between people. The approach everything that’s done in the new science of In other regards, however, language seems developed by Chomsky explains differences in moral psychology in the coming years is going very different from morality. For one thing, human languages in terms of the parametric to be a response to this important and enjoy- linguistic knowledge is distinct from emotion. variation of universal principles. All languages able work. You might be disgusted or outraged by what have verb phrases, for instance, but in some of Certain deep parallels between language somebody says, but the principles that make them, such as English, the object follows the and morality make Hauser’s proposal worth sense of sentences are themselves entirely cold- verb, whereas in other languages the object taking seriously. Chomsky has long observed blooded. Your eyes do not well with tears as goes first. Hauser makes an excellent case that that language is a system of knowledge, but you unconsciously determine the structural the variation in moral systems is constrained in what we know (competence) is different from geometry of a verb phrase. By contrast — and interesting ways, but he provides no evidence how we use this knowledge in everyday life Hauser wrestles with this throughout Moral for parametric variation of the linguistic sort. (performance). Linguistic competence is also Minds — even those who accept that some Instead, as the cultural anthropologist Richard unconscious: every English speaker knows that moral capacity is innate often see it as inextri- Shweder of the University of Chicago, Illinois, something is wrong with the sentence “John cably linked to emotion. Perhaps the universal and others have argued, you get a difference seems sleeping,” but only experts understand core of morality is a set of emotional responses in emphasis: all cultures value both purity and why. Similarly, moral intuitions are imper- — disgust, shame, sympathy, guilt and so on fairness, for instance, but some emphasize the fectly linked to action — you can know the — that are triggered by certain situations. former and others the latter. In addition, there right thing to do but choose not to do it — and This hypothesis is supported by clear demon- can be dramatic variation in morality within an only experts can articulate adequate reasons strations that, at least in some circumstances, individual culture. As Hauser notes, for exam- for common-sense moral judgements. Finally, emotion precedes intuition. The psychologist ple, the culture of honour in countries such as just as there are, arguably, innate principles of Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia Pakistan leads to a shockingly high number language, Hauser reviews an extensive array in Charlottesville has found, for instance, that of ‘honour killings’ every year. However, that of cross-cultural, developmental, animal and we are sometimes first viscerally shocked by does not imply that all native Pakistanis agree 909 © 2006 Nature Publishing Group AUTUMN BOOKS NATURE|Vol 443|26 October 2006 on the moral permissibility of honour killings these sorts of deep parallels because, before is done well, although the tone is sometimes as they do on the linguistic grammaticality of Hauser, nobody had really looked. Moreover, gratingly folksy, and there is some unevenness in well-formed Urdu sentences. even if morality lacks certain interesting fea- the level of knowledge assumed (nano metres These differences call into question how tures of language, the very idea of an innate and natural logarithms are used without defi- much insight the research programme devel- moral faculty is well worth investigating. Lin- nition, for example). The explanations are oped by linguists can provide into morality. guists have been exploring this idea for more clear and easy to follow, and the level of fac- For instance, some arguments for linguistic than 50 years; in the study of morality, we are tual accuracy is very high, although effective innateness are based on assumptions about the just getting started. I population size is incorrectly used instead of generative nature of language; these might not Paul Bloom and Izzat Jarudi are in the population size in the book’s only equation. export well to the moral domain. In fairness, Department of Psychology, Yale University, Carroll also turns his attention to irra- though, it might be that nobody has found New Haven, Connecticut 06520–8205, USA. tional views on a variety of topics, including the genetics of Trofim Lysenko, chiropractic ‘medicine’, and opposition to vaccination. This paves the way for a discussion of disbelief in evolution, illustrated with some remarkable Evidence for evolution quotations from US anti-evolutionists. I am stunned by the ability of people to accept the The Making of the Fittest: DNA and the showing that these can spread to high frequen- absurd and discount the rational. Carroll seems Ultimate Forensic Record of Evolution cies in times that are trivially short compared confident that the mainstream religions do not by Sean B. Carroll with the geological record. Carroll then reject evolution, but he fails to mention Islam, W. W. Norton: 2006. 301 pp. $25.95 applies these results to the way that a species for which this is far from clear. He quotes with of desert-living mouse has adapted to spatial approval a statement by Pope John Paul II on Brian Charlesworth differences in the colour of the ground, right evolution, but does not refer to Cardinal Chris- Sean Carroll begins his excellent book The down to the mutational changes that lead to toph Schönborn’s anti-darwinian diatribe in Making of the Fittest by pointing out that darker coat colour. The New York Times on 7 July 2005. Carroll’s about 50% of the American public doubt Carroll illustrates the power of natural final chapter warns of the dangers arising from the truth of darwinian evolution, yet accept selection to generate evolutionary novelties climate change and the overexploitation of nat- other aspects of biological science, such as the by discussing duplications of the opsin genes ural resources, where scientific advice is often use of DNA in forensics. His involved in vertebrates’ colour vision. Exam- ignored by governments because of economic aim is to use evidence from ples of genes and genomes that decay when considerations. modern research on DNA to their function is no longer maintained As Carroll rightly concludes: “Understanding convince the general reader by natural selection illustrate and accepting evolution is a matter of adhering of “the case for biologi- how “selection acts to the scientific process.” It is extremely impor- cal evolution as the basis tant for scien- for life’s diversity, beyond tists to fight any reasonable doubt”. the idea that He deliberately does not evolution can introduce any of the be separated standard evidence for from the rest evolution as a histori- of science sim- cal process, and only ply because of its briefly describes the unpalatable impli- use of DNA sequence cations for traditional data to re con- religious accounts of struct phylogenies. human origins. We have Instead, he uses a to insist on the fact that series of examples scientific conclusions intended to pro- are based purely on vide compelling the study of nature, evidence for the without reference basic processes to religious or other involved in evo- authority.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics”
    Regina A. Rini (forthcoming). “Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics”. To appear in Springer Handbook of Neuroethics (ed. J. Clausen and N. Levy). Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics Regina A. Rini University of Oxford [email protected] Abstract: This chapter discusses the philosophical relevance of empirical research on moral cognition. It distinguishes three central aims of normative ethical theory: understanding the nature of moral agency, identifying morally right actions, and determining the justification of moral beliefs. For each of these aims, the chapter considers and rejects arguments against employing cognitive scientific research in normative inquiry. It concludes by suggesting that, whichever of the central aims one begins from, normative ethics is improved by engaging with the science of moral cognition. Key words: is/ought gap, moral agency, moral intuition, moral philosophy, ought-implies- can I. Three Central Questions of Normative Ethics It is undeniable that the field of empirical moral psychology has grown dramatically in the last decade, with new experimental techniques allowing us unprecedented understanding of the causal and computational structures of the human moral faculty. Or, at least, it is undeniable that this research contributes to a descriptive project, one of better understanding the facts about who we are and how we think.1 But what might be denied is that these investigations have much to offer to normative ethics, a distinctively prescriptive sort of inquiry.2 The purpose of this chapter is to show why normative ethics - the study of 1 Although this chapter discusses quite a range of psychological findings, it is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature.
    [Show full text]
  • DOI: 10.1126/Science.1137651 , 998 (2007); 316 Science Jonathan
    The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology Jonathan Haidt Science 316, 998 (2007); DOI: 10.1126/science.1137651 This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. If you wish to distribute this article to others, you can order high-quality copies for your colleagues, clients, or customers by clicking here. Permission to republish or repurpose articles or portions of articles can be obtained by following the guidelines here. The following resources related to this article are available online at www.sciencemag.org (this infomation is current as of February 15, 2012 ): Updated information and services, including high-resolution figures, can be found in the online version of this article at: on February 15, 2012 http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5827/998.full.html Supporting Online Material can be found at: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2007/05/15/316.5827.998.DC1.html A list of selected additional articles on the Science Web sites related to this article can be found at: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5827/998.full.html#related This article has been cited by 84 article(s) on the ISI Web of Science www.sciencemag.org This article has been cited by 35 articles hosted by HighWire Press; see: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5827/998.full.html#related-urls This article appears in the following subject collections: Psychology http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/collection/psychology Downloaded from Science (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published weekly, except the last week in December, by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy 316K Science and Philosophy: Moral Psychology MWF 1:00-2:00 GAR 3.116
    Philosophy 316K Science and Philosophy: Moral Psychology MWF 1:00-2:00 GAR 3.116 “In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology.” G. E. M. Anscombe “Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." E. O. Wilson “I do not believe that a moral philosophy can ever be founded on a scientific basis. The valuation of life and all its nobler expressions can only come out of the soul’s yearning toward its own destiny. Every attempt to reduce ethics to scientific formulas must fail. Of that I am perfectly convinced.” Albert Einstein Instructor: Michael Dale Email: [email protected] Office: WAG 421 Office Hours: XXXXXXXX & by appointment 1 Course Description: This particular version of Science and Philosophy will focus on the burgeoning field of moral psychology. The last few decades have seen unprecedented advances in the empirical sciences, particularly neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology. What happens when these empirical findings—many of which undermine or at least come into conflict with our ordinary intuitions about ourselves and the world—run up against the traditionally theoretical discipline of ethics? Can they weigh in on such debates or should they be understood as mere descriptions of the world? For example, can the empirical finding that peoples’ behavior is not so much predicted by their character traits but instead by the situations that they find themselves in undermine virtue ethics, which presupposes the existence of character traits? Or what about morality itself? Can the idea that natural selection shaped our moral beliefs call the objectivity of morality into question? In this class, we attempt to answer these questions.
    [Show full text]
  • How Should Neuroscience Study Emotions? by Distinguishing Emotion States, Concepts, and Experiences Ralph Adolphs
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Caltech Authors - Main Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2017, 24–31 doi: 10.1093/scan/nsw153 Advance Access Publication Date: 19 October 2016 Original article How should neuroscience study emotions? by distinguishing emotion states, concepts, and experiences Ralph Adolphs Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, HSS 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. E-mail: [email protected] Abstract In this debate with Lisa Feldman Barrett, I defend a view of emotions as biological functional states. Affective neuroscience studies emotions in this sense, but it also studies the conscious experience of emotion (‘feelings’), our ability to attribute emotions to others and to animals (‘attribution’, ‘anthropomorphizing’), our ability to think and talk about emotion (‘concepts of emotion’, ‘semantic knowledge of emotion’) and the behaviors caused by an emotion (‘expression of emotions’, ‘emotional reactions’). I think that the most pressing challenge facing affective neuroscience is the need to carefully distinguish between these distinct aspects of ‘emotion’. I view emotion states as evolved functional states that regulate complex behavior, in both people and animals, in response to challenges that instantiate recurrent environmental themes. These functional states, in turn, can also cause conscious experiences (feelings), and their effects and our memories for those effects also contribute to our semantic
    [Show full text]
  • Emotion and Public Attention to Political Issues
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship Political Science, Department of 4-2013 Emotion and Public Attention to Political Issues Michael W. Gruszczynski University of Nebraska-Lincoln Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses Part of the American Politics Commons Gruszczynski, Michael W., "Emotion and Public Attention to Political Issues" (2013). Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. 24. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/24 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. EMOTION AND PUBLIC ATTENTION TO POLITICAL ISSUES By Michael W. Gruszczynski A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: Political Science Under the Supervision of Professor John R. Hibbing Lincoln, Nebraska April, 2013 EMOTION AND PUBLIC ATTENTION TO POLITICAL ISSUES Michael W. Gruszczynski, Ph.D. University of Nebraska, 2013 Adviser: John R. Hibbing Which mechanisms underlie the orientation of public attention to political issues? Though research on media agenda-setting has been one of the most successful enterprises in political communication and behavior, little is known of the actual processes that drive this phenomenon. I hypothesize that inherent in all environmental stimuli is emotional information, and that it is this information that drives the linkages between media and public agendas.
    [Show full text]
  • Positive Emotion Dispositions Differentially Associated with Big Five Personality and Attachment Style
    The Journal of Positive Psychology, April 2006; 1(2): 61–71 Positive emotion dispositions differentially associated with Big Five personality and attachment style MICHELLE N. SHIOTA, DACHER KELTNER, & OLIVER P. JOHN University of California at Berkeley, USA Abstract Although theorists have proposed the existence of multiple distinct varieties of positive emotion, dispositional positive affect is typically treated as a unidimensional variable in personality research. We present data elaborating conceptual and empirical differences among seven positive emotion dispositions in their relationships with two core personality constructs, the ‘‘Big Five’’ and adult attachment style. We found that the positive emotion dispositions were differentially associated with self- and peer-rated Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and Neuroticism. We also found that different adult attachment styles were associated with different kinds of emotional rewards. Findings support the theoretical utility of differentiating among several dispositional positive emotion constructs in personality research. Keywords: Emotion; positive emotion; positive psychology; personality; Big Five; attachment Downloaded By: [CDL Journals Account] At: 22:51 20 December 2007 Introduction Shiota, Campos, Keltner, & Hertenstein, 2004). In the present investigation we explored distinctions Philosophers and writers have long debated the nature among the major personality correlates of several of happiness, reaching a wide range of conclusions, corresponding positive emotion dispositions. Prior but never a consensually accepted definition. studies have documented robust relationships Recently scientists have joined this enterprise, creat- between global positive affect and the Big Five trait ing a flourishing line of inquiry: a Psycinfo search Extraversion, as well as secure adult attachment for ‘‘happiness’’ now yields over 4,500 citations.
    [Show full text]
  • Gene-Culture Coevolution, Group Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation
    EC_2018_A12 Gene-Culture coevolution, group selection, and the evolution of Cooperation The Evolution of Cooperation How can altruism / cooperation evolve? 1 EC_2018_A12 Levels of Selection "although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe (...) an advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another.” (C. Darwin, Descent of Man, 1871) Levels of Selection Individuals (“basic” [Neo]Darwinism) Genes (“Selfish-gene” Sociobiology) Groups? Multilevel selection? Higher-level adaptations? Genetic Group Selection? “Naïve group selectionism”: The probability of survival of individual living things, or of populations, increases with the degree with which they harmoniously adjust themselves to each other and to their environment. This principle is basic to the concept of the balance of nature, orders the subject matter of ecology and evolution, underlies organismic and developmental biology, and is the foundation for all sociology. (Allee et al. 1949) “The good of the species” (Wynne-Edwards) 2 EC_2018_A12 Levels of Selection Migration, genetic drift, etc: Intergroup effects weaker than intragroup, interindividual selection. Intra x intergroup differences X Wilson DS & Wilson EO (2007) Rethinking the theoretical foundation of sociobiology Multi-level selection/ limits in kin selection theory/ “major transitions” Eusociality: Kin Selection X Individual selection + preadaptations. (communal nests) Nowak, Tarnita & Wilson, “The Evolution of Eusociality”, Nature 2010 (X Abbot et al [+100!], Nature 2011) “Major Transitions” in Evolution Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1997 “Apart from the evolution of the genetic code, all these transitions involve the coming together of previously independent replicators, to cooperate in a higher-level assembly that reproduces as a single unit.” 3 EC_2018_A12 Natural selection & the evolution of cooperation Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization.
    [Show full text]
  • How People Think About Fairness and Why It Matters for Equitable Budgets
    How People Think About Fairness and Why It Matters for Equitable Budgets Jason Lakin May 2019 1. BACKGROUND Ideas about justice, fairness, altruism, and redistribution are at the core of the work we do around government budgets at the International Budget Partnership. Along with other global and national civil society organizations, we believe that tax and expenditure policies should allow everyone, and not just the rich, the opportunity to lead a dignified life. Yet the progressive policies necessary to yield such an outcome are perpetually contested and achieving them depends on significant support from the public. It is a foundational assumption of this paper that building support among a broader public for progressive policies is one among several important facilitating conditions for reform. Support for redistributive policies is partly kindled by self-interest – e.g., we might expect that it will come from those below the median in income (or wealth) who will benefit the most – but, in most cases, self-interest is not enough to motivate widespread support for redistribution. This is because either (1) the intended beneficiaries do not constitute a majority of the population, (2) despite constituting a majority, the beneficiaries do not support these policies for other reasons, or (3) even when the beneficiaries are a majority, the alliances needed to introduce and maintain these policies require support from smaller groups who have disproportionate power and influence over the political system and will not directly benefit from them. Thus, creating a moral case for fair budget policies – one that can galvanize a broad coalition – is integral to achieving progress.
    [Show full text]
  • Methods, Models, and the Evolution of Moral Psychology
    Methods, Models, and the Evolution of Moral Psychology Cailin O'Connor Abstract Why are we good? Why are we bad? Questions regarding the evolution of morality have spurred an astoundingly large interdisciplinary literature. Some significant subset of this body of work addresses questions regarding our moral psychology: how did humans evolve the psychological properties which underpin our systems of ethics and morality? Here I do three things. First, I discuss some methodological issues, and defend particularly effective methods for addressing many research questions in this area. Second, I give an in-depth example, describing how an explanation can be given for the evolution of guilt|one of the core moral emotions|using the methods advocated here. Last, I lay out which sorts of strategic scenarios generally are the ones that our moral psychology evolved to `solve', and thus which models are the most useful in further exploring this evolution. 1. Introduction Why are we good? Why are we bad? Questions regarding the evolution of morality have spurred an astoundingly large interdisciplinary literature with contributions from (at least) biology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and computer science. Some sig- nificant subset of this body of work addresses questions regarding our moral psychology: how did humans evolve the psychological properties which underpin our systems of ethics and morality? Debates in this literature are ongoing, and often heated. One reason for this is that there are a number of methodological problems researchers must tackle in addressing the evolution of moral psychology. Human psychology evolved in the deep past, over the course of millions of years, and as a result of countless interactions between individuals.
    [Show full text]
  • What Disgust Does and Does Not Do for Moral Cognition Jared Piazzaa
    What Disgust Does and Does Not Do for Moral Cognition Jared Piazzaa, Justin F. Landyb, Alek Chakroffc Liane Youngd, Emily Wassermand a Lancaster University, Department of Psychology b University of Chicago Booth School of Business cCharlie Finance Co., San Francisco, CA dBoston College, Psychology Department 2 1. Introduction Disgust is typically characterized as a negative emotion associated with the rejection of distasteful or contaminating objects (Rozin and Fallon 1987). The physiological aspects of disgust involve nausea and loss of appetite, and the bodily expression of disgust includes behaviors (e.g., gagging, vomiting) designed to orally block or expel noxious substances (Ekman and Friesen 1971; Royzman, Leeman and Sabini 2008; Rozin, Haidt and McCauley 2008; Yoder, Widen and Russell 2016). The canonical elicitors of disgust are well documented: many people report feeling nauseous or sick at the sight or smell of oral contaminants (e.g., rotten food, bodily waste) and/or disease vectors (e.g., blood, skin maladies, sexual fluids, certain animals; Curtis, Aunger and Rabie, 2004; Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 1994; Olatunji et al. 2007). It is uncontroversial that disgust can also be evoked in the context of a moral offense. What remains controversial is disgust’s role or relevance within a moral context. When Armin Meiwes, the Rotenburg Cannibal, was discovered to have eaten the severed penis of his voluntary victim, before killing him and consuming his flesh over the next ten months, the story of this crime undoubtedly aroused disgust (and horror) in many of us. The relevant question is not whether we felt disgust about this crime—for most of us, human penis is not on the menu, and the thought of Meiwes’ preferred cuisine is deeply distasteful.
    [Show full text]
  • Moral Psychology Fall 2016
    PSYC GU4672: Moral Psychology Fall 2016 PSYC GU4672: Moral Psychology (seminar, 4 points). Fall 2016. Tuesdays, 10:10 AM – 12:00 PM. 405 Schermerhorn Instructor: Larisa Heiphetz ([email protected]) Office hours: By appointment The best way to reach me is via e-mail, and I typically reply to e-mails within 48 hours. I am happy to meet with you throughout the semester to discuss anything related to the course; please e-mail me to set up an appointment. I. Bulletin description II. A full description of the content of the course III. The rationale for giving the course IV. The reading list and weekly syllabus V. Course requirements I. Bulletin description Prerequisites: Two courses in psychology, including at least one course with a focus on social and/or developmental psychology, and permission of the instructor. Review of theories and current research on moral cognition and behavior. Topics include definitions of morality, the development of moral cognition, the role that other aspects of human experience (e.g., emotion, intentions) play in moral judgments, and the relationship between moral psychology and other areas of study (e.g., religious cognition, prejudice and stereotyping, the criminal justice system). II. A full description of the content of the course. How do children learn to distinguish right from wrong? Why do some people act more morally than others, and how is it that the same person can make moral decisions in some circumstances but not others? What does it mean to be “moral”? Questions like these have fascinated scholars and laypeople for centuries. In this seminar, we will discuss a) theories of moral cognition and b) empirical findings on morality in children and adults.
    [Show full text]
  • Psychedelic Unselfing and Moral Perception
    Psychedelic Unselfing and Moral Perception A Philosophical Account of the Change of Values Induced by Psychedelic Experiences Juuso Viljami Kähönen University of Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences Philosophy Master’s Thesis April 2020 Abstract Scientific and scholarly attention to psychedelics has recently faced a resurgence. Recent studies suggest that psychedelic experiences can change values and behavioral dispositions, for example increase appreciation of nature and increase prosocial behavior. For this reason psychedelics have been identified as a promising option for moral neuroenhancement. However, we still struggle to understand these changes in the valuations psychedelics induce, or why exactly they are morally enhancing. In this thesis I construct a philosophical framework to understand these changes. I combine Iris Murdoch and Abraham Maslow’s thinking with empirical studies on psychedelics and experiences of self-transcendence. Psychedelics induce experiences of self-transcendence which involve evaluative changes. I argue that these changes are not random but result from an intelligible process. I first claim that psychedelics in some cases induce unselfing, that is, perspectival and evaluative changes resulting from reduction of salience attributed to oneself. By reducing egoic centering, unselfing opens our attention to the world and can cause perspectival widening from egocentric into more allocentric (other- directed) or cosmocentric (universal) perspective. The second main claim is that the process of unselfing is often connected to sharpened perception of values. The increased attention to the world and reduced egocentric attributions of salience, resulting from unselfing, can widen our evaluative context and make it possible to perceive or grasp intrinsic values better, thus ‘tuning the moral compass’ away from instrumental egocentric mode of evaluation.
    [Show full text]