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Egypt's Shiite Minority: Between the Egyptian Hammer and the Iranian

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Egypt's Shiite Minority: Between the Egyptian Hammer and the Iranian No. 591 September 23, 2012 http://jcpa.org/article/egypts-shiite-minority-between-the-egyptian-hammer-and-the-iranian-anvil/ Egypt’s Shiite Minority: Between the Egyptian Hammer and the Iranian Anvil Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah While some 90 percent of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, the number of Shia in Egypt has been estimated at up to 2.2 million, including “Twelvers” and Ismailis. A Shiite dynasty, the Fatimids, conquered Egypt in 969 and ruled the country for 200 years. The new Muslim Brotherhood President of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi, is reported to have said that the Shia are more dangerous to Islam than the Jews, while former Muslim Brotherhood leader and presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh warned during the campaign that Shiism must not be allowed to enter Egypt. At its core, the Muslim Brotherhood’s basic ideological doctrine is pan-Islamic and religiously inclusive, seeking to downplay religious differences between Sunnism and Shiism. However, the Brotherhood’s initial enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution soon soured as it was increasingly perceived as a Persian nationalist and distinctly Shiite revolution. This perception became widespread in Sunni Arab societies after Iran attempted to export its revolution to Gulf Arab states, and after it formed an alliance with the Syrian regime, which was engaged in an open clash with the Brotherhood’s Syrian branch. President Morsi, as his predecessors before him, has adopted a confrontational policy toward the Shiite minority and he will not tolerate any affiliation with Iran. Egyptian President Morsi – A Sunni Hero? Much has been written about the visit of Egypt’s newly-elected president, Mohammad Morsi, to Iran at the end of August 2012 and its implications for Egypt’s regional and global policies, especially vis-a-vis Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh. However, Morsi’s international debut made its biggest impact at home. After he publicly denounced Syria’s regime while being hosted by Damascus’ top ally, Iran, his speech pointed to the new image he is attempting to cultivate: The tough, fearless leader who speaks with the voice of the people who chose him. For Islamists, he was a Sunni hero against the Shia.1 Clearly, Egypt intends to normalize its relations with Iran, whereas Mubarak’s Egypt was constantly raising the specter of Iranian plots meant to destabilize his regime. Still, even though Iran was the first Muslim country after Saudi Arabia that Morsi visited, the Arab street took note that Morsi, a life member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, rejects the notion of an Iran-led “Shiite crescent” posing a threat to the Sunni communities of the Muslim Middle East. Morsi won praise from ultra-conservative Sunnis in Egypt who are his key allies and who only days earlier were loudly denouncing his trip to Shiite-majority Iran. For the first time in modern Egyptian history, an Egyptian president hit notes that were music to Salafi ears. Morsi kicked off his address with a salute to Abu Bakr and Omar, the Companions of the Prophet Mohammad and his first successors. Ultra-conservative Salafis despise Shia as heretics. Mentioning these two successors was seen as an implicit snub to Iran: Sunnis revere them, but Shia hate them because they are seen as cheating the man they see as Mohammad’s rightful successor, Ali. The reference to the Companions of the Prophet was no coincidence. Morsi has a Muslim agenda that unfolds step by step. His first move was during Id-el-Fitr prayers, when the Egyptian president chose to pray at the Amr Ibn el ‘As Mosque, named for the Arab Muslim conqueror of the seventh century and the Muslim colonizer of Egypt. In his salute to the Companions of the Prophet, Morsi hit an exposed nerve in Egyptian society, signifying to Salafis, Sunnis, Muslim Brothers and Egyptian Shia his stance vis-a-vis the Shiite question in Egypt, an issue that is rarely discussed in the press. A Shiite Dynasty Ruled Egypt for 200 Years Islamis the state religion of Egypt. Most citizens, approximately 90 percent, are Sunni Muslims. Although there are no official statistics about the number of Shia in Egypt, it has been estimated that they constitute roughly one percent of the population: around one million people. Some scholars put Egypt’s current Ismaili population (the second largest branch of Shia Islam after the “Twelvers”) well above one percent and estimate Egypt’s total Shia population at 2.2 million, mainly concentrated in seldom-studied southern Upper Egypt.2 The main Shiite institution in Egypt is Al Majlis Al-A’la le Ahl al-Bayt (the Higher Council for the Protection of Ahl al-Bayt – the House of the Prophet Mohammad) headed by Mohammad el Dereiny.3 The notion that Shiism is imported or alien to Egypt is incorrect. A Shiite dynasty, the Fatimids, conquered Egypt in 969 and ruled the country for 200 years. The Fatimid Islamic Caliphate, or al-Fatimiyyun, was an Ismaili Shiite Muslim caliphate that spanned a vast area of the Arab world, from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. Originally based in Tunisia, the Fatimid dynasty extended its rule across the Mediterranean coast of Africa, and ultimately made Egypt the center of its caliphate. At its height, in addition to Egypt, the caliphate included areas of the Maghreb, Sudan, Sicily, the Levant, and Hijaz. The ruling elite of the state belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shiism. The leaders of the dynasty were also Shiite Ismaili imams; hence, they had a religious significance to Ismaili Muslims. They were also part of the chain of holders of the office of caliph. Therefore, this constituted a rare period in history in which the descendants of Ali (hence the name Fatimid, referring to Ali’s wife Fatima) and the caliphate were united to any degree, except for the final period of the Rashidun Caliphate under Ali himself. The caliphate lasted from 909 to 1171, when Saladin became Sultan of Egypt and returned the country to the nominal fealty of the Sunni Muslim Abbasid Caliphate. Although the Fatimids endowed numerous mosques, shrines, and theological schools, they did not firmly establish their faith in Egypt. Numerous sectarian conflicts among Fatimid Ismailis after 1050 may have been a factor in Egyptian Muslim acceptance of Saladin’s (Salah ad Din ibn Ayyub) reestablishment of Sunni Islam as the state religion in 1171. The Al Azhar theological school, endowed by the Fatimids, changed quickly from a center of Shiite learning to a bastion of Sunni orthodoxy. Yet Egypt remains a country with strong Shiite ties. The cultural legacy of Ahl al-Bayt (descendants of the Prophet Mohammad, literally, “people of the house”) remains strong even today. The clearest testament to the strength of Egyptian reverence for the Ahl al-Bayt is seen in the abundance of shrines and mosques dedicated to Hussein, Hassan, Zainab, Ali, and other Shia imams. Many of the Fatimid era’s traditions are still practiced. Shiite practices such as celebrating Al- Mawlid Al-Nabawy (the Prophet’s birthday), Ashura (commemorating of Al-Hussein’s death), and even using lanterns during Ramadan are still common in Egypt. Egyptian Sunnis visit important shrines in Cairo such as Al-Hussein and Sayeda Zainab, and celebrate the deceased in a manner that overlaps with both Shiite and Sufi practices. Followers of conservative Wahhabi Islam, who view these practices as aberrations, often rebuke them for doing so. Shiite scholars trace three generations of Egyptian Shia:4 The first generation was contemporaneous with Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, who first stirred the dispute over who should follow Mohammad in leading the Muslims after the Prophet’s Companions, who were not blood relatives, took over. This generation ceased to exist after years of Sunni rule. The second generation involved Iranians who immigrated to Egypt in the nineteenth century and retained their Shiite faith. Former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s wife was herself a descendant of this group. Finally, there are converts, many of whom were drawn to the faith after the Iranian revolution and the media campaign against Iran under Sadat. Many are former members of Islamist groups such as Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood. Disenchanted with the jihadist movement’s failure, these men found an alternative in Shia Islam and the new Islamic state being chiseled out by Ayatollah Khomeini. If Shiite ideology could not penetrate Egypt even under Shiite Fatimid rule, it seems that the intensive Shiite preaching efforts, sponsored by Iran and its religious leaders, have borne fruit and perhaps dozens of thousands of Egyptians have converted to Shiism. The new converts are disguised in more than 76 Sufi groups5 that seem to be the ultimate refuge of Shia in Egypt. Because of their relative obscurity and the fact that they tend to shy away from public or political activism, Shia are often overlooked in discussions of Egypt’s religious minorities. Misinterpretation and confusion abound among both Sunni and Shiite communities, making reconciliation or acceptance between them an increasingly challenging task. The schism between Sunni and Shiite Islam dates back to the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 632 CE and focuses basically on who should have replaced him as Muslim ruler, but the historical nature of the split does little to lessen the reality of Shia living and worshiping in Egypt. Efforts by Al-Azhar University to bridge the gap between the various schools of thought have done little to reconcile Shiite and Sunni ideologies. Sheikh Mahmood Shaltoot, head of Al-Azhar University in 1959, issued a fatwa recognizing the legitimacy of the Jafari school of law to which most Shia belong.
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