Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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The End of a Two-State Settlement? WP Alternatives and Priorities for Settling the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Muriel Asseburg and Jan Busse S

On the occasion of their joint government consultations in February 2016, Prime Minis- ter Benjamin Netanyahu and Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed that this was not the time for making major progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, given the in- stability in the Middle East. However, merely adhering to a two-state settlement as a mantra without taking any concrete steps to implement it effectively reinforces the one-state reality under Israeli dominance. Ultimately, this will make settling the con- flict impossible. Popular support for a two-state solution is waning on both sides. While at present alternative one-state or confederate models have even slimmer chances of being realized, Germany and the EU should nevertheless explore the creative and con- structive aspects of these models, which would enable the two sides to maintain their national identities as well as realize their individual and collective rights. Their priority, however, should be to alter the cost-benefit calculation of the parties to the conflict, so as to generate the political will for bringing about a settlement at all.

Since the 1947 UN partition resolution, Security Council in February 2011. They large parts of the international community comprise a territorial settlement on the as well as the most important representa- basis of the 1967 borders, with agreed land tives of the parties to the conflict and their swaps; security arrangements that take into populations have come to adopt the two- account the needs of both sides; a solution state paradigm as their preferred option to the refugee issue that is both just and for lastingly settling the Israeli-Palestinian acceptable to the conflict parties and the conflict. The UN Security Council explicitly main host nations; and as the confirmed this approach in its Resolution capital of both states. The 1993 Israeli-Pales- 1397 of March 2002. tinian Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) The cornerstones of a two-state settle- were a decisive step in that the Palestine ment have long been defined. US President Liberation Organisation (PLO) formally Barack Obama formulated them in his first recognized the State of Israel. In turn, Israel speech to the UN General Assembly in Sep- formally recognized not a Palestinian state, tember 2009; the E3 (Germany, , but at least the PLO – and thus the Pales- United Kingdom) presented them to the UN tinians’ right to self-determination. Since

Dr. Muriel Asseburg is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division. SWP Comments 24 Jan Busse is a lecturer and research fellow in the Department of International Politics and Conflict Research at the April 2016 Universität der Bundeswehr Munich. This SWP Comments is based in part on a chapter of their forthcoming book, Der Nahostkonflikt: Geschichte, Positionen, Perspektiven (C. H. Beck, August 2016).

1 then, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the fact that these were only meant to be unofficial talks have worked out detailed valid for a five-year interim period leading approaches for settling all areas of conflict. to an independent Palestinian State. The Yet today, the positions of the parties are Accords essentially limit the PA to self- far apart on all final-status issues – notice- adminsitration and keeping internal order ably further apart than in previous nego- in the largely unconnected Areas A and B tiations. Under international pressure, (enclaves totalling around 38 percent of Prime Minister Netanyahu did commit in the ). Since the Second Intifada, principle to a two-state solution in a 2009 Israel has also reserved the right to carry speech at Bar Ilan University. In his 2015 out its own military operations and arrests electoral campaign, however, he explicitly in Area A. In Area C of the West Bank promised his voters that no Palestinian (around 62 percent), the Accords provide State would be created during his mandate. for extensive Israeli control over security; His government has yet to commit itself civil order; and construction as well as to a two-state approach; several ministers land and resource use (see also the map in reject it explicitly and demand Israeli sover- UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas 2015, http:// eignty over at least parts of the occupied www.ochaopt.org/documents/atlas_2015_ Palestinian territories. They put forward web.pdf, p. 4). At the same time, the Oslo not only security reasons, but also histori- Accords give Israel control over the Pales- cally and religiously based claims to “Judea tinian territories’ air space and sea and land and Samaria”. borders during the interim period. This is By contrast, the leadership in Ramallah still the case today. Israel only gave up has adhered to its quest for Palestinian control over the border between the Gaza statehood and the two-state approach. Strip and Egypt in mid-2007. Last but not Whenever Palestinian politicians have re- least, the Oslo Accords cemented Israel’s ferred to dissolving the Palestinian Author- dominance over Jerusalem and the Pales- ity (PA) and instead campaigning for equal tinian economy, especially trade, currency citizens’ rights in one state, should no and access to resources. progress be made in the peace process, this Moreover, throughout the Oslo process has merely been a threatening gesture. all Israeli governments – regardless of their Even so, like their Israeli counterparts, they political affiliations – forged ahead with no longer expect bilateral negotiations to building settlements in the Palestinian ter- lead to an acceptable conflict settlement. ritories. In summer 2005, the Sharon gov- Both conflict parties therefore rely first and ernment only evacuated the settlements in foremost on unilateral steps to realize their the resource-poor and ideologically insig- respective interests and only maintain a nificant Gaza Strip – which is not consid- minimum level of cooperation in managing ered part of the historic homeland of the the conflict. Jewish people. As a result, around 350,000 settlers now live in about 125 settlements among some 2.89 million Palestinians in Consolidation of a one-state reality the West Bank. In East Jerusalem, there are Meanwhile, a one-state reality has long taken some 200,000 settlers in 12 settlements. An shape in the area of the former British additional 10,000 settlers live in about 100 Mandate of Palestine (for details see SWP outposts. These are illegal under Israeli law Comments 21/2014). Israel might only have as well, but they are increasingly legalized annexed a part of the Palestinian territories retroactively, removed only temporarily, that it occupies – East Jerusalem – but it or else rebuilt on a different site after being also has extensive control over the rest. The removed. foundations for this situation were laid in A complex system has thus evolved be- the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995, despite tween the Mediterranean Sea and the river

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2 Jordan, under which inhabitants enjoy – or state settlement was rejected by a majority are deprived of – different rights depending (51 percent) of the Palestinians surveyed for on their citizenship, place of residence the first time. By December 2015, the rejec- (Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusa- tion rate had reached 54 percent. In addi- lem) and ethno-religious identity. Today, tion, two-thirds of those surveyed no longer the area controlled by Israel no longer has a thought the approach viable because of Jewish majority. Of the around 12.6 million settlement construction. The same trend people living there, around 6.2 million are has been shown among the Israeli popula- Jews and 6.3 million Arabs (Palestinians and tion. According to a poll by the Harry S. other Arab minorities). In the coming years, Truman Institute of the Hebrew University demographics are likely to change further in Jerusalem, support in Israel for a two- in favour of the Arab share, especially as state settlement stood at 51 percent in June large waves of Jewish immigration, as were 2015. A year earlier, it had been at 62 per- seen in the 1980s and 1990s, are not to be cent. Clearly, many Israelis share the assess- expected. ment that a two-state settlement is no longer realistic. They also do not expect it to bring about peace. Waning support In both societies, frustration over the A two-state settlement is becoming increas- failure of the peace process is also accom- ingly unlikely. The financial and political panied by seeing one’s own side (only) as a costs of implementing it rise with every victim, by demonizing the other side, by settlement unit needing to be demolished becoming increasingly radical and by en- and with every settler needing to be evacu- dorsing violence. This finds expression in ated and compensated. At the same time, concrete acts of violence, such as the (knife) the occupation and the construction of attacks by Palestinian perpetrators and the settlements are increasingly fragmenting so-called price-tag attacks by Israeli settlers the Palestinian territories – and thus the (attacks meant to signal that measures run- territory that would be available for a Pales- ning contrary to settler interests have a tinian state. Other factors contribute to the price). Around 30 Israelis and 150 Palestin- problem: the construction of settlement ians have died in the latest escalation of infrastructure and the separation barrier; violence from October 2015 to the end of the isolation of East Jerusalem and the March 2016. Even though this escalation – blockade of the Gaza Strip; and a complex described by many observers as a “third system of checkpoints, separated streets intifada” – has so far not assumed the shape and permits. In addition, the split between of an organized uprising, the lack of a Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the political horizon (US-mediated talks broke Gaza Strip, which has led to the creation of down in April 2014) is jeopardising the con- two government and security apparatuses flict management agreed upon in Oslo. and two legal systems, is endangering the Radicalisation has been acompanied by creation of one single Palestinian state. an erosion of democratic values. According As a result, populations in Israel and to the Israel Democracy Institute, in 2015 a the Palestinian areas have increasingly quarter of the Jewish Israelis polled rejected abandoned the two-state approach. While equal rights for non-Jewish Israelis. Almost this formula enjoyed majority support 40 percent saw a strong leader who was not among both the Israeli and Palestinian subject to democratic controls as the solu- populations in polls from the mid-2000s tion to Israel’s problems. In the Palestinian onwards, support has noticeably waned in territories, the decreasing popularity of the both societies since then. According to the leaderships in both Gaza and Ramallah (not Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey least because of the lack of progress made Research (PCPSR), in December 2014 a two- in ending the occupation) has prompted

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3 further restrictions on political freedoms. for Jewish dominance, proposals for a bi- In any case, the Palestinian political system national state, and concepts for a confeder- is democratic in name only (even if one dis- ation of two independent states. counts the occupation). At the same time, an opinion poll carried out by PCPSR in September 2015 found that the creation A Jewish-dominated state of a democratic political order was the top In Israel, supporters of a one-state approach priority for only 9 percent of Palestinians. can especially be found on the right of They attached more importance to ending the political spectrum. Its supporters claim the occupation (48 percent); realizing the ownership of the West Bank for religious- right of return (30 percent); and Islamizing ideological motives. For instance, the for- society (13 percent). Fuelled by the conflict, mer foreign and defence minister Moshe the domestic political developments in Arens and President (both both polities thus also run contrary to the Likud) reject a two-state settlement and in- international expectation that a two-state stead promote annexing the West Bank and approach would lead to the creation of two granting its Palestinian population civil democratic states. rights. On both sides, confrontational methods Naftali Bennett, the leader of the ex- of conducting the conflict (violence, boy- treme-right settler party The Jewish Home, cott, legal recourse, internationalisation education minister and member of the vs. military approaches, settlement drive, security cabinet, likewise rejects a Palestin- collective punishment, sealing-off and ian State. In his “Stability Plan” presented blockade) are increasingly seen as having in 2012, he advocates the unilateral annexa- no alternative. Moreover, the Israeli opposi- tion of the West Bank’s Area C and the tion offers no credible alternatives that Israeli settlements. The Palestinians living might lead to a two-state settlement. Oppo- in Area C would receive full civil rights in sition leader Isaac Herzog’s plan for sepa- Israel. Bennett’s plan, however, not only ration from the Palestinians, which he seriously underestimates the number of presented in early 2016, stems from the Palestinians concerned – he puts them same siege mentality as Netanyahu’s at 50,000 while the UN’s 2014 estimate is policies. As a consequence, there is a risk 300,000 – it also grants the Palestinian not only of a renewed confrontation between populations of Areas A and B only autono- Israel and the Gaza Strip, which is likely to mous self-administration. be even more violent and destructive than These and similar proposals for settling the last one, but also of a further erosion or the conflict that emanate from the Israeli even collapse of the PA caused by an escala- right thus represent a formalisation of the tion of the current violence into an armed one-state reality. They stipulate keeping uprising, a worsening of the PA’s financial different sets of rights – albeit to varying crisis, or violent Palestinian infighting degrees – including preferential treatment for the succession to President Abbas (born for Jews over Palestinians. They reject Pales- 1935). tinian statehood on principle. Palestinians in the annexed areas would be granted Israeli citizenship and individual civil rights, Alternatives to the two-state model but as a collective, they would have only In light of the growing doubts about the limited political rights. In other words, this viability of a two-state settlement, both approach aims not at a binational state, but the Israeli and the Palestinian side have in at a Jewish-dominated one-state model, in the past few years developed alternative which Israeli sovereignty would be formally approaches to dealing with the conflict. extended to parts of the occupied territo- These include one-state models that provide ries. It is also striking that these proposals

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4 explicitly or implicitly exclude the Gaza theorist who decisively marked the inter- Strip. For only without the Gaza population national debate on Palestine before his (of around 1.85 million at the end of 2015, death in 2003, argued as early as 1999 for according to the Palestinian Central Bureau the creation of a binational state as an of Statistics) would it be possible to main- alternative to the Oslo peace process. He tain a demographic Jewish majority in such underlined the multiple interdependencies a state in the medium term. In the same between the two sides, making partition vein, such proposals also categorically ex- practically impossible; and he did not think clude the right of return for Palestinian that it was viable to assert Palestinian na- refugees. tional self-determination in a separate state because of Israeli claims to the territory. Instead, he considered equal civil rights for A democratic binational state Israelis and Palestinians to be the decisive Alongside these ideas, there are proposals foundation for an effective coexistence in for a one-state settlement, or for a binational one state. state, that stipulate the same rights for In 2011, the Palestinian philosopher Sari Israelis and Palestinians. Except for the in- Nusseibeh – the PLO’s former representa- ternational contributions to the debate, tive in East Jerusalem, long-standing Presi- these proposals stem from a relatively small dent of Al Quds University there, and long- minority of post-Zionist Israelis. For in- time supporter of a two-state settlement – stance, the former Labour Party politician argued in favour of an Israeli annexation of and speaker of the , Avraham Burg, the occupied territories, in what was a pro- sees the low probability of a two-state settle- vocative thought experiment for Palestin- ment as an opportunity for promoting a ian society. In his scenario, Palestinians state based on equality, justice and freedom would initially be second-class citizens with for Israelis and Palestinians. For the Israeli civil but not political rights; establishing historian Ilan Pappé, such a one-state for- full civil rights in one state would, for Nus- mula represents the only possibility of end- seibeh, significantly improve their living ing the discrimination against the Pales- conditions compared to life under occu- tinian population of Israel and the Israeli pation. The Palestinian academic and occupation, and of enabling Palestinian activist Ghada Karmi advocates a one-state refugees to return to their homeland. approach for different reasons. She con- The Israeli sociologist Yehouda Shenhav siders the quest for Palestinian statehood a has also argued in favour of a one-state delusion, and therefore backs the struggle approach. For him, the main problem with for equal rights, not least to lay bare the a two-state settlement is that in focusing injustices of the occupation. on the occupation that started in 1967, it In his 2006 book One Country, the Pales- neglects the injustices committed in and tinian-American journalist and activist Ali resulting from the 1948 war. Moreover, the Abunimah suggests a one-state solution eviction of settlers would create new in- based on eight principles: equal treatment justices. He therefore supports a consocia- for all male and female citizens and respect tional democratic system within a single for civil, political, social and cultural rights; state. A central element of the political the founding of a union of two national order would be a joint Israeli-Palestinian communities with equal rights; preserving constitutional court. the linguistic and cultural traditions of Additionally, ever more Palestinian both nations; religious freedom and neu- intellectuals and activists – in contrast to trality of the state towards religious com- the nationalist factions of the PLO – are munities; accepting forms of inclusive iden- taking a stance for a one-state settlement. tity that transcend the borders of national For instance, Edward Said, the literary communities and overcome identities that

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5 are based on rejecting the other side; confederate parliament, which would have recognising special relationships with the to take into account the individual rights respective diaspora communities; giving of citizens of the Union, regardless of where the state special responsibility for protect- they live. To solve the refugee issue, Halper ing the holy sites of the three monotheistic suggests giving the Palestinian population world religions and guaranteeing access to the possibility of choosing within the frame- them; promoting economic opportunities, work of the Union whether they want to social justice and a dignified life for all acquire Palestinian citizenship or the citi- citizens as well as reparations for victims zenship of their host country. Within the of earlier injustices. Union there would be freedom of move- Whilst the above proposals for a one- ment, residence and employment. In this state settlement differ in the details, they scenario, Palestinian refugees could return share a number of characteristics: In par- to Israel without receiving Israeli citizen- ticular, they provide for a binational, ship. Their presence would thus not be a democratic and secular state for Israelis challenge to the character of the Israeli and Palestinians, in which both collective state. In parallel, Israeli settlers could live and minority rights enjoy effective protec- in the West Bank under Palestinian sover- tion. They thus fundamentally differ from eignty. such one-state approaches as promoted, for In November 2014, the Israeli-Palestin- instance, by Hamas in its charter, where ian non-governmental organisation IPCRI the whole country is considered an “Islamic (Israel-Palestine: Creative Regional Initia- endowment” (waqf) that God has entrusted tives) presented the most comprehensive to Muslims. While Jews would be allowed to plan yet for a confederation. It was elabo- live in it as well, they would neither have rated with the participation of Israeli and equal status nor collective political rights. Palestinian representatives from the politi- It is interesting to note that in the past cal sphere, academia and civil society, and decade Hamas has taken a pragmatic turn provided for the creation of two independ- towards the two-state paradigm and de- ent, sovereign and democratic states on the facto coexistence with Israel. basis of the 1967 borders. The two states would form a political and economic union, with joint economic and social institutions Confederate models and a High Court for Human Rights. Bor- There are, however, also innovative ap- ders between the two states would be open; proaches that go beyond a one- or two-state and their citizens would enjoy freedom of approach. In this context, confederate movement and, eventually, freedom of resi- models are of particular relevance. In 2004 dence as well. Jerusalem would be an open the Israeli anthropologist and human- city, and the capital of both states. This rights activist Jeff Halper proposed a two- would solve three crucial problems: first, step plan for solving the Israeli-Palestinian Jerusalem would not be divided; second, conflict. His approach is based on the reali- Palestinian refugees would be allowed to sation that the conflict’s core problems can return; and third, Jewish settlements in the only be solved on the regional level. First, West Bank would not have to be evacuated. he suggests creating a viable sovereign A further innovative approach is the Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 project intiatied by the Swedish diplomat borders. Then a regional confederation Mathias Mossberg in 2008. The project pro- consisting of Israel, Palestine and Jordan (as posed a model of “parallel states”, both of well as Syria, Lebanon and possibly other which would extend over the entire terri- states such as Egypt in the long-term) would tory of Israel and Palestine. Sovereignty be established. Laws concerning the whole over this area would be divided, and pri- “Middle East Union” would be passed by a marily be defined not along territorial lines

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6 but based on citizenship. In this way, Israel forms of government that guarantee collec- could keep both its Jewish and largely demo- tive cultural and political rights – for in- cratic character as well as its settlements. stance, by introducing a federal system with At the same time, a Palestinian State could extensive autonomy for the federal states. be founded and Palestinian refugees be Accordingly, clear majorities of both popu- given the right of return to this state. Some lations have rejected one-state approaches. tasks would be carried out jointly by the According to a September 2015 poll by the institutions of the two states, others sepa- Israel Democracy Institute, around 36 per- rately by each state. There would be a per- cent of Jewish Israelis agree with annexing manent mechanism for solving disputes the West Bank, but almost 60 percent are and problems. Economically, the two states against granting full civil rights to the Pales- would enter into a union. Legally, each tinian population of the annexed areas. In state would be responsible for its respective June 2013, a joint poll by the PCPSR and population, but there would also be areas the Truman Institute found that about two- of joint or harmonized jurisdiction. thirds of the Palestinian as well as the Israeli population rejected a one-state settle- ment with equal rights for Jews and Arabs. Realistic alternatives? In contrast, confederate models offer a Given the political realities today, one-state compromise that might make it possible to models do not offer a viable approach to preserve national identities and collective the conflict. Implementing the Israeli right’s rights, and to simultaneously open up paths one-state proposals would merely cement of cooperation. Yet confederate models – existing power relations and ignore the regardless of whether they relate exclusive- Palestinians’ right to self-determination – ly to Israel-Palestine or to the neighbouring and would thus not bring about peace. One- states as well – are ultimately based on two state approaches based on equality and states. In that sense, they are faced with the agreement face several obstacles: the domi- same obstacles to implementation as con- nance of nationalism in both societies; the ventional two-state approaches – at least for existence of irreconcilable identities; and as long as sovereignty and territoriality the profound mistrust between the two remain intertwined. sides. They would therefore need to be preceded by a paradigm change in Pales- tinian society, to replace the struggle for Conclusions national self-determination with one for A two-state settlement to the Israeli-Pales- equal rights. From a Jewish-Israeli perspec- tinian conflict is the central point of refer- tive, a one-state solution based on equal ence of international politics. German and rights runs counter to political Zionism, European policies should actively counter which enjoys nearly unanimous support the dwindling chances of such an approach among Jewish Israelis. It remains especially being realized and the consolidation of the unclear how Jewish Israelis would be per- one-state reality. That would be crucial to suaded – against a background of historical prevent the continuation and entrench- persecution and a dwindling demographic ment of the unlawful situation linked to majority – to give up the status quo, in- the occupation, which is about to celebrate cluding vested rights and privileges, for an its fiftieth anniversary. In that context, it is experiment with uncertain outcomes. This also useful to discuss alternative solutions is true regardless of the fact that propo- and sound out to what extent their creative nents of a one-state approach such as Abu- elements could contribute to overcoming nimah do provide for political mechanisms obstacles to conflict resolution. that would ensure a balanced representa- Yet the main problem is not the sub- tion in political institutions, and suggest stance of a two-state settlement, but the

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7 lack of political will for realizing any settle- ment, whatever its details, and for making the necessary compromises. The question that must be prioritized by German and European politics is therefore how to gen- erate the necessary political will on the part of the parties to the conflict, instead of merely referring, mantra-like, to a two-state settlement. Current approaches – such as the initiative for an international Middle East conference being promoted by France, or a report to be published by the Middle East Quartet (representing the USA, Russia, the UN and the EU) with recommendations

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und for solving the conflict – might well be first Politik, 2016 steps towards changing the cost-benefit All rights reserved analyses of the political elites, but they are These Comments reflect unlikely to suffice. Concrete and binding the authors’ views. measures will also be required: parameters SWP for a negotiated settlement stipulated by Stiftung Wissenschaft und the Security Council; a robust mediation; a Politik German Institute for readiness to back the implementation of International and any deal with substantial security guaran- Security Affairs tees and a security presence; but also spell- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 ing out concrete sanctions in case of non- 10719 Berlin cooperation. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN 1861-1761

Translation by Tom Genrich

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 27/2016)

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