Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments The End of a Two-State Settlement? WP Alternatives and Priorities for Settling the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Muriel Asseburg and Jan Busse S On the occasion of their joint government consultations in February 2016, Prime Minis- ter Benjamin Netanyahu and Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed that this was not the time for making major progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, given the in- stability in the Middle East. However, merely adhering to a two-state settlement as a mantra without taking any concrete steps to implement it effectively reinforces the one-state reality under Israeli dominance. Ultimately, this will make settling the con- flict impossible. Popular support for a two-state solution is waning on both sides. While at present alternative one-state or confederate models have even slimmer chances of being realized, Germany and the EU should nevertheless explore the creative and con- structive aspects of these models, which would enable the two sides to maintain their national identities as well as realize their individual and collective rights. Their priority, however, should be to alter the cost-benefit calculation of the parties to the conflict, so as to generate the political will for bringing about a settlement at all. Since the 1947 UN partition resolution, Security Council in February 2011. They large parts of the international community comprise a territorial settlement on the as well as the most important representa- basis of the 1967 borders, with agreed land tives of the parties to the conflict and their swaps; security arrangements that take into populations have come to adopt the two- account the needs of both sides; a solution state paradigm as their preferred option to the refugee issue that is both just and for lastingly settling the Israeli-Palestinian acceptable to the conflict parties and the conflict. The UN Security Council explicitly main host nations; and Jerusalem as the confirmed this approach in its Resolution capital of both states. The 1993 Israeli-Pales- 1397 of March 2002. tinian Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) The cornerstones of a two-state settle- were a decisive step in that the Palestine ment have long been defined. US President Liberation Organisation (PLO) formally Barack Obama formulated them in his first recognized the State of Israel. In turn, Israel speech to the UN General Assembly in Sep- formally recognized not a Palestinian state, tember 2009; the E3 (Germany, France, but at least the PLO – and thus the Pales- United Kingdom) presented them to the UN tinians’ right to self-determination. Since Dr. Muriel Asseburg is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division. SWP Comments 24 Jan Busse is a lecturer and research fellow in the Department of International Politics and Conflict Research at the April 2016 Universität der Bundeswehr Munich. This SWP Comments is based in part on a chapter of their forthcoming book, Der Nahostkonflikt: Geschichte, Positionen, Perspektiven (C. H. Beck, August 2016). 1 then, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the fact that these were only meant to be unofficial talks have worked out detailed valid for a five-year interim period leading approaches for settling all areas of conflict. to an independent Palestinian State. The Yet today, the positions of the parties are Accords essentially limit the PA to self- far apart on all final-status issues – notice- adminsitration and keeping internal order ably further apart than in previous nego- in the largely unconnected Areas A and B tiations. Under international pressure, (enclaves totalling around 38 percent of Prime Minister Netanyahu did commit in the West Bank). Since the Second Intifada, principle to a two-state solution in a 2009 Israel has also reserved the right to carry speech at Bar Ilan University. In his 2015 out its own military operations and arrests electoral campaign, however, he explicitly in Area A. In Area C of the West Bank promised his voters that no Palestinian (around 62 percent), the Accords provide State would be created during his mandate. for extensive Israeli control over security; His government has yet to commit itself civil order; and construction as well as to a two-state approach; several ministers land and resource use (see also the map in reject it explicitly and demand Israeli sover- UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas 2015, http:// eignty over at least parts of the occupied www.ochaopt.org/documents/atlas_2015_ Palestinian territories. They put forward web.pdf, p. 4). At the same time, the Oslo not only security reasons, but also histori- Accords give Israel control over the Pales- cally and religiously based claims to “Judea tinian territories’ air space and sea and land and Samaria”. borders during the interim period. This is By contrast, the leadership in Ramallah still the case today. Israel only gave up has adhered to its quest for Palestinian control over the border between the Gaza statehood and the two-state approach. Strip and Egypt in mid-2007. Last but not Whenever Palestinian politicians have re- least, the Oslo Accords cemented Israel’s ferred to dissolving the Palestinian Author- dominance over Jerusalem and the Pales- ity (PA) and instead campaigning for equal tinian economy, especially trade, currency citizens’ rights in one state, should no and access to resources. progress be made in the peace process, this Moreover, throughout the Oslo process has merely been a threatening gesture. all Israeli governments – regardless of their Even so, like their Israeli counterparts, they political affiliations – forged ahead with no longer expect bilateral negotiations to building settlements in the Palestinian ter- lead to an acceptable conflict settlement. ritories. In summer 2005, the Sharon gov- Both conflict parties therefore rely first and ernment only evacuated the settlements in foremost on unilateral steps to realize their the resource-poor and ideologically insig- respective interests and only maintain a nificant Gaza Strip – which is not consid- minimum level of cooperation in managing ered part of the historic homeland of the the conflict. Jewish people. As a result, around 350,000 settlers now live in about 125 settlements among some 2.89 million Palestinians in Consolidation of a one-state reality the West Bank. In East Jerusalem, there are Meanwhile, a one-state reality has long taken some 200,000 settlers in 12 settlements. An shape in the area of the former British additional 10,000 settlers live in about 100 Mandate of Palestine (for details see SWP outposts. These are illegal under Israeli law Comments 21/2014). Israel might only have as well, but they are increasingly legalized annexed a part of the Palestinian territories retroactively, removed only temporarily, that it occupies – East Jerusalem – but it or else rebuilt on a different site after being also has extensive control over the rest. The removed. foundations for this situation were laid in A complex system has thus evolved be- the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995, despite tween the Mediterranean Sea and the river SWP Comments 24 April 2016 2 Jordan, under which inhabitants enjoy – or state settlement was rejected by a majority are deprived of – different rights depending (51 percent) of the Palestinians surveyed for on their citizenship, place of residence the first time. By December 2015, the rejec- (Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusa- tion rate had reached 54 percent. In addi- lem) and ethno-religious identity. Today, tion, two-thirds of those surveyed no longer the area controlled by Israel no longer has a thought the approach viable because of Jewish majority. Of the around 12.6 million settlement construction. The same trend people living there, around 6.2 million are has been shown among the Israeli popula- Jews and 6.3 million Arabs (Palestinians and tion. According to a poll by the Harry S. other Arab minorities). In the coming years, Truman Institute of the Hebrew University demographics are likely to change further in Jerusalem, support in Israel for a two- in favour of the Arab share, especially as state settlement stood at 51 percent in June large waves of Jewish immigration, as were 2015. A year earlier, it had been at 62 per- seen in the 1980s and 1990s, are not to be cent. Clearly, many Israelis share the assess- expected. ment that a two-state settlement is no longer realistic. They also do not expect it to bring about peace. Waning support In both societies, frustration over the A two-state settlement is becoming increas- failure of the peace process is also accom- ingly unlikely. The financial and political panied by seeing one’s own side (only) as a costs of implementing it rise with every victim, by demonizing the other side, by settlement unit needing to be demolished becoming increasingly radical and by en- and with every settler needing to be evacu- dorsing violence. This finds expression in ated and compensated. At the same time, concrete acts of violence, such as the (knife) the occupation and the construction of attacks by Palestinian perpetrators and the settlements are increasingly fragmenting so-called price-tag attacks by Israeli settlers the Palestinian territories – and thus the (attacks meant to signal that measures run- territory that would be available for a Pales- ning contrary to settler interests have a tinian state. Other factors contribute to the price). Around 30 Israelis and 150 Palestin- problem: the construction of settlement ians have died in the latest escalation of infrastructure and the separation barrier; violence from October 2015 to the end of the isolation of East Jerusalem and the March 2016. Even though this escalation – blockade of the Gaza Strip; and a complex described by many observers as a “third system of checkpoints, separated streets intifada” – has so far not assumed the shape and permits.