ARAFAT’S DUELING DILEMMAS: SUCCESSION AND THE PEACE PROCESS By Lenore Martin*

This article analyzes the intersecting dilemmas involved in the succession to Yasir Arafat. Succession theory explains the first dilemma: Arafat’s refusal to designate his successor for fear of usurpation encourages a succession struggle. The smooth transition of power after Arafat depends on the political legitimacy of his -controlled regime. The second dilemma: the unresolved peace process threatens to undermine that legitimacy which is already under challenge by factions within and outside of Fatah that oppose the peace process. How Arafat and his regime resolve these dilemmas will determine the future of a Palestinian state.

INTRODUCTION Arafat to leave the scene without a political The fate of the nascent Palestinian state resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. still hangs in large measure on the answer to In that event, it is more likely that a the question: who will succeed Yasir Arafat? succession struggle will erupt, pitting The answer, while never entirely transparent, mainstream candidates against each other appeared somewhat easier to reach before and against rejectionists. Moreover, even if the recrudescence of the intifada in the fall a single candidate emerged, there would of 2000 and the apparent breakdown of the likely be an extended period of uncertainty peace process. Most analysts then predicted or instability within the Palestinian polity. A a succession contest dominated by violent succession contest would seriously candidates within Fatah and the ruling elite, destabilize the foundations of a still fragile while at the same time recognizing the Palestine and its repercussions would impact possibility of a violent succession the entire region. struggle.(1) The and the The issues confronting a stable suspension of peace talks, however, put into succession and a stable peace are interlocked question the feasibility of a smooth on the horns of dueling dilemmas linked to succession and underscore the need for the the legitimacy of the regime. The first is a Arafat regime to repair the rifts in the larger dilemma of succession. Every autocrat Palestinian political community in order to hesitates to groom a successor for fear of achieve it. usurpation. Yet, in the absence of an This article seeks to provide an in-depth acknowledged successor, candidates for explanation for why the succession to Arafat succession may engage in violent struggles would be smooth or turbulent. It argues that for power and put into issue the legitimacy the divisions within the Palestinian polity of the autocrat’s regime. over the legitimacy of the Arafat regime and The second dilemma results from the the feasibility of the peace process to stymied peace process born of the Oslo achieve Palestinian national aspirations Accords of 1993 and 1995. The peace foreshadow an even greater crisis were process was, in part, a search for alternatives

60 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Lenore Martin to the anger and frustration on both the may change over time as some candidates Palestinian and Israeli sides begotten from drop off, as when Faisal Husseini died in the violence of the first intifada that had 2001, or newer names may appear as the begun in 1987. The peace process result of political maneuvering or popular legitimized the establishment of the recognition. Palestinian Authority (PA) and contributed Social science succession theorists warn to the legitimization of the Arafat regime. us not to engage in such speculation.(3) However, the final status negotiations called Outcomes of succession struggles are for profound compromises that many in the unpredictable, particularly where the rules of Palestinian political community were not succession themselves may be challenged. prepared to accept. The failure to resolve Such is often the case in the authoritarian the passionately controversial issues regimes of the developing world where the involved in the peace process increased the political legitimacy of the regime has not challenges to the political legitimacy of the become entrenched.(4) By contrast, in the Arafat regime. The second intifada has western democracies where political again given vent to anger and frustration and legitimacy has been well entrenched, the the violent responses on both Palestinian and rules of succession have been Israeli sides threaten to destroy any chance institutionalized and violent succession for renewal or progress in the peace process. struggles are considered a very low risk.(5) This article will first explore the Nonetheless, even in well-established development of these interlocking dilemmas, authoritarian regimes, there is always a risk and then address their implications. that the regime might collapse and the rules of succession would change, as occurred in ARAFAT’S SUCCESSION DILEMMA the former Communist states of the Soviet Succession Theory and the Middle East Union and Eastern Europe.(6) That is There is always considerable speculation certainly the case if overturning a regime is over who may succeed the aging and the result of a social revolution, as witnessed sometimes ailing President of the PA, the 72 in the Middle East: the Arab nationalist year-old Yasir Arafat. Arafat himself fuels regimes that deposed monarchies in Egypt, the speculation by refusing to designate a Syria and Iraq; the Islamist revolution in successor. Will his successor be a member Iran; and the Ataturk revolution in Turkey. of the old-line Fatah leadership such as the Why the lack of predictability, Oslo peace process advocate and Secretary particularly in an autocratic regime? The General of the PLO Executive Committee, answer involves the autocrat’s dilemma. (Abu Mazen); or an Oslo On the one horn, autocrats do not designate peace process rejectionist, such as the Head successors for fear of encouraging premature of the Political Department of Fatah and usurpation of the their power. Rather, “Foreign Minister” of the PLO, Faruq autocrats prefer to encourage competition Qaddami; or even the more middle of the among subordinates,(7) sometimes creating road, speaker of the Palestinian Legislative overlapping bureaucracies. To induce Council, Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala)? Or, will loyalty the autocrats offer patronage to their it be a Palestinian notable such as Zakariya subordinates,(8) thereby providing them al Agha, or a Fatah Young Turk such as with opportunities to indulge in personal , or the leader of one of corruption. On the other horn, the struggle the security forces, such as Jibril Rajoub on for power among potential successors, as the West Bank, or his counterpart well as bureaucratic inefficiencies and the Muhammad Dahlan, in Gaza?(2) The lists personal corruption of subordinates, can

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 61 Arafat’s Dueling Dilemmas: Succession and the Peace Process undermine the effectiveness of the regime not to formally announce his designation of and encourage opponents to challenge its a successor, Hussein has not completely political legitimacy. All of which, in turn, resolved the dilemma. He still risks a breed new contenders for power, risking bids struggle for succession between his sons and to usurp the ruler, or at least invite their respective allies.(13) And in instances succession struggles, again risking the where there may be a number of hereditary longevity of the regime. successors, the autocrat may still wait to To try to resolve this dilemma, the designate a successor at the last minute, as autocrat has two possible options, neither of did King Hussein of Jordan. which offers a perfect solution. The first The alternative option is for the autocrat option may be to appoint a family member to confer succession upon a weak or neutral as successor, thereby introducing (or if candidate, as reportedly Nasser did in already a monarchy, thereby continuing) a selecting Anwar Sadat as his successor in rule of hereditary succession. Although Egypt. This too may not resolve the there are multiple choices for principles of dilemma, because, if the so-called weak hereditary succession, such as agnatic designee shows too much strength, the seniority (the oldest son) and agnatic- autocratic may then revoke the designation, cognitic (oldest child, including female as Mao did with his revocation of Lin Biao children), there is often a preference for as his successor. Also, the designation of a selecting the oldest son.(9) The rationale successor may stimulate potential rivals to behind appointing typically the oldest male try to eliminate the designee, as did Deng child, whom the autocrat can both dominate Xiao Ping in purging Hua Guofeng in the and trust, anticipates that familial affection struggle for Mao’s succession.(14) and favoritism will breed greater loyalty and Ultimately, if the autocrat chooses not to lower the risk of usurpation than with resolve the succession dilemma and dies or unrelated subordinates. We have seen this leaves power without having appointed a phenomenon recently even in staunchly successor, it becomes the task of the regime republican states in the Middle East. Thus, to appoint the new leader. If the regime Hafiz al-Asad designated his son, Bashar, as faces a power struggle that could lead to its his successor in Syria, and Saddam Hussein destruction, the ruling elite may try to appears to be grooming both of his sons to forestall the succession struggle by succeed him in Iraq.(10) appointing a weak or neutral candidate. This Introducing hereditary succession, may be only a temporary measure until however, does not always work to resolve another strongman comes to power, as the dilemma. Hafiz al-Asad had in fact evidenced by the Ba’thist successions in originally designated his eldest son, Basil, as Syria and Iraq that ultimately brought Hafiz his successor. After Basil’s untimely death al-Asad and Saddam Hussein to power. in an automobile accident, the Syrian Moreover, to succeed with the appointment dictator then turned to his younger son, of even a “caretaker” candidate, there has to Bashar, who ultimately did succeed him but be sufficient cohesion and adequate political without the same degree of confidence in his legitimacy of the ruling elite. skills as leader.(11) Or the heir apparent may himself become a problem. Saddam Hussein Succession Theory and the Palestinian probably promoted his younger son, Qusay Political Community as a potential successor because of the The case of Yasir Arafat is clearly a unsavory reputation of his oldest son, classic example of the autocrat’s dilemma. Uday.(12) However, by remaining careful Arafat has concentrated all power within his

62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Lenore Martin personal control. He has refused to designate institutionalized and most fragile is the rule a successor.(15) He has created overlapping for succession within the PA itself. The bureaucracies to prevent subordinates from Oslo Agreements called for a Basic Law or challenging his power. By reputation, he constitution for the PA. Although the plays his subordinates off against each Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) other.(16) The multiplicity of internal drafted and adopted a Basic Law in 1997, security forces, numbering about a dozen, Arafat has withheld its promulgation. He evidences Arafat’s autocratic concern to objected to the equal status conferred upon avoid concentrating power in the hands of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial any single subordinate.(17) He has also branches of the government, and apparently tolerated personal corruption and was not happy with the succession rule that engendered public disaffection with the called for elections, preferring to keep that extent of the corruption and the inefficiency section of the Basic Law vague.(23) of the regime.(18) Subsequently, Arafat compromised with There are effectively three centers of the PLC and authorized the PLO Legal political authority within the larger Committee to draft a new Constitution.(24) Palestinian political community, all of which That draft was published in 2001.(25) The Arafat has gathered within his autocratic Electoral Law within the Basic Law of 1997 control: the PA, the PLO, and Fatah. The and the Draft Constitution of 2001 confers PA is the newest and most fragile center of interim Presidential authority on the Speaker power because it is a creature of the Oslo of the Council but requires Presidential Agreements of 1993 and 1995. Arafat elections within 60 days of the vacancy in became the “Ra’is” or President of the PA, the President’s office. Each political party by winning an overwhelming majority in the may have only one candidate. If the new elections of January 1996 sanctioned by the Constitution were adopted and elections held Oslo Agreements. for the Presidency, and if Fatah were to The second, and more firmly established, produce a consensus candidate, Fatah’s center for authority is at the head of the candidate would likely have the advantage, PLO. The PLO is governed by its Executive given its dominant role in Palestinian Committee to which Arafat was first elected politics. However, given Arafat’s autocratic Chairman in 1969 and has since been concern to avoid creating avenues for his regularly re-elected. (19) When the Palestine own usurpation, it is not clear that he would National Council proclaimed a new state of permit the adoption of this new Constitution. Palestine in 1988 and delegated to its Central The succession rule in the Executive Committee the task of forming an interim Committee of the PLO calls for it to elect its government, Arafat was also elected own chairman. Because Fatah dominates the President of that state in 1989.(20) Executive Committee, the Fatah candidate The third and dominant center of would again have the advantage in filling the authority is within Fatah.(21) Fatah’s vacancy left by Arafat. Who would succeed leadership is lodged primarily in the Fatah Arafat in Fatah? Under Fatah’s succession Central Committee and to a lesser extent in rules, the Central Committee must, by two- its Revolutionary Council.(22) The Central thirds’ vote, fill its vacancies from Committee in theory operates through candidates from the 120 member collective leadership. In practice, Arafat has Revolutionary Council - which also includes served as head of the Central Committee. all members of the Central Committee. Each of the centers of authority has its Fatah’s Central Committee would then own succession rules. The least become the arena for a succession struggle.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 63 Arafat’s Dueling Dilemmas: Succession and the Peace Process

What will happen, therefore, if Arafat vacates all three centers of political power Challengers to the Political Legitimacy of without having designated a successor, or the Regime even, at the last minute, having designated a Who are the challengers to the legitimacy weak successor? The answer to this of the regime, and why does the regime need question depends to a great extent on the successful results from the peace process in political legitimacy of the regime and the order to overcome their challenges? expectations of the Palestinians as to the Arafat’s regime and its Fatah power base continuation of the corruption and face challenges from four potentially inefficiency of that regime under Arafat’s disaffected groups within the larger successor. In short, the regime needs to be Palestinian political community: members of able to bolster its legitimacy in the face of Fatah that oppose the peace process; radical the many critics of its poor governance. Islamists; refugees in the diaspora; and the That, in turn, depends upon the regime’s democratic elite.(26) Many complain about ability to resolve the related dilemma of the the poor governance of the regime, and some peace process. may sponsor contenders for power after Arafat departs from the political scene. THE PEACE PROCESS DILEMMA More importantly, although they are not The Peace Process and Political Legitimacy necessarily all political allies, collectively The peace process dilemma arises from they create significant rifts within the the fact that the Arafat regime looked to its community and could create serious successful resolution to establish a sovereign obstacles for a consensus candidate to Palestinian state. This would be a polity succeed Arafat. with the attributes of a nation state, free from The most difficult challenge comes from the burdensome restrictions of Israeli factions within Fatah itself, as well as within occupation. In short, it would be capable of the larger PLO, that reject the Oslo providing a measure of national security for Agreements and the peace process in the Palestinians, and in so doing would general.(27) There are a number of Fatah enhance the regime’s political legitimacy. veterans within the Central Committee, such On the other hand, the regime confronts as Faruq al-Qaddumi and Muhammad challengers who question the validity of the Ghunaym, who have been outspoken on this peace process and critics who support the issue. There are also rejectionists among the goal of a two-state solution, but do not see militant Fatah groups participating in the the process as producing the promised second intifada.(28) Within the groups of results. Hence, the more the regime Fatah militants are younger leaders who struggles in vain to revive the peace process, accept a so-called “two-state solution” but the more support its challengers garner. advocate achieving it by compelling Israeli Even if the peace process were restored, a unilateral withdrawal, rather than by failure to achieve Palestinian aspirations negotiations.(29) These factions include the would risk substantial loss of political so-called “insiders” veterans of the first legitimacy. In short, without a successful intifada who were displaced in Arafat’s resolution of the peace process the proto- allocation of political rewards in the new state of Palestine will be extremely Palestinian regime by the “outsiders” from vulnerable to recurrent political and the PLO’s headquarters. And there economic crises. And the regime will need are PLO rejectionists within its Executive substantial political legitimacy in order to Committee such as the Arab Liberation resolve these crises. Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of

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Palestine, the Democratic Front for the PA.(33) The radical Islamists reject the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestine peace process, and not only criticize the Liberation Front. Arafat regime for its bad governance, but The problem for Fatah is that, if it is also for its lack of Islamic legitimacy. unable to rebuild a consensus within its own Tactically, they have signaled a willingness political organization, it will not be able to to accept a two-state solution, but only as an provide the collective leadership critical for interim step to achieving their strategic goal designating a successor to Arafat. Could of eliminating the state of Israel.(34) Fatah then split the succession among two or The remaining two challengers to the three leaders holding one or more offices as political legitimacy of the Arafat regime are head the PA, head of the Executive less likely to sponsor viable candidates in a Committee of the PLO, and head of Fatah’s succession struggle, but constitute potential Central Committee? (30) Again, predictions allies for contenders in that struggle. First, are risky, because collective leadership there are the Palestinians in the diaspora, decisions are not necessarily stable.(31) many of whom populate refugee camps and Moreover, by splitting the leadership, Fatah yearn for the benefits of the “right of return”. risks struggles for control over the They remain wary of the regime’s Palestinian political community between or willingness to compromise their claims in among the three power centers. the peace process and destine them for more Even if collective leadership did stabilize, generations of hardship. and Fatah did rebuild its consensus, given Finally, there are members of the the relatively advanced ages of many of the Palestinian elite who decry the regime’s senior Fatah leaders who may be appointed corruption, oppose its authoritarian methods, to succeed Arafat, their tenure in these and want the regime to strive for the growth positions may be short, and struggles among of a thriving civil society and the younger candidates would still ensue. transformation of the regime into a liberal Strategically, every competitor in a democracy. Some of these liberal succession struggle after Arafat is likely to democratic forces are found in the seek the broadest coalition. This will be Palestinian Legislative Council that has difficult in a political environment in which sought to introduce democratic principles there are factions within Fatah opposing the into the draft Basic Law.(35) peace process and problems in forming alliances with challengers both within and The Peace Process and Palestinian National outside of Fatah, despite their common Security chorus of criticism of the corruption and To overcome the challenges to its inefficiency of the regime. political legitimacy, the regime also needs to One such alliance has already been convince the Palestinian political community proclaimed, however, between the younger that it can deliver national security, as a rejectionists within Fatah and another promised result of the peace process. The significant source of challenge to the political legitimacy of the regime is thus political legitimacy of the regime, the radical linked with four other attributes of a secure Islamists.(32) The most prominent radical state, with which the nascent state of Islamists are and Islamic Jihad, both Palestine is hardly well endowed.(36) These of which operate politically within the West attributes of national security are all Bank and Gaza, but outside of the three integrated, and in addition to the political centers of power within the larger legitimacy of the regime include: tolerance Palestinian polity, Fatah, the PLO and the for ethnic and religious diversity, adequate

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 65 Arafat’s Dueling Dilemmas: Succession and the Peace Process economic capabilities, available essential foreign assistance.(40) To the extent that the natural resources such as oil and water, and regime fails to provide the rising populations adequate military capabilities to deter or of the West Bank and Gaza with essential defend against internal and external threats services, the more radical Islamic groups can of violence.(37) Let us briefly assess how step into the breach and gain popular support these attributes of national security in the by providing social welfare services. Palestinian state could bolster or undermine Another factor that hampers Palestinian the political legitimacy of the regime. economic development is the state’s critical Although the Palestinian political lack of essential natural resources, community is spared the ethnic dissension particularly water and energy. Drought and that creates insecurity in a number of Middle inefficient distribution of water, as well as East states, and the regime appears to have temporary closure of water deliveries reached a modus vivendi with the radical because of the intifada have exacerbated Islamists in the community, there is always a water shortages.(41) But even if such risk that militant religious groups such as conditions did not exist, the fact is that much Hamas and Islamic Jihad will challenge the of the West Bank and Gaza’s natural water regime and increase dissension within the supply, emanating from the West bank community. aquifer, the coastal aquifer and the Jordan The West Bank and Gaza have a Valley basin, is under Israeli control.(42) substantially underdeveloped economy. Furthermore, Palestinian energy supplies, Even without the virtual economic blockade oil, gas and electricity, need to be imported, imposed by Israel as a result of the second although the discovery of gas off the Gaza intifada, the economy of the Palestinian state coast does promise some relief from total lacks much of an industrial base and other import dependency in the future.(43) resources that are prerequisites to Finally, the and Israel’s successfully develop the economy. In security concerns have severely limited the addition, the development process is military capabilities that a Palestinian state hampered by constraints on its ability to might need to protect the regime in the event export products imposed by Israeli of violent civil war. The General Security regulations and security measures that render Service that is to provide internal security exports more costly and less may have exceeded the Oslo Accord competitive.(38) The fragility of this limitations, but the suspected widespread economy and turmoil within the state make importation of small arms into the West it, in turn, unattractive to foreign investment. Bank and Gaza has deprived the regime of Even domestic banks prefer to invest outside the monopoly on the use of force.(44) of the West Bank and Gaza. The Arafat Accordingly, a successful outcome of the regime is highly dependent on largesse from peace process would be expected to increase foreign governments and international non- the attributes of national security for the governmental organizations, as well as from nascent Palestinian state. It would provide Israeli transfers of taxes collected from more independence from Israeli interference customs duties, sales taxes, and income and in Palestinian economy, larger amounts of social security taxes collected from foreign aid, and generally greater prospects Palestinians working in Israel.(39) for economic development in the West Bank Preventing Palestinians from working in and Gaza. It would require fairer sharing of Israel as a result of the intifada has severely water resources so critical for economic impacted the regime’s revenues and development. The cumulative results would substantially increased its dependency on enable the PA to be more self-sustaining and

66 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Lenore Martin thereby would improve the ability of the substantial foreign subsidies for financing regime to deliver essential social welfare to essential services - principally from the non- the population. All of which would increase rejectionist states - sustained international the political legitimacy of the regime. More involvement in Palestinian affairs is likely to trenchant therefore is the dilemma of the continue whatever the outcomes of these Arafat regime in seeking to succeed at the succession struggles. peace process that the challengers to the There is furthermore a risk that if regime oppose and thereby would use to contestants in the succession struggle resort threaten the very legitimacy of the regime. to violence, it could spark a disintegration of the political community, i.e. a civil war as International Intervention into Succession occurred in Lebanon in the mid-1970s. A Struggles Palestinian civil war would embroil states A succession struggle occurring without outside of the West Bank and Gaza. For any successful resolution of the peace example, Jordan, the majority of whose process that has achieved a truly sovereign population is Palestinian, might be tempted state, would risk turning violent as to intervene, although it would more likely candidates challenge both the legitimacy of do so only with Israeli acquiescence.(47) In the regime and the peace process and reject any event, Israel, which perceives itself as the rules of succession that give advantages having most at stake if chaos were to break to old-guard Fatah candidates. A violent out, would then be tempted to follow the succession struggle will be vulnerable to Syrian example in the Lebanese civil war – external involvement, and the candidates and even without an invitation, intervene to themselves may seek international support restore order. openly or quietly. (45) Support might simply be financial or propagandistic or even by CONCLUSIONS providing intelligence information. But Following classical autocratic principles there is always a risk that such support could of succession, Yasir Arafat has concentrated escalate into the clandestine supply of arms in his own hands control over the three for security forces that might back one power centers of the PA, the PLO and Fatah, candidate or another. without designating a successor. Even if All the major actors in the Middle East Arafat were to designate a successor at the have stakes in the outcome of a Palestinian last minute, Arafat’s death or incapacity succession contest, as do their international would still create a succession crisis for allies in Europe and the United States. The Palestinian decision makers. If the Arafat Middle East is split ideologically among the regime can maintain its political legitimacy, so-called rejectionist states, such as Iraq and there is a greater probability that Fatah’s Iran that condemn the peace process; and ruling group within the Central Committee states that have made peace with Israel such can weather the crisis and, in the absence of as Jordan and Egypt, or are willing to an Arafat designee, select a successor – even negotiate peace under certain conditions, if it means selecting a compromise candidate such as Syria and Lebanon, or states that or choosing different successors who will accept the need for the peace process, such share authority within the power centers. If as Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council the Palestinian political community states. (46) The United States and the continued to feel under siege from the Israeli European Union join the latter group. occupation, the factions that have challenged Given the weakness of the Palestinian the regime may rally around it with the economy, and the regime’s dependency on

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 67 Arafat’s Dueling Dilemmas: Succession and the Peace Process larger population and support the successor in states. See Rodger M. Govea and John D. or successors. Holm, "Crisis, violence and political On the other hand, if the succession crisis succession in Africa," Third World coincides with the unresolved crisis in the Quarterly, vol. 19 (1998), pp. 129-48. A regime’s political legitimacy accentuated by recent Middle East example of the problem an unresolved peace process, it is likely that of prediction is found in Glenn E. Robinson, the struggle for succession will be a stormy "Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and one, whether or not Arafat has picked his Political Instability in Syria," Middle East successor. And, with the regional interest in Policy, vol. V, no. 4 (January 1998), pp. its outcome, the violence could escalate. In 159-179, where the author considered a such a scenario, again the outcomes are number of post-Asad scenarios and unpredictable, not the least of which will be considered the succession by Asad’s son, who ultimately succeeds Yasir Arafat. Bashar, to be the least likely (p. 176). 4. Burling, pp. 256-59; see Govea & Holm ______for African successions during 1963-88 and also, Aaron Segal, "Can Democratic *Lenore G. Martin is Professor and Chair of Transitions Tame Political Successions," the Department of Political Science at Africa Today vol. 43, no. 4 (1996) pp. 385- Emmanuel College. She is an Associate of 404, for African successions from 1988 to the Weatherhead Center for International 1995. Affairs at Harvard University, where she co- 5. Govea & Holm, pp. 129-30. See also chairs to Middle East Seminar. She is also Peter Calvert, "The Theory of Political an Affiliate in Research at Harvard’s Center Succession," in Peter Calvert, ed. The for Middle Eastern Studies, where she co- Process of Political Succession (London: chairs the Study Group on Modern Turkey. Macmillan, 1987), pp. 245-66. Her latest book is New Frontiers in Middle 6. See Andros Korosenyi, "Revival of the East Security published by Palgrave in 2001. past or new beginning? The nature of post- communist politics," in Andros Bozoki, NOTES Andros Korosenyi, and George Schopflin, 1. See in particular, Jean-Francois Legrain, Post-Communist Transition (London: Pinter, "The Successions of Yasir Arafat," Journal 1997), pp. 111-31. of Palestine Studies XXVIII, no. 4 (Summer 7. Burling, p. 256. 1999), pp. 5-20; Glenn E. Robinson, 8. See Segal, p. 374. "Palestine after Arafat," The Washington 9. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, "The Quarterly (Autumn 2000), pp. 77-90; and constitutional economics of autocratic Barry Rubin, "After Arafat: Succession and succession," Public Choice vol. 103 (2000), Stability in Palestinian Politics" Middle East pp. 63-84. Hereditary principles, of course, Review of International Affairs (MERIA), already operate in the monarchies of the vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1998), pp. 1-9. Middle East. See Michael Collins Dunn, 2. See the commentators cited in note 1 "The Coming Era of Leadership Change in above and Danny Rubinstein, "After Arafat" the Arab World," Middle East Policy, vol. Moment (June 1999). V, no. 4 (January 1998), pp. 180-87; and 3. Robbins Burling, The Passage of Power: specifically for the problems of Saudi Studies in Political Succession (New York: succession, M. Ehsan Ahrari, "Political Academic Press, 1974), pp. 254-65. It also Succession in Saudi Arabia: Systemic seems problematic to try to correlate types of Stability and Security Implications," succession with social and economic factors

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Comparative Strategy (1999), no. 18, pp. 13- 20. Were the PA to lose its legitimacy, 29. arguably, the PLO might again declare a 10. Ofra Bengio, "A Republican Turning Palestinian State and appoint Arafat its Royalist? Saddam Husayn and the Dilemmas President. of Succession," Journal of Contemporary 21. See Barry Rubin, The Transformation of History, vol. 35, no. 4 (2000), pp. 641-53. Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to Hosni Mubarak has also been cited as State-Building (Cambridge: Harvard favoring his son as his successor. Financial University Press, 1999), pp. 22, 216-18. Times [FT], April 24,2001, p. 7. 22. The Central Committee is the executive 11. See Volker Perthes, "The political body for Fatah’s General Congress. The economy of the Syrian succession," Congress numbers some 1,200 members, Survival, v. 43, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 143- and is supposed to meet every 5 years; 54. however, it has not done so since 1989. In 12. Uday murdered his father’s bodyguard in the interim, the 120 member Revolutionary 1988 and has been engaged in corruption; Council serves as its ruling body. Three although an attempt on Uday’s life in 1996 members of the Central Committee are left him disabled. Bengio, pp. 649-50. elected by the Central Committee itself, the 13. Charles Recknagel, "Sibling Rivalry rest are from the General Congress, and the Seen Coloring Saddam’s Succession", Revolutionary Council may nominate an RFE/RL, August 2,2001. unspecified number from the occupied 14. See Peter Ferdinand, "China" in Martin territories who have 15 or more years of McCauley and Stephen Carter, eds. membership in Fatah and have held office in Leadership and Succession in the Soviet its armed forces or bureaucracy. Legrain, pp. Union, Eastern Europe and China (London: 6-7. Macmillan, 1986), pp. 194-215. 23. Nathan Brown, "Constituting Palestine: 15. Nor does he have the option of creating a The Effort to Write a Basic Law for the hereditary succession: his daughter is only in Palestinian Authority", Middle East Journal, elementary school. vol. 5, no. 1 (Winter 2000), p. 33. 16. See Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and 24. Barry Rubin, Transformation, pp. 36-37. the Search for State: The Palestinian 25. See The Draft of the Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Constitution, 2001, Palestinian Center for Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 687-92. Policy and Survey Research. 17. Gal Luft, "Palestinian Military 26. Khalil Shikaki reports that in 2001 the Performance and the 2000 intifada", MERIA, popularity of Fatah within the West Bank vol. IV, no. 4, p. 4. (including East ) and Gaza sank to 18. For a description of the pervasive 29%. Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided", corruption in the regime see Mideast Mirror, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 1 December 2,1999, pp. 141-73; Ghassan (January/February 2002), p. 92. Khatib, Palestine Report on Line, Ocyober 27. Rubin, Transformation, p. 97. 6,1999, vol. 6, no. 6. 28. NYT August 25, 2001, p. A4, (referring 19. According to the PLO charter, the to armed groups of Fatah members, such as Palestinian National Council, which the Popular Resistance Committees); FT, functions as the PLO’s parliament, is to meet February 8, 2001 (describing the local every 3 years and elect the PLO Executive anarchy and referring to Martyrs of Al-Aqsa Committee. However, it does not do so on a targeting PA officials suspected of regular basis. Legrain, p. 6. corruption); and Sara Roy, "Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continual Denial

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 69 Arafat’s Dueling Dilemmas: Succession and the Peace Process of Possibility" Journal of Palestinian 34. Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, Studies, vol. 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001), p. 17 p. 3. (referring to other Fatah militias, sometimes 35. See David Schenker, Palestinian acting through the National and Islamic Democracy & Governance: An Appraisal of Forces that spearheads the second intifada). the Legislative Council (Washington, D.C.: 29. Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided", p. 97. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30. Legrain considers Abu Mazen the best 2000), Policy Paper no. 51. candidate to succeed Arafat as the head of 36. Lenore G. Martin, "Towards a Fatah, but also believes his age (71), lack of Preliminary Framework for Security in Israel charisma, and uncertain popularity, render and a Palestinian State", unpublished paper, Abu Mazen only a "transitional figure". He delivered at Harvard University, April 2000; also considers such a sharing of power also, Lenore G. Martin, "Conceptualizing possible with Abu Mazen leading Fatah, Security in the Middle East: Israel and a Faruq Qaddumi leading the Executive Palestinian State" in Tami Jacoby and Brent Committee, and Qurei heading the PA. Sasley, eds. Redefining Security in the Legrain, pp. 14, 19. Rubin also hints at the Middle East: Effects of the Peace Process possibility of collective leadership. Rubin, (Manchester: University of Manchester MERIA, p. 8. Press, forthcoming). 31. See the discussion of Soviet collective 37. See Lenore G. Martin, "Towards an leadership and succession struggles Integrated Approach to National Security in following Stalin’s death, in Myron Rush, the Middle East," in Lenore G. Martin, ed. Political Succession in the USSR (New New Frontiers in Middle East Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), York: Palgrave [St. Martin’s], 2001), pp. 3- 2nd. ed. Recall the quick successions after 22. Brezhnev: Andropov, Chernenko and 38. See Steven Barnett, Nur Calika, Dale Gorbachev (1982-85), suggesting Chua, Oussama Kanaan, Milan Zavadjil, considerable infighting for succession within "The Economy of the West Bank and Gaza the collective leadership of the Central Strip" (International Monetary Fund, 1998). Committee of the Soviet Politburo. See Exports from the West Bank and Gaza George W. Breslauer, "From Brezhnev to shrank from some $500 million to Gorbachev: Ends and Means of Soviet practically nothing after the intifada. FT, Leadership Selection" in Raymond Taras, June 22, 2001, p. 7. ed. Leadership Change in the Communist 39. Some 60% of the PA budget for 2000, States (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. before the second intifada, came from taxes 24-72. and duties collected by Israel. NYT 32. Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided", p. 95. December 6, 2000, p. A 6. Israel has 33. See the Covenant of the Islamic withheld these taxes and duties that totaled Resistance Movement, August 18, 1988. For some $400 million at the end of 2001. Wall a discussion of the roots, relationships and Street Journal, January 31, 2002, p. A14. activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad see 40. The Gulf states, for example, have Robinson, Building, pp. 132-173; for a more pledged some $550 million and other Arab focused discussion of Hamas’s opposition to League members some $150 million to Oslo and nuanced political positions, see sustain the PA. NYT December 6, 2000, p. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The A10. Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia 41. See Julie Trottier, Hydropolitics in the University Press, 2000). West Bank and the (Jerusalem:

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PASSIA, 1999, pp. 99-134; Ha’aretz, May 23, 2001. 42. See Karen Assaf, Nader al Khatib, Elisha Kally and Hillel Shuval, eds., A Proposal for the Development of a Regional Water Master Plan (Jerusalem: Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, 1993); Hillel I. Shuval, "A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to the Conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the Shared Water Resources of the Mountain Aquifer," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp 40-43. 43. NYT, Seprember 28, 2000, p. A6. 44. See Luft, pp. 5-6; Philadelphia Inquirer, December 18, 2000. 45. See Robinson, "Palestine after Arafat", pp. 84-86, who assesses the interests of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the U.S. and the E.U. on a succession struggle. Iran, for example, has been suspected of supplying arms to the PA. NYT, January 12, 2002, p. A5. 46. Saudi Arabia has, for example, expressed its concern publicly over the jeopardy to the region and the peace process if Arafat were to be marginalized. NYT January 27, 2002, p. 8. 47. Cf. Rubinstein, Moment (pp. 8-9) who believes that Jordan might change its mind about a confederation with Palestine, with Israel’s blessing.

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