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Syrian Opposition Survey June 1 – July 2, 2012 Survey Methodology SURVEY METHODOLOGY

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Syrian Opposition Survey June 1 – July 2, 2012 Survey Methodology SURVEY METHODOLOGY • From June 1-July 2, 2012, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Pechter Polls of Princeton, NJ (P3) surveyed members of the Syrian opposition. P3 provided consultative guidance on the survey’s implementation and analysis. • Due to the logistical and political complexities of the project, several months of preparation were required for both survey development and recruitment of opposition activists who had strong in- country networks that had not been permeated by the regime. • To minimize the possibility of participants’ arrest, or any other form of regime interference, IRI and P3 employed a referral or “snowball” methodology – relying strictly on dissidents who were known to IRI or P3. Thus the survey is not a randomized sample – as would be seen in a public opinion poll – and is also skewed heavily toward men, which is partially a reflection of the opposition’s composition. • The project primarily relied upon five networks to initiate the survey’s circulation. From there, activists within and outside of Syria from different ethnic, religious, political and socioeconomic backgrounds were encouraged to circulate the survey amongst their sub-networks. • The questionnaire was developed with the input of all network leaders, under the guidance of Dr. David Pollock, former chief of Near East/South Asia and Africa Research for the U.S. Information Agency. • The survey was translated from English into Syrian colloquial Arabic and placed on a secure server outside of Syria with extensive security protocols to mitigate against regime tampering. International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls SURVEY METHODOLOGY • Each of the five trusted network leaders was given an individual link to access the questionnaire, allowing P3 to track progress and observe any suspicious results in real-time throughout the survey’s administration. • Respondents were assured that their responses to the online survey would be anonymous. • A total of 1,168 interviews were completed by July 2, 2012, 85 percent of respondents were male and 15 percent were female. Margin of error is not strictly applicable to this survey because of the non-random selection of respondents. • Of the sample of 1,168, approximately 315 of the respondents indicated they were inside Syria when they completed the questionnaire, though there is discrepancy in the survey regarding this figure as some respondents may have inconsistently reported the place where they live versus the place where they were when taking the survey. • Not all respondents answered every question. Therefore, the number of responses for any question may not total 1,168. • Figures in charts and tables may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding error. International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Demographics Age 40% 36% 35% 30% 25% 25% 20% 20% 18% 15% 10% 5% 1% 0% Younger than 18 18-25 26-35 36-45 Older than 45 International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Gender 90% 85% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 15% 10% 0% Male Female International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Highest level of education achieved Certificate in post-graduate education 20% Some post-graduate education 9% Certificate from university/vocational 37% education Some university/vocational education 20% Certificate in secondary education 8% Some secondary education 6% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Your normal profession or occupation Student 13% Laborer 4% Housewife 2% Office worker 12% Merchant 11% Engineer 18% Doctor 14% Manager 8% Retired 1% Unemployed 5% Other 13% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Your ethnic background 90% 81% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 14% 10% 2% <1% 0% 1% <1% 0% Arab Kurd Assyrian Armenian Turkmen Circassian Other International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Your religious background 90% 81% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 11% 10% 3% 4% <1% 0% 1% 0% Sunni Alawite Shia Christian Druze Not Other (Not Alawite) Religious International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls The governorate you consider your home Dimashq Governorate 25% Al-Hasakah Governorate 11% Homs Governorate 11% Aleppo Governorate 10% Rif Dimashq Governorate 10% Hama Governorate 9% Daraa Governorate 6% Idlib Governorate 6% Latakia Governorate 4% Deir ez-Zor Governorate 3% Other 2% Al-Suwayda Governorate 2% Tartus Governorate 1% Al-Raqqah Governorate <1% Quneitra Governorate <1% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls The place where you now live Syria 29% Saudi Arabia 23% United States 11% UAE 7% Germany 4% Turkey 4% France 2% Britain 2% Jordan 2% Egypt 2% Qatar 1% Lebanon 1% Cyprus <1% Tunisia <1% Other 12% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls If you are now living in Syria, where are you living? (315 of sample living in Syria) Dimashq Governorate 32% Rif Dimashq Governorate 13% Al-Hasakah Governorate 12% Aleppo Governorate 11% Idlib Governorate 7% Homs Governorate 6% Hama Governorate 5% Daraa Governorate 5% Latakia Governorate 3% Syria (General) 2% Tartus Governorate 1% Al-Suwayda Governorate 1% Deir ez-Zor Governorate 1% Al-Raqqah Governorate 1% Quneitra Governorate <1% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls International Relations Thinking of how various foreign countries have treated the Syrian opposition in recent months, please rank the following countries where seven means the country has treated the Syrian opposition the best and one means the country has treated the Syrian opposition the worst. France 5.46 Qatar 5.45 Turkey 5.33 Britain 5.25 Libya 5.25 Rating Average Rating Germany 5.1 The U.S. 4.89 Saudi Arabia 4.74 Egypt 4.21 Jordan 3.4 Lebanon 2.3 Iraq 1.53 China 1.46 Russia 1.41 Iran 1.17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls On a seven-point agreement scale where seven means agree strongly and one disagree strongly, how strongly do you agree with the following ideas about foreign military intervention in Syria today? An international alliance should … Rating Average 7 6.35 6.25 6.25 6 5.09 4.91 5 4 3 2.63 2 1 0 Impose a no-fly Use force to Provide far Enter Syria to Invade Syria to Not intervene zone over the provide safe greater protect civilians bring down the militarily country humanitarian armaments and Assad corridors and/or training to the government safe zones Free Syrian Army International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls If an international alliance does intervene militarily, which of the following countries should lead the alliance? Select all that apply. Turkey 54% Saudi Arabia 41% NATO 41% France 40% Qatar 36% The U.S. 34% Britain 27% No military intervention 15% Israel 1% Russia 1% China <1% Other 7% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls If an international alliance does intervene militarily, which of the following countries should not be involved? Select all that apply. Israel 79% Russia 78% China 74% No military intervention 16% The U.S. 13% Turkey 13% Britain 12% Saudi Arabia 11% NATO 10% France 10% Qatar 8% Other 9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Post-Assad Syria If the Assad regime is no longer in power, would you return to live in Syria? 60% 51% 50% 40% 30% 20% 20% 14% 12% 10% 2% 0% Yes No Don’t know Temporarily, to I'm currently help rebuild the inside Syria country International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls After the Assad regime falls, what should be the electoral/government process? 45% 40% 40% 36% 35% 30% 25% 20% 16% 15% 10% 6% 5% 3% 0% Transitional A constitutional Constitution writing Straight to Straight to government assembly leading after parliamentary parliamentary presidential leading to elections to elections – like elections – like elections after elections after Tunisia Egypt Assad fall Assad fall International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls Suppose for a moment that the Opposition to the Assad regime could achieve any objective it wanted to achieve. Please score the options below on a seven point scale where seven means important and one means not important. Train and appoint a system of judges who can truly be independent of political or financial pressure and make 6.71 decisions that treat people fairly Build a strong economy 6.63 Give a fair and proper trial to suspected war criminals 6.47 Rating Average Rating Punish the war criminals in the government quickly without being delayed by judicial processes 6.31 Build a system of political parties like those found in Western Europe and North America 5.96 Build stronger bridges between opponents of the regime living in Syria and those living abroad 5.56 Unite under a new opposition umbrella coalition 5.39 Unite under existing Syrian National Council (SNC) coalition 4.7 Replace the Assad government with people who reflect the ethnic and religious identities of Syrians 4.58 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 International Republican Institute (IRI) - Advancing Democracy Worldwide Pechter Polls How important is each of the following in your opinion for helping Syria build a strong economy? Please score each on a seven point scale where seven means important and one means not important.
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