Philosophy Anno 7 Settembre 2020 Kitchen #13 ISSN: 2385-1945

Il Tempo e il Time and Continuo the Continuum

Philosophy Anno 7 Settembre 2020 Kitchen #13 ISSN: 2385-1945

Il Tempo e il Time and Continuo the Continuum A cura di Cord Friebe e Marcello Garibbo

 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle andBergson Account ofthe 19 Time‑continuum after Time andthe 7 Continuo Claudio TarditiClaudio Il Tempo eil Continuum. An on Time the Debateon Landázuri and Eternalism de Manuel C.Ortiz I. ELEMENTI STORICI / GaribboMarcello Reassessing Husserl’s INTRODUZIONE Introduction tothe HISTORICAL Presentism PERSPECTIVES Problem(s) 35 Aristotle. AnInterview Time, Mindand The Growing Block 73 49 ­II. FILOSOFIA Cord Friebe Shira YechimovitzShira with Thomas Crowther CONTEMPORARY CONTEMPORANEA/ of Time of theContinuum Francesco Orilia Nothing ComesNext and theProblem DEL Micro-Structure Presentism andthe PERSPECTIVES 99 85 TEMPO the Continuum 143 111 129 What isMoving Right di Zenone. Florian Fischer for theLimit Decision Due evidenzecliniche Rivivere l’incubo III.ESPLORAZIONI / Now? Dispositions. A Metaphysical Rodrigo Codermatz Limit Deciding Elton Marques Symmetry-Breaker PERSPECTIVES FURTHER Problem Time and

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 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo An IntroductiontotheProblem(s) Time andtheContinuum. (Heidegger 1983, 115). Over thecourseoflast centuryandespeciallytowards the Marcello GaribboMarcello end, throughthedigitalrevolution, thisexperience hasbeenpushedtoanextreme. years, publicationsonthetopichave beenliterallyexploding,notjustinmetaphysics end of the Century, tracing an alternative line of thought that runs parallel to that of of thinkingthroughoutthecentury.FromBergson’sCreative Evolution toHeidegger’s etc.). Yet, lookingatitsmajorphilosophical,scientific central topicthatcutsacrossvery differentphilosoph- of experiencing, thinking, and organizing time that held we feel asmuch disconnectedfromthepastaswe do Being andTime,fromEinstein’stheoriesofrelativitytoPrior’stemporallogic, tify tothefactthatsomethinghaschangeddrastically inourrelationshiptotime,cre- the factthatrhythm ofmodernlife isdictatedby apermanentlackoftime the engagement with language. And, in fact, this line becomes even morevisibleand from thepresent andthefuture. We have beenlong for centuriesseemno longeravailable. Theresultisthat ating asenseoflossand impotence. and philosophy ofscience,butalsointhephilosophy ofmind,thephilosophy ofaction, seems tohave beenputasideandthetopicoftimeiseven moreontherise.Inlast and literalworks, we may aswell speakofatemporalturntodescribethemovement shipwrecking in the raging river of modern times. Given INTRODUZIONE Recurrent talk of acceleration,temporal disintegration, andofdysinchronicity tes- Proust toBorges,theengagementwithtimeisubiquitousfrombeginning Hermeneutic vs StructuralismandPost-Structuralism, Philosophy inthe20thCenturyisusually character- University of Siegen University ing madethisthescarcestofallresources.Already Heideggercomplainedagainst in thepervasive feeling thatcontemporary life hasaseriousproblemwithtime,hav- in ethics,andaesthetics. important now, fromtheperspective ofthe21st Centurywherethelinguisticturn ical schools (Continental vs Analytic, Phenomenology/ ized intermsofthelinguisticturn,languagebeinga This raisinginterestinthetopicoftimemay have oneofitsimportantroots 1 Traditional ways Rosa (2015) and Han (2017). century. Two recent examples are has changedof time over last the explored wayour the experience works have 1 Many different participants. ofkers conference the asall aswell ference. We spea other - thank all con the at - based on talks their Claudio Tarditi in issue this are Francesco Cord Orilia, Friebe, and The from essays Florian Fischer, tribution summer-school. the to Institute Turin/Genua con for their - support. We thank also Goethe- the throughble generous their financial having made conference the possi- We thank the Thyssen-Stiftung for and the LoSpazio Theatre Vuoto. Time (https://s-p-o-t.weebly.com/) for Philosophy the Society the of of Siegen, bynized University the in September 2019,co-orgaItaly - temporal continuity in held Imperia, a summer-school and workshop on * The of idea from issue this stems sophy of Kant. tion and in philo experience the - of temporalthe structure percep- PhD project, Marcelloinvestigates of Siegen. Inhis University the at GaribboMarcello isaPhDstudent *

7 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo ty. Whatdoesitmeanfor timetobecontinuous?Does ed presentwithnogreattemporalbreath.Moreover, suchdiscontinuitydoesnotonly come a matter of both theoretical and practical necessity. And the relation between of booksandpublicationsonthetopic. compensated by thinkingandtheragingriver bebroughttorestinthevast number ed tochangeandappearstherefore irreduciblydynamical.Temporal change seemto cussed. Thus,theissuewants tobringattention someproblemsthatsuchconcep- of the temporal continuity for the contemporary philosophy of time in its different extensive, andpassing? vant to reflect upon the concept of continuity emerged. The second part discusses the continuum in relationship to time. continuity emerged. Thesecondpart discussesthecontinuum inrelationshiptotime. concept ofthe continuumtoshow how thecontemporary orthodoxy to thinkabout which may bebetter apttocapturethedynamicalnatureoftime. Chul Hanpointsout,contemporarylife ischaracterizedby anineradicabledisconti- Cantor. Whethersuchaconceptionisapttocapture thenatureoftimeishardlydis- Only by addressing thesequestionsatthislevel canwe makesenseofourexperience dwelling, restingandlingeringdifficult. time andthecontinuumisparticularlyrelevant here.Then,asphilosopherByung- this permeatingfeeling thatwe have somehow losttime,itisnotsurprisingthatso tal question: How can time be conceived as being both something continuous, hence to implyagenuinecoming-to-beandpassing-by. Thisraisesafundamen- temporal continuityisanecessaryconditionfor understandingany experienceofdu- the passage of time imply some sort of continuity that tive conceptionsof the continuumfromhistoryofphilosophy andmathematics tion may leadto.It wants todiscusspossiblesolutionsaswell asconsideringalterna- space for temporalbreath,thusfor anexperienceofduration.Itmakesany form of sequence of disconnected events, appointments and achievements. This leaves little strict regimentationofwork andleisure,we oftenseemtoexperienceourtimeasa shape theexperienceofhistory,itisalsoentrenchedinoureveryday life. Duetothe as well asthedeclineofutopianvisionsfuture.Thishasleftuswithanisolat- ally justasequenceofdisconnectedevents? Infact,developing therightconceptof strands. Especiallyinthecontextofanalyticphilosophy oftime,theorthodoxy isto and thusrethinkourrelationshiptotime. spective. We donotthink that suchquestionscanbesettled by mathematicaltheo- ral continuityby grapplingwiththesequestions from agenuinephilosophicalper- nuity (Han2017). The20thcenturyhasexperienced theradicalbreakfrompast many philosophicalworks engageswith suchtopic.Asifthelosscouldbesomehow ration andpersistence,hencefor thinking(andre-thinking) ourrelationshiptotime. reflection about the way we experience time and we think of ourselves in the world. ries ofthecontinuumorby physical notionsoftimealone.Theyrequirephilosophical presuppose a mathematical conception of the continuum that goes back to Georg imply morethanthesimpledistributionofdifferenceinapre-given space.Itseems is problematicmainlyfor onereason.Incontrasttospace,timeisintimatelyconnect- light ofsuchdevelopments, itappearsparticularly rele- holds past,presentandfuturetogether?Or,istimere- The currentissueofPhilosophy Kitcheninvestigates thenotionoftempo‑ Metaphors besides,re-thinkingtimeandourrelationtoitseemhave be- From apurelytheoreticalperspective, theconceptoftemporalcontinuity More specifically,theaimofissueistoshow therelevance ofthetopic In whatfollows I’llfirstsketchsomeimportantstagesinthe historyofthe temporal continui- 2 Preciselyinthe continuous of experience time. adis- to related intimately are nia disorderscal such asschizophre- howissue analyses psychologi- 2 Codermatz’s contribution this to

8 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The conceptoftheContinuumhasavery longhistory,goingbacktoZeno’sparadoxes, Zeno’s paradoxes raised have beendiscussedinvery different forms by philosophy, Zeno’s conclusion,Aristotledeveloped adetailedanaly- er withAristotle’s understandingof theinfinitehave vide somebackgroundfor thepaperspublishedinthisissue,aswell asgivingagener- cal implications.Thisvariety ofdifferentperspectives andquestionsmakesit very dif- can beneitherinfinitelynorfinitelydivisible. of whetherthecontinuityspace,time,orchangeisatissue. opment oftheconcept,anarrative thatisinnoway exhausting orinescapable.This of histories of the Continuum, some of whichare interconnected, others which re- cess of dividing that can be repeated ent existence. of continuousparts.Theydonothave any independ- grappled withbothapproaches,tryingtoreflectontheirontologicalandmetaphysi - gagement withZeno’sparadoxes ofmotioninthePhysics. Zenohadtriedtodemon- to threedifferentdebatesinthephilosophy oftime:thenaturetemporalpassage, tinuum to develop a formal definition of the real numbers, scientists addressed Zeno’s ficult, infactimpossible,totraceasinglehistoryoftheconcept. We may ratherspeak time continuous,soitfollows thatno temporalinstant set theframework for all later developments of the al motivation for why thequestionabouttemporalcontinuityisofcrucialimportance. strate thenon-existenceofmotionby showing thatit- sis ofthenotioncontinuity.Centraltothisanalysis any two instants, notasasequenceofextensionless standing ofthecontinuumhasmany consequences.Is I. Since allpotential parts ofthecontinuumexistonlyasaresultprocessdivision, I’ll point at some questions the Cantorean definition of continuity raises in connection I’ll pointatsomequestionstheCantoreandefinitionofcontinuity raisesinconnection However oftenthecontinuumisdivided,processofdivisionnever leadsto points. meaning oftemporalexistence,andtheontologicalstatusprocesses.Thiswillpro- mathematics, and the natural science. Whereas mathematicians focused on the con- narrative willmainlyconcern theabstractconceptofContinuum,independently main independentofoneanother. paradoxes inthecontextofatreatmentmovement, timeandspace.Philosophers parts. For Aristotle,partsmerelyaretheresultofapro- points cannotbepartsofthecontinuum.Points existonlyaspotentialboundaries uum isanundividedwholegiven priortoits(possible) understood asthatwhich passescontinuouslybetween important momentsthatallow for tellingoneconsistentnarrative aboutthedevel- inferred that indivisible points areneither actual norpotentialpartsofthecontinuum. is atop-down approachaccordingtowhichthecontin- instants. hence tothevery originofwestern philosophy. Fromthenonward, theproblemsthat has animmediatesuccessor.For, instantsonlyexistas boundaries oftemporalintervals. Accordingly, timeis 5 This conceptionofthe continuumtogeth- The firstimportantstageinthishistoryoftheconceptisAristotle’sen- The Continuum:ABriefHistoryoftheConcept In thelightofsuchapluralityhistories,hereIwillconcentrateonfew 4 Whenappliedtotime,Aristotle’sunder- ad infinitum 3 To avoid (Phy. 231b15). From this, Aristotle sitive to the issue the to of continuity.sitive of tation solutionAristotle’s - sen Coope (2008)for- arecent interpre solve in Book 4of Physics. the See to of which time, attempts Aristotle aboutzles and nature the status the of puzcontinuity a series to leads - 5 understandingThis particular of see mathematics, (1994). White comparison contemporary with of accountrecent analysis this in Wieland (1962,278-325).For amore accountAristotle’s of continuity is of 4 interpretation A classical tributions in Salmon (1970). sion of paradoxes, the con the see - 239b-240a. For discus ageneral - in Physics. the Phy, See Aristotle in vived formulation Aristotle’s 3 Zeno’s paradoxes only have sur -

9 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 1781/87, A169/B211). Hedidnotbreakwithsuchadefinition,aslatermathematician Aesthetics intheCritiqueofPureReason,the continuousnatureofspaceandtime Aristotelian thesisthatcontinuacouldnotbemade Thus, theContinuum isnolongerseen asanirreducibleconcept, butitisidentified counts of the Continuum, which would be later taken established an important distinction between intuitional and formal/conceptual ac - of the Continuum. For, Kant related the continuity of space andtime to theirbeing essentially Aristotelian.LikeAristotleKant consideredcontinuousmagnitudesto out ofindivisibleparts(seeBell2013). Furthermore, of thecontinuumwhereitisconstitutedinfinitelysmallindivisiblesections. For ception oftheactualinfinite.Moreover, theymakepossibleanewunderstanding of theAristotelianframework andbecamethesub- concept. Inthe14th Century,Aristotle’sconceptionofthecontinuum becameob- with acertain setofpoints. Cantordeveloped adefinition ofsuchasetthrough a with thestructureof realnumbers.According tothisidentification,thesetof of theworks of Georg Cantorattheendof19th would do.Nonetheless,Kant still represents animportantpointwithinthehistory which becameprominentinthelatermathematicaldescriptionofcontinuum view andanticipatedlatermathematicaldevelop- Century. At leastfromamathematical perspective, treatment oftheactualinfiniteput forward by Cantor. these controversies were (partly)resolved, asaformal finitesimals. Theseareinfinitelysmallquantitiesandtherefore presupposeacon- the calculationofinstantaneousquantitiessuchasvelocity by makinguseofin- this reason,theirintroductionwas animportantsteptowards theabandonment that insomerespectsdepartedfromtheAristotelian to aradicallynewway ofthinkingaboutinfinityandtheContinuum. these presentthemostimportantdevelopment inthe acting toCantor. a singularimmediatepresentationofitsobject(Kant 1781/87, A32/B47). Thus,Kant a newturn.Developed independentlyby NewtonandLeibniz,thecalculusallowed and theinvention ofthedifferentialcalculus, discussionsaboutthecontinuumtook standing modernmathematicsandphysics. However, intuitions ratherthanconcepts.According totheargumentsofTranscendental real numbersisisomorphic tothesetofpotentialpointsdividinga lineinspace. not only because of this are such works philosophically relevant. They also have led ments. up by differentphilosophersandmathematiciansinre- is nothingthatcanbegraspedonconceptualgroundsalone.Itrequiresanintuition, in the15th Century,NicholasofCuesdeveloped anaccountoftheactualinfinite have extendedpartsonly,pointsbeingnoofcontinuabutonlylimits(Kant having becomethefoundation for doingandunder- history oftheContinuumsinceAristotle,set theory ject ofnumerouscontroversies. ject ofanintensive debate.William ofOckhamproposedaviewthecontinuum birth ofset-theoryattheend19th Centurythat by Cantoreansettheory(seeMoore1990, 55-56).With theriseofmodernscience 6 ThomasBradwardine arguedatlengthfor the During the18th, Immanuel Kant’s understandingoftheContinuum isstill In anutshell,Cantor’saccount isbasedontheidentificationofContinuum It is difficult to overestimate the importance 8 7 Itwas onlywiththe definition. Prauss (2017). See cizing both andAristotle’s Cantor’s works out such aconception,- criti from Kant, Prauss2001). Starting conception of continuity (Prauss new of aradically elements sents Kant’s understanding pre of- time Gerold Prauss. Prauss argues that important mention to works the of standing of Continuum the is it context8 Inthe of Kant’s under uum, Moore see (1990,57-74). both infinite and the the contin- calculus in connection with 7 For agood discussion of the (2017b) and (2013,Sec. 3). Bell Roques also (2017a). See Ockham’s Roques view, see 6 For areconstruction of -

10 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo This newapproachtothecontinuumbreaksradicallyfromAristotelianunder- (Brouwer 1975). HermanWeyl arguedfor theimpossibilityofany formal definitionof counts ofthecontinuum.Moreover, Husserlarguedfor cribing a central role to temporal continuity in the con- emphasized thedynamicnatureoftime.Onthisbasis,herejectedany attemptto of thetemporalcontinuumasbasisfor aconstructivistaccountofrealnumbers countable) infinityofpointssatisfyingcertainproperties(seeMoore 1990, 110-122). of theContinuumover any formal, mathematicaltreat- engaged directlywiththeCantoreanset-theoreticaccountofContinuum.His of timeandchange.Motivated by ageneral skepticism Century isHenriBergson.Bergsondidnotonlyinsistontheprofound differencesbe- Cantor’s theoryoftransfinitenumbers.Thankstothis, C.S. Peircedefended anAristotelianapproachoftheContinuumagainstset-theo- Century Cantor’saccountoftheContinuum became the phenomenologicalfundamentalityoftime,thusas- tween ourintuitionofthecontinuumandany conceptualdescriptionofitbutalso tinuity. to reconcilethedynamicalnature of time withitscon- tive multiplicity,Bergsontriedtodevelop analternative conceptionoftheContinuum fore notsuitablefor understandingthecontinuityoftime.Bynotionaqualita- the continuumcouldbeidentifiedwithanactual(un- quires theconceptofactualinfinitedeveloped by freed fromany geometricintuition.Thisdefinitionre- deliver apurelyalgebraicdefinitionofcontinuousline the beginningof20thCenturysaw theriseofphenomenology.EdmundHusserl the Continuumtomatchentirelywithourintuitions(Weyl 1987). ticians atthebeginningof20thCentury.Thepragmatistphilosopherandlogician tion. For thisreason,itreceived numerouscritiquesfromphilosophersandmathema- formal construction of the reals. this makesBergsonparticularlyrelevant. the focus ofCantor’sworks, butalsofor thecontinuity the standardframework tothinkaboutcontinuity. This the establishmentofsuch aframework. Cantor’sdefi- towards intuition, theriseofformal methodsinmathe- stitution ofintentionality.Anotherimportantthinkerthebeginning20th standing of both the continuum and the infinite, as well asfrom oureveryday intui- and spatialcontinuityisarecurringtopicinthis issue, model thecontinuityoftimewithaspatialline.Independentlywhethersuchline retic one (Peirce 1992). Similarly, the mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer took the intuition ment of it. many philosophers argued,satisfactory. nition oftheContinuum delivered asolutiontoZeno’s matics, philosophy andphysics certainlycontributedto phenomenological approachledhimtoemphasizethepriorityofanintuitive account paradoxes thatwas formally correctandtherefore, as ing adichotomy between intuitionalandconceptualac- is given throughgeometricalintuitionordescribedconceptually,itisstatic.Itthere- holds notjustfor thecontinuityofspace, whichwas 11 Given that the distinction between temporal Parallel tothiscontroversy inthecontextoffoundation ofmathematics, Despite thesecontroversies, duringthe20th 10 Thus, Husserl followed Kant in emphasiz- 9 These constructions 12 Dedekind’s (2013). cuts. Bell See based onstruction so-called oped con amore- intuitive - Dedekindwhereas devel using fundamental sequences, 9 Cantor by constructed reals the duced concept. the James also See (1981, 148)where James intro- temporal continuity. James See role to ness ascribed acentral oftion conscious of stream the - Whitehead. James’ concep- James andWilliam North Alfred mention to works the tant of impor isalso context12 Inthis it contribution issue. this to de Lándazuri’stion of see time, Bergson and concepAristotle’s - ume. For acomparison between with Tom Crowther in vol this - continuity, Interview the spatial see temporal and between ferences maybe dif crucial there - that gest ofsages Physics the sug to seems - Kant. in Even some pas- Aristotle found can betinction already in 11 Asabove suggested, such adis- tribution volume. this to Continuum, see Tarditi’s con- of his understanding of the engagement Cantor and with 10 For adiscussion of Husserl’s -

11 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “before-than”. II. A-series determinedby past,presentandfuture,theB-seriesdeterminedby the At thisstagewe cannow turntothespecificquestionof The tenseddeterminationsareconsideredas merely To doso,Iwillfocus onthreedebatesinanalyticphi- on theworld. of thingsbutratherreflectoursubjective perspective cerns thequestionaboutfundamentalityoftemporalbecomingandgoesback order oftemporalinstantsaccordingtotherelation with thesetofrealnumberscanbeandhasbeen of timecanbe further partitioned into smaller intervals. Continuum raisesaseriesofquestions,atleastfor thoseviews whichemphasizethe Cantor’s definition for granted. the firstone,itconcernsnotionoftemporal ex- tinction, theA-TheoryarguesthatA-seriesmarksfundamentalaspectsofre- to McTaggart’s distinctionbetween two seriesoftime(seeMcTaggart 1909). The dynamic natureoftime. doxy inthecontemporaryphilosophy oftimeistotake temporal continuity.How shouldthecontinuityoftime trast totheA-Theory,B-Theoryrejectsfunda- first approximation, itcanbeunderstoodasaddress- this sectionIwant toshow thatsuchanassumptionis differs radicallyfromthedistributionofdifference in to aspectsoftheworld whicharefundamentalandthusirreducible.Thisimplies stood isamatterofnumerous controversies. a tenselessworld. Theydonotpickoutrealproperties ality. applied totime.To dothis,itisnecessarytomap the real spatial continuum,hisidentificationofthecontinuum according to whichtoexistintime istobelocatedat space. Itimpliesthingsbecomingpresent. a commitmenttotherealityoftemporalbecoming.Timepassesinway which Do pastand futurethingsexist?Eternalism istheview Lastly completenessmeansthateachinstantoftime mentality oftheA-Series.According totheB-Theory. numbers withinstantsoftime.ThetotalorderonRgiven by “<”correspondstothe nal intentwas todevelop analgebraicequivalent ofthe represents the common boundary of past and future. In problematic andtherefore requiresfurtherdiscussion. istence. How precisely suchdebateshouldbeunder- indexical linguisticdevicesthroughwhichwe relateto ing thefollowing question:Whatkindofthingsexists? losophy relatedtotime.Theclaimisgoing tobethattheCantoreandefinitionof binary relationsafter-than,before-than andsimultaneous-with.Basedonthisdis- be understood?AsIhave suggested above, theortho- Tensed The seconddebateisintimatelyrelatedto The firstimportantdebateinthecontemporaryphilosophy oftimecon- The ContinuumandtheContemporary Philosophy ofTime temporal determinations 14 Densityheremeansthateachinterval 13 Even ifCantor’sorigi- such as“present”,“past”and“future”relate 15 Incon- 16 Asa to the traditional formulation. traditional the to stick Rosenkranz Iwill 2018). Here 2013; Deasy, 2017;Correia/ temporarysmand permanentism between tinction controversythe of in dis terms the - authors for areformulation of call years, some few last 16 Inthe Fischer see of (2013). debate the Friebe (2012).For view an overall last, for e.g. see, presentism at &Rosenkranz (2018); Correia see Growing Block Theory (GBT), tribution volume; this to for the asMarques’(2015) aswell con- Spotlight Theory Deasy (MST)see For of adefence Moving the Time goes (1998). Mellor back to (new) B-Theory of eternalist the 15 The standard formulation of Grünbaum (1973),326-8). a world-line. for instance See a local ordering of along events to sufficesidentify case, this it of the text In Theory of Relativity. bealso applied con the within - order. auniversal to The model can 14 One does not apply to need this in Grünbaumatically (1973). - has developed been system goes (1914)and Russell back to ofnition continuum the time to 13 The application of Cantor’s defi- becoming». 1978,35). (Whitehead of continuity, but no continuity of argued «There isabecoming that of Zeno’s paradoxes. Hefamously of becomingtinuity on basis the hand, denied con the Whitehead - tion of continuum. the other Onthe engages Cantor’s with itly concep- (1930, 181-3)where James- explic . (Williamson,

12 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo While theA-Theoryassumesthatpresentisafundamentalaspectofreality, ce toto by claimingthattimeisnotcontinuous.Somere- der. Itleaves outany senseinwhichtemporalbecom- of temporalcontinuity,thustheimportancelooking cent developments inphysics seemtopointinthisdi- cally. Even ifphysical timeconsistsofindivisibletem- of time. with thedynamicalnatureoftimeseemstoholdfor writing of his last book been instantiated. Marcel’s writing of his last book could be voted tothelogicofaspectsanddifference between theprogressive andthe Continuum couldbecompatiblewithpresentism. temporal points,theCantor’sContinuumseemsto questions concerningtheextensionofpresentand ternative conceptionsoftheContinuum.Anotherpos- tinuous. Hence,thechallengeofreconcilingthismodel true. Marcel may bewritinghis lastbookwithoutever thecompleteevent ofMarcel’s tence intheprogressive tobetruewithoutthe sentenceintheperfective ever being describes anactioninthe pastthathascometoanend.Itispossible for thesen- the sentenceincorresponding perfective form “Marcelhaswrittenhislastbook” discreteness oftimeshouldbeaddressedphilosophi - tion. First,itisnotclearhow thisunderstandingofthe definition oftheContinuumraisesaseriesques- the growing blocktheory,accordingtowhichthepresentandpastequallyex- ty ofthepresentisfundamentalityexistence.Further views inthedebateare sibility herewould betorejecttemporalcontinuityin at the history of philosophy and mathematics for al- sentism emphasizestherelationbetween existen- as muchpresentthingsdo.Ontheotherhand,pre- according toeternalistspastand future thingsexist some instantoftheentirespatio-temporalblock.Thus, as “present”isatensedexpression,presentismpresupposestheA-Theoryoftime. any A-Theory. Insofar asitpresupposesanactualinfiniteofdistinct Presentism shoulddevelop adifferentunderstanding may arguethatdynamictheoriesoftime suchas rection. model onlydescribesthecontinuityoftemporalor- poral intervals, dynamictheoriescouldstill be arguingthattimepasseswithinsuch presentism specififiessuchfundamentalityinontologicalterms.Thefundamentali- perfective. imply acommitmenttoeternalism. its elapse. ing asthemotion/directionofpresentmay becon- ic class of temporalentities, namely processes. A lot of work has been recentlyde- intervals. Thethirdimportantdebatedoes not concerntimeassuchbutaspecif- ist andthemoving spotlighttheory, which combineseternalismwithanA-Theory his lastbook”.Suchsentence describesanoccurrenceasitisunfolding. Incontrast, and presentness. Thus,presentistsholdthatonlypresentobjectsexist.Insofar 20 Consider for instancethesentencein progressive: “Marceliswriting In thelightofthesetwo debates,Cantor’s This nonetheless raises a seriesof further 21 Moreover, itisnotclearhow thephysical 19 Differentalternatives areopen.One 18 Moreover, the 17

Craig (2000,227-248). Craig questions and problems see 21 For adiscussion of such Mechanics, (2018). Rovelli see recent developments in Quantum on of of basis the time creteness argues20 Rovelli for dis the - Cantor’s definition of continuity. tism - presen called substantivalist aversionsents of presentism tinuity. pre- Incontrast, Orilia has aproblem temporal con with - of Time Block Theory Growing argue in volume this the that Friebe19 Both and Yechimovitz has morethat point. than one understood asaproperty of aset problem continuitytral is isthat here. notever relevant The cen- infinity is uncountable is how- numbers. of real the ity That the corresponding cardinal the to - of points uncountable infinity presupposes it 18 Infact, an Continuum for instance p. (see 55). poses Cantor’s definition the of of whople apresentist presup - 17 Bourne- (2009)isan exam andnentism aswell. temporaryism continuity applyral perma- to The concerning claims tempo- that is compatible with iscompatible with that

13 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo on thenatureofprocesses.Alltheseconsiderationslead context ofthedebateabouttemporalpassage, count ofthecontinuitytimethatisnotdelivered by change, views whichholdontosomerobustsenseof continuous inthesenseofbeingalways furtherextend- entities. Theyaretheontologicalcorrespondentto es areunderstoodasincomplete,extendingtemporal contrast tospatio-temporallyboundedevents, process- of points,thusitdescribesastructurethatisdevoid of Cantor’s. formal definitionoftheContinuumalone.Beitin this question cannot be settled by appealing toCantor’s time beconceived simultaneouslyassomethingcontin- to thefundamentalquestionofvolume: How can temporal existenceorabouttheontologicalstatusof derstanding presupposesthenanactuallyinfiniteset able andatany pointdivisible.However, itishardtosee any incompleteness. portant distinctionbetween events andprocesses. processes areessentiallycontinuous.Theirunfolding is uous, hence extensive, and passing? They suggest that ing oftemporal continuity may here help toshedlight interrupted, for instanceby hissuddendeath. linguistic progressive aspect.Thisinturnmeansthat help understand this kind of continuity. Such an un- how theCantoreanconceptionofContinuumcould becoming seem all to be requiring a more dynamic ac- Reflection onsimilarexampleshasledsomephilosopherstodraw anim- 23 Hence, a different understand - 22 In introduced problem. solve the to positions and processes are bution volume, this to where dis- asFischer’s aswell lem contri- of history such probsystematic - change. Strobach See (1998)for a continuity the and ofwith time related and istherefore intimately beginning the siders of change This problem when one arises con- of lem first the moment of change. issue concernsrelated prob the - (2007). Arsenijevic A further, here instance Rödl (2005,166-172)and rediscovered. recently been for See definition the of continuum has ses 23 Indiscussions about proces (2018) for two opposing views. Stout (2016)andsee Crowther tus processes can be understood, ways in which ontological the - sta necessity. There different are isaprocess, experience that by philosophythe of mind. They argue (2018)doSoteriou for same the ory. O’Schaugnessy (2000)and such for- distinction the action emphasized importance the of (1984). Thompson (2008)has logicthe Galton of see aspects study22 For of asystematic and progressive, the Aristotle’s -

14 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo James W. James W. (1979). SomeProblemsofPhilosophy. Cambridge,MAandLondon:Harvard Arsenijevic M.(2007). DieBedeutungderZenonischenParadoxa fürdiePhilosophie Aristotle O’Schaughnessy B.(2003).Consciousness andtheWorld. Oxford: Oxford University Correia F. &Rosenkranz S.(2018). NothingtoCome.ADefence oftheGrowing Block Coope U.(2008).Timefor Aristotle. Physics IV. 10-14. Oxford: Oxford University Grünbaum A.(1955). ModernScience and theRefutation ofZeno.TheScientific Galton A.(1984) TheLogicofAspect.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Craig W.L (2000).TheTensed TheoryofTime:ACriticalExamination. Volume Crowther T. (2018). Processes as Continuants and Processes as Stuffs. In R. Stout (ed.). Moore A.W. (1990). TheInfinite.London:Routledge. Mellor D.H.(1998). Real TimeII . London:Routledge. McTaggart, J.M.E.(1908). Theunrealityoftime.Mind,17 (68):457-74. Kant, I.(1781/87). CritiqueofpurereasonTransl. anded.by P. Guyer &A.W. Wood Husserl E.(1990). OnthePhenomenologyofConsciousness ofInternal Time Brouwer L. E. J. (1975) . Bourne C.(2009).AFuture for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bell J.(2013). ContinuityandInfinitesimals.E.N.Zalta(ed.)TheStanford Encyclopedia Heidegger, M.(1983). DieGrundbegriffederMetaphysik. Han, B. (2017). Id. (1973). Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Friebe C.(2012) Zeit,Wirklichkeit, Persistenz. Einepräsentistische Deutungder Fischer F. (2016). Philosophy oftime:ASlightlyOpinionatedIntroduction.Kriterion, Deasy D.(2015). TheMoving SpotlightTheory.PhilosophicalStudies,172 Theory ofTime.Volume 395ofSynthese Library: StudiesinEpistemology, 30 (2)SpecialIssue:NewDevelopments inPhilosophy ofTime:3–28. Physics. J.Barnes(ed.).TheCompleteWorks ofAristotle. TheRevised Transl. by D.Steur.Cambridge:PolitePress. 293 ofSyntheseLibrary:StudiesinEpistemology,Logic,Methodolyand Oxford Translation. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press. (139–173) FrankfurtamMain:Viktorio Klostermann. (1998). Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. (8):2073–2089. of Philosophy, URL:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/continuity/. (1893–1917). Transl. by J.B.Brough,Dordrecht: Kluwer. Company. Einsamkeit. Monthly, 81 (5):234–239. Raumzeit. Paderborn:MentisVerlag. Logic, MethodolyandPhilosophy ofScience.Cham:Springer. Processes, Action andExperience.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Philosophy ofScience.Cham:Springer. der Zeit.InT. Müller(ed.),PhilosophiederZeit:NeuePhilosophischeAnsätze University Press. Press. Press. North-Holland. Press. Bibliography (1981). The Scent of Time. A Philosophical Essay on the Art of Lingering The PrinciplesofPsychology. Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Gesamtausgabe Bd.29/30,Frankfurta.M.:Viktorio Klostermann. Collected Works: 1. Ed. by A. Heything, Amsterdam: Welt –Endlichkeit –

15 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Thompson M.(2008).Life andAction: Elementary StructuresofPracticeandPractical Williamson T. (2013). ModalLogicasMetaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wieland W. (1962). DiearistotelischePhysik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck undRuprecht. White M.(1994). TheContinuous andtheDiscrete:Ancient Physical Theoriesfroma Whitehead A.N.(1878). ProcessandReality. D.R.Griffinand W.Sherburne(ed.) Weyl H.(1987). TheContinuum: ACriticalExamination oftheFoundation ofAnalysis. Strobach N.(1998). TheMoment ofChange.ASystematic HistoryinthePhilosophy Stout, R.(2016). TheCategoryofOccurrentContinuants.Mind,125, 497, 41–62. Soteriou M.(2013). TheMind’sConstruction.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Salmon, W. (ed).(1970). Zeno’sParadoxes. Indianapolis:TheBobbs-MerrillCompany. Russell B. (1914). Rovelli C.(2018). TheOrderofTime.Transl. by E.SegreandS.Carnell.London:Penguin Rosa, Hartmut(2013). Acceleration. ANew TheoryofModernity.Transl. by J.Trejo- Id. (2017b). OckhamontheInstantofChange.Vivarium , 55/1:130–151. Roques M.(2017a). OckhamonthePartofContinuum.Oxford StudiesinMedieval Rödl S.(2012). Categories oftheTemporal. An Inquiryinto theForms oftheFinite Id. (2015). DasKontinuum unddasUnendliche.NachAristoteles undKant einRätsel. Prauss G.(2001). TheProblemofTimeinKant. Transl. by P. Cicovacki. InPredrag Peirce C.S.(1992). Reasoning andtheLogicofThings.K.L.Ketner (ed.),Cambridge, Id. (2018). Experience,Process,Continuity,andBoundary.InR.Stout(ed.).Processes, Action andExperienceOxford: Oxford University Press. 166). Rochester: University ofRochester Press. Thought. CambridgeMA:Harvard University Press. Transl. by S.PollardandT. Bole,Philadelphia:ThomasJeffersonUniversity Contemporary Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. of SpaceandTime.Volume 395ofThenewSyntheseLibrary:Texts and Studies intheHistoryofPhilosophy. Dordrecht:Kluwver Academic Cicovacki Ed.,Kant’s Legacy: Essays inHonourofLewis (153– WhiteBeck Philosophy, 5:181–212. Intellect. Transl. by S.Salewski. London:Harvard University Press. New York: FreePress. Books. Mathys. NewYork: ColumbiaUniversity Press. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber. MA: Harvard University Press. Publisher. Publishing Company. Press. Our Knowledge of the External World. London:TheOpen Court

16 Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s) — Marcello Garibbo Garibbo Marcello — Problem(s) the to Introduction An Continuum. the and Time  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle andBergson Aristotle. AnInterview Account ofthe 19 Time, Mindand Time‑continuum after 49 Claudio TarditiClaudio with Thomas Crowther on Time I. the Debateon Landázuri and Eternalism de Manuel C.Ortiz Reassessing Husserl’s Presentism 35 ELEMENTI STORICI /HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 17

 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle’s exposition.Aristotle’s Bergson’s defend Iwill on view Aristotle andBergsononTime Creative Evolution Heidegger criticized Bergson’s Heidegger criticized views Phenomenology of Physics the and Bergson’s in on his views time by onhe misunderstood affirmingthat time Aristotle’s CHANGE For purpose, this texts analyze briefly Aristotle’s I will Basic Problems of of Problems and Time Basic inBoth Being and will examine Bergson’swill durée between distinction will be also helpful to make some be make helpful also to will Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (Essai Consciousness of Data the on Immediate Essay Collège de France de . courses in Collège he the gave remarks on the recently published on recently remarks the Manuel C. Ortiz de LandázuriManuel C.Ortiz Duration and (DS ). Simultaneity Duration approach goes that beyond paradigm. the Aristotelian as Heidegger says, develops but adifferent rather time by showingtime does it not that criticise Aristotle’s, of physics time the show to with relationship its traditional exposition from Physics IV. from exposition paper Inthis traditional I University of Navarra University DURATION (EC)and

MOVEMENT 1 It to the philosophy the to of nature. researching on questions related edge in Plato. momentAt the he is and knowl virtue ship- between and has worked- on relation the cept of pleasure (2012) in Aristotle hisHe wrote PhDon con the - (Spain). of Navarra University professor the is associate at de LandázuriManuel Cruz Ortiz erence works the in French. and ref- my own Iwill translation 1 For works the of Bergson, Iuse PERCEPTION and and ), 19  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotlian fashionwithouthaving understooditproperly?Inany case,ifhehasdone Aristotelian conceptionoftime,asHeideggersupposes?DidBergsontreattimeinan ( cerned withKant’s treatmentoftimeandspacethanAristotle’s»(Massey2005,65). of presence. As Massey has shown, «is explicit aim is to demonstrate that all count- ent instant,hasalltheprotagonism,dueto metaphysics ofthebeingaspresence. categories, andwould nothave realizedthattemporali- of timecanhardlybefound inhiswritings.Infact,best-known works about cized Bergson’sviews ontimeby affirmingthathemisunderstoodAristotle’stra- cording toHeidegger,would nothave overcome thephilosophy ofpresence proper of thetimewheninfacthisphilosophy ofduréeisdependentonit.Bergson,ac- which issurprisingconsideringthesubjectofhisdoctoralthesis:doctrineplace Creative Evolution, butinthiscase, Bergson wants tocorrecttheroleofstableforms for HeideggerwiththeAristotelian conception oftimeisthatthe“now”, the pres- timately dependentonAristotle.InBeingandTime Heideggeraddressestheprob- traditional concepts.However, hethinks thatlife itselfhas been shapedintoconcepts, the modernviewoftime,especiallywithKant’s (timeasahomogeneousscheme); try toshow: i)thatBergson’sphilosophy oftimearisesfromaconfrontationwith time to the conscience flow. Bergson would have understood time from ontological ty isthehorizonofcomprehension ofDasein. time (Essai, flows intheconstantpresent,whereasHeideggerhadtreatedtemporalityasba- ditional expositioninPhysics IV. HeaccusesBergsonofcriticizingAristotle’svision to Aristotelianmetaphysics. ThisdependenceofBergsononAristotle’sphilosophy of such asculture,andtherefore itmustbeunderstood initsculturalforms. Inthissense, as ahomogeneousmediumlikespace.Inthisregard,Bergsonismoredirectlycon- so, ithasnotbeeninanexplicitway, since clearcriticismsofAristotle’sphilosophy sic conditionofhumanexistence:«Whereasduréeisprimarilypresent‒theeter- scarce, ifnotnon-existent.InBergson’swork, thediscussionwithAristotleisabsent, Bergson did notcriticizeAristotle’s philosophy oftime Heidegger reproachesBergsonfor tryingto offeranewconceptionoftimethatisul- Heidegger, insimilarfashiontoBergson,acceptsthatlife cannotbeunderstoodfrom Missverständnis desAristotelischenZeitverständnisses» Heidegger1927b, 328).Iwill Bergson’s doctrinearisesfromanAristotelianconfrontationoftime;ii)that Bergson would bedependentonthatconception oftimethathighlightsthepresent Bergson’s durationisfirstofallcreationonlife, Heidegger’stemporalityisnakedex- Both inBeingandTimeBasicProblemsofPhenomenologyHeideggercriti- not having understood the Aristotelian understanding of time («beruhtaufeinem nal presentofthenow andofthelivingact‒Zeitlichkeit isprimarilyfuture.Whereas presence (according to Heidegger 1927a, 433) rests on the fact that Bergson’s ing presupposesspatialrepresentationandthatthemeasurementoftimetreatsit ii) thatBergson’sinterpretationofthevulgarunderstandingtimepreciselyallows interpretation oftimeinthecommonsense(vulgäreZeitverständnis ) isbasedon instant (Heidegger1927a, 17-18), only thathewould have transferred theproblemof in Aristotle(Aristoteles delocosenserit).We onlyfindopencriticismofAristotlein istence toward death»(Seypell1956, 506).Now, doesBergsonreally criticizethe him to inaugurate a metaphysics of flow as continuous creation, not a metaphysics lem ofbeingaspresenceandtheAristotelian understanding oftime.Theproblem εἰδος ) innature,theheritageofPlato’sphilosophy, andnottheconceptionoftime. The mainproblem ofHeidegger’sviews isthat Heidegger pointsoutinGrundproblemederPhänomenologie:i)that Matière etmemoire, Duration etsimultanéité)references toAristotleare 2 the durée,the for although he made in philosophy the clear, least at of dence on isnot all at Aristotle 2 For H.Massey, Bergson’s depen- durée

20 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle, having treatedtimeasa“measureofmotion”would have considereditina The importantword inthisproblemis Aristotle arethesubstancesthatchange,exist now, inaction,andthathave po- In thesecondpartofbook IVofthePhysics Aristotleoffersushisfamous analysis of would onlybepossibletocountthemovement ifthe ciates thebefore andafter,thesimultaneityofsomethingwithothermovements. out (1970, 316), anecessaryconditionfor theretobetime;withoutthesoulis would have fought against since it would imply a spa- time asanumberwould bethetimeofphysics, differentfromrealtime,whichflows. time linehasbeenpreviouslyspatializedandthe“nows” triad, aquarteron,quintet,etc.The tialization oftime.To theextentthattimeisanumber, fore” and“after”»(Phy. 219b1), athesisthatBergson flows, andtimeisthemeasurethatsoulmakesofmovement. Onlythesoul appre- to future,accordingbefore andafter,withreference toothersimultaneous time is a structure of the soul or an for Aristotlepointstoanessentialelementoftimewhichisnotphysical; themeas- the Aristotelianphilosophy oftime?Inonesenseitdoes,butinanother itdoesnot, time. ThisisAristotle’sthesis,whichBergsonsharescompletely:thetimeofphysics is tential aspectsthatallow change.Timeisonly ameasureofthemovement thattakes does notpointtoan“originaltime”ofthesoul, but simplyanalyzeswhattimeisasit time. Hispositioninthis respectisthatthisnotsomethinginitself, but “thenum- spatial way, anditstreatmentwould notbevalid for arealphilosophy oftime. sisting innotingandreproducingthestructureofcertainassembliesunits:apair, as Aristotlesays, itimpliescounting,measuring,and stands timeas«numberofmotioninrespect“be- a measureofmotion,anditimpliesfreezingtimetoaccordingthe II. Bergson did not openlycriticize Aristotle, there isan movements. Ifthisisso,timeonlypossibleandexiststotheextentthatthere manifests itselfinthestructuresofourordinary understandingoftime. no pointintalkingabouttime.Thatiswhy theanalysis oftimeinBookIVPhysics place insofarasthereisasoulthatmeasures. In thefollowing pagesIwillanalyze uring soul. In this respect, as will be seen later, Aristotle does not seem to think that in abroadsensemeans“measure”.«Itisnecessarytotaketheactofcountingascon- implicit criticism in his approach, since Aristotle under- in hiswritings.However, itcouldbesaidthateven if is asoulthatmeasures,sincetheonlythingexistsnow thatchanges, in theabstract sense(whichwe useincounting),but thesenseofmovement that have beenenumerated.Thiswould obviously meanafreezingoftimeand,therefore, bly» (Brague1982, 137). before andaftercomparedtothe“now”. However, doesthetimeofphysics exhaust briefly Aristotle’sphilosophy oftimeinorderto compareitlaterwithBergson’s. ber ofmovement according to thebefore andafter” (Phy. Analysis ofTimeinPhysics IV Therefore, for Aristotle,ultimately,time doesnotexist.Whatexistsfor One canonlymeasuremovement accordingtoitsstructurefrompast However, isthisreallyso?DoesAristotleunderstandtimeinaspatialway? Is thisthetimeofphysics? Yes, andaswe measuremotion,we spatialize a priori ἀριθμός ἀριθμός form of sensibility, but, as Wieland points isfundamentallyastructure,anassem- , whichistranslatedas“number”,but 219b1). Timeis number not (Fasolo 2006). underlining differences their also Bergsonbetween and Aristotle, show connection speculative the on hand, other the to has tried 2005,50nnd(Massey 90).G. Fasolo, view, asHeidegger supposes not so much on the Aristotelian of onmainly Kant, his criticism and Bergson’s depends of time view Essai.the suggests Massey that he did not discuss him in with it onhis in thesis place the Aristotle,

21 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “nows” (Phy. “now” onlyexistsinapresentway, soitcannotbesaidthattimeisameresumof Aristotle thinks that time can be compared to a line, becausealine might be divid- (Brague 1982, 142). Timeistheexperienceofapeculiar structureofthemovement ent fromwhatitwas awhileago;before, itwas inoneway, afteritisinanother.The cause thenow issomethingthatchangesalthoughitremainsthesame; continually changing, there is never an instant equal to another. This is precisely the continues tobeinstant,even thoughthingschange.Theinstanttaken as “essence”is we may lay itdown thatone“now” ( ed into other smaller lines, but not into points (Phy. continuum admitting ofnoparts; parts ofitandnows withinit,whichhitherto had we say thatthere istime,andthisthatwe say istime» (Phy. tion tothe“before” and“after”. We say thattimepassesbecausethe“now” isdiffer- deals withthe“now”, sincetimeseemstohave todowiththe“now” anditsrela- tion ofthatchangeinthe“now”, whicheven thoughitchangesremainsinacertain there isperceptionofthenow. Therefore, thefoundation oftimeseemstobeinthe that flows and links thepast and the future. There isonly time tothe extent that difficulty indefiningthe now,inwhichtime isnotcomposedof “nows” asparts: «For the now islikeapointthatchangesandremainsthesameaspoint.Thatwhy fore andafter. to measuremovement accordingtothebefore andafter,soAristotlestates: tions ofpossibilitytimeinitsordinarymanifestations. Iftimeissomethingcontin- than apointto( tribute ofit;insofarasitnumbers,isnumber( the soulpronouncesthat the‘nows’ aretwo, onebefore andoneafter,itisthenthat difficulty ofdealingwiththe now because preciselytospeakofthe“now” onemust that ofspace.Itisnotthe numberasapoint,butlinedelineatedby pointsthatal- sense as“now”. according tobefore andafter.Timeis sense itisnumber?Inthethattheretimewhennow isbothoneandtwo, aware thatthe measurementoftimeimpliesadifferenttype ofmeasurementfrom If we say thattimeiscontinuous,andnotameresumof“nows”, itispreciselybe- However, the“now” isvery importantfor theexistenceoftime,because itenablesus not afixed point:«When we thinkofthe extremesas different from themiddleand perception oftheinstantthatchanges.Theasasubjectremainsidentical,it uous, andwe normallyimagineitasaline,thencannotbemeresumof“nows”. is counted(Ross 1936, 64).However, before givingthedefinitionoftime,Aristotle important inunderstandingAristotle’spurposebookIV, toinvestigate thecondi- imagine thatitisapointinanimaginarytimeline, butthatisnotthenow, sinceitis low the measurement oftime.«He holdsthatduration isinitsown nature aperfect both unity of the before and after and inner dimension, tension of the before andafter The ‘now’ isthelinkoftime( other). However, thisisnotasobvious asitiswiththepoint,whichfixed. Itdividespoten- and futuretime),itisalimitoftime(for itisthebeginningofoneandend so farasitconnectsisalways thesame,asitiswithmathematicallines(Phy. 222a10-15). tially ( «In sofarthenasthe“now” isaboundary( The now isnotapartoftime,butlimit,becausetimecontinuous,while διαιρεῖ δὲ δυνάμει δὲ διαιρεῖ 218a19), since the now is changing, and time has todo with the percep- στιγμὴ στιγμῆς ), andinsofarasitisdividingthe‘now’ isalways different,butin συνέχεια χρόνου συνέχεια τὰ νῦν τὰ ἀριθμός )» (Phy. ), ashasbeenmentioned(for itconnectspast ) cannotbenexttoanother,any more becauseisunityoftwo elements:be- 218a18-19). Aristotlewarns ofthe ἀριθμό 220a18-20). This simile is very πέρας ς, 220a21-22)». Inwhich ), itisnottime,butanat- 219a28-30). Aristotleis

22 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The unityoftimedependsinpartonourcountingnows» (Coope2005,131). κείσθω ( companied by amagnitude ( on movement. Now, why canwe measuremotion?Becauseevery movement isac- way) inhisdoctrine.Inacertainsensehedoes(by stressingthecharacterof time order tobeablemeasuremovement (thatistime)itnecessarytobeachange were nochange,therewould benotimeeither(Phy. only apotentialexistence,arebroughttoactualexistenceby amindwhichdistin- which islimitedby thenow ( guishes periodsandnows withinit»(Ross 1936, 68).Preciselybecausetimeisacon- different “nows”, and in that sense time is limited by the “now”. In this way we can see tion dominatedby making-present(Massey2005,122). Heideggerpoints outthatin the measurementoftimeisnotspatialization,butmaking-present.OnHeidegger’s treatment oftimeinPhysics IV, tryingtoshow thatfor Aristotlewhatisessentialto the line:«Whentwo linesegmentsarejoinedatapoint,eachsegmentitselfexistsas tinuum, thenow hasaroleinunifyingtimethatthepointdoes nothave inunifying time, ratherthanregarding timeasbeingderived from motion(Massey2005,163). derstands this as measure),andinacertain sensehedoesnot(by linkingtimeas ameasurewith succession inwhichthemindplacesevents accordingtothebefore andafter. space in which the movement takes place (which must be ignored), and another is the another insuccession.Thesearetwo different levels and,infact,Bergsonwillunder- account, measuredtimeisnotaspatializationofpureduration,buttemporaliza- a unitywhetherornotwe markpointsonit.Timeisnot,inthisway, priortothenow. Now, onethingisthatinordertounderstandtimewe ment insofarasitadmitsofenumeration»( movement aschange): not matter: ing tothe“now” thathaschanged.So«timeisnotmovement, butonlymove- is a construction of the soul from the perception of change, which is the real, accord- in order to count time the mind does not “spatialize” it, placing one moment next to in ordertocounttimetheminddoesnot“spatialize” it,placingonemomentnextto how Aristotletriestoseparatetimefromtherealmofreality.Time,thinksAristotle, have toignorethespaceinwhichmovement takesplace,andanotherthing isthat line thesecondlevel asthekeytoavoiding many errorsinphilosophy. One thingisthe ἔκ τινος εἴς τι εἴς ἔκ τινος (Heidegger 1927b:343-344) completely formal senseofstretchingout(Erstreckung)isintendedin«fromsomethingto of thespatialrepresentation(räumlichenVorstellung ), somethingthatAristotledid,too.A something». Itisimportanttoseethis,becauseitwas withreference tothisdetermination time inthesenseofspatialextensionitsreference tomotion. that theAristotelianconceptoftimewas misunderstood(mißverstanden wurde ) inthe modern period,especiallyby Bergson;fromtheoutsethetookthisdimensionalcharacterof In thecaseofdetermination , Phy. A differentquestioniswhetherAristotlespatializes time(inaBergsonian The nextstepintheanalysis oftimeisitsrelationshiptomovement. Ifthere In 219a30). Thesoulperceives timeasitmeasuresmovement accordingto Grundprobleme derPhänomenologieHeideggeranalyzesAristotle’s ), andfor thisappreciationthespatialcharacterofexperiencedoes ἀκολουθεῖ ὁ χρόνος ἀκολουθεῖ κινήσει τῇ ὁ χρόνος inanexistentialway regardingmotionthoughtalongwith 3 μέγεθος τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ὑπο εἶναι- δοκεῖ τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ χρόνος νῦν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι εἴς ἔκ τινος , Phy. 219a11), anditseemsthattimeis ἀριθμός we shouldgetridourselves completely , Phy. 219b3). 218b22), sotimeisdependent (Phy. lation (1988). lation - 3 Iuse trans A. Hofstadter 219b23). Heideggerun-

23 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “time of consciousness”, nor even a “time of the human being”, but is the very time of “original time”or“soultime”,thiswould notbewhatBergsoncallstherealdurée.It “scheme” ofsensibilityorthatthereisan“originaltime”consciousness.Inany case 316) seemstobecorrect:timefor Aristotledoesnotoccurthroughthesoul(durch And, ifthisisnotso,perhapshedoesgive aglimpseofan“originaltime”,properto According toAristotle,timeassuchdoesnotexist,thereisonlymovement andthe Aristotle makesaconsiderationofthepredicative structuresalreadypresentinordi- There istimeinasmuchthesoulcannumber.Aristotlesays littlemoreabouthow (nicht ohne der Tätigkeit der Seele). Wieland considers that in the analysis of time der Seele)orinthesoul(),butratherdependsonactivityof of sensibility?DoesAristotlepointtoanidealistictheorytime(Hamelin1931, 42)? clear thatthisisnotpossible,butthen,timeaform ofthesoul,asanapriorischeme element ofchange(movement): ception oftime(Dubois1961, 299-300),whichisthevery movement ofthings.Roark of possibilitysuchanexperience(Conill1981, 257). Timeasmeasureornumber cause they do not consider the now as “now”. In this sense, Wieland’s position(1970, change andlive life beyond theimmediatepresent,thankstomemoryandfantasy. could benoperceptionofchange.ItcannotattributedtoAristotlethattimeisa to count,itisimpossiblefor theretobetimeunlessissoul»(Phy. the soulandtime:«Butifnothingbutsoul,orinreason( things thatflow, andthatencompassesbothhumanlife andthelife oftheuniverse. the conscience. However, it should be considered that if Aristotle had pointed to an from the time of the physics we could speak of an internal time, proper to the soul or the soul,priortomovement, andwithwhichthesoulmeasuresmovement? Thislast time that Aristotle marks? Could there be time without a soul? Aristotle makes it depends ontheactofsoulthatmeasures(Festugière 1971, 206). the soulmay beabletonumberwithrespect to“before” and“after”.Itshouldbead- soul thatmeasuresit.Now, whatexactlyistherelationshipbetween thesouland as theform ofperception). Ross seemstoproposearealistic thesis ontimeasareal simply makestimedependentontwo poles: thesoulthatmeasuresandmove- soul isnotafactofdailyexperience,but,theresultreflectiononconditions III. Even thoughanimalshave thesefaculties, theyarenotcapableofmeasuringtimebe- ment thatismeasured.Aristotlethusputsanobjective andarealcriterionontheper- nary language about time and its properties. In this sense, the presupposition of the mitted that thesoul“remains” inrespect tochangein acertain sense andcannum- problem of this interpretation is that itcouldlead to anidealisticviewof time(time is notbecausethedurée“originaltime”asHeideggerthinks,itonlya in whichmotionisthematteroftime,andperception its form (Roark 2011): theonly it can be admitted that the human soul has the capacitytolook( hypothesis would seem to putAristotle precisely in relationwithBergson,sinceapart has recentlydefended anhylomorphic understandingofAristotle’sdoctrineontime, ber it,becausewithoutsomethingthatdoesnotchangeinrespectotochange,there Time is not the thing tobeatdifferent placerorindifferent states;andthuschange,or rather(sincechange be inoneplace, orinonestate,atonce;itis the existenceoftimethatmakes itpossiblefor a Aristotle doesnottherefore presentanidealistic philosophy oftime,but Time andtheSoul However, firstlyitisnecessarytoexamineAristotle’spositionregarding ratio cognoscendi of change. It is rather the ratio essendi ψυχῆς νοῦς ψυχῆς . A thing can only θεωρεῖν ), isqualified 223a25-27). ) beyond

24 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle emphasizesthefactofmeasuringtime,andthatmeasurementisonlypos- According toRoss, itseemsthatonethingis“realtime”andanother“know Time certainlyoccupies a majorplaceinBergson’sphilosophy; however, whileBergson 219a11). Without movement therewould benotime,anditisthesoulthatmakes V. which issomethingcontinuousthatflows, isinconstantflux. various writings.Therefore, whenanalyzingtimeinBergson,it isimportantnotto gists have thoughtaboutthe dataofconsciousness inaspatialway, eliminatingthe does nothave aspecificwritingontime,thisthemeappears again andinhis tialize” timeandturnitintoaline.Thatiswhy, intheend,Aristotlespatializestime, tinuous thatflows. Now, when we measuretime, we have totake thenow asalimit the onehanditseemshedid,becauseby consideringtimeasameasureofmovement, through Bergson’s lens, did Aristotle spatialize time? Here the answer is less clear.On duce atimeeven “morereal”thanthatofphysics, togointothevery heartofreality, treatment oftime,thetimephysics isthemeasureofmovement; thattimeisnot tation. Iwillcomparebothviews afterexaminingBergson’streatmentoftime. to Bergson’sapproach.However, thereisalackoftextualevidencefor thisinterpre- time”. If this is so, Aristotle would have seen the duration of things in a way very close that timehasmagnitudebecausemovement issusceptibletomeasurement(Phy. derstand towhatextentAristotlewas thephilosopherwhobestdescribedhow the them. As I will demonstrate, an examination of Bergson’s approach allows us to un- question ofplaceinthePhysics. Therefore, ifBergsondoesnotconfrontAristotle,it that BergsoncouldnotignoreAristotle,ashisdoctoraldissertationwas aboutthe tique of the approach of although heisaware thatthisisadifferentmeasuringexercise fromthereal“now”, spatialize itbecauseAristotlehimselfisaware thattimecannotbetakenasasumof sible insofarasthemovement hasmagnitude.Ontheother hand, itseemshedidnot as ameasureofmovement. Aristotlehimselfisclearinhistreatisewhenhestates IV. Bergson findsno reasonto criticizeit, orhe is moreinterested in focusing hiscrit- Did BergsoncriticizeAristotle’sanalysis oftime?We would strive invain tofindacri- movement; realdurationasamarchincontinuouscreation(DS:53). real, theonlyrealthingisvery movement ofthings.Now, Bergsonintendsto intro- measurement. Becausetimeisameasurewe necessarilyspatializeitanddraw itasa ics. For example,thepurpose intheEssaiistoshow how philosophers andpsycholo- in asegmentoftime:thisisnecessarilyanexercise ofintelligenceinwhichwe “spa- instants; thenow cannot beunderstoodasapointinline,sinceitissomethingcon- idea oftimeoriginates,thatis,thephysics, thetimewe useinourdailylives, is becausedeepdown heeitheracceptshisapproachesorfindsnoreasontocriticize icism oncontemporaryapproaches(Kant, psychological positivism,etc.).Itisclear lose sightoftheintention withwhichitappearsinawork thatdeals withothertop- line (Phy.

states, becomestheratio cognoscendi oftime.(Ross 1936,65) already involves timeasanelement)theexistenceofsamethingindifferentplacesor Time inBergson Bergson onAristotle However, oneremainingquestionoftimeinAristotlecouldstillbeanalyzed 220a17). Insummary, Bergsoncouldacceptwithoutreservation Aristotle’s Physics IV in the works of the French philosopher. Either

25 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Through thedifferent writings ofLapenséeetlemouvant we findtheideathat the VI. continuous flow ofthelife ofconsciousness.Now, fromthisit would beinappropriate open. ItistruethatalreadyintheEssaiBergsonplacespuredurationfrontof of thespatialization psychological phenomena and tosafeguard humanfreedom cosmology andendswiththeology(Gouhier1948, 161). Rather,whatBergsontries consider Bergsonismasaphilosophy thatstartswithpsychology butcontinueswith with metaphysical value, since the pointofview will seelateron. when Aristotle statesthattimeisa measureofmotion,and thatitdoesnotexist in Essai isthattimecanonlybeunderstoodintermsof Evolution andinDuration andSimultaneitythatBergsondevelops hisphilosophy of to measure it. The time that passes, the time that is time. In this work there is no treatment of the that timewould bethatsameflow. Inthis way, there the flow ofconsciousness,totheextentthatitseems time” tothesubject.Moreover, themainobjective oftheEssaiistoshow thelimits to thinkthatBergsonunderstandstimeonlyastheflow ofconsciousnessoran“inner tempt todevelop aphilosophy oftimeinallitsamplitude.Inthissense,itispossibleto the operation of the mind that places the images in space, but Bergson does not at- time thatflows» (Essai,166). time beadequatelyrepresentedby space?To thiswe mustanswer: yes, ifwe aretalk- to dois to show thelimitationofspatializing the living time of consciousness:«Can time inagenuineway, givingmetaphysical value totheinternaltimeofthings,aswe thor indicatesatthebeginning,isrelationship ofthebodywithspirit,andthat directly withthesubjectoftimeandduration,he onlymentionsthedurationofcon- that we elaborateasameasure ofmovement, as ifitwere realtime. Inthissense, space insofarastimehasalreadypassedandwe need against determinism(Essai,VII-VIII),however, thequestionoftimeremainsquite sciousness asopposedtothetimeofphysics. Theobjective ofthistreatise,asthe au- study ispsychological. However, intheEssai ration, whichwhenitcomesbackonitself,“spatializes” problem of time lies inthe confusion oftaking the abstracttime of physics, the time is no“data”ofconsciousnessassuch,butaflow, adu- ing aboutpassedtime;no,ifwe aretalkingaboutthe is why thequestionoftimeoccupies a secondary place. Itisundoubtedlyin Creative lived in thenow is something different thatisnot possi- ble tospatialize.To talkaboutthat livingtime,Bergsonusestheword durée: What is time insideus? A qualitative multiplicity, without resemblancetothe number; anor- ganic development thatisnot,however, anincreasingquantity [...]. Whatisthereofduration change, buttheirmomentsfollow oneanotheronlyfor acon- outside ofus?Onlythepresent,or,ifoneprefers, simultaneity.Without doubtexternalthings sciousness thatremembersthem.(Essai,170) Abstract andReal Time The keytotheentiredoctrineoftimein In Matter andMemory,Bergsondoesnotdeal duration isvery muchrelatedto 4 5 durée science qui remémore». les se succèdentse que pour une con- changent, leurs moments mais ne doute choses les extérieures Sans mieux, simultanéité. aime la présent seulement, ou, l’on si durée, en dehors de nous? Le de la […].Qu’existe-t-il, sante pourtant pas une crois- quantité oppement organique qui n’est nombre; le blance avec un- dével sans- ressem qualitative, plicité au-dedans de nous?- Une multi que5 «Qu’est-ce durée la Bergson. of formy texts the own translation dulez temps qui s’écoule». Iuse du écoulé; tems non, vous si par quoi nos répondons: oui, s’agit s’il adéquatement par de l’espace? A 4 «Letemps répresenter peut-il se -

26 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo To takethepresentasamathematicalinstantis VII. We couldonlysay thatthereisnotimeifeverything The realdurationofthingsisnotfor Bergson ametaphysical hypothesis, butsome- everything being made. The measurement of time is warned ofwhenherejectedthepossibilityspeak- operate inreality. other words, the“before” and“after”arenotmerementalconstructions,butrather ent. Thisiswhy we mustadmitthatthereisarealdurationoperatesinthings.In were awholecomposedofalways thesamemove- was alreadydoneandnothingchanged’iftheuniverse we know haspassed”(DS,62). we cannotmeasureitwithoutconverting intospaceandassumingthateverything gument, because it is the experience itself that direct- that the“before” and“after”arethetermsofatimeline. tions. Thistime, ontheotherhand,is notonlyapsychic time, butreal,ontological time: demonstrate theexistence oftheduréethroughar- time” ofconsciousness. Bergsonnever makesa“tran- duced fromtheexperienceoftime,itisnotan “original the intrinsiccharacterofmovement as“becoming”. this way: “Real durationisproved; we seethattimeispassing,andontheotherhand thing found purelyandsimplyinimmediate experience.Thefoundation ofBergson’s a line:“Thelinewe aremeasuringismotionless,time an abstractionthathasspatializedtimeturningitinto any case,Aristotlethoughtthatifwe take thenow asa scendental deduction” of the original time, nor does he scendental deduction”of theoriginaltime,nordoeshe sis thatBergsonrejects,butratherthereverse. ThetimeofwhichAristotlespeaksis as “data”,“sensitive impression”,etc.,which areconstructionsoftheintelligence.In However, alsointhiscaseBergsoncouldsay thatitis never aboutdurationasduration”(2013, 3). measure, we musthave itasthelimitofasegment,so not somethingthatexists,itisonlyaconstructionofthemind,usefulabstraction: ments, asAristotlethought.However, theuniverse, theworld, life, isalways differ- pure abstraction, something thatAristotlehadalready philosophy ontimemustbesoughtinourown experience,withoutabstractionssuch is mobility.Thelinemadeatall,timewhatbeingmade,andeven whatmakes ing of the“now” as a point in a line (Phy. itself (sincewhatexistsisthemotionthatmeasured),hedoesnotpresenta- ly shows therealduration, withouttheneedfor deduc- What exactlyisthepresent?Ifitaquestionofpresentinstant,Imeanmathematical quite floating.(2013,168-169) we think.How long?Impossibletofixexactly;itissomething sciousness tellsusthat,whenwe speakofourpresent,itisatacertaininterval oftimethat instant isapureabstraction,viewofthemind;itcannothave realexistence....]Ourcon- instant whichistotimewhatthemathematicalpointline,itclearthatsuchan Reality ofDuration Bergson thinksthatrealtimehastodowith 6 8 Real durationisnotde- 218a18). In 7 durée» surne porte durée que la en tant mesure la Jamais du temps fait. se que tout qui mêmece et fait fait, se qui temps ce du est est le tout fait, temps mobilité. est bile, Laligne le 7 «Laligne qu’on mesure immo est - flottant» ment quelque ;c’est chose assez durée ?Impossible- exacte de fixer de durée que nos pensons. Quelle intervalle sent, àun c’est certain lorsque nous parlons de notre pré- conscienceNotre nous que, dit […] réelle. avoir d’existence rait tion, une vue ne- de sau l’esprit ;il une est instant pure- abstrac ligne, qu’unla clair est –il pareil que à point est le mathématique au temps ce quimatique serait veux dire– je d’un- mathé instant de actuel, l’instant s’agit sent ? S’il que au juste pré6 «Qu’est-ce le - connaissons» poser déroulé tout que ce nous sansrer convertirsup en espace et - noustie ne pouvons mesu pas- le temps déroule, se par d’autre et nousvée; constatons que le éprou est 8 «Ladurée- réelle -

27 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Time is real as duration because things are not made, but Time isrealasdurationbecausethingsarenotmade,but VIII. change in an unchanging time. Bergson tries to show how time has its foundation in count thatdurationoperatesonthingsthemselves. Aristotlethoughtthattheuni- ceptualizing timeinanewway). of Einstein’stheoryrelativity, atleastwithregardtosomeofitsphilosophical im- of things.Timeisthatconstantlynewflow. Whatisex- verse moved inhomogeneous cosmic cycles. Time does not change things,butthings the very movement ofthingswhichisbasedonarealduration,makes this sense,for Bergson,theAristoteliananalysis would time we useinourdaily lives tosolve practicalprob- fundamental bothtounderstand why Bergsondoesnotpsychologize time(sinceit flow inconstantnovelty. Ontheother hand,thedirectexperienceofthisduréewhich tinuous elaborationoftheabsolutelynew»(EC,11). there andtime“passed”over them.However, Bergson’s treated timeasahomogeneouswhole,ifthingswere always different. also states:«Theuniverse lasts.Themorewe godeeperintothenatureoftime, are beingmade,incorporatingrealityintonovelties. That Now itispossibletoestablishthreetypesof timeinBergson’sphilosophy. Ontheone Finally, timeasaconceptualconstructionfrom the originalexperienceoftime,which Bergson says: «All our beliefinobjects, all ouroperations on the systems thatscience not be incorrect; indeed, it would have seemed perfect makes adistinctionbetween timeasaconstruction more we understandthatdurationmeansinventions, thecreationofforms, thecon- plications (Bergsonreproaches Einsteinfor having turnedtime intoadimension,con- perienced now isalways newwithrespecttothepast. point is that time as duration operates in the very flow ure ofmovement. However, thisanalysis would have in explaininghow we constructtimefromthemeas- in a scientific (that ofphysics) or vulgar sense (the is capturedby intuition,andwhichistheoriginal experienceoftimeinconsciousness. 8) and he isolates, areinfactbaseontheideathattimedoesnotbitethem»(EC,8)andhe is why realityiscreative evolution. Philosophershave hand, the real time of things, what Bergson calls lems), andtimeastheactualdurationofthings.In has arealfoundation, theflow ofreality itself),andtounderstandBergson’scritique leads tothespatialisedtimeofphysics. been insufficient,sinceit wouldnot have takenintoac- as apuresuccession.(DS,63) part oftimeappearsasajuxtapositioninspaceandnolonger pended, and if there is creative evolution, I understand very well that the already developed If timehasapositive reality, ifthedelay ofdurationover instantaneityrepresentsacertain hesitation orindeterminacyinherenttoacertainpartofthingsthatholdseverything elsesus- At thispointitbecomesclearthatBergson This distinctionbetween durée,experienceof durée andtimeinphysics is Duration, “Originary”TimeandofPhysics It isinour experienceofthecontinuous durationof things thatwe 9 durée and which is presented as a 10

11 l’absolument nouveau» formes, continue élaboration de signifie inventions, de création plus nous comprendrons que durée approfondirons du nature la temps, 11 «L’univers dure. Plus nous temps ne mord pas sur eux» surreposent que l’idée le en effet que science isole, la systèmes nostoutes opérations sur les 10 «Tout notre croyance aux objets, comme succession pure» danssition non l’espace et plus temps comme apparaise juxtapo- déroulée du déjà quebien partie la comprends je lution créatrice, très enfin toutévo reste, ya le s’il - à elle des chosestie quisuspendue tient par tion inherente àune certaine ou indétermina - hésitation taine une représente ser l’instantanéité durée de la sur retard le si tive, posi- temps aune9 «Sile réalité - -

28 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “durations”, andherethedurationappearsasaunitary 120-121) andLovejoy (1913, 328-329),theindivisiblecontinuityofdurationdoesnot An importantquestionwhentalkingabouttheduréeisinwhatsensevarious dura- X. (Tugendhat 1992, 573-584). Certainly,itseemsthatBergson treatsduréeasthetime (because makingsuchaseparationisconceptualoperation)notthesameassay- of consciousnessand,in thissense,aseitheranoriginaltimeordeeper and morereal ers thereisasubjective timethatismoreoriginal thannaturaltimeinitsstructure with Einstein’stheoryofrelativityleadsBergsontothinkthatasingledurationthe consciousness? No,itis rather thetimeoflife and,assuch,itisnot strictly subjective, whereas eternity would be the total duration, the per- encounter real time, multiplicity without divisibility and succession withoutsepara- common toalltheotherdurations.ThecoursethatBergsongave attheCollègede France inthe1901-1902 academicyear, centredontheideaoftime,andthereare than “ordinary”timeor thetimeofphysics. However, istheduréeonlytimeof fect flow. Now, Bergsonspeakshereofthedifferentdu- flow thatcanhave moreorless“tension”.Thematerial- tions coexistintheuniverse andwhetheritispossibletospeakofasingleduration, ferent qualitiesdoexist(Mourelos1964, 88).Thefactthattheycannotbeseparated that inrealdurationtheseparationofdifferentqualitiesisnotpossible,butthosedif- tion. As Ĉapek (1971, 118-125) stated in contrast to the criticisms of Ushenko (1929, anced) in DS by stating a single duration ofthe universe ( DS, 44).Theconfrontation any tension,inwhichsomethingremains unchanged, some enlighteningexpositionsofwhathethinksaboutthedurée: IX. In hisanalysis oftimeinBergsonandHeidegger,Tugendhat statesthatfor boththink- Bergson already treats thedurée neity. AsDeleuze points out(1968, 87), ifthereismultiplicity intime it isnecessarily ration ofeachthing,sothatthereisnotoneduration, rience ofthat timeorinternalduration ofthings.Theevident proofisthatduration universe isnecessaryasareference for allotherdurationsinordertoadmitsimulta- ity ofthingsisnothingbutarelaxed duration,without ical, ontological flow, sothatthereare no“beings”,but ing thattherearenodistinctqualities. imply theabsenceofdistinctionsbetween thephasesofduration.Bergsonstresses by reference toaunit,sincethemultiple isonlypossibleby reference totheone. but multipleones.Thisideaiscorrected(oratleastnu- but “internal” tothings.Itisnotsubjective becauseone canhave an objective expe- extend eachother.We saidthatthereisnotoneduration,butratherdurations,moreorless the durationcontractedinitself,itsentirety,itwould beeter- tense, whichrepresent,correspondingtoallconceivable degreesoftension,fromthecom- nity. (Lesson16thMay 1902) plete relaxation, which would bethelowest degree of materiality,tothehighesttension, Duration ispresentedtousnaturally,immediatelyasamoving continuityofqualitiesthat Duration andOriginaryTime Simultaneity andDurationoftheUniverse 12 here as a metaphys- serait l’éternité» serait tout ce en elle-même, entière, tée haute, jusqu’à durée la contrac- jusqu’à tension plus la la rialité, plus- le bas degré maté de la serait depuis relâchement complet, le qui degrésles concevables de tension, sentent, qui correspondent àtous plus au moins tendues, qui repré- a pas une durée, des durées, mais autres.les Nous disions qu’il n’y qui prolongent se qualités unes les comme une continuité mobile de immédiatement naturallement, 12 «Ladurée nous présentée est

29 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo XI. consciousness oftime”;thatis,accordingtoTugendhat, exposition of Aristotleaddresses.Now, ifAristotlehad operates in a real way: things flow irreversibly, andtime operates inthesameflow. France from1902-1903 heexposedAristotle’sphilosophy oftimeincontrasttoPlato that neitherAristotlein thePhysics norBergsoninhis thing internaltothings themselves. Thisisa question that heaven has a soul. Now, to think that the universe this pointanddoesnotfinishexplainingwhat it means to explainhow timeoperates intheflow oflife. time if there were no human soul, since the soul of heaven that contains everything the ideaoftimeinAristotle,butratheradefence againsttheKantian interpretation, toral thesisonitsplaceinBookIVofPhysics, butalsoinhiscoursesattheCollègede sciousness», asTugendhat andpossiblyHeideggersup- spective canwe understandBergson’scommitmenttothecreative evolution in order a previousoriginaltimeofconsciousness.Theprob- spatialized time,whichisamentalconstruction,and assumed that timehasitsfoundation inthesouland and possessesaregularmovement would be themeasureofallmovements: and Plotinus(Bergson2016, 151-167). Curiously,we donotfindthereacriticismof Memory, theoriginalduration,isnota«timeofcon- However, BergsonthinksthatAristotle isobscureon Bergson goes beyond consciousness, it is the duration of life itself. Only from this per- Bergson would have distinguished the homogeneous, Bergson knewAristotle’sphilosophy oftimewell, andnotonlydidhewritehisdoc- Bergson says inDS: position well, sincehetakestheduréeas“original pose, butthevery timeofflowing reality. Tugendhat in in arealisticsense.Bergsonsays thatAristotledoesnotbelieve thattherewould beno his analysis seems not to have understood Bergson’s has a“soul”mightlead one tothinkthattimeissome- lem withthisinterpretationisthatoriginaltimefor The thingandthestatearebutinstantsartificiallytakenontransition;thistransition, This sentence:suppressthesoul,thereisnomoretime,thissentencewillsimplymeanthat vents themfrombeingpure instantsappearing and disappear - only naturallyexperienced,isthedurationitself.Itmemory,butnotpersonalmemoryex- soul enveloped by it,timewillbeborn fromanactionandareaction,themovement on ternal towhatitretains,distinctfromapastwhichwould ensurethepreservation of;itisa fore beanabsolutelynecessarything.(Bergson2016,162) the soulandfromonmovement. Timewillthere- memory internaltothechangeitself,awhichprolongsbefore intheafterandpre- ular movement, ifthereissky,asitnotpossibletodootherwisethanexistwiththe ing inapresentwhichisconstantlybeingreborn.(DS,41) if thereis movement of the sky, the sky enveloping all things and thesky moving with a reg- Conclusions 13 14 sans cesse» sant dans un présent qui renaîtrat - disparais apparaisant et tantanés empêche de les purset d’être ins- qui prolongue dans l’avant l’après au changement lui-même, mémoire unetion; c’est mémoire intériure conserva - la dont assurerait elle d’un passé disctincte retient, qu’elle àce extérieure personelle mémoire, non mais pas mémoire durée la est est même.mentée, Elle - expéri naturellement sition, seuel - tran cette et pris sur transition; la artificielement des instantanés ne sont13 «Lachose que l’etat et nécessaire» doncsera une chose absolument l’âme sur mouvement. le Letemps tion, du mouvement sur de l’âmeet d’une d’une- et action reac naîtra lui l’âmeenveloppé par lui, temps le autrement que donner de se avec commeciel, on ne peut pas faire vement régulier, on si donne se le mouvant se ciel d’un le et mou- enveloppant ciel le choses toutes on donne se mouvement le du ciel, simplement signifiera ceci si que phrase n’yaplus il de temps, cette phrase: supprimez14 «Cette l’âme,

30 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle would be that for Aristotle time would not exist without the numerical ca- Aristotle thinksthatthereisastablemovement orrhythm thatserves asameasure ous, butalways different;realitydoesnot“pass”throughtime, butrealityexistsina else, because “before” and “after” are not simple moments; they point to the fluctu- out internalduration,withoutirreversible flow towards somethingnewanddifferent. changes inthetimearrow thattransforms realityinanirreversible mode:therecould continuous creation,andnever mererepetition. ed thattimeisthenacertaincircle( time. For Bergson,however, movement impliesinternaltime,duration.Something time. Inthisway, timeaddsnothingtomovement, therecouldbemovement without ference withBergson’sapproach.Real durationthinksBergson,isabove allnovelty, is time ofrealdurationcannotbemeasured: flow frompasttofuture,isalways new. this isso,didAristotlenotpointtotheideathatbeyond timeasanactofmeasure- for time.«Theonlykindofmovement whichnaturallymaintainsauniform paceis things intohomogeneous units,identicalfromacertain tion oftheuniverse: duration oftheuniverse intheBergsoniansense.However, thishypothesis isonlya that theuniverse hasanumericalsoul,we would befacingathesisclosetothereal a way that,contrarytowhatNewtonandKant hadunderstood,itisnothomogene- ating arrow ofthevery movement ofthings.Timeisthustheontologicalproperty of stresses thattimeistheratio essendiofchange(Ross 1936, 65).Butitshouldbenot- a “realduration”ofthemotion?Itseemsso,anditiswhatRoss pointsoutwhenhe able tomeasuresomething, itisnecessarytogroup Bergson hadalreadyobserved thisintheEssai.To be ment there is a rhythm to the motion of the universe, and that therefore, it would be movement inacircle;andtherotationofheavenly sphere therefore furnishesthe remote connection,althoughAristotlepointsinsomeinstancestoanobjective dura- pacity ofthesoul,becausetherewillbeonlymovement, whichisthe“substratum”of point ofview (Essai,57). However, it isimpossibleto long asitistakenintoaccountthat“measured” time,“alreadypast”since have two homogeneous durations, since the duration is being, whichismovement, change.Timeoperatesinthevery heartofthingsinsuch be movement withouttimebuiltby thesoul,buttherecannotbemovement with- best unitfor measuringthemovement ofeverything else»(Ross 1936, 66).Now, if The timethatlastsisnotmeasurable.measurewhich isnotpurelyconventional implies to checkwhethertheyareequalorunequal.(DS,47) the othermovements aremeasuredby this,andtimeby thismovement (Phy. 223b17-24). motion canbe.Thisalsoiswhy timeisthoughttobethemovement ofthesphere,because regular circular motion is above all else the measure, because the number of this is the best If, then,whatisfirstthemeasure( in effectdivisionandsuperposition.However, successive durations cannotbesuperimposed known. Now neitheralterationnorincreasecomingintobeingcanberegular,butloco- Going backtotheanalysis oftime,Bergson’sturningpointwithrespectto In thissense,BergsoncouldadmitAristotle’s analysis oftimeasvalid as For Bergson,timeisnotonlyameasureofthemovement, butsomething πρῶτον μέτρον πρῶτον κύκλος τις κύκλος , 233b29), andhereliesthemaindif- 15 ) ofeverything homogeneouswithit, elles sont ouelles égales inégales» durées succesives poursi vérifier superposerOr on ne saurait des and division superposition.effect not purely conventional implies in mesurable. The measure which is 15 «Letemps qui dure pas n’est

31 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle’s conceptionoftime,would have misunderstooditby criticizingaconcep- ρόμενον αἰει ἕτερον αἰει ρόμενον 93), whatBergsoncalls“virtuality”,assomething thatisnotcurrentbuthasareality (Deleuze 1968, 99);power intheAristoteliansense,butopentonewactualizations. λουθεῖ τῇ κινήσει τῇ λουθεῖ dern istimmerdieZeitselbst,Heidegger1927b, 354). Intheexperienceof“now” is correctly, would nothave developed thephilosophy ofdurée? change canbeunderstoodasanopenpotentiality, constantgenesis(Mourelos1964, erates innaturecreatingnovelty. Theuniverse lasts,BergsonthinksinECandDS, could criticizeAristotleishisfailuretorealizethatrealityinmotionnotauniverse ever, istheflow oftheuniverse, thecontinuous overcome theAristotelianparadigm(Massey2005,122). without historyorduration.Aristotlethoughtthatsubstanceswere thereandmoved geneous instants. tion oftimethatwould bebasicallydependentonthatofAristotle.Would Bergson fact, it is through a peculiar reading of Aristotle that he can say that Bergson fail to the summaryexecution ofBergsoninBeingandTime (Sinclair 2019, §11) because,in time continuous.Itisthevery flow ofmovement ( to countaccordingbefore andafterifIconvert timelived toasuccessionofhomo- standing timeas a continuum.Bergson’sunderstandingofduréeisclosetoAristotle’s sis for thetimeofscience,even for timeasameasureofmovement inourdailylives. always different.Fromthispointofview,whenAristotlesays thattimeisthemeas- Now, theappreciation that time is basedonmovement, as Aristotlehadsaid,leads Bergson tosituatetimeinthevery heartoftheflow ofthings.Thus,whatBergson rience ofitthatisthefoundation oftime.Actually Aristotleisvery closetounder- not criticizetheAristoteliananalysis oftime,butratheracceptsitasavalid analy- revealed theinnerdurationofthings.Lévinaswas certainlyrightwhenhedenounced not apartoftimebutisalways timeitself»(DasJetztistdaherkein Teil derZeit,son - ment, theconstructedtimethatexistsonlyfor thesoulitmeasures.Real time,how- point, althoughAristotlecouldhave deepened inthefoundation oftime:change( philosophy ofthe“now”. The“now” ( ure ofthemovement accordingtothebefore andtheafter,whathehasdoneisto involves thecontinuous creation of novelty. Inthissense, the universe andthingsthat in anunchanginguniverse, withoutinternaltime.Bergson’sintuitionisthattimeop- have misunderstoodtheAristotelianconception oftimeand,ifhehadunderstoodit homogenize theinstantsoftimeassegmentsthatdelineatealine.Itisonlypossible One could still ask whether Bergson, although he did not openly criticize I thinkthatBergsonwould notneedtocriticizeAristotletoomuchonthis For Bergson,timeasameasurementistheobjective measureofthemove- , Phy. , Phy. 219b23). Itistheprimarydurationofthingsandourexpe- 220a14), asHeideggerpointout:«Thenow isconsequently τὸ νῦν τὸ ) isalways new,different,andatthesame γήνησις γήνησις τὸ δὲ νῦν διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ τὸ- διὰ φε τὸ κινεῖσθαι νῦν δὲ of thecosmos.Bergsondoes ἀκο -

32 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle. Physics. J.Barnes’translation(1985). Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press. Tugendhat, E.(1992). HeideggerundBergsonüberdieZeit.DasArgument,34, 573-584. Wieland, W. (1970). DiearistotelischePhysik. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Ĉapek, M.(1971). BergsonandModernPhysics. Dordrecht/Boston:D.Reidell. Gouhier, H.(1948). MainedeBiranetBergson.InLesétudesbergsoniennesI.Paris: Coope, U.(2005).Timefor Aristotle. Oxford: ClarendonPress. Conill, J. (1981). Eltiempoen la filosofía de Aristóteles. Valencia: Facultad de teología Ushenko, A.(1929). TheLogicofEvents. Sinclair, M.(2019). Bergson.NewYork: Routledge. Seypell, J. H.(1956). ACriticism of Heidegger’sTime Concept withReference to Brague, R.(1982). DuetempschezPlaton etAristote. Paris:PUF. Id. (2019). L’idée detemps,CoursauCollègeFrance 1901-1902. Paris:PUF. Id. (2016). Id. (2013) [1934]. Lapenséeetlemouvant. Paris: PUF. Id. (1968) [1923]. Duration. Paris:PUF. etsimultanéité Id. (1959) [1907]. L’evolution creatrice. Paris:PUF. Bergson, H.(1927) [1889]. Essaisurlesdonnéesimmédiates delaconscience.Paris: Ross, W. D.(1936). Aristotle’s Physics. Oxford: ClarendonPress. Roark, T. (2011). Aristotle onTime.Camdrige:CambridgeUniversity Press. Mourélos, G.(1964). Bergsonetlesniveaux deréalité.Paris:PUF, Paris. Massey, Lovejoy, A.O.(1913). TheProblemsofTimeinRecent FrenchPhilosophy. The Id. (1988). TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology(tr.A.Hofstadter).Bloomington, Id. (1927b). GrundproblemederPhänomenologie.FrankfurtamMain:Vittorio Heidegger, M.(1927a). SeinundZeit.FrankfurtamMain:Vittorio Klostermann. Hamelin, O.(1931). Lesistèmed’Aristote. Paris:Vrin. Festugière, A.J.(1971). Letempsetl’âme.InÉtudesdephilosophiegrecque.Paris: Fasolo, L.(2006).Tempo edurata. Illuogodelpresente inAristotele eBergson . Milan: Dubois, J.M.(1961). Letempsetl’instant selonAristote. Paris:DescléedeBrouwer. Deleuze, G.(1968). Lebergsonisme.Paris:PUF. H. (2005).TheOriginofTime.HeideggerandBergson.NewYork: Sunny Albin Michel. Albo Versorio. Vrin. San Vicente Ferrer. PUF. PUF. Bergson’s Durée.Revue InternationaledePhilosophie,38,503-508. Press. Philosophical Review, 21, 322-243. Indiana. Klostermann. Berkley: University ofCalifornia Press. Bibliography Histoire de l’idée de temps. Cous au Collège de France 1902-1903. Paris: An introduction toaPhilosophy ofTime.

33 Aristotle and Bergson on Time — Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri Landázuri de Ortiz C. Manuel — Time on Bergson and Aristotle

 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The recent philosophical debate Time‑continuum aftertheDebateon General Relativity theory most theoretical physicists theory most theoretical Relativity General Claudio TarditiClaudio QG theory isrooted of underestimation in their sub- jective experience; b)such experience; could adivide jective be fruitfully theory and opposition eternalism/spacetime between of space and ascontinua time opted for eternalism, also known also opted for eternalism, as“block-universe CONTINUUM on the idea that the very experience of time isintui of- experience time very the on that idea the overcome phenomenology, by transcendental based sion, is, processes. that ablurry sight of elementary situation is muchsituation more complex for concerns what the and Time- (1908).Even iftheoreti famous paper Space spacetime ispossiblespacetime only under subjective basic this the a)the that in paper this demonstrate My aim isto Reassessing Husserl’sAccount ofthe Rovelli’s Quantum Gravity (QG)theory ourRovelli’s perception Quantum Gravity consensus about nature. For very its instance, for tool, the asamathematical cept of spacetime physicistscal commonly accept nowadays con the - Presentism and Eternalism eternalism. As a matter of fact, after Einstein’s of after fact, eternalism. As amatter experience. liarly focused and presentism on between liarly divide the about ispecu of- nature the time ETERNALISM theory”. findsThis view support in Minkowski’s tively given asacontinuum; given of tively formalization c)the nvrià di Torino Università SPACETIME - asan illu itself reveals menological foundation of physics. onsed of possibility the apheno- recently, his works focu mainly are - French phenomenologists. More ght and reception among their in Husserl’s thou- intersubjectivity issues the and ofespecially time is research field phenomenology, Hismain University). Salesian sophical anthropology (Pontifical and ProfessorAssistant in philo- philosophycal of (University Turin) - post-doctoral in theoreti fellow Claudio Tarditi (1978),PhD, is QUANTUM GRAVITY PHENOMENOLOGY 35  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The recentphilosophicaldebateaboutthenatureoftimeispeculiarlyfocused onthe Their tendency is radical. Henceforth space by itself, and timeby itself,are doomed to (1908), whereheprovided empiricalevidenceoftherealityspacetime,consistently cetime viewoftheworld» (2019, 1).Amongthem,itis exist; rather,timelocally emergesfromtherelationsamongquantum events. There verse, QGdemonstratesthattheelementary processescannotbeorderedinacom- worth consideringRovelli’s claimthatbothpresentism opens hispaperasfollows: «Theviews onspaceandtimewhichIwishtolay before entities (Sider1999, 325-326). Asamatteroffact,afterEinstein’sGeneral Relativity you have sprungfromthesoilofexperimentalphysics. Thereinliestheirstrength. with Einstein’stheoryofspecialandgeneralrelativity.Asiswell known, Minkowski verse theory”.ThisviewfindssupportinMinkowski’s famouspaperSpaceandTime of manifolds isessentialfor generalrelativity.Indeed,«we would thenhave inthe variety oftime-flow, butdirectlyleadstoaradicaleternalism. world nolongerthe Conversely, in his eyes, special relativity does not work in a three-dimensional world, framework ofthegravitational field,thequantumevents arenolongerordered by time dependsonthegravitational field:inother words, onceassumedthequantum to beovercome infavor ofathirdway, namelya“local”accountoftime.Insynthe- these theories,itcouldbebasicallyarguedthat,accordingtopresentismonlythe divide between presentismandeternalism.Althoughthereexistmany variations of theory mosttheoreticalphysicists opted for eternalism,alsoknown as“block-uni- the conceptofspacetime(butaccepteditin1915), Minkowski claimedthattheidea fade away into mere shadows, and only a kindof union of the two willpreserve an the conceptofspacetimeasamathematicaltool,situationismuchmorecom- ferent spaces, as entailed by special relativity, only in a that, accordingtoMinkowski, inertialobservers inrelative motionmay occupy dif- try becomesachapterinfour-dimensional physics» (Petkov 2010, xxi).Thismeans and flow oftime)whichareincompatiblewiththespa- situation is characterized by a «proliferation of views a unique time. Ratherthan entailing that there isnochangeorbecoming intheuni- sis, Rovelli maintains that, following general relativity and QG(quantisticgravitation), and eternalismare“naïve options”(2019, 1325-1335) I. a result, Minkowski’s idea of the four-dimensional spacetime not only excludes any simply becausethislatter would implyoneabsolutespacefor allinertialobservers. As Instead, there are elementary processes in which […] whichrejecttherealityofspacetimeeitherexplic- reveals itself asanillusion,thatis, ablurrysightofelementary processes(2019, 1326). mon successionofinstants. Accordingly, time(asasuccession ofinstants)doesnot present isreal,whereasfor eternalismtherearesuchthingsasmerelypastandfuture nature. plex for whatconcernstheconsensusaboutitsvery uously interact. Asaresult,for Rovelli our perception ofspaceand timeascontinua itly or implicitly by defending concepts (e.g. becoming is neither a space that contains the world nor a time along which the events happen. independent reality»(Petkov 2010, xv).Against Einstein,whoinitiallydisagreedwith in three-dimensionalspaceaninfinitenumberofplanes.Three-dimensionalgeome- 1 Indeed,asemphasizedby Petkov, thepresent Introduction Nevertheless, even iftheoretical physicists commonly acceptnowadays space, butaninfinite numberofspaces,analogouslyasthereare quanta of space and matter contin- real four-dimensional world. essentially touch his physics».essentially me, aquestion which does not question, but, to seems asit problemtime-space isanother Minkowski’s conception of the towards temological attitude be epis the - will «What cle: in his notes on Minkowski’s- arti 1908,when remarks to Sommerfeld back 1 dates Actually, debate this

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “now” and,thus,itistotallyillegitimatetotalkaboutpastandfutureevents simply 2009, 135). Inthisshortpassage, thereclearlyemergeshow, accordingtoWeyl, the come by transcendentalphenomenology, basedonthe idea thatthevery experience opposition between eternalism/spacetimetheoryandQG is rootedintheir of theexperience continuumasanabsolutegiven for any subject. of theontologicalfeatures ofspacetime,butalsowiththetranscendental inspection oretical physicists andphilosophersoftimeshoulddealnotonlywiththedescription other hand,Rovelli arguesthat,all things considered,time’scontinuityisapersisting on theonehand,Minkowski admitsthattherealityofspacetimeisacounterintuitive of time(asbecomingandflow) interactswiththephysical (real) features oftime.If, er terms,bothspacetime and QGtheory eludeany inspectionofhow theexperience of «realnow» ismeaningless.Inotherwords, Minkowski introducedastaticviewof ed inphysics. Secondly, Petkov assesses Rovelli’s account ofeternalismasacom- eyes, dimensionalityisnotafundamentalfeature oftheworld, ascommonlyaccept - claiming (as Rovelli does) «neither presentism nor eternalism» shouldentailthat the compassing past,present,andfuture. world isneitherthree-dimensionalnorfour-dimensional. Thismeansthat,inRovelli’s rienced asacontinuum. Indeed,asstressedabove, theconflictbetween spacetime does nothappen,inthesubject’seyes reality ceaselessly transforms itselfthroughout does nothappen;asawholeithasnohistory.Onlybefore theeye oftheconscious- time. Amongothers,H.Weyl emphasizedthat«theobjective world merelyexists,it theory andourcommonexperienceoftimeextensively characterizesthehistoryof time isaprecisedescriptionofwhatreallyis,namelyanontologytime.Inoth- thesis thatnoevent istobeprivilegedas“now”, insofarasinspacetimethenotion the world isthree-dimensionalandevolving intimeandeternalism(alsocalled“block time for whichspacetimeisanunchanging,once-and-for-all pictureoftheworld en - spection ofthesubject’sexperiencetemporal becoming.Inotherwords, boththe- an infiniteprocess.Thus, Weyl seemstosuggestthattheproblemoftimecannotbe stood ontwo differentlevels. Indeed,if fromanontologicalpointofviewthe world and moves pastitasaspatialimageengagedintemporaltransformation» (Weyl are “real now” as present events» (2019, 1329), the spacetime theory is based on the Rovelli’s attemptto overcome eternalismandPetkov’s defense ofMinkowski’s space- merely addressedfromtheontologicalstandpoint, butalsorequiresanin-depthin- reality ofspacetimeandthesubjective experience ofthetime’sflow aretobeunder- ness climbingupintheworld lineofmy body,asectionofthisworld “comestolife” nent physicists felt theneedtoreconcilespacetimewith subjective experienceof mensionality oftheworld (atamacroscopicscale).Indeed,ifpresentistaccountof rejecting bothpresentismandeternalismkeepsunaddressedthequestionofdi- picture oftheworld, albeitsupportedby anumberofexperimental evidences,onthe plete misrepresentation.Indeed,ratherthanclaiming«thatpastandfutureevents underestimation of subjective experience; universe”) accountsfor afour-dimensional world withtimeasfourth dimension, interpretation ofspacetimeuniquelyasamathematicaltool.However, someemi- illusion. Inotherterms,theybothunderestimatethefactthattimeisalways expe - both contemporarytheoreticalphysics andphilosophy oftime. because they are equally real. It is worth emphasizingthat, what is really at stake in Accordingly, fromtheeternalistperspective, thereisnoprivilegeofthe With thisregard,suchaconflictisprobablyattherootof very diffused Under thesepremises,my aiminthispaperistodemonstratethat a)the Following Petkov’s criticism,Rovelli’s argument comes at a high price. First, b) such a divide could be fruitfully over-

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo As iswell known, Weyl’s early accountoftime-continuum(developed inhismajor Weyl’s teacher of mathematics at that time) during theyears 1905-’08. InWeyl’s construed mathematical entities. This means that, whereasthe construed entities of timeisintuitively given asacontinuum;c)theformalization ofspacetimeispossi- on time-consciousnessandtheDingvorlesungen (1997) ontheconstitutionofspace, works enological heritageispatent: view, ourintuition about thecontinuum originates from common or stableelements, continuum ofinstants»(Weyl 1987, §8).Butfollowing Weyl’s argument,thisisjust continuum ofpointsonatrajectoryrecovers inacontinuousmonotone fashionthe one correspondencebetween thereallineand thepre-phenomenalspace,butjudges transcendental phenomenology. to beessentiallyrecognizedinWeyl’s claimthatcoordi- deeply influencedboth by neokantianism terms, Weyl shareswithHusserlaradicaloppositionbetween, ontheone hand,time flowing frompointtopoint;inother words, thesecretofhow thecontinuallyendur- turns outtobefalse.Preciselywhateludesusisthenatureofcontinuity, tions. Thismeansthattimeisadurationwithoutpoints:consistsinintercon- time, Weyl considersHusserl’s(andBergson’s)phenomenaltimeasaconsciousexpe- tial movement, the situation is not significantly different. Indeed, «in movement, the transitions, thepresentisonlypossiblebecause of thesimultaneousperception some ofwhichheprobablyattendedwhenHusserlsubstituted for Hilbert(who was account oftranscendentalegoastheresiduumphe- annihilation» (1987, §5.3.4),aclearrepriseofHusserl’s II. and spaceaspre-phenomenalexperiencesand,ontheotherhand,time superposition: thetemporalcontinuumdoesnot have points,theinstantsaremerely refers toIdeenI,hisaccountofthecontinuumisdeeplyindebtedHusserl’slectures nomenological reductioninIdeenI(1976, §49).Nevertheless, althoughWeyl always nate system is«theunavoidable residuumoftheego’s nected partsthataresuperimposedoneachother.With thisrespect,Weyl’s phenom- rience coexistingwithmemoryoftheinstantjustgone.ConsistentlyHusserl’s namely invariants emerging from a plurality of acts of experience: for instance, the reduced. Moreclosely,Weyl accepts CantorandDedekind’s axiomabouttheone-to- resulting frommathematicalformalization aremadeoutofultimateelements(the perspective, Weyl describestheintuitionoftimeasaflow ofongoingtransforma- perception oftime,movement, ofalineextended,andsoforth. For whatconcerns past andofthefuture.Accordingly, Weyl maintains: points), the pre-phenomenal life-experiences ‒ time in particular ‒ cannot be further unsatisfactory theextensionofsuchacorrespondence totime.Alsoconsideringspa- ing presentcancontinuallyslipaway intotherecedingpast.(1987, 91-92). Inother ble onlyunderthisbasicsubjective experience. are addressedto himby mistakeand,therefore, whenaddressedtohim, areunintelligible.So the theoretical clarificationoftheessence of time’scontinuousflow is not forthcoming.The tuition oftime provides noanswer - just asamanmakes no replytoquestionswhichclearly I thinkthateverything we are demandinghereisobvious nonsense:tothesequestions,thein- The Continuum, 1987, and Space Time Matter 1922, both published in 1918) is The viewof a flow consistingof points and,therefore, dissolvinginto points Ontology andEpistemologyofTime 3 Such an influence is 2 andHusserl’s details, see Feist (2004). see details, andical theoretical 3 For more biograph- Bernard &Lobo2 See (2019).

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Accordingly, although the evidence-based concept of spacetime provides witha use- The secondpointofdivergence concernsWeyl’s choicefor predicativism.Following Weyl’s argumentationinchapter6ofTheContinuum (probablyinfluenced by (which, of course, can in no way be understood mathematically); 2) it is due to thees- (included thesequenceofnaturalnumbers),uniquelygraspableby categorialacts.b) was notcommittedtoany kindofrestrictionmathematicswiththepurposefit- cal enquiryontimeexperience. through theLogical Investigation foundation ofthemathematical continuumbasedupon theanalogybetween the ting itintostrictly intuitive (or predicative) limits. Rather, hewas stronglyinvolved the continuum,neithertemporalnorspatial. tion withHusserl’sviewthattherecannotbeany directaccesstoformal categories their actualinteraction.Assuggestedby R.A.Feist (2004,138), Weyl’s declarationof tive experienceoftimeatall.Thus,fromWeyl’s perspective acompletetheoryoftime ful mathematical tool for sketching an ontology of time, it cannot explain the subjec- to reconstructtheline»(Longo1999, 404).Inthelightofthisinspection,itcouldbe quence ofalineasone-dimensionallaw. Itisaposte- as well asformal andaxiomatictheoriesofanalysis capable ofproviding agroundfor at thesametime,aformal theoryofpossible regionsofbeing.Inotherterms,Husserl as hewas firmlyconvinced thatmathematicsisa variety ofknowledge ofrealityand, act determinationispossible(Weyl, 1987, 92).Pointsdonotbelongtoourintuitionof sence oftime(andnottocontingentimperfections inourmedium)thatafixed time- substantial divergence. a) spacetime andsubjective timeexperience,ratherthananin-depthassessmentof at firstglance.Indeed,histhoughtleadstoaprecisedistinctionbetween objective scendental features of time experience as fundamental issues for any theoryoftime. argued thatWeyl’s phenomenologicalinspirationleadshimtoaccountfor thetran- a derived conceptualconstruction,anecessaryconse- Husserl’s phenomenology doesnotexclude any formal (non-intuitive) mathematics, By contrast, in Husserl’sthought such logicalrestrictionsaretotally excluded, insofar Poincaré andRussell),theconstitutionofallhigherlevel objectivitiesdependsonthe From thistherefollows that1)anindividualpointintimeisnon-independent, i.e., regional ontologies. natural numberisgiven inanimmediateintuitionofiterationisclearlycontradic- rior reconstruction[…]whichputstogetherthepoints point cannot be exhibited in any way, that always only an approximate, never anex- phenomenological membershipshouldnotprevent fromconsideringtwo pointsof perience. Inotherwords, thereisnoontologyofspacetimebeyond anepistemologi- in aresearchofformal systems, astestified by theMannigfaltigkeitslehre in Weyl’s view, predicative constructions based uponthe domain of natural numbers. immediate intuitionofnaturalnumbers.Thus,whereasthelatterexistindependent- is purenothingnesswhentakenby itself,andexistsonlyasa“pointoftransition” is supposedtothinktogethertheontologyoftimeandepistemologyex- ly, allotherobjectivitiesareconstitutedinconformity tologicalconstraints,thatis, category of the natural numbers can supply the foundation of a mathematical discipline. But perhaps thecontinuumcannot[...].(1987,90). These two arguments leadWeyl tothe thesisthataphenomenological As aresult,«thepointwithoutdimensionsis Nevertheless, Weyl’s phenomenologicalpostureisnotsoradicalasitseems Firstly, Weyl’s claiminTheContinuumthat thesequenceof as apartof his formal ontology.Thismeansthat 4 is provided by (1964). Wittgenstein curve isalaw 4 A precise proof a that of fact the , not of points, aset developed

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Things and Space With andbeyond Weyl, isitpossibletoconceive ofspacetimeandtimeexperience together? More precisely, once grasped the double nature oftime,how tosketcha concludes: volvement». of theflowing timeastwo absoluteevidences? Mycoreargumentisthatthisat- continuum, namely the phenomenological condition of both the flux of the lived-ex- Phenomenology oftheConsciousnessInternal Time(1991), andthoseof1907 on Proper Time,Lived Time,andMetaphysical Time,Weyl tuitions in away that reflects oura priori cognitive in- tion abouttheOriginofConceptManifold inPhilosophy ofArihmetics: to takeintoaccountboththephysical evidenceofspacetimeandtheexperience description of the bond of ontology and epistemology of time? In other words, how deals with the issue of the continuum. I will limit to the most insightful. Although the tempt shouldbemadethroughanin-depthreassessmentofHusserl’stranscendental arithmetical knowledge isoriginallybuiltup infounding actsfrombasic,everyday in- III. must necessarilyovercome thelevel ofphenomeno- progressively shiftfromphenomenologytopredicativ- periences and the flowing of theintuitive data, isarealleitmotiv phenomenology. intuitive andformal structureofthecontinuum since in 1927, with the title ism. With thisregard,inalecturedelivered inPrinceton ical continuumdonotcoincide,Weyl suggests thatitsmathematicalconstruction is inprincipleexcluded. Oncedemonstratedthattheintuitive andthemathemat- immediate intuition of time and the intuition of the naturalnumbers succession lectures of1891 onPhilosophy ofArithmetic (2003),thoseof1905–1908 On the logical methodasawhole,itplays apeculiarroleintheearlyHusserl,notablyhis his firstgreat work. For instance,letusconsiderthe following passagefrom thesec- how Husserltakesintoseriousconsideration boththe logical description. huge quantityofpassages‒fromthepublishedtextsandmanuscriptswhereHusserl The immediatelyexperiencedissubjective andabsolute.Ontheotherhand,objective we noteintheconcretecaseis, ontheonehand,points orextendedparts,and,on the world isnecessarilyrelative andmay berepresentedby somethingdefinite,numbersorother of time,thecolornuances of acontinuouscolorspectrum,thetonalqualitiesin “tone of opposites, subjective-absolute and objective-relative, seems to me one of the most funda- symbols, only after a coordinatesystem hasbeenarbitrarily imposed onthe world. This pair this concept,theconceptof continuum.Thislatterconceptisnotcontainedasaparticu - progression”, andsoon,thenwe acquire theconceptofcombination-by-continuity, and,from mental epistemologicalinsightsonecangatherfromscience.(Weyl 2009,31) If we consider,for example, thecohesionofpointsonaline,moments a span lar, distinguishable, partialcontentintheimage ofevery concretelygiven continuum.What Time, Reality, andtheTranscendental Within the limit of this work, I cannot provide a complete discussion of the 6 Within thisframework, itisworth noting (1997). As emphasized by Tieszen (1996, 304), «Husserl thinks that 5 Thisisthebasicreasonwhy Weyl Time Relations in the Cosmos, nomenological perspective». should be developed from phe the - how whole the of mathematics not asaprototype be seen of of Thesystem can Continuum phenomenologicaltain ideas, the debt cer to its 289): «Despite (1997, by DaSilva 5 As stated (2010, 1)(footnote 2). Centrone also 6 See of the phenomeno- - -

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo of theSixthLogicalInvestigation (2001c), wherehe categorical intuition of a set, categorical abstraction refers to the collection’s form, ous intuitions,categoricalconceptsdependonintuitions.Concerningthe called by Husserl“formal-ontological categories”. If categorial abstraction.Whereassensuousabstraction egorical abstraction, pure logic and mathematics include no sensuous concepts. Once without any considerationofallmaterial aspectsoftheset’smembers.Accordingly, originates inintuitionofconcretedata:moreprecisely,thecontinuityis categorial intuition. of any attemptof formalization ofthecontinuity(thesamelimits Weyl willempha- of Hilbert’sview,following which«onebeginsby assumingtheexistenceofallele- gorical concepts(for instance,“relation,set,number”), gives sensuous concept (for instance, “house, red”) and distinguishes between sensuousabstractionandpure formalization ofthecontinuum.With thisrespect,itmustbenotedastronginfluence the phenomenologicalconditionfor any mathematicalformalization ofthecontinu- sensuous andmixed conceptsarebaseduponsensu- size concerningCantor-Dedekind ’s axiom): and continuity»(Hilbert1900, 181). Nevertheless, Husserlisfullyaware ofthelimits Husserl’s discourseonmathematicalentities in §60 It isworth puttingthispassageinconnectionwith mixed concepts,categoricalabstractiongives cate- means ofcertainaxioms,inparticulartheaxiomsconnection,order,congruence ments (thatisoneassumesatthebeginningthreedifferentsystems ofthings:points, provided thatlogico-mathematicalintuitionisacategoricalpurified by cat- upon purecategorialabstraction,whichexcludes allthematerial contained inthe um. ThisdoesnotentailthatHusserliscommittedtotheproblemofarigorous intuitively graspedamathematicalconcept,onecangraspotherob- lines andplanes)oneputstheseelementsintocertainrelationstoone-anotherby jects innewcategorialactsofhigherlevel. Thus,mathematicsresultsbeingbased We areabletobringeachsinglegroupelementrepresentationinitsown rightintemporal (Husserl 2003, 231) which we now turn.We speakoftotalities,groups,andmultiplicitiesalsowheretheconcept of continuouscombination.(2003,20) other hand,thepeculiarcombinationsinvolved. Theselatter,then,arewhatisalways iden- exhaustion ‒of suchgroupsisunimaginable. Hereeven ourpower of idealizationhasalimit. edge capacitycouldenableus tohave the actualrepresentation‒oreven themeresequential cally expandednumberseries isinfinite,asthegroupofpointsinaline,and,general, that extensions ofmostgeneralconcepts areinfinite.Thegroupofthenumbersinsymboli - of their authentic formation, or of their symbolization through sequential exhaustion of the a acteristic sortofcombinationcontentstherearisestheconceptcontinuum, at thelimitsof a continuum.Thethoughtthatsomeconceivable expansion of ourknowl- succession, even thoughnotinoneallinclusive act.Butallofthisisimpossibleinthecasesto tents whichtheyconnect(places,times,colors,tones,etc.).Theninreflectionuponthischar- tically presentwhenever we speakofcontinua,however differentmay betheabsolutecon- individuals involved, alreadycontainsa logical impossibility.We speakofinfinitegroups.The whole From thisstandpoint,thereemergeshow theconceptofcontinuum the partsofwhichareunitedpreciselyinmanner 7 2001b, 14). “passing »(Husserl, over into self” of continuity, i.e. asa continuous case limiting count asalegitimate such corresponding moments shall The of of likeness any case exact ‘moments’ ofconstitutive other. the unbrokenly over into corresponding ‘moments’ of one the pass stitutive con- immediately whole’ the ifall form an ‘indifferentiated sarily concreta neces sensuous neous Investigation be found in Third the Logical 7 passage isto similar A very : «Two contempora- as thatof -

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo cause ofitsirreversibility: change, for exampleinthecontinuousmigrationofaqualitative discontinuityover consciousness as an immanent moment when we allow unchange to pass over into continuum phasesinto a setofpoints. evant differences with respecttotheperceptionofspace,itmust beadmittedthat, evant for usisthat,inHusserlwords, «continuityisextension,andqualitative con- of §19 ofThingandSpace,Husserlargues: core ofthegeneralproblemtemporalandspatialperception.At thebeginning cal overview oftheenormouscriticalliteratureonthesetexts:thusIwillonlyrecall One couldspotthesametensionbetween intuitionandformalization ofthecontinu- possibility ofanabstractdifferentiation into phases.[…]»(Husserl1997, 59).This from 1905–1908. Althoughthetranscendentalexperienceoftimereveals somerel- the continuumwithinframework ofHusserl’slecturesontime-consciousness determinations themselves, for exampletheflowing over fromqualitytoquality,per- tinuity qualitative extension.That essentially impliesfragmentability andtheideal time-consciousness of1905–19085. Inbothcases,I cannotprovide even asyntheti- an expansefilledupunitarilyinsuchanda way. 2)Thecontinuityofthefilling some quotationsinordertoshow how thequestionofcontinuumisatvery sion ofkeeping thenotionof“original impression”, spective, inmy interpretive hypothesis, Husserl’s deci- In ordertomakesenseofthesegreatdifficulties, onehastoaddressthequestionof Much morecomplexappearstobetheissueoftemporalcontinuumprecisely- For whatconcernsthespatialcontinuity, Husserldistinguishestwo mainmean- plicitly attested by the following passage: um alsoinHusserl’slecturesof1907 onThingandSpaceaswell asinhiscourseson ings: 1)Thecontinuitythatbelongstospatialextensionassuchandcomes idea ofabasicimpossibility ofreducingtheintuitive in boththelecturesontime-consciousness andspatialperception,there emergesthe idea ofthepriorityintuitive continuumuponitsmathematicalconstructionisex- haps inthetransitionfromredthroughpurpletoviolet.Butwhatisparticularlyrel- Although infactevery bodycanberesolved intoaninfinitemanifold ofplanesectionsand character ofextensionsappearance:inthemisconstitutedthespatialandtemporalex- of thegreatest.We willstilldevote effortsofour own tothesedifficulties.(1997,55) events inthepast.Hereresideimmensedifficulties,whichupto now have defiedtheacumen every beingmaintainsitspositionintime.Even agodcannotalterthetemporalpositionsof ceeding beyond theplane,whatisatissuepreciselylaws accordingtowhichtheplanes encompasses allthesesectionalfigures,isstillnotthegeometryofspatialbody.Inpro- can beconsideredacontinuumofplanesections,yet thegeometryofplanefigures,which spatial-temporal predicates.(1997,51) abyss ofthepast,yet, on the otherhand,timehasvalidity asaneternalandfixed form, since and theformations lyingonthemarecontinuallymodified.(1997,173) panse thatbelongstotheessenceofthinglyobjects;inthemtherefore liesthesourceofall Here I have in mind the wonderful phenomenological forms of appearance which have the If timethusappearsasaneternalstreamwhichprecipitateseverything temporalintothe 8 Fromthisper- 9 off continuously.off concrete Every ception, is shaded that isan act ness, impression, or even per original conscious wecall «What - 8 Indeed, argues Husserl that -

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “living-present” isthemost originarytypeofindividuation,composed ofamultiplici- Accordingly, theproblemof“originalimpression”containsandincludesam - enological continuumoftimeassomethingobjective: content) andconstitutingabsolutetime-consciousnessdesignatesthe“lengthwise” of individuation as a temporal process. From a genetic point of view,it is precisely in concerns notonlytheobjects, butalsotheegoassuch.Inotherwords, theimmanent content ofapprehension introduced inhisLogicalInvestigations , astestified by the clarify theconditionsofmathematicalformaliza- Manuskripte, wheretheproblemoforiginaryimpression develops intotheissue tinction between constitutedtime-consciousness(immanentunityofactandits tinction between constitutedtranscendentobjectandconstitutingtime-conscious- terms ofthedoublecontinuum“transverse” and“lengthwise” segments,thedis- tinuum asalogicalconstruction.Asiswell known, Husserlfounds thesedifferent ex- this processthattheegooriginates in itsimmanence.Thismeansthatindividuation the flow ofconsciousness,Husserl recallsintoquestion theschemeapprehension/ ty ofsensiblegiven unified inacontinuoussequence.Afterdecisive discussionwith temporal continuum,strictlydependsonhisattemptto tion oftime.With thisregard,Husserlargues: although notconceivable asapunctualsourceofthe Husserl becomes definitively aware ofthe impossibilityof conceivingofthe phenom- Husserl approachesanewthese«extremelyimportant matters»intheBernauer R. Ingardenabouttheproblem oftherelationbetween theunityofsensibledata ness designatesthetransverse intentionality(phase-continuum),whereasthedis- number of manuscripts that he was not really satisfied by this solution). Expressed in periences ofthecontinuumontwo varieties ofintentionality(butwe know froma intentionality (stretch-continuum).Nevertheless, inamanuscriptfrom1908 or1909, bivalence of the intuitive (pre-phenomenal) continuum and the mathematical con- does notariseassomethingproducedbutthroughgenesisspontanea ; itisprimalgeneration, else iscontinuouslyproduced.Butititselfnotproduced: eration. […]Theprimalimpressionistheabsolutebeginningof other pointascontinuouslyproducedfromit;andevery con- of phenomenology.(1991,345–346) consciousness andcontinuitiesofmustnot beregardedastemporalobjects other hand,memoryissurelysomethingthatitselfhasitsnow, andthesamenow asatone, starting fromany pointwhatsoever, we canthinkofevery this production, the primal source, that from which everything tinuous productionisaby meansofcontinuousit- themselves. Theseareextremelyimportantmatters,perhapsthemost inthewhole for example.No.Therelurksthefundamentalmistake.Theflow ofthemodesconscious- relation) ofphaseconsciousnesstoandinthiscasethephases ness isnotaprocess;theconsciousnessofnow isnotitselfnow. […]Memoryisanex- pression thatalways andonlyrefers toaconstitutedtemporalobject.Retention, ontheother It isinherentintheessenceofevery linearcontinuumthat, Is itinherentlyabsurdtoregardtheflow oftimeasanobjective movement? Certainly!Onthe it doesnotspringfromanything. Itisprimalcreation.(1991,106) hand, isanexpressionusedtodesignatetheintentionalrelation(afundamentallydifferent constituted to what isconstituting. what to constituted regressioninfinite from is what of original the impression isthe the by concept entailed difficulty 9 As isknown, most the serious »(1991,49). by itself exist can never in such apunctual awaythat phase must they ences that be extended essence of both of- experi these modified.tively It belongsthe to shadings,same only reproduc- ness, requires also the precisely duction, phantasy-conscious- uum of such shadings. But repro- perception implies awhole contin- and

43 continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo What remainsdefinitelyopenisthequestion of theflux’snature:provided thatthe of retentionalmodificationsandtheinfluenceretentionsindetermination es hisperspective andemphasizes theroleplayed by boththeprotensionsofflux consciousness impliesanessentialcorrelationbetween immanentperceptionand ous texts, what is at stake here is no longer the mere […] retentional consciousness of chored inthefluentpresent»(Husserl2001, XIII).Asaconsequence, intheBernauer condition ofpossibility of theconstitutedtime?Iforiginaryprocess needstobe Manuskripte tled inadouble horizon ofretentional and protentionalphenomena.Thus,hechang- the constitutionofatemporalconsciousness.Inotherwords, thefluxofabsolute temporality are based on the “originary process” (Urprozess) of individuation. Indeed, grasped by theego, without whomthefunctionofconstitutionwould notbepossi - the originary flux, butrather aself-consciousness ofthe originary fluxoriginallyan- ticipations andmoreorlessintensedegreesoffulfillment(Erfullung)empty- describes the present itself as fluent continuity: «A fluent consciousness structured flux isplacedatatranscendentallevel, why doesitmanifest itselfaposteriori,as the constitutionoftemporal(immanent)objects andtheactsofapprehension. derstood as an independent level ofintentional consciousness, responsible for both difference between act-consciousness andconsciousness oforiginaryconsciousness. the dangerof infiniteregression), Husserl doesnotfullysucceed indealingwiththe sciousness constitutestheErlebnisse a continuousandconsistentflux.Fromthisviewpoint,bothobjective andimmanent In the lightof this passage, it is clear that in these man- Husserl statesinthetextn.9: manuscripts n.6and9.InthesetextsHusserlarguesthatthefluxofabsolutecon- rality. Thisimpliesthattheconstitutionoftemporalobjectsisinseparablefrom protentional contents.Itfollows thattheoriginaryprocess(Urprozess reveals itself not as a mechanism of constant modification of the present in thejust perceived object.Accordingly, theimmanenttemporality,namelynoeticsideof passed; rather,thetemporalfluxisdeeplyintertwinedwithpassive syntheses,an- model seemstobemore fruitfulthanthemodelofapprehension(always subjectto uscripts Husserlisnolongercommittedtotheideaofanoriginarypresentationnes- intentionality, derives fromthetemporal constitution ofthefluxconsciousnessas ing (Entfullung). With thisrespect,Husserlmaintains:«Differentlyfromtheprevi- in thisway isnecessarilyaconsciousnessofitselfasfluent»(Husserl2001a, 48). ble, itsindependenceisseriously compromised.Thismeansthat,although thenuclear of theoriginarypresentations.Thisseriesisconstituted[…],aswell astheseriesoforig- sound asatemporalobject.Ifwe abstractively isolateanoriginarypresentationanditsflow the persistingperceptionofasoundisnottobeunderstoodmerelyasobjective series tively, notatemporalobjective given (zeitgegenstandliches).Inotherterms,we willobtain tention andcontinuesfromanoriginarypresentationtoanewoneascoincidenceofthis no representation(Darstellung)ofsomethingobjective within thenucleargiven. Accordingly, persisting sound(wherethelastoriginarypresentationfallsintoretention),thatwe graspthe […]. (2001a,171) I meanthatitisonlyby virtue of thecoincidence(Deckung ) whichcrossesretentionandpro- inary flux;nevertheless itsobjectivation hasadifferentsense in thetemporalflux, we obtain ineachpointanewnucleargiven (Kerndatum) takenabstrac- Still, theproblemisnotcompletelysolved aslongtheUrprozess Husserl testifieshis awareness ofthedangerinfiniteregressionand 10 as temporalobjectswithinimmanenttempo- also Schnellalso (2002). 10 Translation ismine. See or Urstrom) is un-

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo As alreadypointedout,therelevance ofthephenomenologicaldiscourseabout claimed that,onceassumedthecorrectnessof thesettheoryaxioms,therefollows contain a complete description of that reality (Gödel 1947). Gödel’s perspective can of thecontinuum problemdepends ontheresultswe etc.) withouttakingseriouslyintoaccounttheissueofsubjective-transcenden- oped anumberofontologiestime(i.e.spacetimetheory,QG,presentism,eternalism, ence ofcontinuityandtheattemptto formalize it.Eachprotentionalinstantisnever cess andconstitutionfallintoakindofshortcircuit.Inordertosummarize,whatis enology. According tothisview,theoriginaryflux,un- of theindependencecontinuumhypothesis fromthesettheory’saxioms,this emerges fromtheawakening oftimeitself(Husserl,1966, 178). each newinstant. It isfor thisreason that Husserl describes consciousnessaswhat ture iseithertrueorfalse.Thus,theaxioms’indeterminacy impliesthattheydonot that conceptsandtheoremsdescribeaparticular realityfor whichCantor’sconjec- demonstration ofthecontinuum hypothesis’ independenceof Zermelo-Fraenkel’s dependently ofourability todiscover it.Bycontrast,Cohen(1963) maintainsthatthe found? Otherwise,whichisitscurrentstatus?UnderGödel’stheoremofincomplete- determinacy. With thisregard,thecontinuumhypothe - determined aglobalreconsiderationofthenotion tal timeexperience,oftendismissedasanillusion.Especiallyafterthedemonstration time continuumhasbeenlargelyneglectedby mathematicians,theoreticalphysicists, does notconsumethesurpriseofourconsciousnessinfrontpresentation fully anticipatedby thepreviousone:thismeansthatgraspingoftemporalflux time transversal intentionality,whichisalways inconnectionwiththetimeofimma- tions. Nevertheless, Husserlemphasizeshow longitudinalintentionalityisatthesame derstood aslongitudinalintentionality,shouldbetheoriginofalltemporalconstitu- axioms (plustheaxiom ofchoice) solution?” Hasthecontinuumproblembeenresolved? Ifso,whichsolutionhasbeen sis involves amanifold ofphilosophicalquestionsdealingwiththequestion“whatisa strong dependenceontheissuesofconsistencyandin- solution in set theory (and mathematics), because of its and philosophersoftime.Regardless oftheirreciprocaldifferences, all ofthemdevel- and theemergenceofpunctualnewinstants,thatis,between theintuitive experi- struggles tofindanequilibriumbetween thecontinuousprocessoftemporalization at stakeinHusserl’sscrutiny oftime-consciousnessisthepossibilityneworiginary IV. Some scholars mind. Fromthisperspective, thecontinuumhypothesis hasagiven value oftruth, in- mathematics hastodealwitharealmofobjects andconceptsindependentofour ness, isitunavoidable apluralisticviewaboutthecontinuum? mathematical reality(asarguedby Gödel),thesolution nent objects.Itfollows that,infrontoftheproblemtime,notionsorigin,pro - presentations within the continuum of intentional givenness. More precisely, Husserl unique non-constituted element in Husserl’s phenom- isfying: ratherthanrequiring theunderstandingofany issue isnowadays rathercontroversial. Itshistory be includedintheplatonic Conclusions Gödel himselftookpartinthisdebatewithan article(1947) inwhichhe 11 conceive oftheoriginaryfluxas approach tomathematics,namelytheviewfor which 13 iscompletelysat- 12 has Sokolowski (1964). for instance11 See especially chapters 4,8,and chapters 12. especially discussion, Linnebo see (2017), 12 For of this aprecise overview tinuum of (i)has cardinality the infinite each subsetsis: the of con- continuum of the hypothelations 13 formuThere two classic exist - -

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo can reach within a certain axiomatic system. His ed upadmittingtheimmeasurablenessofintuition cetime isgiven toatranscendentalsubject.Moreclosely,ratherthanbeingmereil- the relevance ofthesubjective experienceoftimeend- the very natureoftime.Those(likeWeyl) whograsped dental life withany scientifictheory. tempted todemonstrateinthistextisthatHusserl’s any mathematicalformalization, therefore any physical theory,would beimpossible. and formalization ofthetimecontinuum.WhatIat- listic Much work isyet tobedoneinthisdirection.Nevertheless, Husserl’sthoughthasstill matical tool,ratherthananexhaustive explanationof much toofferinordershedlightintotheenigmaticentrenchmentofourtranscen- physicists considerspacetimetheory afruitfulmathe- phenomenology isstillinapositiontoprovide arigorousdescriptionofhow thespa- lusion, theintuitive experienceoftimecontinuumisanabsolutegiven withoutwhich solution iswidelydiffusedamongmathematicians. Analogously, asIemphasizedabove, most forma- even if the collection isinfinite. collection even ifthe one object from set, each exactly of aselection make to sible tion of non-empty ispos it sets, - affirming that,any given - collec ory plus axiom the of choice (1904), - the set Zermelo-Fraenkel called ofassumes rules list nine-item the mulations ifone equivalent are countable infinite. twofor These the after cardinality transfinite est number- real has small the (ii) set; (countable natural the infinite) or -

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Gödel, K.(1938). TheConsistencyoftheAxiomChoiceandGeneralized Cohen, P. J.(1963). TheIndependenceoftheContinuumHypothesis.Proceedings Claesges, L.(1964). EdmundHusserlsTheoriederRaumkonstitution. TheHague: Centrone, S.(2010). LogicandPhilosophy ofMathematics intheEarlyHusserl. Cantor, G. (1878). Ein Beitrag zur Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Føllesdal, D.(1999). Gödel andHusserl.InJ.Petitot&F. Varela (Eds.),Naturalizing Feist, R.(Ed.).(2004).HusserlandtheSciences.SelectedPerspectives . Ottawa: De Warren, N.(2009).HusserlandthePromiseofTime.Cambridge:Cambridge Da Silva, J.(1997). Husserl’sPhenomenologyandWeyl’s Predicativism.Synthese, Bernard, J. & Lobo, C. (Eds.) (2019). Id. (1947). What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem? Id. (1944). Russell’sMathematicalLogic.InS.Feferman, J.Dawson &S.Kleene(Eds.), Linnebø, O.(2017). Philosophy ofMathematics. Princeton:Princeton University Press. Id. (2003).Philosophy ofArithmetic. Dordrecht: Springer. Id. (2001c). LogicalInvestigations (III-VI).NewYork: Routledge. Id. (2001b). LogicalInvestigations (I-II).NewYork: Routledge. Id. (2001a). DieBernauerManuskripte uberdasZeitbewusstsein (1917/18). Dordrecht: Id. (1997). ThingandSpace.Lecturesof1907 . Dordrecht:Springer. Id. (1991). OnthePhenomenologyofConsciousness ofInternal Time(1893– Id. (1976). Id. (1970). TheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendental Phenomenology. Husserl, E.(1966). Analysen zurPassiven Synthesis (HuaXI).DenHaag:Nijoff. Hopkins, B.(2011). TheOriginoftheLogicSymbolicMathematics. EdmundHusserl Hilbert, D.(1900). UberdenZahlbegriff.Jahresbericht derDeutschen Mathematiker- Id. (1995). Collected Works III: Unpublished Essays andLectures . Oxford: Oxford Id. (1990). CollectedWorks II:Publications 1938–1974. Oxford: Oxford University 1917). Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic. Journal ofSymbolicLogic(119–141). Evanston: Northwestern University 110, 277–296. Vereinigung, 8,180–183. 54, 515–525. USA the National Academy ofSciencesUSA, I(50),1143–1148. and JacobKlein.Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press. angewandte Mathematik, 84,242–258. Continuum Hypothesis.ProceedingsoftheNational Academy ofSciences Ottawa University Press. Phenomenology (385–400). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Philosophie. ErstesBuch(HuaIII/1).DenHaag:Nijhoff. References University Press. University Press. Springer. Nijhoff. Press. Kluwer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Dordrecht: Springer. Press. Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen , 24, 556–557. Weyl and the Problem of Space. Dordrecht: American Mathematical Monthly, Journal fur die reine und

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Tieszen, R. (2005). Van Dalen, D. (1984). Four Letters from Edmund Husserl toHermann Weyl. Husserl Wittgenstein, L.(1964). PhilosophicalRemarks. Oxford: BasilBlackwell. Weyl, H.(1987). TheContinuum: ACriticalExamination oftheFoundations of Zermelo, E.(1904). Beweis dassjedeMengewohlgeordnet werden kann.Mathematische Sokolowski, R.(1964). TheFormation ofHusserl’sConceptConstitution.Den Schnell, A.(2002).DasProblemderZeitbeiHusserl.EineUntersuchunguberdiehus- Schlipp, P. A.(Ed.).(1963). ThePhilosophy ofRudolfCarnap.Chicago:OpenCourt. Id. (2009).MindandNature , Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press. Rykman, T. (2005).TheReign ofRelativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rovelli, C.(2019). “NeitherPresentismnorEternalism”. Foundations ofPhysics, 49,pp. Id. (2019). NeitherPresentism norEternalism:At What Price?. Petkov, V. (Ed.)(2010). Minkowski Spacetime:AHundredYears Later. Dordrecht: Longo, G.(1999). TheMathematicalContinuum. From IntuitiontoLogic.InJ.Petitot Annalen, 59,514–516. Analysis. NewYork: Dover. 1325-1335. & F. Varela (Eds.),Naturalizing Phenomenology(401–428). Stanford: Studies, 1,1–12. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. serlschen Zeitdiagramme.HusserlStudies,18 (2),89–122. Springer. Stanford University Press. Haag: Nijhoff. kowskiinstitute.org/conferences. Phenomenology, Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics. http://www.min-

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continuum after the Debate on Presentism and Eternalism — Claudio Tarditi Claudio — and Eternalism Presentism on Debate the after continuum ‑ Time the of Account Husserl’s Reassessing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “reality is tensed”. A-theorists also believe that there is a “A-series”) isafeature oftemporalrealityitself.There “A-theorists” ontheonesideand“B-theorists”other.Theseunusu- An Interviewwith Thomas Crowther Time, MindandAristotle. 1. ­ derstood simplyinterms oftemporalnotionssuchas“earlierthan”,“later dynamic aspecttotime;thattimereallypasses. Mytyp- come partofmy past.Andmy lunch will move fromthe ciple know that2030isearlierthan 2040withoutknowing whether2030 self isaseriesoftimesand events therelationsbetween which canbeun- a pastandfuture.Thisiscapturedby theclaimthat al-sounding namesderive fromimportantideasthatwere articulatedin future into the present, and then it will become past. than” or“simultaneous with” (theB-series).Noticetheserelationsarecom - things areoutthereindependent ofus.Theythinkthattemporalreality it- tion ismerelyamatterofhow we view things,ratherthanamatterof how the temporalworld itself.Theythinkthat this distinc- tion between past,presentandfutureisnot afeature of the distinctionbetween past,presentandfuture(the the work oftheCambridgephilosopherJohnM.Ellis tury philosophy of time was a tale of two warring factions; with so-called really isatimethatthepresent,andsothere nature oftime.ButIthinkthisfor reasonsthatdifferfromthosehave often pletely independent ofnotionspast, presentorfuture.One caninprin- In brief,Ithinkourfirst-personexperiencecantellussomethingaboutthe B-theorists arephilosopherswhothinkthatthe distinc- McTaggart. been offered for answering thisquestionaffirmatively. ing thissentenceisapresentevent butitwill soonbe- of Time? Can OurFirst-PersonExperienceTell UsAnything AbouttheNature Let mebeginwithabitofbackground.Thestory20thcen- 1 Crudelyput,“A-theorists”believe that 2

ral structure of structure experience. ral and ofnature time tempo the - focus on aparticular with the mind, epistemology and Aristotle, metaphysics, philosophy the of Warwick. works Hemainly on philosophy of University the at Tom Crowther isprofessor of (2008), Markosian (2004). (2008), Markosian Prior (1959),Zimmerman,see 2 For examples of the A-theory (1908) and McTaggart (1927). McTaggart McTaggart are texts shaped by distinction. this The key philosophythe isstill of time tiny, discussion century 21st in comeues to scru- under critical contin- and itself distinction the beues refocussed to and refined, 1 Though contin debate the - 49  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo A-theoretic claimsaboutthemetaphysics oftime.Intherecentliterature, with these basic questions concerning thevery content of such notions or 2040isinthepast,presentfuture.B-theoristsalsodeny thattimeis of “tensedreality”and“temporalpassage”thatfigure on first-personexperiencecanhelpusintrying tomakesomeheadway dynamic, thattimeissomethingreallypasses.Thisdenialoftencap- claim that“realityistensed”,and“theresucha characteristically advanced by A-theorists–suchasthe ent withtakingrealitytobetenselessorinvolve about these notions.Telling thisstoryis one ofthethemesmy research arguments for theA-theorythathave beenofferedin are eitherincoherentorremainuncashedmetaphors. are betterexplanationsofthecharactertemporalexperienceconsist- as “tensedreality”or“temporal passage”.This,inmy view,iswhere expe- something to be a satisfyingdiscussion of the very ideaofwhatitis for tical abouttheway thatexperiencehas tendedtoenter thing astemporalpassage”–tobetrue.ButIamscep- the literatureinfollowing way: the traditionalcharacterizationsoftemporal passage the firstplace.Idon’tthinkthisisright.Itafamiliarpointthatmany of the B-theoristswhoopposeit,thatvery notions to A-theoristswhoargueinthisway, andtomany of ferent markedpartsofa12 inchwooden rulerareall that constitutetemporalrealityareallinexistencetheway thatthedif- tured by theideathatB-theoryisablockviewoftime.Thetimesandevents no passageatall. most B-theoristshave characteristicallyrejected(2),arguingthatthere rience –atleastmostfundamentally –comesintodebatesaboutthe phi- particular, I think that theliterature doesnot contain Here, first-personexperienceisplaying anepistem- But Ithinkitisnolesstruethatthereaninsufficient - ic role:itprovides onewithjustification for various in thisarea. into debatesaboutthetruthofclaimsthiskind. in theformulation ofthisargumentaresufficiently well-understood in in existence. losophy oftime.It isafurtherstoryexactlywhatsuchreflection tellsus ly cleargraspofwhatitisfor realitytobe tensed.In 1. 3. 2. Therefore realityistensed/theresucha The bestexplanationofitsseemingtousthatrealityistensed/theresuch At thevery least,itisatleastnaturaltoreconstructsomeofthese When we reflect onfirst-person experienceit a thingastemporalpassageisthatrealitytensed/theresuch a thingastemporalpassage. seems tousthatrealityistensed/theresuch thing astemporalpassage. temporal passage. 3 Iinclinetowards takingvarious claims in the present. I thinkthatreflection 6 Butitisanassumptioncommon 4 5 7

Smart (1949) andSmart (1951). Williams goodparticularly examples of this, worktury on B-theory. the See, for some cen- of mid-20th classic the worldof of isatheme manifest the features relevant the articulate to 7 Scorn for attempts A-theorists’ as Prosser (2016,ch.7). and such B-theorists other Paul (2008,ch.2), (2010),Dyke 6 by This taken line isthe in Paul (2010)and (2008). Dyke important role in arguments the for the an play this A theory like 5 Reconstructions of arguments Dainton (2011)for example. suggested inleast passages of 4 This kind of argument isat (1991), and (2008). Dyke (1984),LePoidevinOaklander work includes (1998), Mellor and (1951).MoreWilliams recent (1949) Smart see century 20th of the part B-theory in earlier the 3 For important examples of the

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “the present”or“temporalpassage”actuallyhave application.Anditmay be – andthatinforms the work ofmany philosophersoftime –isjustadiffer- vealed tousinsense-perceptual experienceoftheworld, andfirst-person worries aboutcontentfulnessthatIhave justtalked with thetaskofproviding anargumentfor theclaimthatnotionssuchas would benoneedfor anindependentargumentfor theexistenceof one to entertain such a perceptual-demonstrative thought are sufficient in of somekind,thenthereisnotafurthersteptobetakenestablishthat our. Ifsomeoneisindeedentertainingaperceptual-demonstrative thought (a kindofthoughtthatphilosopherscalla‘perceptu- guarantees thattheseconceptshave application.Were thisthecase,there grasp on the concepts of “the present” or of “temporal passage” – where questions thatgowell beyond whatIcangointohere. debates abouttime,oncesuchquestionsthecontentofnotions ent notionoftimefrom thatwhichIamattemptingtobetterunderstand in ence totellusanything muchaboutthenatureoftime. even entertainthethoughtthat objectisthat colour cussing. Thatis,itispossiblethattheconditionsrequiredfor onetohave a concepts thatconstitutethecontentofthought. an accountof thenatureofmanifest time.Manifest time istimeasit- re about. But setting this aside for the moment, what I such thingastemporalpassage. simply tellsusthatrealityistenselessandthere isno about thenatureoftime–aresuchthatobtainingtheseconditions an objectinfrontofone,thatoneperceives, thathassomeperceived col- al-demonstrative’) itisnecessarythatthereinfact think, very crudely, is that the notion of time that physicists operate with tion afamiliarworry abouttakingfirst-personexperi- that experiencethenhasaroletoplay inproviding apremiseinthoseargu- those notionsareclearanddeterminateenoughtoframefruitfuldebates themselves for theexistenceofthingswhicharereferents ofthe the conceptsinvolved inthedemonstrative have applicationintheir envi- functioned asanindependentpremise(asintheargu- my research(and others likemeare).Iamprimarilyinterestedin providing not possibly do justice to here. Of course it triggers the ments, muchastheargumentin(1)-(3)above. might bethatoncethesequestionshave beensettled,then we arestillfaced may beso.Butthereareotherpossibilities.For oneto ronment, letaloneafurthersteptowhichexperienceofcertainkindmay ment (1)-(3)above). present orofpassage,anargumentinwhichexperienceacertaintype up for disputehave beenclarifiedandmadedeterminate.Onethoughthere Briefly put,thethoughtisthatcontemporary physics Before moving onfromthisquestion,Ioughttomen- be relevant inproviding apremise.Thevery conditionsrequiredfor some- ing, thisleaves itopenwhetherexperiencehasany epistemicroletoplay in is somewhatsimilarinthecaseoftemporalnotionswe have beendis- This raisesmany furtherquestionsthatIcan- Given whatIhave saidhere,itremains openthatthesituation Returning tothekindofargumentwe have justbeenconsider- 9 Thesearecomplexanddelicate 8 That aphysics Lowe (1998,ch.1). see - role met of in experience general 8 For of an example of the view this ceptual demonstrative contents). demonstrative ceptual thoughts per entertain with to ity role in capac the - a constitutive kind plays ofexperience acertain be argued occurrence the that of to islikely it waythat (in asimilar present or of notion the of passage notiona grasp of relevant of the the role in kind aconstitutive plays tain occurrence of of experience acer For be open will argue it to the that about truth evant how things are. in- constituting rel the be irrelevant thereby is not will experience that here 9 Iemphasize claim the that - -

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo There are two different but related ideas here. Let me deal with them sep- 2. experiences of timeinsomereasonably broad sense.Ithink every philos- y”. Therearedifferent notions ofaconceptobviously, andalotdependson reflection onthat experience.ItisnotthatIaminterestedinother opher oftimewould beabletoagreethatwe have experiencesoftimein of thiskind–thathaving aconcept,for example,theconcept blackbird, of theexperienceishow thingsseemtoone inhaving (e.g. aballrollingalongthelawn) orofstasis (e.g.anexperienceasofacat quite plausible. Thoseofuswhohave childrenwill findithardtoresistthe experience oftimeeludesourattempttocaptureits consists intheabilityto usetheword “blackbird”correctly.Against this commit us to too much on this front. Whichever side of these various de- events orprocesses.Drawing onanidea fromThomasNagel(1974) onecan acterize thecontentofexperience. stood isastheclaimthatsubjectcanhave anex- such abroadsense. another (e.g. an experience as of one footstep following another) count as something changing,orasacatinstasisonthe lawn, orfootstep follow- say that experiences are events or processes such that “there is something al. Let’strytounpackthisabit.Experiencesarephenomenallyconscious arately. Iaminclinedtothinkthatthereissomethingrightaboutbothof seem tobeatfirstsight. the experienceonedoes.Inthiscase,claim isthat troversial. Butletmetrytoaddressthisquestioninaway thatdoesnot that itislikefor thesubject”tobeundergoingthem,inway thatthere them, butwiththecaveat thateachof thesesuggestionsreallyraisesmany that thereismuchlesssubstantive disagreementherethantheremight nature conceptuallymightmeananumberofthings. possessing theconceptsthatwould beused tochar- perience oftimewithoutthesubjectexperience more questionsthanitanswers. notion oftime,orthatItakeittobeirrelevant tometaphysics. Ijustsuspect But the usual way in whichthis claim has been under- background, theideathatexperience oftimeisnonconceptual appears bates abouttimeortemporalexperienceoneison,itoughttoberelative - just lyingtheremotionlessonthelawn) or ofoneoccurrrencesucceeding ing footstep, withouthaving theconceptsof“change”,“stasis”or“xfollows it would bepossiblefor onetohave experiencesasof is nothingitlikefor a rocktoberollingdown aslope. ly uncontroversial thatanexperienceasofsomekindchangegoingon how thisnotionisunderstood. Butlet’sassume–asithasbeenin debates The firstclaimisthatourexperienceoftimenonconceptu- What itisfor anexperiencetobeoftimeispotentiallyquitecon- Our Attempt toCaptureItsNatureConceptually.ArtisticPractices Seem BetterSuitedtoExpress thisElusive NatureThanPhilosophical Some PhilosophersHave claimedthatOurExperienceofTimeEludes Reflection. Whatdo You ThinkofthisClaim? Now tothesubstanceoffirstquestion.Theclaimthatone’s 11 The“content” 10

11 See, for example, (1992). Crane argumentstant are. in area this some of impor the effective an have impact on that howties might be understood, ambigui- ambiguitiesare in how claim this (2006) for argument there that Crowther (1994).See McDowell Evans (1982)and see debate 10 For sides of this different -

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo words “change”,“stasis”or“succession”,theyenjoyed experiencesinwhich of thesevery temporalconcepts.Thatshows thatthepossessionofthese doesn’t conceptual capacitiesthataredrawn onin hisauditoryexperienceofthat caveats needtobemade.First,notethat thisisjustanegative claim.Itdoes concepts isnotnecessaryfor perceivers tohave theseexperiences. Itseems experience ofnon-linguisticanimalsvarious kinds. about philosophicalquestions,doesnotessentially appeartoinvolve do- sic theoryorsonataform. AndIthinkthatthekindofauditoryexperience ano sonataby Mozart,andtheauditoryexperienceofanexpertonsonata sic-theoretic trainingorunderstandingofmusicalform listeningtoapi- sion in the literature over the last few decades. tionality, it clearly does manifest capacities that one possesses. But it is nor- these cases,itisemotionsofdifferentkindswhich areexpressed. the ideathatsubjectdoessomethingwiththeir bodythatserves asthe their rage. The fact that we talk about expression here seems to involve to expresstheirsadness,for example,ortheir furiousshoutingtoexpress think, dependsonhow exactly it’sunderstood. tistic practicemay expressthenatureof experienceoftimebetterthan that Rosen ishaving wouldn’t have beenavailable tohimunlesshehadthe that therichperceptualexperienceRosen hasinsuchcircumstances form like Charles Rosen, who is listening to the same piece of music. I think ferent optionsopenaboutwhatthepositive storyis. they arenotconcept-dependentintherelevant way. Thatleaves many dif- things seemedtothemsomeway, away thatischaracterizableinterms thought thateven before ouroffspringcametounderstandtheuseof to methatonecouldmakethesamepointonbasisofreflection mal todistinguishexpression frommanifestation. public vehicle for somethingbroadlyinternal , whichiswhat’sexpressed.In philosophical reflection.Thisisareallyinterestingsuggestion.Alothere,I piece ofmusic. relevant temporalfeatures ofexperiencearetobeexplained.Itsays only not tellusagreatdealaboutourtemporalexperience,norexactlyhow the poral experienceswithconceptualcontent.Thinkofthedifferencesin not presenttheideasIhave justdiscussed asconclusive. I think it’s true that artistic practice does express the nature of temporal But atthevery least,theclaimseemsplausible.Even if being madeouterand(insomesense)public.Sowe takesomeone’scrying is ing thingswithone’sbody,onemightworry aboutthedegreetowhichit idea ofsomethingwhichisinnerand(insomesense)private tothesubject, is somethingthat wouldn’t be shared by one who knows nothing of mu- it isconcededthatthisclaimplausible,though,some kind ofperceptualengagementinvolved insomeonewithout any mu- expressive of anything. This, of course, is not to say that such reflection manifest anything. Asanexercise ofcreativity,intelligenceorra - The notionof“expression”ismostnaturallyusedtoindicatethe The secondpartofthisquestioninvolved thesuggestionthat ar- This claimhasgeneratedquiteabitofdiscus- Against thebackgroundof thisway of understandingthequestion, Given thatphilosophicalreflection,understood asdeliberation Second, itdoesnotfollow fromthisthattherearen’tany 12 Ido ential response.ential III)for an(1994, lecture influ- for example,12 See McDowell tem-

53 ­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 1 and2arethepremises3isconclusion.It 1. p 3. q

2. Ifpthenq work outwhethertwo sentencesinthesameparagraphofthatwork are was mistaken. with the very ideaof propositional contents and their volve deliberation about whether they are true or not. But such reflection is over thespaceofanhour,onetryingtowork outwhatAristotleissaying osophical reflectionitselfissomethingtemporal,thatis,it on theotherhand,issomethingthatagentsdo, thatmay involve judging of philosophical reflection. It is a written inscription that communicates re- ples oftheelusive temporalcharacteristicsofexperience.Specifically,they goes onintimeandover time.Philosophicalreflectionmightinvolve, say, can narratewhatwent onover thattime.Onecansay, ittookmeanhour consistent withoneanother.Thisisactivitythatgoesonover time.One es –inparticular,music, dance,anddrama–doprovide betterexamplesor experience better than philosophical reflection. But I think that this may be about time in some passageof Book IV of the Physics, or involve trying to are atemporalandtimeless.These timelesspropertiesarea and theirtemporal propertiesarepublically observable andopentoview. actions asthinking,reasoninganddecision.Ithinkthere agree. Thetemporalpropertiesofsuchpracticesasmusic,danceanddra- as amentalratherthanbodilyaction–doesn’treallyexpressanything. true, Ithinkthatthepropositionalcontents,andre- to comeunderstandthattheway I hadreadthisparagraphpreviously that suchpropositionalcontentsaretrue,orimply oneanother,ormay in- to deny thesuggestion whenitisunderstood in thisway. Artisticpractic- the topic.Iftemporalpropertiesofexperienceareelusive, theneven tic practices,likemusic,danceordrama,provide particularlygoodexam- true in a sense that is not particularly interesting: philosophical reflection – relations. Considertheargumentform below, inwhich not tobeidentifiedwith thecontentsthemselves. models ofthe experienceofthepassage oftimethandoes reflection.They more soisarrivingatanunderstandingofthetemporalpropertiessuch reasons for this. One obvious contributing factor is the sheer difficulty of make senseofthemwithoutthinkingtheirtemporalproperties. ma aresoevidentandimportantthatitishardtoeven begintoseehow to provide betterexamplesthanphilosophicalreflectiondoes.Iaminclinedto bad fit for thetemporalpropertiesofexperience. But1-3isnotaninstance is atendencytoruntogetherphilosophicalreflection lations between thecontents communicatedby thisargumentform: lations ofimplicationbetween abstractcontents. Philosophicalreflection, has beenvery littlegood work doneonthis. A different way totakethesuggestion isastheideathatartis- Even with that warning having been made, I still think it’s hard But again,Iwant tohedgethisagreement.Don’tforget thatphil- It iseasytoforget thatsuchreflectionistemporal.Therearemany 13 Another issues in recent literature. the on these thing best the written The, for Mind’s Construction Soteriou’s outstanding 2013book IIof Part to Matthew reader interested I’d the 13 Here refer

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “philosophical theory”issimplyincapableofdelivering thekindofillumina- way ofconceptualizingthesubject-matter;onethatiscapableproviding well ishard.Itrequirescreativity,and thatphilosophersfind ways which aresometimesvery subtleanddifficulttodiscern,atothertimes worry aboutphilosophicaltheorizingthatmightapplymuchmorewidely want todissentfromthesuggestionratherthanagreewithit. wrong tome,asaclaimaboutthecharacterofmy own mentallife). overwhelming andunmistakeable.Many ofusspendagreatdealourlives dium” ofphilosophicaltheoryandtheuselanguageisnot ence and aesthetic engagement are one of these areas in which philosoph- arising from the nature of the subject matter don’t exist. Doing this work some insurmountablebarrierwhenitcomestoengagingwithsubjectslike allowing arttotransform usinalloftheseways.But withthatbeingsaid,I selves toseethedramaofourthinkingunfold before aninternaleye seems seems obvious. (Theideathatwe areabletopointourattentioninside- al. Indeed,nothingaboutthetemporalpropertiesofphilosophicalreflection Of coursethekindsofpracticesIhave mentionedcandojustthat,inways ter thateludes thereachoflanguage. For amodel ofwhatphilosophy can from otherenquirers. to bedoneinaway thatmakesone’sintellectualengagementwiththe– form for theseexercises ofinsightandunderstanding.Andallthisneeds to draw on their own imaginative powers, and to draw on the imaginative tion intheseareascanbedonewell, oritcanbedonebadly.Agoodphiloso- this. It’sjusttheform withinwhichphilosopherswork. Philosophicalreflec- think it’simportanttoresisttheworry asI’ve justexpressedit.The“me- tic subjectmatter.Anditisthisin-principle incapacitythatprovides for the tue ofthisdistinctionbetween thelinguisticmediumandnon-linguis- tion ofthesetopicsthatphilosophersmighthave hopedfor, simplyby vir- to involve somethingineffable,orinarticulable.According tothisworry, than justtothecaseoftemporalexperience,butothertopicsthatseem tic andconceptual,therelevant subject-matterisnot.Thisageneral there isanintrinsicdifficultyinthinkingthatphilosophicalreflectioncan ment thattookplaceinadifferentmedium,say, danceormusicpoetry. purportedly powers oftheirreaders.Itrequiresexercising thecapacityfor insightand pher oughtnever trytopretendthattherelevant problemsandchallenges possibility thatilluminationmightbebetterprovided by a form ofengage- properly illuminate certain areas, because philosophical reflection islinguis- might beread, and indeedis perhaps more likely toberead.Thisraisesan understanding, andputtingthistogetherwith what mighthave tobeanew But this isn’t true of philosophical reflection and mental activity in gener- ical reflectionhasamonopolyonproviding illuminationandunderstanding. ical theorymight beabarriertosuccessful illuminationof asubject-mat- in aform thatinvites andmakespossibleconstructive critical engagement important issueaboutphilosophicalenquirymoregenerally.AndhereI like tomakeafinal point,becausethereisanother way thatthequestion Though I’m aware I’ve pursued this topic for toolong anyway, I’d A different way thatonemightunderstand thissuggestionisthat One mightthinkthat questions concerningaestheticexperi- I shouldstartby saying thatIcertainlydon’tthinkphilosoph- ineffable andinarticulable–subject-matterpubliclyaccessible,

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 3. This isavery interestingquestion,andaquestionthatisvery difficultto Aristotle articulatingin Book VIofthePhysics. There–amongstmany oth- Wollheim’s magnificent work onthesetopics. want tointerrogateabitfurtherquitewhattheimplieddifferenceisbe- will makefor goodphilosophy intheseareasistheabilityofphilos- working inliteratureandpoetry.Itwould bevery odd opher todraw onimaginative capacities,skillsofintelligentandcreative or Bernard Williams, or read Sarah Broadie’s extraordi- give asatisfactoryshortanswer to.Thereissomuchthatcontroversial delicate, intricateandsubtletobecapturableorunder- derstand afinite magnitudeasaconstruction fromaset of extensionless derstanding andrepresentingnotionsofcontinuity andinfinitywhich went do hereI’dencourageyou toreadsomeofRichard el toilluminatecharacterandemotionallife because er things–Aristotleoffers anargument for theviewthat we cannotun- character ofourethicalresponsesandthefinestruc- are infactquitesimilartothechallengesfacedby those standable throughthecrudetoolsofconceptualstructureorlinguisticex- set-theoretic approach was the idea that it is possible to understand the subject matterinquestionisthemuddyandnuanced tion. Butthisanswer isalreadybecomingProustianandTolstoyan enough tween philosophicalreflectionandartisticpractice,as we finditintheques- them. Thesearejustthecapacitiesthatalsorequiredofgoodnovelists. to harbourreservations aboutthecapacityofnov- to notethatthechallengesphilosopherfaces the finedetailsofcharacterandemotionallife aretoo far beyond anything thatwas available toAristotle andhiscontemporaries. thematicians cametopossessasystem ofpowerful newtechniquesfor un- ture of our ethical life, read anything on these subjects by David Wiggins rejection ofideasabout the relationsbetween pointsandlinesthat we find notion ofsomethingcontinuous(orwhatAristotle mighthave called“the pression. To thisphilosopher – andlover ofliterature–thework ofMarcel points, nomatter how many points we addtogether. IfCantorisright –and my thoughtsabouttheseissuesabitfurther.With theadvent ofsettheory, nary bookEthicswithAristotle. None oftheseskillscomes(orstays) easy.Thesereflectionspromptmeto Proust andLeoTolstoy, amongstmany others,would dispensewiththis infinite by division”) intermsofasetpoints.Thatisstraightforward in itslength,soIhadbetterleave thingshere. insight anddescription,focussed reflectiononthe world asitstrikes in thework ofRichardDedekind, Karl Weierstrass andGeorgCantor,ma- line ofthoughtprettyquickly. here. Hopefullysomeofmy answers tootherquestionswillhelpfillout Relevant Today, AfterGeorg Cantor SucceededinProviding a Do You Think Aristotle’sReflections onContinuityMay StillBe Mathematical Formalization oftheContinuum? Part ofthenewconceptioncontinuitythat underlay Cantor’s I don’tthinkthatany ofthisisaccidental.Ithinkthatpartwhat 15 Itisinterestinghere 14 Ifthe dinarily brilliant essays. brilliant dinarily collections(1995) are of extraor century.eth (1981)andWilliams of second the - of half twenti the works intant moral philosophy (1985) isone of most the impor (2006).Williams in Wigginstures or - lec magnificent the of series for example,15 See Wiggins (1998), (1980) and Wollheim (1987). for example,14 See Wollheim - -

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 204a34-a36). with very muchconfidence. which thesequestionscomeintofocus, Aristotle’s views aboutmathemat- which areintelligibleandhave nomagnitude.However, we arecon- which arebasicinthe world aswe finditinoureveryday experience.Here or arithmetic. Unfortunately, from the few passages of the of mathematics in general to think that in the Physics, or abstractobjects,theirpropertiesandrelations,whichwere metaphysi- objects thathave adeterminateidentity andrealitycompletelyindepend- of continuityinthePhysics isquitecircumscribed.Myviewthateven the general, thePhysics isanattempttoidentifytheprinciplesofnature, and ducting aninvestigation intoperceptiblethings…»(Ph. encountered throughthesenses,whetherwe aretalkingaboutgeometry cannot be reconstructed in very much detail; or at least ematical continuitythat areapplicabletotheworld ofnaturalscience as cally distinctfromtheobjectsofsensibleworld. According tothisnar- evant for contemporary philosophy. I will mention just two, though I don’t consistent withwhatAristotlesays in BookVIofthePhysics, thereremain ence, thatis,world asmanifest tousinourordinaryexperienceofit.In ent ofall connection tothenatural world. They are discussionsofformal are intendedtobediscussions thatcapturefactsaboutthenotionofmath - are evidence ofthat.Andonceone thinksaboutthenotion ofcontinui- about mathematics.Afamiliarnarrative inhistoriesof a numberofways inwhichAristotle’sdiscussionsofcontinuityremainrel- so, anattempttounderstandsuchnotionsas“time”,“change”and“place” and structural properties that are intended to be applicable to, or grounded from some of the different ideas about mathematics that we findin Plato– the discussions of mathematical notions of continuity ty inthisway –asanattempt tospelloutcertain formal features ofthe the development ofmathematicsisthatAristotlejuststraightoutrejected than a specific application of Aristotle’s general views there is a place for infinity among mathematical entities and among things think thattheseareexhaustive. that thisargumentisamistake. the axioms of his set theory are generally accepted – then it might seem rative, for Aristotle, mathematics can only be a high-level or general scope resent continuityand‘theinfinite by division’ina way thatseemstobein- need tobecommittedclaimsaboutAristotle’s views matical continuity in Book VI are not intended to be descriptions of the re- most abstractandformal partsofthediscussionnotionmathe- it ismanifest tous in sense-perception.Thelinesquotedfrom III.5above Plato’s ideathatmathematicshadadistinctive subjectmatter;asetof Forms investigation oftheformal orquantitative features ofobjectsthatcanbe ics – and in particular the ways in which his attitudes to mathematicsdiffer issue heremightbeavery generalone,includingthequestionofwhether is aplaceinPhysics III.5whereAristotleisspeakingtothispoint:«Now, the in, thestructuralpropertiesofworld thatistheobjectofnaturalsci- lations between magnitudes, quantities or objects, understood as abstract The first thing to say is that I think that Aristotle’s investigations I thinkthateven ifwe acceptthatCantorisrightwe canrep- 16 Thismay reflectnothingmorenorless 17 However, onedoesn’t (1982) and Bostock (2009,ch.1). ophy Lear see of mathematics cussion of philosAristotle’s - 17 For helpful dis- extremely by translation (1996). Waterfield passage16 Inthis Iquote the Metaphysics in

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aesthetic are,quiteexplicitly,investigations ofthestructureworld thought about. For the as manifest tosense-perceptionandasmanifest intemporalawareness. ght visionary metaphysics”. Strawson says: «Descriptive metaphysics iscon- volves, whatAristotleappearstobedoinginPhysics world asitmanifests itselftous–Ithinkthatmany oftheclaimsAristotle of continuity remainrelevant even inthefaceofidea thatCantor’sas- of approachtomathematicalcontinuity–asaconcep- obvious fromtheirwork thatAristotleandKant were quantity, counting,measuringandordering.Heisnotengaginginadiscus- ends of lines or parts of lines. scriptive approachtometaphysics mightinvolve. sumptions about how thecontinuum oughttobeformalized areconceded. sionary metaphysics isconcerned to provide abetterstructure»(1959, 9). as “descriptive metaphysics”, and contrasted with “re- and continuityinthePhysics, quitegenerally,istobeconstrainedby how sion ofthemathematicscontinuitythatispurelyformal intheway that as coming to awareness, they are manifest to us as the tent todescribetheactualstructureofourthoughtaboutworld, revi- tion tohis1959 work Individualsfamouslydescribed the kindofprojectthatP. F. Strawson, intheintroduc- tions, thisapproachseemsnolessrelevant tomethan fest tous–instantlygeneratesarangeoffurtherques- tion oftheformal propertiesoftheworld asitismani- the tuting even moreof a reasontobesuspiciousaboutwhatAristotleis uptoin time arejustdifferentprojects.Theconnection with thenotionofdescriptive these structuresshow upinthe way thatthenaturalworld ismanifest tous. the settheoryofCantor,andhisformalization ofthenotioncontin- tion. To theextenttowhichitmakessensethinkofextensionlesspoints the way inwhichpartsoftheworld aremanifest tousinsense-percep- tensionless point as being constitutively dependent on the notion of a lim- metaphysicians (1959, 9).Thatcharacterization,Ithink,isinstructive. For metaphysics willnodoubtstrikesomephilosophersreadingthisasconsti- makes areintelligible,perceptive anddefensible. Thevery notionofanex- physicians. Amongstlate20thcenturyphilosopherswe couldaddDavid place for suchaproject.Settheoryanddescriptive metaphysics ofmanifest not merelyinterestedinthestructureofourthou- uum, is.Aristotle’sdiscussionofthenature form, structure,magnitude, Strawson describes Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley as revisionarymeta- Subject tothisexpandedconceptionofwhatdescriptive metaphysics in- Lewis tothislist. branch ofdescriptive metaphysics; thatbranchwhichconcernsnotionsof it is suggestive abouthow we might expand the scope ofwhat such ade- it ofalineorpartline,seemstomakesensewhenwe reflecton have thetimeor spacetosay much moreaboutthesequestionshere. abouttheworld, orthestructureofworld as Physics. Iguessit’sobvious that Idon’tsharethesesuspicions.But There isasecondsense, though,inwhichAristotle’sdiscussions Strawson offersAristotleand Kant asexamplesofdescriptive It doesn’tfollow fromthisthatsettheory shows thatthereisno Physics and the Transcendental 18 And though this kind 19 It is Itis VI is sketching out a VI issketchingouta notion metaphysics. of descriptive about catholicism this with the wouldhimself happy been have 19 Ido not Strawson imply that boundariesthe of parts. their ing boundaries, objects, their or - space-fill of manifestly faces us to sur asthe themselves fest mani- themselves lines these breadth, lack they sensethe that extensionless, inthemselves we understand as lines these 18 where that And note further -

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo This idea is related to some of the ideas I have just discussed. But it also in- always which willtakeinthenarratives ofthingsbothlivingandnotliving,which which isacontinuousbutnever-ending narrative, astorywhich willin- volves scrutiny oftheextenttowhichAristotledoes–ornotofferus (DC) xisatemporalcontinuity ifftheexistenceofxinvolves process-phas- (MC) xisacontinuityiffcannotbedividedintoindivisibleparts/xdivis- does notcome toanend. es always being succeededby furtherprocess-phases insuchaway thatx ceasing successionofprocess-phases. clude births,lives anddeathsofdifferentcreatures ofdifferentspeciesand chain of occurrences, drinkings of coffee, walks tothe shops, eating dinner, cording tothisview: cally, hisviews abouttemporalcontinuity. cussion inthePhysics. Thisisaconceptionofcontinuitythatparticularly Physics isinBookVI,thefirstchapterofwhichAristotledevotes entirely a unifiedtreatmentofcontinuityinthetextPhysics. Anditfocusses associated with time, and a form of temporal continuity. This idea is bound that itlinksthetemporalcontinuityofsomething totheexistenceofanun- time iscontinuousbecausethe“process”(theprocess the notionof“theinfinitelydivisible”.More formally, ac- ties. to argumentsfor theexistenceofcontinuousquanti- there is another conception of continuity that is central to Aristotle’s dis- truth ofthisclaimaboutspatial and temporalmagnitudes.ButIthinkthat up withAristotle’sideathattimeiscontinuousorinfiniteinthesense I thinktheideathatAristotleisgettingathere In Book VI ofthe just goesonandon. it does not come to an end. When one phase of process gives out, there is in whichtherealityoftimeconsists,presumably)“doesnotfail”thatis, ible intoinfinitelydivisibleparts. ity whichwe mightcall“mathematicalcontinuity”or it justgoesonandon. in particularontheinterestofAristotle’sclaimsaboutcontinuity,specifi- finite exists by onethingbeingtakenafteranother.Whatisalways finiteonits own, 20 magnitudes eachpartpersists,inthecaseoftimeandhumanracepartsceasetobe, man racefromwhatitisinthecaseofdivisionmagnitudes.Generallyspeaking,- But theway inwhichtheinfinitemanifests itselfisdifferentinthecaseoftimeandhu- but insuchaway thattheprocessdoesnotfail. but always succeededby anotherpartwhichisdifferentfromit.Butwhereasinthecaseof Thisdiscussionconcernsthatnotionofcontinu- anotherphaseofprocessthatfollows it.So,we have thisideaofa This notionoftemporalcontinuitycanbelabeled “dynamic”in The mostfocussed discussionofthenotioncontinuityin At III.6,206a23-206b3,Aristotlesays: Physics, Aristotle offers a batteryof arguments forthe 21 Bostock (1991)and (1992). White of continuity in Physics the see 20 For important discussions tion of (1986). Waterfield - Ifollow21 Here transla the

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo – would beofvery littledirectconsequence for thisideathattimeisady- 4. we were preparedtowaive thekindofdefence oftheseideasofferedabove views aboutmathematicalcontinuity,thatis,thepossibilitiesofun- nite by addition;thatis,theidea“we canalways gobigger”.Andthen out somequitesubstantialfurtherargument,theconcessionofCantor’s of timeandfinitespatialmagnitudesaremathematicallycontinuousinthe on thesurfaceoftext. derstanding finitemagnitudesintermsofsetsindivisibleparts–even if differences won’t comeintoview.Aristotle thinksthatbothfiniteintervals ed magnitude,isnot.Oneresultoftheseobservations isthatatleastwith- ences emerge.Inconnectionwiththenotionoftime,Idescribedaproper- es, andwhy theseareinteresting.Ifwe focus ourattentionjustontheno- cussion ofthesenseinwhichtimeisinfinite.Anditconsiderableinde- can bemoreandmore,for exampletime, erty ofasinglemagnitudeandtherelationsbetween ematical continuity”.Mathematicalcontinuityisaprop- case. Justas itistruethatfor every process-phase,when itgives out,there continuity ofwhichdynamic continuityisaspeciesjustthatoftheinfi - closely relatednotionofthe“potentiallyinfinite”thatis sense thatIdescribedearlierunder(MC).Thatis,theyarebothinfinite- sessed by thingswiththelogicofnoncountablemass(thingswhichthere tinuity plays animportantroleinAristotle’sdiscussionoftimeandhisdis- tell usaboutthedynamiccontinuityoftime.Thisnotioncon- the thought mightbethatthereis an analogueofthistruth inthespatial the ideathat“we can always gosmaller”,we mightthinkthatthenotionof the firstnotionofmathematical continuity was thatofinfinite divisibility, following process-phase,insuchaway thattheprocessnever gives out. that somethingisdynamicallycontinuousifit consistsofprocess-phase ty thatIdescribedas“dynamiccontinuity”(DC)above). Thiswas theidea tion of “mathematical continuity” that Aristotle discusses in Book VI, these namic temporalcontinuity.For settheory has,onthefaceofit,nothingto magnitudes. Itisobviously notthecasethat spatialmagnitudesconsistof pendent interestfor contemporary debatesinthephilosophy oftime. nuity hasanimportantconnectiontotheideaofprocessoroccurrence. process-phase continuouslyfollowing process-phase. In short,yes thereare.Letmesay alittlebitaboutsomeofthesedifferenc- It isclearthatthisnotionofdynamiccontinuity doesnotapplytospatial Mathematical continuity does not. Dynamic continuity is a property pos- In ity, understoodhereasitisby Aristotleasthepropertyofasinglebound- its parts.Dynamiccontinuityisnot.conti- ity thatisquitedistinctfromwhichIcalled“math- ity thatdoeshave applicationinthespatialdomain.Insameway that ity asjustthespecificapplicationtotimeofa notion ofcontinuityorinfin- ly divisible.Butoncewe move away fromthisnotionofcontinuity,differ- Physics BookIII,itisthisnotionofdynamictemporalcontinuity,andthe Are thereAny ImportantDifferences According toAristotleBetween the ContinuityofSpaceandthatTime? However, perhapswe mightseethisnotionofdynamiccontinu- 22 Thisisanotionofcontinu- process). Mathematicalcontinu- cussion Coope see (2012). and recent dis- for an excellent (1979) (1966),Lear Hintikka see notion infinite of potential the 22 For important work on the

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo These areviews for whichAristotleoffersanarray ofbaroquearguments Aristotle appears,for example,toacceptEuclideangeometry.But Aristotle’s views about what it isfor space to bemath- Aegean orChalcis,alloftheactiontakes place“underone(visible)roof”; Aristotle’s defence, butIwon’t gointothemnow). Ithinkthatmuchofthe visible magnitude.For, atleastonthefaceofit–andherethere isanother vast cosmiccontainerthatseemstobethe samecon- with theideathatwhetheroneisinMacedonia,Athens, theislandsof one even moreclearlywhenonelooks closelyat of continuityandinfinityappearstobebeing played by one mightbeimpressedwiththethoughtthatatleastasfarwe move geometry doesseemtorequireusmakesenseoftheideaa give aproofoftheinfinityspace,orspelloutphysics thatshows that depend crucially ontemporalnotions. Inparticular,itseems toinvolve the extent to which the central role in Aristotle’s accounts ematically continuous; that is,for aspatialquantitytobeaninfinitely di- evidence ofthefactthatAristotleisinterestedinmanifest space,orspace can constructalinelikethat.(Ithinkthattherearethingstosay herein extended body. On the other side of that boundary of the spatial universe straight linethatcanbeextendedindefinitely.Iftheuniverse isspatially space, andindeed,materialobjectsinisfalse.Itnottrue,accord- side. For any spatialinterval ormagnitude,thereisalways morespaceon area aroundwhichthere isextensive disagreementbetween commenta- always anotherstepwe cantake,soonealsomighthave beenimpressed around ontheearth,for every step acrossadistancewe traverse, thereis as itispresentedtousineveryday sense-perceptualawareness. Andwhile spatial universe, andtheimpossibilityofactuallyinfiniteobjects?Ithink arguments inPhysics III.5–andtheyarealsoembeddedwithinageocen- sive argument–theyseemtoemergefromsomeextremelyelusive apriori actually infinitebodies,donotseemtobesupported by particularlypersua- temporal notionsratherthanspatialones.That strikes for mehere,amongstotherthings,isthatit reveals the the othersideofitsboundary. there isalways anotherspatialmagnitudereadytobetraversed onthefar tors –Aristotle’s explicationofthis notioninPhysics III.6itselfappears to tainer wherever oneis. that thisisafascinatingquestion.Isuspecthereagainwe areseeing tric cosmologythatwe know tobefalse. there issimplynothing;where“nothing”doesnotjustmean“emptyspace”. minate spatialmagnitudethatistraversed, onceonereachesthefarside, resistance toAristotlehereisnotsomuchthatwe eachindividuallycould universe isboundedandfinite.Andtherecannotbeanactuallyinfinitely is always anotherthatfollows it,itmightbethoughtthatfor every deter- in Physics, III.5. ing tohim,thatspaceisunlimitedinthisway. Hethinksthatthespatial it is,butthathisviews aboutthenatureoftheselimitsandhisviews about limited, atthevery leastthereseemstobeatensionwiththeideathatone This claimisthesourceofanumberdifficulties forAristotle. What’s reallydrivingtheseclaimsaboutthefinitenatureof But Aristotleisvery clearthathethinksthisclaimabout 23 What’sparticularlyinteresting on where one is spatially located. on where one isspatially one to depending different slightly over and time, look to seems also around in various ways predictable edging move does to it seem that is, isconsistent acknowl with - container”same wherever one 23 Acknowledging is“the it that

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The ideathatthereareconnectionsbetween time,thesoul,andactivi- 5. world in language, or broader cultural practices or institutions).Idealism is what «in some way» or «in principle» could possibly mean as applied to which time is continuous and infinite, that are the realintellectual driv- whatever thesefurtherdifficulties,itis veryhardto odd tothinkofthepropertynow beingseenby Tom, assomethinginde- generally wanted toavoid being idealists.At least,philosophers withinthe enough to include: experiences, beliefs, our capacitiesfor describing the edition ofthePhysics BookIIIandIV. Ihave- omittedjustacoupleofsen come away fromthediscussionsof continuity andin- some way dependentonthemindoritsactivities(“activities”hereisbroad activities –to bethedefaultposition. a division,thatprocessofdivisioncouldalways (insomeway, inprinciple) spatial parts,thenfor every spatialmagnitudethatmightresultfromsuch sage inwhichAristotlediscussesthisquestionhead-on.Hereisthepassage sense thatitisAristotle’sviews abouttime,andthevarious respectsin things asordinaryobjects–ortime,for that matter–philosophershave things areinsomerobust andmeaningfulsenseindependentofus our to avoid idealism aboutsuchthings,andtakenrealism–theview thatsuch the extendabilityofsuchaprocessdivision. from Edward Hussey’stranslationinthe1983 ClarendonAristotleSeries ties of thesoul, is a thread that runs through Aristotle’s discussion of time tences for easeofreading: finity inBooksIII,IVandVIofthe more plausiblefor somesubjectsthanfor others.For example,itwould be pendent offactsaboutTom and hisexperiences. But whenitcomes tosuch Idealism aboutsomesubject-matter,say, ordinarycommonsense objects be continued. idea thatifonewere tobegindividingupsuchamagnitudeintosmaller in theBookIVofPhysics. Butthereisafamous–orinfamouspas- ing-force behindthediscussion. kind ofphilosophicaltradition inwhichIwas raisedhave generally wanted like palmtreesandperegrinefalcons,istheview thatsuchobjectsarein what it is;as for example if it is possible for there to be change withoutsoul. (Ph. time if there is no soul, except that there could be that X which time is, whatever X makes it possible thatthereshouldbesomethingtodothecounting,itisalsoimpossibleanything should becountable,sothatitiscleartherewould benonumbereither…Butifthereis nothing thathasitinitsnaturetocountexcept soul…thenitisimpossiblethatthereshouldbe It isalsoworth investigating how timeisrelatedtothesoul,andfor whatreasonitisthattime it adifficultquestion,whetherifthere werenosoulthere wouldbetimeornot. Forifitisim- is thoughttobeineverything –onearthandintheseaheavens… Onemightfind This raisesquestions both interpretive and philosophical about What motivates thisideathat realism oughttobethe default Time andtheSoulthatAristotleDraws attheEndofFourth Book of Physics? DoesItImplySomeSortofIdealism? How DoYou ThinkWe ShouldUnderstandtheConnectionBetween Physics withoutthe 24 But ing discussion of question. this - (1979)for fascinat Lear 24 See 223a16-28)

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo your viewcommitsyou toaform ofidealismabout would or mightbethecase,without aclearstatement one ofthegreatestphilosophersinhistory,is informed by somekindof of thereasonsfor thisisthatthereaderlikelytocome of thetruth of theantecedentthese conditionals,and countable. Thenextstepappearstobethattheonlythinghasabil- even “thatpersonisshameless”we want tothinkthatthetruthofsuch consists largelyofaseries ofconditionalsaboutwhat Physics IVhasgeneratedagreatdealofdiscussion.One something here beyond the initial appearances. An additional motivation argument for thatconclusion.Anassumptionofthepassageappearsto saying that he is an idealist about time. Indeed, he seemsto be offering an away withthedistinctimpressionthatAristotleishere an obligationtoshow is misplaced. against you. It is a charge that you are generally under something, thatisgenerallyabadthing,orcharge and nothingmore.Itistrue thatthetextisnotunprob- appearance that Aristotle is offering an argument for and culturethatwe have ever developed, thoughnevertheless theworld a mind-independentworld thatcontainedobjectsandperfectly determi- a say. at leastinthekindsofcasesIhave described, don’tget the dependenceoftimeonsoullookspretty poor. to beavoided, andbecauseallinterpretation,even whenthesubjectisnot then therecouldbenotime. from these ideas that were there no souls (with their abilities to count) tify several motivations. Onecrudethoughtisthateven ifallsentientbe- taking anecessarilybrieflookatquestionsofthosekinds,we mightiden- tween realismandidealismlurkinthebackgroundhere.Butadvance of the idealismoftimehere isjustthat:anappearance, to such putative truths about objects like “that object is six feet wide” or the ways thatitissonow, even given thatwe doexist.Andwithrespect things aretrue.Thevery ideaoftheworld istheideaofthattowhichour things isconstitutively independentofany decisionsthatImay makeabout nate facts about them. Or we want to be able to think that it might have position? Somedelicatequestionsaboutthenatureofdistinctionbe- representations mustconform, andagainstwhichourdesiresordecisions, putatively depends)were wipedoutovernight, thentherewould remain Some philosophershave attemptedtoarguethatthe Principle ofCharity,thereisapressureonthe partofthereadertofind be thatthenotionoftimeis–oratleastinvolves –thenotionofwhatis been thatnosentientbeingswhodeveloped therepresentationalcapacities in this case isthat the argument that I have justbriefly reconstructed for ity tocountisasoul.AndthenAristotleseemssuggestthatitfollows ings (onwhichtheidealistmay thinktheexistenceofrelevant objects independent oftheminddid,andremaineddeterminateinvery many of lematic. ThisisAristotle writingafterall.Theargument how thosethingsmay be,orany desiresImay have aboutwhethersuch 25 Against thisbackground,ifsomeonesays that The passagequotedabove fromtheendof Because many ofusthinkthatidealismabout timeissomething 26

world through moving my body. body or how of move to the parts decisions about how move to my in changes from my in facts, the which itself our can manifest wills many the to waysin sensitive ately be appropri to need will desires - independent of our decisions and which about truths world the are ing specification the way of in - 25 Ofcourse, satisfy any fully things. The obvious of invalidity count) to capacity (the distinct are of asoul counts that a feature O doesn’tthat follow. and O(time) being F(dependent on asoul). But count) to ity has property the of of asoul counts that capac O(the - ent on asoul) because afeature propertythe of being F(depend - has O(time) that says it structed, be invalid. to seems As recon- 26 it,As Ipresented argument the

63 ­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “mind-dependence” about theexistenceofsuchathingorinstantiation – thereaderisintendedtothinkthatjustastherecan Therefore itisunclearwhy hewould expectorintendtheattentive read- dence claim.Buttherearedifferentkindsofmind-dependenceclaimsthat what itisfor anobjecttohave the relevant propertyinaway thatinvolves of suchapropertyinthe mind-independentworld. of thequotedpassage–soalsocantherebetimewithoutsoul.Idon’t of positions or ideas. Idealism centrally involves some kindof (for example,goodnessofacertainkind)isthatanobjectgoodintherel- general about“Aristotle’sidealism”inPhysics BookIV, 10-14. Even ifIdon’t erties independentofthecontingentattitudes that acommunityofevalua- ertheless bethecasethatthisobjectisnotsuch astomeritsuchpositive can bemade.Someofthemaremorenuancedandworthy ofconsideration claim aboutthemind-independenceoftime. er togeneralizetheseclaimsaboutthemind-independenceofchangea evaluative responsefromanappraiser.Given thisview,oneunderstands evant senseinsofarasitmeritsapositive evaluative judgementorpositive co-exist withatleastsomeoftheintuitionsthatmotivate theassumption some individualevaluator, orthatthingsdon’t have particularvalue prop- something is good ornot is something that can bedecidedorstipulatedby sion. Therearethosealsowhobelieve thatAristotlein- a clear endorsement or assertion of the idealist conclu- appraisal fromanevaluator. Thisistosay that“mind-dependence”about siderable pains earlier in Book IVto emphasize that while there isanim- to careabout resisting,ismind-dependence inthislatter sense. We don’t think thatwhat isreallytroublingabout idealism,andwhat we reallyought the very propertyitis. fers hereisabadone.Rather–sothethoughtgoes tends thereadertoseethatargumentheof- tors happenstohave. For even ifIjudgethatthisobjectisgood,itmay nev- than others,andidealistclaimsaboutsomesubjectmattermightbeableto that we oughttoberealistsaboutthatsubjectmatter. more positive suggestion.Thiswillrequiremetosay somethingabitmore mistaken. One very basicworry, though, isthatAristotle has gonetocon- making essentialreference tocertainkindsofevaluative responsesby sub- passage. To engage a bit more fully with the question, let me try make a portant connectionbetween timeandchange,theyarenotthesamething. understanding anobject, propertyorphenomenoncancomeapartfrom be changeindependentofthesoul–asventured inthevery finalsentence been madeinsubtlydifferent ways intheliteratureabout value properties jects. Soonthisapproachthereisanelementof“idealism”(or“subjectiv- ism”) involved intheunderstandingofwhatitisfor somepropertytobe ideas aboutwhatthattreatmentmightlooklike. have thetimeheretoexplainmy reasonsfor thinkingthatthisapproachis have thetimetoapplythisindetail thepassage,itwillgeneratesome And thisisrelevant because,asIhave alludedtoabove, onemight So Iamnotquiteconvinced thatthisisthebestway withthis But notethatitdoesn’tfollow fromthis thatwhetherornot Here isanexamplefromadifferentarea. Asuggestionthathas Idealism itselfisnotsomuchapositionoranideaasitfamily dity cannot ofdity it. be extent the an argument of degree this of cru- may be going on in passage, this else son suspect to whatever that argument,the - it, isarea asIsee mind-depen-

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo «countable nows» isindependentoftheexistenceparticularsoulswho what itis,mightbeobjected.Thisaninterestingchallenge,andraises want tothinkthatthefactsaboutordinarycommonsenseobjectsandtheir out everything there ever is or could be. But the moral of the kind of pro- objects incorporateaform ofidealismorsubjectivism.Isuspectthatthe of timethatissaidtobedependentonthesoul,notanunderstanding developed form) whatwe may have hereisanearlierexampleofa“tobe” even ifourviews abouthow tounderstandtherelevant factsaboutthose cifically, thecapacities for counting(includingcount- even thoughtheseexistentialconstructionsareellipticalfor thericherin- comes crucially connected to the very idea of what can be made intelligi- construction, inwhichthesenseofitisnotprimarily “toexist”,butto“be critics may observe thatcontrarytothekindofstoryIhave beentryingto Metaphysics (wheresuchauseof“tobe”achieves itsmost articulateand spective, Aristotle would beadvancing the claim that it as Aristotle’sphilosophy matures,thevery notionof“tobe”(naeinai)be- about themind-dependenceofunderstandinginexistentialterms.Ifone are doingany countingormeasuringofchanges«nows». Itshouldbe that Ihave justspenttimedescribing. telligibility claim.It’salsonotirrelevant tothisquestion,Ithink,note that form ofidealismdiscussedabove inexistentialterms(«Iftherewere no to makeinresponseisnotehow naturalitistoexpresseven theclaims to give anaccountoftheway that Aristotlecoucheshisdependenceclaims there shouldbetimeifisnosoul»(Phy. tell, Aristotle seems tomake precisely the kind of dependenceclaimsthat many furtherquestions. posal justconsideredisthatwe canresistthiskindofproblematicidealism, properties aredeterminedsimplyby ourdesiresordecisions,thatthere noted thatifoneisattractedtothisapproach,thenimportanttask nate countable changes of various kinds, and determinate facts about the practice ofevaluative judgementtherewould benogoodnessorbadness») But thatwould beconsistentwiththeideathatexistenceofdetermi- I have saidaretheparticularlyproblematicones(e.g.«itisimpossiblethat ble orunderstandable.Even ifthePhysics isalessmaturework thanthe is nodifferencebetween anasteroidwipingoutallsentientlife, andwiping ing changes, and counting what he calls «the nows»). ing reference tocertainkindsofcapacitiessouls;spe- is notpossibletounderstandwhattimewithoutmak- is speakingloosely,itfairlynaturaltodescribeeven themorenuanced intelligible orunderstandable”. in theparagraphwithwhichIbeganmy response tothisquestion.For the kind ofidealismabouttimethatemergesinPhysics IV.10-14 canbemore helpfully understoodintermsofthekindidealism Let meendjustby makingafew observations. Anobvious point 27 Fromthisper- 223a26)). Itistheexistence . Understand to the Desire IV.10-14 in his book Aristotle: discussionfascinating of Physics is made by Jonathan in his Lear kindis the of suggestion that 27 IfIunderstand him right, this

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The first section of this book, which is now in its third edition, is anextremely help- This isatour-de-force ofabook,introducingancienttheoriestimeandthecon- The following editionoftheClarendonAristotleseriesfocuses onBooksIIIand IV. White’s textisdifficult, but veryrewarding. of continuityareinextricablylinked).Sections two andthreecontainexcellent dis- cussion oftheinfinitefromonemostinteresting philosophers working today. search onthephilosophy oftime. ful historicaloverview ofthehistory thenotionofinfinite(towhichnotions tinuum andassessingtheirsignificance for contemporaryresearch.Itisrelevant to following translationisvery good,andanexcellent placetobegin: ty andtheinfiniteinancientphilosophy from thepointofviewcontemporaryre- many oftheissuestouchedonindiscussion above. If you want toinvestigate Aristotle’sphilosophy oftimeinmoredetail,two particu- Edward Hussey’snotesareexcellent: I would suggestthattheinterestedreaderstartwithAristotlehimself.The Here arethreetextsthatincludeexcellent discussionofissuesrelatingtocontinui- in thethemes Ihave beendiscussing here,itwould have tobe: larly importantrecentstudiesofAristotleontimecanberecommended: Theories fromaContemporary Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Aristotle, ContinuityandtheInfinite Aristotle Physics BooksIIIandIV.Transl. withnotesby Hussey,E.(1983). Aristotle And finally: White, M.J.(1992). TheContinuous andtheDiscrete:Ancient Physical and theEarlyMiddleAges. London,Duckworth Press. (1996). Oxford, Oxford University Press. Clarendon AristotleSeries.Oxford, ClarendonPress. Cambridge University Press. Coope, U.(2005).Timefor Aristotle, Physics IV.10 . Oxford, ClarendonPress. Suggestions for Further Reading Sorabji, R.(1983). Time,Creation andtheContinuum: TheoriesinAntiquity Moore, A.W. (2019). TheInfinite.3rded.London,Routledge. Roark, T. (2011). Aristotle onTime:AStudyofthePhysics. Cambridge, If Ihadtorecommendone bookonAristotlefor thosewhoareinterested Physics. Transl. by Waterfield, R.,withnotesfromBostock, D.

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Jonathan Lear’sbookisasubstantialwork ofphilosophy initsown right,inaddi- Aristotle’s discussioninPhysics, BookIV(particularlyabout‘thenow’, whichIhave Van Inwagen, P and Zimmerman, D. (2008) 20th century.Thisis: very valuable collectionofessays thatincludesintroductionstoresearchonthena- gest thatonereadsthepaperscollectedinsectionCof: Real Time,abookthatsparkedsomuchinterestinthephilosophy oftimeinthelate at theintersectionofphilosophy ofperception andthemetaphysics oftime. For a ture oftemporalexperienceaswell assubstantialcontributionstothatresearch,see: to afew suggestive remarksofLear’sinthistext. tinuity at work in the tion tobeinganoutstandinggeneraloverview ofAristotle’sphilosophy. Itcontains not said much about here) and my view that there are two different notions of con- particularly stimulatingdiscussionsofPhysics BookIIIandIV. Myown views about philosophy here. For thosewhowant togodeeperintocontemporaryphilosophy oftime,Iwould sug- Bardon, A.(2013). ABriefHistoryofthePhilosophy ofTime.Oxford, Oxford B-theoretic perspective, see: For very helpfulbasicintroductiontocontemporaryphilosophy oftime,froma Phillips, I.(ed.)(2017). TheRoutledge HandbookofPhilosophy ofTemporal Experience. Even ifonedisagrees with Mellor,there is anextraordinaryamountofinteresting Mellor, D.H.(1998). Real TimeII . London,Routledge. Essential readingheremustbethelateHughMellor’sfollow-up tohisown 1981 book There isagreatdealofwork incontemporaryphilosophy ofmindthatlies Time andtheTemporal Oxford, Blackwell. University Press. University Press. Lear, J.(1988). Aristotle: TheDesiretoUnderstand.Cambridge,Cambridge London, Routledge. Physics—which I have said something about here—owe much Metaphysics: The Big Questions. 2nd ed.

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle Wiggins, D.(1998). Needs,Values, Truth. 3rded.Oxford: Clarendon Press. White, M.J.(1992). TheContinuous andtheDiscrete:Ancient Physical Theoriesfrom Oaklander, N.L.(1984). Temporal Relations andTemporal Becoming:ADefence ofa Crowther, T. M.(2006).Two ConceptionsofConceptualismandNonconceptualism. Crane, T. (1992). TheNonconceptualContentofExperience.InCrane(ed.) Coope, U. (2012). Aristotleon the Infinite. InC.Shields(ed.)TheOxford Handbook of Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals:An Essay inDescriptive Metaphysics. London: Soteriou, M.(2013). TheMind’sConstruction.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smart, J.C.(1949). TheRiver ofTime.Mind58:483- 94. Nagel, T. (1974). WhatIsItLiketoBeaBat?ThePhilosophicalReview, 83 (4):435- 450. Id. (2006).Ethics:Twelve Lecturesonthe Philosophy of Morality.London:Penguin Prosser, S.(2016). ExperiencingTime.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prior, A.N.(1959). ThankGoodnessThat’sOver. Philosophy 34: 78- 84. Paul, L.A.(2010). Temporal Experience. JournalofPhilosophy, 107(7): 333- 359. Mellor, D.H.(1998). Real TimeII . London:Routledge. Markosian, N.(2004).ADefence ofPresentism.InD.Zimmerman(ed.),Oxford Id. (1927). TheNature ofExistence.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. McTaggart, J.M.E.(1908). TheUnrealityofTime.Mind17, 456-473. McDowell, J.(1994). MindandWorld. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Lowe, E.J.(1998). ThePossibility ofMetaphysics: Substance,Identity andTime. Id. (1988). Aristotle: TheDesiretoUnderstand.Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Id. (1982). Aristotle’sPhilosophy ofMathematics.PhilosophicalReview 91: 161- 92. Lear, J. (1979). Aristotelian Infinity. Le Poidevin,R.(1991). Change,CauseandContradiction. Basingstoke:Macmillan. Hintikka, J.(1966). AristotelianInfinity.ThePhilosophicalReview 75 (2):197- 218. Evans, G.(1982). TheVarieties ofReference. Oxford: ClarendonPress. Dyke, H.(2008).Metaphysics and theRepresentational Fallacy. NewYork: Routledge. Dainton, B.(2011). Time,PassageandImmediateExperience,.InCallender,C.(ed.) Broadie, S.(1991). EthicswithAristotle. NewYork: Oxford University Press. Id. (2009).Philosophy ofMathematics: An Introduction. Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell. Bostock, D.(1991). AristotleonContinuityinPhysics VI’,inL.Judson(ed.)Aristotle’s Id. Physics Books III and IV. Transl. with notes by Hussey, E. (1983). Clarendon Aristotle Physics. Transl. by Waterfield, R.,withnotesfromBostock,D.(1996). Oxford, Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 187- 210. The Oxford HandbookofPhilosophy ofTime.Oxford: Oxford University Contents ofExperience.Oxford: Oxford University Press. a Contemporary Perspective . Oxford: ClarendonPress. Studies inMetaphysics Vol. 1.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russellian TheoryofTime.Lanham,MD:University PressofAmerica. Erkenntnis 65:245- 276. Physics: ACollectionofEssays . Oxford: ClarendonPress. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press. Bibliography Series. Oxford, ClarendonPress. Methuen. Press. Press. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:

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­ — Thomas Crowther with Interview An Aristotle. and Mind Time,  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Wollheim, R.(1980). Art. 2nded.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity anditsObjects Williams, D.C.(1951). TheMythofPassage.JournalPhilosophy 48:457- 72. Williams, B.(1981). MoralLuck.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Zimmerman, D.(2008).‘ThePrivilegedPresent:Defending an‘A-Theory’ofTime’.In Id. (1987). Painting asanArt. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press. Id. (1995). Making SenseofHumanity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Id. (1985). EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy . London:Fontana Press. Sider, Tet.al.(ed.)Contemporary Debates inMetaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell. Press. Books.

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 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 125 109 The Growing Block 71 What isMoving Right II. Cord Friebe Shira YechimovitzShira of Time of theContinuum Florian Fischer Francesco Orilia for theLimit Decision Now? Nothing ComesNext Dispositions. A and theProblem Metaphysical Micro-Structure Limit Deciding Elton Marques Symmetry-Breaker Problem Presentism andthe 97 83 FILOSOFIA DEL CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES TEMPO CONTEMPORANEA/ 71  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 72  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo There many are problems temporal continuity, with but Cord Friebe GROWING order agenuinely get to temporal dynamics really that uum, however, genuinely the temporal sense of term. the Then, be shown will it their that strictedly. study, case As aparadigmatic paper the space. ment: nothing comes next. Without contin- time the in suchment that unre aworld exists must- what vary discusses Growing the Block Theory (GBT)of as time, makes it distinguishable from mere variation across distinguishable it makes from variation mere Nothing ComesNext dynamics gets lost: the objection of spatial analoguedynamics lost: objection the of gets spatial consider temporal passage in strong the existential consciousness-dependence one iswhat needs in recently presented by Correia and by presented Correia Rosenkranz whorecently account fails to do justice to the continuity-requireaccount the do to to justice - fails this holdsthis for those seriously require the who- take dynamical. world the Inparticular,that isexistentially isahardthere one for those philosophers who believe turns back. Finally, paper the suggests Kantian that University of Siegen University BLOCK THEORY TIME CONTINUUM character of the character Cord Friebe isprofessor of philosophy SiegenUniversity. at aphysics and- Kant, aparticu with His research ranges from phi the - lar focuslar on philosophy the of time. losophy of- physics met analytic to KANT

73  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The (2018). Accordingly, theworld isexistentially dynamical:onlythepastandpres-

comes next.Moreover, withoutthetimecontinuum,genuinelytemporalcharac- considers temporalpassageinthestrongexistentialsenseoftermmustanswer one draws it.Then,Kant fallsdown thesameobjectionascurrentapproach, un- ent exist, but thefuture has tocome.The advantage of Correia/Rosenkranz’s ap- cerns theideaofbeing“existentially dynamical”:itwillbeshown, in thissection,that ways new and thewholeofworld isconstantlygrowing. Intuitive asitseems,the ophers who believe that the world is existentially dynamical. In particular, this holds exists unrestrictedly,asCorreia/Rosenkranz infactdo.Then,however, thischallenge GBT nonethelessfaces various conceptualproblems.Thefirstset ofproblemscon- gument againstthegrowing blockview.Ibelieve thatany metaphysics oftimethat growing blockviewturnsouttobeunsatisfactory,preciselybecauseofthelack time continuum. teriously, acrossspace.Inparticular,therelativistic version ofCorreia/Rosenkranz’s tial analogue,i.e.nothingexcludes thatthereissuchadynamicsalso,butthen:mys- ter ofthedynamicsgetslost:againstthisversion, onecanraisetheobjectionofspa- that whatexistsunrestrictedly(simpliciter)mustvary withtime.Ittherefore should the challengeofdoingjusticetocontinuity-requirement.Further, Ialsobelieve, tology accordingtowhichthesumtotalofexistence isalways increasing.Always, for thosewhotakeseriouslytherequirementthatinsuchaworld mustvary what self-consciousness. spirit ofthepapercanbecharacterizedinthisway: Thereareprobablymany prob - study. –Regarding themaintopicofthis SpecialIssue,i.e.“Time-Continuum”,the a genuinelytemporaldynamicsthatreallymakesitdistinguishablefrommerevar- sented inthemonographNothingtoComeby Fabrice CorreiaandSven Rosenkranz I. II. nally pureintuition may closethegap:objective timeflow isexistentiallycontinuous new slicesofexistence appearwithoutever disappearing,andso thepresentisal- metaphysics beingtrulyexistentiallydynamical. presents ametaphoroftimethatisclosetothegrowing blockview:alineinsofar proach, tobespelledoutinSection2,isthatitreallytakesseriouslytherequirement problem surrounds theideaoftime continuity,namelythat theblockis“constantly in virtueof,i.e.ontologicallydependenton,thecontinuityofsubjective time.Kant ing, thattheaccountcannotadequatelyrepresentcontinuity oftime:nothing iation acrossspace.Thus,thecaseathandshouldbetakenasaparadigmatic in general,thatKantian consciousness-dependenceiswhatoneneedsinordertoget its maindifficulty canbesolved byanew formulation oftheGBT. Thesecondcrucial is notrestrictedtothisparticularversion of the growing blockview,butstandsfor all less headdsthattherepresentationoftimemustbeaccompaniedby theIthink,by lems withthecontinuityoftime,butthereisahardoneespeciallyfor thosephilos- be viewed asthemostpromisingaccountofexistentialdynamics. I will discuss a new formulation of the Growing Block Theory of time, recently pre- Growing Block Theory (GBT) is intended to be the existentially dynamical on - The paperhasawiderunderlyingmotivation thanthatofproviding anar- The Growing BlockTheoryofTime Introduction In thefinalSection4,Iwillsuggestthat Kant’s theoryoftimebeingorigi- However, inSection3Iwillarguethattheblockisnotconstantlyincreas-

74 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 83). Insuchaway, thereisnotemporalvariation ofwhatexistssimpliciter butonly ontology. However, thistemporalvariation occursacrosstheblockuniverse, “given” only affectsanexistentially cussion. Thecontrastshows thatnotallnotionsofdy- cated somewhereinspacetime,atsomespacetimepointporother.Ifas one cansay thatsomethingexistssimpliciter iffitislo- even withthemostpromisingaccountathand. will see,theMSTdoesnothave thedifficulties underdis- with theMoving Spotlight Theory(MST). whole of possible worlds, i.e. iff it is located in some pos- view that theblock universe as a whole is static (i.e. eternalism), butthat,restrictively with what exists fromanothertemporal perspective. Thisiscompatiblewith the eternalist couldacceptfor herblockuniverse view:«whatexistsasofonetime,dif- can andshouldbeallowed by eternalists aswell. However, thelong-lastingmostfa- GBT-continuity cannot(seethefollowing section).Time-Continuumfacesaparticu- simpliciter” and“existence@”. restricted quantification.Appliedtospacetimephysics, growing”: asitturnsout,inthefollowing section,thisdifficultyremainsunresolved temporally whatisobjectively present.Therefore, itcanbeconsideredasadynamical ferent conceptionsofexistence,namely“existence the GBTreallycandistinguishtheirviewfromreasonableeternalism. than theworld asofanearliertime.Thequestionhenceariseswhetherproponents the problemisthatnotionofwhatexistsambiguous:alsoeternalistssurelybe- tion ofwhatispresentnotavariation ofwhatexists;theMST-ontologyisaccord- thing existssimpliciteriffitislocatedsomewhereinthe fers fromwhatexists asofanother»(Tooley 1997, 16; seethe replyinMellor1998, accept, insomeway orother,theGBT-ideathatworld as ofsometimeislarger as muchaccordingtoeternalism,thestaticontologyoftime.Theobjective varia- a given time,appliedtospacetimephysics: ofbeingrealizedwithrespecttoagiven, second senseofexistencecapturesthemerelyperspectival senseofbeinglocatedat a wholeisstatic(i.e.notgrowing), thisexpressestheideaofblockuniverse. The analogous tomodalrealismaccordingwhichsome- sible world orother,whereassomethingexists@ iffitis a variation@, i.e. a variation of what exists from one temporal perspective compared Further, the second criticism does not affect theMST. Its notion ofcontinuityisbasedonCantor’sset-theoret- namism aresubjecttothefirstcriticism.Theargument non-perspectival sense ofbeinginthedomainun- particular spacetimepointp mous proponentoftheGBTcharacterizeshis own viewinsuchaway thatevery porally what existssimpliciter.For, amerevariation@ proponents of theGBTmustargue that itvaries tem- it varies temporallynotonlywhatisobjectively presentbutalsowhatexists.Then, ingly not existentially dynamical. By contrast, defenders of the GBTmustargue that ical accountofthecontinuum,whereasintended lar problemwithinexistentiallydynamicalontologies.According totheMST, itvaries lieve that dinosaurs and computers are located at different times, and so they could located withinagiven, particularpossibleworld. Then, To clarifytheGBT, itishelpfultocontrast One way ofspellingoutthisdifficultyrequiresthedistinction two dif- dynamical ontology,asGBT. 0 . 3 Eternalismis,therefore, 2 Thefirstcapturesthe 1 For, aswe old eternalism is Mellor (1998). isMellor old eternalism The for good- standard reference Cameron (2015)and (2015). Deasy ory has found see new friends; couple last the of- years, the this is moving across block. the In ducible property of presentness - irre an objective, that idea the with (eternalism) view universe 1 The MSTcombines block the neity (containing neity on an absolute plane of- simulta structure, everything located time 3 Depending on specific the - space Friebe (2018,sec. see 1). details and (2004,3-4);for Lewis more tinctions in Sider (2001,59) dis- close similar to 2 Itisvery p outside lightcone the located of ing in this perspectival sense.ing in perspectival this maybe considered- itself asexist 0 , or only the event located at p , or at only event the located p 0 ), or everything 0

75 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Accordingly, thesentence “E!x”isshorthand for: Always, This sentenceistrueorfalsenotonlyonempiricalgroundsbutcanbeacceptedas To understandtheformulas, oneshouldnoticethat: This sentenceistrue.Itsoinvirtueofmerelyempiricalreasons.Therefore, itshould commitment: out the(constant)growing intermsofexistencesim- es ofexistenceandinsteadholdthattheallegedperspectival senseofexistenceis ways inthepast”): CR 2019) have presentedasignificantlyimproved ver- E!x should be read as: “Always everything always exists now”. This is Williamson’s simpliciter. pliciter. for theGBT. Considerthefollowing statement(exam- two differentcommitments:arathertrivialone,shared ter sentenceexpressesthatwiththeappearanceofBroccolihaschangedwhatexists true onlyby non-eternalists(presentistsincluded).Intermsoftheforegoing, thelat- difficulty atissue:theydon’taccepttheassumptionthattherearedifferentsens- two principles(withE!:“exist”;G:“always inthefuture”;T:“time”;At the marketaccordingtowhichitreallyvaries whatexistssimpliciter. tuitive way of talking that, e.g., Dinosaurs exist tween “temporalexistence”andlocation”,whichleadstothecounterin- speaking, whatthereiswithrespecttoonespacetimepointdiffersfrom sion oftheGBT. According tothem,Tooley etal.conflate at some time in the past. Moreover, the whole account is idiosyncratically written Undoubtedly, however, theadvantage oftheirapproachisthatnow thereisaGBTon ple takenfromCR2019): nothing over andabove “location”.Oneshouldcarefully distinguish,theyargue,be- is withrespecttoanother.Thus,thechallengefor proponentsoftheGBTistospell in Timothy-Williamson-(2013) language,whichmakesthereconstructionnoteasier. be acceptedastrueby every philosopher.Here,ontheotherhand,issubstantial by everyone, withasubstantialonebeingcharacteristic “Broccoli ispresentlytobefound somewhere, butwas nowhere tobefound in800BC.”

(P2) Tx (P1) E!x→GE Broccoli ispresentlysomething,butwas nothingin800BC.” 1. 3. 2. 4 Recently, CorreiaandRosenkranz (CR2018; Correia/Rosenkranz themselves goadifferent way ofspellingoutthe E!m → and ‘Always’. Principles allow prefixing by Every predication/quantificationistensed. Formally, the growing block universe can fully be captured by the following →At x,H¬E! T E!m; with T : ‘truesimpliciter’. any combination of the universal quantifier now but are located somewhere else, precedence» (Broad 1923, 66). ing of which to has relation the it noth- literally isquite there that precedes events,it future but of apresent event is, not that of GBT:«“the the essencefather words4 Inthe of grounding the ∀ x Always, : “shift”;H“al- E!x, andso

76 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “Always every timeatitselfwas nothingbefore, i.e.isnew.”At itself,every timeis “Always everything willalways inthefuturebesomething.”Nothingnever ceases The GBT, asitstands,isintendedtocapturetheideathat«thesumtotalofexist- Thus, theGBTnotonlyisintendedtobeanexistentiallydynamicalontologyoftime (and, presumably, for all)existentially dynamical view(s) oftime.Bycontrast(again), (simultaneously?) appear.Thiscriticismseems tobeanold-fashioned,Aristotelian older ones,ortogetherwiththenewest moment infinitelymany othernewmoments of growth isnotguaranteedby always beinggreater. ways] ways] ence is always will be argued that, without an adequate representa- what existsunrestrictedly.However, thereisasecondrequirementtobesatisfied: ontologies. Notonlyvaries whatexists@–insomeper- characterization of“permanentism”,i.e.eternalism.Itisalways truesimpliciterthat es» (CR2018, 66),intheexistentialsenseofterm. eroding» (CR2018, 44),sothattime«constantly pass- mediate successor.Eithertherewillbeagapbetween thenewest momentandallthe pliciter-existence of past,present,andfuture times(andresidents intime).It,there - fore, assumes theexistenceofCantor’s continuumof(space-)time points.Then, the the MSTdoesnothave thisproblem. defence againstCantor’s accountofthecontinuum,butinfactit iscrucialfor this the existentialdynamicsgetslost. tion ofthecontinuity of time,thetemporal character of devoted tothissecondproblem. the variation must be freshly added to the block. Consequently, for times (and to exist.Further, GBT’ssecondprinciple“(P2) tics is that thereis a future for existentially dynamical temporally, alongtheideaoffreshlyaddedslicesex- dodos existnow (‘although’theyarenow located inthepast). account oftheGBTcannotdothislatterjob. Further, it section, itwillbeshown thateven themostpromising always true.Therefore, whatexistssimplicitervaries III. spectival sensefromttot’–,asitcouldbesatisfiedalso by eternalism,butit varies is Broad’s sloganthattheblockisalways increasingintotheirlanguage: «always there nothing otherthanalways beinggreater . However, thisiswrong.For, thecontinuity residents intime), ical surface, the expression «is istence thatnever ceasetoexist.To sumup,thedialec- is conceived ofas«constantly growing withoutever believe thatalsoontologicallyincreasingisessentially being new; but alsotodojusticethecontinuityoftime. a newresidentoftimethatwas nothingbefore» (CR2018, 36).Onthegrammat- there is[somethingnew]»soundsstatic,butCorreia/Rosenkranz apparently The problemisthatthelastmoment,edgeof being,willnothave anim- To beginwith,lookcarefullyatCorreia/Rosenkranz’s way oftranslating GBT’s ProblemwiththeContinuityofTime Correspondingly, GBT’sfirstprinciple“(P1) For, theMSTpresupposes (inCR’sterms)“permanentism”,i.e. E!x. increasing» (Broad 1923, 66). 5 E!mistruesimpliciteralthoughnot continuous, otherwise it is not really temporal. The following is [always] increasing » sounds dynamical, while «[al- 6 The block Tx 7 Inthis →At E!x →GE”

x, growing block universe. ing”, isassumed asit for the tonous mono “2, 4,6,8,[…]”is(strictly) 7 sequenceA discrete such as mine. always are section this 6 in quotations the The of italics (things,dents objects, events). past, present, and- resi future ent, and and times for future holds for past, pres likewise - everything being that said 5 Throughout paper, the Iassume H¬E!x” shouldbereadas: but not “ not but always growing is should bereadas: constantly the grow sim- - -

77 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo As Correia/Rosenkranz frequently stress, itisreally nothing to come. Everything in (space-)time, sothatitcouldbethecaseproponentsofMSTalsohave the comes fromnowhere, theaddingoffreshslices ofexistenceapparentlyisorthogo- eternalist assumption that guarantees non-empty neighborhoods of every moment virtue ofconstantlybecominggreater.However, thisisillusionary.Dynamicsrather wards thefuture.Thelackingcontinuityapparently goeshandinwithalackof er withanotionofprecedence, ent for theMST–anontologicallydistinguishedmomentoftimethat,unfortunately, can beseeninthecontextwhichCorreia/Rosenkranz seektoavoid afrozenpres- Correia/Rosenkranz apply non-classical, ‘free’ logic in order to get the intended exis- nal totheallegeddirectionofgrowing. The block,inparticulartheedgebeing,is temporal directionality.Primafacie,theblockrepresents acertaintimedirectionby that ispresent. the jumpingpresent.For every differs substantiallyfromCantorianmathematics:takenthegiven formula togeth- distinct timeispresent»(CR2018, 73). difficulty ofdoingjusticetothecontinuity-requirement.Thatinfactthey have not tential dynamics.Allthisisgood,buttheconsequencethatneighborhoodof the past(withinblock)exists,butnothingregardingfuture.Theterm“ex- argument that shows that, even thoughCorreia/Rosenkranz’s GBT-dynamics real- Interpretation: «Itfollows thatalways thereisatmostonetimethatpresent.It MST isdistinguishedfrometernalismby theadditionalclaimthatsometimeisob- not actingwhilebecoming greater,whereas“growing” suggeststhat theedgeofbe- new andlastmomentofexistence,butithasno inherentmotion,itisnotdirectedto- means thatconstantsdonotalways refer, theydonotnecessarilyhave referents. moment oftimeishalf-sidedempty: present, i.e. a present ishalf-sidedempty. is moving continuously, in the istential dynamicsgets lost. ing (or, the block) is doing something. In this way, the temporal character of theex - ing, nothingcomesnext.Inotherwords: thepresentisconsideredsimply tobethe is always thesame.Formally: istence” is unique, so that regarding the future nothing is ly isexistential inthesensethatit varies whatexistssimpliciter , thereisno reason likewise follows thatagiven timeisonlyever presentonce,andhencethatalways a jectively present.Thispropertyofpresentnessisassumedtomove constantly across being. Thesentence“E!m”is,iftrue,truesimpliciteralthoughnotalways true,which ∃ Tx x(Tx Apparently, thegiven formula alonecannotexclude asomehow jumping Contrariwise, in the adequate GBT any neighborhood ofthe(newand) last No I will explain this further in the last section. Let me firstly add a different & x ε is present&H¬(x non-continuous motion of presentness. However, in the MST nothing / δ -like definitioncantherefore beappliedtoget thecontinuityofgrow- is present)&G¬(x ε / ε δ , therewillbea some -sense of the term. This might work, thanks to the ε / δ -like definitionwilldothejobof avoiding is present)& δ suchthat[…],sothepresent ∀ y(Ry real neighborhood ishalf-sided empty block:Around edge the of being, the FIG 1Screenshot of growing the & in some other senseof y is present→yL x))

78 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo – between «pointyrelativisticGBT»and«bow-tie rel- ‘everywhere inthe upper [lower] lightcone’,andwiths 2018, 136). Inparticular,thisclaimhastobeunderstoodastherejectionofidea curves andpropertimesalsoareincludedintotheobjective structure:“proper-time” er-)time ratherthanunqualifiedspacetime.In this way, ed againsteternalism–thateverything saidabouttimecanalsobespace, one canraisetheobjectionofspatial analogue,i.e.theargument–usuallypresent- of evaluation», butwronglyconcludethat everywhere inthelower-side ofs, with non-temporal ones. Here is it(with would expect,fromanon-eternalistperspective, that(theconceptsof)timelike which shows thatthedistinguishingcharacteroftimeismissing. One getsanexistentialdynamicsacrossspace:everywhere everything everywhere that there is variation along a timelike curve. For, thiswould bevariation across (prop- to believe thatthisexistentialvariation reallyistemporal.For, againsttheaccount two principlesincommon; with tentially dynamicalontologylackingthetemporal char- the elsewhere regionisunpopulated” (CR,2018, 149). so-called space. Counterintuitive asitmay, nothingintheGBT-accountathandforbids that. ativistic GBT»(CR2018, 150). Bothversions have the along the literature on the Putnam/Stein-controversy acter. Inmoredetail,Correia/Rosenkranz distinguish– are populatedornot,e.g., thepointy-version affirms: “at any given spacetime-point, Now, onecanconstructaspatial analogue by substitutingallthetemporalnotions Instead ofappealingonly to thelightcone-structure ofrelativisticspacetime,one Relativity, theyrightlyholdthat«we mustmakespacetime-pointsourbasicpoints must accordinglybeunderstoodasvariation acrossspacetimeratherthantime»(CR [lower] side’;andwiths:“place”): now meaning“spacetime point”.Theydisagreeastowhetherthe elsewhere regions precisely thisspatial-analogousway (seeCR2018, chap.9).With regardtoSpecial is usuallyconsideredtobethefundamentalnotionoftime. in thespatialupper-side(ofit)continues toexist;andfor any spatiallocations,at (P2) Sx→@x (P1) E (P2) Tx (P1) E those inthecausalfutureofit,andelsewhereregion ofit.(CR2018,135) termined by each such point, between that point itself, those points in the causal past of it, [we must]appealtonoobjective structureofspacetimeotherthanthefourfold division,de- spatiotemporaryism !x → !x →GE By contrast,Correia/Rosenkranz claimthat«variation inwhatexists,ifany, Moreover, Correia/Rosenkranz themselves constructarelativistic GBTin Look againatthetwo principlesoftheGBT: →At x,H¬E

E !x !x

¬ E !x !x 8 turnsouttobeanexis- and s did notyet now meaning and exist.Simpliciter-factschangeacross meaning‘everywhere inthe upper else in spacetime» (CR2018,136). in spacetime» else everywhere exists also exists what which,to in spacetime, everywhere spatiopermanentist according view “«the view,universe terms: in their block opposed (relativistic) the to ishence “Spatiotemporaryism” “permanentism”). to sed (oppofor “non-eternalism” - 8 “Temporaryism” term istheir

79 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo With regardtothepointy-version, thefirstprinciple“E With regardtothisversion, theblockcannotgrow inspacelikedirection, because curve throughsalongwhichtheblockshouldgrow. Then,afterthecurve haspassed ond principle“Sx→@x everything everywhere inthecausalfuture(upperlightcone)stillexists,andsec- er-time (ofthattrajectory).This,however, isunjustified,given onlythetwo principles. way freshslices ofexistenceshouldbeadded.Therearemany ways todoso.This melike curve through forbids, i.e.thereisnocontradictionwiththetwo principles,toassumeaspacelike through grow? Nothingcomesnext! therein everything already exists. However, the two principles hold relative to “any” thing haspassed,oneusesatemporallanguagestemmingfromtheconceptofprop- ty butalsothatthereare infinitelymany directionsinwhichthe blockcouldpossi- direction of time. allegedly temporalpassage,butonecanavoid thiswiththebow-tie version accord- shows thatthe(missing)continuity oftimeisclosely connectedwiththe (missing) so thatwithoutfurther assumptionstheproponentsofGBTcannot tellinwhich Now, my objectiongoesasfollows. The“particle’strajectory”–meant:acertainti- principle thatonlysays thateverywhere inthecausalfuture sstillexists.Thepoint particle’s trajectory(timelikecurve). There are infinitelymany suchtrajectoriespass- in thecausalpastofs,didnotyet exist.Therefore, Correia/Rosenkranz suggest: is thatby saying thatalongatrajectorysomething“continues”toexist,“after”some- ing throughsand,again,thequestionarises:whathappens next, how doestheblock ing towhich,atany spacetime-point,theelsewhereregioniscompletely populated. bly grow. All timelike curves through Accordingly, ats, relativistic GBT.(CR2018149) exist onthistrajectoryeven afterthelatterhaspassedthroughs.Letuscallthiskindofview s, The possibilityofspacelikegrowing clearlyshows thespatialanalogueof Here, theproblemnotonlyisthatneighborhood aroundsispartlyemp- s doesnot s is ‘new’onany particle’strajectorypassingthroughs,whileitcontinuesto continue s – has been introduced arbitrarily. Nothing in the account ¬E ! x ” says thatfor any spacetime-points to exist, which afteralldoesnot contradictthefirst s are ontologically on a par, no one is privileged, ! x → Possibility of spacelike ‘growing’Possibility of spacelike GBT: FIG 2Pointy relativistic Infinitely many timelike directions manytimelike Infinitely GBT: relativistic FIG 3Bow-tie

E ! x ” says thateverywhere , ats , everywhere

80 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “transcendentally ideal”, i.e.originallysubjective. About “empirically real”–objective, inthesenseneeded–but (the possibilityof)theexperienceofobjectsorevents in(objective) time.Thismakes (necessary connection)between events” –areinfactjustified(againstHume),but gically dependentonthesameconditionsoftheir(possible) experience.Kant’s criti- continuity oftime,i.e.toitsgenuinedynamicalcharacter,even ifoneconsidersthe ontology. can beobjective passage oftimethanksto(invirtueof;groundedby) theconscious- our timeconsciousness.Rather,thedependence(also)isontological, i.e.thereonly explanatory; I will not (only) argue that we can onlyun- consciousness. However, thisdependenceisnot(only) opposite path:itisobjective timethatdependson could help. existential dynamicsaswell. Somethinghastobedoneclosethegap.Infinal objective timeexplanatorily dependentonsubjective time:onecanonlyarrive, apo- only iftheycanbelinkedwiththeconditionsof experience(against‘dogmatic’meta- cal metaphysics canbesummarizedby theideathatmetaphysical statements–such objective time,insomeway orother,alsohasthechar- objectively dynamicaltime.Theassumptionisthatourexperienceandpercep- steriori, atanunderstandingofobjective temporalrelationsandbecoming the following quotation: temporal continuity, andclosestto theGBT, consider derstand that,e.g.,SpecialRelativity istalkingaboutob- tinuity, timedirectionalitygetslostandsothetemporalcharacterofintended tween objects, and the temporal becoming of (objective) events or processesontolo- the possibility)ofexperiencealsoareconditions oftheobjectsexperience(see, tially Kantian. Firstly, Kant famously claimed that (sub- ty oftimeontologically dependsontimeconsciousness. the missinglink,namelysothatobjective continui- the passageoftime.Given this,many philosophersbelieve thatonecanonlyunder- tion aretensed(see,e.g.,Soteriou2013, chap.4):onehasthesubjective impressionof section, IwillsuggestthatKantian consciousness-dependence ofobjective timeflow as that“thereisobjective temporal becoming” orthat“thereisobjective causality acteristics ofpassage. stand thisfact,i.e.onecanonlyexplainourexperience/perception,ifgrantsthat IV. Usually, non-eternalistsclaimthattemporalexperience Kant 1781, A111). Thismakesthetemporallocationofobjects,relationsbe- most promisingaccountofanexistentiallydynamical ness oftime.Apparently,theanalyticmetaphysics oftimecannotdojusticetothe physicians such asLeibnizorAristotle). purposes ofthispaper, temporal continuityis,for Kant, jective timegiven ourtemporalexperience/perception, jective) time–aspureintuitionisaconditionof between epistemologyandontologyexpressedby thesloganthatconditions(of because ofsubjective time,given apriori.Alsofamously,then,Kant provides alink Therefore, Iconcludethat,withoutanadequaterepresentationoftimecon- 10 Kant’s Consciousness-dependenceofTime Such aconsciousness-dependenceisessen- Now, the idea is that consciousness 9 Given theforegoing, Itakethe 12 11 Appliedtothe provides depends face the difficulties at issue. difficulties the face contenderas the does that not MSTappearsthe in paper this reasons said, for dialectical point. this at be safe to As 10 To be fair, MSTseems the (2018). (2017) and Sattig block Dengless) see universe; world- isa(tense objective the can be explained,sage ‘although’ pas- argue perceived the that eternalists 9 Ofcourse, many also are there quote, Prauss (2019). see 12 For reading of asimilar this be found, e.g., in (2015). Allais metaphysical project can also 11 of Kant’sThis characterization explanatorily onthe who and disagree

81 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Apparently, for Kant, whilebeing drawn, thelineisal- er than“addingfreshslices”,theproblemofnext comes next.Given the contextofKant’s work, however, “time”doesnotmean(an - current analyticmetaphysics. Ifso,Kant, aswell, canbeconfrontedwiththeprob- er by thestickinourhand.Thisdirectionality-problem directlyleadstothecontinu- on the impression that Kant’s claim is close to the GBT. conceptual reasoning–asitwere withCantor’sset-theoreticalaccountinmind–is er timedirectionasfundamental. earlier/later-than onlydependentonthe(temporal)directionofdrawing it. ent ontheA-theoretic,directedmotionofobjective presentness.Thecrucial continuum: the lastmoment,i.e. edgeoftheline, wise/perpendicular to the board). What we make representable to us by drawing a ways increasing.However, if“drawing” isnothingoth- Otherwise, thedynamicalaspectoftimegetslost.Onlydrawing oftheline–not gap totherestofline,orcannotbepointlike, i.e.itaddsatoncea(small)line,not tion ofincreasing(alongtheboard)differsfromdirectionaddingslices(cross- transcendentally ideal, i.e. originally subjective. dependent ontimedirection.For, a(spatial) linecanrepresentthetemporalorderof the lineassuch–canbeanimagethatmakespassageoftimerepresentableto that onemustuseintuitionalsowhilereasoningabouttime. transitive order that turns into a temporal B-series of earlier/later-than only depend- tion isthefundamentalfeature oftime.InMST, someCantoriansetof points,such alytic) “realtime”,i.e.transcendentally realtime,butrather“objective time”,i.e.em- as originallyobjective, inKant’s terms:as“transcendentallyreal”. at least,risky):indeed,itdoestheintendedjobonly“insofar”asonedraws theline. apparently notsufficient.Timeissopeculiar,becauseitoriginallypureintuition, a notionofdirectionality.However, every version ofnon-eternalismshouldconsid- as atimelikecurve inspacetime,representsamerelyantisymmetric,irreflexive, and analogue sincetheyclaimthattimeorder–theB-theoreticalrelationisfunda- In philosophicalreasoning,Kant says, oneneedsan“image”inordertomaketimerep- Kant isanon-eternalist:eternalists,by contrast,have lessproblemswiththespatial moment isstilltobesolved. Asitseems,alsoKant facesthedifficultythatdirec- resentable tous.Philosophicalreasoningispartlymetaphorical,and,for anadequate makes mostlyplausiblethatnon-eternalistsmustholdcontrariwisetimedirec- mental feature of time. Again, the MST is the most illuminating contender, because it pirically realtime.Then, thissametimealsois,for Kant, philosophical understandingoftime,oneneedsthespatialanalogue“aline”.Purely problem withtheGBTunderdiscussionisthatithasanorderofprecedencebutnot us. Thisremarkshouldbetakenasevidencefor thefactthat,for him,timeorderis ity-problem: strictlyspeaking,again,thenewest stuffontheboardeithercreatesa is thesource ofasolutiontotheproblem ofthetime lem that the intended existential dynamics of time cannot be continuous: nothing line, isapparentlynotalineinherentlyextendingbutalways beingmadegreat- being progressively drawn. Thiswould betheendofstoryifoneconsiderstime draw it(Kant 1787,B156) [time] cannotbemaderepresentabletousexcept undertheimageofaline,insofaraswe Taken inisolation,thegiven quotetalksabout“realtime”inthesenseof Then, Kant argues,the(needed)spatial analogueofalineismisleading(or, Thus, for Kant, timedirectionalityismorefundamentalthanorder. 13 Now, letme focus 14 This to General Relativity, Friebe (2016). Relativity, General to respect with also claim, mentality of for adefense funda this 13 See - about objective time as originally asoriginally about time objective (as pure intuition), butjective ing about aspurely sub time - - Kant here is not that talk 14 Note

82 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo V. The requirementcan(only?)besatisfied by groundingobjective timeinsubjective (not timeorder).Itclosesthegapofdiscontinuity,and established. Thereisnolongeradiscontinuousgap,sincetherereallywillbenext empirically real,i.e.,sotospeak,“actualizedintuition”(=appearance):by conscious- everything subjective, i.e.regardingevery representa- one is after anontology of temporal passage in theexistentially dynamicalsenseof Otherwise, theunityof(transcendental)subjectcouldnotbeestablished.Applied nuity oftime,expressedby thedrawing of the line,butnotsufficientlysowithoutbe- stantly passes.Without thetimecontinuum,however, given areperhapssufficientlyflexibleas to alsojustifyamoregeneralsuggestion:if to thecaseathand,thiswould meanthattheIthinkmustbeabletoaccompany the tion (intuitions;concepts)inus,Kant holds–again,fa- tial dynamicsfallsdown thespatial-analogueobjection. the the term,continuity/directionalityoftime provides themostseriouschallenge. time, given apriori. tending inthedesireddirectionoffuture. so projectsthedirectionofmotionfromstickinour actualizing subjective time essentiallyistimedirection activity ofactualizingsubjective time.Thisactivityof ly dynamicalontologycannotexplainhow timecon- Kantian consciousness-dependenceclosesthegapby Even themostpromisingaccountofanexistential- moment. Thelastmoment,theedgeofbeing,becomes […]”, establishestheunityoftime.Thetimeisnothingotherthanconti- representation oftime,i.e.pureintuition.Self-consciousness,expressedby “Ithink, mously –that: must beaccompaniedby consciousness.With regardto making objective timeflow ontologicallydependentonasubjective conditionofex- ment” stillis(andwillbe)theonlylastmoment,inits no nextmoment,becausethealleged“nextlastmo- perience: timeaspureintuition(andimagination). its own, genuinedirectionofbecoming. ing accompaniedby theIthink. ly accompanying thelastmoment,unity(=continuity)ofpresentcouldbe hand intothelinethat,by now, isinherentlyself-ex-

genuine temporaldynamicsgetslost;theexisten- The Ithinkmustbeabletoaccompany allmy representations.(Kant 1787,B131) Although thepaperfocused onaspecific variant oftheGBT, thearguments Transferred totheobjectivizedtime–beingnolongermereintuitionbut Conclusion 15 Therewillbe 16 the GBTwouldthe be nonsense. Kant’stion that isclose to claim assump the otherwise subjective; - ally needs of imagination the time. ally Kant addition that - for claim the (2019) possible; Rosefeldt also see future the makes imagination the of such appearance, actuality the intuition) and,alized grounded on appearswhat ispresent- (asactu of imagination: needs capacity the 16 Probably point, this at Kant wholethe block isextending. is dynamical in sense the that ing still but past future), the its and past) the (regard presentism - (regarding ofnation eternalism The GBT isnot simply acombi - block. simply an eternalist-like ofpast growing the block isnot tinction, but suggests it the that regard dis GBT/presentism the - to with questions:these isneutral it –Iwouldpresentism? answer to of GBTor, the lation instead, of - an articu moments? still Isthis 15 But:about what past the

83 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Allais, L. (2015). Tooley, M.(1997). Time,tense,andcausation. Oxford: ClarendonPress. Williamson, T. (2013). Modallogicasmetaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Correia, F. &Rosenkranz, S.(2018). Nothingtocome.Adefence ofthegrowing block Cameron, R.(2015). TheMoving Spotlight. An essay ontimeandontology. Oxford: Sattig, T. (2018). Thesenseoftemporalflow: ahigher-orderaccount.Philosophical Soteriou, M.(2013). Themind’sconstruction.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sider, T. (2001). Four dimensionalism:anontology ofpersistenceandtime.Oxford/ Friebe, C.(2016). Timeorder,timedirection,andthepresentist’sviewonspacetime. Deng, N.(2017). Temporal experienceandtheAversus Bdebate.InI.Philips(Ed.), Deasy, D. (2015). The Moving Spotlight Theory, Id. (2019). Temporal existenceandtemporallocation.PhilosophicalStudies, Lewis, D.(2004).Tensed quantifiers.InD.Zimmerman(Ed.),Oxford studies Kant, I.(1781/87). CritiqueofpurereasonTransl. anded.by P. Guyer &A.W. Wood Id. (2018). Metaphysics oflaws andontologyoftime.Theoria,33(1),77-90. Broad, C.D.(1923). Scientific thought. London:Routledge. K. Pollock(Eds.),Theimagination ingermanidealismand Rosefeldt, T. (2019). Kant onimaginationandtheintuitionoftime.InG.Gentry& Prauss, Gerold.(2019). ZurBegreifbarkeitderAusdehnung von ZeitundRaum.Kant- Mellor, D.H.(1998). Real timeII . London:Routledge. The Routledge handbookofphilosophy oftemporalexperience(239-248). 2073-2089. (1998). Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. online-first. Studien, 110 (3),397-412. Studies, online-first. theory oftime.Cham:Springer(SyntheseLibrary). Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. Kriterion: JournalofPhilosophy, 30(2),91-106. metaphysics (3-14). Oxford: Oxford University Press. London: Routledge. New York: Oxford University Press. Bibliography Manifest reality. Kant’s idealism and his realism. Oxford/New York: Philosophical Studies, 172 (8), romanticism (48-65). in

84 Nothing Comes Next — Cord Friebe Friebe Cord — Next Comes Nothing  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The orthodox be acontin to it - approach states time to The Growing Blockand theProblem TEMPORAL EXTENSION TelUniversity Aviv Shira YechimovitzShira insights; and two the anonymous to constructive comments for their and referees suggestions. and group lab the Miller forvided; Centre and the at Kristie ofTime, Sydney and for University the helpful remarks conversations* Iwould and for Belkind fruitful thank Ori guidance; like for support the Cohn the Institute pro they - on account of being it ahybrid A-B-theory. Tension lies Finally, discuss Iwill possible consequences. uum. show to paper Inthis Iaim growing the that block slices of present.slices First, Ishow acontinuous that grow- ing block necessitates a present with zero temporal apresent with ing block necessitates acontinuous that in fact the block isbuilt B-theoretical model poses aunique problem continuity the to of time, duration; second, Ishow such that notion of present rules out some widely accepted B-theoretical solutions outrules some B-theoretical accepted widely BECOMING to the B-theory rules out B-theory the rules to some of the ones.A-theoretical problem the to of continuum, the commitment its while through the becomingA-theoretical of instantaneous of theContinuum CONTINUUM * theory. temporal order and direction in the a hybrid A-B theory, in particular focuses on growing the block as research currently Her University. of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv andfor History the Philosophy Student Cohn the at Institute Shira Yechimovitz isan M.A. TEMPORAL DIRECTION GROWING BLOCK 85  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo A-series. Theyentailaspace-liketimeandmetaphysical pictureoftheuniverse as A-series (McTaggart 1908). A-categories, inrespecttowhichtimechanges. The standardconceptionisthattimeandspacearecontinuous.Sincecom- What changedisthefactthatanewentitycame intobeing,thusforming newrela- of timeisthatitappearstoinvolve somesortofflow orchange.Itseemsasifevery comes totime. er point;anditisinfinitelyindefinitelydivisible: any divisionofthecontinuumwill ed of point-like durationless instants. The continuum is gap free: it persists without cess iscalled becoming(Broad1923, 65-68). one by one,thusforming afour-dimensional growing block. Thefuturedoesnotex- est son.Achangehasoccurred,yet Tom himselfdidnotundergoany intrinsicchange. counts ofcontinuity.Finally,thegrowing blockviewisahybrid ofthetwo. Itiscom- the relations between its terms will be referred to as B-relations. The second feature does notonlyhave anorder,italsohas apreferred direction:itrunsfromearlierto dimensional slicesofreality keepcomingintoexistence,joiningthe world history tions withthepre-existingmembersoffamily. Suchisthechangeoftime.Three- dynamic metaphysical viewandaretherefore moreinclined to embracedifferentac- ther inthepast.Theserieswhosetermsarepast,present,andfutureiscalled than hisfather.Thechangeofthingsintimeis relative totime.Thechangeofamo- ter isthechangeTom Smithundergoesashegrows tallerthanhisfatherJohn.There I. a staticfour-dimensional spacetimeblock.Suchviews arecompatiblewiththecur- a longlastingphilosophicalandmathematical inquiry. The tensionincreaseswhen it always resultinpartsthatcanturnbefurtherdivided,withoutever resultingin any breaksorinterruption;itisdense:between eachtwo pointthereisalways anoth- so untilthebirthofanewsibling.Afterwards, Tom willnolongerbeJohn’s young- as anewchildisbornintothefamily.IfTom isJohn’syoungest son,hewillremain notion of time, since it lacks two important unique features. The first is that time rently accepted Cantorian account of continuity. A-theories argue that the A-series monly consideredstructurallysimilartoaone-dimensionalspace,thetimecontinu- ment intimeisdifferent,andcanbecompared tothechange Tom Smithundergoes mitted bothtotheviewofuniverse asa four-dimensional spacetimeblockthat put inthesametermsaschangethingsrespecttotime.Anillustrationoflat- um isoftenportrayed astheEuclidian straightgeometricalline.Justasthe is objective andthings in timedochangerespecttoitsterms.A-theoriesentaila instant intimechangesfrombeingfuture,topresent,furtherandfur- its beingconstitutedby pointsontheother,raisechallengesthatwere thesubjectof indivisibles (Bell2019, viii).Thesepropertiesofthecontinuumononehand,and is added,itbecomesthe newpresentandtheprecedentslicebecomes past. Thispro- ist. Thepresentisthemost recentslicethatcameintobeing,andonce anotherslice is atimetinwhichthesonshorterthanhisfatherand timet’inwhichheistaller is eternallyfixed inB-relations,andtothe claimthatthereareobjectively distinct later. Thetemporalseriesthatrunsfromearliertolaterisknown astheB-series,and line ismadeupofextensionlesspoints,thetimecontinuumtakentobeconstruct- A geometricallineisnotafulldescriptionoftheordinary(common-sense) According tothegrowing blocktheory,thechangeoftimeitselfcannotbe The growing block’sdualnature makesthepuzzle of thecontinuum Introduction B-theories oftimeembracetheB-seriesandrejectobjectivity

86 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo A-categories inthemodel,whichentailsthatpresentmomentcannothave any This distinctionisderived fromwhatMillercalls«thegrowing blockontologicalthe- The A-theoreticalcommitmentsofthegrowing blockentailanobjective presentmo- The onlyintelligibleoptionfor thegrowing blocktheorististoadmitthatthetempo- When holdingtoacontinuous growing blockview,apoint-likepresentisinevitable. (Miller 2013, 348). Thepresentmomentistopologicallydistinctfromtherestof of theproblemspoint-likepresentbringsaboutandtheiracceptedsolution.Ithen of point-like instants. In the following section I show that the present slice cannot clude whatMillercalls«thedynamicthesis»,accordingtowhichtheanswer tothe ordered, directedblock, butisalsothelatest additiontoreality.But these two defin- entails enumeration, or consecutiveness, meaningtheinstantiationoftemporal entails notonlytheorderingrelationofearlier and laterthan,orsuccession–italso of onetemporalsliceatatime.Asnewcomes intoexistenceontheedgeofre- change ispossibleduetotheprocessofbecoming; namely,thecomingintoexistence this isnotthefullpicture;growing block’sA-theoreticalcommitmentsalsoin- than zerotobecomeallatonce. two pillarnotionsofthegrowing blocktheory.Thefirstisthe very definitionofthe der two restrictions:(a)thepresentcannothave any non-zerotemporalextension; features: one,ithas no successors;andtwo, itisnotjustthelast temporalsliceinthe question aboutwhichmomentisthepresent ever-changing (Miller2013, 348). This show why theydonotapplytothegrowing block.InthefinalsectionIdiscusspossi- seemingly impossibletoresolve, astheblockgrows throughthebecomingofthree-di - sence ofapresentevent isnotthatitprecedesfutureevents, butthatthereisquite sis»; namely, that the pastand the present exist, while the future is a non-existence stantaneous slice of reality at a time. These restrictions are a direct consequence of and (b)thegrowth oftheblockcanonlyoccurthroughbecomingonesuchin- II. as moreslicesaccumulateoneby oneinagradual process.Theprocessofbecoming ality, theslicethatwas oncepresentbecomes thepastandgoesdeeperinto Hence the very definition ofthe present inthe growing block consists oftwo distinct mensional sliceswithzerotemporalextension.Orifwe thinkoftimeasastraight ment thatisdistinctfromthetwo othertemporalcategories,thepastandfuture. non-zero duration;thesecondpertainstoforming oftheB-relationsthrough ral dimensionoftheblockisconstructedthroughadditionpresentslicesun- ration greater thanzero.Eachnew slicewould thenhave sometemporal extension, process ofbecoming,whichcannotpossiblyallow for any durationoftimegreater particulars oneby oneandtherefore one before theothers(Craig2000,234-235). ing features ofthepresent cannotbeconsistentwiththenotionof extendedpresent. have any non-zerotemporalextension,andthattheblockcanonlygrow throughthe line, timeinthegrowing blockuniverse literallyisformed throughtheaccumulation literally nothingtowhichithastherelationofprecedence»(Broad1923, 66). But ble consequencesandconclusions. becoming of one such durationless slice at atime. In the third sectionIlay outsome block by virtueofbeingtheonlysliceexistencethathasnosuccessor:«thees- II.1. The ProblemoftheDefining Features ofthePresent The Growing BlockandtheProblemofExtendedPresent Let usassume acontinuousgrowing blockinwhich the presenthasdu-

87 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 191). Inthecontextof thegrowing block,pastgenesisrefers tothingsintimecom- As a result we will end up with an entity that is contradictory by its very definition: 2002) or «the now-now problem» (Braddon-Mitchell 2004) might be summarised ways have infinitelymany successors,andnoamountofdivisionwillever leadtoa even ifvery small.For convenience, considersuchanextendedtemporal sliceasa well. Indeed, the objectors could say that it is easy to see why the of thepastthatwas borndeadismorethan justgrim;pastgenesisdisqualifiesthe of thepresent,whileavoiding theproblemsofpoint-likepresentandcontinu- end-point; namely,theboundarybetween thisnewtemporalinterval andnothing- good reasonsnotto.For one,itstrengthensanotherobjectiontothegrowing block grow inextendedtemporalintervals mademostlyofpastwithoneuniquepresent force restriction(a),itdoesnotnecessarilyimplythat(b)hastoholdas the latestadditiontoreality,eachofthemwould alsobeconsideredapresentslice. that inturnarealsoindefinitelydivisible.Sincethosesub-intervals areallpartsof temporal interval onthegrowing block.Any suchtemporalinterval ofthegrow- this very instantcansustainactivityorprocesses andconsciousness.Themisfortune the now-now problem.(Forrest 2004,Forbes 2016) According todeadpastgrowing that we ever were trulyinthepresentisfaint.Pastgenesisalsoweakens thedead do we have noway ofknowing whetherourtimeisthetruepresent,buthope the edgeofrealityandpastismerelyanything thatprecedesthepresent– the following discussionofthe way theblock’sB-relations areformed. dead pastgrowing block’slineofdefence againsttheepistemicobjection, aswell as single presentslicethathasnosuccessors. a continuousinterval isbeingindefinitelydivisible,any such“present”slicecouldal- a “present”slicethathasoneormoresuccessors.Andsinceoftheproperties aphysic, we aremuchlikeliertobe inthepast.Ifwe embrace(a)butnot(b),only as follows: we believe thatourtimeisthepresent,butgrantedagrowing blockmet- supporters of past genesis might say –there is no reason why the block should not straightforward, conclusive way toprove pastgenesis tobeimpossibleinagrow- suggested by Forbes (2016), thatreliesonthefactthingsinpastusedtobe against theproblemofpasttruth-makers,inparticular theresolutiontoproblem reply totheobjectionsproblemsofcontinuummay give raiseto,butthereare ness. Thus,theproponentsofpastgenesisattempttoholdondefining features point-like, butthenask:musttheblockgrow throughthebecomingofoneduration- past growing block:avariety ofthegrowing blockthatwas conceived inresponseto present; itisnotonlythe lastmoment,butalsothelatest. Thiswillbecomeclearer in present. um (tobediscussedinsectionIII).Itmightseemtemptingtoturnpastgenesisasa ing blockwould thenhave tobeindefinitelydivisibleintosmallertemporalintervals ing intoexistencedirectlyaspast,withouthaving beenpresentfirst.Iftheis ing block’spresentby appealingtowhatForbes calls«pastgenesis»(Forbes 2015, ing blockuniverse, as pastgenesisignoresthesecondfeature of thegrowing block’s known astheepistemicproblem. less sliceat atime?Inlinewiththisobjection,somemighttrytoreconciletheconflict blockers, we can know withcertainty that we areinthe present moment,sinceonly between theextensionoftemporalslicesanddefining features ofthegrow- A possibleobjection might be that while this line ofargument might en- The epistemicproblem,alsoknown as«thepresentproblem»(Bourne Setting asidetheepistemic objectionandthedeadpastsolution,there isa present has to be

88 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo As proponentsoftheA-theoryobserved, theprocessofbecominginvolves notonly The derivation ofsuccessionfromconsecutiveness rendersboththe extendedpres- The successionoftemporalslicesdependsontheconsecutiveness oftheirbecoming, after Salreadyexisted. of timeorinourconsciousness,ratherthanfeatures oftimeitself.Butthegrowing widely heldthatincontrastwithastaticB-theory,objective temporalbecominghas will takethemtobeprimitive; others,astheresultofasymmetriesincontents event, atemporalsliceoraninterval of timeisimmaterial–itwould have hadtobe ent tohave any non-zeroduration.TheB-relationsofearlierthanandlater in ent andpast genesisasimpossiblefor the growing block. curred consecutively, orelsetheywould have beenoneandthesameslicethere - consecutiveness, meaningtheinstantiationoftemporalparticularsoneby one which makesitimpossiblefor asingletemporalslicetohave internalsuccession.Like growing blockmodel,theB-seriesstemsfromA-series.Whenanewsliceofreal- greater thanzero;whenever thereismorethan oneslice,itmeanstheirbecomingoc- the abilitytoaccountfor temporaldirection(Craig2000,256-258), andthegrowing t is laterthan slice S’ at time t’ is the direct consequence of S’ coming into existence fore itcameintobeingthatslicewas nothingatall(Broad1923, 66).That includesthe different strategiestoaccount for theorderand directionofthetimeseries.Some the B-theories,growing blockiscommittedtothethesisthateverything thatex- therefore ittakesmorethanoneslicetoform atemporalsegmentwhosedurationis tween itsearlierandlaterparts.Butaspreviously shown, anything thatcomesinto the growing blockareformed throughbecoming.Asatemporalslicecomesintoex- fore have a singleB-locationandzeroduration.Thus,there canonlybeonenewdu- the notions of temporal succession and consecutiveness are intimately connected. able, successive parts.Thecontentsofeach newslicearealways simultaneous and spread acrossseveral B-locations,andthere would have hadtobeadistinction be- anything in the spatiotemporal block to have duration – whether we refer to it as an a slicenecessarilyoccupiessingletemporallocationintheB-series.Obviously, for successor oftheslicethatwas formerly theedgeofbeing.Thus,any amountofex- and therefore onebefore theother(Craig2000,234-235). Inthegrowing blockview, succession, i.e.,theB-relationsofearlierthanandlaterthan,butalsoenumeration,or relations of temporal succession. To put it moresimply,thefactthatsliceSattime reality comeintoexistencethatdidnotandcouldhave existedbefore, sincebe- neous inrespecttothetemporaldimension,whichmeansallofcontentsuch rationless sliceatatime, andonlyonesuchslicecanbethelatestaddition toreality. ity isaddedthroughbecoming,newrelationsbetween thissliceandthesumtotalof ists intimedoessoeternallyfixed B-relations.DifferentB-theorists may employ istence thatjoinstheuniverse throughasingleactofbecomingcanonlybesimulta- istence throughtheprocessofbecoming,itconcurrentlybecomesimmediate block makesuseofthisnotionbecomingfor thisvery purpose. block are not arbitrary or illusory; rather they are objective features of time itself. It is block alsoadherestothecommitmentthattemporalorderanddirectionof being together is B-simultaneous, and therefore cannot be divided into distinguish - II.2. The ProblemofConsecutiveness inBecomingandtheForming of B-Relations In otherwords, very muchlikeinMcTaggart’s originalargument,inthe It now becomesclearthatthegrowing blockdoesnotallow for thepres-

89 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The factthatthegrowing blockbuildsthroughtheaccumulationofdurationlessslic- 231a21-b10). Thecontinuumhasthepotential tobeinfinitelydivided,notintopoints, or elsetheblockcouldnotbegap-free.Inthatcase,how canB-locationsbedistin- ed throughbecoming,itmustalsocometobeexactlyonthevery edgeoftheblock, es posesatwofold problem.Ontheonehandthereisproblemofaddition;clear- challenge tothetimecontinuumingrowing blockmodel;thefirstisprob- ent is point-like, the temporal location of each and every new slice would be the same equally toany numberbetween nandn+1,nomatterhow small.Given thatthepres- come allatonce,whichIshowed tobeimpossibleonthegrowing block.Thisapplies es. We cannotsay thatthe timecontinuumispriortothesetemporalslices, because curs intheprocessofbecoming.Given agrowing blockmetaphysics, therehastobe cannot bedividedeverywhere atthesametime.Aristotle’sargumentisasfollows: guished onefromtheother?Letedgeofrealitybeintimet growing blockmetaphysics allows for thetimeseriestobedense. growing blockaccountpreviouslygiven, itbecomesevidentwhy proponentsofthe tions; thepresentsliceliesatvery edgeoftheblock,andwhenanewsliceisadd- tially divisibletoinfinityinthesensethattheymay bedividedanywhere, thoughthey first introducedinAristotle’sdiscussionofZeno’sparadoxes andlaterembraced by them tobe actual entities, thecomponents oftheblockand notjustthepotential these slices. Thus,ifwe are committed tothegrowing blockview we mustadmit tinuum is prior to its parts and points exist not in actuality, but as limitsoflines(Phy. first, sincepointshave noparts,theycannot form acontinuum,andsecond,the con- zero duration,andeven infinitelymany suchslicescouldnever amounttoany du- are actualizedonthatvery location,therecanbenofurtherlocations;inorderfor the as ofitspredecessor,andconsequently,theentireblock. such athingasanactual instantaneoussliceoftime,andasIshowed theblockcan- are the boundaries of the segments that are the parts of the continuum, but any such III. In thissection I will explore two ways inwhichthepoint-likepresentmay posea Brentano, Peirceandothers.(Bell2019, 157, 163). Continuousmagnitudes arepoten- ration greaterthanzero.Ontheotherhandthereisproblemoftemporalloca- model mightwant tohold ontosuchanassumption. mon: theydiscredittheunderlyingassumptionthatlengthofaninterval onaline nothing would have existedintimeifitwere notfor theconstantaccumulationof not existpriortothese slices andcanonlygrow throughthebecoming ofsuchslic- parts onlycomeintobeingasthewholesaredivided. up andform temporalduration(zerotimesinfinitystillequalszero);andthesecond is thatoneofthepropertiescontinuumdensity,yet itisunclearwhethera is generatedby addingupthelengthsofitssmallestcontinuants.Lookingbackto ly theblockitselfhastemporalduration,butitconsistsofindividualslicesthathave lem famouslyknown asZeno’sparadox ofplurality:how candurationlessslicesadd location but intosegmentsthatcanalsobeinfinitelydivided, andsoon,on.Thepoints III.1. t The firstsolutionistoviewthelineaspriorpoints.Thisapproach was The solutionsIamabouttodiscussinthissectionhave onethingincom- The Point-LikePresentandtheContinuum n+1 But thiscannotbesaidofthegrowing block, seeingthatadditioninfactoc- tocomeintoexistence, a temporalinterval fromt The ProblemwithPoint-LikePresentsForming Duration n tot n . Aslongastheslices n+1 willhave tobe-

90 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 2010, 277-280). Therefore, theextensionofacontinuousline doesnotdependonthe of t es constitutingtheblocktobeactual.OurbestsciencetakesCantorianapproach whatsoever onitslength.Instead,theline must beassociatedwithametricordis- val’s endpoints.Sincelengthisnotanintrinsic feature ofasetpoints,thepoints count, and then show how it resolves the paradox of plurality. Then I will show why was abletoprove thatany finitesegmentontherealnumberline–regardlessofhow would berighttothinkofthesegment’slengthassumlengthsthose correspondence to any other proper subset on the real number line,and to the real of realnumberscannotbeputinaone-to-onecorrespondencewiththeintegers. ence with the set of positive integers, which is neither gap free nor dense. Cantor each ofitsmembershasfinitelymany predecessors.Anexampleofadenumerable was abletoestablishaone-to-onecorrespondencebetween thesetofintegersand tn consistsofslicesS1+S2+…+Sn.Letussay thetemporaldurationofuniverse the growing block,we willrunintoaproblem. Thesumtotalofrealityatany time tance function (see Dainton 2010, 281-283). But if we try to apply this answer to themselves donotmatter.Theadditionof a singlepointtoaninterval hasnoeffect to thecontinuum,whichmodelscontinuumafterrealnumberline.Cantor they cannotexistpriortothebecomingoftheircontent. the bigbang, therewillbenotemporal durationatall.Another thingisthataccording treat everyday objects. denumerable. Aninfinitesetisdenumerableifitcanbeorderedinsucha way that ferent sizesofinfinity.Aninfinitesetcanbeeitherdenumerable(countable)ornon the Cantoriansolutioncannotbeappliedtogrowing block. there are more rational numbers than integers on finite segments of the same length, the setofrationalnumbers,whichisdense,butnotgapfree.Sodespitefactthat as oftn+1begreaterthantheduration oftimeastn?Even ifwe assumethatas a thenewtimetn+1,whicharealsodurationless. Sohow canthedurationoftime as oftimetnisnotthesumduration the temporalslicesforming it(which sion, we cannotsay thattheaddingofSn+1toblockmakesitgrow inrespectto amount ofpointsfor ittohave length. Thelengthisthedistancebetween theinter- short orlong–containsthesamenumberofpointsasany othersegmentonthereal size oftheirsmallerparts.Ifasegmentthesidewalk consistsofpaving stones,we short, containsthesamenumberofpointsasentirerealline(Dainton set istheofintegers.Alldenumerablesetscanbeputinaone-to-onecorrespond- Furthermore, any propersubsetontherealnumberlinecanbeputinaone-to-one ry”. According tomeasuretheory,aninterval mustcontainnon-denumerablyinfinite number line,andastheentirerealline.IwillbrieflypresentCantorianac- number lineitself.Hence,any segmenton acontinuousline,nomatterhow longor paving stones.Butsinceany segmentonacontinuouslinecontainsthesamenum- points itconsistsof.Ineveryday life, we takethesize of objectstobethesum its temporal duration.Andifwe assumethereisastarting pointtorealitysuch as has tobezero).Reality thenincreasesthroughthebecomingofanewsliceSn+1at boundaries of its potential parts. Moreover, the problem of locations still remains as by addingupitspoints?Oneway available inmathematicsiscalled“measuretheo- ber of points regardless of its length, we would be wrong to treat it the same way we both infinitesetshave thesamenumberofmembers.ButasCantorproved, theset n therealreadywas a pre-existingfour-dimensional blockwith temporalexten- Cantor proved somethingthatseemscounter-intuitive: thattherearedif- Let usmove ontoanapproachthatmightallow for theinstantaneousslic- But whatotherways aretheretodetermine thelengthofaninterval ifnot

91 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo As thisdefinitionmakes very clear,aconsequenceofdensityisthatmember As previouslymentioned,theB-theoriesoftime neednotbethreatenedby thenotion The truenatureoftime isgiven tousby ourintuition.Thosewho holdtheseviews cessor comesintobeing,thereisnoway ofcomingupwithinfinitelymany slices in of reality.Theserelations,onceformed, areeternallyfixed (Broad 1923, 69).Soonce ed to the sum total of reality through becoming, it comes into relations with the rest one ofthekeycommitmentsgrowing blockview.Onceatemporalsliceisadd- of thepoint-likeinstant,andmorespecifically thepoint-likepresent.B-theoretical endorsing differentsolutions. ThinkerslikeBergson,Brouwer, Wyle, andothersassert of thegrowing blocktoo? Cantorian continuumorthenotionthatpoints arepotentialorideal.Soperhapsthe dense seriescannothave animmediate successororpredecessor.Thiscontradicts formed throughbecoming. tive A-theoreticalbecomingconflictswiththepropertyofdensity.TheB-theoristcan the B-theoryandthoseofA-theorythatkeepsgrowing blocktheoristfrom the growing blocktimeseries,therecanonlybeafiniteorzeronumberofelements. to theproblemofcontinuum.Thebindisthat thedoctrineofinstantaneous time isspace-likeandsoB-theoristsarenotcommitted eithertotheobjectivityof that thenumbered,mathematical notionofthecontinuumisnothow timeisinitself. time andaccept aprimitive pre-metrical notionofthepresent. Couldtheproponents form adenseseries: to measuretheory,aninterval mustcontainanon-denumerablyinfinitenumberof are a non-denumerably infinite number of points composing the continuum. But this still acceptthattheindefinitedivisibilitywillnever leadtoindivisiblesorthatthere achieving resolution. The fact that the B-series of time is formed through consecu- sor and every single a new slice becomes on the edge of reality, a relation of succession is formed between answer tothegrowing block’sproblem canbefound intheA-theoreticalsolutions are freetoassertthatall thatexistsisacompletelyunifiedandindivisible durationof Euclid defined thestraight line asa lengthwithout breadth,and ifthe line means givingupcompletelyonany A-theoretical notions. Suchablockcannever be present isincompatiblewithbecoming(Craig2000, 236).ApureA-theoryisopento present momentortoitsdynamicity.Thus,the B-theoristsarefreetoembracethe points between every two points on the line. Namely, that instances in time points inorderfor ittohave measure,whichleadsustotheproblemofdensity. it andthepreviousslices.Thus,every pointonthetimeserieshasonedirectpredeces- is composedofpoints,we takethattomeanthereareinfinitely many between themasdensityrequires.Inotherwords: between two differentelements of (Huntington 2003,34) finity of other elements; so that no element has a successor, and no element a predecessor Between every two elementsofadenseseriestherewillbeatleastoneandtherefore anin- III.3. III.2. Once again,itisthecombinationofmetaphysical commitmentsof The ProblemofDensityandBecoming Pure A-TheoreticalSolutions past slice has one direct successor. Once a slice’s immediate suc-

92 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 79-84). Broad declares that it is misleading to call becoming “a change” (Broad 1923, Another istoreconceive thegrowing blockinsuchaway thatcantranscendthecon- The Cantorianviewofthecontinuumisnotwithout itsweaknesses, whichgave rise This is a direct result of its being a hybrid A-B-theory. The fact that the growth of the 246). Byacceptingaprimitive pre-metricalnotionofthepresent,A-theoreticmeta- 68), whichisonereasonitcannotfitwiththeideaexpressedasBergson’sdurée come welded togetherintoaunified continuum.(Bell 2019, 163; Dainton2010, 306). of continuity.Oneapproachistocontinuelookingfor otheraccountsofcontinuity. continuum that I tested so far conflict with the A-theoretical elements of the grow- events intimeareorderedandrespecttowhichrealitykeepsexpanding.Suchor- with suchconceptionsoftemporalcontinuityliesinthefactthatgrowing block or ashe puts it:«thebasicrealityis things acting»(Priorunpublished, in Craig2000, growing block. réele, orPrior’sideathatthereisnotransitionofinstantsfrombeingfutureto the analogyofreal number line,asthetruecontinuumrequiresan even greater tinuum, thesepointsmust bewelded together,whichcannotbeconceptualized using taking extension as fundamental. Perhaps one of them could be a better fit for the to (roughly)two groupsofopposingviews: thehyper-dense Peirceancontinuumand flicting traits.Oritcouldbethatthegrowing blockspacetimeisinherentlydiscrete. dered homogenousspace-liketimeisincompleteoppositiontothesenotionsofdu- tion suchas“whatisthepresenttime?”or“how longisthepresenttime?”vary de- the viewthatthereisnosuchthingaspresentsimpliciter.Theanswers toques- sis thattimeisacontinuum.AlltheB-theoreticalsolutionsfor theproblemsof IV. accept suchnotion.Perhapsthemostevidentincompatibilityofgrowing block stantly, but once something enters existence, it remains unchanged (Broad 1923, 66, allows for durationtobetakenaspriormetrics. second, the present hour or the present decade (Loizou 1986 in Craig 2000, 248). This I showed thatinacontinuousgrowing blockuniverse, thepresenthasnoduration. number of points: nothing less than the maximal possible number of points. When not merelybeacollection ofinfinitelymany points.Inordertogenuinely form acon- packed inthis hyper-dense manner, thepointslosetheir individualidentity andbe- ration andcontinuity. present tobeingpast:thetimeisallthatexistsandchangeinthings, ment, but is also, in a way, committed to a static block; new things come to be con- raising Zeno’sparadoxes ofpluralityandmotion.Onepossiblesolutionisadheringto physics canavoid Zeno’sparadoxes (Craig2000,248). Butthegrowing blockcannot pending onthecontextinwhichtheyareasked.“Presenttime”canmeanpresent ically appealing theory,so it would be beneficial tofinda way tosettletheproblems ing block,andviceversa. Butthegrowing blockisstillavery intuitively andmetaphys- is committedtotheclaimthatthereatemporaldimensionalongwhichallof block canonlyoccurthroughtemporalslicesofzeroextensionconflictswiththe- IV.1. The idea underlying the hyper-dense continuum is that the continuum can- A-theoretical becomingcannotendorseaninstantaneouspresentwithout The growing blockmay holdtoadynamic thesisregardingthepresentmo- Conclusion Revising theOrthodox Continuum

93 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 310). Taking extensionasfundamentalcanprovide asolutiontotheparadox ofplu- T-instantaneous, buthas Θ While this view was proven useful in solvingsome of thepuzzlescontinuum (Broad 1959, 769-772) (see Dainton2010, 307-309), itishardtosee how hyper-density couldbeappliedto of theblockcannotoccurthroughbecomingdurationlessinstants,yet at extension asfundamentalistoabandontheideathatpointsaremostfun- conceived ashaving indivisible,extensionless parts –i.e.thepointsthatconstitutea of thecontinuumhave extension,no matterhow small. True, theorthodox contin- of smaller lines, and so on without ever reaching a bottom level (Dainton 2010, 309- ordinary time.AtemporalsliceshallberepresentedasapointtontheT-axis.Butif can beextended.ThinkofthingsintimeasorderedalongaT-axis,whichstandsfor ous presentandsuggeststhattimecouldhave anotherdimensionalongwhichslices we adda theses asthegrowing block.Butthegrowing events theorydeparts fromthegrow- finite regressionorcircularity. the sametimeitmustthusoccur.Onabove suggestion,thetemporalsliceis damental constituentsofaline.Instead,thepartslinearelines,whichmade the growing blockviewgiven theproblemofregulardensityandbecomingdiscussed the blockisconstructed. abstraction form existingevents, andsoaretheinstantaneousslices: accepting asecondtemporaldimensionstillseemslikeslipperyslopeleadingtoin- slice would be represented by a straight line of finite extension, parallel to the straight line–anditisthisthatthedifferencebetween theviews hingeson. To take III. Moreover, whilethereappearstobenoinconsistencyonthisparticularaccount, In “AReply toMyCritics”,Broadhimself deals withtheproblemofinstantane- II – there must be such a bottom level in the form of instantaneous slices from which poses atheoryofgrowing events thatstill holdstothesameontologicalanddynamic rality, but itisincompatible with thegrowing block because –asIshowed insection uents ofreality(Perović 2019, 19). Sothecontinuous four-dimensional blockisbutan uum alsohasthepropertyofbeinginfinitelyandindefinitelydivisible,butitis ing blockinthattheformer, events arethemostfundamentalontological constit- instantaneous andextended.However, Idonotseeany way how incorporating is hardtoseehow theycanever reachsuchmaximal quantity. in sectionIII.2.Moreover, sincethetemporalslicescomeintoexistenceoneby one,it by adheringtoatheoryofgrowing events, ratherthangrowing block.Perović pro- -duration canhelpthegrowing blockovercome theproblemsdescribedinsection events take some time to unfold and such temporal extendedness of an event is difficult(if events] theorist’sevents; rather, events aremetaphysically prior and instantaneousslices and theirpropertiesareabstractions fromevents. Thisisjustanother way ofsaying that ties. (Perović 2019, 20) not impossible) torecover frominstantaneoustemporal slicesofobjectsandtheir proper- […] itisnotsuchsliceswith their instantaneouspropertiesthatbuilduptheGE[growing IV.2. There mightstillbeaway toloosentheclutchofsomecommitments Recall thattheproblemthispaperisconcerned withisthatthegrowth Extension asfundamentalisthenotionthatmostparts Θ -axis, whichstandsfor anadditionaltemporaldimension,the The Growing BlockRevised Θ -duration, soonemightsay itsucceeds inbeingboth Θ -axis.

94 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 353). Sophysics gives usevidencecontra thegrowing block,beitcontinuousordis - The propertiesofthediscreteandcontinuousarediametrically crete. Evidenceinsupportofthegrowing block may turnupinthefuture(morelike- ents. Soperhapsifthegrowing blockisdiscrete,thereneedbenotension inthefact considering adiscreteaccountofthegrowing block,questionsfromthephysical of any discretedurationoftimeendsinindivisible atomicquantitiescalledchronons. opposed. Whilethecontinuoustemporalinterval isindefinitelydivisible,thedivision ory’s originalcommitmenttotheprivilegedpresent,avariant ofthegrowing event objective present,orthecommitmentofgrowing blocktotemporalorderand could not be farther from the growing block. They do not incorporate the notion of crete (Dainton2010, 300-301; Rovelli 2018, 54-56). Chronons are usually defined as a certain minimal physical quantity. Indeed,when On theotherhandthereisworry thatthesetwo theoriesdifferonsuchfunda- On thisaccounttheuniverse grows, butitisagrowing event ratherthanagrowing growing block,andcertainlytothenotionof theobjective present.(Miller2013, 352- they can have a metric and they can be seen as formed of their smallest constitu- growing event theoristhave an“edge of existence”andstillavoid theB-theoretical to overcome theproblems of additionandlocations mentionedinsection III.1.But the slicescould betemporallyextended, ratherthaninstantaneous, we willbe able that itstemporalduration isconstructedthroughthebecomingoftemporal slices.If tinuous spacetime)andthegrowing blockare farfromaperfect fit.Thespecialtheo- tum mechanicsmightsupportadiscretespacetime,andtherearestillsomevery the very edgeofbeing(Perović 2019, 22)andthequestionremains:how canthe they arethesourceoftheory’sstrongintuitive appeal,andtheblockslicesare tological and dynamic theses of the growing block, because it may very well be that the continuum.Perhapsthisisasacrifice worth makinginordertopreserve theon- fixed, objective temporalrelationsordirection,and«inthe vast universe thereis direction. AsRovelli putsit:«Time hasloosenedintoanetwork ofrelationsthatno sciences arise.Whilesomeofourbestsciencereliesonthecontinuitytime,quan- succession? meantime, thereisstillvalue ininvestigating otherconsequencesofadiscretegrow - ry ofrelativityposesachallengetoboththeontological anddynamicalthesesofthe needs tobeconstructedthatidentifiesthepresentnotwith“ongoingness”but rather itreplacesit.Perović alsonotesthatinordertokeepthegrowing blockthe- mental grounds,thatthegrowing events theoryisnotadefence ofthegrowing block, not indispensablefeatures, but–somemightsay –redundantandeven disqualifying. nothing thatwe canreasonably call“present”»(Rovelli 2018, 59). promising theories, such as quantum gravity, according to which time might be dis- ing blockpicture. ing event theoristmightbeabletoadoptadifferent,moreA-theoreticalaccountof ly intheform ofphilosophicalarguments,rather thanscientificobservations). Inthe longer holdstogetherasacoherentcanvas» (Rovelli 2018, 58).Reality possesses no block, anditconsistsofaccumulatingevents, ratherthanslices.Itappearsthegrow- block metaphysic. Theymightentailadynamicmetaphysical picture,butonethat IV.3. A clearadvantage of takingspaceandtimeasdiscreteisthat,onthis view, On theotherhand,specialtheoryofrelativity(whichsupportsacon- But itseemsthatthetheoriesinquestiondonotconcurwithagrowing Can theGrowing BlockbeDiscrete?

95 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo one (orinthefirstsingularinstantaneoussliceofexistence,if you prefer) stepping commitments of the block on the one hand, and its B-theoretical commitments on change inthegrowing blockisreducibletobecoming(Broad1923, 67) doesnotcon- can onlybecomeonthevery edgeofreality.Andthefactthatevery othertypeof en duration?Perhapstheanswer isthatthefeatures ofthepresentsliceentailthat ent B-locations,andtherefore –by theway B-locationsareformed –consistsofmore ons doexist,theirsizewillbeuniform anddetermined.Inthewords ofLeeSmolin: which inevitablyconflicts withthedoctrinethattimeiscontinuous.The A-theoretical Of alltheoptions Iconsidered,the growing event theory andthediscrete growing from section IImust be rejectedfor discrete time, orelsewe end up backinsquare the durationofentireblockcouldbeadditive. from tion torealitycouldbeanatomicslice.Butwhatwillofourcommitmentthe the other, rule out any possibility to resolve this tension. It seems that the answer that becomingwilloccurthroughtheaccumulation ofinstantaneoustemporalslices, the continuityoftime.Thedefining features ofthegrowing block’spresentdemand the next.Theslicesjustbecomeandby theconsecutiveness ofthatbecomingthey the block,asitisnottraverse oftheblock’sedgefromonetemporallocationto duration of the slicesandhow isitdetermined? Will theystillbeuniform once giv- the ideaofdiscretegrowing block.Butsomequestionsstillremain.Whatisthe flict withthefact thatoncetheycome intoexistence, theslicesremainstatic.Any the extensionofasingleslicecanonlybeasgreatsmallest to beincoherentandirrelevant (seeCraig2000,240-242). Butitseems thatifchron- than asingleslice.Butwhatkeepsthemfrombeingshorterchronon?There sarily. The growth of the block is not a kind of motion and must not be mistaken for are stillvoices inthediscussionwhodoubtwholenotionofchronons,claimingit space; any duration greater than a chronon is spread between more than two differ - B-series? Cansuchanaccountgive risetoZeno’sparadoxes ofmotion?Notneces- In conclusion,asahybrid A-B-theorythegrowing blockposesauniqueproblemto B-theoretical way suchasRussell’s“at-at”theory. right intoZeno’sparadox ofplurality.Butmaybe by acceptingthedoctrinethattime motion (Broad 1959, 766-767), so there isnoneed to explainhow the block grows no paradoxical entitiessuchas“present”sliceswithsuccessors,andthelatestaddi- might bethatthegrowing blocktheorycannotholdontoallofit. Itsdefenders will nothing paradoxical abouttemporalslicesjustcomingintoexistenceontheedgeof motion ofobjectsacrossspaceinthegrowing blockcanbeanalysed inacompletely possible lapseoftime:thechronon.Theonlythingthatcanbeuneven isthequal- is discrete,thegrowing blocktheoristcansalvage theextendedpresent.Thatway, itative differencebetween two slices,namelydifferencesacrossthedimensionsof long asthepresentslicecannotbedividedintofurtherslices,therewill have togive upeither some ofthetheory’scommitments, orthecontinuity oftime. before we canarrive atthatconclusion,theargumentsagainstextendedpresent According toloopquantum gravity, spaceismadeofdiscreteatoms eachofwhichcarriesa (Smolin 2000a,106inDainton2010,300). which isarbitrarilybigorsmall–instead,thevolume mustbeoneofafinitesetnumbers tiny unitofvolume. Incontrasttoordinarygeometry,agiven regioncannothave avolume t n tot Thinking backtothedefining features ofthegrowing block’spresent,as I trustthatthislineofthoughthasthereaderspaperwarming upto n+1 withoutever traversing infinitely many locations inbetween. Thereis

96 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo on acontinuousgrowing blockview. on theotherhand,isabletopreserve alloftheelementsthatseemedcontradictory growing events theoristswillbeforced tokeeptheB-commitments,willtheystill tions: iftheysucceedindisposingoftheB-theoreticalcommitmentsentirely,would it to thegrowing block’sontologicalanddynamicaltheses,buttherearestillopenques- still beagrowing block?Andcouldthetheorystillsupportanobjective present?Ifthe block seemthemostpromising.Thegrowing events theoristsshouldbeabletohold be abletoadoptanA-theoreticalaccountfor continuity?Thediscretegrowing block,

97 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Aristotle (2008).Physics. (Waterfield, R.trans.).(Bostock,D.ed.)Oxford University Craig, W.L. (2000a).TheTensed TheoryofTime:ACriticalExamination. Springer Stillwell J.(2002).TheContinuum Problem.TheAmerican Mathematical Monthly. Id. (1959). A Reply to My Critics. In The Philosophy of C.D. Broad , ed. Paul Arthur Broad, C.D.(1923). Scientific Thought. NewYork: Harcourt,Brace&Company, Inc. Braddon-Mitchell, D.(2004)How dowe know itisnow now? Analysis, 64(3),199–203. Bourne, C.(2002).WhenamI?Atensetimefor sometensetheorists?Australasian Bell, J.L.(2019). TheContinuous, theDiscreteandInfinitesimalinPhilosophy and Rovelli, C.(2018). TheOrderofTime.(AllenLane). Perović, K.(2019). ThreeVarieties ofGrowing BlockTheory.Erkenntnis, 1-23. Miller, K. (2013). Presentism, eternalism, and the growing block. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon McTaggart, J.E.(1908). Theunrealityoftime.Mind17(68), 457–474 Huntington, E.V. (2003).TheContinuum andOtherTypes ofSerialOrder.Dover Forrest, P. (2004). The real but dead past: A reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Forbes, G.(2016). Thegrowing block’spastproblems.PhilosophicalStudies,173, Forbes, G.(2015). Accounting for ExperiencesasofPassage:Why Topology Isn’t Dainton, B.(2010). TimeandSpace.Durham:Acumen. Journal ofPhilosophy, 80(3),359–371. 358–362. Vol. 109, No.3(Mar.,2002),286-297. (Eds.), 699–709. Mathematics. SpringerVerlag. Schilpp, LibraryofLivingPhilosophers(NewYork: Tudor) Netherlands. London:Kluwer Academic Publisher. Press. Enough. Topoi 34, 187–194 publication, Inc. Bibliography A companiontothephilosophy oftime.Malden,MA:Wiley-Blackwell. Analysis, 64(4),

98 The Growing Block and the Problem of the Continuum — Shira Yechimovitz Shira — of the Continuum and the Problem Block Growing The  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The standard account of micro-structure the is of time TIME views the time line asconsisting line time the ofviews undenumerably Francesco Orilia useful questionsuseful and comments. wish Ialso thank to two anonymous suggestions. valuable for their referees forand Philosophy the Society of Time. Iwish thank organizers to the support for their and audience the for many conferencethe The Time-continuum in Imperia, of Italy, September Siegen 5-6,2019,organized by University the at , has presented been and Presentness, Temporal Succession * Presentism, A version of paper, this title the with of time suchof time aspresentism, according which to only based on Cantor’s conception of continuity and thus what is present exists, for it seems to leave no room leave to ispresent seems forwhat it exists, for the instants of line.for instants the aCantorean time This paper earlier thanmany ordered instants earlier by B-theoretic the durationless instants. durationless Cantorean the conceptiondate and more generally defends aversion can accommo of that presentism - Presentism andtheMicro-Structure relation. relation. This problematic for an mayseem A-theory any approach micro-structure the based on to of time of Time Università di Macerata Università PRESENTISM * ETERNALISM CONTINUITY arch for paper. this image, which has supported- rese imageand scientific the manifest ofnator project the PRIN2017 momentthe coordi he isnational - mind metaphysics. and analytic At philosophy of language, of logic and concern mainly arch the interests - Hisrese of Macerata. University philosophy of language the at Francesco isprofessor of Orilia DISCRETENESS The 99  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 6, 2020): explain why thisview iswell equippedtodealwiththechallenges posedby theabove cro-structure oftime,how timesareconnected. In§3,Ishallbrieflyreviewthemain oretical optionsregardingthenatureoftimes, i.e., instantsandintervals, andthemi- erence totheCantoreanaccountofcontinuitytime,hasbeenraisedasfol- with themhere(for my takeonthem,seeOrilia2016). er consensus. Indeed, much of the literature on presentism involves criticisms of it Cantorean conception,butwithwhatIwould liketocallinstantism. BythisImeana micro-structure oftime, stantivalist presentism , can successfully address these problems, and thusbe con- general standpointregarding,intheterminologyofNewton-Smith(1980, ch.6), the generally, Ishallarguethatapresentismofthissortiscompatiblenotonlywiththe from thepoint ofviewdurationism, apresentistaccount ismoreproblematic.This, quotation. In§5,we shallseethat,ifwe lookatevents from thepointofviewin- traced backtoAristotle’sconceptionofthecontinuum (Physics, 6).This,Ishallalso tions, orintervals oftime,arefundamental, may becalleddurationism, andcanbe stantism, substantival presentismcandealwith them.However, ifwe lookat them standpoints intemporal ontologyandintroducesubstantival presentism. In§4,Ishall argue, indeedconstitutesahurdlefor presentism. sidered compatiblewithCantor’saccountofthecontinuum,asappliedtotime.More I. Presentism is an A-theory of time, according to which only present things exist. It I shallarguethatpresentism,oratleastanappropriateversion ofpresentism,sub- maker problemandtheofcross-temporalrelations.However, Ishallnotdeal many seriousdifficultiesthatpresentismmustconfront.Mostnotoriously,thetruth- minority view,sincetheB-theoryoftime,orB-eternalism,appearstoenjoy alarg- in my view, suggeststhatpresentism shouldfavour instantismover durationism.I instants asfundamental.Theoppositegeneral standpoint, accordingtowhichdura- ing blocktheorists.Asamatteroffact,despiteitscommonsensicalappeal,thereare is very muchdebatednowadays andhasmany supporters,although itisprobablya lows inthecallfor papersfor thisissueofPhilosophy kitchen (consultedonApril by B-theorists, or even by non-presentist A-theorists, such as A-eternalists or grow- (uncountable) infinityofinstants?Inthecontemporarydebatesabouttimeinanalyticmeta- questions. Itisnotclearhow thisunderstandingcouldbecompatiblewithPresentism.Insofar certain propertiesofthecontinuumspace.Thisleaves openthequestionwhethersuchan account canbeappliedtotemporalcase.Isthetime-continuumthoughtasanactual as somethingcontinuous,henceextensive, andpassing? seems toimplycommitmentEternalism.Moreover, theCantoreanmodelgives priorityto as itpresupposes anactual infinite of distinct temporal points, the Cantorean continuum the continuousnatureoftimewithitsdynamic.How cantimebeconceived simultaneously temporal relations(A-Theory). These problemsraiseafundamentalissue:thatofreconciling the temporalorderbasedonrelation“earlierthan”.Hence,challengeofintegratingthis model holdsfor any theorywhichconsiderstemporalpassagetobemore fundamentalthan physics, theCantoreanaccountofcontinuumisoftenpresupposed. Thisraisesaseriesof It isimportanttounderlinethattheCantoreanaccountwas originallyconstruedtoformalize Introduction I shallproceedasfollows. In§2Ishall brieflyreviewthemaindifferent- I shallratherfocus onafurtherproblemfor presentism,which,withref- which, liketheCantoreanconception,admitsdurationless

100 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Are theretimes?Althoughsomephilosophersendorseoratleasttakeasaserious (negative and)positive integers.Instant-densitism holdsthattimeisdense, i.e.,ithas tionism option eliminativismabouttimes(Chisholm1990; Hestevold 2008),thisoptionis or suminquestion.Given thisline,occurringatatimeisbeingmemberofcertain of simultaneousevents (Pianesi&Varzi 1996), wherecompleteness mustbeunder- of dates.Timesmay beeitherintervals, e.g.,thehourgoingfromtoday’s noonsharp entities (withinstantsordurationsasmorefundamental,dependingonwhetherin- vals thatcomposeitaregunks. Instant-discretism dates, e.g.,“April11, 2020,2.30p.m.Greenwich time.”Datesarenotemptyterms that were truewhenCaesardiedentailsthe proposition‹Caesardies›. that thedeathofCaesaroccurredatacertaintimemeansworld proposition time isfor apropositiontobeentailedby acertainworld proposition;for example, doctrine aboutspace(Dainton2010, 2)),accordingtowhichtimesaresuigeneris tions, notallofwhichareequallyopentothedifferentontologicalviews tobereviewed the natureoftimes. to today’s 1p.m.sharp,ortheinstantofbeginningthisinterval, today’s noon tive entities; i.e., to use a now-fashionable terminology, time is tions are fundamental, and any duration is infinitely divisible into smaller and smaller tive real numbers(negative numbersenterthepicture iftimeistakento have no the structureof(negative and)positive rationalnumbers.Instant-continuism shall conclude,in§6,withsomeruminationsonwhichversion ofonstantismmay be all detailshow theworld may beat aninstant;theworld propositiontruenow isthe set, orbeingapartofcertainwhole.Analternative reductionistoption,proposedby stood asnolackofany event simultaneouswithsomeevent comprisedintheclass simultaneous events (Russell1914; Whitehead1929) oracompletemereological sum according to whichtimes are reduced to events. A time iseitheracompleteclass of sharp. Such items are what we are discussing about in considering Instantism and stantism ordurationismisaccepted),andtheoccurrenceofevents atthemisaprim- II. sion, orstretchoftime)issomehow made up ofthem.According tothelatter,dura- Prior (Prior1968, ch.11), istoviewtimesasworld propositions,whichrepresentin Durationism, butbefore turningtothat,letusbrieflyconsidertheoptionsregarding most problematic.Itishardtodeny thatwe succeedinreferring tosomethingwith not totimes?Letusassumethenthattherearetimesandtheythereferents rationless orpoint-likeinstantsarefundamental andany duration(interval, exten- propositions that will be true count as future instants. In thisaccount,tooccurata present instant,whileworld propositionsthatwere truecount aspastinstants,and itive andunanalyzablerelation.Asregardsreductionism,letusfirstconsiderrela- intervals, withoutever reachingdurationless instants,whichexist,atbest,asderiva- like “thewingedhorse”orroundsquare,”andwhatdowe refer towithdatesif holds thattime iscontinuous,i.e., it hasthestructureof the(negative and) posi- better for thepresentist. below. Theprimitivistoptionissubstantivalism (about time; there is an analogous doctrine about space (Dainton 2010, 2)), Times andtheMicro-structureofTime What aretimes?Thereisaprimitivist option andvarious reductionistop- We can furtherdistinguishthreealternative roadswithinInstantism. Let usgobacktoinstantism holds thattimeisdiscrete, i.e.,ithasthestructureofset and durationism. According totheformer, du - (about time;thereisananalogous gunky, and the inter-

101 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo A-properties, andaretakentobemorefundamentalthanB-relations suchasbeing 301), capableofanswering Zeno’sparadoxes (Grünbaum1968). However, duration- We traditionally distinguish between A- and B-theoriesof time (see, e.g., Loux2006 count for timepassageunderstoodasthebecomingpresentofsometemporalitems erties suchaspastness,presentnessandfuturity.Suchpropertiesaretakentoac- or events, which are past, present or future only in a subjective sense, dependent on contrast, B-relationsaremostfundamental and areobjectively exemplified by times earlier orsimultaneous.Thesearetypicallyconsidered,totheextentthatthey cro-structure oftime,mentionedinthequotationfromCallfor papersinthe erties alsoexemplify B-relationsatbestinaderivative sense.For example,Socrates’s exemplify pastness,presentnessorfuturity.Alltheentitiesthatexemplify suchprop- emplifies pastness,thesecondpresentnessandthirdfuturity. Furthermore, there of (letussuppose)thefirsthumanlandingonMars.Thethemobjectively ex- events ofSocrates’drinkingthehemlock,my pressingtheK of A-properties. events, exemplifying pastness and presentness, as the case may be. Futurity may at tions, aswe shallsee.Assounderstood,pastness,presentnessandfuturityarecalled that were previouslyfuture,whilesomeothertemporalitemsthatwere previously for asurvey andreferences tosupportersofsuchviews). According tothefor- their beingorderedby B-relations.Thus,thereisnotimepassageunderstoodinterms denumerably orundenumerablymany, dependingontheformer orthelatteroption, trast, in both instant-densitism and instant-continuism, no instant has an immediate the to thepreviousexamples, thereexistSocrates’drinkingthehemlock, my pressing drinking thehemlockisearlierthanhuman landingonMarsinasmuchasthefor- the future-tensed proposition ‹a human will land on Mars› is true, and accordingly admitted, somehow reducibletoA-properties. According tothelatterapproach, in successor, for inbetween any two instantsthereareinfinitelymany otherinstants; sentness andfuturity,respectively. Finally, even theobjectsinvolved insuchevents, are thetimesatwhichsuchevents takeplace, whichalsoexemplify pastness,pre - and futurityobjectively accruetobothevents andtimes.For example,therearethe III. Socrates, thecupwithhemlock,myself, my laptop,thehumanlandingonMars,all mer approach, there are in a most fundamental sense objectively exemplified prop- notable supporters,includingPeirceandWhitehead,recentlyhasseensomething respectively. mer event ispastandthelatterfuture. most beattributed topropositions, totheextentthatthey willbetrue; for example, present becomepast.Thesetemporalitemsmay betimes,events, oreven proposi- past, presentandfutureareequallyreal,theyallexist.Thus,pastness,presentness block theory,onlypastandpresentexist, andthefutureisnotreal.Thus,goingback ism, ormoregenerallytheAristotelianconceptionofcontinuum,hashaditsown introduction. This arguably constitutes the standard view nowadays (Dainton 2010, like arevival (seeDainton2010, §17.7, for references). beginning). Ininstant-discretism,any instanthasanimmediatesuccessor.Incon- K key onmy laptop, theobjectsinvolved insuchevents, andthetimesofsuch According toanotherA-theoretical approach,pastism,orthegrowing According toA-eternalism,whatisoftencalledthespotlight view oftime, Temporal Ontologies Instant-continuism amountstotheCantoreanconceptionofmi- key onmy laptopand

102 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo when the present-tensed proposition “a human is landing on Mars” will be true, it will occurrence exist,andtheyallenjoy presentness.Pastnessandfuturitymay atmost only my pressingtheK occurring atallthetimesinsequence,only oneworld propositioncouldbetrue change can hardly be accounted for (Newton-Smith 1980, ch. 6, §6). If there were a ontological details,whichneednotdetainushere).According tothisapproach,past, could thenbesaid,inasense,toearlierthanthelatter. viewed as ordered by this relation, with presentness thus shifting from onetime to will betrue,andcanthussaidtoexemplify pastness.Again, theformer proposition tion couldbesaid,inasense,toearlierthanthelatter(itmay be worth notingthat true, and can thus be said to exemplify futurity. Consequently, the former proposi- the correspondingpresent-tensedproposition “a humanislandingonMars”willbe the reductionoftimestoevents, namelythat thepossibilityoftimepassagewithout dorsed withoutcircularity(see,e.g.,Newton-Smith1980, ch.6,§6;Meyer, 2013, ch.9). tist cansay thattherearepastandfuture times.Thereishowever awidespreadopin- times as well. Thus, presentists, following the lead of Prior, have typically resorted to a future times,andthelatteralsolackpastevents, andthuscannotconstructpast drinking the hemlock is past in that it is earlier than my tokening this sentence, which they are past, present or future, but only in a subjective sense pretty much as things tively arrangedintermsofbeingearlierorsimultaneous,and,onthebasisthis, tion of time, because it cannot rely on the being earlier relation freely available to the for thewholeperiod,whichwould mean, given theidentificationoftimes with world as IwilldistinguishinawhiledifferenttypesofPresentism.StandardPresentism advantages for thesubstantivalist option.First,we may noteaproblemsharedwith spectively. Inasimilarway, thetimes atwhichsuchevents occurandthustheobjects are spatiallyhere,nearorfarinrelationtoagiven subject.For example,Socrates’s and incertainpeculiar imaginary circumstanceseven inferable (Shoemaker1969). Second, ithasbeenclaimed thatpresentismisintroubleaccounting for thedirec- Be thisasitmay, thereareanumberofotherdifficultieswiththisproposaloratleast Pastism andPresentism,for theformer lackfutureevents andthuscannotconstruct B-eternalists couldacceptareductionoftimestoevents, thisoptionisnotopento B-theorist (Oaklander, 2002;2003). Given substantivalism, however, timesmustbe no longerexemplify futurity,butratherpresentness). reduction oftimestoworld propositions.Oncetimesaresoviewed, even thepresen- period oftimewithoutchange,i.e.asequence oftimeswiththevery sameevents present andfuturearealsoreal,butinadifferentsense:events andtimesareobjec- ple, thepast-tensedpropositionistrue,andaccord- position, asequenceofdistinct times.Yet, achangeless periodoftimeseemspossible, propositions, thattherewould beasingle instant, ratherthan,contrarytothesup- ply called ion thattimesaresomehow presupposedinthisapproach,sothatitcannotbeen- involved inthemarealsopast,present, orfuture. is simultaneouswithmy pressingtheK ingly thecorrespondingpast-tensedproposition holds thatonlywhatispresentexist.Hence,stillrelyingonthepreviousexamples, human landingonMars;whichmakesthelattertwo events, presentandfuture,re- be attributedtopropositions,theextentthatthey were orwillbetrue; for exam- A furthersortofA-theoryispresentism, or,letmesay, standard This briefsurvey shouldmakeitevidentthat,whereasbothA-and In theB-theoreticalcamp, we shallmention just B-eternalism,typicallysim- the B-theory (though there are many variants, as we turn to fine-grained key onmy laptop,theobjectsinvolved initandthetimeofits key onmy laptop,andearlierthanthefirst presentism,

103 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo (2002, 2013) permanentism. According toit,asWilliamson putsit(2013, 4),“always (will existatafuturetime),whileaddingthatit isnotmerelypastorfuture,sinceit earlier thantimet2.Acomparisonmay beuseful.Thesunisapresententitythat derate presentism, iselaboratedanddefended inOrilia2016. However, thereasons of whichistypicallytakentobeapresentistasset. everything is always something;”thus, for example,Socratesstillpresentlyexists, order totacklemany otherwell-known challengesthatPresentismmustconfront, ent timebecamepresent,orwilloccuratthemwhenthepresentnolonger cur atlatertimes,involving thesun;sothatsunalsoexistedatthoseearliertimes, we canconcentratefor ourpurposesonsubstantival presentism, i.e.,apresentism ence ofthetimesatpresenttimeissimply duetotheoccurrenceatpresent tions ishardlylinedupwithcommonsense(Hinchcliff, 1996, 124), thepreservation times asprimitive irreducibleentities.Moreover, Ihave alsoproposedthereinthat,in the presentistcouldsubscribetoasubstantivalist approachtotimeandthusaccept that simplyincorporatessubstantival timesandleaves itopenwhetherornotthere that motivate thatendorsementofex-concreteobjectsneednotdetainushereand though it is no longer a concrete object, as he used to be, and he is rather ex-concrete. the presentistcouldalsoaccept“ex-concreteobjects”endorsedinWilliamson’s tity inthattherewere events thatoccurredatearliertimesandevents thatwilloc- time justasmuchthepresenttime,thoughwithnoevents occurringatthem.For terminations. Thisisfineif by past fectly compatiblewiththepresenttime’sbeing adurationlessinstant.For theexist - ture. However, ofanentitythatenduresthroughtimewe cansay thatitexisted,ex- ty andcoming tohostordinaryevents andtheobjects involved inthem, e.g.,letus facts, whichoccuratthe presenttime,alltimesoccuratthe andthisis time ofallthefactssortt1isearlierthant2 . Asconstituentsofsuch another intheorderprovided by therelation.Third,areductionoftimestoproposi- are ex-concreteobjects. such events. Theothertimesexist,butare,we may alsosay, empty.Suchtimesare say, onlythepresenttimeisfilledwith events andthuswiththeobjectsinvolved in and will exist at those later times. In other words, the sun isapastandfuture entity, Presentism withsubstantival timesandex-concreteobjects,whichIhave calledmo- McTaggart, we areusedtothinkthatpast, primitive entities,always exist,always permanentlyorderedby thebeingearlier past or future, as the case may be, in that events occurredatthembefore the pres- namical A-theoretical aspect that we expect in any form ofpresentismentersthe picture. Thus, onetimeafterthe other becomespresent, thusceasingtobeemp - perfectly compatible withthepresenttimebeinganinstant. involved inevents thatoccuratthepresenttime,butitisalsoapastandfutureen- it isatthepresenttimethatthereoccurallpermanentfactsofsortt1 ion. It may be worth noting that the fact that all times exist at the present time is per- is toviewthetimesthatareearlierandlaterthan thepresenttimeinsamefash- is alsopresent(existsatthetime).This iswhatwe thinkofthesun.Theidea ists now, andwillexist,thusthatitispast (existedatapasttime),anditisfuture lation, though only the present time is such that events occur at it.That is, we may be present.Buttheyarenotmerely besides beingapresententity,butitisnotmerely According tosubstantival presentism,alltimes,understoodassuigeneris Of course, which time is the present time keeps changing, andherethe dy- In Orilia2012, Ihave proposedthat,inordertocircumvent thesedifficulties, and past orfuture,sincetheyalsoexistatthepresent future present andfutureareincompatiblede- we meanmerelypastand past orfutureentity.Following merely fu- re-

104 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo All that really matters is theassumption of aseries of instantsarranged by thebe- Zimmerman 2011 andSullivan 2012). call them so, which are the facts of the sort other ceasestobepresent,thereby becomingempty. of substantival Presentism.Thispassageraisesthefollowing difficulty forpresentism: events exist,thereby constitutingtotalpresentreality,orthe totalstateofaf- come present,arefilled with events, whilealltheotherevents are empty:onlypresent val presentismthereclearlyissuchroom. For thisapproachdoesnotviewthepre - of which,atmost,canbepresent.Hence,instant-continuismappearstoentailthat times whichareconstituentsofsuchfacts.Andcorrespondingly,onetimeafterthe taken tooccuratthepresenttime.Insodoingitremainsaform ofpresentism. quoted in the introduction, with the goal of then evaluating it from the point of view tality of the A-properties in accounting for passage. It simply gives a direction to this fairs, we may say. Thisisso,even thoughthereisanirreduciblebeingearlierB-relation to accountfor timepassage,understoodaslosingfuturityandacquiringpresentness tion, andthusthisrelationseemstobegiven ontologicalpriorityover A-properties. there are some non-present entities, and thus it appears to be incompatible with pre- the instants areundenumerably many, or rather dense or discrete, in which case the suppose, John’skissingMary,Johnandaswell asthepeculiarevents, ifwe may although framedintermsofspacetime,ratherthansimplytime,aredefended by aspect oftimeiscaptured by thefactthatinstants,oneafter other,astheybe- are lost and acquired by other instants, there is A-theoretical passage.The dynamic sentness ofaninstantsubjectively interms ofsimultaneity,asintheB-theory,but same mannerfromthepointofviewinstant-densitismandinstant-discretism. and thenpastness. sentism. Moreover, thepassageraisesaproblemfor A-theoriesingeneral,andthus stant, sumed. Letusturntosuchanswers. IV. Let usnow reconsiderindetailthepassage of thePhilosophy Kitchencallfor papers However, A-propertiesaretakentobefundamentalinanA-theory,asthey room for timepassageintermsofA-properties, onceamostfundamentalbeingear- pose thatthereare,tenselesslyspeaking,undenumerablymany instants,onlyone permanently arrangingtheinstants. Itspresenceinnoway hindersthe fundamen- plifies suchpresentnesskeepschanging,andcorrespondingly futurityandpastness presupposed by instant-continuism is ordered by the B-theoretic being earlier rela- posed by instantism.However, ittakesalltheseinstantstoexistatthepresent in- presentism canofferareequally valid, regardlessofwhich version ofinstantismisas- instant-continuism appearstopresupposeeternalism,sinceitpresup- in termsofitsobjectively having events occurringatit.Sincetheinstantthatexem - implicitly afurtherdifficulty forpresentism:Theundenumerableseriesofinstants ing section. Substantival presentism makes room for the series of instantspresup- instants are denumerably or countably many. Hence, the answers that substantival ing earlierrelation,independentlyofwhetherthisseriesiscontinuous,inwhichcase lier relationthatarrangesinstantshasbeenacknowledged. Now, given substanti- qua As regardstheseconddifficulty, theproblemhereiswhethertherestill The firstdifficultycanbeimmediatelydisposedofinthelightpreced- Instantism fromthePerspective ofSubstantival Presentism It shouldbenotedthatthesetwo issuescouldberaisedinpreciselythe constituents ofB-relationalfactstheform tisearlierthant’,whichare time t1 is earlier than time t2, and the (Somewhat analogousviews,

105 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo And thuswe shouldadmitthatthereareevents, suchasp This isthechoiceproposedby Hestevold (2008),whocallssuchanextendedpres- V. dynamic. Theformer donotinvolve changeandareperhapsmoreappropriately otherwise presentists would be committed to ahost ofpastobjects thatthey do not event; e.g.abutterfly’sflappingitswingsexactlytwice ent thatpresentistsshouldallow for had betterbethatof“an‘extraordinarilybrief’ ent a“thick”present,andthuspeaksof“ThickPresentism”.” Theoppositechoiceis,in of mindAugust’s, whichlastsfromt once we admitthis,itseemsthatwe mustalsoadmitpastevents, incontrastwith pre- occupy ourspeciouspresent,andthustheirexistencecanhardlybedenied.Andyet, cupies aninterval oftime. consider aballrapidly moving fromaplacetoanother.Intuitively, thismovement oc- called states(ofaffairs).Thelatterincontrasttypically involve changeandaremore ceases tobepresent,dependsonwhichinstantsareearlierandlaterthan of a faster movement, occupying simply the time of the second flapping of wings, or of itswingwithinonethick present,whenthesecondflappingistaking place.And ception isveridical, letusassume,andthusEDpresentlyexists.However, EDis made want toacknowledge. Buteven withsuchbriefpresents,there would bepastobjects things preciselyinthisway. To besure,acertaininterval canbe takentobepresent. that thepresentistshould notacknowledge, even simplythebutterfly’s firstflapping than otherevents. Bybeingearlierthanotherevents, theseevents canhardlybecon- this stateoccursatacertaininstant;thedurationistmay say somethingsimilarafter the presentinstant.Thatis,ift1isand02are,respectively, earlierand that ofaslightly fastermovement, takingalsothetime ofathirdflapping? Ithinkthe admitted itseemscanbesubdividedintoslices,someofwhichmustpast.And suspect, involves consciousstatessomeofwhichareearlierthan othersandmustthen sidered present.Theymustbepast,onecouldurge.Moreover, thereisaconsciousstate sisting oftheball’sbeinginp sentism. Supposefor examplethatAugust now In Casati’sandVarzi’s (2015) terminology,events canbesubdividedintostatic namic event istakentoreallyoccuratanextendedinterval oftime,andoncethisis reconstructing instantsintermsofintervals. Asanexampleofthelatter, we could moreover, what would precisely determine the length of the present? Why notthat physical andmental,presentism,onecouldthensuspect,isfalse(Orilia2012a). passage, inthesensethatwhichinstantsbecomepresent,afterpresentinstant usually called events. As an example of the former we could consider a snapshot of a up, onecouldsay, ofstaticevents following oneanother,e.g.,event e interval fromt if we acceptdurationsasprimitive andfundamental,itseems we areforced toview instantaneous ordurationless.Hestevold argues thatthedurationofthickpres- his terminology,“ThinPresentism”,accordingto whichthepresentis«thin»,that later thant1,itis2thatwillbecomepresent,whereas0always remainpast. ball’s beinginp be past,e.g.,thevisionofe ball sittingstillatacertainspecificplace.Bypresupposinginstantism we may say that

What canthepresentistreply?Theproblemisduetofactthatdy- Dynamic Events Dynamic events pose a problem for presentism. We observe them, they can 1 tot 1, thenevent e 4. ThusAugust seesacertaindynamicevent; callitED.Theper- 2 andthevisionofe 3 andfinallyevent e 2 consistingoftheball’sbeinginp 1 tot 4, his specious present, which, one could 4, hisspeciouspresent,which,onecould seesaballrunningfromp 3. Hence,thereexistpastevents, both 4 consistingoftheball’sbeinginp ” (Hestevold 2008,334). For 1, p 2, andp 2, thenevent e 1 consisting of the 1 consistingofthe 3, that are earlier 3, thatareearlier 1 top 4 in the 4 inthe 3 con- and 4. 4.

106 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo VI. erties such as those consisting of the ball’s exemplifying the following properties: event asanevent thatoccursataninstant,butinvolves theexemplification ofsuch one couldacceptpast-tensedandfuture-tensedpropertiesofthesorthaving been events assubparts of events thatoccurataninterval. Thatis,thepresentisthadbet- consisting of the ball’s moving, August has at ent-tensed properties. objects having suchpast-tensedandfuture-tensedproperties,inadditiontopres- with retentions,impressionsandprotentionswithinit,sothattheperceptionofa F at instant tor the interval fromt1to4.At timet3thereoccursastaticevent whichistheball’sbe- than durationismseemstobeabetterchoice for thepresentist. think presentiststypicallytakethepresentinthisway. Andthusinstantismrather ter takethepresenttobeadurationlessinstant,atwhichevents occur,andinfactI the speciouspresentinvolves retentions, trast withothermodelsofthespeciouspresent(seeDainton2018). According toit, tional modelofthespeciouspresent,whichcertainlyispresentist-friendly,incon- tue ofthis,we may say, therealsooccuratt3thedynamicevent whichistheball’s temporal aspectoftheperplexity iswell explained by Findlay (1941, p.156; insertions tentions), a“now” (impressions)andan“after”(protentions)withinit:retentionscor- zling character...[that] may beineliminable”(Dantoin2010, 284).Thespecifically and theappealtotensegrantedby anA-theory,itcanbedoneasfollows. Firstofall, and future-tensedproperties, respectively. Thus,inperceivingthedynamicevent simply dense,progressionintimeremainsbaffling forZenonianreasons,with“apuz- at t4(seeOrilia2012, for furtherdetails). succession isnotaofperceptionsbutoneperceptionwith“before” (re- substantivalist option.Byendordingit,thepresentistcanalsonicelyaccount for dy- In sum,the presentist has no problems with instantism, at least after accepting the resources offered by substantival presentism,i.e.,withinstantsasprimitive entities moving fromp1to4.Therearedynamicevents, inotherwords, insofarasthereare past-tensed properties.To illustrate,consideragaintheballmoving fromp1to4in presentist isbetteroffwithout having toanswer thesequestionsandwithoutpast responding totheevents consistingoftheball’shaving beeninp1attandhaving namic events. And, on the other hand, dynamic events suggest that the presentist presentist (ormoregenerallyfor whoever embracesinstantism)? ing atp3,buttherealsooccurevents involving past-tensedandfuture-tensedprop- is thatthesethreeitemsrepresentexemplifications ofpast-tensed,present-tensed, into bracketsaremine): ing inp3;aprotentioncorrespondingtotheevent oftheball’spotentiallybeinginp4 having been had better avoid durationism.Butisinstant-continuismreallythebestchoice for the been inp2att2;animpressioncorrespondingtotheevent consistingoftheball’sbe- clearer. For it isnot, essentially, a problem ofspace or quantity, butsolely oftime .... It is [W]hen we strip Zeno’sproblemofitsspatial andotherwrappings,itssignificance becomes A naturalfurtherstepistoassociatethisapproachaHusserlianreten- The problemisthat,despiteourCantoreanwisdom, acontinuous,oreven Concluding Remarks But thenhow shouldthepresentistaccountfor dynamicevents? With the in p1 att1,having been being potentially F at timet.Onecouldthenreconstructadynamic in p2 att2,beingpotentiallyin44.Byvir- impressions andprotentions. Theideahere t3 an instantaneous conscious state

107 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Thus, perhaps,onemay betemptedtosay thatoneshouldfavour instant-discre- conclusion, ...Idon’treallyknow. we couldinprincipleviewtheuseofrealsasanapproximation ofwhatwe should Quantum Mechanicsmay betakentosuggest discretetime(Dainton,2010, 299).In gests that time is continuous (Salmon 1970, 35). And fortunately, aftersettingaside though. Modernphysics couldbedonewithdiscretemathafterall:theexpertstell discreteness (Salmon1970). ty (SeeGrünbaum1968, Salmon1970). Finally,Zenodoes notonlyhave arguments diagonal is ficient tonoticethis:ifaphysical squarehasa1meterlongside, we mustsay thatits the mathusedinmodernphysics seems topresupposecontinuity.To seeit,itissuf- for commonsense,whichthepresentistissupposedtohonour.Onotherhand, tism, whichgrantsthatany instanthasanextinstant.Afterall,itismoredigestible agonal. The example suggests that we need reals to measure time, which in turn sug- against continuity.ItsStadiumparadox canbeviewed asanastyargumentagainst and Findlay’s perplexity,Zeno’sargumentsagainst continuity(theAchilles, meter persecond.Itwilltake,itseemswe shouldsay, secondstomove alongthedi- really do(Caratheodory1963; Penrose2004,ch.16). AndtheStadiumcansome- us thattherearesystems ofdiscretemathematicsthatcouldbeemployed, andthat how bedigestedby theInstant-Discretist(Dainton,2010, 296).Finally,onecouldadd, Plurality paradoxes) can beanswered by theCantoreanconceptionofcontinui- on tootherinstants. or bereplacedby any other.For before suchpartcanbereplacedby any othersimilarpart,it other, andoncethisissaidithardtounderstandhow any ultimatepartcanever passaway arrow ofZeno,standsstillin theinstant,for thesimplereasonthatithasnoway ofpassing tinuum orby thefacts of infiniteconvergent numerical series...Andtheproblemassumesits therefore foolish tothinkthatwe canmeetZeno’spuzzlesby themoderntheoryofcon- must have firstbeenreplaced by aninfinityofothersimilarparts.Ouradmissionseemsto most naturaltosay [given Instant-Densitismor–Continuism]thatnonecanbenexttoany most vexing form ifwe allow thatordinaryhappenings have ultimatepartsthattake no time [in my terminology,staticevents occupying durationlessinstants].For ofsuchpartsitseems leave uswithaworld immobilized and paralyzed, in whichevery objectand process,likethe There arepossiblerepliestotheseargumentsinfavour ofcontinuity, √ 2 meterlong.Considerthenabodymoving attheuniform speedof1 Dichotomy,

108 Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time — Francesco Orilia Francesco — of Time Micro-Structure the and Presentism  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Williamson, T. (2002).NecessaryExistents. InA.O’Hear(Ed.),Logic,Thought and Whitehead, A.N.(1929). ProcessandReality. An Essay inCosmology.NewYork: Zimmermann, D.W. (2011). PresentismandtheSpace-Time Manifold. InC.Callender Orilia F. (2012). Filosofiadeltempo.Ildibattito contemporaneo . Rome: Carocci. Oaklander, L.N.(2002).Presentism,OntologyandTemporal Experience.InC. Chishom, R.(1990). Events Without Times:AnEssay onOntology.Noûs,24, 413-428. Caratheodory, C.(1963). AlgebraicTheoryofMeasureandIntegration. NewYork: Casati, R. & Varzi, A. C. (2015). Grünbaum, A. (1968). Sullivan, M.(2012). TheMinimalA-theory.PhilosophicalStudies,158, 149-174. Shoemaker, S.(1969). TimeWithout Change.JournalofPhilosophy, 66,363-381. Salmon, W. (1970). Introduction. Id. (2003). Presentism: A Critique. In H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (Eds.), Newton-Smith, W.H. (1980). TheStructureofTime.London:Routledge. Id. (2013). ModalLogicAsMetaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russell, B.(1914). OurKnowledge oftheExternalWorld. London:AllenandUnwin. Prior, A.N.(1968). Papers onTimeandTense . Oxford: ClarendonPress. Pianesi, F. &Varzi, A.C.(1996). Events, Topology, andTemporal Relations. TheMonist, Penrose, R.(2004).TheRoad toReality. NewYork: Knopf. Id. (2016). ModeratePresentism.PhilosophicalStudies,173, 589–607. Id. (2012a) DynamicEvents andPresentism. PhilosophicalStudies,160, 407-414. Meyer, U.(2013). TheNature ofTime . Oxford: ClarendonPress. Loux, M.J.(2006).Metaphysics. AContemporary Introduction . (3ded).Routledge, Hestevold, S.(2008).Presentism:ThroughThickandThin.Pacific Philosophical Id. (2018) Temporal Consciousness.InE.N.Zalta(Ed.),TheStanford Encyclopedia Dainton, B.(2010). TimeandSpace.(2nded.).Durham:Acumen. Findlay, J.N.(1941). Time:ATreatment ofSomePuzzles.Australasian Journalof 143-167, NewJersey:Humanitiespress,1968 (pagereferences aretothis Time, Reality 78, 89–116. Quarterly, 89,325-347. (Ed.), of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), version). win2018/entries/consciousness-temporal/. Callender (Ed.),Time,Reality Chelsea PublishingCompany. Language, 233-251. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Philosophy, 19, 216-235. Repr. inR.M.Gale(Ed.),ThePhilosophy ofTime, archives/win2015/entries/events/. University Press. New York. Press. Hackett, 2001 (2nded.). Press. Macmillan. Bibliography The Oxford Handbook ofTime,163-244. Oxford: Oxford University Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes. London: Allen & Unwin. and Experience,196-211. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Events. In E. N. Zalta In Id.(Ed.),Zeno’sParadoxes, 5-44.Indianapolis: and Experience,73-90. Cambridge:Cambridge https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ (Ed.), http://https://plato.stanford.edu/ The Stanford Encyclopedia

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 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Theory (MST). Its advantage lies in that it adds it in that the to Theory lies advantage (MST).Its This paper suggests approached an answer ararely to What isMoving RightNow? question on model the known Moving asthe Spotlight Elton Marques debate a clear view of kind might the of view that nature aclear debate what isrequiredwhat correspond to “spotlight” the to in an but an approach for understanding metaphor the at bring and thesis main the to promote union the of two illuminating way and address difficulties. anticipated cates clearly what kind what of thing clearly aboutcates which mod the - correspond ‘moving the to spotlight’ responsible for components: present a)the awareness isthe of our mental states should correspond states mental passage of the to and flow b)the of states our awarenessmental or our MENTAL AWARENESS el’s us. spotlight can tell The paper’s goal main isnot ETERNALISM the defense of moving defense the the spotlight asatheory itself, passage ofthe More time. specifically, ourtheory indi- the corethe of theory. this To achieve our purpose, we time and spotlight the time to itself. We hope indicate to LanCog, of Centre Philosophy, of Lisbon University PERMANENTISM Analytic Philosophy”.Analytic Online Companion Problems to in lowship of project the aspart “The LanCog, in which he holds- afel research groupof international the Elton amember isalso eternalism. andtionship determinism between Lisbon- on athesis rela the with ved aPh.D. of from University the metaphysics- of Hehas time. recei Elton Marques works on mainly the MOVING SPOTLIGHT, CONSCIOUSNESS 111  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo «eternalism statesthat“therearesuchthingsasmerely According withthemetaphor,aspotlightilluminatingpresentmoves inuninter- eternalists, thedifferencebetween futureorpastthings objects, facts,times,relationsandevents. According to can makethepassageoftimecompatiblewithaneternalistontology,whichistyp- of time.Thosethesesare,respectively, eternalism(or cording toDeasy,thethesisthat:«itisalways thecase which points intimeareordered relatively as“being which aninstanceoftimeisabsoluteandnon-rela - way ofpresentingthemodelisby discussingitinre- true that everything is (then) present» (1999, 326). According to the same author, tive present. ture. Deasy(2015), for example,definesitasatheoryin theory” oftimehasdifferentdefinitionsin the litera- that everything existseternally»(Deasy2015, 2074). the propertyofbeingfuture, presentorpast.Thischar- to adescriptionoftime asevents orderedaccordingto sentist thinksthateverything ispresent;moregenerally,that,necessarily,italways and presentthingsisnotthattheformer doesnotexist.Thisthesiscontrastswith ally referred toastheA-series.Permanentism anything isanabsoluteandnon-relative present,while and eternalismaremostcommonlyassociatedwith anterior, posterior, orsimultaneously” toorwitheach acterisation contrastswith B-seriestheoriesoftime,in I. Eternalism isthethesisinwhichthereexistnon-present MST). MSTemergedfollowing ametaphorcoinedby C.D.Broad(1923): Before facingthechallengesthatwe imposeonthisarticle,itisfirstnecessarytoex- B-theories oftime.Theirproponentsusuallydeny that rupted fashion,travelling acrossspace-time. Itstheoreticaladvantage liesinthatit make itcompatiblewiththeMcTaggartian A-theory respond tothedesirefor atenselessontology,butalso past andfutureentities”»(1999, 326). presentism, whichmakestheoppositeclaims.InSider’sclassicformulation, «apre- permanentism), and the thesis that time passes, usu- plain thetheorywithwhichwe struggle:the“Moving SpotlightTheory”(henceforth presentism ically tenseless. In this section, we present that model ly associatedwithA-theories.Theso-called“A-series lation tothethesesitaccommodates.Suchcor- by discussing relevant aspects of its definition. We arenaturallytemptedtoregardthehistoryofworld asexistingeternallyinacertain order ofevents. Alongthis,andin afixed direction, we imaginethecharacteristicofpresent- fronts ofthehousesinastreet.Whatisilluminatedpresent,whathasbeen ness asmoving, somewhat like thespotoflightform apoliceman’sbull’s-eye traversing the is thepast,andwhathasnotyet beenilluminated isthefuture(59). A Moving Spotlight In theMcTaggartian approach,A-seriesrefers 5 7 andtransientism 6 aredoctrinestypical- 4 Permanentism 2 is,ac- 1 One 3 ard definition, indeed. definition, ard looks anon-stand7 Its like - A 3 Formally: describeto thesis. this ‘permanentism’ term the 2 Williamson (2013,4)coined inquiringare in our investigation. an aspect we of what clarifies that picture of world, the or an image provide that theories a indicate to worduse that here. We use ‘model’ however, weshould how we clarify MSTisnot like uncommon;ories 1 The use- the of to ‘model’ refer to ¬ Deasy 2015).Formally:Deasy S( (cf. exist to things cease that and exist to things start that according which to are there 6 Transientism thesis isthe present and objects events. our quantifiers consists only of more domain unrestricted of ifand istrue onlysentism ifthe 5 In amore rigorous manner, pre - formulations, Fischer see (2016). nionated introduction of different (2006:103).To ‘times’ egy, of of in existence terms the - strat instance, uses adifferent erature. Trenton for Merricks, - of in lit lations the thesis this 4There formu many are - different ∃ ∀ y =x)&S( xA ∃ y =x(cf. 2015). Deasy ∃ xF ¬ ∃ - opi A slightly y =x)). ∃ xP

112 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “eternalism orpermanentism” mightnotofferanad- The opposite would be toimpose a limit on creation:as (2001) andCameronRoss (2015), focus thetheoryon considering theadditionalclausethatpermanentism eternalist ornot. culty inprofessing apresentistpermanentism,atleast objects thatchange,etc. other. Before moving ontocharacterisetheMSTmodel,we would liketodiscuss eternalism only. es MSTasamodelthatbindstheA-seriestopermanentism,otherauthors,likeSider eternalist world thatwas, nonetheless,createdby God. vidually sufficient for any MSTmodel.Thesenseofthis vantage over Deasy’sformulation. However, itcaptures the lattercouldnotbe, for instance,aneternalistone. that includes,for instance,differentparts,i.e.,days, ages, does notfit well withourintuitionofatemporallife there benon-eternalistpermanentismandnon-per- ferent definitionsintheextantliterature.WhileDeasy(2015), for instance,propos- the thesesofpermanentismandeternalism,sincethesearerelevant partsofdif- themselves bepartofanMSTmodel.Thedisjunction ducing adisjunctionbetween permanentism andeter- and someinstantoftimeisanon-relative, absolute and eternalismmay bothbepartofthedefinition:MST as correspondingtoMST, independentofwhetheritis and compatiblewiththeA-seriescanbecharacterised shall notbeconsideredasatheorycommittedwithper- are differentlydefined.Becauseofthis,itisdifficultto son thatthereisnothinginconsistentintheideaofan ants ofeternalismarenot permanentistandcaneven addition liesinconsideringthethesisthatsome vari- aspects ofthe modelthatwe think we shouldhave in However, that is a theological cost that no one should manentism. Naturally,any modelthatis permanentist non- permanentisteternalismhasalower theological make permanentismandGod’screationcompatible; reason thanmerelythatofassociatingdoctrines manentist eternalism?We may experiencegreatdiffi- present. price, andwe dohave areasontothink thateternalism nalism, whichcanonlymeanthatboththeses are indi- relationship as follows: allpermanentists are eternal- manentism andeternalism?We oughttoconsidertheir mind: a)the definitionintermsof “eternalism”isnot is trueif,andonlypermanentismoreternalism istrue, impose on any doctrine, at least not without a better in away thatmakesitsoundsappealing. We thinkit ism seems,however, moreappealingfor thesimplerea- ists, butonlysomeeternalistsarepermanentists. long as there is a creative act at the origin of the world, 11 Here, then,ishow onecouldcharacteriseMST, Thisdefinition 8 Whatistherelationshipbetween per- 10 12 Non-permanentisteternal- bearsthenovelty ofintro- 9 Can ferent time present» (2016, 7). time ferent line, thus rendering always adif- It moves (yes!)alongside- time the light” on present the point in time. (hence name) the which “sheds its ory, aspotlight present the islike ing moving the to spotlight- the a description by Fischer: «accord- for instance take characterization, 12 For amore content-focused couldpermanentism be separate. for ficient MST, and andeternalism plusnalism wouldA-series be suf- Indeed,eternalism. wethink eter (2015) definition, which includes 11 This isaversion of Deasy’s sion of permanentism. presentist couldthis be counted asaver ‘Parmenidic Perhaps presentism’. ofa defender wemight what call presentism, or ifyou static like, asa possibletified defender of Barbour (1999)has iden been - our10 Despite claims, Julian aswell. which existed has always of things changing many times, since experience the wehave a‘future’), (orfuture wecall what of manyrience it and times, the nally, because expe the wehave - eter exist has ‘past’) always call so (or past the we what eternal, is indeed: exists ifeverything that reason would be straightforward, andpermanentism eternalism. The andpresentism i.e., transientism, oppose that theories to sideration Our con extends same the thesis - ontology. isatransientist sentism (2019)suggestsDeasy pre- that (2018,:16),and permanentism the under consider to seem eternalism and9 Correa Rosenkranz also inspired by Fine‘s fragmentalism. coined by Skow (2015),which was resembles model the MST that intend present to aversion of do to in paper. this try Here, we explaining ‘presentness’, aswe MSTcouldof classical resist tion of ‘temporal Adepts facts’. mightit not for an explana- call fundamentaltors are So, aswell. temporal opera- that view the to temporal, are which leads facts tal fundamen all - that accepts ity by Williamson’s theory of modal- because model the case inspired like Williamson’s MST. That isthe paper might not apply models to ory. The question main of this Broad's to - the related closely posed aversion of MST, or amodel 8 Williamson (2002,2013)has pro- - - -

113 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 1966; Putnam1967; Penrose1989; Petkov 2006);argumentsintermsof“truthmak - The metaphor remains hollow, imprecise and non-ex- The typicalmotivation for aproponentofMSTistomakecompatibleoppositethe- Why dowe needtomakesenseofthemetaphorinfirstplace?Therearesever- (Broad 1923, 60).Ifwe say whatisnormallysaid,i.e., considering allwe have, we cannow askproperly:whatisthespotlightthat“shedits events in the world, must itself be an event in this world ent is,athesisstillabsent fromtheliterature.Oneimportantpointtomention isthat enwrapped inthefollowing circularity:thespotlightin- on offering good reasonstoaccept MSTasamodel.Ofcourse, ifMSTisfalseandthe easily understood. If being understoodincludes being identifiable,themetaphorof cept theofficial formulations?InRelativity andtheMoving Spotlight, for instance, ers” andthe“grounding”version ofthischallenge(Rea 2006);considerationsinfa- world: for example,argumentstakingtherelativityofsimultaneityseriously(Rietdjik vour ofMinkowskian space-time;andthedifficultiesofcausalrelationsbetween wonder why thatmodelisnotmoreappealing. that thespotlight,toextentinwhichitilluminates that the metaphor is too basic to explain, then we are to conceive anexplanatoryaccount of“whatismoving rightnow” does notdepend dicates amutablepresentwhich,inturn,isthespotlight. the reasonwhy Broadsoughttorejectit(or atleastpartofthereason).We suppose the spotlightdoesnotseemsufficientlyexplanatory.Asithappens,thismightbe to indicateasagroundfor understandingBroad’sorig- that thistheoryembraces.We thinkthatatleastsome to beaneternalistarealsoreasonsprefer MSTover otherA-seriespicturesofthe quantifiers present as well as past and future entities. Considering all this, the reasons the ideathattimepassesandhasadirection,we should the highnumberofeternalistswhoareembarrassedby thedifficulties involved in thing specialaboutthepresent.Anyone whowishestodeny presentismwhileassert- amounts toofferingathesis onwhatthemutablepres- al characterisationsofMSTwithoutany explanatory accountofit:why notjustac- adepts ofMSTwillfinditappealingtohave something ses: 1)timepasses,having anobjective absolutepresentand2)thecorrectontology II. Skow (2009) is quite explicit about metaphors in thecontext of MST: they may be Broad didnotimaginewhatcouldtrulybeelucidated by thepassageofspotlight planatory. Answering thequestionposedby thepaper paper, we hopetohelpmakesenseofthemetaphor presents andnon-presentfacts.Thereasonsfor acceptingMST, besidestheclassical untrue thatalleternalistmodelisapermanentistone.With thispictureinmind,after if we donotknow whatthespotlightis. inal metaphor. is notpresentist,i.e.,itthatwhichincludesinthemostunrestricteddomainofour ing thepassageoftimewillfindinthatmodelanobvious sourceofinterest.Given light” if anything? What could its nature be? How can we explain it as a metaphor? less common,b)eternalismissufficient forMSTasaprimitive thesis,andc)itseems helpful for illustrative purposesonly.Thewholepointofmetaphorsisthattheyare block universe, arerelatedtotwo strongintuitions:timepasses,andthereissome- A MetaphortoBeUnderstoodandExemplified 14 Itseemsclear 13 Inthis for instance, in Sider (2001). which has defined, been it as, result of unappealing the wayin unpopularity model of that a (2015)considers13 Deasy the that we can explain or wecan explain describe? that light correspond something to paper: does moving the spot- enjoy question main the of this spotlighters wouldclassical account.tory We even think that amore deserves explana it - that metaphor seriously and consider the of idea the to taking pathetic philosophers maybe more sym- paper,14 Inthis weassume that

114 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo we should simplyclarifywhat is meantinthatthesis. Letusbringtolighta princi- our consciousanddynamic mentalstates.Here,thesamethesiscan bedefended our purpose,arealways presentones.Suchathesisresembletheoneproposed by which we are aware, at leastin the relevant sense to comes toourawareness ofourmentalstates.We are el, ourmentalstatesmustcorrespondtothe ofaffairsonwhichtheydepend, critique. Thatwillbethebeginningofourquest:How tofindsomethingchanging change in our mental states would thus be that which we avert, by methodological our mentalstatesberesponsiblefor thechangeswe indicate? Against thatthesis,the world isotherwiseablockuniverse, ourpointwould beempty,butitwould notbe verse; which the latter would, at least partly, be itscause. quandary. the sameinterest in exploringpossibleanswers tothis the following: ty. However, thatsenseraisesquestionsaboutitslegit- to usthatthishypothetical objectorwould becorrect.Theanswer we arelookingfor, that may correspondtothespotlight,in world? Ourmentalstateschange.Could against thearguments the authorhimselfhasmadeinhisrejectionof it.For now, aware ofourpresentmentalstates,andthestates sume aswell thatthequestionaboutwhatcouldrefer totheclassicalmetaphorin swer mustindicatearealchange.Thereisclearsense says aboutourmentalstatesistrue:inablockuniverse, orany othereternalistmod- states donotsatisfytheabove criterion,for allourmentalstatesaresomehow re- spond toachangethatismorethanjustqualitative changeinthesenseofGeach’s Braddon-Mitchell in2004. However, thesamedoesnotapplyin any way when it Broad’s modelisinterestinginandofitselfthatmany philosophersmighthave Let us then undertake this methodological point: we want the spotlight to corre - ple ofwhich tomakeuse,whichwe mightcall‘Inow principle’.The“Inow principle” many defenses ofthisaresufficient to assumethismodelasastartingpoint. Weas- meanwhile, becomescloser.Itisnotour mental statesthatanswer tothespotlight principle, i.e., to present only different properties indifferenttemporalparts. Itseems proponent ofatraditionalblockuniverse couldclaimthatthechangesinourmental property invalid somuchasitwillshedlighton theclassicalmetaphor,whichisourpurpose imacy. Geach (1972) expressed it well when he wrote in whichthingschange,even inastandardblockuni- i.e., some future event must be connected with some corresponding mental state, of here. Moreover, we assume that MST is an interesting account about time and that lated withthenon-presenttemporalpartsofourbrains.Theresulting but ourawareness ofourmentalstates.Whattheproponentblockuniverse would nomorebeachange intemperaturethanavariation intemperaturealongapoker’s were differenttemperaturesat positionsalongthepoker’stimeaxis. Butthis[...] a merevariation ofattributesbetween differentpartsofawhole.(304-305) On thisview,thevariation of apoker’stemperaturewithtimewould simplymeanthatthere length would be[...]We thushave aviewthatreallyabolisheschange,by reducingchangeto 16 a qualitative change in time, i.e., in p, butint2 In the model known as the growing block model, it relates the present, to 15 We areconvinced thatany attemptedan- x does nothave thesameproper- t1, x has the 17

model, does time not pass. cession and Inthis anteriority. tionships of suc simultaneity, - organizedare according- rela to in which B-series, with events models compatible eternalist 16 The to block refers universe and Ross Cameron (2015). (2015) for instance Deasy 15 To of defenses MST, see states of anger or frustration. states mental certain to be related ing or smashing awindow may 17 For instance, of act - the break

115 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The ideathatourconsciousnessmoves orflows while t existence ofthepresent,aswell astemporality itself. ent andonlyinit.Itisstilltruethat,thefuture,we of any version of MST. However, the thesis that we can have non-consciousmental er or not it is true, there is nothing to discuss, because it is an acknowledged part or thefuture,themselves existing.Ourthesisiscommittedtotheexistenceoftense- curate, thementalstatesrelative tonon-presentevents mustcorrespondtothepast city wherewe are.Now, certainly,iftheeternalistpictureofworld isthemostac- which we areaware isthepain,however mild,anditis our model,justthepresentmentalstatesaswe areaware ofthem,andthatisthedif- can bestatedthus:df: will be aware ofour mental states that, today, are in the change ina more robustsense.Itis also phenomenolog- cates apassageoftime, inthecorrectdirection,anda of themetaphorinMST. Indeed,thethesisthat “con- why we should associate it with the spotlight. The an - those mental states to the present. Our thesis attributes to those mental states the tal states,suchasunconsciouswillbepurelyneurophysiological phenome- future. true that, in the future, when we will be aware of a cor- difference between presentandnon-presenttimes. We shallconsider, accordingto ference uponwhichwe wishtoremark.Nevertheless, tobesure,many non-present tal states. However, itisfrankly absurd andwould not tion. Therival hypothesis would holdthatwe areaware ofourfuture (orpast)men- those. How canwe defend thetruthofthatprinciple?We cananswer thisby elimina- the universe iseternalisticnotnew,andwe question aware ofwriting,andthemental statesthatcor- are theonlycandidatesfor consciousness(Searle1997, 232).However, somemen- states draws littlesupport,and we mustsay somethingaboutit.Cantheretrulybe science flows” has everything we need:namely,itindi - swer isstraightforward: becauseithelpstomakesense Supposedly, thefutureandpasttemporalpartsofourbrainshave associatedchem- respond tothataction.We now feel avery slightpain ness. However, theonlyconscious mental stateswillbethoseaboutwhichwe are na, over whichwe have nocontroloremotion.Thesewillbenon-felt mentalstates. mental statesaswhereconsciousnessmightornotreside.Mental responding mentalstate,we shallbelivinginthepres- non-conscious mentalstates?Thisquestionisimportantbecausewe shouldhave a mental statesshouldbeavailable tous,accordingourmodel. present. Tomorrow we may feel greatjoy inwalking throughthestreetsofParis, in ourthroat;we areaware ofit.Thementalstate in someway aware, now. We believe itisquitereasonabletorestrictawareness of istry; they are functional brains, that had or did not have the device of conscious- including non-felt mentalstates, derived in the brain.Hisideawas tocharacterize ically adequate, i.e.,ithelpsustomake senseoftheideathat we live temporal lives, less non-consciousmentalstates.Onthetenselessexistenceofsomething,wheth- be defended by any eternalist(ornon-eternalist). in which we are aware of our mental states. We are 19 Thus, the present corresponds to the instant Searle, for instance,extendsthescopeofmentaltonon-conscious, we arealways aware ofourpresentmentalstates,andonly 18 Itis 20

erty of being aware oferty something. of being prop the presenterty with - prop the - answer issimply relate to block the to universe. Our ative of- isanbly advantage MSTrel - more intelligi far states mental accommodateable to conscious being that webelieve 19 Infact, not for allow any of them. should «yes»,apresentist say should An eternalist states. tal ence of non-present men- wouldists on- diverge exist the and- non-eternal 18 Eternalists reach a different conclusion. adifferent reach (1980),for example,Ceel wemay events, asdoes and private jective as sub- states If wedefine mental states. mental especially mental, dependsit on how wedefinethe isnot by and all, accepted states non-consciouscan have mental we that thesis the 20 Naturally,

116 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo III. The nextobjection simplypunctuates theimpossibilityof makingouranswer ad- We aimtoproposeananswer, whichaccountsfor the We shallconsiderthesimpleideathatspotlightisanontologicalbasic,asadi- even inaneternalistworld. So,for thoseinterestedininterpretingtheMSTmetaphor conscious mentalstates,theonlyonesofwhichwe are we aregoingtotacklenext. corresponds toasupertimeidentifiedwithGod’sconsciousmentalstatesandb)that cal rival theses that offer potential answers to the same question: a) that the spotlight objections thattargetourversion orthatapplytoitwillcarryouttheiroffensive on consequently, thespotlightwould somehow berelatedtotheentropy ofsystems. equate asa version ofMST. TheMST hasbeendefinedasthe unionoftheseslike can elucidateitabitmore.Indefense ofour theory,we managetoavoid the circu- vergent opinionthatfitsmuchmorewithclassicaladeptsofMST. Ifthe spotlightis we sharewithBroadsomeofthenegative considerationsofhistheory,perhapswe tures thethesiswe wishtodefend. Thespotlightisanaspectofourmentallife, re - the spotlightisrelatedtosecondlaw ofthermodynamics,i.e.,thepresent,and, two fronts:theywilleitherobjecttotheideaofrelatingpresentandconscious- think aboutitasabasicfact,andwould remain aninterestingproposal.However, if the very pointofhaving ametaphoristoelucidatesomething.Ofcourse,onecould as non-primitive, i.e.,assomethingtoexplain,thisisapromisingidea. such asMST-Time,aSkow’s model(2015) inspiredby aware, doesnotgatherconsensus.Worse thanthat,it sion ofBroad’sMSTtheory.Finally,we shalltrytocompareourthesiswithhypotheti- a propertymorelikelytohave massorsize,i.e.,abasicfactabouttheworld. We think somehow basic,itneedsnofurtherexplanation atall.Thepassageoftimewould be Ultimately, wheretimeisconcerned,MSTmeetsideal- Some ofthesearepartlydirectedatsimilarmodels, Kit Fine’s fragmentalism (2005). As a version of Skow’s model, it has many different ness, aswe do;ortheywillobjecttotheideathatourmodelcanbeclassifiedasa ver- passage oftime,tothequestion“whatisspot- per’s originalinsight:thepresentandexperienceofaresame.The present partsinsideofafragmentaryworld. Others,inturn,aredirectedatthispa- now istheawareness ofourmentalstates, withouttheabove circularity. ism. is polemicandobjectionablefor reasonswe anticipate. is thespotlight.Inourproposal,itmightstillbe abasicontologicalfact:whatis lated toourpresentmentalstates,whicharebecausewe areaware ofthem. light?” Surely,theassociationofpresentwithour larity thatwe stated above: thespotlightindicatesamutablepresentwhich,inturn, 21 III.1. III.2. Naturally,thatraisesproblems.Andiswhat All that conspires with a reasonable principle, the “I now principle”, and nur- Explanation? Problems withOurSolution Why NotJustAccept the MetaphorWithout Further How StrangeWould itBeasaMST Model? end up anon-classic with model. MSTmodel,the even ifwethereby within idealism reestablish aims to our conscious minds. This paper of no dependencehave relation of passage of MST, in time, aclassic facie. prima The present and the even though isnot, iseternalist, it MST, thesis, classic while that with models, in compatible are general, a cognitive agent. The eternalist ent properties, i.e., dependent on present or asmind-depend future) - be past, (to temporal properties inent defender,time and specifies (1781/87) isperhaps most the prom- on of time, 21 Idealism which Kant

117 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo ‘being aware ofourmentalstates’. can easilyascribe tothepassageof time ifwe thinkofitasinthemodel we describe. emerges, areaspectsof ourmentallife, we canchallengethe tacit identificationbe- correct inwhatwe consideringasrequisitestoconceive anMSTmodel type. world is,whetheror notitisamentalphenomenon,anobjective aspecttowhichwe with illusions,i.e.,thatwhatever issubjective mustbenon-objective, likeacognitive with whichwe move relative toothersisirrelevant whenconsideringtherelativi- consideration follows fromtheidentificationof‘beinginabsolutepresent‘with correspond toourawareness onourmental states.We believe thatthisisthesense ory lackstheuniquenessof the present,i.e., we couldnothave thesamepresental- eternalism withtheMcTaggartian A-series.TheA-series,meanwhile, have beende- ways andalsodonothave anindependent present, i.e.,inthis model, the‘presentness’ tween whatissubjective andwhatisnotobjective. Everything thatispartofthe double moving spotlight, which they defend persuasively against objections of incon- to Torrengo andSpolaore(2019). Thelatterauthors consideramodeltheydubthe time passes.Furthermore, itisnolonger agreeduponamongauthorsthatnoMST take: anuniquepresentisnotrequired,butonlymakesroomfor theintuitionthat the mentalstatesrelatedtochemicalprocessesinbrainacausallydetermined dependent phenomena.Thepassageoftimeoccurswhenonebecomesconscious tive, despitenotbeingabsoluteaswe explainedit,i.e.,anontological,unique,andin- to the speed oflight. That contributes to our characterisationofthe present as objec- fects would become part of our life only if we could move at very high speeds, close ty ofsimultaneity,thecontractionspaceanddilationtime.Therelativisticef- two events, AandB,whicharebothsimultaneousinourcoordinatesystem andnot the theoryofrelativitydoesnotacknowledge assignificant.Thedifferencebetween that matterstosomeonewishesadopta version ofMST, and we thinkthatbe- tant sense to theMST; b)a distinctive trait of all MST, the passage of time,iscontem- fined asthesesthatpostulateone,andonlyabsolutepresent. Without theunique- sistency. Italsoseemsthatthecorrectnessofthose hypotheses reveals thatwe are structure. Thattraceoftheobjective presentbelongstoaphilosophicalwager we simultaneous inthereader’s,isclosetozero.Thisdifferenceexistsbecausespeed agree aboutit,i.e.,thereis,inourmodel,justonepresenttimefor real,theonethat and inwhatsensethereisnotanabsolutepresentourtheory.Itbecausethe- a uniquepresentitpostulatesanobjective andabsolutepresenttime-inanimpor For somedevelopments onthesemodels, we coulddraw onSkow (2015), inaddition model cancontemplatemorethanonepresent,and,thus,spotlight. negative answer isfalse.Theequivocation consistsofidentifying subjective aspects mental statesincludetheperceptionofsimultaneousevents, withdifferencesthat model isaversion ofMSTfor two reasonsinparticular:a)despitenotcontemplating ness ofthepresent,we donotenvision asimilarmodel.We defend thefactthatour pendent phenomenon, would be an objective aspect of the world. We believe that the planes of simultaneity, especially for relativistic reasons, in practice, our subjective plated andexemplified inourmodel.Perhaps we shouldclarifyinwhatsensethereis illusion. However, sinceourmentalstates,fromwhichconsciousness somehow ing aware of our mental states put us ina position to know what ‘the present’is.This is absoluteinanothersense,sincewe canidentifythepresent with somethingand is always relative toourawareness ofourmentalstates.Butcourse,thepresent Though itisquitepossibletohave different objective presentsondifferent One couldalsowonder whetherornotthe passageoftime,asamind-de-

118 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo «fragments» notforming acompleteandconsistent «whole»(Fine2005,281). The Additionally, we finditdifficulttoexplain,withinaneternalistontology,thekind of Time (2015). MST-Time, inturn,hasamanifest inspiration:KitFine’sfragmentalism The version we presentisrelatedtothatrecentlypresentedby Skow, called MST- There is a possibleobjectiontotheidea that thepresentcanbemental.Inourmodel, Why would itbesurprisingthatamodel suchasMST, whichiseternalist,couldbeide- (2005). According totheauthor,thatversion ofthemodelgives usnotauniquepres- (1781/87) claim.Ifthisistrue,thensothepropertyofbeingpresent.With nominds conscience –butthepassageoftimeisanindependent cause itisnotamind-dependphenomenon,atleastinourmodel.However, we think coherent, butthewholeofreality(allfragmented facts)isnot:thelegitimateper- ent, butmany objective presents:«(4)Each time ispresentrelative toitself,andonly of obtainingaclearnotiononthespotlightmetaphor:abilitytoindicatesome- change that could act as a passage of the time. Nevertheless, this is precisely the point ent is purely mental, but the changes in time are not? That sounds less satisfactory. vided, or,toputitanotherway, fragmented. The realityisconstitutedby different ever. Thisobjectionmerelypresumesthatitisunacceptabletemporalityshould enon too. However, if there are no minds, there are no temporal properties whatso- does notguaranteethepassageoftimeanymore, be- feature oftheworld. We arguethatthisseemspossible, that somepointsoftensionmightarisehere:for example,thechangeofpres- ter all,perspectival inthatsense,withouta division between theperspectival andthe to itself»(Skow 2015, 58).According tofragmentalism,theworld isessentially di- thing toexplainofwhatconsiststhepresentandpassagetimeitself. the present is mental, but notonly: the passage of timeisa mind-dependent phenom- to experience things presently, it does not make sense to attribute ther humanornon-human,aliendivine,counttowards thatpurpose.Without any to beapresent.Any mindscapableofsomeawareness oftheirmentalstates,ei- al wheneternalistsseemsympathetictotheidealismoftime? and not a perspectival present. That is, in the end, the appropriation of Fine’s thesis spectives onsomephenomenacorrespond to theirultimatereality.Theworld is,af- any event orobject.Ofcourse,humanmindsarenottheonlythingrequiredfor there mented: the aware orself-aware natureof our mentalstates.However, how plausible real. Ourperspective onthepropertyofbeing presentindicateswhattheis, maximal collections of tensed facts are fragments, andeach fragment is internally nalists) have alreadypresumed(cf.Kant 1781/87; Gödel1949, minds, thereisnotemporality.Timeideal,assomeauthors(someofthemeter- ute tothespotlight samecharacter,indicatingitassomethingundeniably frag- is adependableaspectthatdependsonourmindsand is Skow’s version? We shallseewhether ornotsomeof thedifficultiesofMST-Time is unacceptable.We couldsimplyreply:yes, timeisideal,asphilosopherslikeKant but thattheresultwould bevery different:thespotlight by Skow, which we also incorporate in answering our question. All we do is attrib- be associated with a mental phenomenon. However, we should rather ask why this III.4. III.3. We shouldconsideranotherhypothesis: perhapsthepresentisideal–andit The Presentness isMindDepend? It IsaMST, Really? Two Objectionsby Wilson (2018) be on aswell. list this McTaggart (1908)should 22 According Gödel to (1949), 22 Yourgrau 1991, etc.). presenthood to

119 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 1979, 275-99). Thedifferencebetween aclassicblockuniverse andourmodelis,thus, cally causedmentalstates.Itisnotclearthat,inclassiceternalism,we mustseparate, one by one,inadynamicmovement. Usingthetermswithwhichwe have beenpos- el preserves whatisrequiredsimple:ourconsciousness effectively preserves itand clarifying Broad’smetaphor,we endedupanswering Wilson’s challengesandcreated ence oftimepassing is notappropriately explained. In the second place, in ourmodel, objection ismoreencompassing.According totheobjector,Skow provided noreason of thekind,applicabletoSkow’s model,butnottoours,says thatthereisnoreason cal orasymmetrical,whetherwe live inaworld wheretimeiscircular,orwhether version for MST. However, thatproblemdoesnotapplytoourversion. Motivated by er thanmoving backwards ormoving insomeotherway» (2018, §4).Naturally,with why the so-called ‘arrow of time’ must have the orientationitsupposedlyhas.That ferentiate ourmodelfromaclassicblockuniverse: ourawareness ofourmentalstates differences for any blockuniverse, Skow’s model would bewronglycategorised,i.e.,it quite simple.Inthefirstplace,inablockuniverse, timedoesnotpass,andourexperi- time passes,thepropertyofbeingpresentissubjective, butourexperiencethattime from thisthatSkow’s modelisunabletotellwhethertheworld istimesymmetri- to locatethemovement ofthepresentassuccessive towards thefuture.Itfollows does notgive usany clearsenseinwhichthespotlightmoves steadilyforwards rath- the passageoftimeoccursinany otherpossibledirection.Wilson callsthisthe «ob- the presentandfromtofuture,thatobjectionpresentsSkow with accommodate thedynamicofourconsciousnesstoclassicmodel.Someauthors somehow, presentmentalstatesfromnon-presentones.Itisnotclearthatwe can sion inspiredby FineandSkow, compatiblewiththethesesofboth,difficulties apply tooureffortconceptualiseMSTasanidealistmodel. seems toflow inatime-orientedmanner,and we are aware ofdifferentmental states are aware ofamental stateandhow ourconsciousnessworks. Ourconsciousness static awareness ofamentalstate.To supportthisthesis,we shall observe how we a version ofSkow’s modelthatisimmune tothatcriticism.Thereasonourmod- a delicateproblem:itquestionsitsadequateplaceandcategorisationasplausible Skow’s modelarenotrepeatedinourcase.We caneffectively provide areasontodif- Broad’s model,whichispresentinSkow’s thesis.Thatobjectionpresentsreasonsto MST beinganasymmetricallyconceived model,inwhichtimerunsfromthepastto mental statesoccuronlyinthepresent,butitisdynamic,andmoves over allphysi - refuse attributiontoSkow’s modelofthepresenceelements,whichdifferentiates possesses thedesireddynamiccharacterororientation. Ifwe arecorrect,thereisno passes correspondstosomethingidentifiableandexplainable.Thesecondobjection is notstationary,actingasatruemoving spotlight.Morespecifically,ourconscious is, atbest,avariant oftheblockuniverse, butnotanewversion ofMST. it fromaclassicstationaryblockuniverse. Sincethemodelinitiatedby Broadmarks ing thequestion,ourawareness ofourmentalstatesisdynamic, asymmetricaland least ourmindmusthave ateasedcharacteristic(cf.Geach1972, 306andMcGilvray have notedprecisely that: nomatterhow muchthe world isdeclaredtenseless,at has adirectionthatmirrors thedirectionwe suppose timetohave. jection from mode of motion» (Wilson, 2018). According to the author, «MST-Time The answer to that objection is simple: despite our presentation of a ver- The classicobjectionconsistsofdenying apossibleexemplification of

120 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The author,Braddon-Mitchell,willhave realisedthattheanswer toourpreviousques - There isanotherobjection,applicablenotonlytoSkow’s modelbuttothespotlightin could even agreeaboutwhereitis).Thisdiscussion bringsustoafurtherobjection el isnotaversion ofaGrowing Block, we shouldhave a very similarpointaboutthe condition for theretobeapresent.TheresultresemblesForrest’s (2004)modelfor ent whenthereisnocriterionfor such.Ifwe arenotpresentistsandsoacceptthe come thedifficultiesheraised: we compareitwithpastorfuture,aneternalistontology,objective present,and, our mental states, which is a dynamic process, to explain the use of the metaphor could be explained with a phenomenological approach. We can use the awareness of conscience, aware ofourexperiencesonlyintothepresent,itiswhatconstitutes which thepastisdeadasidefromfactthatitexists.Itbecausenoonelives we cannever guarantee that we trulylive inthepresent.Naturally,we live intherel- general. ItarguesthattheMSTmustbeabletoguaranteeindicationofpres- tion rested on the temporal status of consciousness. He tells us, in an attempt to over- future: thefutureisdeadinsamesense,atleastfor now. the Growing BlockTheorists,sometimescalled«thedeadpastview»,accordingto the presentis,by definition,thetimewhen we have consciousexperiencesofour facts andevents we experience.We know thatwe arelivinginthepresentbecause that model,ofdistinguishingtheabsolutepresentfromany otherpasttime(arel- for atransientandconstantspotlightthathasdirection.Indeed,thedoes the absolute and relative present must be produced,andthe fact that we experience ative present).Theauthoriscorrect,butthatproblemdoesnotapplytoourcase.It ative present.Relative toinstantt Broad renouncedin1923. Braddon-Mitchell(2004)tellsusthatthereisnoway, in However, we know nothing of the absolute present. A relevant difference between put forward by Braddon-Mitchell. mental states.According toourthesis,having consciousmentalstatesisalegitimate need: the dynamic aspect of the flow of time, thespecial feature of the present, when not justhave adirection,butthedirectioniswhatwe needtodescribetheMST!We present aswell. So,timewould beanaspectofourmentallife, andtheflow of time in somesense,anabsoluteone(inthesensethatpresentisidentifiable,and we in thepast,sincenoonehasaphenomenologicallife there.Ofcourse,sinceourmod- is truebecausethepresentpropertythatourconsciousnessattributesto inclusion ofnon-presentevents andobjectsamongourontologicalcommitments, instant taspresentdoesnotconfer uponusthediscriminatingpower we seek. have inthismodelanon-standardA-seriestheorybutonethatpreserves whatwe sciousness. Someholdthatconsciousness issomeby-product ofthecausalfrissonthattakes fidence thatthe currentmoment was thepresent,because it would become aprioriinthe manner of Descartes’s cogito. In so far as we know we are conscious, we would know that place onthebordersofbeing andnon-being.Ifthiswere thecaseitwould restore our con- Suppose thatthehyperplane thatistheobjective presentistheonlyonethatcontainscon- III.6. III.5. A similarquestionwas appliedtothegrowing blockmodel,theonethat Note that if whatconstitutes the passage of time is thedynamicflow ofour There areZombiesEverywhere? Where IsthePresent andHow toKnow It? in whichwe have ourmentalstates,t is present.

121 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo were uncovered by Lorenz’stransformations andthenexplainedofficially byEinstein, we were all in the same systems of coordinates, although we are all performing rela- compassing ourmentalstates,ofwhichwe areaware, andthereader’s,ofwhichyou ence, incapableofbeingmeasuredby any normal,non-atomicwatch. objection can be explained in the following terms. Assuming special relativity, we enough to both be called ‘the present’. It was Bertrand Russell (1915) who explained, writing. However, isthatcompatiblewiththerelativityofsimultaneity?Bytaking what can be indicated in the present of both. However, it will be a near-zero differ- even expectable.Ofcourse,ifwe areinmotionrelative toanobserver orstationary tive movements, onestoward theothers.Thisreasoniswhy, essentially,therelativ- questions concerningspecialrelativity,sinceadaptingtothattheory,withoutartifice, ture ischanged,andthenwe shallhave thatundesiredscenario,whichpuzzledusin travelling relatively close to what we consider to be the speed of light, the whole pic - to specialrelativity,theoccupierofseveral hyperplanes ofsimultaneity,eachexhibit- that theory,objectshave distendedtemporalparts,whatisnotpromissoryfor act. Inotherwords, we mustguaranteethatourpresentsaresufficientlycoincident, suggestion: we mustguaranteethatthereisacertaincoincidencebetween count- soning (asifourtheorieswere notstrangeenoughalready).Neithercanwe avoid the a questioninspiredby Braddon-Mitchell.Nevertheless, we donothave, as faraswe as partofwhatoccursintheworld. Ifthere are,somewhereintheuniverse, minds are aware, donotdiffersignificantly. Weexplainthat forpracticalpurposes,itisasif are exhibited in different planes of simultaneity. Thisbeing so, even if we are in the speed for theobtainingofobservable relativisticeffectsisnotsomethingactual,or None ofuswould acceptthestrangeconclusionthatseemstofollow fromthatrea- He consideredsothecostsofthesiswe enunciatetobetoohigh.Aversion ofhis not zombies,livinginothertimes.That,ifabsurdandunacceptable,hasquitea not strangeenough,we cannotbesurethatthepeoplewithwhomwe converse are must equallyrelativisetheanswer tothequestion‘whatthings,besidesus,arein mental states. relativity asahorizon,we shouldnotethatpersonsare,intherelevant contextof relative toatrain platform, for instance,there will beaminimaldifferencebetween modated withwhatwas saidabove becausepeoplemoving ataminimallynecessary present, we cannotguaranteethatwe have before uspresentobjects.Asifthatwas present?’ Even assumingthatwe areintheobjective present,we arestill,according ultaneity doesnotapply, inourcommonexperience,topeopleandtheir conscious us. How canwe escape?Intermsofsimultaneity,Einstein’sthesiscanonlybeaccom- istic effectshadremainedhiddenuntilthebeginning ofthelastcentury,whenthey i.e., allmusthave consciousmentalstatesonlynow atthismoment atwhichwe are is a reason that generally favours non-presentists. How could we deal with that? Our ing differentperspectives onthe world. Thethingsthatnow dependonperspectives in bothsystems ofcoordinates, willnotbethesame. However, they willbesimilar know, conflicts between present times, past and future, simply because relative sim- less subjective presents,andsoon,for allconsciouspeoplewithwhomwe may inter- high acceptancecost,thusmakingthetheoryunappealing.Thatisasensibleproblem. time was past,itsoccupantswillbeZombiesand thuswe would have noawareness. (Braddon- the currentlocationinspace-timewas inthepresent,sinceassoonthatlocationspace- Mitchell 2004,202) What perhapscouldbe claimed isthatinstantsoftimeandtheirintervals, Moreover, intheabsenceofanything further,surelythetime interval en-

122 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo consider presentnow alsobelongtothereader’srelative present.Again, thisiswhat onds ofdifferencebetween thesoundproduced by thefingersofourrighthandand events we can perceive presently. For instance, if we snap our fingers, with 0.3 sec- which we areaware. Whatmakes an objectpresentisthatitpartofourpresent,or, our lives withzombies.However, why doourfutureorpastmentalstatesnotcon- events. For thatreason,unlesstherelativisticeffectsarequiteevident,undercharac- we mean when we say thatour theory has anobjective, though non-unique, present. with hischaracteristicsubtlety,thatthepresentmusthave anextensionthatis,in which existinthetenseless fashion.We becomeaware ofthem,inthevery precise the intervals of time we are exposed to indicates that the vast majority of objectswe fact, impossibletodelimitate.Itsextensionisrelative totheinterval between the taneous events. However, bothwillbeperceived by theconsciousmindaspresent the soundproducedby thefingersofourlefthand, wewillsurely have non-simul- fragment. That means that what is present depends only on what we are experienc- fragmentalism thatisinherenttoit,inunionwithourtheoryaboutwhatthepresent transform usintozombies.To show thedifference, we claimthe following: nozombie figure azombie’slife whenthereisno awareness involved? Theanswer isjustthat teristic circumstances familiar tothetheory(aspeedrelatively closetothespeedof they causallyresultfrom temporalpartsofourbrainthatgeneratereal mentalstates, that possibilityisdiscarded. Worse thanthat,even thechoicesofwhichwe arenow fore, have inherentinittheideathatwe areentirelyresponsiblefor ourpast, present that they are conscious in the future. The composition of the theory would, there- say of an event whether or not it is present, for there are no non-present events of aware, inthepresent, mustsomehow beprevioustoourconsciousness ofthemsince and futurechoices,allofwhichexist,according toatenselessontology.Inourmodel, are deterministorfatalist(Rietdijk1966; Putnam1967; Penrose1989; Shanks1994; any eternalistmodelfaceschallengestoaccommodatingfree-will,whetherthey sense ofthe word, onlywhenwe experiencethem consciously.Theproblem seems However, thatisourlife, accordingtothetheorywe aredescribing.Theotherprob- Maxwell 1993, Lockwood 2005).However, we believe ourmodelfacesanaggravat- Does thetheorycontaindeterminism?Ibelieve thatwould beavalid criticism,but present. Thefactthatthereisnosignificantandnoticeabledisagreementconcerning not. Itwillnever bethecase,aswas describedabove, thatwe donotknow whatto no zombiescouldhave amentallife, aswe do.To describethisby usingthescenar- perience ofconscience,andthefactthatithappensinatime-orderedflow doesnot unsolvable. How toproceed? We emphasisethatdeterminism willonlybeaproblem ing. It is true because our awareness of our mental states defines what is present or ity planesinwhichwe happentofindourselves, i.e.,theyarepresentonlyinsidethe is. Iffragmentalismiscorrect,thenallobjectsarepresentineachofthesimultane- io ofzombiesisastrangeway tounderstand it.Eachtemporalpartofushastheex- ing factor:inclassiceternalism,we cansay thatourfuturechoicesareconscious,i.e., it isnotacriticismexclusively directedatourmodel.According tomany authors, lem –how we know thatanobjectispresent–solved inourproposalwiththe had orwillhave anawareness ofhismentalstatefor eachmental-event inhis“life”. light), therewillbenoconsciousmindsthatcoexistwithzombies. better said,it is thecoincidence with aconscious mental statewhatmakes anobject III.7. Our scopewas, untilnow, onlyaway torunascenarioinwhichwe share But What AboutItBeingDeterministic?

123 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Thus, we cannotseehow todiscriminatethepassageoftime,whichindicatesanab- The advantages of the model are relative to its capacity to avoid the traditional prob- We mustcompareouranswer totwo otherpossibleanswers. Couldthespotlight correspond, somehow, totheentropy expressedinthesecondlaw ofthermodynam- conciliate ourmodelwithfree-will. changeable mentalstates,likeours,nothingprevents usfromthinkingofGod’smen- consensual amongeternalisttheoristswhobelieve inGod,buteven ifGodcouldhave one whoholdsthatGodisatemporalbeingsubjecttochange,atleastinitsmental change’. Thesecondthingwe shouldsay isthatwhichcanonlybesaidby some- our thesismaintainsitsexplanatorypower. Theanswer tothequestion‘whatcor- ent andpast,pastfuture,futurepresent inthesameinstant.Theepistemic tems withpatternsofdisorderinonedirection,allwhichare,however, existent. thermodynamic states,whichpresentaratio the second law of thermodynamics in any eternalist model. The reason for this is that first question,theanswer isquitesimple:thepassageoftimecannotbeattributedto to free-will,thecompatibiliststrategiesareinorder,iftrue.Sinceitisnotourpurpose determinism isunacceptableandonlythenrejectthemodelfor thatreason.Relative for anon-deterministphilosopher.Thatis,itwould firstbenecessarytoprove that tal statesasconsciousnow, inthesameinstantt the notionofchangeinthings,namely ofchangeinthepropertiesbeing do have thisadvantage. SinceMcTaggart’s problemsuggestsa contradictioninvolving are likeany otherstateofaffairs,inablockuniverse. Therearetemporalpartsofsys- absolute present,likeasupertime,withwhichitcouldbeidentified?Concerningthe solute orrelative present,ifwe accommodateinthatmodeltheresultofsecond states, i.e.,beliefs,desiresandjoys. We suspect,however, thatsuchathesiswillnot be states ofGod,we have two thingstosay. Thefirstisthat,ifsuchthecase,then against adopting Skow’s fragmentalism. Anotheradvantage ourmodelhas isitsex- sents negligible.Many problemsarethusavoided, suchas Wilson’s (2018) objections as we have seen,themany subjective presents coincide,ifnotcompletelythenat scious mental states are present, despite each person having their present. Naturally, argument, based on the impossibility of locating the present, also fails. All our con- avoid it, i.e., the same problems do not appear in our version of MST. If this is true, we IV. Some authorshave indeedprovided goodanswers tothosequestions,butwe easily responds tothemoving spotlight?’is‘theconsciousmentalstatesofGod,which never beaninstanceoftheMcTaggartian contradictionbecauseitwillnever bepres- planatory power. Namely,our modelanswers a relatively ignoredquestion: towhat present, pastandfuture,ourversion isimmune toit.Aconsciousmentalstatewill ics? Couldwe attributetoGod’sconsciousmentalstatessomepriority,suchthatthe law ofthermodynamics. here todefend any ofthem,itremains anindicationthattheymightbeasolutionto lems withMST: namely,McTaggart’s problemandtheepistemic problem(Deasy2015). least sufficiently,which makesdivergences inthesizeorduration ofthosesamepre- believe thatwould beanaturalresponse. III.8. Advantages Concerning theideathatpresentmustbeidentifiedwithmental Is theSpotlight SomethingElse? in aclearsense,fromordertodisorder, in whichwe have consciousness.We

124 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo the borderlinethatseparatespresentfromnon-presentandtopointout did notthinkofthatmetaphorassufficientlyexplanatory. Wehopetomakeclearer does the moving spotlight effectively correspond? That is an important question, not onlyfor eternalists,butfor philosophersof timeingeneral. possible changes in how it is drawn. With that, we hope to make MST more attractive, based ontheneedtogive substancetoametaphor.Broad,whofatheredthemodel,

125 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Correia, F. &Rosekranz, S.(2018). NothingtoCome,ADefence oftheGrowing Block Ceel, R.(1980). RadicalEpiphenomenalism:B.F. Skinner’sAccount ofPrivate Events, Cameron, P, R.(2015). An Essay OnTimeandOntology. Oxford University Press. Gödel, K.(1949). ARemark ontheRelationship between Relativity Theoryand Geach, P. T. (1972). LogicMatters . Blackwell. Sider, T. (2001). Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology ofPersistence andTime.Oxford: Searle, J.(2006).Aredescobertadamente. SãoPaulo:MartinsFontes. Fischer, F. (2016). Philosophy oftime:AslightlyopinionatedintroductionKriterion, Fine, K.(2005).Tense andReality inModalityandTense: PhilosophicalPapers. Oxford: Id. (2019). Characterisingtheoriesoftimeandmodality,Analytic Philosophy 60(3), Deasy, D.(2015). Themoving spotlighttheory,PhilosophicalStudies172 (8), Braddon-Mitchell, D.(2004).How dowe know itisnow now? Analysis 64(3),99–203. Broad, C,D.(1923). Scientific Thought. London:Routledge &Kegan Paul. Barbour, J.(1999). TheEndofTime.Oxford University Press Id. (1999). Presentism andOntologicalCommitment, Journalof Philosophy 96, Petkov, V. (2006). Is There an Alternative to the Block Universe View? InDieksD. Penrose, R.(1989). TheEmperor’sNew Mind:ConcerningComputers,Minds,and Merricks, T. (2006).Goodbye Growing Block,editedby DeanZimmerman(ed),Oxford Maxwell, N.(1993). OnRelativity TheoryandOpennessoftheFuture, Philosophy of McGilvray, J.(1979). ADefense ofPhysical Becoming,Erkenntnis 14, 275-99. McTaggart, J.M.E.(1908). TheUnrealityofTime,Mind17, 457–474. Lockwood, M.(2005).TheLabyrinth ofTime:Introducing theUniverse. Oxford: Forrest, P. (2004).TherealbutDeadPast:AreplytoBraddon-Mitchell,Analysis Kant, I.(1781/87). Critiqueofpurereason.Transl. anded.by P. Guyer &A.W. Wood Russell, B.(1915). OntheExperienceofTime’,Monist25,212–33. Rietdijk, C.W. (1966). ARigorousProofofDeterminismDerived fromtheSpecial Rea, C,M.(2006).PresentismandFatalism, Australasian JournalofPhilosophy84, Journal ofPhilosophy 30(2),3-28. Theory ofTime.Springer. 325–347. 358–62. Theory ofRelativity. Philosophy ofScience 33 (4),341–344. 511-524. 283-305. 2073- 2089. 240-247. (Ed.) (1998). Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Studies inMetaphysics , Oxford University Press Science 60(2),341–348. Scientist, LaSalle,IL:OpenCourt,555–562. Oxford University ress. Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press. Behaviorism 8(1),31-55. Laws ofPhysics. NewYork andOxford: Oxford University Press. Idealistic Philosophy. InP. A.Schilpp(Ed.),AlbertEinstein:Philosopher- H. (1967). TimeandPhysical Geometry, The JournalofPhilosophy 64(8), Bibliography The Ontology ofSpace-Time,Amsterdam:Elseivier,217-228.Putnam, 64 (4),

126 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Yourgrau, P. (1991). TheDisappearanceofTime.NewYork, CambridgeUniversity Wilson, A.(2018), Skow on thePassageofTime,Analysis 78 (1),117-128. Williamson, T. (2002). Necessary existents. In A.O’Hear(Ed.),Logic,Thought and Spolaore, G.andTorrengo, G.(2019). Themoving spotlight(s)Inquiry, Skow, B.(2009).Relativity andthemoving spotlight,TheJournalofPhilosophy 106 Id. (2013). ModalLogicasMetaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Id. (2015). Objective Becoming.Oxford: Oxford University Press. (12), 666-678. Cambridge University Press,233-51 Language: Royal InstituteofPhilosophy Supplement 51. Cambridge: Interdisciplinary JournalofPhilosophy (onlinefirst)1-18. Press. An An

127 What is Moving Right Now? — Elton Marques Marques Elton — Now? Right Moving is What

 .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo There are basically fourThere the options basically are which to state A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker DISPOSITIONS LIMIT DECISIONPROBLEM Florian Fischer options for solutions decision temporal the limit to logic. ofoptions classical realm the Iargue that leave blesome: twoThealleged solutions first are asymmet - decision problem physical background for of instant the change. Inpar problem. Metaphysical considerations function asa non-classical solution. Dispositions bring about the and thussymmetry-breaker remove for need the a none. limit asthe to referred isusually This situation belongssite –only first, the second,the only both or including about debate the dispositions enables new changes- in world, the meta the so constitute they account of dispositions, for theLimit DecisionProblem Limit DecidingDispositions. ric andric thus something need ground to this asymmetry in (a symmetry-breaker); while the last two last the while in (asymmetry-breaker); asymmetry limiting instant in a change from one state to its oppo in instant achange its to limiting - from one state the second interval and secondthe only second the interval interval. ticular, Iargue according that process triadic the to University of Siegen University since all of options since these all trou- seem MANIFESTATIONS PROCESSES the limiting instant belongs instant limiting the to lar attention to dispositions). to attention lar - aparticu tence, (with causation - persis temporal existence, time: lems concerning of nature the ence. Hisworks focuses on prob- logicto and philosophy the of sci- research spans from metaphysics of Siegen. His University the Florian Fischer isapost-doc at MOMENT OFCHANGE - 129  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo The so-calledlimitdecisionproblemisaparticularlytrickyintheoretical To begin with,thinkofany temporalboundary thatinterestsyou. Before thebound- ther thantheother.At thispoint,it’snotaquestion ous, we canthinkofthesituationintermstwo ad- of thepossiblesolutionsthatarecompatiblewith classicallogicbringswithitthe ond section,Iintroducethelimitdecisionproblemfor change.Ifocus onthesystem- of logicanymore, i.e.,logiccannotdecidebetween the options arecompatiblewiththeclassicallogic,they of alively debate. change between restandmotion. vourite theoryofdispositions,thetriadicprocess accountofdispositions,insection question then becomes to which interval the border tion. Isthereafirstinstantofmotion?lastin- doning theprincipleofbivalence . Thoughthefirsttwo that theyseemincompatiblewithclassicallogic,aban- the limitdecisionproblem,sinceallfour optionsseem the second; or it belongs to both; or neither. It is called the firstinterval; oritbelongstothesecondandonly function asasymmetry-breaker for thesecases.Therefore, Ifirstintroduce my fa- first two options. to itsopposite.Take thewell-discussed exampleofthe question ofhow todescribethechangefromonestate decision problemisoftenreferred tounderthehead- stant ofrest? atic aspects oftheexposition of the problem, rather than its history. The asymmetry asymmetric, whichraisesthequestionofwhy thelim- I. state orifyou areemotionallyindifferent, atheoretical questionarisesregarding the ary onestate obtainsandafterward another.Whether you fear oranticipate thenew II. III, andthenlay down theimplicationsfor thedebateabout themomentofchange motionless andfromexactlywhattimeonitisinmo- moving. Thequestionisuntilwhenexactlythecar moment whentheobjectinquestion,say acar,isstill ment ofchangebelongstothefirstinterval andonly mentative setupofthepaper. need for somethingtodecideoneway ortheother.Iproposethatdispositionscan problematic. Thelasttwo optionshave theproblem philosophy. It hasa long history in rest, and clearly, there is a later moment where it is in thefourth section.Inthefinalsection,I takeastepbackandevaluate theargu- iting instantshouldbeassignedtotheoneinterval ra- ing «themomentofchange»anditcirclesaroundthe joining intervals and the border between them. The belongs. Primafacie, The paperisstructuredasfollows. Inthesec- The MomentofChange Introduction Under theassumptionthattimeiscontinu- 2 The temporal version of the limit 4 therearefour options:themo- 1 andis still the subject 3 Clearly,thereisa come IV. in this section back to decision problem.limit We will solutionsrequire the different to of sorts changesferent that points out, i.e., dif are - there that tion issuggested, asStrobach Also, amixed sometimes descrip doesit not» (Strobach 1998,6). instant,limiting but in another way the obtains already at new state not. Moreover, waythe in acertain instant, in another does respect it limiting the obtains at still old state option Strobach introduces either-way- the Besides four the options discussed, not exhaust solution the space. 4 The options mentioned here do a prime example of change itself. 1998, 247).Motion been has always define and rest motion» (Strobach involvesit «question the of how to example isproblematicbecause 3 Although prominent, quite this problem. sion about debate temporary deci- limit con waswell - of medieval the lars include contributions from scho- about they isthat collection this Change». thingThe remarkable of on essays «The the of Instant al. (2018)for arecent collection 2 See, for example, (Roques et for in (Strobach past» the 1998,1). moment of change has argued been conceivable answer concerning the gly, systematically almost every - «[i]nterestin that Strobach states answers it. to systematic the There, about moment the of change and of of history the debate the view Strobach1 See (1998)for an over : «In a certain respect, the : «Inacertain - -

130 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo This isthecontentualway offraming thetemporallimitdecisionproblem.Butone To see clearly why the limit decision is called «problematic», let’s look at a simple ex- With thecommon(Cantorian)distinctionbetween openandclosedintervals, we can (t0, t1)thatis{ x could set it to an arbitrary number properly smaller (or respectively properly higher) cludes them.For example,thesetofnumbers0

131 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo φ The problem, now, is that all four solutions seem troublesome, while it seems like one force adeviationfromclassicallogic. one of the adjoiningintervals brings with itthequestionofhow todecidewhichof osition is either true or its negation is true. Of course, of them has tobe chosen. The last two solutions clash with classical logic, while the erty obtains atthelimitinginstant or towhichinterval which areinvolved inbringingaboutthechange which statesthatapropositionanditsnegationcannot domly assign the limit to one of the intervals. The asymmetry needs to be grounded tions are,hence,asymmetric–thisiswhy theyarecompatiblewithclassicallogic– the two intervals this is going to be. There need to be some grounds for why the limit- tions would have tobepreferred, becausetheydonot first two threatentobearbitrary.Letmeexplicate. tion regardingthemoment ofchangeneedtobekept question –someremarks areinorder. to seethelogicalconsequencesofdifferentpossible a generalagreement,however, thatthefirsttwo solu- apart. Theontological questioniswhich stateorprop- and secondsolutionareasymmetricalsolutions, which are compatiblewithclassicallogic;whilethethird andfourth arenot.Butthefirst solution goesagainstthelaw ofnon-contradiction, answers very clearly,soletuslistthefour basicpossi- sion problem still arises. The motion-example helps us law ofexcluded middle,whichstatesthatany prop - non-classical logicshave beendeveloped, andpeople reject principles at the heart of classical logic. metry-breaker –namelytheunderlyingdispositions, property we have toascribet1, in something.Iusetheterminustechnicus«symmetry-breaker» for this. instant betterbeassignedtojustoneinterval, nottowhichone.Thefirsttwo- solu ing instantshouldbelongtothisspecificinterval. Classicallogiconlygives usthatthe have argued for the third and fourth solution. There is logic. Thethirdandfourth solution,however, seemto but theyshouldnotbearbitrary(cf.Sorabji1976, 69).Itwould beadhocto justran- be true together. The fourth solution goes against the brings withittheneedfor asymmetry-breaker. bilities, onefinaltime. With R( isinmotion,we canalsoformalize thefour options: 1'''. 3'''. 4'''. 2'''. You can easily see that the first two solutions are compatiblewithclassical t1 isbothatrestandinmotion t1 isneitheratrestnorinmotion t1 isatrestandonly t1 isinmotionandonly Summing up, the situation seems to be this: the first and second solution But thefirsttwo solutionsalsohave theirproblems. Attributing t1toonly Even withthisallsettled,itisstillopenwhat First, theepistemicand theontologicalques- Before we goonwithmy proposalfor asym- φ ): φ isatrestandM( 5 i.e.,thelimitdeci- 6 The third 7 R(t1) ¬ R(t1) R(t1) ¬ R(t1) φ ): ⋀ ⋀ ⋀ ⋀ people, however, you that agree decision case. limit Most ofral the questioningalso in tempo the it - and someone might think about tioned of in case the Buridan’s ass, over other. the This can be ques- stack for particular this preferring of no are hay ifthere stack grounds donkey the gible that can choose a of Buridan’s- ass. unintelli Itseems in case the asyou feel interval this sion why explain to isexplicitly it 7 You compul should same the feel - middle» (Roques al. 2018). et offourth against law the excluded oflaw non-contradiction, and the trary, third the goes against the two«The first arbioptions - seem ard wayof depicting debate: the of paper. this Ifollow- stand the wouldthis go beyond scope the agree,I tend to adiscussion of logic. classical with bility While and fourth solution’s incompati- Medlin 1963)question third the 6 Some philosophers (e.g., be understood asashorthand. ing acolour property should, thus, our property. aboutThe talk - t1hav has col the that - not itself time the about talk here, car to the is since it 5 To be more precise, Iwould have M(t1) ¬M(t1) ¬M(t1) M(t1)

132 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo This isacommonassumption,whichIjustwant to called «finks»;orwhether thecanonicmanifestation cases aresortedwhether thecanonicmanifestation is circles aroundwhatIliketocalltheprevented manife - er is not found in the (formal) description of the situa- cannot justconsideranything asexternalinput;itneeds we gettoknow this.Iamsolelyoccupiedwiththeon- station problem,i.e.,caseswherethecanonicmanifes - does notoccur, althoughthetrigger andthedisposition the mathematicaldescriptionofproblemalone. formulations whichmighthave epistemicconnotations. tological questioninthispaper.Becauseofthat,thereis the borderbelongs.Theepistemicquestionis,how do terexamples in the literature. tation isabsent.Therearetonsofexamplesand coun- temporal limit decision problem. This symmetry-break- the intervals doesn’thelpby. Sure,timeisasym- itself tion and, thus, we need external input. Obviously, we dispositions. ter andgive abriefaccountofandshortmotivation for my favourite theoryof the «momentofchange».Thereisametaphysical debateonhow changeisbrought to be relevant for the problem at hand. However, look- question is,how dodispositionsleadtotheirmanifestations? Typically, glassdoesn’t to introducemy solutiontotheproblem oftheinstantchange.Standardexam- tions towards otherlimitdecisioncases. from any claimregardingtheimplicationsofmy solu- are present – thesecasesarecalled «masks».Thereis symmetry-breaker toenableaclassicalsolutionthe asymmetry translatetothelimitdecisionproblem? about, andthisisthedebateaboutdispositions.Iturntoinnextchap- stimulus tomanifest. sion problems, aka the debate about the moment of change. Consequently, I abstain III. In thissection,Iintroducethemainaspectsofdebateaboutdispositionsrequired no riskofconfusion,and,thus,Icanallow myself some metric (future-directed,ifyou will),buthow doesthis make explicit.Notehowever, thatthetemporalityof manifestations: fragilitycanleadtobreaking,andsolubilitydissolving.The prevented by removing the disposition – these cases are ples ofdispositionsarefragilityandsolubility.Thesecomewithcanonical ing atthemetaphysics ofchangeisnotarbitrary–afterall, we areconcernedwith its solubility. It seems like dispositions need a trigger or its fragility manifests. And a sugar cube needs to be put into tea or coffee todisplay break for noreason.Onlyifyou strike it withahammerorthrow ittotheground, Third, thesymmetry-breakerisnotfound in Dispositions Summing up,thetaskistofindanontological Second, Iexplicitlylimitthediscussionofthispapertotemporaldeci- In anutshell,thedebateaboutdispositions 10 11 Sometimes the problem 8 9

ing moment the of change. the to agree TPD-solution regard- 2) famously did, you could still Henri Bergson (Bergson 1910,ch. as intervals, ofin terms spatial of time representation the with advantage, that, ifyou disagree sion problem has added the deci- tion of temporal the limit descrip- mathematical passes the 9 An aclosed.other But which iswhich? should and be the an open interval fracture the after of surfaces the or destroyed,can be created one no that matter (Medlin 1983).Given body context of a martial fracturing aproblemders occurs that in the 8 For example, Medlin consi Brian - forthis context the of paper. this other,the and just assume Iwill two than first solutionsthe rather groundsneed for picking one of file» in file» Fischer (2018). tions, alook «case the at take aboutin debate the disposi - ious kinds of examples used 11 To aglimpse get of var the exclude trigger-free dispositions. however, the that TPD does not tions who atrigger. need Note, cussed for only disposi arise - because counterexamples the dis- introducedI have «trigger-talk», ofples trigger-free dispositions. maybe decay goodoactive - exam Fundamental dispositions or- radi dispositionsall atrigger. need 10 Itiscontroversial whether external solution, which sur - -

133 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 2010, 729). Thus,thetimespanbetween theingestion account ofdispositions(TPD)andhopethatmy remarksaboutthediachronicmask- curs att1andthenthereisnothingfor sometime without thepossibilityofinterference, would beonto- of thepoisonanddeathiscoreproblem. count ofdispositions. ed (by ahuman),northedispositions,aspoisonisstilldeadly,butitprevents the example, if you take the corresponding antidote, you prevent death through a deadly cess depend on the specific poison and specific body, but cess startsinyour body.Sure,thespecifics ofthepro- cause of)thepoison.Callcaseswherepreventer actsafterthetrigger«diachronic could insistthat«ingestionintheabsenceofcorrespondingantidotes»isap- general agreementthatmaskingcasesaremoreproblematicthanfinkingcases. For going oninthepoisoncase.With theingestion,apro- gap ( tion, andthereisapossible end-resultofthisprocess.Notmuchhinges on this,butI’d derstood as processes. Thisavoids thetemporal-action-at-a-distance-criticism: there the in-principlepossibilityofaninterference» (Schrenk, this isthatthepoisoningcanleave permanentdamagestoyour body,even ifthe end followed yet againby amanifestation att2,shouldbe this context.Inthefollowing, Ipresentmy theoryofdispositions:thetriadicprocess the hardestproblemcasesfor atheoryofdispositions,for systematic reasons. sitions debate.Ofcourse,Icannotdiscussthematteranywhere nearexhaustionin Upon reflection, you canseethatthediachronicmask- I focus ontheapplicationofTPDtothisproblem manifestation nevertheless. Maskingcasesposeaformidable challengetoany ac- result oftheprocess(death)canbeprevented. rejected in the first place. However, thisis not what’s particles inthevoid, thuschargedthattheyrepel eachother. process-understanding of disposition manifestations. rather thandefending it endetail. masking cases».Astheycannotbefixed by tinkeringwiththetrigger,thesecasesare not exclude allprevention cases.Antidotes areoftenadministeredafter(and, well,be- masking cases(cf.Schrenk2010, 729). poison. Theantidotedoesneithertakeaway thetrigger,aspoisonisstillingest- propriate triggerfor thedispositionofdeadlypoison.Theproblemisthatthisdoes problem casesby makingthetriggermoreexplicit.So,insteadof«ingestion»you in caseswherethereisno naturalend-pointtotheprocess:for example, thinkoftwo ifestation, and because of this temporal gap, «there is in any case,itisnot«nothing».Avery clearindicatorof ing casesaresonotoriousbecausetheyincludeatime ing casesatleastmotivate it.Asthispaperisconcernedwiththemomentofchange, logically bad.Anaccountthatclaimsthetriggeroc- like to reserve the word manifestation for the process. In thisway, it can also be used Δ t) between thestimulusandcanonicalman- According totheTPD,then, themanifestations ofdispositionsareto beun- The vitalbitoftheTPDfor thispaperisthe This tour de force brought us right to the heart of the contemporary dispo- Upon themaskingcases,thereisaparticularlynastysubclass:diachronic So, inthecaseofpoisoning,thereisaprocess thatstartswiththeinges- Note, thattemporalactionatadistance,even 12 You mightthinkthatyou couldexclude the Δ 13 t

cial version, Fischercial see (2018). indiscriminately. Fortation - offi the paper, use word the Iwill - manifes not important in context the of this aspect of ontology the triadic the is cumb afight to about words. As . But Idon’tgen suc this - want let to useothers word the for my wirkun behaviour; resultant called have for I what «manifestation» term dispositions. Some people use the pute going about on in debate the 13 There issome terminological dis- cesses. Fischer See (2018,ch. 4). be understood to have aspro- asresulting behaviours,as well chronic wirkungen, aspect isthat wirkungen which Icalled sitions and resulting the behaviour, dispo in-between - athird level with supports it ontology,that atriadic aspects. The synchronous aspect is diachronous and synchronous its whichparts, can be understood as TPD. The TPD consists of two introduction and of defense the abook-length written 12 Ihave - dia . The

-

134 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo closely connectedtotheprogressive aspect. can bewalking totheuniversity withoutever reaching ed tohave itsfullidentity.Fromthatitfollows, thata cause people were focusing circumstances. victim happen,someofthemirreversible, even ifdeathisprevented. explicate. Theideaisthateven whentheendresultisprevented, theprocessitselfis es. Thissolutionismadepossibleby thesamefeature oftheTPDthatallows ittoact or ifIharden ittomakeshatterproof (nodisposition, vicious astheyallow for theprevention tohappen afterthetrigger.Now, accordingto the diachronicmaskingproblemisaconceptual misunderstanding.Itjustarose,be- that may ormay notbecompleted; depending onthe the university (maybe because she isstruck by light- tation process.ButtheTPDalsoensuresthatprocesscannotbeprevented. Letme the TPD,manifestation is nottheendresultbutprocessitself.We have already the triggeranddispositionarepresent.Diachronicmaskingcasesespecially the manifestations ofdispositionsareprocesses.Buthow doesthishelpwiththemo- the process is temporally separated from the trigger, not its beginning. The process tion, nomanifestation occurs.Yet, thisisnowonder and than theprocessthatleadstoit.Itdidn’treach itsca- seen thattherefore thereisnotemporalseparationbetween thetriggerandmanifes- at how theTPDdealswithdiachronicmaskingcases. about themomentofchange?InsectionIII,we have seenthataccordingtotheTPD, as asymmetry-breakerregardingthemomentofchange.Iwill,hence,discussitin IV. However, they are asymmetric solutions, and this asymmetry needs to begrounded Let ustakestock.InsectionII,we have saidthatthesolutions1and2totempo- ning, maybe somethingmoremundanehappens). The ment ofchange?To seehow theTPDcanactasasymmetry-breaker,we have tolook more obvious thantolookatthemetaphysics ofchangeinthecontextdebate ral limit decision problem are to be preferred, because they agree with classical logic. not prevented. Remember thatinthepoisoncase,alotofchangesbody more detailinthenextsection. not problematic. IfIdonotstrikethe glass(notrigger) manifesting. Of course, the manifestation can still be nonical endresult,butthe dispositionnevertheless was process canbeinterruptedoreven cancelled.Somebody process isanongoingentity,i.e.,itneednotbecomplet- prevented. If you take away the trigger or the disposi- uum, butshould,ofcourse,notbesomethingrandomoradhoc.Butwhatwould be understanding ofmanifestations alsooffersasolutiontothediachronicmaskingcas- important thingisthatthereanongoing process in something.Thissomethingcancomefromoutsidethemathematicsofcontin- is notemporalgapbetween theprocessandtrigger.Only(possible)endof lem. Themanifestation processisthere,even ifitisinterfered with orcancelled.Hence, And inturn,thismeansthat,actually,thereisno diachronicmaskingprob- The process-understandingofmanifestations, accordingtotheTPD,is Disposition andtheMomentofChange In amaskingcase,themanifestation canseeminglybeprevented, although 15 on the end result rather 14 Thus,a details, see Fischer see (2018,ch.details, 4). assumed For in debate. the more ogy, or which explicitly isimplicitly do humeanhas the to with ontol- than process. the Roughly this ended up being on result the rather aboutof debate the dispositions backgroundthe on how focus the of paper, this but in isastory there 15 Itwould limitations the exceed extended. temporally essentially Idon’tthat processes think that are It isbecause of understanding this «process» describe to my account. than «progressive» with with rather When push comes shove, to Istick only considereditly one. this with ings of processes, but- I’mexplic 14 There understand other are -

135 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo There needstobeafirstmomentofthemanifested, becauseotherwiseamask would The worry isthatconsidering themanifestations of that itbegins.Hence,isconceptuallyimpossiblethatthemanifestation (process) conceptually impossible,themanifestation processneedstobepresentnomatter cision problem.Butlet’sbeexplicit. change. So how would the situation be described in the only enforces thatt1isthefirstmomentofmanifestation, not necessarilythat es. Onecouldacceptthisbutrejectthatfavours thesecondsolutiontotem- to the trigger, we see that the manifestation process must start with a closed interval. tation process.To beprecise,with«thebeginning»Idonotmeanitsinitialstagebut that isfragility),ofcourse,theglassdoesnotbreak.Butifdispositionkept,as that themanifestation (process)beginswhenthedispositionistriggered. due to(somekindofchange):nochange,moment qualitative difference, adispositionalist would say, is take thistobeaviablesolutionthediachronicmask- the thirdandfourth solution.Theideaisthat themanifestation andthechangein disposition hastostartwithaclosedinterval becauseofthediachronicmaskingcas- the translationfromTPDtotemporallimitdecisionproblem.Ofcourse,this the secondsolutionviathisrouteconsistsoftwo steps.Thefirststep would bethe terval andthesecondinterval only. terms ofthemetaphysics ofchange,accordingtotheTPD?At t1thereisachange the TPD is irrelevant for the limit decision problem. to pairitwiththefirst solution, Icannotsee. the TPD.Still,itismuch morenaturaltopairtheTPDwithsecond solution. How question isneitheratrestnorinmotion,orthat itisatrestandinmotiont1.For, dispositions ischangingthesubject, especiallyasthe soon asthetriggerthere,manifestation processstarts. still be(conceptually)possible. standing. Allofthismightbecontroversial. Yet allwe needfor theproblemathandis some qualitative difference,otherwisethey would not second stepisopentocriticism.Ihave claimedthatthemanifestation (process)ofa argument for theTPDitself–whichwe have omittedinthispaper.Thesecondstepis short whileonly,butatt1itismanifesting. Thus, the borderbelongstosecondin- property couldcomeapart.Thinkaboutthechange fromresttomotion.TheTPD poral limitdecisionproblem. is prevented –andthus,thediachronicmaskingproblemisaconceptualmisunder- is supposedtohelpinthecaseoftemporallimitde- ing problem or not. It should be clear, however, how this if you have noproblemwithacceptingtruthvalue gapsorgluts,you could stillhold it’s thefirstmomentofmotion.Nothingin TPD forbids thatatt1theobjectin how shortatimeelapsed.Ifwe (inthought)pushtheinterruptioncloserand happening. Apreviouslyunmanifested dispositionismanifesting. Itmightbefor a be two. Nolimit,nolimitdecisionsproblem.Butthis And infact,IfinditplausiblethattheTPDis, principle,compatiblewith An additionalway tochallengethesecondstepwould be theclaimthat Thus, onecouldsimplydefinethetriggerasbeginningofmanifes- The two intervals inquestionneedtohave Now, itdoesn’tmatter(here)whether you Let ustakethistothelimit.For theprevention ofthemanifestation tobe Let usdiscussthisfor amoment.First,notethattheargumentinfavour of 16 17

sitions and processes would do. problem. Not any theory of dispo- aboutdebate decision limit the impact about on debate the the tures, the an have TPD isable to - because of those fea «strange» point. the but isprecisely that Only 2018for objectionsMaslen it), to e.g., (see troversial 2019; Williams trigger. the with This con isvery - of powers issynchronicfestation mani the - that claim the features position. Among things, other it 16 The TPD surely isaminority stressing point. this an anonymous for referee 17 Iwould thank to like

136 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo And tothesequestions,theTPDhasadefiniteanswer. (potential) endproductsof(manifestation) processesandthe(manifestation) pro- adjacent states.Thus,whethertheprocessisalreadyinstateofitsendresult,say ent answer thanthequestionwhichstateobtainsatborder,opensuppos- changes intheworld. Butdoallchangesinvolve dispositions?Soeven ifoneagrees change isnotarbitrary,becausedispositionsare intimatelyinvolved inbringingabout cesses themselves have to be distinguished according to the TPD. To dissolve this wor- one couldstillrejectthat(thesamekindof)dispositions areinvolved inallchanges. whether abreakingglassisalreadybroken,irrelevant for thequestionathand.The ma facieastrongerlinkfor any ofthetwo questions. give risetoafall-backoptionfor my argument.Theideaisthefollowing. Accepting grant the transmission from the metaphysics of disposition manifestations to the that thequestiontowhichinterval thetemporalinstancebelongscanhave adiffer- that thetemporalandonticquestionare(partly)independentofeachother,i.e., temporal borderbelongstothesecondinterval andthesecondinterval only. temporal limitdecisionprobleminthefirstplace,Ican’tseewhy thereshouldbepri- to oneofthequestions,eithertemporalorontic,notother.Butifyou that dispositionsareinvolved insomechangesandfinds my examplesconvincing, then onlybe appliedtodisposition-involving cases.This, ofcourse,doesnotrule out there are «different options for different cases» (Strobach 1998, 12).TheTPD would the worry. Pandispositionalists believe that every propertyisessentiallydisposition - fending a mixed description. If you are a pan dispositionalist, you straight up reject asymmetrical solutiontothetemporalquestion,namelysecondsolution,that settle thetemporalquestion.Andthen,TPDstillgives usgoodreasons for an accepting atruthvalue gaporacontradictionregardingthemotionatt1,doesnot an asymmetricsolutionregardingthetemporalinstance.This,inturn,shows that sibility of an interesting, complex answer to the limit decision problem. In particu- state» and«[o]ntheotherhand,onecanaskaboutlimitofstate» (Pérez- and theonticquestionregardinglimitdecisionproblemhave tobekeptstrict- sumed thatthefour different formulations oftheproblemareequivalent. Butthey are: istherealastmomentoftheunbroken,andfirstbreaking? al. All changes in the world involve dispositions, and thus, the generality of the TPD is Ilzarbe 2012, 292). non-classical solutionsandthedifferentiationoftemporalonticquestion, might notbe.PalomaPérez-Ilzarbe,for example,arguesthatthetemporalquestion ment. Inmy expositionofthetemporallimitdecisionprobleminsectionII,Ihave as- manifestation. Ihave arguedthatconsideringdispositionsregardingthemoment of ry, itisimportantthatwe needtobevery careful,whichdispositionsandaccording- not limited.Theotheroption iswhatStrobachcallsamixed description , namelythat hold thatevery temporallimitdecisioncase hastobetreatedinthesameway? Ihave lar, it allows to combine a symmetric solution regarding the properties involved with ly apart.«Ontheonehand,canaskaboutlimitoftimethatmeasuresa limiting instanceisbetween theunbrokenandbreaking.Therelevant questions ly whichmanifestation processeswe track.Thelimitdecisionproblemonlyarisesfor based theasymmetryofsolutiononmetaphysical asymmetryofdisposition Another issueworth discussingisthegeneralityofTPDsolution.Doesit A challengertomy argumentcouldtrytoobjectthatIonlygive asolution At thispoint,therearetwo options: eitherbeingapandispositionalistorde- The combinationofthetwo worries, thecompatibilityofTPDwith There isanotherpotentialpointofcritiquefor thesecondstepofmy argu-

137 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo V. covers halfofthecases.Reconsider thecar,whichisfirstinrestthanmotion.Now of motion is also the end of rest, and both together then is the s-change from motion es. Thepictureisthis:we have beginnings ofprocesses(viadispositionsmanifesting), of changes.ButifI’mrightthattheendaprocesshastobeunderstoodas- ending oftheoldandbeginningnewstate». ginning ofanewprocess,thenthetwo C-changesinvolved arenotonapar.Andthis, given onlyanaccountofthefirstinstance. gument isonly hypothetically valid. Thishowever, isnotthe case.First,my goal was the secondbetween themotionandlaterrest.Theobjectionwould bethatIhave the beginning.ThisisadifferentkindofattacktogeneralityTPDsolution.It the generalityofTPDisrestricted. that theothercasescoincidentallyalsohappentosupportsecondsolution;but tion. However, Ithinkitallamounts toaniceoverall picture.Letusnow takeastep that favour thesecondsolution,namelythatlimitalways belongstothenew–is to rest;whileeachbeginningofrestisalsotheend ofmotion,andbothtogethercon- to Strobach,ans-changetakesplacebetween two positive states,e.g.,between rest fundamentality ofdifferentkindschangesfromit.Strobachdistinguishessucces- tion itself but merely its generality. So, one option would be to just bite the bullet and also assumethatitcomestorestagain after ashortperiodofmotion.Inthisexam- seems like you can accept everything I have argued for andstill hold that the TPD only sion problem.Itscore–thatdispositionfunction asmetaphysical symmetry-breaker stitute thes-changefromresttomotion. and motion;whileC-changesconsistinthebeginningorendingofonepositive state. sions, or:s-changesandCambridge-,C-changes(Strobach1998, 2).According accept thattheTPDjustgives ushalfofthepicture.Butmaybe we canhave more. Strobach, rightly,pointsoutthat«[e]very s-changeconsistsoftwo C-changes:the I have argued that theTPDallows for asolution to thetemporallimitdecisionprob - ning and the end of a process. One could argue that there is a metaphysical difference relatively independentofthemorespeculative considerationsatthe endofthissec- rails. We have alreadygiven anaccountaboutthechangefromunmanifested to man- ple, therearetwo interestinglimits,thefirstbetween theinitialrestandmotion; process actuallyisthebeginningofanotherprocess. processes inthefirstplace?Themoving carhasthedispositiontostop. You canstop in turn,suggeststhatC-changesareontologicallymorefundamentalthans-chang- ifesting: theTPDsays thatthereisafirstmomentofthemanifestation process,and it by jammingonthebreaks,oritcanbestoppedinamoreunpleasantway by guard lem; butIdid notarguefor theTPD inthispaper,soitmight seemthatthewhole ar- hence thesecondsolutionistobealsoappliedinthiscase.So,«end»ofone between thebeginningandendofaprocessthatIhave onlyspokenabout back andassesstheargumentative setupofmy account. but eachbeginningisalsotheendingofanincompatibleprocess.So,

The lastthingIwant todiscussisthepossibledifferencebetween thebegin- This concludesmy discussionoftheTPDsolutiontotemporallimitdeci- This, initself,doesnotimplyanything about thefundamentalityofkinds Why shouldwe accepttheasymmetry between beginningsandendsof Conclusion If thisreplyissensible,onecouldtrytodraw implicationsregardingthe First, I want to point out that this worry does not challenge the TPDsolu-

138 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo vour oftheTPD.Itisquiteawidespread view tothinkof other accountofdispositionsthatcouldpotentiallybeused.Itisthespecificunder- ory ofdispositionstohave implications for thelimitdecisionproblem,letaloneofany with theotheravailable solutionsinthenextstep.But we shouldonlyacceptgapsorglutsifthereisnoclas- Given stablecosts,themoreapplicationcasesatheo- goal, theTPDonlywas anexamplewithwhosehelpIwanted toshow how thede- this transcendspaperby far.Inanutshell,my goal the secondinterval. there isnoothercontender,theTPDandwithitdebateaboutdispositionsspeaks the temporallimitdecisionproblem – andthisisunique,asfarIknow. Aslongas show was thatdispositionsallow for anewargument sion problemisanargumentinfavour oftheTPD. standing ofmanifestations asprocessesoftheTPDthatenabledtransmissionto argument was convincing, theclaimthat dispositionscanbethesymmetry-breaker sical solution.Mysolutionwould needtobecontrasted modus tollens» the solution to the temporal limit deci- motto «oneperson’smodusponensisanother ry has,themoreprofitableitis.Thus,accordingto more generalthanjusttheTPD.Iwanted toshow that thedebateaboutdispositions problem buttoenrichitssolutionspace. philosophical theoriesintermsofcostsandbenefits. in thispaperwas nottotryandsolve thelimitdecision in favour ofonetheclassicalsolutions.Ihopethiswill in favour of the second solution: the limiting instance belongs to the second and only is established.Furthermore, Idon’tknow ofany otherattempttotakeaspecificthe- is relevant to the debate about the temporal limit decision problem.Regarding this lows for anovel kindofsolutiontothetemporallimitdecisionproblem,speaksinfa- limit decisionproblemonceandfor all.AllIwanted to be seenasanadvantage by thepeoplewhothinkthat bate aboutdispositionscaninfluencethedebatemomentofchange.If my Of course,Idonotclaimtohave solved the But the whole argument can also be read the other way around: 19 18

for a temporal limit decisionfor atemporal case. limit change can be asymmetry-breaker how a(neo-)humean theory of 19 So, for example, Icannot see forest» (Ladyman al. 2007,234). et - in rain the live to ourselves cile now suggest wemust that recon - butof deserts, wethink facts the ing appreciation Quine’s aesthetic Anyone iswelcome go to on shar of canopy. new thickets revealing science regularly with deserts, than lush spaces rather and leafy . «Ours isthus of arealism Realism Don Rainforest Ross called have James what Ladymanmatches and My ontological rather preference ing of of complexity the world. the and hinder captur the straitjacket ing, Occam’s razor can turn into a in- theoriz too2012, 97).Used early Occam’s razor in philosophy (Heil, campaigns against misuse the of Johnories. Iside with who Heil, philosophical evaluate way to - the 18 Idon’t think right isthe this that it al- - -

139 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Williams, N.(2019) ThePower Metaphysic. Oxford University Press. Sorabji, R.(1976). AristotleontheInstantofChange. Schrenk, M.(2010). Thepowerlessness ofnecessity.Noûs.44(4):725–739. Strobach, N.(1998). TheMomentofChange.ASystematic HistoryinthePhilosophy Roques, M.&Goubier,F. (eds.)(2018). TheInstant ofChangeinMedieval Philosophy Pérez-Ilzarbe, P. (2012). Ladyman, J.&Ross, D.withSpurrett,&Collier,J.(2007). Every ThingMustGo, Medlin, B.(1963). TheOriginofMotion.Mind.72: 155–175. Maslen, C.(2018). Thecasefor widespreadsimultaneouscausation.Philosophical Heil, J.(2012). TheUniverse asWe FindIt. Oxford University Press. Fischer, F. (2018). NaturalLaws asDispositions.PhilosophicalAnalysis 76, DeGruyter. Bergson, H. (1910). Quarterly 68(279): 123-137. Consciousness. tr.,F. L.Pogson,Montana,Kessinger PublishingCompany. of StenEbbesen(287-304). Brill. Society, Suppl.Vol. 50[first version]. and Beyond. Brill. of SpaceandTime.TheNew Synthese HistoricalLibrary,Vol. 45,Springer. Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Márquez (eds.)LogicandLanguageintheMiddleAges. AVolume inHonour problems inPeterofAuvergne, InJ.LethFink&H.HansenA.M.Mora- Bibliography Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Socrates desinitessenondesinendoesse:Limit-decision Proceedings oftheAristotelian

140 Limit Deciding Dispositions. A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem — Florian Fischer Fischer Florian — Problem Decision for the Limit Symmetry-Breaker Metaphysical A Dispositions. Deciding Limit  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 143 III. di Zenone. Due evidenzecliniche Rivivere l’incubo Rodrigo Codermatz

ESPLORAZIONI / FURTHER PERSPECTIVES 141  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 142  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Temporal Consciousness and Parnas’s are Ipseity TEMPO VISSUTO TEMPORAL CONSCIOUSNESS Consciousness and Temporality Theory and Parnas’s Ipseity-Disturbance Model.Ipseity-Disturbance From comparison the of differential diagnosis in adimensional criterion differential ophrenia (Parnas). Inboth disturbances is time ogy and psychology: clinical one of isundoubt these - Phenomenology has provided important investigative blocked, in encapsulated moment: the in confabula- Barba) and to the manifestation of first the prodromalBarba) and manifestation the to sphere form the of and atrans-diagnostic and takes slow motion, in an eternal time, not take orAchilles wefind episodic that in manysubjective temporality Rodrigo Codermatz clinical modelsclinical among such Barba’s asDalla Memory, Due evidenzecliniche Rivivere l’incubodi Zenone. edly the notionedly the temporality, of duration, lived research. roleWhat philosopher can the in have still engram; in schizophreniarelived wecan- that astep approach isby now that guiding clinical latest the symptomsand early of aspectrum syndrome of schiz- lived temporality would confabulation to temporality lead (Dalla lived amalfunction or weakening of temporality: this lived temporality therefore leaves the purely speculative purely the speculative therefore leaves temporality arrowthe immobilized island in of their time. The lived cloning and becomestion it serial the of arevitalized models,these Barba’s wediscover both Dalla that this perspective? this neuropsychol psychiatry, psychopathology, to tools SCHIZOFRENIA associato. diin Psicoanalisi Trieste acui è Centro di Formazione eRicerca gruppo di Neuropsicoanalisi del al partecipa nalisi. Attualmente fenomenologica psicoa- edella psichiatria studio allo della cato di sità Trieste, peranni èdedi si - in Filosofialaureato all’Univer Rodrigo Codermatz, dopo essersi CONFABULAZIONE IPSEITY - -

143  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo «ogni personavive untemposuoproprio,intraducibile,ognunosenteper Achille ouna frecciaimmobilizzatinellaloroisoladitempo. Theory (MCTT) di Dalla Barba (2002) e i suoi studi sulla confabulazione in ambito neu- (Dalla Barba)ealmanifestarsi deiprimisintomiprodromicieprecocidiunasindrome camicia diforza oun’armatura,compulsivi ritagli delpassatonellaconfabulazionee ed episodico,unengrammarivitalizzatoerivissuto checicadeaddossocomeuna e protensioneprogettualenelmondodistesasulletredimensionitemporali,memo- col pensierodiBergson(Minkowski), diHeidegger(Binswanger, Tellenbach), diSartre, concetto divissutoinprimapersona generale. disturbi della temporalità vissuta: è Minkowski stesso ad affermare che la schizofre- dello spettrodellaschizofrenianelsecondocaso(Parnas).Dalpuntodivista fenome- temporalità vissuta porterebbe, secondo gli autori, alla confabulazione nelprimocaso debitori della tradizione fenomenologica: la Memory, Consciousness and Temporality ti quali la filosofia, la neuropsicologia, la psichiatria, la psicanalisi e le neuroscienze in fertile programmadiricercainterdisciplinareeunproficuodialogotradiversi ambi- di tempovissuto,percomeloabbiamodefinito,impostainoltreuncostrutto tria, rivestendo un’importantefunzionedidiagnosiprecoceedifferenziale.Ilconcetto di molteteorieemodelliricercanelcampodellaneuropsicologiapsichia- to elatrascendenzamondana.Inquestosensoèdivenuto ormaiilnucleofondante temporali e intenzionante, volta a costituire preriflessivamente l’identità del sogget- temporalità presente,tacita,prossimale,immediata,personale,vissutainprimaper- disperanti dellatemporalità neivissutitipiciequotidianicomeinquelli atipicie zione, unasimiliper-riflessività, unaspeculazionedestinataarimuovere gliaspetti sé, cosìcomeognunohafamepervive persé,muoresé.Nessunopuòsostitu- sona, immersionesintonicanelmondocomeprogettualitàdistesasulletredimensioni soggettiva dell’esperienza,iqualiadiChalmerschecirassicuranoessereeffettiva- Minimal Selfnell’IDMdiParnassonoprospettiva inprimapersona,presenzialità,tem- La psichiatriaelaneuropsicologiafenomenologiche contemporaneehannofattopro- Polanyi eMerleau-Ponty.Ilconcettoditempovissutoèintesocomedurata, mento nell’attimo:laclonazioneserialediunframmento delpassatoautobiografico nia èdurataintaccata,impossibilitàdiassimilare tuttociòcheèmovimento edurata. nologico, dicono entrambigli autori, sia la confabulazione che laschizofreniasono minkowskiana di tempo vissuto. Un malfunzionamento o un indebolimento di questa ria episodicaautobiografica e,inquanto tali,assolutamenteinscrivibilinellanozione mici della schizofrenia in ambito psichiatrico. Comune a entrambi è, a mio parere, il ropsicologico e l’Ipseity-Disturbance Model (IDM) di Parnas (2014) sui sintomi prodro- mente noi stessi presenti hic et nunc poralità personale,preriflessiva, tacitaeprossimaleimmersione(carnehusserliana) pria lariflessionesullatemporalitàladdove la fenomenologia husserlianas’interseca patologici? un passochenonriusciamoafareintempo,un’eterna moviola, nellaschizofrenia:un irsi aquestanostraesuaesperienza»(Minkowski 1933, xi), Avremo allorasianellaconfabulazione chenellaschizofrenia,l’incapsula- Che anche la domanda filosofica sul temponon siache un’eccessiva astra- Che ruolorimane alloraallafilosofia acospettodeltempo vissuto? Introduzione Sia laTemporal ConsciousnessdellaMCTTdiDallaBarbachel’Ipseityo Nel presentelavoro prenderòinesame duemodelli,entrambidichiarati – – dal quale vorrei iniziare questa mia riflessione: il sentirsisituatocomeBefindlichkeit,qualità

144 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo (Brentano, Sartre,Merleau-PontyeHusserl),partedalpresuppostochelacoscienzaè cazioni cheglieventi hannocausatoalivelloe fisiologico,biochimico, neuroanatomico essere presenti,sonoioche gliconferisco ilpassato.Leincisionielemacchie d’inchiostro cervello, nelmiosistemanervoso ecognitivo, modificazionechedefiniscotracciamne- ci eneurocognitivi(imaging),inlineaconlatradizionefenomenologica continentale categorie nosologiche. chiudo gliocchipossoimmaginarla,odiarlaoamarla,distinguerladauna ormai oltrepassare il dilettantismo filosofico, valersi dell’esperienza clinica per porsi che puòpreludere alla catastrofe. Unaseriameditazionesulla temporalitàdeve cocemente nel narrato e nel vissuto temporale del soggetto quel “vincolo creodico” virtù diunacoscienzacheglieloattribuisce:letracce suicuscinideldivano miparlanodi gurarsi comecriteriodiagnosticosovraordinato apiù tutte le volte cheio e imieiospitivicisiamosedutisopramanonhanno maismessodi funzionale e questariattivazione nonècheunanuova percezione,unrivivere parados - trans-diagnostico dove iltempovissutovenga aconfi- tà diverse: per esempio io posso percepire questa penna sul tavolo di fronte a me, se del pazientequaleconditiosinequanondiognipossibile“aiuto”,nelpercepirepre- tale deve essereprimadituttofilosofo nell’assumerequellaposturaattaall’ascolto za diqualcosa.Diconseguenzalacoscienza“investe” isuoioggettisecondomodali- zione fenomenologica dellaconfabulazioneconirisultatidirecentistudineurologi- salmente l’evento contenutonella tracciamnestica(Paradox oftheMemory Trace). sulla scrivania o i segni sui cuscini del divano non sono chela riattivazione dellemodifi- stica; maqualèlanaturatemporale di questa tracciamnestica?Senz’altroilbicchie- al centrodellaricerca(comelodimostranoalcuneteo- I. I segnicheglieventi hannolasciatosuglioggetti acquisisconoilsensodipassatosoloin La MCTT, definitadall’autorestessoneurofenomenologica perchécombinaladescri- re-sulla-tavola nonpuòcheesserepresente.DallaBarba(2016) citaMerleau-Ponty: rie sulla disperazione) intenzionalità, ossianoesi,attonoeticoproiettatosuglioggetti,edèsemprecoscien- iutare il professionista della salute mentale; bensì il professionista della salute men- loro enonsonoilrisultatofinalediunprocessoontologicocausale. lazioni tralacoscienzaeilsuooggettosonooriginaliirriducibiliperchédiverse tra barca avela, possoricordarla,ricordaredove equandol’hocomprata;tuttequestere- delle macchie d’inchiostro. Ma, di per se stesse, queste tracce non rinviano al passato: sono di fugaeassenzacheèilpassato(1945,529-530). ce delprocessocorporeochehaaccompagnatounadellemiepercezioni,esel’impulsonervo- so passadinuovo attraverso questipercorsigiàtracciati,lamiapercezione riapparirà,io avrò Questo tavolo portadelletraccedellamiavitapassata,vihoincisole mie iniziali,vihofatto zione, cheèpresente,potràindicarmiunevento passato[…]unapercezioneconservata èuna presenti; e,sevitrovo deisegnidiqualcheevento “anteriore”,litrovo perché,peraltravia,ho percezione, continua a esistere, è sempre al presente, non apre dietro a noi quella dimensione una nuova percezione, forse pure affievolita e irreale; tuttavia, in nessun caso questa perce il sensodelpassato,perchéportoinmequestosignificato.Semiocervello conserva letrac- Memory, ConsciousnessandTemporality Theory Non bastaconfidareinunaprecisafunzioneocompitodelfilosofo nell’a- Il bicchieresullatavola, quidifronteame,apportaunamodificazionenelmio 1 in un approccio dimensionale e (1989) e Panzarella et al. (2006). et (1989) ePanzarella 1 Per esempio Abramson al. et -

145 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo (1933, 19) esembradescrivere iltacito(intraducibile)sépre-riflessivo, ilséprossi- 63) malungidall’essereunhomunculus“frontale”chesetacciaemarcailtempo-a episodica coscienza checipermette,alcontrariodella TC, diaccedereaunatemporalitàimper- e informazioni nelletredimensionidellanostra temporalitàsoggettiva: DallaBarbala e lesuetredimensioninonsonochestrutturesubordinatediunatemporalitàperso- Gli eventi, di per sé, producono patterns di modificazione del cervello aspecificie tasma scolorito»(Bergson1889, 134), èmerasimultaneità;lecoseesternecambiano della miapersona,quest’«unicaposizionelancettaedelpendolo»(Bergson 1889, tengono alcunainformazione concernenteiltempo,nésonoorganizzaticomeuna definisce di unfuturopersonaleverso cuiprotendereè,perl’appunto,loslanciodiciparla della memoriasull’anticipazionedelfuturo,sebbenequestestrutturedipendanodallo zione neltempononèlamemoria,bensìloslancio[…]misembracheilpassatoci sapere chequelcaneè nostro), adunfuturoimpersonale(conoscere ladatadelle sonale, aunamemoriasemantica siastorica(saperecheBushèstatopresidente degli senza dubbiomailoromomentisisuccedono solo perunacoscienzacheliricorda. ad altreugualmentesalienti. seconda dell’attenzioneprestatanellacodifica,dell’emotivitàassociataall’evento, del- successione. Questipatterns,inoltre,possonoesserepiùomenostabilivulnerabilia atemporali: aspecificiperchénoncontengonoalcunainformazione checidicesesono sia datoinmodoprimitivo dellamemoria[…]l’avvenire vissutocièdatoincontesta- stesso meccanismoneurale(lobomediotemporale.)Scrive Minkowski: «iltempo si sato o nel futuro, senza alcun Mental Time Travelling, comenon c’è prioritàontologica Stati Uniti)cheautobiografica (conoscerelapropriadatadinascita,del matrimonio, Ben distinta dalla TC è, invece, la Minkowski, mentreespressionicome“vivere nelpassato”o“rivivere ilpassato”testi- rappresentazioni, ricordi, significati,procedure oaltro;atemporaliperchénoncon- presente riservata allaTC. La TC, nelsuoessere tempovissutopersonale eattuale personale, del rivivere unricordo ovivere un’attesa o delsentirsisituatieorientati nel prossime elezioni);mala KC nonconcernemail’esperienzafenomenologica deltempo ricevono unadimensionetemporalesoloinvirtùdellanostrapresenza: moniano cheilpassatoappartienedifattoalpresente. male di Polanyi. E ancora: «Il fenomeno che introduce primitivamente il fattore dire- nale fermamente ancorataalpresente,senzaalcunapossibilitàdiviaggiarenelpas- presenta anoicomefenomeno primitivo, sempre presente,vivo […]vicinissimoanoi» investire diunicitàstoricaedesistentiva larealtàeilmondo,adapriredimensione in quantocosatralealtre(traccemnestiche),poichéiltempo,sestesso,nonesiste la profondità di codifica, se sono esperienze richiamate o ripetute più volte o associate bilmente inmodopiùprimitivo delpassato»(1933, 19). L’esperienza fenomenologica del presenteèl’intuizionediretta,ilfuturol’attesa. (Agostino, 325) esistono nell’anima,névedo possibilitàaltrove: ilpresentedelpassatoèlamemoria, sente delpassato,ilpresentepresente,futuro».Questeultimetreforme sono itempi:ilpassato,presentefuturo».Piùesatto,sarebbedire:«Tre sonoitempi:ilpre- Risulta dunquechiarochefuturoepassatononesistono,impropriamentesidice:«Tre Temporal Consciousness(TC). Aldifuoriessailmondoè«nostro fan- Gli oggettidelmondo,quindi,nonsonomaipresenti,passatiofuturima È questatemporalitàvissutaepersonale-purapresenzahicetnunc Il tempononpuòesserecercatonellecosedelmondoeneppurenelcervello, e autobiografica a immettere il temponel mondo, acollocareoggetti, eventi Knowing Consciousness (KC) un’altramodalità di

146 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo (presente), cioèdurata,nonpuòessereconfusaconlaKC deltempoesterno,comune, o comportamentiabitudinari eripetuti,èverosimile, plausibile,indistinguibile daiveri cipazione dieventi pubblici, insomma,tutteledimensioniconcernentilatemporalità e cronologico(Husserl1893), laconoscenzasemanticadelleunitàditempoe cita procedurale, la memoriasemantica, illinguaggio,laconoscenzadeltempofisico come unapennatraletante,nellasuamolteplicità(M)trascendenteognivissuto e nonaltrepenne)mentrelaKC, interagendoconpatterns piùstabili,lariconoscerà con entrambelemodalitàdicoscienza: la TC, interagendoconpatterns menostabili, con U).Sihannoalloralecosiddettehabitsconfabulation, chesonodigranlungale con lastoria,ilbackground,situazionepresenteefuturadelsoggetto.Nellaconfa- ciso, nonvengono cioèinvestiti nellalorounicitàmaprocessatidallaKC attraverso e completo dell’ippocampo ossia nell’amnesia ippocampale (Scoville & Milner 1957). I Quindi ilcontenutodiqueste confabulazioni,formatosi dallacondensazione dieventi gire conquellipiùstabili,ilrisultatochegli eventi ripetuti,leabitudini,lamolte- già distortedaaltrepartidelcervello: laTC noninteragiscepiùcon ipatternsmeno quella specifica penna, che ho comprato la scorsa settimana in quel preciso negozio, della simultaneitàemolteplicità.Quandovedo lapennasultavolo iolainvesto della memoriacheproducestatioazionisonononintenzionalmenteincongrue quindi laconfabulazionecomeproduzionedifalsememorie,untipodistorsione di neuropsicologiaeneuroimaging:l’ippocamporisultaessereunastrutturacentrale ticolarmente, vanno intaldirezione.DallaBarbaeLaCorte(2015) ipotizzanochel’ip- tata: laTC elamemoriaepisodicavanno completamenteperseneldannobilaterale temporale: scriveva Minkowski (1933, 26): «Tutto ciòcheèdueinrapportoaltempo zione altempo,allostessomodoincuituttociòchesisuccedeaffermacomedueo storia, il background, la sua situazione presente e futura. Così un paziente confabu- stabili perchéquestisonoabolitioresiinaccessibili inmodalitàTC mava aintera- all’interno diunaretecoinvolta nell’esistenzatemporaledell’individuo.Definiscono sente e di progettarsi in un futuro personali, perdita della memoria retrograda e ante- si succede.Inversamente, tuttociòche durapassandosiaffermacomeunoinrela- ricordi persinodaifamiliari odachièinstrettorapportocolpaziente e neconoscela mente comeununicoe specificoevento inunospecificocontesto spazio-temporale. rienze personalipassate,routine,abitudinioeventi frequenti)processatoerronea- rograda ediogniesperienzafenomenologica dellatemporalitàsoggettiva epersonale molti.» mente preservato, laTC èpresentemamalfunzionanteinquantoriceve informazioni più frequentieriflettonoilrichiamodiunpassato episodicopersonale(ripetuteespe- plicità, sonoprocessaticomeevento unico, passato,presenteofuturo(Mèconfuso pocampo siailcorrelato neurale della TC, avvalorandosi direcentienumerosistudi patterns piùstabilierimangonoinunasfera, percosìdire,impersonale.Ipazienti, possono sìesserericonosciuticomefamiliarimanonrientranoinunricordobenpre- pazienti amnesici non hanno alcuna esperienza del loro tempo personale: gli oggetti impersonale. in tutteetrelesuedimensioni.Alcontrariorimangonopreservate lamemoriaimpli- loro relazioni,deltempopassatopubblico,autobiograficoedellastoria,nonchél’anti- le conferirà una suaunicità (U) inscrittain unatemporalitàpersonale(peresempio, lante ospedalizzato, alqualevenga chiestocos’abbiafatto laseraprima,riporterà una bloccati inunistantaneopresente,manifestano incapacitàdiorientarsiinunpre- bulazione enell’amnesiadiencefalica,dove abbiamounippocampoalmenoparzial- Le ricerchediDallaBarbasullaconfabulazione,echequiciinteressanopar- La dissociazione delle due modalità di coscienza è ampiamente documen-

147 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo che nonhannomaicostituitounaspecificasingolaritàspazio-temporale. occorso inununicoespecificocontestospazio-temporale(laseraprima)èrimpiaz- confabulazione puòessereisolataemisurataempirica- e impersonale dalla KC comeaccade, per l’appunto, nelle cosiddette habit confabula- e neuraledellaTC equindidellatemporalitàvissutapersonale.Lesioniadifferenti e laselezionenellaneocortecciaassociativa dipreciseespecificheinformazioni epi- clonazione. Questoclonetemporaleimprigiona eimmobilizzailpaziente,loobbligaa gica, definisconoipseità lasensazionedicostituireunsoggettovitale, autocosciente e dei confabulatoriacon-fondere abitudiniedeventi ripetutiinunepisodiouniconon tutta latemporalitàsoggettiva epersonaledelpaziente,ilsuopassato,lasuamemo- tiva epersonaledistortamalfunzionanteallabasedella dove vengono formate lerappresentazionigenerali,pro- damentale della coscienzaèilsuoessere direttasempre verso unoggetto(la coscien- tiva, l’eterno ritorno seriale di un frammento del nostro passato sottoposto a continua tions: c’èun’intrusionesemanticaneltempovissutochegenerailcontinuum,molte- quindi unruolofondamentale perlaTC comemodalitàdi coscienza conferente l’u- zato da un’abitudine, dalla routine, dal prodotto di una serie di ripetuti eventi passati za èsempre coscienzadiqualcosa) e questapropensioneall’oggetto è,perl’appunto, all’ospedale, osullorofuturodicendochedomanidovranno recarsiallavoro quando, sul loropresentedicendo,peresempio,chesonoascuolamentreinvece sitrovano sua attivitàabitudinariaaggiungendotalvolta l’allocuzione“comealsolito”:unevento autoidentificantesi come polodiesperienzaecomeprospettiva in primapersonasul suto personaleverrebbe riprodottaserialmenteeclonatainunamolteplicitàastorica aree delcervello porterebberoalmalfunzionamentodellaTC percuil’unicitàdiunvis- alla cortecciaentorinale(EC),alsubicolo,CA1eCA2,èrelativamente preservato sodiche, deiricordiplausibiliattiariempiregapmnemonici(abductive inference). II. Nell’IDM (Nelsonetal.,2014) gli autori,anch’essidebitoriallatradizionefenomenolo - Barba,1993a). L’ippocampo posterioree,inparticolare,ilCA3(CornodiAmmone3)giocherebbero riguarda soloilpassatomaanchepresenteefuturo.Spesso,infatti,confabulano ria episodica,l’orientamentonelpresenteeilsuoprotenderealfuturo:latendenza mente tramitelaBatteriadellaconfabulazione(Dalla mondo, intenzionalità e costituzione trascendentale dell’oggetto: caratteristica fon- ria ma il frutto di una distorsione della nostra temporalità vissuta personale e sogget- nelle fasid’esordiodell’ADdove difattoabbiamoancoraleconfabulazioni.Dunque, nicità episodica alla realtà. Prova afavore diquestaipotesiè che ilCA3, comparato recitare semprelastessaparte,ilsuopassato: fiumedivienerisaccanellaqualecisi patterns edellefine-grainedlocalrappresentation(funzionedipointer),cioèlaricerca plicità, serie,successioneesimultaneità. invece, nonlavorano più. ietta all’ippocampoposterioredove avviene l’elaborazionedeiseparation/completion l’ippocampo einparticolareilCA3sarebbero,perDallaBarba,correlatoanatomico long-axis specialisationchedall’ippocampoanteriore, bagna piùvolte. Ipseity-Disturbance Model Un’altra caratteristicadellaconfabulazioneèilsuoestendersiecoinvolgere Le tecnichedineuroimagingevidenzianouna La confabulazione non sarebbe quindi un semplice disordine dellamemo- 2 Questatemporalitàsogget- sola volta. sola item più volte visto di aver confabulanti affermavano ipazienti volte; quattro sola, altri degli item sentati venivano pre- pazienti al., 2004):ai TaskMemory Recognition nel dimostrato èstato 2 Questo , alcuni una volta presentati una presentati (Serra et et (Serra

148 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo 1945, 418): lapiumadi uncappello può diventare unamano elapuntadelbastonedi (1963), cioèèdataepotremmo pensareall’essere-nel-mondo(Dasein)comeesse- coscienza pre-riflessiva più basilare, cale edesplicita(guardolasediaallamiadestra)euna conoscibilità neltempoattraverso icambiamenti(iden- corpo chehalapeculiarità,adifferenzadituttiglialtricorpidelmondo,essereespe- energia maèilmediumincuil’esperienzacostituitaearticolata.Nelson(etal.,2014) va personaleedèentratonelcampodicoscienza, e ogniattointenzionaleècostituitodaquestidueaspettiinterdipendenti,l’embed- ce edembeddednessintheworld sonoinseparabili,soggettoeoggettoduemo- Questo immediatoespontaneosensodivitalitànonva tità diacronicaesincronicadiJaspersScharfetter). due modalitàintenzionalipossonocorrisponderealladistinzionefocal v/otacittra del mondo(Körper), distaresospeso eoscillaretraquesteduedimensioni.Queste del mondodeglioggetti.Parnasriprendeevidentemente la fenomenologia diMerleau- farebbe damediumall’ipseitànelsuoincontrarsi eincarnarsi,asuavolta, nelmedium dedness intheworld elatacitapre-riflessiva autocoscienzacomediretta,irriflessa, dell’altro), definitaoperative intentionalitychecostitui- dness acuisi riferisce Parnas. zione obiettiva piùomenoconsciadelpropriocorpo,lasecondaa una consapevo- si articolanellaprospettiva inprimapersona,come lamiaesperienza. soggettiva. Soloinunsecondomomento,ciòcheèstatoesperitodaunaprospetti- spontanea esperienzadeinostripensieri,percezioni,sentimentiesofferenzevissuti abbiamo coscienza di noi stessi grazie al nostro essere assorbiti nel mondo delle cose sce lanostraprimariapresenzanelmondochesemplicementeaccade,direbbeHenry soggettività trascendentale a monte della costituzione La percezionestessa«è accoppiamento delnostrocorpoconlecose»(Merleau-Ponty Ponty, mailmiocorpo, sotto dimec’èunaltrosoggetto,perilquale un mondoesiste. Ponty quandoparladiunsensodirezionefamiliare eabitudinaria:inquantoLeib, mento di embeddedness in the world, riprende ilconcettostrawsoniano dipersonacomeri- mette all’evento passato didiventare ricordoecontribu- rito simultaneamentecomevissuto(Leib)osempliceoggettotraglialtrioggetti mondo comeschemacorporeoprepercettivo: nonsonoioatoccare, diceMerleau- menti astratti diun’unica struttura che è ilpresente (Parnas & Handest 2003). Noi re-gettati (Geworfenheit) heideggeriano.Sensodelsécomeunreflectedself-presen- nel mondo(Husserlparlava diLeib, carne comeinter- però lettointerminivitalistici:essononèsolo fonte di usa il termine Minimal self invece di ipseità e lo definisce come la qualità implicita del- un ciecoocchio.Ilnostro corpoinerisceallospazioequestainerenza èl’embedde- isce alsensodiidentitàpersonale(Parnas,2000).Parnas immagine corporeaeschemacorporeo,dove laprimasiriferisce allarappresenta- il miocorposiincarnanelmondo,divieneabitudine primordiale,sapereabitualedel incarna nelmondo,unaconsapevolezza cenestesica epropriocettiva sussidiariache in primapersona:èquestoesserevissutopersonacherendeun’esperienza l’intenzionalità. Riprendonoancheladistinzionetracoscienzariflessiva tematica, fo- la coscienzadidarsiinprimapersona,implicitapercuituttal’esperienza lezza implicitadifondo delnostrocorpoche nellapercezioneentraincontattoesi Nel concettodiembeddednessèinsita,inoltre,l’esperienzastessadelnostro Per Parnasla schizofrenia,definita per l’appuntodisturbodell’esperienza del 3 un tacito senti- 4 di immersione 5 per- 6

nel suonel arco ermeneutico (1991). 6 Come intendeva anche la Ricœur di Fuchs (2007). Ponty ePolanyi cono eil attentivo 5 Cfr. arc of awareness 4 Cfr. anche Fuchs (2016). ). dimension da quello prossimaletica) (tacit (coscienza- polo tema distale 3 Polanyi (1964)distingueva il di Merleau-

149 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo e diidentitàconsestessiilcorrelativo senso di co-presenzialità osimultaneitàdel cui entraincontatto.Ritirandolasuapresaepostura intenzionanteedesplorativa dal ovvi escontati,pernaturaliedevidenti,molti aspettidelmondosocialeepraticocon ovvietà espontaneità,diqueltacitobackground chefasìlapersonaprendaper correlate, complementariecompenetrantesiilsintomonascedove l’indebolimento che erastatadataperscontatacomemediumdell’autocoscienza,oradivieneabitata, con un indebolimento della loro dimensione tacita (diminished self-affection), a cui tormentata da problemi e questioni che la gente di solito dà per scontate, le è impos - finora vissutaoesperitatacitamentemacheora richiedeattenzioneeconcentrazione. della perditadelsensocomunedell’orientarsinelmondo,diquelnaturale qualcosa dentrodiluiècambiato,diventato inumano. ficato eilpazientelamentadinonsentirsio aver persoilcontattoconsestesso,che di impossibilitàamantenereunapresasullarealtà,nonsisentepiùaffettodalmondo, qualche modofiltrato,deprivato dellasuapresenza.Nelpazientesubentraunsenso di vetro”, dipercepirecolorispentieoggettilontani.Èpersalatacitapreriflessiva dita delproprionucleointerno,unsensodidistanzadalmondoesterno(chesembra discontinua, accelerata, rallentata, ferma), una diminuzione della chiarezza o traspa- descritti comeunaperditadiimmersionenelmondo,unsensoimpostodistaccodal dell’una permette l’acutizzarsi dell’altra. Questo punto di vista permette, secondo flessività, che si riferisce quindi a forme di esagerata autocoscienza e iperfocalizza- frequentata; ciòchenormalmenteètacitodivienefocale edesplicitofinoall’iper-ri- zione attentiva. Diminishedself-affectioneiper-riflessivitàsonoquindistrettamente è lasecondamodalitàdistorta dellatemporalitàsucuiverterà questa discussione. è diretta verso qualcosache,insestesso, nel suocorpomaanchemondo,era sono, aquestopunto,solo deipensatieinsorgonol’iper-riflessivitàla caratteristica sibile “fermarsi dalpensare”: esperiscequindiun’enormedistanzatra leielecose,che sintomo principaledellaschizofrenianellasuaforma piùpuraericonoscibile:sitratta subentra unintensificarsidiquella focale (hyperreflexitivity): ladimensionetacita, sé (Self-disorder)odell’ipseità,va acolpireealteraretuttiquestiaspettidell’ipseità Per esempio,lapazientediBlankenburgAnna Rau sisente“scucita”,“disincarnata”, La perditadell’evidenzanaturalecomesindromenegativa èperBlankenburg(1971) il Emergono profondi cambiamentinellatemporalitàsoggettiva (vissutacomelenta, Parnas et al., 2005). Innanzitutto nella diminished self-affection disturbi del senso di Parnas, unariletturacriticaeunitariadeicriteridiagnosticidellaschizofrenia(sintomi non èpiùstimolato,incitato,attratto,influenzato,immersoinesso:tuttosenzasigni- nalità, einsorgeunadistanzafenomenologica percuil’oggettopercepitoapparein myness dellapropriaesperienza,condizione emediumdiunaspontaneaintenzio- renza dellacoscienza,unacertaopacitàeunpervasivo sensodivuotointerno,per- mondo, undiminuitosensodipresenzaeesistere,evanescente sensodelvissuto. nel secondodominiodell’EASE-scale(ExaminationofAnomalousSelf-Experience, mondo, iltempovissuto:netroviamo una esaurientedescrizione fenomenologica mondo, percuiquestononglièpiùabitualeefamiliare, l’attenzione focale delpaziente perplessità schizofrenica (Ratlösigkeit)descrittadaStörring(1939). L’iper-riflessività presenza appaionomoltoprecocementecomeprodromidellaschizofreniaevengono positivi, negativiedidisorganizzazione). irreale, morto, meccanico)e una sensazione di vivere inritardoouna“campana bile Gestalt e portaall’emergereaccentuarsi disingoliaspetti isolati,chediventano Un disturbodell’ipseitàcolpiscequindiprincipalmenteilsensodipresenza In questocomplessopanoramad’esordiopredominanoisintominegativi. La perditadella presanaturalespontanea sulmondodissolve ognipossi-

150 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo (deficit dellefacoltàesecutive della working memory).Nelgiustapporsileprospettive (delirio diinfluenza),finoallatotalescomparsaognidistinzioneedemarcazionetra confabulazione diDalla Barba, dove laTC malfunzionanteripropone pursempreuno o compartimentalizzandosi (per esempioinunegoosservante eunoosservato che confusi, incoerenti,tangenzialifinoalderagliamentoototalebloccodelpensiero costituire unfenomeno chenonvienepiùriconosciuto,trasformandosi inqualcosadi vista esterno,piùastrattoecomprensivo, sovrastando questoflussoecogliendotutte e dell’attenzione). Questo processodibackward migrationaprelastradaall’emergeredeicosiddettisin- grazione edeframmentazioneiper-riflessiva sdoppiandosi(IchSpaltung),dividendosi di pianificazione(planning),divienedistraibile,ilsuopensieroediscorsosifanno dere l’iniziativa, a prestare attenzione, perde ogni capacità di controllo (monitoring) e tanto cheilpazientesisentesovrastato eincalzatodaipensieri,nonriescepiùapren- di dejavù,momentipassatinelpresente.Stanghellini (etal.,2016) parladifram- finisce conl’assumerecaratteristichequasipercettive (Gedankenlautwerden) sinoa di anastrophèeapofania,ossiacoscienzaabnormesignificato.Mentrenell’esplo- flessività (lostessoaccadeancheperladisorganizzazionedelpensiero,linguaggio tomi positivi,qualileallucinazionieideliri,chenonnasconoexnovo dalnullamaci zione dellaGestalt,l’iper-riflessivitànonèpiùcuriositàeperplessitàmadivienerumi- stesso fotogramma monolitico e serialedelpassatopersonale: ilfiumeèdiventato un soggetto, ioaggiungerei di veri epropriconatiditemporalitàvissuta, diabortitempo- stereotipato ripetersidiunpassatocongelato, già descrittodaJaspers(1913) come si con-fondono eillorocontenutodivienespessoneutraletantodagettarepaziente sione fisionomica, nell’essere tenuto in ostaggiodal particolare, ilpazientesi sente alla senze, diproprietàd’essenze(freigesetztWorden) e,inquestadisarticolazione(locke- sivo espessoautoriferito (apofaniaconradiana).Interminiconradianidiremmoche son semprestatievengono riscoperti,percosìdire,daquestadimensionediiper-ri- sé el’altro,allacon-fusioneconl’altro(transitivismodiBleuercomefluidtransition). alieno, dicompletamenteestraneo,unaforza chesorveglia, controlla,otieneinpugno sività, unaproliferazione dimetaprospettive, dacuiilpazienteaccedeaunpuntodi spettico econtestualeladisinibizionedituttelealtreprospettive che convergono in rali. L’aspetto protensivo dellatemporalitàvissuta entrainscaccopropriocomenella mentazione del tempo in atomici now-moments che si impongono e adombrano il nella piùcompletaperplessitàeincapacitàdidecisione(ambivalence) finoallapara- nazione pseudo-ossessiva, ansia,attaccodipanico,stupor:l’esperienzaintrospettiva mercé delmondo,seguelasuacatastrofe esisente“andareapezzi”,nelladecostru- rung) dellasuacoerenzapercettiva, dispiegalafisionomiacomerapportoincrociato pria confusionediidentità. una perditadicontinuitànellatemporalitàdello schizofrenicoeuncontinuoripetersi un flusso,interferendo ecompenetrandosi:una vera epropriacascatadiiper-rifles- indipendente edisconnesso,pulsa(pulsating)alsuopostopreme(Gedankenjagen), il futuroche rimane “bloccato, non avviabile” mentre il presente si trasforma in uno ingaggiano una irrisolta battaglia trail beneeil male)epuò subentrare una vera e pro- intrusivi esicaricanodiunsignificatoesagerato,straordinario,emozionalmenteinva - le prospettive inunasolaunicaegrandegiustapposizione.Maognipensierorimane lisi dell’azione e al collasso di ognigoal-directed behavior. Il sé segue questadisinte- l’oggetto mondanosi ètrasformato in unanube oinondazione(Űberflutung)d’es- blocco dighiaccio maèpursempre lo stessofiume. Si nota,infatti,untotaledisancoramento,unafugadalpuntodivistapro- L’iper-riflessività comebackward migrationbloccaogniprotensione verso

151 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “ponte” piuttostoche“burro”.Questatensionetrala e minacciatodaframmentidifuturo(eventi catastrofici)ecostringeilconfabulatore continuum, sommergeloschizofrenicochesisente invaso daframmentidipassato e divieneaspettativa dicome andranno lecose: origina dallasintesipassiva dellanostratemporalitàvissuta(laretentiohusserliana) evitando ognicambiamento(neophobia),overstimolation e,allimiteestremo, corpo, osirifugia in un’immobilitàartificiale, minimizzandomovimenti epercezioni, e subentrailtentativo compensatoriodapartedelsoggettodiricostruireunaconti- visto nonpuòesserciMentalTimeTravelling. Èquestotempo-fantasma che,come come differenzaderridiana, comeritardotemporaletral’onozukarao secondo sog- getto eilmizukaraoprimosoggetto.Ilconoattualizzainibisceprobabilità(planning frammentato, compartimentizzato, parcellizzato, tomizzato per cui troviamo il col- di Blankenburg)segnalarotturadell’organizzazionedinamicadeltempochediviene di Störring,l’apophänieeladiffidenzaconradiana,perditadell’evidenzanaturale frammenta, siatomizzaecollassainuncontinuum,indebitandosiconlospazio. tempo vissutoepersonale,diunadurataacuiècoessenzialel’immersionenelmondo, facendosi daluipenetrareesentendosiunoconesso»(Minkowski, 1933, 280),come tionality deivissutiintrusivi. tempo incapacediavanzare, l’Achille olafrecciadiZenonechenonappartengono più tracce in fotogrammi ricomposti in successione in una continuità senza durata: è il dersi alfuturosismembraautopticamente,riavvolge susestessarileggendolesue dico “iericamminavo lungoil...”l’interlocutoresiaspetta zofrenia. Inquestocaso,fallendoogniprocessoinibitore,l’esternodivieneintrusivo span attentivi enella working memory, dellefunzioniesecutive (shifting,updating e solito richiedonosemplicemente comportamentispontaneioautomatici, unatem- sensazione dicostituireunsoggettovitale-perdeslancio,siritira:laconcezionedina sincronismo inquanto«facoltàdiavanzare armoniosamenteconildivenire ambiente, sistem ecortecciafrontale),asecondadellostatodivigilanzaonelcasoindeboli- suo non-essere, a prescindere dalla distanza, dalla meta, dallo spazio, come abbiamo al tempoperchégiàrisucchiatinelsuoesseredissezionato, nelsuoesseremorto, si tratta) temporalmente, un’inerzia della temporalità vissutache invece di proten- sce ilsensodiagency,lapropriaidentità:ètraKimura,quell’aidaintersoggettiva nella camiciadiforza dellasuaabitudine. mica deltempopresuppostodientrambiimodelliesaminati,ilpresentismoun ritirandosi socialmentenelfreezingoftime,lostuporecatatonico,l’inversion ofinten- nuità internaattraverso l’iper-riflessività, quasiunarivalsa cartesianadell’animasul mento dellafunzioneprotensiva, sipuòritrarreeallargare(comenelsognooinstati poralità troppolenta(slow down) otroppoveloce (speeding up),lasovrastima di rompersi oframmentarsi,l’incapacitàdiprocedere(perchéprocessoenonevento prima partedellafraseelasuaconclusionecostitui- una ridotta abilità ariconoscerestimoli inintervalli ditempo minimali,disturbinegli un’incarnazione (Husserl) che riassorbein sé letredimensionitemporali,sicontrae, una prospettiva inprimapersona,presenzapre-riflessa,contattovitaleconlarealtà, intervalli temporali, unritardoedisturboneimovimenti sequenziali delledita, ipnotici indottidadroghe),interrompersi oframmentarsicome avviene nellaschi- lasso el’indebolimentodellafunzioneprotensiva chesipuòritrarre,allargare,inter- Volontari, attentieprecisiprocessicognitividianalisi insituazionichedi Fuchs (2007) parladellaprotensionecomediunconoprobabilitàche Il momento compensativo della iper-riflessività (l’astrazione, la Ratlösigkeit Il tempovissutocomeTC oIpseità–intesacomesensazionedicostituire 7 se io di Picard coding 7 Cfr. predictive il e Friston (2014).

152 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo Abbiamo cercatoinquestepaginedidelinearedue quadripsicopatologici:nellaconfa- oggettivo. capacità ditenereiltempoorilevare delleasincronie).Rifacendosialmodellodi cessivo; questidisturbinelvissutotemporalesembranoessereancheallabasedeisin- come una camicia di forza o un’armatura; abbiamo alluso metaforicamente ad una ctive codingdiFriston(2008),evidenziacomeipazientischizofrenicisianoincapaci come unicoevento temporale (durata). e delGABA, nelsequenziarel’azione:unritardodellagrandezzadimillisecondipuò volgono ilcervelletto (inparticolareilpeduncolocerebellaremedio),assiemeaigià caso citatodaMartin(etal.,2018), itempidireazionedelpazienteAFnondecre- grammata dipassoin(analogamentesiriscontraneisoggettischizofrenicil’in- tomi disorganizzativi.Peresempionel“fingertapping”taskilpazienteSZscompone denzia lalorodifficoltàapredireeseguire eventi inintervalli breviditempo,ipazienti dimensioni temporali) macontinuamente ritornasuisuoipassi. Iltemposidisperde dico, diun’azioneabitudinaria delpassato,nonèaltrochel’attivazione diuncircuito tingenti, delfluiretempo,nell’adattarsiaicambiamentineiritarditemporali.Nel di distinguereintervalli di tempomanonquellabeneficiarecuestemporaliecon- durante ilcompitoditargetdetection,aunincrementodellasensibilitàdellecellule questo sarebbedovuto adunamaggioreattivitàdelleconnessionineuraliposteriori di avvalersi distimoli-segnalenellapredizioneunostimolo-target,ossiafalliscano attesa dell’informazione sensoriacomeinputmotorioperilrisollevamento deldito, sua capacitàdiformulare previsioni,lasuaprotensioneintenzionante. scono affattoall’aumentaredellaprobabilità del verificarsidell’evento: è invalidata la Frith (2005),gliautorisottolineanoilruoloimportantedialcuneretineuralichecoin- migration, comestagnazionedeltemposoggettivo controilmovimento nelmondo motoria) edunquenecessitadiuntempopiùlungopereseguirel’azionecheèpro- momenti chenelsoggettotipicosonosintetizzatiinunasempliceeunicasequenza rimangono comebloccatinelprimoevento, incapacidiprocederealmomentosuc- messa la capacità di pianificare in anticipo una sequenza di azioni: nel Simon effect evi- porale dellacoscienza(durata)nellaschizofrenia,dell’iper-riflessivitàcomebackward risacca che avanza e si ritrae,il fiume cerca diprotrarsi(siconfabulaintutteetrele neuronale bendefinito, diunengrammarivitalizzatoerivissutocheci cadeaddosso noti disturbinellaconnettivitàneuraleeneisistemidopaminergici,glutammatergici piramidali superficialiedegliinterneuroniinibitoriadisfunzioninellaneuromodu- prevedibili estimoliimprevedibili. Tecniche difMRIeneuroimagingsuggerisconoche interpretati comegliequivalenti neuropsicologicidelladisintegrazionedell’unitàtem- inhibition) localizzatenellacortecciaprefrontale,sonosintomichepossonoessere il riconoscimentodiunastrutturasequenzialecuesnelprevenire eventi prevedi- impedire l’automaticointegrarsidimomentiedeventi discretiinunflussovissuto l’azione induemomenti(abbassamentodelditofinoalcontattoconlasuperficiee lamina corticale sopragranulare. In questi pazienti resterebbe preservata la capacità lazione dell’eccitabilitàpostsinaptica(dopamine-DR-1eNMDA-R) inparticolarenella bulazione, laclonazioneserialediunframmento delpassatoautobiograficoedepiso- bili. Ipazientischizofrenici,inpocheparole,processerebberoallostessomodostimoli Conclusioni Giersch (etal.2016) sottolineacomeneipazienti schizofrenicisiacompro- Un altroindirizzodiricerca,rifacendosialmodelloBayesiano ealpredi-

153 Rivivere l’incubo di Zenone. Due evidenze cliniche — Rodrigo Codermatz Rodrigo — Due evidenze cliniche di Zenone. l’incubo Rivivere  .Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo “vibra” assiemealpaziente. che un’eccessiva astrazione, una simil iper-riflessivitàe chenon faccia ilgioco delcon- essere declinatanelsensodiun’indaginedellediverse modalitàd’esistenza. e diogniricercadeltempopoichéquesto,nellasuavera natura,nonpuòcheessere estrema felicità? Ancoraunavolta dovremmo accontentarcidiun’epochédelgiudizio candosi dalparadosso e divenendo posturadelprofessionista chesiponeinascoltoe emanciparsi dailabirintidellaspeculazionefilosoficaericaderenella veraesistenza, gnosi differenzialenonsoloperquantoriguardagliambitiquiconsideratimaanche di unacoerenzacolpanelrimuginaresulpassato,onellatemporalità“circolare”del- tinuum coldiscreditodelladurataetemporalitàvissuta,chenondebba,invece, trans-diagnostico a cui tendono i più recenti indirizzi clinici e diviene criterio di dia- di ognidisfunzioneoatipicità,chiunquepuòesperire.Quantolungointerminabile tempo cheoradeve diventare necessariamentericercaclinicaepsicoanaliticaaffran- tempo meditava sul tempooggideve essere unclinico. sforzo confabulatoriochecompulsivamente recuperaritaglidelpassatopercolmare anche esoprattuttoquelladelvissutodella sofferenzapsichica;ilfilosofo cheun negli statidepressividove ipetitesfautesdiTellenbach costituiscono l’eternoritorno nuum filtraedilaganelladurata;mapotremmoimmaginarequalcosadisimileanche moviola delnostromovimento. Nellaconfabulazionecomenellaschizofreniailconti- nella autopticadissezioneinattimi,singoliengrammi,prodottiserialmentedaun negli studisulladepressione,disperazione e ilsuicidio.Questostessomiocontri- po, nonriusciamoariappoggiareilpiedeterraintentiedispersinelripercorrerela prima nonriusciamoadaccederealdopo:èunpassocheafareintem- percepito e declinato in diverse modalità (intensità?) di esistenza: il tempo è esistenza. può sembrare il tempo prima di un esame o fugace e irruente nel godere un attimo di processi neurali alterati: ma non sono che dei casi limite di esperienze che, al di là parlano di un tempo che si parcellizza e diviene paretico in funzione di determinati monianza (perusareunterminejaspersiano)ovissutoancoracomenarrato,non poralità sicostituisceacategoriasovraordinata aiduedisturbiconsiderati. può astrarre dall’esistenza ed erigersi a categorialogica,trascendentale,estetica:deve iati prodottisinellatemporalitàvissuta.Parimenti,schizofrenia,imprigionatinel la disperazione(Abramsonetal.1989 ePanzarellaetal.2006). buto puòessereconsideratountentativo diapprocciotrans-diagnosticodove latem- Ci chiedevamo in apertura se anche la domanda filosofica sul tempononsia La temporalitàaprequindipiùchemaiquell’approcciodimensionalee Le evidenzeneuropsicologicheepsichiatricheacuiabbiamoaccennatoci Ma siamopartitipursempredallafilosofia,domandafilosoficasul La domanda sulla temporalità non può astrarre dal soggetto cometesti-

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