climate law 7 (2017) 65-96
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Climate Change Mitigation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Benoit Mayer Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong [email protected]
Abstract
Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy as a Special Administrative Region of China. Unlike China itself, Hong Kong is not a party to international climate change agreements. While China has declared that the Paris Agreement and other climate change agreements apply to Hong Kong, the implementation measures for Mainland China in fact do not apply to Hong Kong. Its unique position under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle has frequently led to Hong Kong being left out of internation- al cooperation on climate change mitigation. Nevertheless, as this article recounts, the government of Hong Kong has shown increasing interest in promoting climate change mitigation—or at least in being seen to do so. In January 2017, Hong Kong adopted the ‘Climate Action Plan 2030+’, which is, in essence, a regionally determined contribution to mitigation.1
Keywords
China – Hong Kong Special Administrative Region – ‘one country, two systems’ principle – Climate Action Plan 2030+ – regionally determined climate change mitigation – non-state actors
1
1 I am grateful to Alexander Zahar and four anonymous peer-reviewers for valuable comments and advice. Any remaining errors are my own responsibility.
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1 Introduction
China has become one of the most prominent actors in international coopera- tion on climate change mitigation. By contrast, international negotiations have often neglected to consider the unusual circumstances of certain autonomous subnational entities, such as China’s Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong.2 International conventions and their Conferences of the Parties gener- ally take it for granted that to each state corresponds one government with an exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and population. After all, it is a general principle of international law that a party to a treaty ‘may not invoke the pro- visions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.3 In accordance with the principle of the ‘sovereignty of States in international cooperation to address climate change’,4 it is left to each state to decide how to coordinate its various local governments or administrations in order to achieve national mitigation commitments, sometimes through the allocation of tar- gets to sub-territorial entities. Such allocation, however, cannot readily be imposed under the ‘one coun- try, two systems’ principle which defines the relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong and which recognizes ‘a high degree of autonomy’5 to the latter. Because Hong Kong is not a party to the international agreements on climate change, it is not directly under any treaty obligation to take any particular measures on climate change mitigation. Moreover, there does not appear to be any formal agreement between Hong Kong and the Mainland on the modalities of their cooperation in this regard. Therefore, as far as action on climate change mitigation is concerned, Hong Kong is drifting somewhere between the continent of international law—the direct application of treaty obligations to sovereign states—and the continent of administrative law—the hierarchical imposition of national policies on lower administrative entities. No reference is made to Hong Kong in China’s Intended Nationally Deter- mined Contribution submitted pursuant to the unfccc/Paris Agreement
2 3 4 5
2 There is a similar oversight of Hong Kong in the secondary literature on climate change miti- gation, with the notable exception of Zhao Yuhong, ‘Responding to the Global Challenge of Climate Change: Hong Kong and “One Country, Two Systems”’, 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 70 (2011). Special thanks are due to Roger Suen for research assistance with this paper. 3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 May 1969, 1155 unts 331, article 27. 4 unfccc, recital 10. 5 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- land and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 19 December 1984, Annex, Part i, second paragraph.
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6 7 8 9 10
6 ndcs are to be communicated by national governments in accordance with Paris Agree- ment article 3. See also the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the People’s Republic of China, 30 June 2015,
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2 Status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Hong Kong enjoys a reputation for being a rich and bustling economy. Despite significant income inequalities11 and an economic slowdown in recent years,12 the territory continues to stand out as a strong regional and global financial and economic center. Hong Kong’s per-capita economic output is comparable to that of many developed countries.13 Services represent more than 90 per cent of the territory’s economic output.14 Hong Kong’s location on the border with China’s giant market has contributed to its development as a business- friendly jurisdiction.15 Its economic power has far-reaching implications, not
11 12 13 14 15
11 Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient in 2011 was 0.53, significantly higher than China’s (0.42 in 2012) or the United States’ (0.41 in 2013): Hong Kong Legislative Council Secretariat, ‘Fact sheet: Hong Kong in Figures’, 31 March 2016; and data from the World Bank, available at
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16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
16 People’s Republic of China, First Biennial Update Report on Climate Change (December 2016), at 140. See also World Resources Institute, cait Climate Data Explorer,
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24 25 26 27
24 Lee Yu-tao, ‘A Study on Greenhouse Gases in Hong Kong: Sources and Mitigation’ (Dis- sertation in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Science Degree in Environmental Management, University of Hong Kong, 1999), at 73. 25 See Hong Kong Water Supplies Department, ‘Annual Report 2015/16: Water Security and Climate Resilient Development’ (2016),
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Table 1 co2 emissions from aviation and bunker fuels used in international and ‘regional’ transportation in Hong Kong in 2012 (Mt co2).28
Emission sources Maritime transport Civil aviation Total
Regional transport (between Hong 9.697 1.746 11.443 Kong and Mainland China) International transport 16.798 12.608 29.406 Total 26.495 14.354 40.849
The problem of how to fully attribute greenhouse gas emissions to a territory is not unique to Hong Kong,29 but it assumes a particular importance in light of Hong Kong’s tiny territory and its strong reliance on extraterritorial activities. The narrow territorial basis used for the greenhouse gas inventory excludes from consideration many activities essential to the well-being of Hong Kong’s residents which occur outside its territory. This raises not only ethical ques- tions, but also pragmatic ones. To omit the extra-territorial emissions embod- ied in Hong Kong’s way of life is to understate the responsibility of Hong Kong and the power of is government to curb greenhouse gas emissions outside its territory through laws and policies of territorial application. The changing, unique status of Hong Kong has allowed it to delay or curtail its action on climate change mitigation in a context of relative international in- difference. Until 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was under colonial rule by the United Kingdom, which remained generally in charge of the territory’s international relations. The United Kingdom ratified the unfccc on 8 December 1993, but it did not extend its application to Hong Kong. Because the United Kingdom is an Annex i and Annex ii party, extension of the Framework Convention to Hong Kong would have caused the territory to shoulder the relatively oner- ous commitment to ‘take the lead in combating climate change and the effects
28 29
28 Ibid. at 141. 29 See, e.g., Glen P. Peters and Edgar G. Hertwich, ‘Post-Kyoto Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Production versus Consumption’, 86 Climatic Change 51 (2008); and David Satterthwaite, ‘Cities’ Contribution to Global Warming: Notes on the Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, 20 Environment and Urbanization 539 (2008).
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30 conduct31 relations with overseas entities ‘in the appropriate fields, including 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
30 unfccc, art. 3.1. 31 Ibid., art. 4(3)-(10). See the statements of Tony Eason, the then Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands, reported in Kathy Griffin et al., ‘Doubts over green pacts’, South China Morning Post, 3 December 1992. See also discussions in Zhao, supra note 2. 32 The four ‘Asian Tigers’ are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Starting in the 1960s, they experienced rapid economic growth. 33 Joint Declaration, supra note 5, Section 3.2. 34 Ibid., Annex, Part i, second paragraph. 35 See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 4 April 1990,
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39 40 41 42 43 44
39 Basic Law, supra note 35, art. 151. 40 People’s Republic of China, Communication in respect of the Hong Kong Special Admin- istrative Region, 8 April 2003, 2213 unts 268 (A-30822). 41 People’s Republic of China, Initial National Communication on Climate Change (10 December 2004),
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China’s obligations under the Agreement. Yet, Hong Kong is not mentioned at all in China’s indc.45 The territory, not being a party to the Paris Agreement, is unable to communicate its own ndc. While Hong Kong has recognized the need to act ‘in light of’ the Agreement and China’s indc,46 its role under the Agreement is likely to remain that of follower rather than leader, as I argue below.
3 Hong Kong’s Indifference to Global Environmental Issues, 1992–2007
Even as the United Kingdom increasingly supported international cooperation on climate change mitigation, Hong Kong’s colonial government expressed very little interest in any aspect of international environmental law. No repre- sentative of the colony attended the 1992 Earth Summit.47 The colonial govern- ment stated that it ‘generally endorsed the objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions’.48 The Kyoto summit, soon after the transfer of sovereignty, was also not attended by Hong Kong.49 Well into the 2000s, the government of Hong Kong adopted no concrete measures dedicated to climate change mitigation. In his Annual Address to Hong Kong’s Legislative Council in September 1992, British Governor Chris Patten highlighted the colony’s ‘environmental priorities’, but made no allusion to the Earth Summit, which had concluded in Rio three months earlier, or to any of its themes (climate change, biodiversity, sustainable development, etc.). Instead, the territory’s ‘environmental priori- ties’ would be to tackle local air and water pollution. Patten emphasized Hong Kong’s capacity to act on these priorities:
for a city like Hong Kong it is hardly overwhelming. We have the technol- ogy to act. We have the resources required. We can make a big difference, 45 46 47 48 49
45 Action by the cpg is naturally going to be more important than action by Hong Kong’s government. In 2012, 11,896 Mt co2 eq. were estimated to have been emitted in Mainland China, 43 Mt co2 eq. in Hong Kong, and 9 Mt co2 eq. in Macau: China’s First Biennial Update Report, supra note 16, at 22, 140, and 170. 46 See for instance infra note 78. 47 Kathy Griffin, ‘Plea on Earth Summit policies’, South China Morning Post, 7 August 1992. 48 Statements by Toney Eason, reported in Kathy Griffin et al., ‘Doubts over green pacts’, South China Morning Post, 3 December 1992. 49 Elizabeth Tacey, ‘Absent sar “indifferent” to climate change issues’, South China Morning Post, 6 December 1997.
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and swiftly, if we choose. And then, when we have cleaned up Hong Kong, we will have a new product for export. Environmental technology is going to be a ‘growth area’ for many years to come.50
Seen in its international context, this statement manifests a glaring contra- diction between Hong Kong’s financial and technological capacity (not to mention its economic interest in developing its environmental-protection in- dustry for export), on the one hand, and its government’s indifference toward global environmental issues, such as climate change, on the other. The transfer of sovereignty on 1 July 1997 did not fundamentally change this outlook. The Annual Address delivered later that same year by Hong Kong’s new Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, epitomizes an approach to environmen- tal protection which treats it as an instrument to promote a ‘business friendly environment’,51 rather than incorporating any sense of global citizenship or environmental trusteeship. Tung highlighted the need for the government to tackle ‘waste and environmental degradation’ as ‘inefficiencies that are costly to our health, our businesses and our community [and] our competitiveness’.52 While claiming that ‘Keeping Hong Kong clean is everyone’s responsibility’,53 the Chief Executive neglected to mention Hong Kong’s own responsibility to respond to global environmental issues. There was a manifest contradiction between his call on individuals to act responsibly and the government’s disre- gard for global environmental challenges. While the need to protect Hong Kong’s environment was increasingly emphasized throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the rationale remained unmistakably utilitarian, focusing on the attractiveness of the territory to foreign investors and ‘talented’ foreign workers, as well as (somewhat as an
50 51 afterthought)52 public health.54 This rationale did not exclude supporting an 53 54
50 Legislative Council, Official Record of Proceedings, 7 October 1992 (pm),
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international agreement on climate change from which Hong Kong could ben- efit. Thus Hong Kong’s government supported the Central Government’s deci- sion to apply the unfccc and the Kyoto Protocol to the territory as of 5 May 2003.55 These treaties did not entail any substantial mitigation obligations for Hong Kong, which was now part of a non-Annex i country. Even the commit- ments applicable to ‘all parties’ in unfccc Article 4(1) did not readily imply any concrete duty for an autonomous subnational entity on the international plane.56 On the other hand, subject to arrangements with the Central Govern- ment, Hong Kong could benefit from any financial or technological support available to developing parties under the Convention and Protocol, in particu- lar emission-reduction projects under the Clean Development Mechanism.57 The Convention-Protocol package was, for Hong Kong, a potential source of new finance and technology, at no cost of commitment. The application of the unfccc and Kyoto Protocol to Hong Kong did, how- ever, fuel debates on the role that the territory should play in climate change mitigation. These started to percolate into the mainstream political discourse in late 2004, when British Deputy Consul-General Greg Dorey called on Hong Kong to ‘volunteer to sign up to developed-country targets to serve as a good example to polluters in the Pearl River Delta’.58 A similar view was expressed by environmental ngos. For instance, Edwin Lau Che-feng, assistant director of Friends of the Earth, emphasized the moral obligation for Hong Kong to
55 56 57 58
destination for tourists and for international business travelers’ and ‘make Hong Kong a more attractive place for highly-skilled professionals to live in’: 1999 Policy Address of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa to the Legislative Council, 6 October 1999,
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‘take a bigger role in cutting greenhouse emissions and help China achieve more reductions’,59 while Robin Oakley, campaign manager at Greenpeace China, argued:
With a gross domestic product that puts it firmly into developed coun- try status, and comparable emissions to several European Union nations, Hong Kong is in a unique position. Instead of hiding behind mainland China’s developing-country status, it could play a powerful role. A com- mitment to binding targets and heavy investment in renewable energy sources could play a vital part in moving the whole of China forward with its sustainable development ambitions.60
Hong Kong’s government responded to such comments by hiding behind le- galistic language: ‘As with other developing countries, China (including hksar [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]) is not required to set an emission target under the Kyoto Protocol.’61 Opportunistically stressing the first element in the ‘one country, two systems’ principle whilst eliding the second, Hong Kong’s government could delay any substantial action on climate change miti- gation until such time as China itself would agree to specific mitigation targets. Hong Kong’s government did show an intermittent interest in the concept of ‘sustainable development’, though initially not for its scope to cover global en- vironmental issues. The concept was referred to, in Chief Executive Tung’s 1999 Annual Address, as a ‘way … to increase prosperity and improve the quality of life while reducing overall pollution and waste’.62 A Council for Sustainable Development was established, holding its first meeting in December 2003.63
59 60 The61 Council carried out consultations focused on its three chosen aspects of 62 63
59 Ibid. 60 Robin Oakley, ‘Kyoto is only the beginning’, South China Morning Post, 19 February 2005. See also Paul Harris, ‘Hong Kong’s climate responsibility’, South China Morning Post, 9 April 2007 (‘even though Hong Kong’s pollution of the global atmosphere does not violate treaties, it is arguably immoral—and downright callous of us—to continue anything re- sembling business as usual’). 61 Legislative Council Panel on Environmental Affairs, ‘Greenhouse gas emissions and their effects on global warming, Summary of views’, 14 June 2007, LegCo document cb(1)2202/06-07(01), at 3. 62 1999 Policy Address, supra note 54, para. 86. 63 See Office of the Chief Secretary for Administration Sustainable Development Unit, ‘A First Sustainable Development Strategy for Hong Kong’ (December 2003),
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4 Hong Kong’s Timid Commitment to Mitigation Targets, 2007–2015
Late 2007 seems, in retrospect, a pivotal moment in Hong Kong’s environmen- tal history. It was at this time that the territory’s government began to give seri- ous consideration to concrete measures for emission mitigation in Hong Kong. It occurred in the context of the publication of the ipcc’s Fourth Assessment Report and the preparations for the unfccc’s Bali cop—events that contrib- uted to the building of a global momentum for action on climate change.71
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
64 Ibid., para. 6. 65 Ibid. To date, there has been no ‘Second’ sustainable development strategy. 66 Ibid., para. 12. 67 Ibid., para. 13. 68 Ibid., para. 13. 69 Ibid., para. 12. 70 Ibid., para. 22. 71 See unfccc, Decision 1/cp.13, ‘Bali Action Plan’, 14–15 December 2007.
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An important impulse came from Hong Kong’s participation in the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) forum. As mentioned, Hong Kong’s Basic Law authorizes it to conduct relations and conclude agreements ‘in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural and sports fields’.72 Hong Kong had joined apec in November 1991, when it was still under British rule, as a way to advance its economic and trade interests in the region. It maintained its membership after the transfer of sovereignty. Although apec is primarily an economic forum, climate change has in- termittently been on its agenda.73 The Sydney apec Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development, of 9 September 2007, announced ‘a forward program of practical, co-operative actions and ini- tiatives’.74 The forum’s twenty-one Member Economies committed to ‘working towards achieving an apec-wide regional aspirational goal of reduction in en- ergy intensity of at least 25 per cent by 2030 (with 2005 as the base year)’.75 While this did not impose a specific obligation on any Member Economy, and while only a few concrete measures were approved (they related to joint re- search, development, and transfer of technology), the Declaration appears to have built momentum for action by Hong Kong’s government. For the first time, the Declaration led the Government of Hong Kong to recognize that it had a role to play. A month after the apec meeting, Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang, in his Annual Address to the Legislative Council, recognized that the territory had a role to play in addressing ‘the crisis of global warming’:76
72 73 74 75 76
72 Basic Law, supra note 35, article 151. See discussion above at note 39 and accompanying text. 73 See, in particular, 1997 Leaders’ Declaration, Vancouver, 25 November 1997,
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Global warming has become a challenge to the international community. In light of their own economic, social and environmental characteristics, governments around the world have to formulate measures to strike a bal- ance between economic development and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, with a view to achieving sustainable development. In the same vein, we should do our part to improve the regional environment.77
Tsang also announced that, ‘As an apec member, Hong Kong will honour its pledge and seek to achieve a reduction in energy intensity of at least 25% by 2030 (with 2005 as the base year)’.78 He outlined several new measures that the government would take, which would promote climate change mitigation, including public consultations on the mandatory implementation of a Build- ing Energy Code and an Energy Efficiency Labelling Scheme.79 Although such measures represented the continuation of the government’s efforts to curb local air pollution by reducing energy intensity, their rebranding as climate change mitigation measures indicated a shift in emphasis from local to global environmental protection. At around the same time, consultations were held between China’s National Development and Reform Commission and Hong Kong’s Environmental Pro- tection Department to enable Hong Kong to host cdm projects. On 6 June 2008, the two administrative bodies adopted the Arrangements for the Imple- mentation of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in the Hong Kong Spe- cial Administrative Region (the 2008 Arrangements).80 No cdm project has been established in Hong Kong itself, but subsequent consultations allowed Hong Kong companies to receive cdm funding for projects they implemented in Mainland China.81 By December 2016, 48 cdm projects had been established in the Mainland by Hong Kong companies.82 Outside the cdm, there was increasing awareness of the need for Hong Kong’s government to cooperate with the Central Government on climate 77 78 79 80 81 82
77 Ibid., para. 37. 78 Ibid., para. 38. 79 Ibid., para. 38. 80 Arrangements for the Implementation of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 6 June 2008,
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83 Arrangements for the Implementation of Clean Development Mechanism Projects, supra note 80, art. 1. 84 Legislative Council Panel on Environmental Affairs, ‘Hong Kong Government’s Prepara- tion for the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009’ (November 2009), para. 4. 85 Ibid., para. 5. 86 Basic Law, supra note 35, article 152(1). 87 See unfccc Secretariat, ‘List of Participants’, 9 December 2005, document fccc/ cp/2005/inf.2 (Part 1). 88 Information drawn from the List of Participants compiled by the unfccc Secretariat for each cop session. 89 See, e.g., Douglas Woodring, ‘Our leaders are asleep at the wheel again on pollution fight’, South China Morning Post, 19 May 2007. 90 ‘In Brief’, South China Morning Post, 2 November 2007.
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91 92 93 94 95
91 See e.g. ‘In Brief’, South China Morning Post, 19 May 2009. 92 See Bernice Chan, ‘Green for go at environment exhibition’, South China Morning Post, 2 November 2010. 93 See Hong Kong city snapshot on the website of the C40 Large Cities Climate Leadership Group,
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96 LegCo Panel on Environmental Affairs, ‘Government Efforts in Addressing Climate Change’, 28 January 2008,
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options,104 causing a delay in important investment decisions, it appeared that it 105 106 107 108 109 110 111
104 ‘Climate Change Strategy and Action Agenda’, supra note 102, para. 4.9. 105 Ibid. para. 4.10. 106 Ibid. para. 1.2. 107 Ibid. para. 1.12. 108 Ibid. para. 5.45. 109 See generally hknic and clp, Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station: A fusion of efforts, a yield of achievements (n.d.),
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112 See 2013 Policy Address of Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying to the Legislative Coun- cil, ‘See Change, Maintain Stability, Serve the People with Pragmatism’, 16 January 2013,
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117 118 119 120 121
117 Environment Bureau, ‘Public Consultation on the Future Development of the Electricity Market’, March 2015,
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122 123 124 125 126 127 128
122 ‘Energy Saving Plan for Hong Kong’s Built Environment 2015–2015+’, supra note 120, at 5. 123 Environment Bureau (in collaboration with Development Bureau, Transport and House Bureau, Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, Food and Health Bureau and Security Bureau), ‘Hong Kong Climate Change Report 2015’, November 2015,
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More than four months later and just a few weeks before the start of the Paris Conference, the Hong Kong Climate Change Report 2015 noted the com- mitments made by the Central Government and announced that Hong Kong’s government would use the national carbon-intensity reduction commitment as a ‘reference to continue to shape [its] mitigation plans’.129 It acknowledged that Hong Kong ‘would need to continue to reduce [its] carbon intensity be- yond 2020’.130 Yet the Report contains no specific target applicable to Hong Kong beyond 2020 and no concrete plan of action for its government to imple- ment on climate change mitigation. Instead, the Report only briefly mentions that the government would ‘consider how to replace the electricity from local coal-fired generation by then, as Hong Kong’s coal plants are retired’.131
5 Responding to the Paris Agreement, 2016 and Onward
The Paris Agreement was adopted on 12 December 2015. China ratified it on 3 September 2016, with application to Hong Kong.132 The Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. These developments raised questions with regard to the role of Hong Kong’s government and its actual commitment. The failure of Hong Kong’s government to present any post-2020 mitigation commitments at the Paris Summit was criticized by some stakeholders, who called on the government to take much more ambitious steps towards climate change mitigation.133 The Paris Agreement does not readily leave room for an autonomous sub- national entity to prepare and communicate mitigation commitments. While China’s indc is a national commitment applicable to the whole of China, the targets and measures it provides are not fine-tuned to reflect the specific cir- cumstances or the capacity of an autonomous subnational entity. For instance, given the dearth of open land available in Hong Kong, China’s commitment to expand forests or achieve 20 per cent of renewable energy in power genera- tion by 2030 could be difficult to achieve in the territory. At the same time, as an advanced economy with a low level of economic growth compared with
129 emerging130 economies, Hong Kong is likely to achieve peaking in its greenhouse 131 132 133
129 ‘Climate Change Report 2015’, supra note 123, at 6. 130 Ibid., at 40. 131 Ibid., at 30. 132 See supra note 44. 133 See e.g. Ernest Kao, ‘Hong Kong must achieve carbon neutrality, says veteran environmen- tal scientist’, South China Morning Post, 19 April 2016.
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134 135 136 137 138
134 Hong Kong sar Government, ‘lcq6: Addressing climate change’, Press Release on 6 Janu- ary 2016,
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Change and the Paris Agreement’.139 Convening for the first time on 7 April 2016, the Committee drafted Hong Kong’s Climate Action Plan 2030+, which was published by the Environment Bureau on 20 January 2017, a few days af- ter some of its key measures had been unveiled by Chief Executive Chun-ying Leung in his 2017 Policy Address.140 This document, containing a target as well as a list of measures to achieve it, aims to initiate ‘a kind of pattern similar to the Paris Agreement’141—in essence, a regionally determined contribution to national and global responses to climate change. Hong Kong’s Climate Action Plan 2030+ defines a carbon-intensity-r eduction target of 65–70 per cent by 2030 from a 2005 baseline.142 This is slightly more ambitious than the Central Government’s commitment to reducing its carbon intensity by 60–65 per cent over the same period.143 The Action Plan 2030+ also announces that, after several years of stagnation, Hong Kong’s greenhouse gas emissions would peak by 2020.144 Like previous policies, the plan relies heavily on reforms in the energy sector to reduce emissions. In particular, it envisages coal in the fuel mix being reduced to about 10–15 per cent by 2030, balanced by an increased reliance on natural gas and (to a much lesser extent) investments in renewable energy.145 The plan sees 3–4 per cent of Hong Kong’s electricity by 2030 coming from ‘renewable energy’, including 1.5 per cent from a new waste incinerator—which, strictly speaking, is not a ‘renewable’ source, considering that non-renewable plastics, for instance, would form part of the fuel mix—and a combination of offshore wind generators and/or solar
139 140 141 142panels.146 Later documentation suggests that renewable-energy generation 143 144 145 146 147will be promoted through feed-in tariffs and renewable-energy certificates.147
139 Ibid. 140 The 2017 Policy Address of Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying to the Legislative Council, ‘Make Best Use of Opportunities, Development the Economy, Improve People’s Liveli- hood, Build an Inclusive Society’, 18 January 2017, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2017/eng/ pdf/PA2017.pdf>, paras. 132–135. 141 Reported in Ernest Kao, ‘Action plan aims to slash carbon emissions by 2030’, South China Morning Post, 21 January 2017. 142 Environment Bureau (in collaboration with members of the Steering Committee on Climate Change), ‘Hong Kong’s Climate Action Plan 2030+’, 20 January 2017,
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The plan emphasizes that energy efficiency and mitigation of transport emis- sions must also be improved.148 The Action Plan 2030+ also announced that Hong Kong’s climate action would be reviewed and updated every five years. The first comprehensive re- view is expected to be initiated in 2019, leading to an update of the Action Plan in 2020.149 This review could be the occasion for Hong Kong’s government to increase the ambition of its mitigation action towards 2030, based on a more advanced understanding of feasible efforts.150 If this timeline is respected, it would in principle be possible for Hong Kong’s targets and action plans to be included in the future updates of China’s ndc.151 As of now, however, Hong Kong’s 2030 mitigation target appears rather un- ambitious. In 2012, carbon intensity had been reduced by 20 per cent against 2005 levels.152 A significant reduction is to be achieved by the replacement of coal-fired by gas-fired power plants, which the government is willing to do anyway to tackle air pollution.153 Even a further reduction to 65–70 per cent by 2030 would not fundamentally change Hong Kong’s primary reliance on fossil fuels for power generation or its minimal investment in renewable en- ergy.154 The waste-to-energy facility, which is heralded as making up a signifi- cant portion of the ‘renewable energy’ target, is also an essential element of a new waste-disposal strategy to reduce the use of landfills and save space in the
tiny148 territory.155 Hong Kong has made no effort toward defining ‘long-term low 149 150 151 152 153 154
and Alistair Marke, Economic Cost of Introducing a Feed-in Tariff for Hong Kong and Who Should Pay? (wwf Briefing Paper, 2017). 148 Ibid., at 32–61. 149 Ibid., at 13. 150 See the Confirmed Minutes of the 220th Meeting of the Advisory Council on the Environ- ment held on 13 February 2017 at 2:30 pm,
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155 156 all157 ships to implement a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan.161 In June 158 159 160 161
155 See Environment Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Blueprint for Sustainable Use of Resources 2013–2022’, May 2013,
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2017, Christine Loh, Acting Secretary for the Environment, indicated that Hong Kong would implement the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for In- ternational Aviation (corsia) adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization in September 2016.162 However, none of these developments reg- ulate emissions from non-international traffic, including that between Hong Kong and Mainland China.
6 Conclusion
Two conclusions may be drawn from this story. In one perspective, the Hong Kong government’s commitment to climate change mitigation appears to be ‘too little, too late’. Table 2 gives an overview of the steps taken by China’s gov- ernment and by Hong Kong’s government on climate change mitigation. It will be seen that there is a consistent time lag, ranging from one to eight years, between China’s actions and Hong Kong’s corresponding steps.163 That the tar- gets are stronger in Hong Kong than in the Mainland is to be expected, given Hong Kong’s greater financial capacity. As a high-income economy, Hong Kong ought to adopt absolute emission-reduction targets instead of carbon-intensity targets. Most of its measures implemented to date have had substantial co- benefits (air quality, waste disposal, etc.), and at least some of them appear to have been opportunistically rebranded as climate change mitigation ac- tion.164 China’s massive investment in wind and solar energy contrasts sharply with Hong Kong’s reluctance to deploy such technologies, on the pretext of financial and technological constraints.165 A city with the level of income and
capacity162 of Hong Kong should be a leader of innovation in climate action. 163 164 165
Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating thereto’ (15 July 2011), in imo document mepc 62/24/Add.1. 162 See Legislative Council, Meeting of Panel on Environmental Affairs, meeting on 26 June 2017 (webcast, 00:55). See also icao resolution A39-3. 163 This was also highlighted, ironically, in relation to the publication of the Climate Action Plan 2030+ more than a year after the Paris Conference, in the press release of the wwf on the first meeting of the Steering Committee on Climate Change: ‘Be Determined and Never Too Late’, 8 April 2016,
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Table 2 Commitments on climate change mitigation in Hong Kong and Mainland China. (The relevant baseline for all figures is 2005.)
Action China Hong Kong
First reporting to the 10 December 2004166 8 November 2012167 unfccc Secretariat 2020 mitigation 26 November 2009168 3 September 2010169 commitment 40–45% reduction in carbon intensity 50–60% reduction in carbon intensity 2030 mitigation 30 June 2015170 20 January 2017171 commitment 60–65% reduction in carbon intensity 65–70% reduction in carbon intensity Peaking co2 emissions 12 November 2014172 20 January 2017173 Around 2030 By 2020
Instead, Hong Kong lags behind the Mainland and many other jurisdictions in the timing and ambition of its action. That its peaking in co2 emissions is likely to occur a decade earlier than in the Mainland tells us more about the difference in the respective degree of development of the two economies than about their engagement in climate change mitigation. From another perspective, however, Hong Kong’s government has at least committed itself to make an effort to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. The endorsement of a renewable energy target in the Action Plan 2030+174 suggests that,166 in the coming decade, Hong Kong’s government may be willing to pursue 167 168 169 170 171 172 climate173 change mitigation beyond measures delivering strong co-benefits. 174
166 China’s Initial National Communication, supra note 41. 167 China’s Second National Communication, supra note 42, at 161–184. 168 unfccc Subsidiary Body for Implementation, ‘Compilation of information on nationally appropriate mitigation actions to be implemented by developing country Parties’, 19 Janu- ary 2015, document fccc/sbi/2013/inf.12/Rev.3,
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Thus the story told here should perhaps not be about a lack of action on the part of Hong Kong’s government, but about its surprising willingness to do something when it could have got away, legally, with doing nothing. After all, quite apart from its non-party status in the international climate change agree- ments, it has no special mitigation arrangements with the Mainland. Still, in the Action Plan 2030+, Hong Kong committed itself to a process similar to that of the Paris Agreement, by reviewing and updating what is, in essence, a re- gionally determined contribution to national and global responses to climate change. Instead of being legalistic in its outlook, the Hong Kong government came to recognize that it should ‘operationalize the Paris Agreement’ within its territory.175 To some extent, mitigation action in Hong Kong is certainly a response to international and regional naming-and-shaming, in a jurisdiction where the media and ngos are particularly active. There is also certainly an element of territorial marketing, as reflected in the words of Chief Executive Chun-ying Leung, justifying the Climate Action Plan 2030+ as a way ‘to make Hong Kong a better and smarter place to live and work [in]’.176 Reputation matters, particu- larly in a territory that relies strongly on international investment and a foreign professional workforce. Beyond these pragmatic considerations, there may also exist a genuine sense of good global citizenship in Hong Kong, not only among members of the public, but also among the territory’s political elite. Hong Kong’s Climate Action Plan 2030+ should be seen not as the endpoint but as the starting point of a growing engagement of the territory’s government with climate change mitigation. It is vital that the 2030 targets are revised as soon as possible, based on thorough feasibility studies. Their ambition should be increased to appropriately reflect Hong Kong’s capacity. There could be in- vestment in extraterritorial projects. The Climate Action Plan 2030+ contains no measures on extraterritorial cooperation or finance. By contrast, China’s Central Government has committed itself to promote international coopera- tion, in particular South-South cooperation, on climate change.177 The revision of China’s ndc in 2020 could serve to introduce a section endorsing Hong Kong’s mitigation commitment, thus allowing the unfccc
175 176 177
175 Speech by Christine Lo Kong Wai, Acting Secretary for the Environment, on 21 April 2017, in a keynote lecture at the 4th International Conference on Climate Change: Post Paris Agreement, Time to Act, in Hong Kong. 176 ‘Message from the Chief Executive’ in ‘Climate Change Strategy and Action Agenda’, supra note 102, at 2. 177 See the China’s indc, supra note 6, at 15–16 (Section ii.O),
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178 179
178 Hong Kong Government, ‘Fifth meeting of Hong Kong/Guangdong Joint Liaison Group on Combating Climate Change held in Guangzhou’, Press release on 27 September 2016,
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