Altruism Predicts Mating Success in Humans
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Beowulf and Competitive Altruism,” P
January 2013 Volume 9, Issue 1 ASEBL Journal Association for the Study of Editor (Ethical Behavior)•(Evolutionary Biology) in Literature St. Francis College, Brooklyn Heights, N.Y. Gregory F. Tague, Ph.D. ~ Editorial Board ~▪▪~ Kristy Biolsi, Ph.D. THIS ISSUE FEATURES Kevin Brown, Ph.D. Wendy Galgan, Ph.D. † Eric Luttrell, “Modest Heroism: Beowulf and Competitive Altruism,” p. 2 Cheryl L. Jaworski, M.A. † Dena R. Marks, “Secretary of Disorientation: Writing the Circularity of Belief in Elizabeth Costello,” p.11 Anja Müller-Wood, Ph.D. Kathleen A. Nolan, Ph.D. † Margaret Bertucci Hamper, “’The poor little working girl’: The New Woman, Chloral, and Motherhood in The House of Mirth,” p. 19 Riza Öztürk, Ph.D. † Kristin Mathis, “Moral Courage in The Runaway Jury,” p. 22 Eric Platt, Ph.D. † William Bamberger, “A Labyrinthine Modesty: On Raymond Roussel Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, and Chiasmus,” p. 24 Ph.D. ~▪~ Editorial Interns † St. Francis College Moral Sense Colloquium: - Program Notes, p. 27 Tyler Perkins - Kristy L. Biolsi, “What Does it Mean to be a Moral Animal?”, p. 29 - Sophie Berman, “Science sans conscience n’est que ruine de l’âme,” p.36 ~▪~ Kimberly Resnick † Book Reviews: - Lisa Zunshine, editor, Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Gregory F. Tague, p. 40 - Edward O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth. Wendy Galgan, p. 42 ~▪~ ~ Contributor Notes, p. 45 Announcements, p. 45 ASEBL Journal Copyright©2013 E-ISSN: 1944-401X *~* [email protected] www.asebl.blogspot.com ASEBL Journal – Volume 9 Issue 1, January 2013 Modest Heroism: Beowulf and Competitive Altruism Eric Luttrell Christian Virtues or Human Virtues? Over the past decade, adaptations of Beowulf in popular media have portrayed the eponymous hero as a dim-witted and egotistical hot-head. -
CONFERENCE AT-A-GLANCE THURSDAY, APRIL 12 3:00 P.M
Conference Schedule CONFERENCE AT-A-GLANCE THURSDAY, APRIL 12 3:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. Registration Narragansett Pre-Function 6:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m. The NRHC Game Night Providence Ballroom 8:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m. Big Picture Discussion Bristol/Kent FRIDAY, APRIL 13 7:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. Registration Narragansett Pre-Function 9:00 a.m. - 9:45 a.m. City as Text Intro and Speaker Narragansett Ballroom 10:00 a.m. - 3:15 p.m. City as Text Providence 3:30 p.m. - 4:45 p.m. City as Text Reflection Narragansett Ballroom 5:00 p.m. - 7:15 p.m. Graduate and Transfer Fair Waterplace Ballroom 6:00 p.m. - 7:15 p.m. Student Art Show Waterplace Ballroom 7:30 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. Banquet Narragansett Ballroom 9:30 p.m. - midnight Open Mic Night Narragansett Ballroom SATURDAY, APRIL 14 7:30 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. Continental Breakfast Narragansett Ballroom 7:30 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. Poster Session I Narragansett Ballroom 7:45 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Registration Narragansett Pre-Function 9:05 a.m. - 10:20 a.m. Session I Papers and Roundtables Breakout Rooms 10:35 a.m. - 11:50 a.m. Session II Papers and Roundtables Breakout Rooms 12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. Presidential Lunch and Address Narragansett Ballroom 1:40 p.m. - 2:55 p.m. Session III Papers and Roundtables Breakout Rooms 3:10 p.m. - 4:25 p.m. -
Altruism, Morality & Social Solidarity Forum
Altruism, Morality & Social Solidarity Forum A Forum for Scholarship and Newsletter of the AMSS Section of ASA Volume 3, Issue 2 May 2012 What’s so Darned Special about Church Friends? Robert D. Putnam Harvard University One purpose of my recent research (with David E. Campbell) on religion in America1 was to con- firm and, if possible, extend previous research on the correlation of religiosity and altruistic behavior, such as giving, volunteering, and community involvement. It proved straight-forward to show that each of sev- eral dozen measures of good neighborliness was strongly correlated with religious involvement. Continued on page 19... Our Future is Just Beginning Vincent Jeffries, Acting Chairperson California State University, Northridge The beginning of our endeavors has ended. The study of altruism, morality, and social solidarity is now an established section in the American Sociological Association. We will have our first Section Sessions at the 2012 American Sociological Association Meetings in Denver, Colorado, this August. There is a full slate of candidates for the ASA elections this spring, and those chosen will take office at the Meetings. Continued on page 4... The Revival of Russian Sociology and Studies of This Issue: Social Solidarity From the Editor 2 Dmitry Efremenko and Yaroslava Evseeva AMSS Awards 3 Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences Scholarly Updates 12 The article was executed in the framework of the research project Social solidarity as a condition of society transformations: Theoretical foundations, Bezila 16 Russian specificity, socio-biological and socio-psychological aspects, supported Dissertation by the Russian foundation for basic research (Project 11-06-00347а). -
Trustworthiness and Competitive Altruism Can Also Solve the ''Tragedy
Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 209–220 Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’$ Pat Barclay* Department of Psychology, McMaster University, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K1 Received 4 November 2003; accepted 19 April 2004 Abstract The benefits of a good reputation can help explain why some individuals are willing to be altruistic in situations where they will not receive direct benefits. Recent experiments on indirect reciprocity have shown that when people stand to benefit from having a good reputation, they are more altruistic towards groups and charities. However, it is unknown whether indirect reciprocity is the only thing that can cause such an effect. Individuals may be altruistic because it will make them more trustworthy. In this study, I show that participants in a cooperative group game contribute more to their group when they expect to play a dyadic trust game afterwards, and that participants do tend to trust altruistic individuals more than nonaltruistic individuals. I also included a condition where participants had to choose only one person to trust (instead of being able to trust all players) in the dyadic trust game that followed the cooperative group game, and contributions towards the group were maintained best in this condition. This provides some evidence that competition for scarce reputational benefits can help maintain cooperative behaviour because of competitive altruism. D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Evolution; Competitive altruism; Game theory; Trust; Public goods 1. Introduction Altruism towards unrelated individuals has puzzled evolutionary biologists for decades, and several theories provide possible explanations for its existence. -
Altruism Researchers Must Cooperate Biologists Studying the Evolution of Social Behaviour Are at Loggerheads
COMMENT PHYSICS How the media COLLECTIVES Leadership EXHIBITION New show EVOLUTION Responses to misconstrued Steven tips learned from house- highlights 300 years of recent reappraisal of kin Hawking’s latest book p.657 hunting bees p.658 science in Berlin p.660 selection p.661 Altruism researchers must cooperate Biologists studying the evolution of social behaviour are at loggerheads. The disputes — mainly over methods — are holding back the field, says Samir Okasha. ast month, 30 leading evolutionary now calling for a radical rethink, arguing that I contend that there is little to argue about. biologists met in Amsterdam to discuss kin selection is theoretically problematic, and Much of the current antagonism stems a burgeoning controversy. The question has insufficient empirical support, and that from the fact that different researchers are PARKINS D. Lof how altruistic behaviour can arise through alternative models better account for the evo- focusing on different aspects of the same phe- natural selection, once regarded as settled, is lution of social behaviour2. Others regard kin nomenon, and are using different methods. In again the subject of heated debate. selection as solid, and the rethink as unneces- allowing a plurality of approaches — a healthy The question dividing biologists is the sary and potentially retrograde. thing in science — to descend into tribal- degree to which inclusive fitness theory, or kin Rival camps have emerged, each endors- ism, biologists risk causing serious damage selection, explains the evolution of altruism ing a different approach to social evolution. to the field of social evolution, and potentially — in which an animal provides a benefit to Heated exchanges have occurred at confer- to evolutionary biology in general. -
Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling †
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2014, 6(4): 272–292 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.272 Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling † By Ed Hopkins * One explanation of altruism is that it arises from “mentalizing,’’ the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over nonaltruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly, when such signaling allows better matching opportunities. Finally, it shows how mentalizing leads to higher payoffs for both partners in a long-term relationship, modeled as a repeated game with private monitoring. JEL C73, D64, D82 ( ) ne of the biggest puzzles in social science remains that of understanding coop- Oeration in human society. Existing explanations have usually been based either on the theory of kin selection or on the theory of repeated games. Yet, there is much evidence that people cooperate with unrelated individuals even in short-run or one- shot encounters. An alternative theory that sees pro-social activities as an attempt to signal desirability to potential mates has been proposed by Zahavi 1975 and Miller ( ) 2000 . This sexual selection explanation of cooperation has been modeled formally ( ) by Gintis, Smith, and Bowles 2001 . They demonstrate that an equilibrium exists ( ) where a high-quality individual can successfully signal that quality to potential part- ners by engaging in costly pro-social activity. This has been called “competitive altruism’’ Roberts 1998 . -
Empathy in Elephants
Do elephants show empathy? Article (Accepted Version) Bates, Lucy A, Lee, Phyllis C, Njiraini, Norah, Poole, Joyce H, Sayialel, Katito, Sayialel, Soila, Moss, Cynthia J and Byrne, Richard W (2008) Do elephants show empathy? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15 (10-11). pp. 204-225. ISSN 1355-8250 This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/81549/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version. Copyright and reuse: Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University. Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Do elephants show empathy? Lucy A. Bates1, Phyllis C. -
The Roles of Altruism, Heroism, and Physical Attractiveness in Female Mate Choice
1 1 The Roles of Altruism, Heroism, and Physical Attractiveness in Female Mate Choice 2 Lacey Margana 1 3 Manpal Singh Bhogal 2 4 James E Bartlett* 3 5 Daniel Farrelly 4 6 7 1 School of Psychological, Social and Behavioral Sciences, Coventry University, Priory 8 Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB, UK 9 2 Psychology Department, Institute of Sport and Human Sciences, Faculty of Education, 10 Health and Wellbeing, City Campus, University of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton, WV1 11 1LY, UK 12 3 Brain, Belief, and Behaviour Lab, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB, 13 UK 14 4 School of Psychology, St John’s Campus, University of Worcester, Henwick Grove, 15 Worcester, WR2 6AJ, UK 16 *corresponding author: [email protected] 17 18 19 2 20 ABSTRACT 21 The role of prosocial behaviour in female mate choice has been extensively explored, focusing 22 on the desirability of altruism in potential mates, as well as altruism being a mating signal. 23 However, little research has focused on the desirability of heroism and altruism in potential 24 partners. Furthermore, the synergistic effect of attractiveness on the desirability of prosocial 25 behavior has only recently been explored, and to our knowledge, has not explored in relation 26 to the desirability of heroism in a romantic partner. We explored the effect of prosociality and 27 attractiveness on female desirability ratings (n=198), and whether desirability was influenced 28 by whether women were seeking a short-term or long-term relationship. We find that women 29 are attracted to men who display heroism and altruism, and this preference is higher when the 30 male is attractive compared to unattractive. -
Physical Attractiveness, Altruism and Cooperation in an Ultimatum Game
Physical Attractiveness, Altruism and Cooperation in an Ultimatum Game Manpal Singh Bhogal1 & Niall Galbraith1 & Ken Manktelow1 Manpal Singh Bhogal [email protected] Institute of Psychology, Faculty of Education, Health and Wellbeing, University of Wolverhampton, Millennium City Building, City Campus, Wulfruna Street, Wolverhampton WV1 1SB, UK Abstract Explaining cooperative tendencies through an evolutionary lens has been problematic for theorists. Traditional explanations derive from theories of reciprocity, biological markets, and more recently via partner choice and sexual selection. The sexual selection hypothesis has been tested within game-theoretic frameworks gaining empirical sup- port in explaining the evolution of altruism. Males have been found to be more altruistic towards attractive females. However, previous research has predominantly adopted a design where participants are not engaging with ‘real people’. Instead, participants make decisions when viewing images or hypothetical scenarios without visual cues. The present study aimed to investigate the sexual selection hypothesis using a face-to-face game theoretic framework. One hundred and thirty-eight participants played a 2-round ultimatum game with chocolate coins as the monetary incentive. We find, that physical attractiveness had no influence on generosity and cooperation when participants play a face-to-face ultimatum game. Instead, proposers were fair when allocating stakes, offering an average of half the endowment to responders. This study refutes the link between the sexual selection hypothesis and generosity when playing economic games with real people. Fairness appeared to drive generosity and cooperation. Keywords Game theory . Ultimatum game . Sexual selection hypothesis . Fairness . Generosity . Altruism Introduction Altruism1 refers to an act which is beneficial to the receiver, yet costly for the altruist (Trivers 1971). -
COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM Giving for Glory in Social Dilemmas
Competitive altruism 1 Running Head: COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM Giving for Glory in Social Dilemmas: The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis Charlie L. Hardy and Mark Van Vugt University of Kent at Canterbury Please do not quote without permission! Word Count: 9840 Competitive altruism 2 Abstract Three experimental studies examined the relationship between altruistic behavior and the emergence of status hierarchies within groups. In each study, group members were confronted with a social dilemma in which they could either benefit themselves or their group. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that when members’ contributions were public, the most altruistic members gained the highest status in their group, and were most frequently preferred as cooperative interaction partners. Study 3 showed that high status members behaved more altruistically than low status members. These results support the idea that by behaving altruistically group members “compete” for social status within their group. Keywords: Altruism, Social Dilemmas, Social Status, Evolutionary Psychology Competitive altruism 3 Giving for Glory in Social Dilemmas: The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis Humans are social animals. This phrase is often stated in the social and evolutionary literatures (Aronson, 1990; Buss, 2004; Forsyth, 1999), but what does it actually mean? The answer centers on issues of selfishness and altruism. Whereas most other mammals help each other only within small kinship groups, humans have the unique ability to form and cooperate within large social groups, which include many genetic strangers (McAndrew, 2002). For example, humans invest time and energy in helping other members in their neighborhood and make frequent donations to charity (Van Vugt, Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000). They come to each other’s rescue in crises and disasters (Van Vugt & Samuelson, 1999). -
Moral Reputation: an Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Goldstone Research Unit Philosophy, Politics and Economics 10-29-2012 Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective Dan Sperber Nicolas Baumard Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Theory and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Sperber, D., & Baumard, N. (2012). Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective. Mind & Language, 27 (5), 495-518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mila.12000 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone/8 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective Abstract From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co-operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. Still, one's moral reputation maybe something too important to be entrusted just to one's moral sense. A robust concern for one's reputation is likely to have evolved too. Here we explore some of the complex relationships between morality and reputation both from an evolutionary and a cognitive point of view. Disciplines Cognitive Psychology | Ethics and Political Philosophy | Theory and Philosophy This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone/8 Moral reputation: An evolutionary and cognitive perspective* Dan SPERBER and Nicolas BAUMARD Abstract: From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co-operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. -
Lecture 16 Kin Selection Challenges to Natural Selection
Lecture 16 Kin selection Challenges to Natural selection: Sexual Selection Kin Selection Types of social interactions Types of social interactions “Actor” → “Recipient” Actor benefits Actor harmed Types of social interactions “Actor” → “Recipient” Actor benefits Actor harmed Recipient benefits Recipient harmed Types of social interactions “Actor” → “Recipient” Actor benefits Actor harmed Recipient Cooperative benefits Recipient harmed Types of social interactions “Actor” → “Recipient” Actor benefits Actor harmed Recipient Cooperative Altruistic benefits Recipient harmed Types of social interactions “Actor” → “Recipient” Actor benefits Actor harmed Recipient Cooperative Altruistic benefits Recipient Selfish harmed Types of social interactions “Actor” → “Recipient” Actor benefits Actor harmed Recipient Cooperative Altruistic benefits Recipient Selfish Spiteful harmed The evolution of altruism The evolution of altruism • an altruistic act benefits a recipient at a cost to the actor The evolution of altruism • an altruistic act benefits a recipient at a cost to the actor • how can altruistic behaviors evolve? The evolution of altruism • an altruistic act benefits a recipient at a cost to the actor • how can altruistic behaviors evolve? let B = benefit to recipient (surviving offspring) The evolution of altruism • an altruistic act benefits a recipient at a cost to the actor • how can altruistic behaviors evolve? let B = benefit to recipient let C = cost to actor The evolution of altruism • an altruistic act benefits a recipient at a cost