Geology, Technology and Policy: Finding Faults and Moving Forward with Nuclear Power and Waste Disposal
Caitlin Lippincott Science, Technology and Society Department Franklin and Marshall College Lancaster, Pennsylvania STS 490 - Independent Study: Honors Thesis Dr. James Strick, Advisor 29 April 2005
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1
Chapter 1: The Political History of the U.S. High Level Waste Repository……...2
Postscript…………………………………………………………………23
Chapter 2: The Geologic Debate over High Level Waste Repositories………….27
Survey of Other Nations………………………………………………….36
Chapter 3: Earthquake Hazards and Public Opinion……………………………..46
Earthquake Hazard: Finding Fault………………………………………..46
Bodega Bay……………………………………………………………….50
Diablo Canyon……………………………………………………………55
Evacuation Problems……………………………………………………..58
Chapter 4: The South Korea Case………………………………………………..63
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..72
Appendix: Quick Outline to Nuclear Energy and Waste Disposal………………74
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………...80
1
Introduction
This project began in South Korea, when two geologists, Uechan Chwae and
Sung-ja Choi, asked me if they could suggest a topic for my senior thesis. They were interested in knowing the history that lies behind the United States’s siting strategies for nuclear power plants and for its proposed waste disposal site. From that moment the project took off and expanded into the following thesis.
I decided to explore the political side of many case studies as well as the geology since the outcomes were often clearly related to both aspects. I attempted to unravel the often very complicated network of agencies involved in the U.S. nuclear program, relying heavily on personal interviews. I also tried to touch on other countries with prominent nuclear programs. With over fifty years of nuclear power history the U.S. is an active guinea pig for nuclear power and waste disposal. This knowledge is valuable to many countries and I hope that it can be used to build upon what has been successful. My dearest hope for this project is that it can be used as a tool to understand what has worked in the past and where the problems emerged; helping other countries learn from past mistakes, and not repeat them.
2
Chapter 1 - The Political History of the U.S. High Level Waste Repository
Currently 20% of the nation’s electrical energy comes from nuclear power; however, the United States fuel cycle produces the largest amount of nuclear waste, both by volume and radioactivity, of all civilian activities involving the licensed use of radioactivity.1 Because of the lack of a permanent long-term storage facility, most of the spent fuel, which is the largest amount of radioactivity but not the largest volume of nuclear waste in the fuel cycle, is stored in large pools or in dry casks at 78 sites across the country. Most of the reactors are near large cities, since they are providing power, and near a large body of water that is needed for cooling the core of the reactor. The majority of the waste is stored on site near the reactors. Thus it is also near large populated cities and close to a large water supply. In addition to reactors, 640 metric tons of spent fuel which was stored at the closed West Valley, New York site, formerly the Nuclear Fuel
Services reprocessing facility, has been transported to Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory to await disposal.2,3
As soon as nuclear reactions became an energy source, the civilian power industry realized that it needed a way to dispose of the waste created. As early as 1955 the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to study disposal methods for the waste from the nuclear weapons created in the United
1 League of Women voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer (Lyons and Burford, Publishers: New York, 1993), pp. 35-36 2 West Valley Demonstration Project Status, http://www.nyserda.org/programs/westval.asp [accessed April 2005] 3 The Eternity Problem: Nuclear Power Waste Storage. Duane Chapman, Contemporary Policy Issues Vol. VIII, Western Economic Association International. July 1990. pp. 84 3
States.4 In 1957 the first civilian reactor went online, and shortly afterwards the NAS reported that geologic burial was the best recommendation for the country’s transuranic and high-level radioactive waste.5 Salt domes were thought to be a possibility as disposal sites and further studies were carried out to determine their effectiveness. Throughout the
1960’s there was a massive expansion in the nuclear power industry, and many plants were built without a disposal plan for the waste. In 1970 the AEC tentatively selected a salt dome near Lyons, Kansas to be the nuclear waste repository, but within two years studies showed that the salt dome’s integrity might have been compromised due to nearby drilling.6 The AEC had been in charge of promoting and regulating nuclear power since the start of the industry. In October 1974, however, the AEC was abolished and two independent agencies were formed to remove the inherent conflict of interest in the system, which involved trying to promote the industry while simultaneously trying to regulate its safety.7 The Energy Research and Development Authority (ERDA), which was eventually absorbed into the new Department of Energy (DOE) in October 1977, was created to promote and enhance the nuclear power industry, and the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) was formed to regulate the civilian nuclear industry. The
ERDA was charged with the task of creating a facility for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste from civilian power plants. In 1977 President Jimmy Carter signed an
Executive Order, which banned the reprocessing of nuclear fuel from U.S. reactors. He
4 15 November 1999, Nuclear Age Timeline, 1999. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment [online]. Available from: http://web.em.doe.gov/timeline. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 5 January 2002, Yucca Mountain Timeline, 2002, Reno Gazette-Journal [online]. Available from: http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=5740. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 6 January 2002, Yucca Mountain Timeline, 2002, Reno Gazette-Journal [online]. Available from: http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=5740. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 7 15 November 1999, Nuclear Age Timeline, 1999. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment [online]. Available from: http://web.em.doe.gov/timeline. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 4 was trying to lead other countries away from the reprocessing of waste for nuclear weapons and to decrease the amount of weapons-grade material in circulation worldwide.
This was an idealistic decision; reprocessing nonetheless continued in the U.S. weapons program and in many of the leading nuclear countries.8 In early 1982, President Ronald
Reagan rescinded Carter’s Executive Order, which allowed consideration of reprocessing in the U.S. But by that time, expansion of the nuclear industry in the United States was coming to a halt, and there has not been any serious consideration of reprocessing to date.9 France and the United Kingdom are the only countries that have been truly successful with reprocessing, on a smaller scale. The Soviets carried out large scale reprocessing, but little is known in the West about their safety record. The main problem with reprocessing, beside the fact that one must dissolve the fuel in nitric acid, creating liquid acidic radioactive waste, arises because uranium is inexpensive. Fresh processed fuel costs approximately $100 a kilogram; to reprocess that fuel would cost about $1000.
Some day the price of uranium will go up, and the disposed spent fuel will become a valuable resource.
The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania marked a shift in the American nuclear industry. The partial core meltdown, which released a minimal amount of radioactive material, greatly increased public fears about the safety of the industry and promptly established an unfavorable public view on nuclear power. No new nuclear plant construction authorizations were approved after the accident and some plant construction projects already underway were halted. The incident led the nation to
8 Personal interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 9 Presidential Actions, PBS and WGBH/Frontline [online], 1998. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/rossin1.html. [Accessed 25 October 2004] 5 focus more rigorously on waste disposal before proceeding with any further propagation of nuclear power. The Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 made it the states’ responsibility to dispose of their low-level nuclear waste.10 The goal for high-level waste was that there would be two separate disposal facilities, the first one to be built in the American West and the second one to be built in the East, and a monitored interim storage facility. This would prevent one state from carrying the burden of the entire nation’s radioactive waste.11 A central storage facility for the nation’s high-level waste was still proving problematic; some sites in Tennessee were being considered, although nothing went further than site characterizations. Once again, almost twenty years after the
NAS’s report stating that geologic disposal of high-level waste was the best means of disposal, the DOE issued the Record of Decision of 1981 supporting the geologic disposal of civilian waste.12 In January 1983 the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 was signed, authorizing the development of a high-level nuclear waste repository, the search for a second repository site and the investigation of a monitored retrievable storage facility.13 Under the Nuclear Waste policy Act of 1982, the DOE was charged with selecting the sites for the repository. Nine sites were originally studied for the primary repository facility (Table 1) with 17 additional sites, mostly in the east and northeast, investigated for the second repository.
10 15 November 1999, Nuclear Age Timeline, 1999. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment [online]. Available from: http://web.em.doe.gov/timeline. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 11 Personal Interview with Paul Dickman DOE 19 October 2004. 12 January 2002, Yucca Mountain Timeline, 2002, Reno Gazette-Journal [online]. Available from: http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=5740. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 13 15 November 1999, Nuclear Age Timeline, 1999. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment [online]. Available from: http://web.em.doe.gov/timeline. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 6
Table 1. Primary Repository Sites (geologic medium) *Hanford, WA (basalt) *Yucca Mountain, NV (volcanic tuff) *Deaf Smith County, TX (bedded salt) Davis Canyon, UT (bedded salt) Lavendar Canyon, UT (bedded salt) Swisher Site, TX (bedded salt) Vacherie Dome, LA (salt dome) Richton Dome, MS (salt dome) Cypress Creek Dome, MS (salt dome)
*chosen for further studies
In 1986, the Secretary of Energy nominated five of the nine sites for further consideration. President Reagan approved three of these sites for additional studies:
Hanford, Washington; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Yucca Mountain, Nevada.14 What followed was a political disaster: there was an uprising from many Eastern States about the possibility of the second repository being placed in the granitic rocks along the East
Coast. There was a significant amount of political heat being placed on the federal government by the state governments opposing a repository in their states. The process of studying so many sites was becoming a financial disaster and therefore the plug was pulled on the second repository project. In 1986 the DOE officially and indefinitely postponed the second repository siting process.15 This was in violation of the Regional
Equity Intent of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, and it left only one possibility for a disposal site.16 A hard blow to the waning nuclear industry came on 26 April 1986 with
14 January 2002, Yucca Mountain Timeline, 2002, Reno Gazette-Journal [online]. Available from: http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=5740. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 15 Personal Interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 16 September 2004, Timeline: The Nuclear Waste Policy Dilemma. Yucca Mountain.org Eureka County Nuclear Waste Page [online]. Available from: http://www.yuccamountain.org/time.htm. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 7 the massive release of radioactive material from the explosion and meltdown of the
Soviet Union’s Chernobyl unit #4 nuclear reactor. This intensified the public sentiment against nuclear power created by the TMI accident. In December 1987 Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and designated that Yucca Mountain should be the sole candidate for the world’s first geologic repository of high-level spent fuel from nuclear reactors.17
In the early days of nuclear waste disposal, salt domes were believed to be one of the best potential locations for the disposal of radioactive waste. They were considered because salt domes, by their physical nature, allow very little infiltrating water. With further studies, however, it was determined that heat created from the decay of the radioactive nuclides might compromise the stability of the salt structures. Granite was also looked at as a possible medium. Due to their mineralogy, crystalline rocks like granite have a higher inherent level of radioactivity, and the relative level of increased radioactivity would be lower than for other media. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act states that the general guidelines for site characterizations were supposed to be primarily based on the geologic considerations.18 Other factors that could qualify or disqualify a site were
“the location of valuable natural resources, hydrology, geophysics, seismic activity, atomic energy defense activities, proximity to water supplies, proximity to populations, the effect upon the rights of users of water, and proximity to components of the National
Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge System, the National Wild and Scenic Rivers
System, the National Wilderness Preservation System or National Forest Lands…such
17 15 November 1999, Nuclear Age Timeline, 1999. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment [online]. Available from: http://web.em.doe.gov/timeline. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 18 NWPA as amended, 2004, US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), pg 10 8 guidelines shall consider the proximity to sites where high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel are generated or temporarily stored and the transportation and safety factors involved in moving such waste to the repository.”19
None of the three site characterizations had been completed by the time Congress demanded a decision for the repository. Dr. David Dobson, chief scientist and executive vice president of the geologic consulting firm Integrated Science Solutions Inc. (ISSI), stated “the rationale for the selection of Yucca Mountain was primarily financial. After the Department of Energy finished screening the three sites, we were in the process of writing site characterization plans for all three sites. None of the site characterization plans were complete and approved at the time that Congress decided to focus on Yucca
Mountain. But their rationale was that the cost estimates coming in for three sites were high, the cost estimates climbed dramatically... Basically what they said was: focus on
Yucca Mountain, if it’s good, go for it; if it’s not good come back and talk to us.”20 There was a desire originally to have the three sites for further study in different rock types, which is mainly why the three were picked, even if three salt sites would have been better geologically. Yucca Mountain was rated the highest in the initial evaluation, although not for ease of transportation. It came down to a budgetary problem with the ensuing lawsuits over the other sites, so Yucca Mountain was adopted as the sole site. The bill to approve
Yucca Mountain was sent to the full House and the President as part of an omnibus budget bill, packaged in with many other pieces of other legislation. It was a small provision of a bigger bill to fund the government.21 Former Democratic Congressman from Louisiana, Bennett Johnston, drew up the 1987 bill (also commonly called the
19 NWPA as amended, 2004, US DOE OCRWM, pg 10 20 Interview with David Dobson, ISSI, 30 July 2004 pg 1 21 Personal interview with Jeffery Williams, DOE, 19 October 2004. 9
“Screw Nevada Bill”22) to pick Yucca Mountain. If the DOE had waited only another year
Yucca Mountain would most likely have risen to the top of the list, but Congress was worried about the costs and thought it could potentially save three hundred million dollars, so Nevada was chosen as the site.
The siting process for the first repository took an abnormal route. The DOE started by screening host rocks instead of looking for the best site. “There were many good sites, but not many communities would accept the repository. It was a sociological process, not just a technical one.”23 Not every site would meet every geologic specification, which is why engineered barriers would supplement natural ones. Senior
Technical Policy Advisor for the DOE, Paul Dickman, states that the right “culture [for a waste repository] is hardest to find, and one can always engineer around bad geology.” A community that would accept the disposal site would have to be accustomed to the risk and environmental damage, as well as value the monetary benefits of the repository.
There needs to be good science to let the political process play out.24 Table 1 shows the nine potential sites for the repository as of 1983. Following the recommendation to the
President by the Secretary of Energy, Deaf Smith County, Hanford, and Yucca Mountain were approved for characterization. Each site that was selected was on or within close proximity to a major DOE installation. “[The characterization] was called a multi- attribute utility analysis, it was an informative decision analysis, that they used to get to the three. There were a whole number of factors, technical, political, financial, that were
22 The Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement Process, Citizen Alert [online], 3 October 1997. Available from: http://www.citizenalert.org/yuccanew/eis-2.htm. [Accessed 31 October 2004] 23 Personal interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 24 Personal interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 10
considered.”25 All three fit the required geologic profile described in the NWPA of 1982.
“It was arguing for the best one amongst equals.”26 Deaf Smith and Yucca Mountain were located in isolated desert areas, with low water tables far from large population centers.27
Hanford, of course, had decades of experience in the nuclear fields of power, bombs, waste, disasters, cleanup, and public relations; it was already severely contaminated.28
Federal officials already condoned Nevada as a “sacrifice area.”29 The Office of Civilian
Waste Management states that “Yucca Mountain is located in Nye County, Nevada, about 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, on the western edge of the Nevada Test Site.
The Nevada Test Site has hosted numerous nuclear-related projects for decades.”30 Being in close proximity to the site where much of the nation’s underground nuclear testing took place is a widely known fact, but it is very seldom used to explicitly justify why
Yucca Mountain was a popular choice for the only site. Author Richard Rhodes (The
Making of the Atomic Bomb) finds it ironic that there is fear that Yucca Mountain will leak 10,000 years from now. He points out that Yucca Mountain is right next to Yucca
Flats, where there are collapsed craters from the weapons testing that are not contained, and are thus already constantly leaking residual uranium and plutonium. Senior Technical
Policy Advisor for the DOE Paul Dickman says “[Yucca Mountain] was not the best of the nine original sites, the best ones were in Utah. The Utah Senators were a lot smarter
25 Interview with David Dobson, 30 July 2004, pg 1 26 Personal interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 27 Office of Civilian Nuclear Waste Management, US Gov info Resource [online], 23 January 1998. Available from: http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa012398.htm. [Accessed 26 October 2004] 28 Office of Civilian Nuclear Waste Management, US Gov info Resource [online], 23 January 1998. Available from: http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa012398.htm. [Accessed 26 October 2004] 29 Personal interview with Paul Dickman, DOE 19 October 2004. 30 Why Yucca Mountain? Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management [online], Available from: http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/about/why.shtml. [Accessed 26 October 2004] 11
and they declared anything close to a national monument out of the running.”31 Although the state of Nevada does not have any nuclear reactors it was picked to be the site of the entire nation’s 100,000,000 gallons of high level nuclear waste, which would be solidified before being disposed at Yucca Mountain, and more than 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel.32
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act decreed that it was the responsibility of the federal government to provide a permanent disposal for the nation’s radioactive waste.33
Following the 1987 decision by Congress to study only Yucca Mountain, a 15-year site characterization began. The DOE studied scientific, technical and engineering aspects of the project. Underground conditions, hydrology, geology, socioeconomics, cultural resources, terrestrial ecosystems, air quality, meteorological, radiological and water resources were all studied intensively, by both government scientists and outside parties.34
The DOE was required to hold public hearings before the Secretary of Energy recommending the site to the President. The Secretary’s recommendation had to be based on the information from the years of site characterization studies as well as sources like the Final Environmental Impact Statement. Many documents were produced for public review and for the Secretary to base his recommendation upon: Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report (May 2001), Preliminary Preclosure Safety Assessment of
Monitored Geologic Repository Site Recommendation (July 2001), FY01 Supplemental
Science and Performance Analysis (July 2001), Yucca Mountain Preliminary Site
Suitability Evaluation (August 2001), Total System Performance Assessment-Analyses
31 Personal interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 32 Recommendation of Yucca Mountain by the Secretary, DOE, Feb 2002 pg 1 33 Final Environmental Impact Statement, Summary, US DOE, Feb 2002 pg S-5 34 Final Environmental Impact Statement, Summary, US DOE, Feb 2002, pg S-6 12 for Disposal of Commercial and DOE Waste Inventories at Yucca Mountain (August
2001).35 In 2002 President Bush accepted the recommendation that Yucca Mountain should be developed as the repository. He forwarded the recommendation to Congress, and the state of Nevada was given, by law, the opportunity to veto the recommendation.
However, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also states that the veto could be overcome by a joint resolution, which requires a majority vote of both houses of Congress. Nevada put forward its objections and a majority vote in both the House and the Senate overturned the objections.36
After the vote in both houses, the state of Nevada’s multiple lawsuits opposing
Yucca Mountain were brought to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Nevada and other opposing organizations brought up challenges on jurisdiction, the
10,000-year compliance period, the controlled area, the waste not being protected primarily by geologic barriers and by multiple independent barriers, and that construction was permitted without knowing that the repository would comply with the U.S.
Environmental Protections Agency’s (EPA) standard.37 The State of Nevada claimed that the 10,000-year compliance standard, created following the 1992 Energy Policy Act
(EnPA) that mandated the EPA to make safety standards to govern the waste disposal by the DOE, conflicted with the Energy Policy Act and was “arbitrary and capricious.”38 A control area was set up by the EPA that prescribed an area five kilometers in every direction and eighteen kilometers to the south, in the direction of the flow of water, to be uninhabitable. “Nevada contends that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting
35 Final Environmental Impact Statement, Summary, US DOE, Feb 2002 pg S-7 36 Interview with David Dobson, 30 July 2004, pg 3. 37 U.S. Court of Appeals ruling July 9th 2004, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc,. Petitioner v. EPA Respondent. 38 U.S. Court of Appeals ruling July 9th 2004, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc,. Petitioner v. EPA Respondent. pp.12-14. 13
the southern boundary of the repository.”39 The NRC was challenged, by the State of
Nevada saying that the NRC’s regulations violated the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA) by allowing a repository to not have isolated waste barriers, which would consist of primarily geologic barriers but including multiple independent barriers.40
Another challenge against the NRC was that their regulations violated the NWPA and the
EnPA by permitting construction of a repository “without first determining that there
[was] reasonable expectation that the repository [would] comply with the EPA standards.”41 The court consolidated Nevada’s and other contesting parties’ objections together and then dismissed all except one. In July 2004, the court ruled that the
Environmental Protection Agency’s 10,000-year compliance period in the safety standard was not viable. The court decided that the 1995 report by the National Academy of
Sciences, which stated that the radiation standard should be based on a “time of peak risk” and stated that there may be a potential for radiation damage for several hundred thousand years, needed to be considered and the safety standard adjusted to account for the NAS findings.42 The U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that the “10,000-year compliance period selected by the EPA violated the Energy Policy Act because it was not consistent with the recommendations of the NAS. [The Court] vacated the EPA and NRC regulations insofar as they include a 10,000-year compliance period. [The Court] denied
39 U.S. Court of Appeals ruling July 9th 2004, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc,. Petitioner v. EPA Respondent. pp. 32-34. 40 U.S. Court of Appeals ruling July 9th 2004, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc,. Petitioner v. EPA Respondent. pp. 51 & 58. 41 U.S. Court of Appeals ruling July 9th 2004, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc,. Petitioner v. EPA Respondent. pp.71 42 Court Rules against 10,000-year Radiation Safety Standard at Yucca Mountain, Physics Today, Sept 2004, 29. 14
or dismissed the remaining petitions for review.”43 The Department of Energy had planned to submit its license application by December 2004, but they were not able to submit on time. Now, there may be additional studies that may have to be completed before the license application is in an acceptable form. The assessment will have to reflect the new dose standard.
The progress of the Yucca Mountain project has been significantly affected by the
Licensing Support Network (LSN, available at http://www.lsnnet.gov/) requirements and project funding. The NRC regulations required that all documents held by the DOE, pertinent to each side of the argument, must be made publicly available on the LSN six months prior to NRC docketing (i.e., finding that the license application is acceptable for detailed review) the license application. In practice this means that DOE must make their documents available on LSN at or before the time of the license application. Therefore, during the summer of 2004 the DOE hurriedly put over 4 million documents on the web.
Nevada sued stating that the LSN was not completed properly. Nevada won their appeal to the NRC, and the DOE’s certification was thrown out for not including 4 million email messages to and from DOE employees who were no longer in the department. The DOE feels that it may not be ready with the completed LSN until the spring of 2005. The planned submittal of the license application is continually pushed back.
The DOE was given only $650 million dollars for the Yucca Mountain budget in
2005. Although this is a significant amount, it is not enough to maintain the opening of the repository in 2010.44 The DOE needs to ramp up spending if it is to start buying
43 U.S. Court of Appeals ruling July 9th 2004, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc,. Petitioner v. EPA Respondent. Pg 5. 44 H. JOSEF HEBERT February 5, 2005, Nevada appeal [online] Bush slices funding for Yucca project, [Accessed on 1 April 2005], available from: http://www.nevadaappeal.com/article/20050205/NEVADA 15
supplies and start building at Yucca Mountain.45 There are two sources of funds for the project, a Nuclear Waste Fund into which the utilities have been paying and which has reached about fourteen billion dollars, and the DOE waste tax dollars. Congress must appropriate the money from the Nuclear Waste Fund to the DOE and decide on the rest of the Yucca Mountain budget.
The candidates that ran for President in the 2004 election have diametrically opposed views on Yucca Mountain. When George W. Bush was running for President in
2000, he was against the Yucca Mountain Project and assured the country that it would not open unless there was “sound science” in its favor. Since becoming President, he has done everything possible to push it forward, even in face of the fact that the science behind the project is being questioned. Bush was in office when the 2002 recommendation from Secretary Abraham came to the desk of the President. Although there was strong opposing scientific advice, President Bush accepted the recommendation and approved Yucca Mountain as the repository site. Currently Bush intends to move forward with the project, although other opposition, beyond his control, may hold up the process.
While in the Senate, Senator John Kerry voted in favor of the 1987 “Screw
Nevada Bill.” But, running for President in the 2004 elections, he stood on the platform that Yucca Mountain would not go through. “Rest assured, Nevada, if I’m President of the United States, Yucca Mountain will not be a repository,” Kerry declared from the campaign trail.46 Kerry protested that there was need for more “rigorous peer-reviewed science” before a suitable repository could be created. Senator Kerry proposed to bring
45 Personal interview with Jeffery Williams, DOE, 19 October 2004. 46 John Kerry, May 17th 2004, www.johnkerry.com [Accessed: 18 October 2004] 16 together another International Blue Ribbon Panel to discuss options. The NAS and the
National Research Council concluded the most recent International reviews in 2001.
Another review was published by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD), the Nuclear Energy Agency, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency in 2002. Although the Kerry camp had not formally addressed where the 77,000 tons of high-level waste could go, he was adamant that it would not be Yucca Mountain, unless another blue-ribbon scientific panel first reaffirmed that choice. Paul Dickman of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management believes that Senator Kerry was catering to the local vote, simply reiterating campaign rhetoric written by Nevada Senator
Harry Reid and his staff. If Kerry had been elected, he would not have had very many options, opines Dickman. “If you can’t put it at Yucca Mountain, then you can’t put it anywhere. He was going to be forced to go after interim storage or might have been caught having to promote reprocessing since direct disposal won’t work.”47
The State of Nevada has opposed the project since the initial designation of Yucca
Mountain in 1987. Like any other state, Nevada does not want to become the dumping ground for the nation’s nuclear waste. From the moment of the recommendation, the state officials have fought and vetoed the project with every power they have. Nevada
Governor Kenny Guinn said of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham “on behalf of all
Nevadans, I am outraged that he is allowing politics to override sound science."48 Many
Nevadans do not believe that the science is “sound.” The views of Nevadans were
47 Personal Interview with Paul Dickman, DOE, 19 October 2004. 48 Kenny Guinn quoted in “Nevada Outraged,” Environmental Science News [online], January 10, 2002 (ENS) Available from: http://www.gci.ch/Communication/DigitalForum/digiforum/ARTICLES/article2002/nevadaoutraged.html. [Accessed 18 October 2004] 17 portrayed by the 2004 campaign polling, where the state was split 50/50 between Senator
Kerry and President Bush.49
Although Nevada was split during the pre-election polling, the actual election results speak to a very different viewpoint. Bush won the state with 50% of the votes while Kerry received only 48%. However, Bush was heavily favored in the counties surrounding Yucca Mountain. In the counties that would be heavily trafficked due to waste shipments by either truck or rail (Lincoln, Lander, Eureka, Esmeralda), Bush nowhere had less than a 55% lead over Senator Kerry, except in Clark Country (where
Las Vegas is located), which Kerry won 52% to 46%. In Nye county, where Yucca
Mountain is situated, the vote clearly suggests that Yucca Mountain is not as big of a concern as everyone is imagining: Bush led Kerry 58% to 39%.50 Bush’s support for
President by the citizens of Nevada is a substantial step towards a favorable view of
Yucca Mountain. If the residents in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain are not concerned enough to sway their vote away from the supporter of the project, then why should the rest of the country be worried about this repository?
The proponents for Yucca Mountain argue the need for a permanent disposal of radioactive waste. In Secretary Abraham’s recommendation of Yucca Mountain many possibly important aspects of the repository are highlighted. He states, “the Yucca
Mountain site is scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a repository.”51 Furthermore, the DOE has done twenty years of intensive study of the site, during which time “some of the world’s best scientists” have been examining the natural
49 John M. Broder, The Battleground, The New York Times Company [online], October 25, 2004. 50 Nevada Presidential Results by County, 3 November 2004, Washingtonpost.com [online]. Available from: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/election/2004/nv/prescounties/. [Accessed on 3 November 2004]. 51 Site recommendation from The Secretary of Energy to the President. Feb 14th 2002. DOE 18
processes and the engineered barriers.52 Many arguments stem from national interests: the need for a long-term repository for the fuel from military vessels, such as aircraft carriers and submarines (“important for our national security”), a secure place for the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium (“important to promote our non-proliferation objectives”), stabilization of nuclear power by maintaining the potential growth of the industry
(“important to our energy security”), removing the waste from areas near large populations and out of the reach of terrorists (“important to homeland security”), and a method much more environmentally sound than the current interim disposal means
(“important to our efforts to protect the environment”).53 The Secretary found no arguments against the repository important enough to prevail over reasons for moving forward with the project and he believes that the concerns will be addressed in due time.54
Some possible modifications were suggested in An International Peer Review of the
Yucca Mountain Project TSPA-SR (Total System Performance Assessment – Site
Recommendation), by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this report the
IAEA states that although there is some room for improvement, the “methodology is soundly based and has been implemented in a competent manner.”55 They suggested that a more realistic approach be used to understand the TSPA: the types of uncertainties and a reduction in the number should be major goal, the engineered barrier transport model should be reviewed independently, long-term corrosion tests should be done on the waste containers, more study should be devoted to thermodynamic modeling and flow and transport in the unsaturated zone, probability and hazard of bi-modal volcanism (both
52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 An International Peer Review of Yucca Mountain Project TSPA-SR, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002 19 explosive rhyolitic eruptions and basaltic eruptions) should be assessed, flow of surface water into human-made boreholes, understanding of behavior of naturally occurring uranium deposits in the area, probabilistic analysis should include more realistic and larger samples, and the sensitivity of the analysis should be further developed.56
Even though the DOE knew the site didn’t fit the original mandate by Congress, it didn’t abandon the project; instead it just changed the regulation. “They [the government of Nevada] also said the U.S. Constitution bars 49 states from imposing their will on a single, politically isolated state without a compelling reason”57 Many who are against the nuclear power industry have reservations against Yucca Mountain based on the fear that it will open the industry up for expansion and renewal. Solving the waste disposal problem would be a great leap forward in solving the problems of the industry. In fact, since Yucca Mountain was put forward as the repository site, over 30 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants have been granted license extensions. This is directly in response to the perception that a major waste disposal barrier for the plants has been removed
(despite the fact that the repository has not been designed to hold all the waste that will be generated by these plants during that extended period of generation, and a second repository will be needed to hold this waste and some defense waste).58 Recent reports indicate that the future of nuclear power does not hinge as heavily on the opening of
Yucca Mountain as was once expected.59
56 An International Peer Review of Yucca Mountain Project TSPA-SR, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002 57 Nevada's legal team outlines arguments against Yucca Mountain, by Erica Werner, Las Vegas Sun Dec 18th 2003. 58 Nuclear Relicensing, 2004, EWG Action Fund, [online]. Available from: http://ewg.org/reports/nucclearwaste/exec_summ.php. [Accessed on 21 October 2004] 59 Yahoo News, [online] 21 March 2005, Rising Energy Needs Renew Nuclear Interest, [accessed 1 April 2005] available from: 20
The only argument against Yucca Mountain that was brought to the fore in the
July 2004 ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals is the viability of the 10,000-year compliance period. In 2002 the compliance period for the Yucca Mountain facility was set by the EPA at 10,000 years. This period was chosen because longer than 10,000 years made it hard to assess engineered barriers and shorter than that made geologic concerns hard to assess. The Court ruled that a peak dose standard (of perhaps about 400,000- years) instead of an arbitrary length of time should be incorporated in the EPA’s safety standard. In the original assessment scientists took into account very large uncertainties for risk and viability of the barriers. The DOE showed that even the worst-case scenario would be under the limit of acceptable dosage for a period of 10,000 years. DOE’s dose projections indicate that dosage at much greater times may not stay under the acceptable dose limit to humans living in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain (15 milirems). The EPA could also change what the dose limit should be due to a much longer time period under consideration. Over the follow years most of the fuel will go into dry cask storage at the reactors; perhaps down the road some will be placed at a centralized location. The casks are metal or reinforced concrete, they are completely sealed and monitored for venting.
They are considered safer than the spent fuel pools, but are not meant for long-term storage. If the waste remains at the reactors, then it is the responsibility of the utilities, and ultimately the taxpayers (through higher costs for electricity and taxes on storage) to keep it safely maintained. If the fuel is taken off site (even during transportation), then it comes under the control of the Federal Government.60
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=518&u=/ap/20050322/ap_on_re_eu/nuclear_talks_future&p rinter=1 60 Personal Interviews with Paul Dickman, DOE, and Tom Cottom, JK Research Associates, 19 October 2004. 21
One stepping stone towards the acceptance of Yucca Mountain is the geologic repository for transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This site, twenty-six miles south of Carlsbad New Mexico, is the “world's first underground repository licensed to safely and permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons.”61 The EPA certified the repository in May 1998, and it received its first shipment of waste on 26 March 1999.
WIPP is constructed in a 2000-foot thick salt bed that has remained stable for 200 million years. Since the opening of the site most of the controversy has shifted to the transportation of the waste from the ten major DOE sites and other sites around the country. This repository is purely for defense low-level and some intermediate-level waste; it was not characterized and licensed for high-level waste.62 Much of the transuranic waste at WIPP consists of clothing, tools and other man-made contaminated materials that were used during the research, development and production of the nation’s nuclear weapons.63 The WIPP site is owned by the federal government and has been managed by the Bureau of Land Management. The DOE, which is in charge of the facility, is not overseen by the NRC (who would normally be the regulator for a geologic repository), but instead by the EPA, who required that the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the EPA’s transuranic waste standard be met.64 The state of New Mexico has remained very active in regulating aspects of operations at the site, in addition to the regulatory oversight provided by the
61 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, U.S. DOE Carlsbad Field Office, 2004, [online]. Available from: http://www.ws/. [Accessed on 1 November 2004]. 62 Personal Interview with Jeffery Williams, DOE, 19 October 2004. 63 Why WIPP? Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, U.S. DOE Carlsbad Field Office, 2004, [online]. Available from: http://www.ws/. [Accessed on 1 November 2004]. 64 League of Women voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer (Lyons and Burford, Publishers: New York, 1993), pp. 119. 22
EPA, and technical oversight provided by the Environmental Evaluation Group and other agencies.65
In the end, the arguments boil down to whether or not one believes in the science: how much faith one has in scientists’ and engineers’ ability to foresee all possible important problem scenarios. Since the late 1950’s the United States has been creating radioactive waste in the form of spent fuel, and since WWII waste from nuclear weapons manufacture has piled up. Something needs to be done with the waste. Arguments center on whether the science that created Yucca Mountain is solid enough to house the radioactive waste for hundreds of thousands of years. For the Yucca Mountain project there are still many questions to be answered and battles to be won before it could become operational. Transportation has become an increasingly important issue, and so has the increase in waste production from the recently re-licensed plants. Although the science may never become any better at Yucca Mountain, naive optimism about the project can be as frightening and costly as bad science, and the waste management program must be cautious with the assurance that they have in the project. Eventually something will go wrong, and how carefully the government insures public awareness will affect how extreme a reaction blows back at them. Nuclear waste is the ‘back end’ of the fuel cycle, which is not actually a cycle because the U.S. does not reprocess and does not connect the circle. Something must be done with the waste, and the current situation with the waste held in pools on-site is not the right path to take for the long term. A permanent solution is necessary, and vigilance over the hazardous radioactive waste created by the nuclear industry must continue for years. Yucca Mountain is the best
65 Why WIPP? Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, U.S. DOE Carlsbad Field Office, 2004, [online]. Available from: http://www.ws/. [Accessed on 1 November 2004]. 23 option at this point in time for the storage of high-level waste, but the techno-optimism held by many of the project leaders needs to be changed. The Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository should not be left for nature, but placed under long-term supervision and repair, to ensure as little danger for future generations as possible.
Postscript:
Since writing this chapter a number of issues have come to the forefront.
Although the document has been updated, there are stories in the news that would be out of date by the time this document was completed. Therefore some of the key issues that are in the headlines of today and will be rapidly changing over the next months are summarized below.
It was once believed by the nuclear industry that a working geologic repository was the key to the future of nuclear renewal. Since the recommendation that Yucca
Mountain be adopted as the repository, a number of plants have gained license extensions and talk has even begun about building new plants. Even as the Yucca Mountain project continues to encounter obstacles, the nuclear industry is moving forward with the expansion of nuclear power in the United States. Nuclear electric utilities are tackling the current storage issues, removing waste from cooling pools and placing it in dry casks, although still on site. There is also increasing talk, internationally, about the need to consider nuclear power as a viable energy source as we strive to protect the environment.
An international conference composed of energy ministers and officials from 74 countries met on 21 March 2005 in Paris to discuss the need for nuclear renewal.
Concerns for global warming have increased and the draining supply of fossil fuels has sparked serious talks about nuclear power. Since the implementation of the Kyoto accord 24 this year, operators of power plants will be responsible and will have to pay for their air pollution. This makes nuclear power, with its low carbon emissions, a more attractive option. However, there is still significant public doubt about the safety of nuclear power, and the back end of the fuel cycle was reportedly not discussed.66
The current problem about what to do with the spent nuclear fuel if Yucca
Mountain does not open (or until it opens) is actively being discussed. The National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have been working on a report on the safety of spent fuel remaining on site at the power plants, in either storage pools or dry casks. “The casks are filled with an inert gas to prevent rust.
The fuel warms the gas, which transfers its heat to the exterior of the cask,” thus cooling the fuel.67 The NAS believes that dry cask storage is a much safer option than spent fuel pools, and about 40% of nuclear power plants are beginning to move their spent fuel.68
Dry casks are much more expensive to build than the quickly filling spent fuel pools.
According to a New York Times article on 30 March 2005, the NAS believes the spent fuel pools to be very vulnerable to terrorism and a dangerous storage option. The NRC disagrees with these findings and is now working on a report for the public that would not divulge any information might compromise national security.69
66 Yahoo News, [online] 21 March 2005, “Rising Energy Needs Renew Nuclear Interest” [Accessed 1 April 2005] Available from: http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=518&u=/ap/20050322/ap_on_re_eu/nuclear_talks_future&p rinter=1 67 Wald, Matthew, New York Times [online] 30 March 2005, “Agencies Fight Over Report on Sensitive Atomic Wastes”, [Accessed 1 April 2005], Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/30/politics/30nuke.html?position=&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=print&adxn nlx=1112179991-rJUex82ls3XypMvYkhZSjw. 68 Werner, Erica. ENN [online] 29 March 2005, “Nuclear Power Plants Turning to Dry Casks for Storing Used Fuel”, [Accessed 1 April 2005], Available from: http://enn.com/today.html?id=7425. 69 Wald, Matthew, New York Times [online] 30 March 2005, “Agencies Fight Over Report on Sensitive Atomic Wastes”, [Accessed 1 April 2005], Available from: 25
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently deliberating on the new compliance standard for Yucca Mountain. Unfortunately for many opponents of Yucca
Mountain, these meetings between government agencies (EPA and DOE) are taking place behind closed doors, and are not open to public participation. The EPA intends to release a draft of the new standard this summer and to allow 90 days of public review before issuing its final regulations. Activists are concerned that this is not enough time to review and comment on this important decision. They argue that the EPA should further open the decision-making processes to outside commentary.70
The most recent noteworthy news is about the possible falsification of documents relating to predicting the flow of water through the repository. On 16 March 2005 the
Department of Energy (DOE) discovered that a USGS employee had fabricated reports on the model of water transport in Yucca Mountain. This could have an impact regarding the rate of decay of the waste packages in the repository.71 The DOE suspects that about
20 emails were sent from one hydrologist to a few other geologists in the USGS disclosing that documents had been falsified. Congressional hearings are being scheduled and the documents are being closely reviewed to understand their significance for the viability of the repository.72
Further developments and changes will surely follow on many of theses fronts.
The political and public policy dimensions of the story are in rapid flux as much as or http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/30/politics/30nuke.html?position=&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=print&adxn nlx=1112179991-rJUex82ls3XypMvYkhZSjw. 70 Grove, Benjamin. Las Vegas Sun [online] 11 March 2005, “EPA radiation options for Yucca met with criticism”, [Accessed 1 April 2005], Available from: http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/lv- gov/2005/mar/11/518433625.html. 71 Wald, Matthew. The New York Time [online] 17 March 2005, “Falsified Work is Suspected at Nuclear Site”, [Accessed on 1 April 2005], Available from: www.nytimes.com/2005/03/17/politics/17yucca.html. 72 Tetreault, Steve. Reviewjournal.com, [online] 29 March 2005, “Yucca Mountain: Falsification suspicion spur hearings”, [Accessed 1 April 2005], Available from: www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2005/Mar- 29-Tue-2005/news/26172351.html. 26 even more than the science. But as the stories in this thesis reveal, those dimensions are every bit as important to the health and future of the nuclear industry in democratic societies.
27
Chapter 2: The Geologic Debate over High Level Waste Repositories
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences determined as early as 1957 that deep underground disposal was the best means for long-term storage of radioactive waste.73
Throughout the years of nuclear industrial expansion the international community has affirmed this assessment. The geologic environment of Yucca Mountain has always been a very important part of the viability of the site. Yucca Mountain is located in the Basin and Range region of the southwestern United States. These mountains and valleys were formed through faulting and volcanism as the earth’s crust slowly spread apart. A clear understanding of the geology will give scientists and engineers the ability to design and build the repository to the most secure standards.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 960.3 (10 CFR 960.3) describes the reason for the diversity guidelines in the possible host rocks of the repository. The diversity was “intended to balance the process of site selection by requiring consideration of a variety of geologic conditions and media and thereby enhance confidence in the technical suitability of the sites selected for the development of the repository.”74 The
DOE was also required to find possible sites in a variety of geohydrologic settings, i.e. variety of different groundwater and climatic conditions. “Regionality” of the sites, the proximity to locations at which the waste was generated or temporarily stored, was also an important factor in determining the suitability of Yucca Mountain and other sites, at
73 January 2002, Yucca Mountain Timeline, 2002, Reno Gazette-Journal [online]. Available from: http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=5740. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 74 10 CFR 960.3 28
that stage.75 It is particularly interesting to note that Yucca Mountain is directly adjacent to the Nevada Test Site. Because of extensive radioactive contamination from many underground nuclear weapons tests, this land has been designated a “sacrifice area,” a statement that is generally accepted by Americans. Nevadans have come to grips with living near a highly contaminated zone.
Once Yucca Mountain was established as the repository, the generic siting regulation for repositories (10 CRF 960) was revised through a public rulemaking to fit specifically to Yucca Mountain. 10 CFR Part 963 was the new regulation that outlined the site suitability guidelines for Yucca Mountain. The regulation required that any information must be brought forward that might make the site or repository unsuitable.
The regulation also demanded that the repository be built to meet radiation standards (the
EPA’s maximum dose standard of 15 millirems per year over 10,000 years for the public in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain), and that the DOE must know how the system would behave under any situation.76 Although 10 CFR 960 laid out the guidelines by which the potential repository sites were chosen, Yucca Mountain was geologically a good choice.
Following 15 years of intense investigation the site was designated as the repository.77 The site investigations performed were some of the most detailed and extensive studies ever carried out.
Geologic surface investigations included the mapping of identifiable rock masses, fracture and joint characteristics, and fault zones. Other surface investigations considered the aquatic and terrestrial ecology; water rights and uses; topography; potential offsite hazards; natural resource concentrations; national or State protected resources; existing transportation systems; meteorology and climatology; population
75 10 CFR 960.3-1-1 76 Appendix IV 10 CFR Part 963. 77 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40 Part 960 29
densities, centers, and distributions; and general socioeconomic characteristics.78
The geologic site assessment at Yucca Mountain was one of the largest investigations ever accomplished. Scientists excavated more than 200 pits and trenches to study the surface and near surface processes and features. More than 450 surface boreholes, over 75,000 feet of rock core samples, and 18,000 geologic and water samples were collected and analyzed. The rock types, geologic formations, infiltration rates, moisture depths, air and water movements, and the water table were all extensively studied and analyzed. Well and aquifer tests were administered to determine the transport of water and other materials through the unsaturated and saturated zones of the rock.
Field studies were conducted to evaluate the state of stress of the earth’s crust in the
Yucca Mountain region. This was done to determine the probability of a volcanic or seismic event since an extensional environment can induce volcanism and faulting.79 In this region of the United States the crust is relatively thin due to the stretching of the lithosphere.
Considerable underground studies have also been conducted at Yucca Mountain.
A five-mile long underground Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) was constructed at a depth of 800 feet and adjacent to the proposed repository. A second, 1.6 mile long tunnel was constructed that crosses over to this Exploratory Studies Facility. This tunnel is known as the Cross-Drift tunnel. It runs 45 feet above and across the main North/South tunnel of the ESF and the repository site (see Figure 1), which lies to the west of the
North/South tunnel. Faults, fractures, stratigraphic units, and mineral composition were
78 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Volume 4, Parts 500 to end, Revised as of January 1, 2001. From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access SITE: 10CFR960.3-1-4-1 Page 545. 79 Yucca Mountain Project Site Recommendation Material, DOE, February 2002, pp. 16 30 mapped and observed in and around all excavated tunnels. Geochemical properties were determined from the many rock samples taken to ascertain their mineralogy, reactivity, and sorption characteristics. The DOE scientists conducted thermal tests on the surrounding rocks to determine how the material would behave when exposed to the high heat that would be produced from the radioactive waste.80
Yucca Mountain is primarily composed of welded tuffs, volcanic ash was solidified at the time of its deposition millions of years ago. The volcanism and faulting occurred in the region from approximately 10 to 14 million years ago. Yucca Mountain itself is formed from a series of volcanic ash flows that occurred 12.8 million years ago.
Regional silicic volcanism, which formed the tuffs, including those at Yucca Mountain, ended about 10 million years ago.
Figure 1. (from http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/documents/m2hk_a/figures/f01_3.htm)
80 Yucca Mountain Project Site Recommendation Material, DOE, February 2002, pp. 17 31
The DOE believes that Yucca Mountain is a good site for many reasons: the water table is deep below the surface; the host rock material is stable for building within and for dealing with high temperatures; the proposed site is not cut by any major faults and the repository can be built deep beneath the ground, keeping the hazardous materials away from the surface environment.
Seismic and volcanic hazards that might be associated with Yucca Mountain are the greatest cause for concern for some. The seismisity and volcanism are due to the extension of the Basin and Range, induced by the crustal stretching. Renewed volcanic activity, though with a low probability, would be devastating. The DOE scientists made many volcanic hazard assessments. They consulted alternative interpretations and a variety of experts. While the large-scale silicic volcanism that created the tuffs in and around Yucca Mountain ended about 10 million years ago, the smaller scale basaltic volcanism has occurred since then, with the most recent event dated at about 80,000 years.81 The assessment’s final results were that the chance of a disruption of the repository from volcanic activity over 10,000 years would be about 1 in 7,000.82 This probability assessment means that there is a 99.9999984 percent chance per year that there will be no disruption of the repository due to volcanism.83
The seismic hazard assessment was also very important considering the activity of earthquakes in the surrounding area. Seismic studies done by the State of Nevada show that since 1976 there have been 621 earthquakes greater than magnitude 2.5, excluding the ground shaking caused by the known nuclear testing, within 50 miles of Yucca
81 Fact Sheet, Yucca Mountain Project, Understanding the potential for volcanoes at Yucca Mountain, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/YMP-0341 November 2003. 82 Final Impact Statement, Summary, DOE OCRWM, February 2002. pp. S-51. 83 Fact Sheet, Yucca Mountain Project, Understanding the potential for volcanoes at Yucca Mountain, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/YMP-0341 November 2003. 32
Mountain.84 Underground nuclear testing can produce shaking at a large magnitude, which is unnatural, but should be considered in the viability of the repository. The testing of modern weapons can simulate magnitude 5 earthquakes. Although the U.S. is no longer testing nuclear bombs at the Nevada Test Site, there is always the possibility that testing will resume. The site was evaluated for where and how often future faulting may occur, how large the earthquakes would be, how much offset or ground displacement would occur, and the variance of ground motion. The DOE intends to design the repository to withstand any of the effects that a possible earthquake could produce. Underground facilities can withstand ground shaking, even intensities caused by underground nuclear testing, but the worry is about a rupture of the repository tunnel or the faults, creating an easy transport path for water.85 Earthquake activity has been monitored around Yucca
Mountain since 1978. In 1992, a magnitude 5.6 earthquake occurred about 20 kilometers, or 12 miles, southeast of Yucca Mountain. The earthquake did not produce any detectable damage in the tunnels or facilities in Yucca Mountain.86
84 Nuclear Waste Project Office, State of Nevada, [online] Earthquakes in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. [Accessed 1 January 2005], Available from: http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/yucca/seismo01.htm 85 Fact Sheet, Yucca Mountain Project, Studying the movement of rock and earthquakes, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/YMP-0344 November 2003. 86 Final Impact Statement, Summary, DOE OCRWM, February 2002. pp. S-51. 33
Figure 2 from Wikipedia online encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:YuccaSeismicActivity.jpg)
Although for the public, earthquakes and volcanoes are more obvious worrisome factors, in actuality infiltration by water may be more important to how well the repository could contain the waste. Although Yucca Mountain is currently in the unsaturated zone, approximately 300 meters above the water table, infiltrating fluid is still a problem. Some anions dissolved in the water could serve as catalysts in the corrosion of the waste packages and water will ultimately be the means by which the radionuclides are transported away from the facility.87 Continued studies and long-term tests are being performed to understand how water does and might infiltrate the facility, corrode the waste packages, and transport the radionuclides into the water table.
87 Yucca Mountain as a Radioactive Waste Repository: A report to the Director, U.S. Geological Survey. Hanks et al, Approved printing at the U.S. Government Printing Office on April 28, 1999. pp. 5 34
Figure #3: Waste Form Degradation and Radionuclide Release.
Illustration of water movement through cracks and around the waste containers
Figure from: http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/scien ce/wfdegrad.shtml
Understanding the geology and the location of the joints and fractures is a key step in understanding how liquids might flow through the bedrock. The surrounding rocks were extensively tested for their permeability or the ability of a fluid to move through the rock.88
88 Yucca Mountain Project, Earth Sciences: A study of how fluid moves through rock. U.S. Department of Energy. DOE/YMP-0006, February 2003. 35
Projected movement of water along faults and through repository block. Figure #4 from Science Beat, Berkeley Lab, April 22, 2002. Available from: www.lbl.gov/.../Archive/ ESD-Yucca-Mountain.html
Gaining accurate knowledge of the paleoclimate is an important matter for the durability of the repository. Understanding the past temperatures and rainfall amounts are important in knowing how future climates might differ from today. Scientists and engineers must predict these changes in climate and design the repository to be able to perform under an appropriate range of climatic regimes. In a 1999 report to the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey, five senior survey members stated that the Viability
Assessment was too conservative in its estimation about the climate around Yucca
Mountain and that the climate would be drier than predicted.89 Throughout the Yucca
Mountain site assessment conservative estimations have been made, and uncertainties have been calculated over a 10,000-year performance period. If these uncertainties are
89 Yucca Mountain as a Radioactive Waste Repository: A report to the Director, U.S. Geological Survey. T.C. Hanks, I.J. Winograd, R.E. Anderson, T.E. Reilly, E.P. Weeks, Approved printing at the U.S. Government Printing Office on April 28, 1999. pp. 10 36 projected for a much longer time period they may exceed the standard. Therefore reassessment may be necessary to fit within the new EPA standard of repository design.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals threw out the EPA’s 10,000-year design performance period for the repository in July 2004. Now a new standard must be created. The Department of Energy is estimating a total cost of $49.3 billion dollars
(calculations from 2001) to see the repository through closure; however, continual delays in the process will significantly increase the total cost estimates.90
Survey of Other Nations
Many countries are tackling the nuclear waste problem; however, geologic disposal is one of the few similarities shared among the programs. As countries begin to break away from their dependence on foreign oil, a popular substitute has become nuclear power. Yucca Mountain is being built to hold mostly spent fuel rods that are considered high level waste, though other countries are considering a variety of radioactive materials.
90 Analysis of Total System Life Cycle Cost of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Project, Department of Energy, May 2001. DOE/RW-0533. 37
Table 2: Nuclear Waste Classification (From The World Nuclear Association)91 High Level Wastes Two types: (HLW) Spent fuel that is not intended for reprocessing and fission products released from spent fuel by reprocessing. HLW is highly radioactive and contains long-lived radioactivity. Intermediate Level Contains large amounts of radioactive isotopes and requires Waste (ILW) shielding. This waste typically comprises resins, chemical sludges and metal fuel claddings, as well as contaminated equipment and waste from decommissioning plants. Many types are solidified or immobilized in a solid, non-reactive material such as cement. In general, short-lived ILW can be disposed of in shallow land burial, but long-lived ILW must be disposed of in a manner similarly to that which is used for high-level waste. Low Level Waste Waste that contains only small amounts of radioactivity with (LLW) negligible amounts of long-lived activity. Low-level waste does not require shielding during its handling and transport and is suitable for shallow land burial. This type of waste accounts for the great bulk of radioactive waste from the nuclear fuel cycle and typically comprises paper, rags, tools, clothing, filters and other such materials. Very Low Level Waste that contains negligible radioactivity and is considered Waste (VLLW) or suitable for disposal with domestic refuse. Exempt Waste (EW)
91 World Nuclear Association [online], Available from: http://www.world- nuclear.org/factsheets/wastes.htm. [Accessed 15 January 2005] 38
Sweden
In Sweden fifteen to twenty tons of spent fuel are produced per year from eleven reactors. This waste is currently stored in a central interim storage facility in Clab near
Oskarshamn Municipality.92 The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co.
(SKB), owned by four power companies, is planning to build a repository for the nation’s spent nuclear fuel. The waste would be deposited in the country’s granitic bedrock and then embedded or surrounded in clay at a depth of 500 meters. The surrounding clay, bentonite, is placed to protect the waste packages from water by swelling and further encasing the canisters.93 The SKB has been studying deep geologic disposal since the mid
1970’s and is currently conducting safety assessments for three actual sites: the Äspö
Hard Rock Laboratory in Oskarshamn, Finnsjön in northern Uppland County, and Gideå in Ångermanland. These sites are solely for calculations, sites to test theories and ideas, and are not candidate sites for the deep repository. 94 The three sites differ when it comes to important conditions such as groundwater flow, climate, tectonic uplift and natural environment. The purpose of characterizing sites with different conditions establish critical variables to gain an understanding of how sensitive the repository will be to variations. The SKB is also trying to study what conditions are most important for safety in different situations.95
92 January 2003, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management) [online]. Available from: http:// www.skb.se/ default____8563.aspx. [Accessed 27 November 2004] 93 Yucca Mountain Project, Sweden’s radioactive waste management program. DOE/YMP-0416, January 2003. 94 January 2003, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management) [online]. Available from: http:// www.skb.se/ default____8563.aspx. [Accessed 27 November 2004] 95 Ibid. 39
Figure 5: Sweden’s Nuclear Sites
Figure from Yucca Mountain Project YMP-0416. U.S. DOE January 2003. http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0416.shtml
Japan
In 2000 the Minister of International Trade and Industry set up the Nuclear Waste
Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) as a government agency. NUMO is in the introductory phases of planning geologic waste disposal. It is projecting to begin disposal between 2033 and 2038 in granitic or sedimentary rock. A literature survey and the selection of the primary investigation areas are the next undertaking for NUMO. One third of Japan’s electricity comes from nuclear power, and the spent fuel is currently all reprocessed.96 The spent fuel is dissolved in nitric acid, usable uranium is extracted and the leftover solution of radioactive acid is mixed with molten glass or cement and
96 10 November 2004, Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan [online], Available from: http://www.numo.or.jp/english/index.html. [Accessed 26 November 2004] 40 allowed to cool, vitrifying it into a solid. The vitrified waste then sits on site to cool for
30-50 years before being moved to a more permanent disposal site.97 As of 31 December
2003, the volume of spent fuel produced from the nuclear plants could fill 17,300 canisters; however, as of 30 September 2004 there were only 1,022 canisters of waste being stored in Japan. Reprocessing had greatly decreased the mass and volume of radioactive waste to be stored.98
Figure 6: Japan’s Nuclear Sites
Figure from Yucca Mountain Project YMP-0413. U.S. DOE January 2003. http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0413.shtml
97 Yucca Mountain Project, Japan’s radioactive waste management program. DOE/YMP-0413, January 2003. 98 10 November 2004, Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan [online], Available from: http://www.numo.or.jp/english/index.html. [Accessed 26 November 2004] 41
United Kingdom
In Britain, the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management is an independent committee appointed by the UK Government whose task is to review the options for managing those UK radioactive wastes for which there is no agreed long-term solution.
The Committee has been asked to consult and to make recommendations to the UK
Government in 2006.99 Nirex, a private corporation that was set up by the nuclear power industry in agreement with the government is in charge of handling all of the United
Kingdom’s nuclear waste. Currently high and intermediate level waste is stored at 34 reactor sites. 95% (by radioactivity) of the waste comes from the civilian nuclear power industry, 4% from defense, and 1% from medical and industrial establishments.
Radioactive waste is produced at a rate of 7,000 tons, or 16,000 cubic meters, per year, which by 2001 had accumulated to 1,960 cubic meters of high-, 75,400 cubic meters of intermediate- and 14,700 cubic meters of low-level waste. The high-level waste is dissolved into a liquid form with nitric acid, then mixed with molten glass and allowed to harden into a solid vitrified substance. This vitrified waste is kept near the treatment facilities, at Sellafield, until permanent disposal is available. In September of 2001, consultation began on the long-term storage facility. This was the first step toward permanent underground storage.100
99 http://www.corwm.org/content-0, 100 November 2004, NIREX (United Kingdom’s Committee on Radioactive Waste Management) [online], available from: http://www.nirex.co.uk/index/iabout.htm. [Accessed on 26 November 2004] 42
Figure 7: United Kingdom’s Nuclear Sites
Figure from Yucca Mountain Project YMP-0418. U.S. DOE January 2003. http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0418.shtml France
France is one country where nuclear power has been truly successful. The public has accepted the technology and infrastructure to support nuclear power and a waste reprocessing program. 96% of spent fuel is recycled.101 The National Radioactive Waste
Management of France (ANDRA) operates independently of the power companies. It is
“under the supervision of the French Ministries for Industry, Research and the
Environment, and is responsible for the long-term management of radioactive waste
101 23 November 2004, The Areva Group [online], Available from: http://www.arevagroup.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=arevagroup_en%2FPage%2FPageHomeFull Template&c=Page&cid=1028798800664. [Accessed 26 November 2004] 43
produced in France.”102 ANDRA was created in 1979 and has built two low- and intermediate-level waste facilities, one at Manche and one in Aube. After twenty-five years of nuclear power operation, 527,214 cubic meters of low and intermediate level waste have been created. The Manche facility was in operation from 1969 until 1994 and has now been sealed and gone into its monitoring phase. Since 1992, the waste has gone to Aube, which is currently 14% filled. ANDRA is also currently researching a location for a disposal site for high-level waste in a 500-meter-thick bed of clay.103
Figure 8: France’s Nuclear Sites
Figure from Yucca Mountain Project YMP-0411. U.S. DOE January 2003. http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0411.shtml
102 ANDRA (National Radioactive Waste Management Agency of France) [online], available from: http://www.andra.fr/interne.php3?id_rubrique=116. [Accessed 15 January 2005] 103 ANDRA (National Radioactive Waste Management Agency of France) [online], available from: http://www.andra.fr/sommaire.en.php3. [Accessed 26 November 2004] 44
Canada
Canada’s nuclear waste program is headed by the Nuclear Waste Management
Organization (NWMO), which was formed as a separate organization by the utility companies in response to a governmental decree. Nuclear generating utilities and The
Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL), a federal Crown Corporation backed by the government, fund NWMO. Canada’s Nuclear Fuel Waste Act was passed on
15 November 2002. “The Nuclear Fuel Waste Act requires NWMO to assess at least three approaches for the long-term management of nuclear fuel waste: deep geologic disposal in the Canadian Shield, storage at nuclear reactor sites and, centralized storage – either above or below ground. NWMO must submit its study and recommendations to the government of Canada by 15 November 2005.”104
Figure 9: Canada’s Nuclear Sites
Figure from Yucca Mountain Project YMP-0408. U.S. DOE January 2003. http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0408.shtml
104 Nuclear Waste Management Organization [online]. Available from: http://www.nwmo.ca/default.aspx?DN=178,177,20,1,Documents. [Accessed 15 January 2005] 45
The geologic assessment at Yucca Mountain for U.S. high-level waste repository is one of the largest site investigations ever done. Scientists may have a better understanding of the geology of Yucca Mountain than of any other site on the globe. The favorable geologic conditions can be combined with the engineered barriers to create the safest environment possible. Although there has been extensive testing and research, the long-term analysis has still not been done. Twenty years of investigation is a significant amount of time spent on a project. But is it enough time to fully understand how small amounts of water will move throughout 300 meters of fractured bedrock or how the host rock will respond to the intense heat of the waste packages? Other questions remain: exactly how many years will it take to corrode the containers, especially with human interference, or how will the climate change, and what effect will that have on the repository? It is now important to become aware of how the system will perform in the future since the past behavior is beginning to be understood.
46
Chapter 3: Earthquake Hazards and Public Opinion
Nuclear power plants are designed and built under very strict regulations.
However, any system is only as strong as its weakest link. In the nuclear industry, that weakness often comes from human assessments or predictions. Public opinion also has a strong influence on the American nuclear industry. Disregard in the industry for the public’s rightful role in a democratic society has proven to be disastrous. There are many case studies that reveal these changes in public perception. Bodega Bay and Diablo
Canyon are perfect examples of cases in which earthquake faults and public opposition played significant roles in the development of plans or construction of a plant: cancellation for one and delay for the other.
Earthquake Hazard: Finding Faults
In tectonically active regions such as the west coast of the United States, earthquake hazards play a significant role in the assessment of sites for nuclear power plants. On passive margins like the east coast of the U.S., away from a plate boundaries, planners must still consider earthquake hazards though such hazards have a far lesser probability of creating a problem. The hazards associated with an earthquake are twofold: that faulting will displace the ground under the reactor, or that ground shaking would occur near the reactor causing failure of the plant’s safety systems.105 The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has created regulations specifically for dealing with earthquake hazards or at least for assessing them.
105 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [online], Appendix A to Part 100, Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, [accessed 2 May 2004], available from: www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc- collections/cfr/part100/part100-appa.html 47
When assessing a site, a “capable fault” discovered in the vicinity of the reactor can make or break the suitability of the site. As defined by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 100, or 10 CFR100 a capable fault is one which displays:
Movement at or near the ground surface at least once in the past 35,000 years, or movement of a recurring nature within the past 500,000 years, [or] seismicity instrumentally determined… to have a direct relationship with the fault and a structural relationship to a capable fault… such that movement on one could be reasonably expected to be accompanied by movement on the other.106
10 CFR 100 lays out many specific site investigations that are required when siting a nuclear power plant, for example, “determining the lithologic, hydrologic and structural geologic conditions of the site and the surrounding area, including its geologic history.”
“Evaluation and identification of tectonic structures underlying the site” -- this could help determine if there are any folds, discontinuities, or discordant bedding, which would offer insight into the site’s tectonic history. Studies designed to understand the behavior of paleoseismic episodes and the type of motion on faults are important. One needs to know whether observed movements are normal, reverse, or transform and if the observations are congruent with current understanding of the tectonic regime. “Listing all historically reported earthquakes which have…or could reasonably be expected to have affected the site, [with] correlation of epicenters or locations of highest intensity of [these earthquakes].” “[Determining] if any fault with any part within 200 miles of the site… could be considered a capable fault.” If surface faulting is observed then investigations must be performed to “determine… to what extent the plant would need to be designed to accommodate surface faulting.” Investigations for tsunami (“seismically induced floods
106 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [online], Appendix A to Part 100, Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, [accessed 2 May 2004], available from: www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc- collections/cfr/part100/part100-appa.html 48 and water waves”) hazards must also be performed for coastal sites. Another important characteristic is the soil stability of the site. Ground shaking can cause “soil instability due to ground disruption such as fissuring, differential consolidation, liquefaction, and cratering.”107
Determining the Safe Shutdown Earthquake is one of the goals of 10 CFR100 for site investigations. This is the earthquake that would “produce the maximum vibratory ground motions,” that would severely damage the power plant, yet still allow for a safe shutdown of the reactor. This is the strongest earthquake that could safely affect the plant.
All these site and laboratory studies are used in a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
(PSHA) that determines the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.
Site assessments in the central and eastern United States (CEUS) and in the western United States are approached with different methods. CEUS seismic hazard studies are much more difficult “because there is generally no clear association between seismicity and known tectonic structures or near-surface geology.” The tectonic forces that created observed structures generally are no longer present; therefore, multiple alternative models must be used to account for this uncertainty.108 In the western United
States by contrast, a tectonically active margin “where earthquakes can often be correlated with known tectonic structures,” seismic investigations must be done for three sources: near surface, blind or buried, and subduction-related earthquakes. Each source will be associated with different fault mechanics. For western sites Federal regulations
107 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [online], Appendix A to Part 100, Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, [accessed 2 May 2004], available from: www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc- collections/cfr/part100/part100-appa.html 108 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [online], Regulatory Guide 1.165, Identification and Characterization of Seismic Sources and Determination of Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion, [accessed 28 January 2005], available from: www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/power- reactors/active/01-165/ 49 require understanding how fault characteristics relate to one another, to “determine the earthquake potential… and estimate the amount of displacement that might be expected: surface rupture length versus magnitude, subsurface rupture length versus magnitude, rupture area versus magnitude, maximum and average displacement versus magnitude, slip rate versus magnitude.” 109
Faulting at different distances from the site has required different levels of detail in the investigations. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.165 describes these regulatory positions.
The regional geology of the site must be understood, “through literature reviews, maps, remote sensing data, and possibly ground work…within a radius of 200 miles of the site to identify seismogenic and capable tectonic sources.” More detailed attention must be given to geological, seismological and geophysical studies done within a 25-mile radius of the site, and even more detail to a 5-mile radius, to determine that there are no capable tectonic structures. This will be done to calculate deformation potential and ground motion characteristics. Also seismometers should be used to monitor seismicity. Within one half mile of the site and on the site itself very detailed investigation should be performed to “assess specific soil and rock characteristics.”110
Seismic hazard assessment is essential to determine the stability of a site, especially in tectonically active regions. However, finding a site is seismically suitable does not guarantee that the plant can be built and operated. Seismic “blemishes” can often ruin a site. Two case studies, in the United States, support this statement.
109 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [online], Regulatory Guide 1.165, Identification and Characterization of Seismic Sources and Determination of Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion, [accessed 28 January 2005], available from: www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/power- reactors/active/01-165/ 110 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [online], Regulatory Guide 1.165, Identification and Characterization of Seismic Sources and Determination of Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion, [accessed 28 January 2005], available from: www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/power- reactors/active/01-165/ 50
Bodega Bay
Figure 10: 1960 picture of the Bodega Bay Nuclear Power Plant site (Photo from: http://www.pressdemo.com/centuryheadlines/1960s/1960s_gallery1.html)
In 1954 the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), of San Francisco,
California (CA), was seeking a site for a nuclear power plant in the northern reaches of the California coastline. An apparently suitable a site was found in a remote setting on
Bodega Bay. One immediate attraction of the site was the quartz diorite bedrock that offered a firmer foundation than the mud or sand on which coastal industrial plants are often built.111 Almost as soon as PG&E started looking seriously at Bodega Head, public and conservationist opposition arose. The Sierra Club and local resident Rose Gaffney
111 Meehan, Richard. The Atom and the Fault. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984). pp 3, 11 51 were leaders in the fight against PG&E to preserve the beauty and life forms of by
Bodega Bay.112
In April 1958, Clark McHuron was hired by PG&E as a consulting geologist to assess the site’s suitability for a conventional steam-electric generating plant. No one from PG&E gave him reason to believe that it would be another type of facility. He quickly recognized the vicinity of the San Andres fault and its subsidiary “zones of apparent weakness,” recommending that design plans should avoid these areas.
McHuron’s investigations were preliminary. He suggested that more site investigations were needed, since in his brief analysis large assumptions had been made.113
The Redwood Chapter of the Sierra Club and concerned residents soon organized in opposition to any sort of plant at Bodega. Local businesses and politicians were mostly in support of PG&E, looking forward to the tax benefits and economic growth they hoped would result from construction of the plant. Most of the unease arose from concern to protect the serenity of Bodega. There was a strong aversion to unsightly power lines and cooling towers, rather than concern about environmental and radiological hazards. The
Sierra Club was mostly in favor of nuclear power, since it was fighting to keep hydroelectric plants off streams and nuclear power seemed to provide an environmentally friendly solution.114
By August 1958 PG&E had purchased the site, specifically for a nuclear power plant. Ferd Mautz, chief civil engineer for PG&E, wrote a report to his managers stating that of the sites suggested by McHuron, Bodega was least desirable. Norman Sutherland,
President of PG&E, decided a new site evaluation was needed. Sutherland hired Dr.
112 Wellock, Thomas. “The Battle for Bodega Bay.” California History, Summer 1992: 193-211 113 Meehan, op cit., pp. 5 114 Wellock, op cit., pp. 195-196 52
Hugo Benioff from California Institute of Technology as the lead seismologist. Benioff’s optimistic assessments of Bodega apparently overruled McHuron’s report. Within two years, in June 1961, PG&E announced plans to build a nuclear power plant at Bodega.115
At first there was only a small amount of opposition to the 300-megawatt reactor, but within a year a large opposition group had formed, with David Pesonen, a conservationist from University of California at Berkeley, leading the way for the Sierra
Club.116 With the arrival of Pesonen, a link was made between “Berkeley’s radical community” and conservationists, and lessons on tactics passed between the two groups.117
Non-violent protests were used, as well as letter writing, attendance at meetings and hearings, song writing, outdoor parties and “attention-getting publicity stunts.”118 The release of balloons dramatically showed where the possible fallout would travel and became a tactic regularly used by anti-nuclear activists. The Public Utility Commission hearings on the plant at Bodega at first drew little attention, but as opposition grew they became a battleground for resistance to PG&E’s plant. Rose Gaffney, whose property had been taken by PG&E for the plant site, became a thorn in PG&E’s side and a leading voice for the public opposition. Slowly safety concerns emerged from the public criticism; however, the plant received its final blow from a subsurface enemy.119
By 1963 most of the bureaucratic issues relating to land use were being settled in the utility’s favor and opponents took up earthquake hazard as the remaining issue.
Pesonen commissioned an independent report by geologist Pierre St. Amand. This report said that Bodega was a bad site, that faulting in the foundation was reason enough to stop
115 Meehan, op cit., pp 6. 116 Meehan, Richard. op cit., pp 7. 117 Wellock, op cit., pp. 197 118 Ibid, pp. 195-197 119 Ibid., pp. 199, 205, 207. 53 construction. Secretary of the Interior, Stuart Udall, read this report and was concerned about the project. He ordered the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to review the issue. By the spring of 1963, PG&E had received full local and state approval for the site, and they were certain that AEC approval was not far off. PG&E began digging a 140-foot diameter hole for the reactor foundation. Geologists Manuel Bonilla and Julius Schlocker were assigned by the USGS to create detailed geologic maps of the site. The USGS decided that they not only needed to look at the geology of Bodega but the possibility of ground shaking at the site, as well. Therefore, Jerry Eaton from the USGS was sent as a senior seismologist. Eaton was less than enthusiastic about this assignment. He paid little attention to the site and his report scribbled over the weekend while he had the flu.
Although this personal spin to the report could have affected its reliability, the harsh jolt alerted PG&E engineers and the public to the possibility of faulting. Eaton attacked design assumptions made by PG&E engineers to handle ground shaking. He said that there was a possibility for faulting beneath the site: “Because we cannot prove that the worst situation will not prevail at the site, we must recognize that it might.”120
Excavation of the site was well under way in the summer of 1963 and Bonilla and
Schlocker were working hard on the geologic mapping. One evening they were pulled from their hotel by a PG&E inspector who said something looked funny in the ground and that they should come inspect. There was an obvious fault in the foundation of the reactor. The 40,000-year-old terrace deposits of sand were displaced by the fault. After the discovery of the fault in the foundation, PG&E suspended its contracts with construction agencies and stopped excavation at the site.121
120 Meehan, op cit., pp. 8-13 121 Ibid., pp. 15 54
Thereafter, the battle became centered upon determining how much offset was possible on the fault. By October 1964 it was decided that this fault was a secondary splay off the San Andreas. Movement of two to three feet could not be ruled out. Ferd
Mautz and PG&E tried to engineer the reactor with the possible three feet of movement in mind. Although the design looked promising, there were enough uncertainties that reasonable assurance could not be made against earthquake hazard. On 26 October 1964 the AEC staff’s report said that Bodega was not a suitable site, and four days later PG&E closed operations.122
Figure 11: Current picture at the Bodega Bay site (Photo from: http://geoimages.berkeley.edu/GeoImages/BainCalif/CAL400/HOLEHEAD.HTML)
Diablo Canyon
122 Ibid., pp. 17-19 55
Figure 12: Diablo Canyon (Photo from: http://daphne.palomar.edu/calenvironment/energy.htm)
PG&E learned from the Bodega fiasco that a nuclear site could not be approved without the support of the conservationists. Therefore in 1965 PG&E decided to ask the
Sierra Club to help them find a suitable site along the California coast. In return for approval of a site for a nuclear power plant (Diablo Canyon), the Sierra Club received the
Nipomo Dunes for state park purchase.123 Internally members of the Sierra Club were divided: some members were not in favor of the coastal siting of nuclear power plants and they split off to form the Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference.124
Geologically, Diablo Canyon looked much like Bodega: bedrock overlain with marine terrace deposits. Trenching in 1967 around the site seemed to show that there were no active faults nearby. The initial site investigations looked good, and PG&E
123 Willis, John. “Abalone, rattlesnakes, and kilowatt monsters” Cultural Geographies, 10: 149-175 2003. 124 Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-E-216, February 1984). 56
started the design and license application process.125 Initially public opinion was encouraging, with 75% in favor of the nuclear reactors. San Luis Obispo County residents were excited by the tax benefits and possibility for economic growth.126 The plan was to build two units at $350 million apiece. They were to go online by mid-1970. Cal
Tech seismologist Hugo Benioff suggested that the reactors be designed to withstand shaking from a magnitude 6.75 earthquake, occurring directly beneath the site. PG&E followed those recommendations, and in 1968 and 1969 construction permits were issued for the two reactors.127
Geophysical exploration near the site in 1970, when the plant was about to become operational, by Shell Oil Company led to discovery of a fault offshore. The Hosgri fault was discovered 2.5 miles off the coast. The possibility existed that the fault could cause a magnitude 7 earthquake, which would be more devastating than Benioff’s design recommendations. This discovery and the resulting arguments that PG&E and the NRC were covering up this information cost PG&E ten years of delay as well as the cost of redesign and reinforcement of the plant to meet a higher earthquake standard.128
Figure 13: Diablo Canyon in relation to Hosgri Fault
125 Meehan, op cit., pp. 43 126 Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty, op cit. 127 Meehan, op cit., pp. 43 128 Ibid., pp. 44 57
(Image from: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc- collections/nuregs/staff/sr1437/v2/fig024.html)
Meanwhile, concern for the abalone population in the cove was growing because thermal pollution that had killed thousands of shellfish in 1972 and 1975. The Abalone
Alliance was formed as a “statewide coalition of grassroots groups concerned about nuclear safety.”129 The accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the earthquake hazard scare, environmental concern over thermal emissions, and protests, held up the opening of
Diablo Canyon. Building from their experience in the Bodega Bay battle, protestors attacked the plant head on. They organized sit-ins in front of the gates of the plant, songs were written, and cartoons protesting against nuclear power were posted in many
129 Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-E-216, February 1984). 58 newspapers. Protestors even dressed up as mutant sponges to emphasize the potential radiological hazards.130
In 1984, after ten years of hold-ups and almost $5 billion dollars over budget,
Diablo Canyon began producing electricity. Although Diablo Canyon has faded from the spotlight, slight opposition and apprehension still remain. Any industrial plant located in a tectonically active region is bound to raise some eyebrows.131
Evacuation Problems
Figure 14: Shoreham Nuclear Power plant on Long Island (Photo from: Mapquest.com)
The Shoreham nuclear power plant was located on the northern shore of Long
Island and to this day it is considered a blemish on the record of the nuclear industry.
This plant did not have a release of radioactivity or cause any serious injury to living
130 Willis, John. op cit. 131 Ibid. 59 creatures. The trouble came from mistakes made by the regulatory authorities, and $5.6 billion dollars was spent on a plant that would never operate.132 The Long Island Lighting
Company (LILCO) commissioned this 849-megawatt boiling water reactor in the 1960’s.
Construction delays held up the plant’s opening until 1985 when it began low power testing at only 5% capacity. Within two years it was shut down. Government intervention and public outrage at the unrealistic evacuation plans ultimately killed Shoreham. The
Shoreham case shows how great an effect public opposition can have on an industry. The major concerns about evacuation planning appeared after the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979. There was no viable escape route for the population (3 million people) off Long Island, through the city of New York.133 TMI alerted the population to the potential inadequacy and mismanagement of evacuation plans.
Figure 15: TMI Nuclear Power Plant
(Photo from: http://freeenergynews.com/Directory/ColdFusion/three_mile_island25years.htm)
132 Michael D. Rennhac, Shoreham, Nuke Worker [online], updated 15 January 2005, [available from: http://nukeworker.com/nuke_facilities/North_America/usa/NRC_Facilities/Region_1/shoreham/index.shtm l 133 Aron, Joan. Licensed to Kill? University of Pittsburg Press: 1997. pp. 10-11 60
The event at TMI in 1979 not only released a very limited amount of radioactive material into the atmosphere; it also became the focal point of intense public distrust of the nuclear industry. One major problem that emerged from the TMI accident was the realization that emergency planning for nuclear power plant problems was poor or even nonexistent. The mismanagement of evacuation procedures and release of information to the public was disastrous. Miscommunication between industry and governmental officials and, finally, to the public immediately caused distrust.
Beginning at 4 A.M. on Wednesday 28 March 1979, a pressure release valve stuck open on TMI’s Unit #2 reactor. Subsequent operator errors sent TMI into a five-day emergency and pandemonium. The utility consistently downplayed the risk in its public statements and press conferences. By 29 March, the situation seemed to be improving, until the evening when engineers and officials began to see that damage was being done to the overheating core. On Friday, 30 March, the utility finally admitted there was a serious problem at TMI. Then they overestimated the risk. Governor Richard Thornburgh was furious with the utility. He had declared, on the utility’s advice, that no evacuation was necessary. Now he was forced to go back on his word. Thornburgh finally issued a warning, based on what little information he could gather, that pregnant women and small children should leave the area.134 Many citizens, wary of the State’s sudden reversal of position, decided that if it was not safe for small children it was not safe for them.
Banks were overloaded with withdrawals, gas stations were running out of gas and the roadways began to fill with fleeing residents. The situation in the plant heated up and officials began wondering how quickly they could evacuate everyone from a five, ten or
134 Smithsonian National Museum of American History [online], Three Mile Island: The Inside Story, [accessed 25 February 2005], available from: http://americanhistory.si.edu/tmi/tmi04.htm 61 twenty-five mile radius. Getting numbers of people to be evacuated from the Emergency
Management Team took hours longer than should have been required for the entire evacuation.135 Discussion and plans for evacuation grew from a 10-mile radius that would include 25,000 people to a 20-mile radius that involved 650,000 residents, including 13 hospitals and 1 prison.136 By March 31st the reactor core was exposed above the cooling water and a hydrogen bubble began to form in the core. Finally, on April 1st the hydrogen was expelled from the core and the reactor began cooling down. By April 9th Governor
Thornburgh had lifted the advisory for local residents. Although the reactor at TMI was shut down and there were no serious injuries, the effect on public opinion was nationwide. The 47 nuclear plants that were planned or under construction after 1979 were all cancelled and since then there have been no new nuclear power plants completed in the U.S.137
Shoreham experienced significant repercussions from the TMI accident. The public began to look more skeptically on the plant on Long Island. The evacuation of three million people from Long Island had never been practical. After TMI, the public came to realize that this was a real problem, not just an unrealistic scenario that would never be faced. As public favor waned, governmental intervention shut down Shoreham.
Governor Mario Cuomo saw what had happened to Pennsylvania’s Governor
Thornburgh. He realized that similar trouble might result if Shoreham ever became operational. Cuomo forced LILCO into a settlement under which the utility could charge residents for Shoreham’s expenses if they agreed to shut down the nuclear power plant.
135 Gray and Rosen, op cit., pp. 216 & 255. 136 Pennsylvania Highways [online] Three Mile Island, updated 30 January 2005. [Accessed 25 February 2005], available from: http://www.pahighways.com/features/threemileisland.html 137 Gray and Rosen, Ibid. 62
Once Shoreham was officially closed, in June of 1987, the decommissioning of the plant began. This added another $182 million to the cost of this never-operating plant.138 Now
Long Island must purchase much its electricity from the grid of other utilities and electricity remains extremely expensive. Changes in the public’s perception destroyed a nuclear power plant and forced the Long Island Lighting Company into bankruptcy.139
The nuclear industry and the government have learned from these situations and mistakes. The public now plays a significant role in the regulatory and licensing process for nuclear activities. There is funding provided for opposition, and there are lengthy public debates. The perception of the nuclear industry has changed dramatically over the past 40 years. Instead of assuming that a plant is inherently likely to be safe, procedures and planning are now based the understanding that a lack of safety and trust exists and that trustworthiness must be demonstrated to the public to gain acceptance. The public is quick to find fault with nuclear power plants, whether it be an actual earthquake-prone fault, flawed evacuation plans, or out of desire for environmental preservation. Attention must be paid in detail to every reasonable objection to guarantee the safest possible outcome.
138 Michael D. Rennhac, Shoreham, Nuke Worker [online], updated 15 January 2005, [available from: http://nukeworker.com/nuke_facilities/North_America/usa/NRC_Facilities/Region_1/shoreham/index.shtm l 139 Aron, op cit., pp. 96, 97, 127, 130. 63
Chapter 4: The South Korea Case
Following the Korean War (1950-1953), South Korea experienced a rapid industrial revolution. This change from an agrarian, peasant society to one of the most prosperous industrial nations took less than 50 years to accomplish, compared to 150 years for
Europe and America. In both cases, industrialization was pushed by new energy resources. In the United States, water power gave way to wood and charcoal, which were soon superceded by coal, gas and oil. In the 1950s, nuclear energy was universally seen as a new, inexhaustible and efficient source of energy. Twenty years later, safety and environmental concerns slowed development of the industry to a crawl in the U.S.. Only now is it again being considered as an energy option. In South Korea, however, the nuclear industry is in its expansive phase. Without significant opposition or uncertainty, the nuclear trade has until now been able to grow rapidly in South Korea.140
In the 1960s, South Korean President Chung-Hee Park began leading the country toward a modern economic system, building new cities, roads, and factories. President
Park opened relations between Japan, the United States and other western nations and started South Korea on its way to becoming a world power.141 The entire infrastructure of
South Korea was revamped and modernized, increasing Korea’s economic and political standing worldwide. During this period, South Korea’s sole electric power utility company was established.142 In 2001, the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) was
140 Robert Walter to Lippincott, personal communication, 29 March 2005. 141 Time Asia [online], “Park Chung Hee”. August 23-30, 1999 Vol. 154. [Accessed 29 March 2005] Available from: http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html 142 World Nuclear Association [online], Nuclear Power in South Korea. Updated September 2004. [Accessed November 20004] available from: www.uic.com.au/nip81.htm 64 broken up, and the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co Ltd (KHNP) was created to control all transmission and distribution of hydroelectric and nuclear power.143
South Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, but it was not until 1977 that its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operation. There are now 20 reactors in 4 locations, producing approximately 40% of the country’s electricity144 (See figure 1 and table 1). South Korea’s demand for electricity is on the rise, increasing by about 9% per year. KEPCO plans to build 8 new nuclear power plants by
2014 to meet this demand. It will also export reactors to many Southeast Asian nations.145
Figure 16 from the International Nuclear Safety Center [online at http://www.insc.anl.gov/pwrmaps/map/south_korea.php]
143 World Nuclear Association [online], Nuclear Power in South Korea. Updated September 2004. [Accessed November 20004] available from: www.uic.com.au/nip81.htm 144 World Nuclear Association [online], Nuclear Power in South Korea. Updated September 2004. [Accessed November 20004] available from: www.uic.com.au/nip81.htm 145 Teollisuuden Voima Oy, South Korea to build 8 new nuclear power plants, 8/5/02. http://www.tvo.fi/183.htm 65
Table 3 - Nuclear Power Reactors in South Korea Capacity Began Reactor Name Location Type (Mega Supplier Operation Watts) Gori-1 Gyongnam PWR 570 USA Apr 1978 Gori-2 Gyongnam PWR 620 USA Jul 1983 Gori-3 Gyongnam PWR 925 USA Sep 1985 Gori-4 Gyongnam PWR 925 USA Apr 1986 Yonggwang-1 Chonnam PWR 925 USA Aug 1986 Yonggwang-2 Chonnam PWR 925 USA Jun 1987 Yonggwang-3 Chonnam PWR 975 Korea Mar 1995 Yonggwang-4 Chonnam PWR 975 Korea Mar 1996 Yonggwang-5 Chonnam PWR 975 Korea May 2002 Yonggwang-6 Chonnam PWR 975 Korea Sep 2002 Uljin-1 Gyongbuk PWR 930 France Sep 1988 Uljin-2 Gyongbuk PWR 930 France Sep 1998 Uljin-3 Gyongbuk PWR 980 Korea Sep 1998 Uljin-4 Gyongbuk PWR 980 Korea Jun 1999 Uljin-5 Gyongbuk PWR 980 Korea Feb 2004 Uljin-6 Gyongbuk PWR 980 Korea Dec 2004 Wolsong-1 Gyongbuk PHWR 650 Canada Apr 1983 Wolsong-2 Gyongbuk PHWR 675 Canada Jun 1997 Wolsong-3 Gyongbuk PHWR 675 Canada Jul 1998 Wolsong-4 Gyongbuk PHWR 675 Canada Jun 1999 Shin Gori-1 Gyongnam PWR 950 Korea 2008* Shin Gor-2 Gyongnam PWR 950 Korea 2009* Shin Wolsong-1 Gyongbuk PWR 950 Korea 2009* Shin Wolsong-2 Gyongbuk PWR 950 Korea 2010* Shin Gori-3 Gyongnam PWR 1350 Korea 2010* Shin Gori-4 Gyongnam PWR 1350 Korea 2011* Near Uljin Gyongbuk PWR 1350 Korea 2015* Near Uljin Gyongbuk PWR 1350 Korea 2015* * Under construction or on order Table information from: www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.htm [accessed 26 Nov. 2004] and http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc5kos6/htm [accessed 26 Nov. 2004]
The sites for all existing and planned nuclear reactors in South Korea are in coastal settings, drawing on seawater for their cooling systems. Of the existing reactor sites, three are located on the east coast, and one on the west coast (See figure 16). The geomorphology of these coastal areas provides a preliminary indication of potential 66 seismic hazards. The southern and western coasts are composed of islands, bays and estuaries that are characteristic of submerged shoreline features. In contrast, the east coast of South Korea is composed of linear beaches marked by terrace features indicative of raised shorelines, similar to coastal California. Geomorphically it is evident that the
South Korean peninsula has been tilted to the southwest, submerging the southwest coast.
This suggests that the eastern coast has been tectonically uplifted similar to coastal
California. Until recently, no geological studies have been undertaken to explain the cause and timing of this activity. But if tectonic uplift of marine terraces has been recent, it would imply serious safety problems for reactors located on or near faults in this part of
South Korea.
In 1998 KIGAM (Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources) hosted an international conference, which included many field trips throughout South Korea.
The agency discovered that they needed help in understanding the observable marine terraces, the type of geology upon which the Wolsong complex rests, and the faults cutting through them. Marine terraces are stepped regions along coastlines that were formed either when sea level falls or when the coastline is uplifted. Often a disruptive event, such as an earthquake, will raise the modern beach creating a marine terrace.
Marine terraces have been correlated around the world with eustatic changes in sea level.
Discovering when the terrace formed can be important for understanding when it was uplifted. If a fault cut an older marine terrace but not a younger one, then a minimum age of the fault can be determined. Radioisotope dates on corals on uplifted marine terraces can be used to determine when uplift occurred. Once dates are ascribed to the terraces, a local uplift rate can be determined, which is important in understanding regional tectonic activity. 67
Recent geological studies have shown that a number of large fault zones extend through the eastern region on South Korea where many of the reactors are located. Some faults even run directly under existing reactors (i.e. Wolsong reactor 1). At Wolsong’s reactor 1 subsidence has occurred, prompting discussions about possible shutdown of the reactor.146
Another hurdle for the Koreans to overcome is the future of the radioactive waste and its disposal. Korea has pending plans to build a centralized interim storage facility by
2016. With the continued growth of nuclear power a more substantial and long-term storage facility will eventually be necessary. 147
There are two main problems facing nuclear power in South Korea: the public and the science. For the most part, the people of South Korea did not understand the need for the development of nuclear power. They did not see the economic impact. The public demanded monetary compensation for the power plants being built around their homes.
They received payments until their demands became unreasonable in the eyes of the
Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) organization.148 Following violent protests by the public the Korean Government and the KHNP began marketing and advertising to change the mindset of the people. A cartoon educational booklet was released to the public. This pamphlet proclaimed that nuclear power was “safe and good for the economy,” that “There are no earthquakes greater than magnitude 5.5,” that “Active faults are short, and not harmful,” that earthquakes were not a problem in South Korea,
146 Dorothy Merritts to Lippincott, personal communication, 31 March 2005. 147 World Nuclear Association [online], Nuclear Power in South Korea. Updated September 2004. [Accessed November 20004] available from: www.uic.com.au/nip81.htm 148 Chwae to Merritts, personal communication, 30 October 2004. 68 and that the reactor is so strong that one should “run to a nuclear power plant if there is an earthquake.”149
The science problem emerges from the struggle between government control, power industry needs and scientific expertise. A Japanese agency known as CRIEPI
(Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry) was brought in by the South
Korean Ministry of Commerce and Technology (MOST) to do scientific studies because the KHNP Corporation declared that the Korean geology experts had insufficient expertise in this field. In 2000 CRIEPI was invited to undertake a long-term study. So far, they have secretly dug trenches and looked at air photos to begin modeling a maximum design earthquake and the maximum ground accelerations from potential faulting at the
Wolsong site. Although the KIGAM was doing congruent but separate studies, MOST is relying solely on KHNP-CRIEPI’s findings for the maximum design earthquake possible on the Eupchan fault. 150
In 1997-98 Dr. Ueechan Chwae was the director of the geology department at
KIGAM, which is an agency much like the United States Geological Survey (USGS). He is a structural geologist and was in charge of making the first geologic maps of South
Korea. During the construction of a primary school at Naa village, southern adjacent to the Wolsong, the construction crew uncovered a fault of a possibly recent age. The nuclear power company did not reveal this information publicly and actually paved over other outcrops of the fault. Dr. Chwae was concerned that they were trying to hide important tectonic information. He went to other sites throughout that region, finding more exposures of a reverse fault that was projected to run under the Wolsong power
149 Chwae to Merritts, personal communication, 30 October 2004. 150 Chwae to Merritts, personal communication, 30 October 2004. 69 plant. Dr. Chwae later discovered that while building the plant the construction team had also found possible active faults at the site. Dr. Chwae began to speak out publicly against the government and Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS, akin to the United
States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Dr. Chwae is a well-known celebrity among
South Koreans. Now he believes that he has become very unpopular with nuclear organizations and the government.151
KEPRI (Korea Electric Power Research Institute, working with CRIEPI to obtain a new seismic code) hired a separate team of Japanese experts to evaluate Dr. Chwae’s finding. In July 1998 Dr. Chwae sent a micro-paleontologist, Dr. Sung-Ja Choi, from his team to the United States to learn how to map marine terraces. There Dr. Choi was supposed to work with Dr. William Lettis, President of William Lettis & Associates, a private earth science consulting firm. Dr. Lettis sent Dr. Dr. Choi to work in the field along the San Andreas Fault in California with Dr. Dorothy Merritts, a well-known expert on marine terraces. Dr. Choi worked there for two weeks. Although she spoke no
English she was a quick learner, and upon concluding her training she handed Dr.
Merritts a letter. This letter stated that the Koreans needed Dr. Merritts’s help. The energy agency was doing “bad things” and there might be active faults on or near nuclear reactor sites. In February 2000, Dr. Merritts went to South Korea, where she saw signs of active faulting and liquefaction near the Suryom fault on the east coast. Liquefaction is a phenomenon in which the ground actually turns to liquid as water moves through the pore spaces; this happens due to intense ground shaking. It is highly destabilizing and dangerous for man-made structures built on such ground.
151 Chwae to Merritts, personal communication, 30 October 2004. 70
The South Korean government has now publicly acknowledged Dr. Chwae’s work and a new strategy has emerged to perform significant geological studies. In 2000,
Dr. Chwae was given three years to carry out field and laboratory studies, after which both Dr. Chwae’s team and the Japanese team would report their results. The KINS will decide whether the reactors need to be upgraded. Since that time the deadline has been extended many times. This is now the ninth year of the project; both teams hope to finish by February 2006.152 Dr. Merritts has returned on several occasions to continue her research with the South Koreans. Dr. Robert Walter, also of Franklin and Marshall
College, has joined the team and is working on dating samples from the east coast to determine uplift rates and the timing of past earthquake events. The final report is due to
MOST by 31 October 2005, after which final decisions can be made by February 2006.
KINS is working with Korea Electric Power Research Institute (KEPRI), which is hiring the Japanese CRIEPI, to create a new code for seismic safety standards in construction of their nuclear power plants. They plan to employ a probabilistic hazard analysis, using data to be collected over the next seven years by KOPEC (Korea Power
Engineering Company), which is under the KHNP. The ultimate goal for KIGAM and
KINS is to develop new guidelines for nuclear power plant siting. By February 2006, the
South Korean government is supposed to have new regulations for power plants located near active faults. This work is also relevant to the siting of a waste disposal repository.
The government has asked for provinces to volunteer to establish and maintain the radioactive waste disposal site (similarly to early U.S. efforts), but so far no province has stepped forward. South Korea is actively pursuing an expansion of its nuclear industry and sales of its technology, both at home and abroad. Over the next few years South
152 Chwae to Merritts, personal communication, 30 October 2004. 71
Korea plans to increase its nuclear capacity and reduce dependence on foreign oil. The
KHNP development plan these shifts in the use of various energy resources (See
Table 4).
Table 4 2003 2015 56,038 MW capacity 78,675 MW capacity Nuclear 28% 37% Oil 8% 3% Coal 28% 31% Gas 26% 21% Hydro 7% 8%
Countries throughout Asia are following suit and beginning to switch to nuclear power. Countries like Vietnam and Indonesia are working with the IAEA to develop their own nuclear power industries. South Korea is positioning itself to help these countries finance, acquire, and install nuclear power plants over the next twenty years, once the permits have been established with the IAEA.153 This is an ambitious goal for the South
Koreans and is putting pressure on their government to fully understand siting processes for its own nuclear power plants. If the Koreans wish to sell the complete package, including geologic studies and siting to other nations, they must first correct the oversights that led to their own predicament.
153 Merritts to Lippincott, personal communication, 12 April 2005. 72
Conclusions
What are the important lessons learned and concepts to take away from these intricate, layered stories?
• There is a fundamental need for checks and balances in the system. The regulating body cannot also be in charge of promotion. This creates an internal conflict of interest that may ultimately lead to failure of the organization and loss of public confidence in the industry and its statements. Even though the work is being done by the top scientists and engineers, all aspects of a large industrial project need to go through a rigorous peer- review process. Having a fresh set of minds review a project can shed new light on potential problems or find holes in the results.
• Public perception plays a significant part in governmental or industrial decisions.
It is important to have the public in on the ground floor. After the fact, it is much harder to convince people that the proper science was done and that decisions were made correctly. Worst of all, if conflict of interest arises, or communications are poorly managed, as at TMI, it may take decades or more to rebuild public trust.
• Finding the perfect geology is impossible; a combination of geologic understanding and creative engineering will create the safest solutions.
• Earthquakes pose a real danger to industrial establishments. However, the right engineering based on geological studies can greatly increase the safety of most plants.
Most importantly, understanding the earthquake hazard in each area will allow a stable power plant to be built and appropriate uncertainties to be taken into consideration. 73
• Often money and politics direct how the science is carried out. The politics need to support the scientific process. Politics must be managed as effectively as possible, so as not to encroach upon and distort the science.
• When nuclear power is the topic, the whole picture needs to be thoroughly aired through many and varied public forums. Everything from the safety of citizens, evacuation planning, economic benefits, availability of resources, waste handling and waste disposal should be discussed. Currently, as nuclear renewal comes to the fore, talks focus on the benefits and importance of nuclear power for the environment and the economy as the price of oil continues to rise and society looks for cheaper energy sources. The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle is liable to be minimized or forgotten in the enthusiasm for “green” energy and less air pollution. Waste disposal is a real problem, which does not yet have a clearly defined path to success. The United States has gotten itself into a very difficult situation with lawsuits, the need for new energy sources increasing and radioactive waste piles growing with no clear, immediate, solution in sight. Developing nuclear countries need to be conscious of the entire nuclear cycle when discussing nuclear power, lest they risk repeating the mistakes of the U.S. in its headlong development of power plants, while postponing until now appropriate consideration of safe waste disposal and reactor decommissioning.
74
Appendix: Chronology of Exploitation to Nuclear Energy and Waste Disposal
Dec. 1951- First usable energy from nuclear fission produced. 1955 - The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) asks the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to study disposal methods for radioactive wastes from nuclear weapons production in the United States. July 1955 - Arco, Idaho is first town to be powered by nuclear energy. July 1957 - First Civilian nuclear reactor 1957 - An NAS report to the AEC recommends that transuranic and high-level radioactive wastes be buried in geologic formations and that the feasibility of using salt beds or salt domes as a disposal medium be investigated: Congress passes the Price- Anderson Act. Dec 1957 – Shippingport, Pennsylvania has the first large-scale nuclear power plant. Oct 1959 - First nuclear power plant without complete government funding. 1966-1967 – A large number of commercial reactors are built, marks beginning of commercial nuclear power. Jan 1970 – National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) is signed requiring review of the environmental impact that a construction project might have. 1970 - The AEC tentatively selects a nuclear waste repository site in salt deposits near Lyons, Kansas.
Dec 1970 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is formed. 1972 - The federal government withdraws the Lyons, Kansas site from consideration for the repository because of concerns that drilling in the vicinity might have compromised the salt deposits’ geologic integrity. Oct 1974 - AEC is abolished and Energy Research and Development Administration and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are formed. 1974 - The Energy Reorganization Act specifically charges the Energy Research and Development Agency (forerunner of U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) with the responsibility to construct and operate a facility for disposal of civilian high-level nuclear waste. March 1975 – Fire at Browns Ferry, Alabama nuclear power plant. 75
Oct 1976 - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act passed to protect human health and the environment from potential hazards of waste disposal. April 1977- President Jimmy Carter, through an Executive Order, bans recycling of used nuclear fuel from commercial reactors. Oct 1977- DOE replaces the ER&DA, and consolidates Federal energy programs and activities. March 1979- Three Mile Island (TMI) suffers partial core meltdown. Minimal radioactive material is released. Oct 1980- The West Valley Demonstration Project Act of 1980 directs DOE to construct a high-level nuclear waste solidification demonstration at the West Valley Plant in New York. The only commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in the United States, the West Valley Plant recovered uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel from 1966-1972. Nearly 600,000 gallons of high-level nuclear waste is stored at the plant. Dec 1980 - The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act is passed, making states responsible for the disposal of their own low-level nuclear waste. 1981 - After extensively evaluating numerous alternatives, DOE issues a Record of Decision opting for geologic disposal of civilian high-level waste. 1982 – President Reagan issues an Executive Order rescinding the President Carter ban on reprocessing of nuclear waste.154 1982- The Shippingport nuclear power plant, built in 1957, is retired. Congress assigns the decontamination and decommissioning of this commercial reactor to DOE. This is the first complete decontamination and decommissioning of a reactor in the United States. The reactor vessel is shipped to a low-level waste disposal facility at Hanford,
Washington. The site is cleaned and released for unrestricted use in November 1989. Jan 1983- The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 is signed, authorizing the development of a high-level nuclear waste repository. 1983 - DOE selects nine sites in six states for study as potential sites for a first repository. In accordance with the NWPA, DOE identifies sites in 17 eastern states as potential locations for a second repository.
154 Presidential Actions, PBS and WGBH/Frontline [online], 1998. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/rossin1.html [accessed 25 October 2004] 76
1986 - The energy secretary nominates five of the nine sites for further consideration, and the president approves three sites (Hanford, Washington; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Yucca Mountain, Nev.) for further study. 26 April 1986- Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor meltdown and fire occur in the Soviet Union. Massive quantities of radioactive material are released over a period of many days. 1986 - The DOE indefinitely postpones the second repository siting program, violating the regional equity intent of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This followed much objection from states in the east and the northern mid-west, where potentially acceptable repository sites in granite are prohibited. Dec 1987- Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act designates Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for scientific investigation as candidate site for the nation's first geological repository for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. 1988 - DOE holds public hearings on its site characterization plan for Yucca Mountain. Nov 1989- DOE changes its focus from nuclear materials production to one of environmental cleanup, openness to public input and overall accountability by forming the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management. 1991 - Surface studies begin at the Yucca Mountain site. 1992 - The Energy Policy Act is enacted, requiring the EPA to develop site-specific public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain. Oct 1992- The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Land Withdrawal Act withdraws public lands for WIPP, a test repository for transuranic nuclear waste located in a salt deposit deep under the desert. 1993 - DOE begins grading work on first phase of the Exploratory Studies Facility at the proposed repository site. DOE also formulates a new Program Approach that sets waste acceptance to begin in 2010, relies on DOE's development and distribution of Multi- Purpose Canisters to begin interim waste storage in 1998, sets a site characterization schedule which defers some work to a repository performance confirmation period lasting up to 100 years after waste emplacement begins. 1994 - Portal entrance to the Exploratory Studies Facility is constructed and tunneling into Yucca Mountain begins. Critics charge that the portal ramps and entrance are constructed for use as a repository, not a study area. 77
1995 - Tunnel boring machine makes progress into Yucca Mountain but encounters loose ground at various points. Five miles of tunnels are planned for the study area by 1996. Bills are pending in Congress that re-prioritize the waste program to emphasize interim waste storage and transportation, with site characterization as a lower priority. NAS reports that a longer-term peak dose standard should be used for the assessment of Yucca Mountain. 1997 - The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act directs that by Sept. 30, 1998, the energy secretary must provide to the president and Congress a Yucca Mountain
Viability Assessment. 1997 - Thermal testing begins at Yucca Mountain. It is scheduled to take eight years. 1998 - The Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment is released in December with DOE declaring the site "viable" but admitting that much work still needs to be done before the site can be officially recommended in 2001. DOE issues its Viability Assessment (VA) of Yucca Mountain, drawing upon two decades of scientific research to conclude that a geologic repository capable of protecting public health and safety for thousands of years can be designed and built at Yucca Mountain. The VA also publishes DOE’s schedule for moving forward with such a repository. 1998 - The federal government defaults on its obligation to begin removing used nuclear fuel from reactor sites by Jan. 31, 1998. 1999 - NRC and EPA propose draft regulations, for public comment, for the licensing of Yucca Mountain, should it be selected. DOE issues its Draft Environmental Impact Statement of Yucca Mountain, concluding that the proposed project would have essentially no adverse impact on public health and safety. (Radiation levels for 10,000 years would be well below EPA & NRC’s proposed limits and less than 1 percent of natural background in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. 2000 - Due to concerns that the EPA's role in setting radiation standards would be too limited, President Clinton again vetoes nuclear waste legislation passed by Congress. The site characterization project continues at Yucca Mountain as DOE prepares the Final Environmental Impact Statement and nears the point where suitability must ultimately be decided. 78
2001 - DOE releases its Science and Engineering report for Yucca Mountain, providing updated scientific results, describing an enhanced design, and opening the public comment period preceding a site recommendation decision. 2001 – EPA releases its final safety standard regulation and NRC issues its final implementing regulation, which implements the EPA standard. 2001 - DOE releases its Preliminary Site Suitability Report, comparing its scientific results to site selection criteria and concluding that the proposed repository will be capable of meeting EPA's stringent Radiation Protection Standard. This report ends
DOE's 20-year, $7 billion scientific site characterization program. 2002: DOE makes its final Site Recommendation on Yucca Mountain. Should DOE recommend the site, the president would decide whether to go forward. Should the State of Nevada object to the president’s decision, Congress then must also approve the site for it to move forward. Feb. 14, 2002 - Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham recommends use of Yucca Mountain to store nuclear waste.155 Feb. 15, 2002 - President Bush approves DOE's recommendation to use Yucca to store nuclear waste.156
April 8, 2002 - Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn formally objected to the Yucca designation.157 2002 – Solidification of liquid reprocessing wastes in completed at the West Valley Plant. 2003 - DOE continues work on its license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The project, however, is over-budget and behind schedule. Nevada's lawsuits against the Yucca Mountain repository are set for oral arguments in front of the D.C. Court of Appeals in January 2004. DOE is scheduled to release a nuclear waste transportation plan sometime in the fall.
155 8 May 2002, Road to Yucca Mountain, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau [online]. Available from: http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/special_packages/yucca/3223825.htm. [accessed 17 October 2004, 27 October 2004] 156 8 May 2002, Road to Yucca Mountain, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau [online]. Available from: http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/special_packages/yucca/3223825.htm. [accessed 17 October 2004, 27 October 2004] 157 8 May 2002, Road to Yucca Mountain, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau [online]. Available from: http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/special_packages/yucca/3223825.htm. [accessed 17 October 2004, 27 October 2004] 79
2003 - DOE is scheduled to apply to NRC for a license to construct and operate a repository at Yucca Mountain. 2004 -The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. throws out the EPA's 10,000-year compliance period in the radiation standard for Yucca Mountain, but dismisses Nevada's other lawsuits. The Department of Energy selects the southern Nevada Caliente corridor to build a rail line for shipping waste to Yucca Mountain (Carlin is named the alternative). The Department of Energy still plans to submit its license application to the NRC in December, but an NRC Commissioner and other officials say 2010 opening is unlikely.158
Data Source include: 15 November 1999, Nuclear Age Timeline, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment [online]. Available from: http://web.em.doe.gov/timeline. [Accessed 17 October 2004], January 2002, Yucca Mountain Timeline, Reno Gazette-Journal [online]. Available from: http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=5740. [Accessed 17 October 2004], September 2004, Timeline: The Nuclear Waste Policy Dilemma. Yucca Mountain.org Eureka Country Nuclear Waste Page [online]. Available from: http://www.yuccamountain.org/time.htm. [Accessed 17 October 2004].
158 September 2004, Timeline: The Nuclear Waste Policy Dilemma. Yucca Mountain.org Eureka County Nuclear Waste Page [online]. Available from: http://www.yuccamountain.org/time.htm. [Accessed 17 October 2004] 80
Acknowledgements: I would like to express my most sincere thanks and appreciation to the following individuals and groups without whom this project would have been impossible:
Dr. James Strick, Faculty, Earth and Environment and Science Technology and Society Departments, Franklin and Marshall College: The biggest thanks to my most trusted and honored advisor.
Dr. Dorothy Merritts and Dr. Robert Walter, Faculty, Earth and Environment Department, Franklin and Marshall College: Mentors and advisors on this and many other projects.
Dr. Sung-ja Choi and Dr. Uechan Chwae, Korean Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resouces, South Korea: Thank you for asking me to research and write this thesis.
Earth and Environment Department, Franklin and Marshall College: Thanks for the enthusiasm, support and the institutional home for this project
Franklin and Marshall Committee on Grants: Travel Grant money and use of Marshall Scholarship for research.
Government of the Republic of Korea: Research and travel funding
I would like to thanks all the individuals who took time out of their busy schedules to allow me to interview them: Robert Budnitz, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Senior
Scientific/Technical Advisor to OCRWM, 19 October 2004.
Kevin Coppersmith, President of Coppersmith Consulting, 24 September 2004
and 8 October 2004. 81
Thomas Cotton, Vice President of JK Research Associates, 19 October 2004.
Linda J. Desell, U.S. Department of Energy, 19 October 2004.
Paul Dickman, Senior Technical Policy Advisor, U.S. Department of Energy, 19
October 2004.
David Dobson, Vice President of Integrated Science Solutions, Inc., 30 July 2004.
William Hackett, Volcanologist on Yucca Mountain Project, 23 July 2004.
Bret Leslie, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 2004 – January 2005.
Richard Rhodes, Author, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun, Nuclear
Renewal, 5 October 2004.
Jeffery R. Williams, Yucca Mountain Technical Liaison, U.S. Department of
Energy, 19 October 2004.