Introduction to Law in Literature and Philosophy Joseph P
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Jurisprudence--Philosophy Or Science Henry Rottschaefer
University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 1927 Jurisprudence--Philosophy or Science Henry Rottschaefer Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Rottschaefer, Henry, "Jurisprudence--Philosophy or Science" (1927). Minnesota Law Review. 1465. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1465 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW Journal of the State Bar Association VOLUI%1E 11 MARCH, 1927 No. 4 JURISPRUDENCE- PHILOSOPHY OR SCIENCE By HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER* T WOULD perhaps be practically impossible to secure for any definition of the term Jurisprudence any very general accep- tance. It is doubtful whether there exists even any general agree- ment as to what subjects are within its scope. The problem of whether, and in what sense, it is to be considered philosophy or science, cannot, however, be discussed without adopting at least some tentative notion of its meaning that shall serve as the basis for the discussion. This can be more effectively done by a general description of the types of problem usually dealt with in treatises and courses on Jurisprudence than by framing a logically correct definition that secured accuracy and completeness by resort to a convenient vagueness. Investigation discloses its use to denote lines of inquiry having little in common other than a professed interest in general questions and problems concerning law and justice. -
Towards a Philosophy of The
Toward a Philosophy ofthe Act MICHAEL HOLQUIST. • • • • • • • • TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT····· UNIVERSITY OF TfXAS PRfSS SLAVIC SERIES, NO. 10 MICHAEL HOLQUIST General Editor M. M. BAKHTIN TOWARDA PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT TRANSLATION AND NOTES BY VADIM LIAPUNOV EDITEDBY VADIM LIAPUNOV & MICHAEL HOLQUIST UN I V E R SIT Y 0 F T E X ASP RES S, AU S TIN ••••••••••• Cop\'right © 1993 lw the L'niversit\, of Texas Press All rights reser\'ed Printed in the United St,nes of AmeriCl Third paperback printing, 1999 Requests te)r permission to reproduce m,nerial trom this work should be sent to Permissions, Universit\' of Texas Press, Box -819, Austin, TX -8-15--819, @ The paper used in this publiCltion meets the minimum requirements of American ;-.Jeltion,,1 StaIlli.lrd te)r Inte1rl1ution Sciences-Pernunence of P,'per te)r Printed Librar\, Materi"ls, ANSI Zj9,+8- 198+, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLlCATION DATA Bakhtin, M, ,\1. (Mikh,lil 189,-19-', I K tilosotii poStlIpk.1, English I Toward a philosophl' of the ,lct / lw Bakhtin ; transLnion ,md notes b\' V,ldim Liap"n{)\' ; edited bl' \',ldim Li,lp"no\' ,1I1d Michael HolqlIisL - 1St cd, p, cm, - (L' nil'ersit\' of 'I'ex, IS Press SLn'ic series; no, 10) Incilides bibliogr,lphical reterences ,1I1d index, ISBN 0-292--653+--, - ISBN 0-292--0805-X (pbk,) L Act (Philosophl') 2, Ethics, " Commlinication-l\\oral ,1I1d ethic,ll aspects, +, Literelture-Philosophl', I. Li,lpUn()\', V,ldim, 193,'- II. Holquist, Michael, 193'- Ill. Title. 1\', Series, BI05,A35 B3+13 1993 128' ,4-dc20 93--'5- • • • • • • • • CONTENTS FOREWORD (fll MICHAEL HOLQUIST TRANSLATORJS PREFACE VADIM LIAPUNOV INTRODUCTION TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION ,x;xi s. -
Interpretive Overlap in Law and Literature
ARTICLES CONTRACT AS TEXT: INTERPRETIVE OVERLAP IN LAW AND LITERATURE MICHAEL L. BOYER* [L]egal practice is an exercise in interpretation. [W]e can improve our understanding of law by comparing legal interpretation with interpretation in other fields of knowledge, particularly literature.† Law is inextricably bound to language. Contracts and statutes are recorded in written form in order to capture the intent of the parties or legislative body in a concrete medium—words. The path that intentions travel on from the human mind to the written word is dark and winding. The final document sometimes fails to contain all the terms the parties intended. Some intentions are lost in the subtlety of language itself, others are misdirected by poor drafting, and many are either overlooked by the reader or not fully contemplated by the writer. Often words, or “signifiers,” carry with them excess baggage, i.e., more than is necessary for the sole communicative purpose for which parties employ them.1 Even seemingly self-explanatory terms, such as “Grade A Chicken,” can carry this excess baggage.2 Whether we ask what the terms in a contract or statute mean, what the intentions of the author were at the time, or whether extrinsic evidence may supplement the document, the answer inevitably includes interpretation. Interpretive acts have always been present in legal discourse, and various authorities have subjected legal interpretation to different * B.L.A., University of Alaska, Southeast; J.D., University of Oregon; Assistant Professor of Law Sciences, University of Alaska, Southeast. † Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. -
Handbook for One-Act Play
Notice of Non-Discrimination “In a well-planned One-Act Play Contest, there are no losers.” The University Interscholastic League (UIL) does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or age in its programs. See Section 360, Non-Discrimination Policy, UIL Constitution and Contest Rules. https://www.uiltexas.org/policy/constitution/general/nondiscrimination Handbook The following person has been designated to handle inquiries regarding the non-dis- crimination policies: Dr. Mark Cousins for University Interscholastic League Director of Compliance and Education 1701 Manor Road, Austin, TX 78722 Telephone: (512) 471-5883 Email: [email protected] One-Act Play For further information on notice of non-discrimination, visit http://wdcrobcolp01. ed.gov/CFAPPS/OCR/contactus.cfm or call 1-800-421-3481 or contact OCR in Dallas, Texas: AMENDED Office for Civil Rights U.S. Department of Education 1999 Bryan Street, Dallas, TX 75201-6810 Telephone: 214-661-9600, Fax: 214-661-9587, TDD: 800-877-8339 25th Edition Email: [email protected] For further information write: State Theatre Director University Interscholastic League 1701 Manor Road Austin, Texas 78722 512/471-9996 or 471-4517 (Office), 512/471-7388 (Fax) 512/471-5883 (MAIN UIL SWITCHBOARD) E-MAIL: [email protected] UIL WEB: www.uiltexas.org ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A very sincere thanks to Connie McMillan and to Elisabeth Sikes for their contributions. I also wish to thank the Texas Theatre Adjudicators and Officials (TTAO) and the UIL Theatre Advisory Committee for their work on this edition. The League also wishes to thank the Texas Educational Theatre Associa- tion, Inc. -
On Literature As Legal Authority
ON LITERATURE AS LEGAL AUTHORITY John M. DeStefano III* “This may prove a worse job than the windmills.” —Sancho Panza1 INTRODUCTION More than a half-century ago, the Kansas Supreme Court declared its independence from literature: “Fortunately,” Justice Burch wrote, “we are not required to base our opinion upon philology or the philosophy of the bards.”2 Unfortunately for Justice Burch, the bards still haunt many a judicial opinion. Literature is not unique in that respect; many forces extrinsic to law dictate the law’s development. Unprecedented events, scientific and historical discoveries,3 and changing cultural attitudes constantly test the limits of judicial ingenuity. The Supreme Court has made noteworthy nods to foreign law.4 The Seventh Circuit looks to economics for inspiration.5 It comes as no surprise, then, that American * J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, 2007. I am deeply grateful for time spent by others reading my drafts and making suggestions. Professor Kenney Hegland lent generous and crucial insights early on. Ginette Chapman, Jessica Tom, and Michael Catlett supervised and encouraged the initial draft. Matthew Clark, Josh Wood, Katherine DeStefano, and Naomi Jorgensen provided detailed work as the piece went to press. Dr. Andres Reyes provided valuable last-minute Latin consultation. As for the selfless toilers who checked all the citations in service of a more perfect law review, remember VIRGIL, AENEID I.203: Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit. All errors remain the fault of the Author (and the reader’s point of view). 1. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA 74 (Charles Jarvis trans., Oxford Univ. -
Efficacy and Meaning in Ancient and Modern Political Satire: Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, and Jon Stewart." Social Research 79.1 (Spring 2012): 1-32
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Departmental Papers (Classical Studies) Classical Studies at Penn 2012 Efficacy and Meaning in Ancient and Modernolitical P Satire: Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, and Jon Stewart Ralph M. Rosen University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/classics_papers Part of the Classics Commons Recommended Citation Rosen, R. M. (2012). Efficacy and Meaning in Ancient and Modernolitical P Satire: Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, and Jon Stewart. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/classics_papers/33 Rosen, Ralph M. "Efficacy and Meaning in Ancient and Modern Political Satire: Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, and Jon Stewart." Social Research 79.1 (Spring 2012): 1-32. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/social_research/summary/v079/ 79.1.rosen.html Copyright © 2012 The Johns Hopkins University Press. This article first appeared in Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 1, Spring, 2012, pages 1-32. Reprinted with permission by The Johns Hopkins University Press. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/classics_papers/33 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Efficacy and Meaning in Ancient and Modernolitical P Satire: Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, and Jon Stewart Keywords Satire, Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, Jon Stewart Disciplines Arts and Humanities | Classics Comments Rosen, Ralph M. "Efficacy and Meaning in Ancient and Modern Political Satire: Aristophanes, Lenny Bruce, and Jon Stewart." Social Research 79.1 (Spring 2012): 1-32. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ social_research/summary/v079/79.1.rosen.html Copyright © 2012 The Johns Hopkins University Press. This article first appeared in Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 1, Spring, 2012, pages 1-32. -
The Structure of Plays
n the previous chapters, you explored activities preparing you to inter- I pret and develop a role from a playwright’s script. You used imagina- tion, concentration, observation, sensory recall, and movement to become aware of your personal resources. You used vocal exercises to prepare your voice for creative vocal expression. Improvisation and characterization activities provided opportunities for you to explore simple character portrayal and plot development. All of these activities were preparatory techniques for acting. Now you are ready to bring a character from the written page to the stage. The Structure of Plays LESSON OBJECTIVES ◆ Understand the dramatic structure of a play. 1 ◆ Recognize several types of plays. ◆ Understand how a play is organized. Much of an actor’s time is spent working from materials written by playwrights. You have probably read plays in your language arts classes. Thus, you probably already know that a play is a story written in dia- s a class, play a short logue form to be acted out by actors before a live audience as if it were A game of charades. Use the titles of plays and musicals or real life. the names of famous actors. Other forms of literature, such as short stories and novels, are writ- ten in prose form and are not intended to be acted out. Poetry also dif- fers from plays in that poetry is arranged in lines and verses and is not written to be performed. ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ These students are bringing literature to life in much the same way that Aristotle first described drama over 2,000 years ago. -
Law and Ideology: Critical Explorations
LAW AND IDEOLOGY: CRITICAL EXPLORATIONS Rafał Mańko* Michał Stambulski** According to Polish legal theorist Marek Zirk-Sadowski, the philosophy of law as a discipline can be approached from two distinct directions: either from the direction moving ‘from law to philosophy’, whereby lawyers try to answer the fundamental questions of jurisprudence by theorising on the basis of legal experience, or, in the opposite direction, that is ‘from philosophy to law’, whereby a certain philosopher or philosophical school is ‘applied’ to the legal field.1 Within the second paradigm of legal philosophy, in recent years there has been a growing tendency to analyse the implications of postmodernism, posthumanism2, or postructuralism upon the legal domain. Specialised volumes analysing the potential inspiration that can be drawn by critical lawyers from the works of such philosophers as Althusser, Deleuze and Gattari, Lefebvre, Agamben have been recently published.3 Most recently, even a volume on Žižek and Law came out.4 This special edition of the Wrocław Review of Law, Administration and Economics brings together a number of papers in which Polish and foreign scholars, both emergent and established, approach the topic of the DOI: 10.1515/wrlae-2015-0019 * Ph.D. in law (University of Amsterdam); external fellow at the Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL), University of Amsterdam. The views expressed in this paper do not represent the position of any institution. ** Centre for Legal Education and Social Theory, Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics, University of Wrocław. 1 Marek Zirk-Sadowski, Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa [An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law] (Warszawa, Wolters Kluwer 2011). -
Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\83-4\NYU403.txt unknown Seq: 1 25-SEP-08 12:20 POSITIVISM AND THE INSEPARABILITY OF LAW AND MORALS LESLIE GREEN* H.L.A. Hart made a famous claim that legal positivism somehow involves a “sepa- ration of law and morals.” This Article seeks to clarify and assess this claim, con- tending that Hart’s separability thesis should not be confused with the social thesis, the sources thesis, or a methodological thesis about jurisprudence. In contrast, Hart’s separability thesis denies the existence of any necessary conceptual connec- tions between law and morality. That thesis, however, is false: There are many necessary connections between law and morality, some of them conceptually signif- icant. Among them is an important negative connection: Law is, of its nature, morally fallible and morally risky. Lon Fuller emphasized what he called the “internal morality of law,” the “morality that makes law possible.” This Article argues that Hart’s most important message is that there is also an immorality that law makes possible. Law’s nature is seen not only in its internal virtues, in legality, but also in its internal vices, in legalism. INTRODUCTION H.L.A. Hart’s Holmes Lecture gave new expression to the old idea that legal systems comprise positive law only, a thesis usually labeled “legal positivism.” Hart did this in two ways. First, he disen- tangled the idea from the independent and distracting projects of the imperative theory of law, the analytic study of legal language, and non-cognitivist moral philosophies. Hart’s second move was to offer a fresh characterization of the thesis. -
Scriptwriting Theories & Practice
Storyboarding and Scriptwriting • AD210 • Spring 2011 • Gregory V. Eckler Storyboarding and Scriptwriting Scriptwriting Theories & Practice Theories on Scriptwriting Fundamentally, the screenplay is a unique literary form. It is like a musical score, in that it is intended to be interpreted on the basis of other artists’ performance, rather than serving as a “finished product” for the enjoyment of its audience. For this reason, a screenplay is written using technical jargon and tight, spare prose when describing stage directions. Unlike a novel or short story, a screenplay focuses on describing the literal, visual aspects of the story, rather than on the internal thoughts of its characters. In screenwriting, the aim is to evoke those thoughts and emotions through subtext, action, and symbolism. There are several main screenwriting theories which help writers approach the screenplay by systematizing the structure, goals and techniques of writing a script. The most common kinds of theories are structural. Screenwriter William Goldman is widely quoted as saying “Screenplays are structure”. Three act structure Most screenplays have a three act structure, following an organization that dates back to Aristotle’s Poetics. The three acts are setup (of the location and characters), confrontation (with an obstacle), and resolution (culminating in a climax and a dénouement). In a two-hour film, the first and third acts both typically last around 30 minutes, with the middle act lasting roughly an hour. In Writing Drama, French writer and director Yves Lavandier shows a slightly different approach. As most theorists, he maintains that every human action, whether fictitious or real, contains three logical parts: before the action, during the action, and after the action. -
Pragmatism, Holism, and the Concept of Law
Pragmatism, Holism, and the Concept of Law Adam Michał Dyrda* equally, most commonplace) accusations against a cer- Abstract tain legal theory is the ‘methodological objection’ (MO). In its general form, it is as follows: When discussing O. W. Holmes’s answer to the question What constitutes the law? Morton White underlines the (MO) The discussed theory fails because it uses the fact that Holmes’s inquiry didn’t focus on developing the wrong methodology and asks the wrong questions, concept of law. White states: ‘…Holmes said little in The which precludes the theory from reaching the right Path of the Law about the notion of legal authority, perhaps (adequate) conclusions. Without putting our ques- because he was interested not in what he called a “useless tions in the right way, we cannot grasp any substan- quintessence of all legal systems” but in “an accurate anat- tial answers, i.e. such answers that (at least) could omy of one”’. Such ambition (or lack of ambition) is charac- have a claim to adequacy.1 teristic of many pragmatic enterprises in the field of jurispru- dence. However, sometimes the opposition between legal It seems, then, that for researchers who use this argu- pragmatism and other legal theories is built upon a refer- ment against a particular theory T, the theory T fails on ence to the notion of the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of law. Many its own grounds because it asks the wrong questions legal philosophers who aim to reveal the very ‘nature of and, thus, receives inadequate answers. However, it is law’ (or ‘the concept of law’ as H. -
Willing Suspension of Disbelief? a Study of the Role of Volition in the Experience of Delving Into a Story
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298068504 Willing Suspension of Disbelief? A study of the role of volition in the experience of delving into a story Research · March 2016 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1046.1843 CITATIONS READS 0 4,182 1 author: Itai Leigh Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1 PUBLICATION 0 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Itai Leigh on 13 March 2016. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. 30/09/2015 Contextualizing Paper for MA Practical Project module MA Acting (International) (EA606-G-SU) East15 Acting School Itai Leigh (PG 145747) Monologue Tutor: Zois Pigadas University of Essex Head of Course: Robin Sneller Willing Suspension of Disbelief? A study of the role of volition in the experience of delving into a story “The magician takes the ordinary something and makes it do something extraordinary. Now you're looking for the secret... but you won't find it, because of course you're not really looking. You don't really want to know. You want to be fooled.” — The Prestige, Director Christopher Nolan, 2006 In this paper I present several angles, trying to understand the degree and the nature of will that takes place in the suspension of disbelief, or in immersion into a narrative we receive. I believe an understanding of the nature of the phenomenon can be, apart from intellectually interesting, doubly beneficial for actors. On one hand it is clearly desirable to have the power to modify the extent to which an audience would tend to get rapt or lost in a project we are creating (whether to elevate it for a more emotional reaction, or reduce it to allow more intellectual deliberation about its themes).