Submission to the Commonwealth Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2019 Federal Election

By Antony Green Election Analyst

Contents Introduction ...... 2 How to Assess the Impact of the Electoral Changes ...... 2 Comparing Results in 2013 and 2019 ...... 4 Changes to Party Nominations under the Senate's New Electoral System ...... 6 How Voters Reacted to the New Senate System in 2016 ...... 7 The Impact of the New Senate Voting System on House Informal Voting ...... 8 Recommendations on the Senate's New Electoral System ...... 9 Recommendation on the Registration of Political Parties ...... 10

Introduction

The 2019 Senate election was the second conducted under the reformed electoral system introduced in 2016. The system's first use was at the 2016 election using the lower 7.7% state quota to elect state senators. As the first double dissolution election since 1987, it was difficult to assess the impact of the new system compared to past half-Senate results.

The 2019 election was the first to be held under the new system with the higher 14.3% state quota at a half-Senate election. It is possible to compare the 2019 results with the result of the last half-senate election under group voting tickets in 2013. As the 2013 election was the high point (or maybe low point) for the manipulation of results by preference deals, the comparison of results is illuminating.

In this submission I look at several features of the 2019 results in comparison to the 2013 results, point out how the changes met their intended objective of minimising the impact of preference deals and maximising reward for parties that campaigned and attracted first preference votes.

For simplicity I will refer to the Senate system in place from 1984 to 2013 as the old Senate system, and the system used for the 2016 and 2019 elections as the new Senate system.

How to Assess the Impact of the Electoral Changes

The abolition of group voting tickets has radically altered the flow of between-party preferences at Senate elections. Under the old Senate system, more than 90% of voters voted above the line with a single preference for a party ticket. This meant that more than 90% of between-party preferences were directly under party control.

With the abolition of group voting tickets, party control over preferences was abolished. Parties could still influence the flow of preferences by distributing how-to-vote recommendations to voters, but the choice on preferences was now entirely for the voter.

To assess the impact of between-party preferences, it is best to compare Senate results with likely outcomes under a non-preferential form of proportional representation where final vacancies are filled based on party first preference vote share.

Table 1 on the next page compares outcome of Senate elections since 1977 with outcomes had the same vote shares been used to allocate seats to parties using a List Proportional Representation system (List-PR). The analysis uses the same Droop quota used for the Senate, but instead of using preferences to allocate the final seats in each contest, it allocates final seats non-preferentially using a highest remainder method.

The difference between Senate results and a List-PR result can be measured by the number of parties that fill seats from trailing positions. A second measure is the number of parties with higher quotas that are passed during the count by trailing parties elected on preferences.

As an observation, the stronger the flow of between-party preferences, the more a Senate result will diverge from a List-PR for an election with the same party vote shares. The weaker the flows, the more PR-STV outcomes will match List-PR outcomes.

2 Antony Green – JSCEM Submission The columns in Table 1 on the next page are explained as follows.

• Filled quotas – the number of Senators elected through complete quotas filled on the total of first preference votes by party;

• Highest remainder – the number of Senators elected from the highest remainder or leading partial quota on first preference votes;

• Trailing wins – the number of Senators elected after having trailed the party with the highest remainder on the initial counts; and

• Parties passed – the number of higher polling parties passed by trailing winners.

Table 1 - Senate Results Compared to List-PR with Highest Remainder Allocation

Highest Election (Seats) Filled Quotas Remainder Trailing Wins Parties Passed 1977 (30) 24 5 1 1 1980 (30) 25 4 1 1 1983 (60) 54 3 3 2 1984 (42) 33 7 2 2 1987 (72) 62 6 4 6 1990 (36) 28 6 2 2 1993 (36) 30 4 2 3 1996 (36) 28 7 1 1 1998 (36) 24 7 5 5 2001 (36) 25 6 5 6 2004 (36) 29 6 1 3 2007 (36) 27 8 1 2 2010 (36) 27 7 2 4 2013 (36) 21 6 9 33 2016 (72) 52 18 2 7 2019 (26) 22 14 .. .. Source: Calculations by author. Excludes Territory Senate races. 2013 calculations based on original 2013 WA Senate result, not the 2014 Senate re-election.

Under group voting tickets at the 2013 election, a quarter of the Senators elected were from trailing positions, and the ratio of parties passed to trailing wins was much higher than at any previous election. In Western , Wayne Dropulich of the Australian Sports Party was elected despite the party polling just 0.23 percent or 0.016 quotas. The Sports Party finished 21st of 27 parties on first preferences, but received ticket preferences from 20 different parties to achieve a quota, 15 of those parties having polled a higher first preference vote. Preferences allowed Dropulich to leap frog parties and defeat a Labor candidate who began the count with a remainder of 0.86 quotas. In , and the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party began the count with 0.51 percent or 0.035 quotas, receiving preferences from 22 other parties including nine with more votes, and passed a Liberal candidate who began the count with 0.81 quotas.

Antony Green – JSCEM Submission 3 Comparing Results in 2013 and 2019

The hypothesis that the Senate's new electoral system weights the allocation of final seats in favour of highest remainders can be tested using the results of the 2013 and 2019 half-Senate elections. Table 1 looked at results since 1977. The tables below concentrate on how the new Senate system worked in 2019 compared to the old system in 2013.

A summary of this comparisons is provided in Table 2. It shows that nine Senators were elected from trailing partial quotas in 2013, but no trailing parties were elected under the new system in 2019. With the new electoral system responsible for weaker party control over preferences and a greater number of exhausted preferences, the new Senate system behaved more like List-PR than the old Senate system using group voting tickets.

Table 2 - Comparing the 2013 and 2019 Results with simulated List-PR results

2013 Senators Elected 2019 Senators Elected Filled Quotas 21 22 Highest Remainder 6 14 Trailing Wins 9 .. Source: Calculations by author. Excludes the four Territory Senators. 2013 calculations based on original 2013 WA Senate result, not the 2014 Senate re-election.

More detail on the 14 Senators elected from leading partial quotas in 2019 is shown in Table 3. On the left are the initial partial quotas and parties for successful Senators, while on the right are the highest polling unsuccessful candidates and parties.

Table 3 - 2019 election – success from partial quotas State Successful Party and Partial Quota Unsuccessful Party and Partial Quota NSW 0.70 LIB 0.61 GRN 0.35 ONP VIC 0.74 GRN 0.51 LIB 0.20 ONP 0.20 DHJP QLD 0.72 LNP 0.72 ONP 0.70 GRN 0.58 ALP WA 0.93 ALP 0.86 LIB 0.83 GRN 0.41 ONP SA 0.76 GRN 0.65 LIB 0.34 ONP TAS 0.88 GRN 0.62 JLN 0.24 ONP Source: AEC election results, calculations by author. Minor party codes are DHJP – Derryn Hinch Justice Party, JLN – Network, ONP – 's One Nation.

Of the 15 parties with a partial quota above 0.5 at the start of the count, only Labor in Queensland failed to win a seat. That was a contest where four parties started with more than 0.5 partial quotas in a race for three seats. In the other five States, the partial quota for the next party in order, in each case One Nation, ranged from 0.20 quotas to 0.41 quotas, all well short of the partial quota of the successful sixth party.

It was a very different pattern in 2013 where every State except Queensland saw candidates elected from trailing partial quotas, shown in Table 4 by underlined text. In Victoria the ratio of the lowest elected party to the highest defeated candidate was 0.04 quotas to 0.81, and in 0.02 quotas to 0.86.

4 Antony Green – JSCEM Submission Table 4 - 2013 election – success from partial quotas State Successful Party and Partial Quota Highest Unsuccessful Parties and Quotas NSW 0.67 LDP 0.39 L/NP 0.55 GRN VIC 0.76 GRN 0.04 AMEP 0.81 LIB QLD 0.90 LNP 0.69 PUP 0.42 GRN WA 0.74 LIB 0.66 GRN 0.02 SPRT 0.86 ALP 0.35 PUP 0.35 NAT SA 0.92 LIB 0.50 GRN 0.26 FFP 0.74 XEN 0.59 ALP TAS 0.82 GRN 0.46 PUP 0.63 LIB Source: AEC election results, calculations by author. Underlined text indicates parties successful from trailing partial quotas. WA result based on the original 2013 Senate result, not on the 2014 re-election. Minor party codes are, LDP – Liberal Democrats, AMEP – Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party, PUP – Palmer United Party, FFP – Family First, XEN – team, SPRT – Australian Sports Party.

Table 5 below categorises all successful and unsuccessful groups contesting the 2013 election under group voting tickets against the new system at the 2019 election, categorising all parties based on their initial partial quota.

Table 5 - Successful and Unsuccessful Groups based on Initial Partial quotas – 2013 and 2019 Senate elections Number of Successful and Unsuccessful Groups 2013 Election (Old Senate) 2019 Election (New Senate) Initial Partial Quota Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful 0.9 to < 1.0 (14.3%) 2 .. 1 .. 0.8 to < 0.9 (12.9%) 2 2 3 .. 0.7 to < 0.8 (11.4%) 2 1 4 .. 0.6 to < 0.7 (10.0%) 3 1 5 .. 0.5 to < 0.6 (8.6%) .. 2 1 1 0.4 to < 0.5 (7.1%) 2 1 .. 1 0.3 to < 0.4 (5.7%) 1 2 .. 2 0.2 to < 0.3 (4.3%) 1 8 .. 4 0.1 to < 0.2 (2.9%) .. 9 .. 27 < 0.1 (1.5%) 2 159 .. 100 Source: AEC results, calculations by author. Based on the original 2013 senate election in WA, not the 2014 re- election.

As noted earlier, 14 of the 15 parties that began the 2019 count with a partial quota above 0.50 were elected. This contrasts starkly with the 2013 result under group voting tickets. In 2013 there were six parties that were unsuccessful having started the count with more than 0.50 partial quotas. There were six parties successful after starting with a partial quota under 0.50 quotas.

None of this analysis means that a party can't win from a trailing position. At the 2016 Senate election, two parties were successful from trailing positions, Family First in and a second One Nation candidate in Queensland. The last three NSW Legislative Council elections have seen trailing parties win the final seat despite high rates of preference exhaustion.

Antony Green – JSCEM Submission 5 However, the weaker flow of between-party preferences under the new Senate system means that the gap between leading and trailing parties must be narrower for a trailing party to win. From the data in Table 5, the third Liberal candidate in Victoria at the 2013 Senate election started the count with 20 times the vote of the Motoring Enthusiasts Party, and in WA, the second Labor candidate had 40 times the vote of the Sports Party. A comparable result in a lower house single member seat would be a candidate on 43% being passed on preferences by a candidate that began the count on 2%.

This analysis confirms that the new Senate system weights the allocation of final seats in favour of parties with the highest remainders on first preferences. This is not the same as advantaging parties with the highest first preference vote. After the allocation of seats to filled quotas, the remaining partial quotas of parties polling above a quota must compete with the initial partial quotas of parties that polled less than a quota on first preferences. Who wins the final seats is then a battle of preferences.

Group voting tickets permitted parties to trade preferences in the race to fill final seats. The new Senate system hands the power over between-party preferences back to voters. At the first two elections under the new Senate system, voters made very different decisions on preferences compared to the complex group voting tickets previously lodged by parties.

The clearest between-party trend in preferences in the new system is that voters are more likely to direct preferences to parties they know over parties they don't know. A party that polls poorly on first preferences tends to attract fewer preferences, while parties with a profile high enough to attract a significant first preference vote, also tend to attract more preferences from excluded parties.

Changes to Party Nominations under the Senate's New Electoral System

Between 1984 and 2013, parties learnt how to use the group voting ticket system to their advantage. Over time more and more minor parties nominated for election, secure in their ability to exchange preferences and aggregate their votes together via group voting tickets. At the first Senate election to use group voting tickets in 1984, there were an average of 7.7 groups per state. At the last election under the old system in 2013, the number had risen to an average of 34.7 groups per state.

As shown below in Table 6, there was a rapid increase in groups contesting election after 2007 as minor parties learnt to use the group voting ticket system. The new Senate system ended guaranteed preference flows and added a disincentive for like-minded parties to compete against each other. The average number of groups per state declined from 33.7 in 2013 to 24.5 in 2019.

Table 6 - Groups contesting Senate election, by State

YEAR NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT TOTAL 2007 25 23 24 21 19 11 8 5 136 2010 32 21 23 22 18 10 4 6 136 2013 44 39 36 27 33 23 13 12 227 2016 41 38 38 28 23 21 10 7 206 2019 35 31 26 23 16 16 7 9 163 Source: AEC nominations.

6 Antony Green – JSCEM Submission Some of the decline in groups nominating was caused by the decline in the number of parties contesting every State. Previously, minor parties might have concentrated on one State, but nominated candidates in other States to increase the pool of minor party votes. With the end of group voting tickets, the significant decline in groups at the 2019 election is in large part due to fewer parties contesting every state. Table 7 tallies how many States parties contested.

Table 7 - Number of smaller parties contesting one or more States, 2013 and 2019

Number of Smaller Parties contesting States Contested 2013 2019 One State 9 15 Two States 5 6 Three States 4 9 Four States 6 1 Five States 7 1 Six States 14 10 Source: AEC nominations, calculations by author. Totals do not include Labor, the or Greens.

Where in 2013 there were 27 minor parties that contested four or more States, in 2016 there were only 12. This withdrawal partly explains the decline in groups contesting. Where previously small parties were encouraged to contest every State to build the pool of minor party vote for preference harvesting, the tactic was self-defeating with the abolition of group voting tickets.

How Voters Reacted to the New Senate System in 2016

Following the 2016 election, the AEC released an electronic dataset of all formal ballot papers. Table 8 categorises this data based on whether ballot papers were completed above or below the line and based on how many valid above the line preferences were completed.

The ballot paper instructions were that a voter should complete at least six preferences if voting above the line, and at least 12 if voting for candidates below the line.

(Similar data for the 2019 election is not yet available.)

Antony Green – JSCEM Submission 7 Table 8 - 2016 Senate election - Formal Ballot Papers Categorised by Method of Completion and Number of Preferences

Percentage of all Ballot Papers Marked as Above the Line by Number of Preferences Below State 1 2-5 6 7-12 >12 the Line NSW 4.7 4.1 80.9 4.3 0.6 5.4 VIC 2.4 3.6 83.5 4.5 0.8 5.3 QLD 2.0 3.3 83.2 4.5 0.8 6.1 WA 2.2 3.4 83.5 4.2 1.2 5.5 SA 2.3 3.0 79.2 5.2 1.7 8.5 TAS 1.1 2.2 61.1 5.0 2.5 28.1 ACT 1.3 1.8 70.6 11.1 .. 15.2 NT 2.3 2.8 50.8 35.5 .. 8.6 National 3.0 3.6 81.2 4.8 0.8 6.5 Note: Calculated by author from ballot paper data released by AEC. The number of groups was substantially smaller in the two Territories, 10 groups on the ACT ballot paper and seven in the .

The new Senate system included two generous savings provisions. The first was that any ballot paper with a valid first preference vote above the line would remain formal. This ensured that any above the line vote cast under the old Senate system would not be declared informal under the new system

The second saving provision for below-the line votes required that only only six preferences were required for a valid vote. The new system ended the requirement for voters to fill in all preferences below the line, and this greatly increased the number of voters who chose to make their own candidate choices.

The rate of informal voting rose from 3.1 percent to 3.9 percent in 2016 before declining slightly to 3.8% in 2019. Informal vote research for 2019 is not yet available. In 2016, of the informal votes, 64.1 per cent were blank ballots, 17.4 percent were informal for having multiple first preferences above the line, and another 13.5 percent informal for not having at least six preferences below the line. A total of 908,305 ballot papers were marked above the line with fewer than six preferences. Were it not for the generous savings provisions, the rate of informal voting would have reached levels not seen since before the 1984 ballot paper reforms.

The Impact of the New Senate Voting System on House Informal Voting

Since its first introduction in 1984, the divided Senate ballot paper has been associated with a higher rate of informal voting at House elections. (See chart next page.) In a reverse of the situation prior to 1984, informal voting in the House has been higher than informal voting in the Senate at every election since 1984. As numerous AEC Informal Voting Research Reports have shown, the higher House informal voting is related to high rates of voters using the Senate's 1-only voting method on their House ballot paper. Past research has shown that 1-only voting is drastically reduced at by-elections when voters are not given a Senate ballot paper.

The same pattern of informal voting being higher in lower houses elections has been repeated in each state following the introduction of a divided upper house ballot paper. It has happened at every Western Australian election since the introduction of the divided ballot paper in 1989, and every Victorian election since the divided ballot paper was introduced in 2006.

8 Antony Green – JSCEM Submission

The only state where this increase has not occurred is South Australia, where there is a specific savings provision to deal with lower house ballot papers with insufficient preferences.

The rate of House informal voting fell from 5.9% in 2013 to 5.1% in 2016 before rising to 5.5% in 2019.

Based on the 2016 House informal vote research, the new senate ballot paper instructions had an impact on House informal voting, with the rate of 1-only below the line voting falling from 29.5% in 2013 to 14.6% in 2016, the lowest rate of 1-only voting since the divided Senate ballot paper was introduced in 1984.

Recommendations on the Senate's New Electoral System

Based on the above discussion, I make the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1

The existing savings provision allowing a 1-only above the line ballot paper to be counted as formal should be retained. Only a small proportion of ballot papers failed to complete six above the line preferences. These votes seem to have relatively little impact on the Senate result and there seems no reason to declare these ballot papers informal.

Antony Green – JSCEM Submission 9 Recommendation 2

The existing savings provision for below the line votes should be modified to allow more votes to count. As it stands, a below the line vote with 3, 4 or 5 preferences can be informal, while an above the line vote with an implied 2 preferences can be formal.

Recommendation 3

The transfer value formulas for distributing surplus to quota preferences should be adjusted so that ballot papers that exhaust with their next preference are not included in the ballot papers to be distributed. Ballot papers that exhaust should remain with the candidate the ballot paper helped elect, allowing other ballot papers with further preferences to play a greater role in the surplus distribution.

Recommendation on the Registration of Political Parties

Commonwealth Electoral law continues to allow the registration of political parties with a low number of members compared to that required under state law. The Commonwealth also allows parties to be registered solely under the signature of a sitting member of parliament. South Australia is the only state that retains such a provision.

A party can be registered with 500 members under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. By comparison, a party needs 750 members in NSW, 500 in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, 350 in South Australia, and 100 in . Most states also require stronger proof of membership than the Commonwealth.

I make the following recommendations in relation to party registration.

Recommendation 4

JSCEM should repeat the recommendation it made concerning the 2016 election that the registration of political parties should be based entirely on having a minimum number of members. The right of MPs and Senators to register a party should be removed.

Recommendation 5

The number of members required to register a political party should be increased to 1,000.

10 Antony Green – JSCEM Submission