[NAME] [FIRM] [ADDRESS] [PHONE NUMBER] [FAX NUMBER]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW IMMIGRATION COURT [CITY, STATE]

______) In the Matter of: ) ) File No.: A ______) ) In removal proceedings ) ______)

INDEX TO DOCUMENTATION OF COUNTRY CONDITIONS REGARDING PERSECUTION OF HIV-POSITIVE INDIVIDUALS IN

TAB SUMMARY GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES 1. Government of Zimbabwe, Sexual Offences Act 2001 (Aug. 2001), available at: https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/- /media/files/un%20women/vaw/full%20text/africa/zimbabwe%20- %20sexual%20offences%20act%202001.pdf?vs=1843

“16 Sentence for certain offences where offender is infected with HIV Where a person is convicted of— (a) …sodomy… and it is proved that, at the time of the offence, the convicted person was infected with HIV, whether or not he was aware of his infection, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years.” (p. 8) 2. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), DFAT Country Information Report Zimbabwe (Dec. 2019), available at: https://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/country-information-report-zimbabwe.pdf.

“. . . societal discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS remains a problem, particularly in relation to health services, education, and employment. In the 2015 TAB SUMMARY Demographic Health Survey, 22 per cent of women and 20 per cent of men reported holding discriminatory attitudes towards those living with HIV/AIDS.” (p. 14)

3. The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI), UK Government, Country Policy and Information Note – Zimbabwe: Sexual orientation and gender identity (Jan. 2019), available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data /file/775001/CPIN-_ZIM_-_SOGIE._V4.0e__Jan_2019_.pdf.

• “Personal circumstances which may place some persons at risk include, but are not limited to, LGBTI rights activists and other persons who openly campaign for LGBTI rights in Zimbabwe as well as a positive HIV/AIDS diagnosis.” (p. 8) • “A positive HIV/AIDS diagnosis may also increase the likelihood of a person facing difficulties such as discrimination, harassment and intimidation (para 116).” (p. 9) • “The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted in its report dated 7 March 2016 that ‘. . . [i]t reiterates its concern about high levels of discrimination against […] lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex children and children affected or infected by HIV/AIDS.’” (p. 11) • “The disproportionate burden of HIV faced by MSM suggests that existing methods of HIV prevention are not sufficient and additional prevention modalities would be helpful.” (p. 29)

4. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe, available at: https://www.state.gov/wp- content/uploads/2019/03/Zimbabwe-2018.pdf or https://www.state.gov/reports/2018- country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/zimbabwe/.

“…societal discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS remained a problem. Local NGOs reported persons affected by HIV/AIDS faced discrimination in health services, education, and employment.” (p. 40)

5. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Zimbabwe 2016 Human Rights Report, available at: https://www.state.gov/wp- content/uploads/2019/01/Zimbabwe-1.pdf.

“… societal discrimination against persons affected by HIV/AIDS remained a problem. Local NGOs reported persons affected by HIV/AIDS faced discrimination in health services, education, and employment…In the 2015 DHS, 22 percent of women and 20 percent of men reported they held discriminatory attitudes towards those living with HIV/AIDS.” (p. 45)

6. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2015, available at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/04/22/dos- hrr_2015_zimbabwe.pdf.

TAB SUMMARY “…discrimination against persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons, and persons with HIV/AIDS were problems.” (p. 2)

NON-GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES 7. Avert, “HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe” (Oct. 3, 2019), available at: https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe.

“Stigma and discrimination towards people living with HIV in Zimbabwe remains rife – with one study finding that 65% of people living with HIV had experienced them.

Survey data from 2015 found 22% of women and 20% of men who were aware of HIV had discriminatory attitudes towards people living with HIV. Around 6% of women and 9% of men did not think children living with HIV should be allowed to attend school with children who are HIV negative. Additionally, 19% of women and 16% of men would not buy fresh vegetables from a shopkeeper with HIV.” (p. 10)

8. Nyika, H., Mugurungi, O., Shambira, G. et al., BMC Public Health, Factors associated with late presentation for HIV/AIDS care in City, Zimbabwe, 2015 (May 3, 2016), available at: https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12889-016- 3044-7.

“Experiencing stigma as a result of being HIV positive was independently associated with presenting late to HIV/AIDS care (OR = 2.99, 95 % CI = 1.54, 5.79). This may be due to the fact there might be loss of material and/or emotional benefits if one’s status is known in the community, particularly in Harare City, where some occupations such as pirate taxi driving and vending are accompanied by verbal abuse thus patients who are in these occupations are stigmatized by their peers in the same trades. This finding gives credence to overwhelming evidence that HIV related stigma is a hindrance to early presentation for care in Africa and beyond [16–18].” (p. 5)

9. (Excerpt) OutRight Action International, A Survey of Laws Impacting the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons in Selected Southern African Countries (Mar. 16, 2016), available at: https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/survey-laws-impacting-human-rights-lgbt- person-selected-southern-african-countries.

“. . . the Sexual Offences Act, directly discriminates against LGBT individuals that are living with HIV or AIDS. For example, Section 16 of the Sexual Offences Act provides that ‘[w]here a person is convicted of…sodomy …and it is proved that, at the time of the offence, the convicted person was infected with HIV, whether or not he was aware of his infection, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years.’” (p. 57)

TAB SUMMARY

MEDIA SOURCES 10. Roger Pebody, Gay Star News, “HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries, HIV is not a crime” (Jun. 10, 2019), available at: https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/hiv- criminalization-is-happening-in-72-countries/.

• “HIV criminalization continues: a global review has found that HIV-related arrests, investigations, prosecutions and convictions have ever occurred in at least 72 countries, with recent cases occurring in 49 countries, including 14 in which the law appeared to be applied for the first time.” (p. 1) • “Between October 2015 and December 2018, at least 913 people living with HIV were arrested, prosecuted, convicted or acquitted in 49 countries. The largest numbers of cases were reported in . . . Zimbabwe (16) . . . .” (p. 2)

Dated: [DATE] Respectfully submitted, [CITY, STATE]

[FIRM] Pro Bono Counsel for Respondent______

By: ______[NAME] [FIRM] [ADDRESS] [PHONE NUMBER] [FAX NUMBER]

TAB 1

Gazetted 17th August, 2001 (General Notice 408/2001) Date of commencement 17th August, 2001.

CHAPTER 9:21 SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT

Act 8/2001

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

PART I

PRELIMINARY Section 1. Short title. 2. Interpretation.

PART II

EXTRA-MARITAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH YOUNG PERSONS AND INTELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 3. Extra-marital sexual intercourse or immoral or indecent act committed with young person. 4. Extra-marital sexual intercourse or immoral or indecent act committed with intellectually handicapped person. 5. Prevention of sexual exploitation of young persons and intellectually handicapped persons outside Zimbabwe. 6. Prevention of conspiracy or incitement abroad to exploit young persons or intellectually handicapped persons in Zimbabwe. 7. Permitting young person to resort to place for purpose of extra-marital sexual intercourse.

PART III

NON-CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS 8. Punishment of rape or certain non-consensual acts.

PART IV

SUPPRESSION OF PROSTITUTION 9. Brothels and pimping. 10. Detention of persons for sexual purposes. 11. Procuring. 12. Coercing or inducing a person to have extra-marital intercourse. 13. Use of place as brothel renders lease void.

0921 SexOffs 2001-08 - NNAP.doc 2

14. Summary ejectment when place is kept or used as brothel.

PART V

PREVENTION OF SPREAD OF HIV 15. Deliberate transmission of HIV. 16. Sentence for certain offences where offender is infected with HIV. 17. Testing of sexual offenders for HIV infection. 18. Presumptions regarding HIV infection. 19. Jurisdiction of regional magistrates.

PART VI

GENERAL 20. Act not to limit offences under other laws. 21. Presumption regarding marriage. 22. Amendment of presumption that boy under 14 incapable of sexual intercourse. 23. Consent by young person no defence in certain circumstances. 24. Repeal of Cap. 9:05. 25. Amendment of section 51 of Cap. 7:10. 26. Amendment of sections 211 and 247 of Cap. 9:07. 27. Amendment of section 2 of Cap. 15:10.

ACT

To amend the criminal law in regard to sexual offences; to make further provision for the suppression of brothels and prostitution; to discourage the spread of the human immuno-deficiency virus; to repeal the Criminal Law Amendment Act [Chapter 9:05]; to amend section 51 of the Magistrates Court Act [Chapter 7:10], sections 211 and 247 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] and section 2 of the Termination of Pregnancy Act [Chapter 15:10]; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing.

ENACTED by the President and the .

3

PART I

PRELIMINARY

1 Short title This Act may be cited as the Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21].

2 Interpretation (1) In this Act— “brothel” means any place which is occupied or used for purposes of prostitution or for persons to visit for the purpose of having extra-marital sexual intercourse for money or reward; “extra-marital sexual intercourse” means sexual intercourse otherwise than between husband and wife; “HIV” means the human immuno-deficiency virus; “keeper”, in relation to a brothel, has the meaning set out in subsection (2); “owner”, in relation to any place, includes a person who lets or sublets or permits the occupation of the place, whether in his own right or on behalf of another person; “place” includes any premises, enclosure, vehicle or boat or any part thereof; “prostitute” means a person who for money or reward— (a) habitually allows other persons to have extra-marital sexual intercourse with him or her; or (b) solicits other persons to have extra-marital sexual intercourse with him or her; “young person” means a boy or girl under the age of sixteen years. (2) The following persons shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be keepers of a brothel— (a) any person who manages the brothel or assists in its management; (b) the owner of the brothel, if he uses the place as a brothel or knowingly allows it to be so used; (c) any person who knowingly receives the whole or any part of any money taken in the brothel; (d) any person who resides in the brothel, unless he proves that he was ignorant of the character of the place; (e) any person found in the brothel who wilfully refuses to disclose the name and identity of the keeper or owner thereof. 4

PART II

EXTRA-MARITAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH YOUNG PERSONS AND INTELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS

3 Extra-marital sexual intercourse or immoral or indecent act committed with young person (1) Subject to subsection (2), any person who— (a) has extra-marital sexual intercourse with a young person; or (b) commits an immoral or indecent act with or upon a young person; or (c) solicits or entices a young person to have extra-marital sexual intercourse with him or to commit an immoral or indecent act; shall be guilty of an offence and liable, subject to section sixteen, to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment. (2) It shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (1) for the accused person to satisfy the court that— (a) he was under the age of sixteen years at the time of the alleged offence; or (b) he had reasonable cause to believe that the young person concerned was of or over the age of sixteen years at the time of the alleged offence.

4 Extra-marital sexual intercourse or immoral or indecent act committed with intellectually handicapped person (1) In this section— “intellectually handicapped person” means a person who is mentally disordered or intellectually handicapped, as defined in section 2 of the Mental Health Act [Chapter 15:12]. (2) Subject to subsection (3), any person who— (a) has extra-marital sexual intercourse with an intellectually handicapped person; or (b) commits an immoral or indecent act with an intellectually handicapped person; or (c) solicits or entices an intellectually handicapped person to have extra-marital sexual intercourse with him or to commit an immoral or indecent act; shall be guilty of an offence and liable, subject to section sixteen, to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment. (3) It shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (2) for the accused person to satisfy the court that he did not know that the person to or with whom he committed the act alleged in the charge was intellectually handicapped. 5

5 Prevention of sexual exploitation of young persons and intellectually handicapped persons outside Zimbabwe (1) Any person who is a citizen of Zimbabwe or ordinarily resident therein and who does anything outside Zimbabwe to, with or against a young person or intellectually handicapped person which, if it were done in Zimbabwe, would constitute— (a) rape, incest, sodomy or indecent assault; or (b) a contravention of section three or four; or (c) an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b); shall be guilty of the appropriate offence referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) and liable to be sentenced accordingly. (2) Any person who, in Zimbabwe, conspires with or incites another person to do anything outside Zimbabwe to, with or against a young person or intellectually handicapped person which, if it were done in Zimbabwe, would constitute— (a) rape, incest, sodomy or indecent assault; or (b) a contravention of section three; shall be guilty of conspiracy or incitement, as the case may be, to commit the appropriate offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) and shall be liable to be sentenced accordingly. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) shall apply whether or not the act which the person is alleged to have committed or which was the subject of his alleged conspiracy or incitement, as the case may be, was an offence in the place where it was committed.

6 Prevention of conspiracy or incitement abroad to exploit young persons or intellectually handicapped persons in Zimbabwe (1) Any person who, outside Zimbabwe, conspires with or incites another person to commit any of the following offences in Zimbabwe to, with or against a young person or intellectually handicapped person— (a) rape, incest, sodomy or indecent assault; or (b) a contravention of section three or four; shall be guilty of conspiracy or incitement, as the case may be, to commit the appropriate offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) and shall be liable to be sentenced accordingly. (2) Subsection (1) shall apply whether or not conspiracy or incitement to commit the offence concerned was an offence in the place where the alleged conspiracy or incitement took place.

7 Permitting young person to resort to place for purpose of extra-marital sexual intercourse (1) If the owner of a place knowingly induces or allows a young person to enter or be in a place for the purpose of extra-marital sexual intercourse with another person or with other persons generally, the owner shall be guilty of an offence and— 6

(a) if the young person is under the age of twelve years, liable to a fine not exceeding thirty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years or to both such fine and such imprisonment; (b) if the young person is over the age of twelve years, liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to both such fine and such imprisonment. (2) It shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (1) for the accused person to prove that he had reasonable cause to believe that the young person was of or over the age of sixteen years.

PART III

NON-CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTS

8 Punishment for rape or certain non-consensual acts (1) Any person who, whether or not married to the other person, without the consent of that person— (a) with the male organ, penetrates any part of the other person’s body; or (b) with any object other than the male organ, penetrates the other person’s genitalia or anus; or (c) engages in fellatio or cunnilingus with the other person; shall be guilty of an offence and liable, subject to section sixteen, to the penalties provided by law for rape. (2) Penetration to any degree shall be sufficient for the purpose of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).

PART IV

SUPPRESSION OF PROSTITUTION

9 Brothels and pimping (1) Any person who— (a) is the keeper of a brothel; or (b) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution; or (c) solicits or importunes other persons for immoral purposes; or (d) demands from a prostitute money in consideration of his— (i) keeping, managing or assisting in the keeping of a brothel in which the prostitute is, or has been, living for immoral purposes; or (ii) having solicited or importuned other persons for immoral purposes with the prostitute; or (iii) having effected the prostitute’s entry into a brothel for the purpose of prostitution; or 7

(iv) having brought or assisted in bringing the prostitute into Zimbabwe for immoral purposes; or (v) present or past immoral connection with him; shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both such fine and such imprisonment. (2) If, in a prosecution for an offence under paragraph (b) of subsection (1), it is proved that a person consorted or lived with or was habitually in the company of a prostitute, and has no visible means of subsistence, that person shall be deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution.

10 Detention of persons for sexual purposes Any person who detains any other person against his or her will with the intention of contravening section three, four or eight shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

11 Procuring Any person who procures any other person— (a) to have sexual intercourse in contravention of section three, four or eight, whether inside or outside Zimbabwe; or (b) to become a prostitute, whether inside or outside Zimbabwe; or (c) to leave Zimbabwe with the intent that the other person may become a prostitute; or (d) to leave his or her usual place of residence, not being a brothel, with the intent that he or she may become an inmate of or frequent a brothel elsewhere; shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

12 Coercing or inducing a person to have extra-marital sexual intercourse Any person who, to enable himself or anyone else to have extra-marital sexual intercourse with another person— (a) threatens or intimidates that other person; or (b) applies or administers any intoxicating drug, liquor, matter or thing to that other person; or (c) causes that other person to take any intoxicating drug, liquor, matter or thing; shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

13 Use of place as brothel renders lease void (1) If any leased premises are kept or used as a brothel by or with the consent or acquiescence of the lessee, the lease shall become void with effect from the date on which the leased premises were first so used: Provided that, if the lessor proves that he was unaware that the premises were so used, he shall be entitled to recover the rent up to the date upon which he became aware of that fact. 8

(2) The reference in subsection (1) to a lease includes a sublease, and “lessee” and “lessor” shall be construed accordingly.

14 Summary ejectment when place is kept or used as brothel A magistrate shall have jurisdiction, on the application of the owner or lessor of any place within the magistrate’s province which is being kept or used as a brothel, to order summary ejectment of any person who is so keeping or using the place.

PART V

PREVENTION OF SPREAD OF HIV

15 Deliberate transmission of HIV (1) Any person who, having actual knowledge that he is infected with HIV, intentionally does anything or permits the doing of anything which he knows or ought reasonably to know— (a) will infect another person with HIV; or (b) is likely to lead to another person becoming infected with HIV; shall be guilty of an offence, whether or not he is married to that other person, and shall be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years. (2) It shall be a defence to a charge of contravening subsection (1) for the person charged to prove that the other person concerned— (a) knew that the person charged was infected with HIV; and (b) consented to the act in question, appreciating the nature of HIV and the possibility of his becoming infected with it.

16 Sentence for certain offences where offender is infected with HIV Where a person is convicted of— (a) rape or sodomy; or (b) having sexual intercourse with a young person in contravention of section three; or (c) having sexual intercourse with an intellectually handicapped person in contravention of section four; or (d) contravening subsection (1) of section eight by committing an act referred to in paragraph (a) or (c) of that subsection; and it is proved that, at the time of the offence, the convicted person was infected with HIV, whether or not he was aware of his infection, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years.

17 Testing of sexual offenders for HIV infection (1) In this section— “designated person” means a member of a class of persons designated for the purposes of this section by the Minister responsible for health; “sexual offence” means— (a) rape, sodomy, incest or indecent assault; or 9

(b) a contravention of section three or four; or (c) a contravention of subsection (1) of section eight by the commission of an act referred to in paragraph (a) or (c) of that subsection; or (d) a contravention of section fifteen; or (e) an attempt to commit an offence specified in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d); “sexual offender” means a person who has been convicted of a sexual offence. (2) Without derogation from any other law, where a person is charged with committing a sexual offence, the court may direct that an appropriate sample or samples be taken from the sexual offender, at such place and subject to such conditions as the court may direct, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he is infected with HIV. (3) The sample or samples taken from a sexual offender in terms of subsection (2) shall be stored at an appropriate place until the finalisation of the trial. (4) The court shall, where the sexual offender is convicted, order that the sample or samples be tested for HIV and, where he is acquitted, order that the sample or samples be destroyed. (5) Where a court has given a direction under subsection (2), any medical practitioner or designated person shall, if so requested in writing by a police officer above the rank of constable, take an appropriate sample or samples from the sexual offender concerned, and may use such force as is reasonably necessary in order to take the sample or samples: Provided that the medical practitioner or designated person may decline to take an appropriate sample in terms of this subsection if he considers that such taking would be prejudicial to the health or proper care or treatment of the sexual offender. (6) An appropriate sample or samples taken in terms of subsection (5)— (a) shall consist of blood, urine or other tissue or substance as may be determined by the medical practitioner or designated person concerned, in such quantity as is reasonably necessary for the purpose of determining whether or not the sexual offender is infected with HIV; and (b) in the case of a blood or tissue sample, shall be taken from a part of the sexual offender’s body selected by the medical practitioner or designated person concerned in accordance with accepted medical practice. (7) Without prejudice to any other defence or limitation that may be available in terms of any law, no claim shall lie and no set-off shall operate against— (a) the State; or (b) any Minister; or (c) any medical practitioner or designated person; in respect of any detention, injury or loss caused by or in connection with the taking of an appropriate sample in terms of subsection (5), unless the taking was unreasonable or done in bad faith or the person who took the sample was culpably ignorant or negligent. (8) Any person who, without reasonable excuse, hinders or obstructs the taking of an appropriate sample in terms of subsection (5) shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine 10 not exceeding ten thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

18 Presumptions regarding HIV infection (1) For the purposes of sections fifteen and sixteen, the presence in a person’s body of HIV antibodies or antigens, detected through an appropriate test or series of tests, shall be prima facie proof that the person concerned is infected with HIV. (2) For the purposes of sections fifteen and sixteen, if it is proved that a person was infected with HIV within thirty days after committing an offence referred to in those sections, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that he was infected with HIV when he committed the offence.

19 Jurisdiction of regional magistrates A court of a regional magistrate shall have jurisdiction to impose the penalty prescribed in section fifteen or sixteen on a person convicted of contravening that section.

PART VI

GENERAL

20 Act not to limit offences under other laws Nothing in this Act shall be taken as limiting any offence at common law or under any other enactment.

21 Presumption regarding marriage Whenever in any prosecution under this Act the question is in issue whether any sexual intercourse between two persons was extra-marital, the persons shall be deemed not to have been married at the time of such intercourse, unless the contrary is proved.

22 Amendment of presumption that boy under 14 incapable of sexual intercourse (1) The irrebuttable presumption or rule of law that a boy under the age of fourteen years is incapable of sexual intercourse shall not apply in Zimbabwe in relation to boys who have reached the age of twelve years. (2) Subsection (1) shall not affect any presumption or rule of law relating generally to the criminal capacity of children under the age of fourteen years.

23 Consent by young person no defence in certain circumstances (1) For the purposes of this section a “sexual act” means (a) anal intercourse; (b) engaging in fellatio; (c) engaging in cunnilingus. (2) A young person under the age of twelve years shall be deemed incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse or a sexual act. 11

(3) Where a person is charged with raping a young person who is his child, step-child or adopted child, it shall be no defence to prove that the young person consented to having sexual intercourse or a sexual act with him.

24 Repeal of Cap. 9:05 The Criminal Law Amendment Act [Chapter 9:05] is repealed.

25 Amendment of section 51 of Cap. 7:10 Section 51 of the Magistrates Court Act [Chapter 7:10] is amended— (a) in subsection (2) by the deletion from paragraph (a) of “rape,”; (b) by the insertion after subsection (3) of the following subsections— “(4) Notwithstanding section fifty, the jurisdiction of a regional magistrate in respect of punishment for a sexual offence, whether on summary trial or remittal by the Attorney-General, shall be— (a) imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years; (b) a fine not exceeding twenty thousand dollars. (5) For the purposes of subsection (4)— “sexual offence” means— (a) rape or sodomy; or (b) a contravention of section 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 or 15 of the Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21]; or (c) an attempt to commit an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).”.

26 Amendment of sections 211 and 247 of Cap. 9:07 The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] is amended— (a) in section 211— (i) by the repeal of subsection (1) and the substitution of— “(1) Any person charged with rape may be found guilty of— (a) assault with intent to commit rape; or (b) indecent assault; or (c) assault with intent to commit grievous bodily harm; or (d) assault; or (e) contravening section 3, 4, 8 or 15 of the Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21]; if such are the facts proved.”; (ii) in subsection (2) by the deletion of “unlawful carnal knowledge” and the substitution of “extra-marital sexual intercourse”; (iii) by the repeal of subsection (3) and the substitution of— 12

“(3) Any person charged with indecent assault may be found guilty of assault or of contravening section 3, 4 or 8 of the Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21] if such are the facts proved.”; (iv) by the repeal of subsection (5) and the substitution of— “(5) Any person charged with sodomy or assault with intent to commit sodomy may be found guilty of— (a) indecent assault; or (b) assault; or (c) committing an unnatural offence; or (d) contravening section 3, 4, 8 or 15 of the Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21]; if such are the facts proved.”; (b) in section 247 in subsection (2) by the deletion from paragraph (e) of “Criminal Law Amendment Act [Chapter 9:05]” and the substitution of “Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21]”.

27 Amendment of section 2 of Cap. 15:10 Section 2 of the Termination of Pregnancy Act [Chapter 15:10] is amended in subsection (1) by the repeal of the definition of “unlawful intercourse” and the substitution of— ““unlawful intercourse” means rape, other than rape within a marriage, incest or sexual intercourse in contravention of section 4 of the Sexual Offences Act [Chapter 9:21].”.

TAB 2

DFAT COUNTRY INFORMATION REPORT ZIMBABWE 19 December 2019

MAP

DFAT Country Information Report ZIMBABWE (19 December 2019) 2

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS 4

GLOSSARY 6

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 7

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 8 Recent history 8 Demography 9 Economic overview 10 Political System 16 Human Rights Framework 18 Security situation 19

3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS 21 Race/Nationality 21 Religion 21 Political Opinion (Actual or imputed) 25 Groups of Interest 26

4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS 43 Arbitrary Deprivation of Life 43 Death Penalty 45 Torture 45 Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 45

5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 49 State Protection 49 Internal Relocation 54 Treatment of Returnees 55 Documentation 56 Prevalence of Fraud 58

DFAT Country Information Report ZIMBABWE (19 December 2019) 3

ACRONYMS

AIPPA Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act CAC Convention Against Corruption CAT Convention Against Torture CAT-OP Optional Protocol to CAT CCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR-OP2-DP Optional Protocol to CCPR aiming to the abolition of the death penalty CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women CERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights CLCRA Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act CMW International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC-OP-AC Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict CRC-OP-SC Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CSO Civil Society Organisation DRG Department of Registrar General GALZ Association of LGBTI People in Zimbabwe GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income GNU Government of National Unity HRW Human Rights Watch IDP Internally Displaced Person ICT Information and communications technology ILO International Labour Organization ISP Internet Service Provider

DFAT Country Information Report ZIMBABWE (19 December 2019) 4

LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and/or Intersex MDC Movement for Democratic Change MOPA Maintenance of Peace and Order Act NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NHRI National Human Rights Institution NIC National Identity Card NPF National Patriotic Front NPICT National Policy for Information and Communications Technology NSC National Security Council PLC Parliamentary Legal Committee POTRAZ Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe POSA Public Order and Security Act PVO Act Private Voluntary Organisations Act SI Statutory Instrument TREAT Trans Research, Education, and Training (a transgender advocacy organisation) TTD Temporary Travel Document UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme USD United States Dollar ZACC Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions ZDF ZEC Zimbabwe Electoral Commission ZFTU Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions ZGC Zimbabwe Gender Commission ZHRC Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission ZPCS Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Service ZRP

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GLOSSARY

Gukurahundi A period of extended violence in the 1980s in which state security forces killed thousands of Ndebele in the Matabeleland provinces Operation Murambatsvina A 2005 security operation in which authorities evicted citizens from urban areas, resulting in the destruction of homes and livelihoods and affecting an estimated 700,000 persons Motlanthe Report Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1 August 2018 post-election violence that resulted in six deaths and at least 35 injuries as a result of security force actions sjambok a heavy whip falanga beating the soles of the feet

Terms used in this report high risk DFAT is aware of a strong pattern of incidents moderate risk DFAT is aware of sufficient incidents to suggest a pattern of behaviour low risk DFAT is aware of incidents but has insufficient evidence to conclude they form a pattern official discrimination 1. legal or regulatory measures applying to a particular group that impede access to state protection or services that are available to other sections of the population (examples might include but are not limited to difficulties in obtaining personal registrations or identity papers, difficulties in having papers recognised, arbitrary arrest and detention) 2. behaviour by state employees towards a particular group that impedes access to state protection or services otherwise available, including by failure to implement legislative or administrative measures societal discrimination 1. behaviour by members of society (including family members, employers or service providers) that impedes access by a particular group to goods or services normally available to other sections of society (examples could include but are not limited to refusal to rent property, refusal to sell goods or services, or employment discrimination) 2. ostracism or exclusion by members of society (including family, acquaintances, employers, colleagues or service providers)

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1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Country Information Report has been prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for protection status determination purposes only. It provides DFAT’s best judgement and assessment at time of writing and is distinct from Australian government policy with respect to Zimbabwe. The report provides a general, rather than an exhaustive, country overview. It has been prepared with regard to the current caseload for decision makers in Australia without reference to individual applications for protection visas. The report does not contain policy guidance for decision makers. Ministerial Direction Number 84 of 24 June 2019 under s 499 of the Migration Act (1958) states that: Where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has prepared [a] country information assessment expressly for protection status determination purposes, and that assessment is available to the decision maker, the decision maker must take into account that assessment, where relevant, in making their decision. The decision maker is not precluded from considering other relevant information about the country. This report is based on DFAT’s on-the-ground knowledge and discussions with a range of sources in Zimbabwe. It takes into account relevant information from government and non-government reports, including (but not limited to) those produced by the US Department of State, the United Kingdom Home Office, the World Bank, Transparency International, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, the Committee to Protect Journalists; various United Nations agencies; and credible news sources. Where DFAT does not refer to a specific source of a report or allegation, this may be to protect the source. This updated Country Information Report replaces the previous DFAT Country Information Report on Zimbabwe, published on 11 April 2016.

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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RECENT HISTORY The boundaries and territory of contemporary Zimbabwe are those of the former British colony of Southern , which became a self-governing British colony in 1923. Acting against the trend of decolonisation and African-majority governments elsewhere, the white minority Southern Rhodesia government made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 and declared itself the Republic of Rhodesia in 1970. Most countries did not recognise the UDI, and many imposed political and economic sanctions on the rebel state. During the UDI period, African nationalists waged a low-level guerrilla conflict (‘the Liberation War’) against government security forces until British-brokered peace negotiations led to a peace agreement in 1979. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by , won general elections in February 1980, and Zimbabwe formally gained independence from the United Kingdom in April 1980. During the Liberation War, the rival nationalist groups ZANU (largely backed by the Shona ethnic group) and ZAPU (largely backed by the Ndebele ethnic group) frequently came into conflict as they competed for local support and resources. Mugabe’s post-independence government included ZAPU representatives, but a political rift between the two organisations led to a period of extended violence in the mid-1980s in which state security forces killed or forcibly disappeared up to 20,000 Ndebele civilians in the Matabeleland provinces (the period known as the Gukurahundi). A 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU ended the violence and created the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) which has ruled Zimbabwe ever since. Zimbabwe’s economy deteriorated significantly throughout the 1990s, worsened by the country’s military involvement in a civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and by the major economic disruption resulting from a compulsory land redistribution policy (see White Zimbabweans). Concerns among civil society and labour groups over the economic situation and increasing political authoritarianism led to the 1999 creation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which remains Zimbabwe’s primary opposition party. Zimbabwe’s economic and political environment continued to deteriorate throughout the 2000s. The international community reacted to ongoing land seizures, increasing political repression and a series of disputed elections by imposing targeted sanctions on its leadership, some of which remain in place. After a deeply flawed and highly violent national election process in 2008, internationally brokered negotiations resulted in the creation of a power-sharing Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009, with Mugabe as President and MDC leader as Prime Minister. The political settlement temporarily stabilised the economy, courtesy in large part to a USD400 million support package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and reduced the level of open political violence. Although marred by constant infighting, the GNU succeeded in introducing a new constitution in March 2013 that contained numerous human rights commitments. The GNU ended after Mugabe and ZANU-PF won respective victories in the July 2013 national presidential and parliamentary elections. A major split within ZANU-PF over who would succeed him as President marked Mugabe’s final term in office, with Vice President leading one faction and Mugabe’s wife Grace the other,

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known as G40. In November 2017, Mugabe fired Mnangagwa and began purging his supporters from within ZANU-PF. Zimbabwe’s military responded by staging an intervention and forcing Mugabe to resign, ending his 37-year reign in office. Mnangagwa assumed the presidency, and defeated the MDC’s in another disputed presidential election in July 2018 (see Political System). Initial hopes that the change of leadership would result in long-awaited improvements to Zimbabwe’s political and economic climate have been tempered by further economic deterioration (see Economic overview), droughts and natural disasters, the violent repression of several demonstrations by security forces, and an increasing intolerance of political dissent (see Political Opinion (actual or imputed)). Mugabe died in Singapore in September 2019.

DEMOGRAPHY Estimates of Zimbabwe’s population range between 14-16 million. Harare is the capital and largest city, with an estimated population of 1.5 million in its city area (and 2.1 million in its Greater Harare peri- urban area). , in the south-west of the country, has a population of just over 650,000. Zimbabwe has a primarily rural population: two-thirds of Zimbabweans live outside urban centres. Apart from major urban concentrations in Harare and Bulawayo, population distribution is fairly even across the country, with slightly greater overall numbers in the eastern half. According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group is Zimbabwe’s largest by far, making up 82 per cent of the population. The Ndebele comprise 14 per cent, White Zimbabweans and Asians less than one per cent combined, and other ethnic and racial groups three per cent combined. Article 6 of the Constitution recognises Chewa, Chibarwe, English, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda, and Xhosa as official languages. It requires the State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level to ensure that the languages are all treated equitably; to take into account the language preferences of those affected by governmental measures or communications; and to promote and advance their use. Certain areas remain ethnically distinct: the Mashonaland provinces in the north are predominantly Shona; the Matabeleland provinces in the south-west are predominantly Ndebele; the Batonga tribe mostly reside in the Zambezi valley; the Shangaan populate the south-eastern Lowveld; and the Venda mostly live on the border with South Africa. While cities and towns are generally mixed, Harare is predominantly Shona, and Bulawayo mainly Ndebele. Zimbabwe’s population is young. The median age is 20.2 years (19.9 for males and 20.4 for females), and around 60 per cent of the population is aged under 25 years. Life expectancy at birth is 59 years for males and 63.2 years for females. Economic mismanagement and hyperinflation have sparked large waves of outwards migration in recent decades, primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US. Migration in search of better economic opportunities continues to occur. International organisations report that more than 250 groups of identified Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) reside throughout the country, comprising approximately 113,000 households. The primary causes of ongoing displacement include rural evictions (45.7 per cent), natural disasters (27.7 per cent), localised conflict (13.3 per cent), and urban evictions (13.1 per cent). The government has provided no resettlement assistance to evicted families, and has depended primarily on international organisations to do this. In March and April 2019, riverine and flash flooding caused by Tropical Cyclones Idai and Kenneth put hundreds of thousands of people at risk of displacement in the east of the country. The US Department of State reported that at the end of 2018 several thousand households in disputed farming areas were at risk of displacement due to verifiable threats or eviction notices. In most cases, those at risk of displacement had resided on their land for years without formal offer letters or title deeds.

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Events that have created or contributed to internal displacement include election-related violence, failed harvests and other climate-related issues, the land reform program (see White Zimbabweans), and the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, in which the government evicted citizens from urban areas, resulting in the destruction of homes and livelihoods affecting an estimated 700,000 persons. Human rights observers report that IDPs from previous years remain in near-emergency conditions, with an overwhelming majority living without basic sanitation and many at a high risk of food insecurity. Most IDPs do not have regularised status. According to the United Nations (UN), as at the end of 2018 Zimbabwe was hosting 18,870 people of concern, comprising 7,800 refugees, 10,210 asylum seekers, and 860 ‘others’. The vast majority of refugees and asylum seekers are from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. The government maintains a formal encampment policy requiring refugees to reside at the Tongogara refugee camp in Manicaland Province, approximately 420 km southeast of Harare. The Tongogara camp hosts approximately 12,100 refugees and asylum seekers, with an estimated 100 new arrivals each month. Nevertheless, approximately 950 refugees live in urban areas, particularly Harare and Bulawayo, and around 6,500 unregistered Mozambicans reside in Zimbabwean border communities. Zimbabwe does not accept refugees from foreign countries for resettlement, but does facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their home countries. Most refugees are reportedly unwilling to return voluntarily to their home countries.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW The agriculture and mining sectors are the mainstays of the economy, along with tourism and manufacturing. Zimbabwe ranked 156th out of 189 countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Index for 2018, with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of USD1,683 per capita. According to the World Bank, this GNI classifies Zimbabwe as a lower-middle income country (defined as one with a gross national income per capita between USD1,026 and USD3,995 per capita). Inequality in income is significant, and there is a major gap between the very rich elite and the majority of the population. UNDP figures indicate that three-quarters of Zimbabweans in some form of employment qualify as ‘working poor’ (defined as earning USD3.10 per day or less), 21.4 per cent of the total population lives below the income poverty line level of USD1.90 per day, and 26.3 per cent of the population is vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. Despite experiencing years of UDI-related sanctions, Zimbabwe had a strong economy at independence. The country was commonly described as the ‘breadbasket of Africa’, while the economy was the second most industrialised in Africa (after South Africa). The country remained economically prosperous throughout the 1980s, expanding rapidly and utilising the industrial base established during the colonial and UDI periods. Since then, a combination of political instability, chronic economic mismanagement, global economic fluctuations, and ongoing drought has had a major debilitating effect on the economy. A World Bank-supported ‘Economic Structural Adjustment Programme’ in the 1990s introduced harsh austerity measures and economic liberalisation, leading to large-scale retrenchments. The agrarian economy experienced a major slump in the 2000s, caused by the flight of experienced farmers from the chaos of the land redistribution program (see White Zimbabweans) and successive droughts. This in turn affected the manufacturing sector, which relies on agricultural produce for raw materials. The consequent sharp fall in output and decline in export earnings caused a collapse in bank lending and an increase in public debt, to which the government responded by printing more money. This led to hyperinflation, with Zimbabwe’s November 2008 inflation rate of 79,600,000,000 per cent – 98 per cent inflation daily – the second highest on record (behind Weimar Germany). The economy briefly recovered during the GNU era, aided by international support and the introduction of a multi-currency system with the USD as the base currency. Since 2015, however, the

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economy has again been in recession. Persistent shortages of foreign currency have caused shortages of basic commodities and driven the cost of everyday goods to record levels. Inflation has again risen to exceptionally high rates: while the official rate at the beginning of 2019 was 31 per cent, in itself the highest since the inception of the multicurrency regime, the IMF reported that annual inflation reached almost 300 per cent in August 2019. Ordinary citizens without access to foreign exchange have found themselves unable to pay for their basic needs. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee reported in August 2018 that rural households spent 68 per cent of their income on food, with diet quality diminishing. In September 2019, the World Food Programme said that Zimbabwe was facing its worst food insecurity in recent memory, with more than five million people in need of assistance. In August 2019, power cuts reportedly averaged 18 to 20 hours a day, with most people only having mains power in a 2200 to 0400 hour window, while many areas also suffered from water shortages. Economic hardship has caused considerable social agitation and labour unrest (see Trade Unionists), which reached a peak after the government’s announcement in January 2019 that fuel prices would rise by 150 per cent (see Political Opinion (actual or imputed)). On 24 June 2019, the government responded to the growing economic crisis by announcing a new Statutory Instrument (SI) that ended the multicurrency economy, banned the use of foreign currency, and amalgamated the existing local quasi currencies into a reborn Zimbabwean dollar. While the government had foreshadowed the move, the timing of the announcement came as a surprise as most observers had anticipated it would come towards the end of 2019. The government introduced the change in a confused and apparently uncoordinated fashion, with the new measures shared via photographs of the SI on Twitter. The business community strongly criticised the move, noting that the import-dependent nature of the Zimbabwean economy meant that access to foreign exchange was essential for resupplying virtually everything, and anticipating that many businesses would fail in coming months due to liquidity issues. Several citizens subsequently challenged the re-introduction of the Zimbabwean dollar in the High Court, arguing that it was both unconstitutional and inconsistent with the Act that had established the multicurrency regime in February 2009. The impact of the SI on combating inflation in the long term, and its impact on ordinary citizens, most of whom did not have access to foreign exchange, is yet to be determined.

Employment Very little primary data exists on employment in Zimbabwe. Different sources place the unemployment rate as low as 4 per cent and as high as 95 per cent. It is clear, however, that the majority of the labour force that participates economically does so in the informal economy, including many Women and Children. A January 2018 IMF study found that the informal Zimbabwean economy averaged 60.6 per cent of the total economy between 1991 and 2015, accounting for 44 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and that Zimbabwe had the third largest informal sector in the world, behind only Georgia and Bolivia. The government has committed to the formalisation of the informal sector, but progress to date has been limited. Legislative workplace protections do not apply to workers in the informal economy, who have few legal recourses against abuses by authorities or employers. Human rights observers report that conditions for workers in the formal sector are generally poor, regardless of the specific sector. Inadequate monitoring systems and staffing shortages mean that authorities are unable to enforce minimum wage and work hours laws, and wage theft is common across sectors. Minimum wages, when they are paid, seldom exceed the poverty line. Penalties for occupational health and safety outcomes are not harmonised, while penalties are insufficient to deter violations. The very high inflation rates significantly erode incomes. DFAT assesses that poor economic and employment opportunities act as a significant ‘push factor’ for emigration from Zimbabwe.

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Corruption Zimbabwe is a State Party to the Convention Against Corruption (CAC). Article 9(2) of the Constitution states that the government must take measures to expose, combat, and eradicate all forms of corruption and abuse by those holding political and public offices. The Prevention of Corruption Act (1985, revised 1996) prohibits active and passive bribery, gifts, and facilitation payments in the public and private sectors. The maximum penalty for corruption-related offences is 20 years’ imprisonment, a fine not exceeding three times the value of the gift or bribe in question, or USD100,000. The Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (2016) provides for corporate criminal liability for corruption offences. The 2013 Constitution provided for the establishment of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), whose key functions include: investigating and exposing cases of corruption in the public and private sectors; combating corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power, and other improper conduct; promoting honesty, financial discipline, and transparency; receiving and considering complaints from the public and taking appropriate action; directing and referring cases of suspected corruption to police and prosecuting agencies; and making recommendations to government on measures to enhance integrity and accountability. The President appoints the ZACC’s chairperson and eight other members, who serve five-year terms with a two-term limit. Despite this strong legal framework, DFAT concurs with the assessments of international and domestic observers that corruption remains a major problem. According to Transparency International, Zimbabwe continues to experience both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption, defined respectively as ‘an everyday abuse of entrusted power by low to mid-level public officials’, and ‘an abuse of high-level power by political elites’. Transparency International ranked Zimbabwe 160th out of 180 countries in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, giving it a score of 22 out of 100 (on a scale whereby zero represents highly corrupt). According to Global Financial Integrity, between 1980 and 2010 Zimbabwe lost an estimated USD12 billion to corruption involving smuggling, illicit financial outflows, and illegal activities. International observers report that a bloated public service, inefficient bureaucracy, and an opaque regulatory environment drive public sector corruption. The public service reportedly has large numbers of unqualified persons on the state payroll, many reportedly serving as youth and gender officers in various ministries and other public entities. The most recent Public Service Commission audit found that illicit salary payments are often made to persons who are retired, deceased, or otherwise absent from their place of employment, while duplicate personally identifiable information in files indicates that some persons receive multiple salaries. A May 2015 Afrobarometer survey reported that a quarter of surveyed Zimbabweans who had tried to obtain an identity-related document had paid at least one bribe in order to do so; while ten per cent had paid a bribe in order to acquire water, sanitation services, or an electrical connection. According to the survey, almost no civilians who had experienced corruption had reported it to authorities because they feared adverse consequences, did not expect authorities to take any action, or believed the authorities themselves were corrupt. Corruption is reportedly particularly problematic in the public procurement, natural resources, customs administration, land administration, and tax administration sectors; and in the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and Judiciary. In-country media sources have advised that reporting on high- level corruption is a ‘red line’ issue. Land reform is one area where corruption is particularly evident. Observers report that the implementation of the government’s redistribution of confiscated white-owned commercial farms (see White Zimbabweans) has lacked transparency and has often favoured the politically-connected elite. Authorities have reportedly allowed individuals aligned with senior officials to seize land not designated for acquisition. High-level ZANU-PF officials have reportedly selected numerous farms and registered them in

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the names of family members in order to evade the official policy of one farm per official. Landowners with ZANU-PF connections have reportedly routinely sold land to citizens but refused to transfer ownership officially or to develop the land as agreed upon in contracts. The Mnangagwa government has taken a number of practical steps aimed at tackling corruption, but their overall effectiveness has been limited. In January 2018, the Judicial Service Commission announced the judiciary would open a number of specialised anti-corruption courts nationwide to prosecute corrupt individuals. In April 2019, however, local media reported that only two such courts were operational. Mnangagwa ordered a mandatory declaration of assets by senior officials in February 2018, which preceded the arrests of a number of senior government officials. In-country observers report, however, that most of those arrested were political opponents of the president and/or supporters of ’s ZANU-PF G40 faction. Authorities subsequently released most of the arrested on relaxed bail conditions. In May 2018, President Mnangagwa created a new anti-corruption body within the Office of the President to carry out investigations, bypassing the ZACC. In February 2019, Mnangagwa dismissed the entire ZACC board, citing its ineffectiveness in tackling graft. Mnangagwa swore in a new team of ZACC Commissioners on 15 July 2019, with the ZACC granted new powers to arrest suspects. The ZACC arrested the Minister for Tourism (a member of the Cabinet) on 30 July in relation to charges dating back to her time as Public Service Minister in 2017, after a National Social Security Authority forensic audit found that over USD95 million had gone missing from her previous department. The case against the Minister is ongoing. In-country sources report that a number of concurrent events in July 2019 are likely to have contributed to the renewed anti-corruption push. At the beginning of the month, the ZANU-PF Youth League released a ‘shame list’ of senior party officials it accused of corruption, including the Reserve Bank Governor, and indicated that it had a second list ready for release. The intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force wrote to the government on 5 July to advise that it would be monitoring the government’s activities closely to ensure that Zimbabwe was adhering to anti-money laundering conventions. In mid-July, the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee reported that USD3 billion had disappeared from the Command Agricultural program between 2017-18, under the administration of the Lands and Agriculture Ministry. In-country sources report that Zimbabweans are generally cynical about government anti-corruption campaigns and bodies, including the ZACC, seeing them as being primarily a tool for settling political scores. DFAT assesses that, given the entrenched nature of corruption, it is unlikely that the government’s efforts on anti-corruption will bring about substantial change in the near term.

Health Article 29 of the Constitution commits the State to: taking all practical measures to ensure the provision of basic, accessible, and adequate health services throughout Zimbabwe; taking appropriate, fair, and reasonable measures to ensure that no person is refused emergency medical treatment at any health institution; and taking all preventative measures within the limits of the resources available to it, including education and public awareness programs, against the spread of disease. The Ministry of Health and Child Care has responsibility for delivering health services, although mission hospitals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also provide services. As of 2015 (most recent available statistic), Zimbabwe had 1,848 hospitals and primary care facilities nationwide. Harare and Bulawayo have three central hospitals each. There are eight provincial hospitals covering all provinces; 63 secondary level hospitals in districts nationwide, and over 1,000 clinics and rural health centres. In 2015, Zimbabwe had 1.6 physicians and 7.2 nurses for every 10,000 people, well below the World Health Organization’s recommendation of a minimum threshold of 23 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000.

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Zimbabwe’s long-running economic and political crises, coupled with the long-running HIV/AIDS crisis and other major disease outbreaks including cholera and measles epidemics, have had a significant impact on the health system and on health outcomes overall. In 2018, life expectancy for men and women was 59 and 63.2 years respectively after reaching a low in 2006 of 34.4 years for men. The maternal mortality rate in 2015 was 443 deaths per 100,000 live births (compared to six for Australia); while the infant mortality rate was 31.9 deaths per 1,000 live births (compared to 4.2 for Australia). In 2015, an estimated 63.2 per cent of the population did not have access to ‘improved sanitation’ facilities (those likely to ensure hygienic separation of human excreta from human contact). Health facilities have widespread shortages of basic medicines such as painkillers and contraceptives. Zimbabweans seeking healthcare are generally required to bring their own drugs, syringes, bandages, and water, and to pay for their treatment in US dollars. In November 2018, the Zimbabwe Medical Association warned that patients were relapsing and deteriorating while operations were being cancelled due to shortages of medicines. A series of strikes in 2018-19 by doctors and nurses over pay and conditions (see Trade Unionists) has placed further pressure on the health sector. Most of Zimbabwe’s political and economic elite travel to South Africa or other destinations abroad to access private medical care. The HIV prevalence rate has dropped from approximately 29 per cent in 1997 to around 15 per cent currently. Nevertheless, it remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. In 2018, Zimbabwe had approximately 40,000 new HIV infections and around 30,000 AIDS- related deaths. The HIV epidemic is generalised, and is largely driven by unprotected heterosexual sex. Key populations affected by HIV include sex workers, with an HIV prevalence of 57.1 per cent, and prisoners, with a prevalence of 28 per cent (see Detention and Prison). Advocacy groups report that approximately 1.3 million Zimbabweans were living with HIV in 2018, of whom 89 per cent of adults and 76 per cent of children were accessing antiretroviral therapy (ART). While Zimbabwe does have better access to ART than most other sub-Saharan African countries, budgetary issues, weak infrastructure, and other capacity challenges mean viral load testing (key to measuring viral suppression) is far from routine, and most existing facilities are located in cities. Over three-quarters of HIV expenditure comes from international donor sources. A national HIV/AIDS policy prohibits discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, and laws also prohibit discrimination against workers with HIV/AIDS in both the public and private sectors. The Ministry of Health and Child Care and the National AIDS Council have worked with international and domestic NGOs on an active information campaign to destigmatise HIV/AIDS. Despite these efforts, local NGOS and in-country sources report that societal discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS remains a problem, particularly in relation to health services, education, and employment. In the 2015 Demographic Health Survey, 22 per cent of women and 20 per cent of men reported holding discriminatory attitudes towards those living with HIV/AIDS. Despite considerable need, there are limited facilities and services available for those with mental health issues, and NGOs report that getting access to mental health services is generally slow and frustrating. There are few certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and teaching in the country. A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals mean that those with mental health issues are often not properly diagnosed and do not receive adequate treatment. Many persons with mental health issues suffer from extremely poor living conditions. There is a considerable social stigma against mental health issues, which many religious Zimbabweans regard as ‘spiritual’ problems. There are eight centralised mental health institutions nationwide with a total capacity of more than 1,300 residents, in addition to three special institutions that house long-term residents and those considered dangerous to society. Residents in the eight centralised institutions receive cursory screening, and most wait for at least a year for a full medical review. Prison inmates with mental health issues routinely wait for as long as three years for evaluation.

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In-country sources report that drug and substance abuse is increasing, particularly for unemployed youth. Major abused substances include glue, petrol, cough mixture, alcohol, and cannabis. Treatment and rehabilitation facilities are limited, are mainly provided by NGOs rather than the state, and are often beyond the means of ordinary citizens. Periodic consultations between government and other stakeholders to discuss possible solutions have not resulted in any formal national approach to addressing the issue of substance abuse.

Education Article 27 of the Constitution commits the State to take all practical measures to: promote free and compulsory basic education for children; promote higher and tertiary education; and ensure that girls are afforded the same opportunities as boys to obtain education at all levels. The Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science, and Technology Development have portfolio responsibility for education, which is compulsory at the primary level. Zimbabwe has seven public and four religious universities offering diplomas and degrees that are fully internationally accredited, including one women’s university. There are a number of state and privately owned vocational training centres in the major urban hubs, while polytechnic training colleges cater for more advanced skills. Zimbabwean culture places a high premium on education. Before independence, the colonial and UDI governments denied the majority of the African population education beyond primary school level. The post-independence government made a strong commitment to education, which included abolishing primary school fees, training thousands of teachers, and building thousands of new schools. Primary school enrolments increased from 1.2 million at independence to 2.1 million at the end of the 1980s, while secondary school enrolments grew from 73,000 to 673,000 in the same timeframe. This early commitment is reflected in the fact that Zimbabwe retains the highest literacy rate in sub-Saharan Africa. Over 86.5 per cent of Zimbabweans aged 15 and over can read and write English (88.5 per cent of males, and 84.6 per cent of females). Zimbabwe’s long-running economic and political crises have had a significant impact on the education system. Per capita funding for primary school students fell by a third in the 1990s and school fees became common again. Countless schools closed during the hyperinflation period of the mid-2000s, leading to a dramatic rise in dropout rates, while an estimated 20,000 teachers left the country at that time. A large percentage of the national budget continues to be allocated to the education sector, but an overwhelming proportion of it goes towards human resources in the form of employment costs (93 per cent in 2018), leaving very little for capital expenditure. Parents are required to make up the shortfall and face significant ancillary costs, including for uniforms, supplies, and an enrolment fee that reportedly averages USD110. Access to primary and secondary education varies considerably. The political and business elite generally educate their children in well-equipped private schools in and out of Zimbabwe, but the rural majority and those in poor urban areas are generally able to access only a basic level of education. Many rural children reportedly walk up to 20 kilometres daily simply to attend school. Accurate statistics on school attendance are difficult to find, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the dropout rate between primary and secondary level is very high, particularly for girls. The economic situation has had a similar impact on Zimbabwe’s tertiary sector. The government has cut funding to the sector, and reduced its grants and loans system for students. Some universities have responded by increasing their student intake as a revenue-generating exercise, leading to significant overcrowding and a decline in educational standards. Average tuition is reportedly around USD1,000 a year,

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the same amount as the annual GDP per capita, which has caused many students to drop out on economic grounds.

POLITICAL SYSTEM Article 5 of the Constitution outlines the tiers of government as: the national government; provincial and metropolitan councils; and local authorities, subdivided into urban and rural councils. The President is the Head of both State and Government, and is Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. Among other powers, the President has responsibility for assenting to and signing bills, calling elections and referendums, deploying the Defence Forces, declaring war and peace, and granting pardons. The President also has the power to declare a State of Emergency in all or part of the country. The President’s Cabinet consists of the President, the First and Second Vice Presidents, and such Ministers as the President may appoint. Cabinet is responsible for directing the operations of government; conducting government business in Parliament, preparing, initiating, and implementing national legislation, developing and implementing national policy; and advising the President. A candidate for President (or Vice-President) must be a Zimbabwean citizen by birth or descent; be aged 40 years or over; be ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe; and be a registered voter. Presidents can only serve two terms, which need not be continuous. Presidential candidates run on a joint ticket with two nominated Vice-Presidents (designated First and Second respectively) and voters elect them directly. The election of a President and Vice-Presidents must take place concurrently with every general election of members of Parliament, provincial and metropolitan councils, and local authorities. Terms of office are five years’ maximum, conterminous with the life of Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the National Assembly, elected for five-year terms. The Senate consists of eighty Senators: six are elected from each province by a system of proportional representation; sixteen are chiefs elected from the provincial assemblies; two are the President and Deputy President of the National Council of Chiefs; and two are elected to represent persons with disabilities. Senators must be forty years of age or above. Following the 30 July 2018 election, the current party-based composition of the Senate is ZANU-PF 34, MDC Alliance 25, and MDC-T 1. The National Assembly consists of 210 members drawn from 210 constituencies, who are elected directly through a secret ballot. In addition, 60 women are also elected as members of parliament through the proportional ‘Special Measures’ program, with each of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces electing six women through a party list system based on the votes cast for the political party in each province. This provision only applies in the lives of the first two parliaments from the effective date of the 2017 Constitution, and will not apply to the next scheduled elections in 2023 unless there is a in the meantime. All members must be 21 years of age or above. The current party-based composition of the National Assembly, based on the 30 July 2018 election results, is ZANU-PF 179, MDC Alliance 88, National Patriotic Front (NPF) 1, and MDC-T 1, meaning ZANU-PF have an effective two-thirds majority. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is responsible for preparing for: conducting, and supervising elections and referenda at all levels; registering voters and maintaining voter rolls; delimiting constituencies; conducting and supervising voter education; and receiving election-related complaints from the public and acting on them as appropriate. The President appoints the ZEC’s chairperson, who must be a judge or former judge, and eight other members. According to the Constitution, elections must be held so that polling takes place no more than thirty days before the expiry of the five-year term; or no more than ninety days after Parliament has passed resolution to dissolve. Polling in by-elections must take place within ninety days after the vacancies occurred, unless a general election is due to be held imminently. Local elections take place concurrently with presidential and parliamentary elections.

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The 2013 Constitution provides the overall framework for the conduct of elections. A number of Acts have sought to align the Electoral Act (2004) with the Constitution, including the Electoral Amendment Act (2014), the General Laws Amendment Act (2016), and the Electoral Amendment Act (2018). Critics have noted that a number of outstanding issues remain that impact on the independence of the ZEC, the right to vote for expatriate citizens, the manner in which ballot papers are procured and printed, and how petitioners can obtain a recount in the case of disputed elections. Since independence, Zimbabwean elections have been characterised by high levels of politically motivated violence, voter disenfranchisement, periodic opposition boycotts, widespread concerns over a lack of impartiality of state media coverage and electoral management, including allegations of ballot rigging and voter intimidation, and disputed results. The March 2008 presidential election period and its aftermath was marked by open violence committed by state security forces and ZANU-PF activists against supporters of the MDC and other opposition parties. The violence included killings, torture, beatings, looting, and burning of property. Perpetrators, including the police, military, local ZANU-PF officials, government-backed militia and war veterans, committed abuses with almost absolute impunity. Up to 300 people were killed, approximately 5,000 were beaten or otherwise tortured, and around 36,000 forcibly displaced. July 2018 Elections An unprecedented 23 presidential candidates and 55 political parties contested Zimbabwe’s most recent national elections on 30 July 2018, representing a significant opening of political space. There was a markedly improved pre-election climate in contrast to previous elections, with all parties generally able to campaign freely (although local NGOs did report dozens of instances of ZANU-PF supporters removing opposition and independent parties’ campaign signs and materials in electorates throughout the country). Actual pre-election violence was rare, although local NGOs did report some cases in which ZANU-PF youth members and war veterans threatened communities with violence if ZANU-PF candidates were defeated (see also Informal Militias), and police arrested an undisclosed number of ZANU-PF supporters for allegedly threatening to burn the house of an opposition parliamentary candidate in Mashonaland East Province. Voting on Election Day occurred largely peacefully, with an estimated voter turnout of 85 per cent. While the election itself was comparatively peaceful, on 1 August 2018 ZDF personnel reportedly killed six unarmed protesters during an opposition-led election-related demonstration in central Harare, with a seventh protester later dying from injuries (see also Political Opinion (actual or imputed) and Extra-Judicial Killings). ZEC declared Mnangagwa the winner of the presidential election on 3 August 2018 with 50.8 per cent of the vote, and presented state-level polling results to stakeholders within 24 hours. Statistical analysis by citizen observers found ZEC’s announced presidential results to be within a credible statistical range, although the margin of error indicated a presidential runoff election was also within that range. MDC Alliance’s presidential candidate Nelson Chamisa subsequently challenged ZEC’s declaration of Mnangagwa as the winner. The Constitutional Court held a hearing on 22 August 2018 to review the challenge to the announced results, but the court denied permits to allow four South African members of Chamisa’s legal team to argue the case. On 24 August 2018, the court unanimously determined that the petition did not meet the required evidentiary standards. It declared Mnangagwa the winner of the presidential election, and ruled that the petitioners had to pay the court costs of the other parties to the case. The Chief Justice inaugurated Mnangagwa as President on 26 August 2018. Chamisa continues to maintain that he is the rightful leader of Zimbabwe. Opposition political parties and civil society organisations strongly criticised the conduct and credibility of the elections. Critics alleged widespread voter disenfranchisement, claiming that the ZEC denied large numbers of foreign-born and/or diaspora citizens their right to vote in the elections due to them not being able to prove their citizenship (see also Exit and Entry Procedures). Those allegedly prevented from voting were widely perceived to have opposition leanings, including more than 200,000

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former commercial farm workers originally from neighbouring countries, many of whom had voted in previous Zimbabwean elections, and approximately 30,000 white dual nationals. Critics also noted that traditional leaders in some rural areas mobilised voters and canvassed support for ZANU-PF in return for farms, vehicles, houses, and other benefits, in doing so breaching a law obliging them to be politically impartial. Local NGOs reported cases in which traditional leaders attempted to collect voter registration slips in an attempt to undermine the secrecy of the vote, and cases in which leaders selectively distributed agricultural inputs and food aid to reward ZANU-PF supporters and punish opposition voters. In one such case, an NGO in Mashonaland West Province reported that village heads had told their villages that government-provided maize would only be distributed to those villagers who proved they had registered to vote and were members of ZANU-PF. Critics also questioned ZEC’s performance, credibility and independence during the elections, claiming that the ZEC was composed largely of personnel loyal to ZANU-PF. Specific points of criticism – which ZEC sought to defend – included that: - ZEC did not release a finalised voters’ roll until after the nomination court had announced the 23 presidential candidates. - The voters’ roll ZEC provided to opposition parties did not include biometric information, and differed from that used at polling stations on Election Day, and ZEC did not provide any transparency of how ballot papers were stored or transported to polling stations ahead of the election. - The printing of ballot papers in an unbalanced layout, with the names of 13 candidates in one column and nine in the next. This resulted in Mnangagwa’s name appearing at the top of a column, raising questions about the lack of impartiality. A number of international bodies officially observed the election, including the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), European Union (EU), and the Commonwealth Observer Group (CUG). Their post-election reports gave a mixed response in relation to the conduct and credibility of the elections. The AU and SADC reports were largely positive, while the EU and CUG reports noted considerable overall improvement from previous elections. Election observers commended ZEC for accrediting 1,209 foreign electoral observers and journalists in a timely and efficient manner, and reported that ZEC-administered polling booths were well run by competently trained officers. The CUG report did, however, note that acute bias by the state media during the election campaign in favour of ZANU-PF, limitations of ZEC in the implementation of its mandate, persistent allegations of intimidation, and the unfair use of incumbency privileges all unduly unlevelled the playing field in favour of the governing party. The Commonwealth report also noted that the post-election violence and associated behaviour of security authorities marred this phase of the elections, and that the CUG was unable to endorse all aspects of the election process as credible, inclusive, and peaceful. Despite the acknowledged shortcomings of the election process, the international community has recognised the result of the election and Mnangagwa’s leadership of Zimbabwe.

HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK Zimbabwe is a state party to most of the major international human rights instruments, including: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and its two Optional Protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC) and on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography (CRC-OP- SC), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the

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Convention Against Torture (CAT) or its Optional Protocol (CAT-OP), to the Second Optional Protocol to CCPR aiming to the abolition of the death penalty (CCPR-OP2-DP), or to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW). The 2013 Constitution strongly emphasises human rights. Chapter 1.4(c) lists fundamental human rights and freedoms as one of the values and principles on which Zimbabwe was founded. Article 44 commits the State and its institutions to respecting, protecting, promoting, and fulfilling the rights and freedoms set out in Chapter Four: Declaration of Rights, which are defined in Part Two: Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms (Articles 48-78). Included among these rights are the rights to life, personal liberty, human dignity, personal security, privacy, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and equality and non-discrimination. Article 34 commits the State to ensuring that it incorporates into domestic law all international conventions, treaties and agreements to which Zimbabwe is a party. This is an ongoing process, and a large number of existing domestic laws remain in conflict with constitutional provisions. The Constitution also enshrines the civil and political freedoms of expression and assembly, and rights to demonstrate and petition, notwithstanding the ongoing repression of these rights since the Constitution’s inception. The 2013 Constitution provided for the establishment of five independent commissions to support and entrench human rights and democracy. The President appoints the heads of these commissions, which are: the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC; see following section), the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC; see Political System); the Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC; see Women); the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC; see Media); and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), whose role is to promote national reconciliation, develop procedures and institutions to prevent future conflicts, and to take measures to conciliate and mediate disputes. In January 2018, Mnangagwa signed the National Peace and Reconciliation Bill (2018) into law to operationalise the NPRC, which in October 2018 released a national strategy document outlining its plans.

National Human Rights Institution Articles 242-244 of the Constitution outline the ZHRC’s composition, functions and mandate. Its key functions include: promoting awareness of human rights; monitoring and ensuring observance of human rights and freedoms; receiving complaints from the public in relation to human rights violations and actioning them as appropriate; investigating allegations of human rights violations and seeking appropriate redress; conducting research into human rights-related issues and making recommendations to Parliament; and visiting and inspecting prisons and other places of detention. The Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) gave the ZHRC an ‘A’ rating at its most recent review in May 2016. This rating indicated that the ZHRC was fully compliant with the principles relating to the status of NHRIs (the Paris Principles), which include: being vested with competence to promote and protect human rights; having a broad and well-defined mandate; having a reporting and advocacy role with government and/or parliament; and having a guarantee of independence from government. In-country sources report that insufficient funding and government support has restricted the NHRC’s ability to protect and promote human rights.

SECURITY SITUATION Zimbabwe’s long-running political and economic instability has resulted in a highly volatile security situation. Demonstrations and street blockades against corruption and economic and political conditions occur from time to time, and have often turned violent. The government has sought to block demonstrations

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over the past year (see Political Opinion (actual or imputed). High levels of unemployment and ongoing shortages of basic goods, ongoing power cuts, medical supplies, fuel, and foods, have contributed to a high level of theft and other crime nationwide. Armed robberies, assaults, and other violent crimes occur frequently, particularly at night and in high-density urban areas, and gender-based violence is common. Politically motivated violence between rival political factions and/or security services has occurred regularly, particularly around elections and protests (see also Political Opinion (actual or imputed)) and Extra-Judicial Killings). Intra-party violence within both ZANU-PF and the MDC has also reportedly increased considerably in recent years. A leading human rights monitoring group reported in July 2018 (before the 30 July 2018 election) that it had recorded 62 cases of intra-party violence within ZANU-PF since the beginning of that year, including assault, coercion, intimidation, and the murder of a two-year old boy; and 53 cases within the MDC over the same period. In March 2019, at least fifteen MDC members were injured in Harare during running battles between rival MDC factions ahead of nationwide ward elections. In August 2019, a ZANU-PF provincial committee member in Manicaland was attacked at home by suspected fellow party members, which reporting suggests was in relation to his outspokenness on under-utilised land and abuse of government farm inputs. The committee member’s wife and 14-year old son were seriously injured by axes during the attack, and were subsequently hospitalised. There are no known insurgent or rebel groups present in Zimbabwe. Despite highly porous borders, there are no significant security threats in the country’s border regions. In June 2018, a blast at a ZANU-PF campaign rally killed two and injured at least 49, including senior party members. Police have not yet closed the case, and DFAT does not have any specific information regarding potential perpetrators. DFAT is not aware of any other significant terrorist attacks in recent years.

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3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS

RACE/NATIONALITY Article 56 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, colour, tribe, place of birth, ethnic or social origin, custom, or culture. Article 63 guarantees the right of citizens to use the language of their choice and participate in the cultural life of their choice. Section 42 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (2004) criminalises causing offence to persons of a particular race, tribe, place of origin, colour, creed, or religion, and provides for punishment of a fine, up to one year’s imprisonment, or both. Human rights observers report that race and ethnicity remain significant factors of life in Zimbabwe, which may affect an individual’s ability to access opportunities available to other Zimbabweans.

Ndebele The Ndebele, who migrated to what is now Zimbabwe from South Africa in the mid-18th century, are Zimbabwe’s largest ethnic and linguistic minority. They are based predominantly in the south-western Matabeleland and Midlands provinces, and are the majority population in Bulawayo. There are also Ndebele populations in other southern African countries. The Ndebele do not differ physically from Shona-speaking Zimbabweans, but are distinguishable by their linguistic differences and identifiable names. Ndebele participate in all areas of Zimbabwean society, including government, business, civil society, and politics, although not proportionally. Many Ndebele have played prominent roles in public life, including as Vice Presidents, Ministers, and key opposition figures. In the lead-up to the 30 July 2018 elections, human rights observers reported that neither the ruling nor the opposition parties publicly disparaged any race or ethnicity. Ndebele and Shona generally co-exist harmoniously in daily life, and intermarriages are relatively common. DFAT is not aware of any recent cases in which Ndebele have been harassed or physically attacked on the basis of their ethnicity. Ndebele representatives report, however, that Ndebele are generally unable to obtain positions of power and roles within state bodies, particularly the security services. Shona speakers from Mashonaland occupy most senior politically appointed posts in the south-western provinces and in Bulawayo, and have reportedly consistently demonstrated bias in selecting service providers from Mashonaland for development projects within Matabeleland. There has been a comparative lack of government spending in the south-west, which has high rates of poverty. The lack of any formal acknowledgment or accountability for the Gukurahundi remains a major source of resentment for most Ndebele, although there has now been some government action on this front (see Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances). DFAT assesses that Ndebele face a moderate level of official discrimination in that systemic marginalisation makes them far less likely than Shona to be able to achieve senior positions in state institutions, despite the lack of any official policy of discrimination. Societal discrimination is unlikely to include violence and is less likely to occur in areas in which Ndebele are the majority population.

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White Zimbabweans The term ‘white Zimbabwean’ is used to refer to Zimbabweans of European ethnic origin. The white Zimbabwean population is predominantly of British descent, with smaller groups of people from Afrikaner, Jewish, Greek and Portuguese backgrounds. The white population of then-Rhodesia was recorded as almost 300,000 in 1975, but declined significantly following independence. The 2012 census recorded 28,732 white Zimbabweans, although this number may be an underestimation given some white Zimbabweans are believed to have classified themselves as ‘African’. The majority of white Zimbabweans reside in Harare or Bulawayo, and most work in the private sector. Many white Zimbabweans have played an active role in politics, including serving in Ministerial roles during the GNU. Mnangagwa appointed former Olympic swimming gold medallist Minister for Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation in September 2018 (Coventry did not compete in the July 2018 elections and is not a parliamentarian). DFAT is unaware of whether any white Zimbabweans are currently serving in the state security services, and believes it unlikely to be the case. Under Mugabe, state media and senior government officials (particularly Mugabe himself) routinely blamed Zimbabwe’s economic and political problems on western countries and (by extension) the white minority. Human rights observers report that this practice has considerably reduced in scale under Mnangagwa, although the government did organise a poorly attended demonstration against western sanctions in Harare in October 2019. In-country sources report that ZANU-PF officials and traditional chiefs in some regional areas continue to push the old line, however. There have reportedly been cases in which local officials in rural areas have summoned white farmers to appear before them and subjected them to low- level harassment, although this has not generally involved violence. In March 2018, the government amended the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act (2008), which required foreign-owned companies to offer at least 51 per cent of their shares to indigenous (black) Zimbabweans. Under the changes, the application of the law was limited to designated diamond and platinum extraction businesses only. DFAT understands that prior to the amendment, authorities had enforced the Act inconsistently, and that it had not tended to impact significantly upon white small business owners. The Land Reform Policy (see Recent history) had a substantial impact on the white community, particularly on commercial farmers. At the beginning of 2000, state media published details of every white- owned farm in the country, declaring them state property. The government took control of over 4,000 farms nationwide from 2000-15, the majority of which were white-owned. In most cases, the confiscation of farms was preceded by government-backed ‘invasions’ by ZANU-PF youth brigades and informal militia groups, including self-declared war veterans (see Informal Militias). Farm invasions were often violent, involving physical attacks, property theft, and other forms of harassment against landowners and labourers (both white and black). In a small number of cases, the invasions resulted in the killings of farmers and farm workers. Farmers evicted from their properties – where most of their life earnings were invested – were not compensated, resulting in scores of former farmers and farm workers being left destitute. Authorities swiftly transferred the titles of most seized farms to politically connected individuals, who included senior ZANU-PF officials (see also Corruption) and judges (see Judiciary). Estimates of the number of remaining white commercial farmers nationwide range from 300-500. The majority of these are dairy farmers, a sector largely spared from the land acquisition program due to the government considering dairy a strategically important economic sector. Mnangagwa has openly acknowledged the failure of Mugabe-era land policies and has made a number of changes around land ownership since assuming power, departing from the unyielding and racially

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tinged stance that characterised the government’s approach under Mugabe. Mnangagwa has publicly said that landholding will no longer be based on ethnicity but on one’s ability to produce, meaning white farmers can apply for 99-year land leases on an equal footing with black farmers, rather than the five-year leases available under Mugabe. The government has given permission to around 245,000 black farmers who acquired farms under the land reform program to sublet or lease their farms, opening up opportunities for white and black farmers to form joint venture partnerships. In December 2017, the government permitted a white commercial farmer in Manicaland to return to his farm after police carrying AK-47 rifles and using teargas had forced him to leave it in June 2017. The government also intervened to stop the eviction of a commercial farmer in Manicaland Province in July 2018, after the ZANU-PF provincial minister had reportedly ordered the farmer off the land so that she could give the farm to her son. Observers report that although widespread land invasions have ceased, sporadic cases continue to occur, particularly in Manicaland. Such takeovers are reportedly often led by either district/provincial administrators, or customary leaders. DFAT is aware of cases where government officials have intervened to prevent the land being taken over. Article 295 of the 2013 Constitution states that any person whose agricultural land was acquired by the State and whose property rights were guaranteed or protected by the government is entitled to compensation for the land and any improvements in accordance with that agreement. Articles 296 and 297 set out the role and functions of the Zimbabwe Land Commission (ZLC), established in 2015, which provides a mechanism for dispossessed farmers to claim compensation for confiscated lands. According to the CFU, the ZLC has, to date, functioned primarily as an arbiter in zoning disputes, rather than as a compensation mechanism. To DFAT’s knowledge, besides the aforementioned December 2017 Manicaland instance, there have been no other cases in which authorities have returned seized farms to their owners. The CFU has reported that none of its members has yet received a 99-year lease, citing in part a cumbersome application process set by the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement. The Mnangagwa administration has undertaken to compensate the owners of seized farms in line with Article 72 of the 2013 Constitution, which states that compensation for acquired land should be paid only for improvements effected upon it, rather than for the land itself. Compensation of this kind was paid for the first time in October 2019, although DFAT understands the sum involved was minimal. Hard-line elements within ZANU-PF have criticised moves to compensate white farmers at all, arguing that land is the birthright of black Zimbabweans. Given Zimbabwe’s considerable economic challenges, it is unclear how the government will be able to afford to fund the compensation exercise. DFAT assesses that white Zimbabweans face a moderate level of official discrimination in that long- standing government practice and rhetoric continues to limit their access to state-sector employment opportunities open to other Zimbabweans. Despite recent improvements in the overall environment, there continues to be considerable legal uncertainty in relation to the commercial farm sector. It remains unclear when or if white farmers who were the owners of seized properties will be able to access compensation, or how substantial such compensation will actually be.

RELIGION Article 60 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, including the freedom to practise, propagate, and give expression to religion in public or in private and whether alone or with others. No person may be compelled to take an oath contrary to their religion or belief or in a manner contrary to their religion or belief, and religious communities are free to establish institutions where religious instruction may be given. Religious groups operating schools or medical facilities must register these institutions with the

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appropriate ministry. Religious groups themselves are not required to register, but most do in order to maintain a tax-exempt status. Religion, and religious institutions, play an important role in the life of most Zimbabweans. Most official state and school gatherings and functions include nondenominational Christian prayers. According to a 2015 official survey, 86 per cent of the population was Christian, 11 per cent reported no religious affiliation, less than two per cent adhered solely to traditional beliefs, and less than one per cent was Muslim. There are also very small numbers of people who identify as Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or Baha’i. Of the total population, 37 per cent was Apostolic, 21 per cent Pentecostal, 16 per cent other Protestant, seven per cent Roman Catholic, and five per cent other Christian. While there are no reliable statistics regarding the percentage of the Christian population that is syncretic, many Christians also associate themselves with traditional practices, and religious leaders have reported a continued increase in syncretism. DFAT is not aware of any instances of significant sectarian or communal discord between members of the various religious groups on the basis of their religion. During the Mugabe era, authorities frequently used security-based laws to target religious gatherings or prayer rallies perceived to be politically motivated. Security services also reportedly monitored or harassed church congregations and religiously affiliated NGOs and their members, including through surveillance and denial of police permission to hold public events. For example: - In June 2017, police arrested a church leader for participating in a prayer meeting with university students following their protest against a rise in student fees. Police charged the church leader with subversion and with participating in a gathering with intent to promote public violence and disorderly conduct, although courts subsequently cleared him of all charges. - In July 2017, police questioned a Bishop over the launch of a ‘Christian vote’ campaign aimed at mobilising Christians to participate in the 2018 general election. - In October 2017, police in Matabeleland South barricaded the road to a memorial service that included prayers to commemorate the Gukurahundi victims (see Recent history). Christian aid organisations and local NGOs focused on memorialising victims of the Gukurahundi reported that security officials monitored their activities with increasing frequency in the lead-up to the 30 July 2018 elections, particularly in areas considered opposition strongholds. DFAT understands that, while the prevalence of politically motivated surveillance and harassment of religious groups has reduced since Mugabe’s departure, some cases have occurred under the Mnangagwa administration. Religious institutions have occasionally engaged in the political sphere to promote and encourage peace and national unity without suffering reprisal. The Zimbabwean Council of Churches was highly active in promoting reconciliation after the 30 July 2018 election, and met with the leaders of the national security services in April 2019. The ecumenical Heads of Christian Denominations issued a statement in May 2019 that called for genuine dialogue among stakeholders, respect for human rights, and the lifting of international sanctions. Both prior to and following the 30 July 2018 elections, multiple church organisations released letters appealing for tolerance, national unity, peace, reconciliation, healing, and stability, while calling on the government to uphold the Constitution and protect citizens’ rights. DFAT assesses that most cases in which authorities have targeted religious groups for monitoring or harassment have been motivated by political considerations. Discrimination based solely on religion is rare. While high-profile religious leaders who engage in political discourse deemed as critical of the ruling party or its leadership may face official sanction; this is unlikely to be the case for ordinary members of religious congregations.

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POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) The 2013 Constitution guarantees citizens the rights to: freedom of assembly and association (Article 58); freedom to demonstrate and to present petitions peacefully (Article 59); freedom of conscience; including the right to practise, propagate, and give expression to their thought, opinion, religion, or belief (Article 60); freedom of expression, including freedom of the media (Article 61); and political rights, including the rights to form, join, and participate in the activities of a political party or organisation, to campaign freely and peacefully, to participate in peaceful political activity, to participate in peaceful activities to influence, challenge, or support the policies of the government or any other cause, and to make political choices freely in free, fair, and regular elections for public office (Article 67). Legislative restrictions have considerably constrained these constitutional freedoms in practice. Authorities have regularly used vaguely worded provisions within the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and other security-based laws, such as the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CLCRA), to curtail political rights, particularly the freedoms of assembly and expression. POSA allows police to prohibit or disperse a gathering based on security concerns (while requiring police to file a court affidavit detailing the reasons behind the denial), and states that if a person was killed as a result of the use of reasonably justifiable force in dispersing the gathering, the killing should be deemed lawful. It also requires organisers to notify police of their intention to hold a public gathering (defined as 15 or more individuals) seven days in advance, penalising failure to do so with penalties of up to USD10,000 or six months’ imprisonment or both. Partisan policing, particularly of demonstrations, and targeted prosecutions has worsened the impact of the repressive provisions within these laws. In accordance with its commitment to align legislation with the 2013 Constitution, the Mnangagwa government has replaced POSA with the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA). MOPA was signed into law on 15 November 2019 following significant public consultation, including input from civil society organisations and the international community. The Parliamentary Legal Committee (PLC) reviewed and rejected an earlier version of the draft bill in May 2019, citing the unconstitutionality of various sections, but withdrew its objections after parliament issued a notice of amendments. In-country sources report that, overall, MOPA represents a subtle improvement on POSA in terms of strengthening political freedoms. MOPA includes a preamble intended to aid in interpreting when MOPA may be used to limit constitutionally enshrined freedoms of association, assembly, and demonstration. It also places additional requirements on authorities. For example, MOPA limits the grounds on which a demonstration may be refused; prevents authorities from temporarily prohibiting any and all demonstrations; requires the ‘regulatory authority’ to respond to certain types of notices within a fixed timeframe; and ensures that only the President, rather than the Defence Minister, may order deployment of the military. Nevertheless, the real test of whether MOPA will increase political freedoms in practice will lie in its implementation. Public confidence in the broader political reform agenda has been set back considerably by the two recent cases in which security forces have used lethal forces against demonstrators, resulting in mass casualties. In addition to the 1 August 2018 post-election violence, security forces reportedly killed at least 17 demonstrators in mid-January 2019 during nationwide protests (‘the fuel protests’) against the government’s announcement of a forthcoming 150 per cent fuel price increase. Fourteen of those killed were shot dead reportedly by security forces using live ammunition. Two died from injuries sustained following severe beatings, while in another case an army truck ran over and killed a 54-year old woman in unclear circumstances. Most of the 14 men and three women killed were from the Harare area. The Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights reportedly provided emergency medical services to 81 people with gunshot injuries in various locations nationwide in the period between 14-21 January 2019.

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Authorities significantly restricted the freedom of citizens to assemble and demonstrate throughout 2019. Although the MDC was able to hold nationwide rallies to mark the one-year anniversary of the 1 August 2018 post-election violence, authorities have blocked most attempts to hold demonstrations in relation to the deteriorating economy. After initially accepting an application from the MDC to hold street demonstrations in Harare on 16 August 2019, the ZRP then issued a prohibition notice, claiming to have evidence that the protests would turn violent (it was subsequently revealed that the ‘evidence’ was the discovery of a cache of stones and other projectiles being hoarded by street children). Hundreds of police armed with automatic weapons, batons, and water cannon reportedly set up checkpoints on major roads and blocked access to MDC headquarters in Harare, while police used loudhailers to warn residents against participating in the demonstrations. After the High Court rejected an application by the MDC to overturn the ZRP’s prohibition notice, riot police used tear gas and batons to disperse a small number of protesters who had gathered in defiance of the ban, with at least one person reported to have sustained injuries requiring hospitalisation. Authorities subsequently prohibited demonstrations planned for 19 and 20 August 2019 in Bulawayo and Gweru respectively. There are no official restrictions on individuals criticising the government, or on the discussion of matters of general public interest. In practice, authorities have been sensitive to criticism of the government in general, and particularly in cases when it has been perceived to be directed towards Mnangagwa personally. Despite a Supreme Court challenge, authorities have continued to charge persons accused of insulting the president and his office under section 33(2)(b) of the CLCRA (undermining authority of or insulting a president). In October 2018, the ZRP cited the law when arresting a man who had given testimony at a commission of inquiry hearing in Bulawayo in which he accused Mnangagwa of complicity in the Gukurahundi (see Recent history). In September 2018, police cited a different section of the CLCRA (section 41(b), relating to disorderly conduct) while arresting a Harare man who had reportedly said that Mnangagwa was incapable of running the country. DFAT is not aware of the outcome of either of these cases. There have also been a number of recent cases in which perceived critics of the government have been temporarily abducted and mistreated by unknown assailants, widely believed to be state security authorities (see Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances). DFAT assesses that the ability of Zimbabweans to criticise the government and express dissent publicly, either collectively or individually, is limited in practice. Authorities are likely to use broad interpretations of national security legislation to prevent political demonstrations from occurring where possible. Zimbabweans attempting to demonstrate without authorisation – and, to some extent, even with authorisation – face a high risk of violence from state authorities. Individuals who are perceived as being personally critical of Mnangagwa face a risk of both legal sanction and possible violence from state authorities.

Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) The MDC is Zimbabwe’s primary opposition party. It was founded in 1999 following a civil society convention in Harare aimed at coalescing groups and individuals opposed to the changes proposed in a 2000 constitutional referendum that would have further strengthened the powers of the presidency (see Recent history). The MDC’s inaugural leader was former trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai, and the party retains strong civil society and labour movement connections. The party’s policies are generally characterised as centre-left in nature. The MDC’s electoral heartland is the major cities, particularly Harare and Bulawayo, and the south-western provinces. The MDC’s current membership is 1.5 million nationwide. MDC members join at the Branch level (for ordinary members) and are expected to attend party meetings and events for at least one year before elevation to the Ward level (for activists).

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The MDC’s establishment presented Zimbabweans the first genuine alternative in years to Mugabe and ZANU-PF rule, with its appeal to voters heightened by the country’s economic decline and growing authoritarianism. Despite consistent and credible allegations of electoral irregularities and government intimidation, the MDC has been highly competitive in Zimbabwean elections since its establishment: - the MDC won 57 of the 120 popularly elected seats in the June 2000 parliamentary elections, winning all seats in Harare and Bulawayo, and all bar two seats in Matabeleland; - Tsvangirai won 42 per cent of the vote in the 2002 presidential election, Zimbabwe’s closest presidential election since independence; - Despite a reduced share of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the MDC again won virtually all of the seats in Harare and Bulawayo and a majority of seats in Matabeleland; - Tsvangirai and the MDC claimed victory in the March 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, but were forced to contest a presidential run-off election in June 2008. Tsvangirai subsequently withdrew from the ballot in response to a campaign of violence against MDC supporters (see Political System). Internationally-brokered negotiations resulted in the creation of the GNU, with Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as Prime Minister; - Significant MDC in-fighting during the GNU period contributed to a poor performance in the July 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections, and the party subsequently splintered into numerous personality-based factions; - The two largest factions formed an electoral pact (MDC Alliance) for the July 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections under the leadership of Nelson Chamisa. Although ZANU-PF comfortably defeated the MDC in the parliamentary election, Chamisa claimed victory in the presidential poll and maintains that he is the rightful leader of Zimbabwe. The MDC Alliance factions formally re-united as the MDC in September 2018. Since the MDC’s establishment, the government has responded to the threat the new party represented by restricting its ability to operate freely in the political sphere. In working to achieve this outcome, the government has utilised state authorities, including the intelligence services, judiciary, police, and military; and non-state actors, including ZANU-PF youth activists, government-backed militia and war veterans. Authorities have regularly subjected MDC leaders, members, and supporters to harassment (including physical violence), intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and judicial harassment; have used security-based legislation to prevent the MDC from holding public gatherings or political meetings; and have often violently dispersed such events when held (see Political System). Both state authorities and ZANU-PF activists have regularly carried out violent attacks targeting MDC activists and supporters, particularly around elections. Politically motivated violence has affected MDC members and supporters at all levels, including the senior leadership. In March 2007, for example, Tsvangirai was severely beaten while in detention after riot police broke up an unauthorised prayer meeting in Harare, fatally shooting one attendee. Government discrimination against the MDC and its supporters has occurred in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, particularly Mashonaland, human rights observers report that ZANU-PF has discouraged citizens from supporting the MDC by manipulating the distribution of government-funded food and agricultural products. In some cases, village chiefs have reportedly required recipients to possess ZANU-PF identity documents, while in other cases ZANU-PF officials have distributed goods at party meetings. The 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (see Demography), in which police forcibly displaced thousands of urban dwellers under the pretext of preventing the emergence of slums, disproportionately affected MDC supporters and is generally understood to have been motivated by a desire to dilute political opposition in high-density urban areas.

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In a number of cases, state prosecutors have brought legal charges against senior MDC figures in cases generally seen as politically motivated. Tsvangirai, for example, was charged with treason in 2002 in relation to an alleged plot to kill Mugabe that focused on a grainy video recorded by hidden cameras of a meeting with an Israeli political consultant. Although a court acquitted Tsvangirai in October 2004 after a year-long trial, the drawn-out court proceedings prevented him from leading an effective political opposition during this time. Other MDC officials have faced charges relating to their economic interests, including MDC Secretary-General Douglas Mwonzora who was charged in September 2016 with abusing trust funds. Similar charges have not been used against ZANU-PF officials, despite their access to state funds and significant evidence suggesting abuse of the same (see Corruption). While ever-present, the level of intensity and focus of official harassment against MDC members and supporters has varied according to circumstance. Overt politically motivated violence reportedly declined significantly in the years after 2008, which analysts have attributed to the politically stabilising GNU period and the weakened threat posed by the splintered MDC after its 2013 election defeat. During this period, harassment against the MDC still occurred but generally took more subtle forms aimed at establishing and consolidating political and electoral influence. While lower-level members were targeted through biased land and food distribution and housing destructions, for example, higher ranking officials and parliamentarians were more likely to be subjected to judicial harassment or intimidation, including occasional death threats. The levels of overt violence against MDC Alliance candidates and supporters ahead of and during the 30 July 2018 election (see Political System) was well below that of previous elections, particularly those of March 2008. The level of harassment against MDC members and supporters has reportedly increased considerably since the disputed 30 July 2018 election (see also Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances). Security authorities targeted MDC leaders and activists for arrest in the wake of both the 1 August 2018 post-election violence and the January 2019 fuel protests, (see Political Opinion (actual or imputed)), and a number of senior MDC figures face serious charges. Authorities have prevented the party from holding further demonstrations throughout 2019 (see Political Opinion (actual or imputed)). MDC members and supporters also increasingly face a risk of violence and harassment from within their own ranks in the form of intra-party violence (see Security situation). In-country sources have expressed concerns over the increasing role of a youth element known as the ‘Vanguard’, which reportedly acts as a private army in support of Chamisa. The Vanguard has reportedly been responsible for much of the MDC’s intra-party violence, including the attack on the female vice-president of a rival faction during Tsvangirai’s funeral in February 2018 (see Women). In March 2018, Chamisa supporters reportedly assaulted supporters of a rival MDC faction during a party meeting in Bulawayo, while supporters of two rival MDC Alliance candidates reportedly assaulted each other during a brawl in Harare in June 2018 ahead of the 30 July 2018 election. DFAT assesses that MDC members and supporters at all levels face a moderate risk of official discrimination, in that the government continues to use state authorities to restrict their ability to operate freely in the political sphere. The level and intensity of discrimination will vary according to location, and is likely to be higher in rural areas in which ZANU-PF is in the political ascendency. The discrimination may include harassment, intimidation, threatened or actual violence, and judicial harassment. The risk is likely to be higher for those involved in direct political activism, including through organising (or attempting to organise) and/or participate in street protests.

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Non-MDC Opposition Parties As noted in Political Opinion (actual or imputed), 55 political parties competed in the most recent national election. Most of these parties were newly formed, had overlapping platforms, had little to no public profile nationally, and received negligible levels of voter support. DFAT understands that officials are likely to tighten the nomination process for future elections (in particular presidential elections), with conditions likely to include candidates being nominated by at least 1,000 supporters and an increased nomination fee. The National Patriotic Front (NPF), founded in November 2017 by members of the expelled ZANU-PF G40 faction that supported Grace Mugabe (see Recent history), was the only non-ZANU-PF or MDC Alliance- affiliated party to win a lower house seat (in Midlands Province), while one independent candidate won a seat in Mashonaland West. Although NGOs reported numerous instances in which ZANU-PF supporters removed opposition parties’ and independent candidates’ campaign signs and materials in wards throughout the country during the election campaign, DFAT is not aware of any cases in which security forces or ZANU- PF activists physically targeted members of opposition parties other than the MDC Alliance. DFAT assesses that members and supporters of non-MDC opposition parties are unlikely to face the same overall level of discrimination as their MDC counterparts because the parties they follow do not represent a significant threat to the government. This risk may be higher in rural areas controlled by ZANU- PF.

GROUPS OF INTEREST

Civil Society Activists Article 58 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly and association. Article 67 guarantees citizens the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of any organisation of their choice, and to participate in peaceful activities to influence, challenge or support the activities of the government or any political or other cause. The Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Act (2007) is the primary legislation governing civil society organisation (CSO) activities. It requires that all CSOs be registered with the PVO Board in order to carry out activities or undertake fundraising. Local organisations can register through district services offices in the area where their headquarters are located. International organisations must sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government ministries relevant to their areas of technical operations that clearly states the proposed activities and geographic areas to be covered by the organisations. The PVOB Board may deny the application for registration if an organisation appears unable to abide by the objectives stated in its application, or if its constitution and management fail to comply with the PVO Act. Penalties for managers of unregistered CSOs that conduct activities or fundraise include up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine of up to USD200 or both. The PVO Act allows the government to deregister any CSO that fails to comply with its conditions of registration, has been subject to maladministration, or has engaged in illegal activities. CSOs can also be deregistered if, in the opinion of the Minister, ‘it is necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest’. While there is no publicly available record or database of registered legal CSOs, unconfirmed statements by government officials put the number of CSOs operating in Zimbabwe at over 20,000. CSOs conduct activities on a wide range of social, cultural, political, and economic issues. A number of domestic and international NGOs investigate and publish their findings on human rights cases.

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Following independence, and as the socio-political situation deteriorated in the late 1990s, there was a strong emphasis from CSOs towards issues dealing with democracy and governance. Zimbabwe’s political opposition has its roots in civil society and labour movement activities from this period, and many MDC figures retain strong civil society connections. The Mugabe government routinely rejected calls for greater civil society engagement in political affairs throughout its time in office. Authorities used provisions within a number of laws, particularly the PVO Act, POSA, and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, to interfere with the ability of CSOs to operate effectively on socio-political issues, particularly human rights. CSOs were also frequently subjected to attacks from state-sponsored media, arbitrary arrests, harassment, intimidation, and occasional physical attacks by state authorities and/or ZANU-PF activists. While the GNU pledged to pursue a progressive legislative reform agenda that would open up more democratic working space for CSOs, this proved largely cosmetic. CSO efforts in the post-GNU period to amend restrictive laws governing CSO regulation and association, assembly, and expression rights to bring them in line with the new Constitution were largely unsuccessful. In-country sources report that there has been little practical change to CSOs’ operating environment under Mnangagwa. Security authorities reportedly remain suspicious of the motivations of CSOs and see their activities as a threat to national stability, particularly in the wake of the January 2019 fuel protests. Following these protests, authorities charged an unprecedented 22 people (including prominent CSO leaders and activists) with subverting a constitutional government, which carries a penalty of up to 20 years’ imprisonment. At least 10 individuals face treason charges, for which the death penalty is applicable. In May 2019, authorities arrested seven civil society activists on return to Zimbabwe after they had attended a capacity-building workshop in the Maldives on non-violent protest actions and strategies. The activists face charges of subverting a constitutional government and are yet to face trial, although preliminary hearings have taken place. One of the seven activists was subsequently abducted from his home, severely beaten, and dumped (see Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances). After the aborted August 2019 protests in Harare, authorities reportedly arrested 128 activists in Harare and an undisclosed number nationwide. In addition to the substantial number of high profile arrests and charges, human rights observers report that the general operating environment for CSOs remains difficult. Like other Zimbabweans, CSOs have been significantly impacted by the ongoing economic crisis, which has placed considerable limitations on their ability to carry out activities. Authorities have continued to deny requests by CSOs to hold public events if their proposed agenda conflicts with government policy positions. State media has continued to disparage CSOs critical of government, often accusing them of seeking regime change. DFAT assesses that civil society activists who work in areas perceived by the government as being political, including those connected to human rights, face a high risk of official discrimination, which may include harassment, intimidation, monitoring, arrest, and judicial harassment.

Media Article 61 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of the media. It provides specific guarantees in relation to: the protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources of information; the free establishment for broadcasting and other electronic media of communication; and the freedom of state- owned media to determine independently the editorial content of their broadcasts, while requiring them to be impartial and to afford fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions. Article 61 also prohibits incitement to violence, advocacy of hatred or hate speech, malicious injury to a person’s reputation or dignity, or malicious or unwarranted breaches of a person’s right to privacy. Article 62 guarantees the right of access to any information held by the state or its institutions or agencies in so far as

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the information is required in the interests of public accountability or for the exercise or protection of a right. It does allow for the restriction of access to information in the interests of defence, public security, or professional confidentiality. Zimbabwe remains a very traditional media environment. Radio is the principal medium of public communication, particularly for the rural majority. The state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation operates two television networks and four radio stations, while two national private FM radio stations are also licensed. Observers report that authorities have consistently refused to grant licenses to community radio stations, and commercial radio licenses have generally gone to state-controlled companies or individuals with close links to ZANU-PF. State-run media, managed by the Ministry of Media, Information, Publicity, and Broadcasting Services, is most prevalent. Its strongly pro-government line was recognised by a number of observer missions as being particularly evident in the coverage of the 30 July 2018 election (see Political System). Several active independent newspapers and commercial radio stations express a wide variety of views. International satellite broadcasting is available through private firms, but is too expensive for most citizens. Most international media outlets operate in Zimbabwe, including the BBC, CNN, and Al-Jazeera. Foreign reporters pay considerably more for permits and accreditation than do their local counterparts: in 2018, the ZMC charged foreign reporters USD200 for a foreigner’s 60-day accreditation, while local journalists paid USD10 for a one-year accreditation. The ZEC charged journalists covering the 30 July 2018 election an additional USD50 fee for further accreditation to election-related events and facilities. In September 2018, authorities reportedly denied a passport application for a freelance journalist who had previously worked for a London-based radio station and who had lived in exile for nearly 15 years. Authorities have not disclosed the reasons for the denial. A number of restrictive laws undermine the constitutional protections relating to the freedom of the media in practice. According to media advocates, particular laws of concern include (or have included): the Official Secrets Act (1970, last amended 2002), the Broadcasting Services Act, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), POSA and CLCRA. These laws inhibit the ability of journalists and media outlets to report freely; severely limit what journalists may publish; grant authorities a wide range of powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined; and mandate harsh penalties for violators, including long prison sentences. Media registration and accreditation laws also allow the government to maintain censorship by prohibiting the ‘abuse of free expression’. The government has undertaken to replace the AIPPA with a law fully aligned to the 2013 Constitution. DFAT understands that three new pieces of legislation will replace the AIPPA: the Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill, the Freedom of Information Bill, and the Data Protection Bill. While the first two bills have both been gazetted and are currently the subject of consultation and consideration by parliament, the Data Protection Bill is yet to be publicly released. Amendments to the Broadcasting Services Act are also anticipated. Authorities have routinely used the threat of prosecution under these laws to discourage perceived reporting critical of the government, a practice that has continued under Mnangagwa. As a result, most journalists have tended to practice self-censorship in their reporting, particularly in relation to sensitive issues such as the military or high-level corruption. Human rights observers report that security forces, officials, and supporters of major political parties continue to harass journalists routinely, including through arrest, obstruction, or threatened or actual violence. Some recent examples include: - In April 2018, police arrested a newspaper editor after he was seen taking pictures at a ZANU-PF meeting, charging him with criminal trespassing. The editor was released after paying a fine;

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- In May 2018, the Deputy Minister of Justice assaulted a radio host and his wife during a live radio broadcast after the host released a video recording of an internal ZANU-PF meeting in which the Deputy Minister said the military would not recognise Chamisa as president if he won the 30 July 2018 election. When the radio host attempted to file a police complaint regarding the assault, he was told that the Deputy Minister had already made a complaint identifying him as the aggressor; - Also in May 2018, MDC Alliance supporters allegedly manhandled a photographer with a state media outlet covering demonstrations at the party’s Harare headquarters, demanding he delete the pictures he had taken; - Security forces assaulted at least four journalists attempting to cover the 1 August 2018 post- election demonstrations, including beating them using leather whips and electric cables and a riot shield; - In March 2019, security forces arrested a documentary filmmaker and charged him under the CLCRA with possession of an offensive weapon at a public gathering after he arrived at State House in Bulawayo for a meeting between Mnangagwa and civil society organisations with a used tear gas canister in his car. The charges carry a maximum five-year prison sentence or a fine of USD2,000. The filmmaker had been questioned by police in September 2018 about a documentary he had produced about the Gukurahundi, for which he had also received death threats. In September 2018, the Media Institute of Southern Africa condemned what it described as the systematic censorship, banning, or expulsion of journalists from public events, stating that the trend was against the letter and spirit of media freedoms as espoused in the Constitution. Reporters Without Borders ranked Zimbabwe 127th out of 179 countries in its 2019 World Press Freedom Index. According to official government data, 52 per cent of Zimbabweans had access to the internet as of mid-2018. The ongoing lack of electricity, however, raises doubts about the general availability of internet access to the ordinary citizen (see Economic overview). The International Telecommunication Union reported, however, that only 23 per cent of the population used the internet in 2017. Although mobile phone penetration stands at 88 per cent (according to official government data), millions of Zimbabweans remain virtually unconnected due to poor network coverage in remote areas or lack of affordable services. Zimbabwe has some of the most expensive mobile data in the world. In October/November 2018, one gigabyte cost USD75 per month, well beyond the means of the ordinary citizen. Internet users are mainly urban elites. WhatsApp is reportedly the most popular form of messaging app, followed by Facebook and Twitter. The information and communications technology (ICT) market is diverse, with 12 licensed internet access providers and 27 internet service providers (ISPs). The government maintains ownership of two of the five international gateways for internet traffic and three of the five mobile service providers. The government also asserts its control through POTRAZ (the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe), a government parastatal tasked with the regulation of telecommunications and postal services, including the internet. Under the Postal and Telecommunications (Subscriber Registration) Regulations (2013), subscribers are required to register with all telecommunications service providers, providing details that include their full name, permanent residential address, and national ID number. Network operators are required to retain this information for five years after the subscriber or operator has discontinued service. The regulations also require ISPs to provide POTRAZ with copies of their subscriber registry to enable POTRAZ ‘to assist law enforcement agencies on safeguarding national security’. The Interception of Communications Act (2007) permits the government to monitor all communications in the country, including internet transmissions. The Act requires telecommunications operators and ISPs to install necessary surveillance technology at their own expense and to intercept

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information on the state’s behalf, penalising failure to comply with a fine and up to three years’ imprisonment. The Act authorises the Minister for Information to issue warrants allowing the monitoring and interception of communication at the Minister’s discretion, meaning there is no judicial oversight or other independent safeguard against abuse. The extent and frequency of monitoring remains unknown. In-country sources have reported that authorities are currently prosecuting a number of individuals in relation to online postings alleging untoward military involvement in the 30 July 2018 election. In August 2018, police charged a man with criminal nuisance for allegedly posting offensive statements on Facebook concerning Mnangagwa, but withdrew the charges two days later (see also Political Opinion (actual or imputed)). Human rights observers have expressed concern that several forthcoming policies will serve to tighten further the government’s control over the internet and online activities. In March 2018, Mnangagwa launched the National Policy for Information and Communications Technology (NPICT), initially introduced by the Mugabe administration in 2015. The NPICT details plans to establish a single national ICT ‘backbone’, to be owned by various public and private shareholders but ultimately controlled by the government. When introduced, this will make it easier for authorities to restrict access to the internet and mobile networks, and to order and impose internet disruptions. The government is also in the process of introducing a Computer Crime and Cybercrime Bill, which will place considerable restrictions on online freedom of restriction when passed. The proposed bill penalises the dissemination of communications with intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, threaten, bully, or cause substantial emotional damage with a fine, prison sentence of up to ten years, or both; and penalises the spreading of false information with an intent to cause psychological or economic harm with a fine, prison sentence of up to five years, or both. While the government has claimed the bill is focused on addressing financial crimes, human rights observers have expressed concern that it will instead be used to target political activists. Opponents of the bill have also criticised it for the vague language used in its provisions, and for providing too much discretionary power to the police to access personal or private information through a warrant from a magistrate, who may lack independence (see Judiciary). Human rights observers report that arrests in relation to online activity and threatening statements from government officials about posting critical content have led to an increase in self-censorship among online users. Human rights observers report that ‘fake news’ has become increasingly prevalent. There was a notable increase in unverified reports, false information, and rumours disseminated on social media during the November 2017 military intervention, including stories that a number of Mugabe’s allies had been arrested or killed. False information also fuelled political attacks on the opposition in the lead up to the 30 July 2018 elections: the state media reported incorrectly, for example, that Chamisa had been mingling with Mugabe ahead of the vote. While the government and military have denounced fake news, NGOs have reported that ZANU-PF has paid pro-government commentators on social media to defend the administration and attack opponents online. While addressing ZANU-PF youths in March 2018, Mnangagwa was reported as urging them to ‘dominate’ the social media space in the lead-up to the 30 July 2018 elections. The period following saw a noticeable increase in attacks on perceived government opponents, including human rights defenders and opposition party members, from anonymous social media accounts. During the January 2019 fuel protests, the government issued directives from the president’s office, channelled through POTRAZ, instructing all mobile and fixed telephony companies in the country to restrict access to entire networks on the grounds of national security. This resulted in total network shutdowns in Harare and Bulawayo, and restricted access to social media platforms and messaging apps nationwide. Services were restored after the High Court ruled that the government did not have the authority to order mobile operators to restrict services. Despite the High Court’s ruling, government officials have not ruled out shutting down internet services in the future, and have repeatedly described access to social media as a potential threat.

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DFAT assesses that journalists attempting to cover sensitive topics such as the military and high-level corruption face a moderate risk of official discrimination in the form of harassment, intimidation, obstruction, and threatened or actual violence. Such journalists are likely to seek to minimise these risks through practising self-censorship. DFAT further assesses that Zimbabwean internet users are likely to be subjected to monitoring, may face legal sanction should they post material perceived to be political in nature, and are also likely to practise self-censorship.

Trade Unionists Article 65 of the Constitution guarantees citizens (with the exception of members of the security services) the right to organise and join trade unions, bargain collectively and participate in collective job action, including the right to strike. Various articles of the Labour Act (2002) reflect these rights, including Article 108, which guarantees protection for persons engaged in lawful collective action (including strikes). Article 30, however, prohibits unregistered trade unions from recommending collective job action or accessing other rights guaranteed to unions in the Act. The Labour Court handles labour-related disputes, and is empowered to reinstate directly workers fired due to discrimination, including due to membership of a trade union. The Labour Act empowers the Minister of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare to: regulate union activities such as collecting dues and paying staff salaries; make decisions concerning the equipment and property that may be purchased by trade unions; veto collective bargaining agreements perceived to be harmful to the economy; and appoint investigators who can (without prior notice) enter trade union premises, question employees, and inspect and copy documents. The Labour Amendment Act (2015) empowers the Minister to order an investigation of a trade union or employer’s organisation, and to appoint an administrator to run its affairs. Despite the constitution guaranteeing the right to strike, the law strictly regulates the ability of workers to do so. Lawful strikes are limited to disputes regarding work issues, and a majority of employees must agree to strike in a secret ballot. Strike procedure requirements include a mandatory 30-day reconciliation period and referral to binding arbitration in some cases. Following a failed attempt at conciliation, the party proposing a collective job action must provide 14 days’ written notice of intent to resort to such action, including specifying its grounds, in order to call a strike legally. There are no provisions prohibiting employers from hiring replacement workers in the event of a strike. Military and police members are the only legally recognised essential services employees, and are constitutionally prohibited from striking. The Minister may declare any non-essential service an essential service, however, if a strike is deemed a danger to the population. Employers can sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes, with penalties including fines, up to five years’ imprisonment, or both. Authorities can suspend individual unions for up to a year for organising unlawful strikes. Unions representing at least 50 per cent of workers may bargain collectively on behalf of all workers in an industry, rather than just union members. The Labour Amendment Act, however, gives the Minister the power to veto a collective bargaining agreement if they deem it to be contrary to the public interest. While some Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) affiliates have been able to engage in collective bargaining with employers without government interference, ZCTU members have reported that employers did not generally recognise the right of unions to represent their members’ full interests. According to International Trade Union Confederation reports, employers have frequently abused institutional weaknesses within the Zimbabwean labour law system by creating deadlocks in the bargaining process, thus forestalling a decision within a reasonable timeframe. Employers have reportedly attacked agricultural workers both verbally and physically during negotiations. Human rights observers report that members of trade unions often perceive

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that they are targeted specifically for adverse employment action, and that workers themselves fear the consequences of participating in trade union activities. Zimbabwe has two competing umbrella organisations that claim to represent the interests of the country’s workers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is the older and larger of the two and its membership is strongly pro-MDC, while the smaller Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) is aligned with ZANU-PF. Under Mugabe, security authorities regularly targeted ZCTU members due to their political affiliations. A 2010 commission of inquiry on trade union rights by the International Labour Organization (ILO) identified a clear pattern of intimidation by security forces against ZCTU members nationwide, including arrests, detentions, violence, and torture. The government accepted the recommendations made in the ILO’s report, and has reportedly taken some steps to address the concerns raised. In-country sources report that there were some moves towards reconciliation from the government under Mnangagwa, including a personal meeting between Mnangagwa and the ZCTU leadership. Despite these positive signs, human rights observers report that official interference with trade union activity remains common, and that authorities have withheld or delayed the registration certificates for a number of unions. Although the law does not require unions to notify police of public gatherings, police have reportedly required such notification and have shut down ‘unauthorised’ events. ZANU-PF supporters have also occasionally prevented unions from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organisational activities.Police and intelligence services have reportedly attended and monitored trade union meetings and activities. In October 2018, police arrested the ZCTU president and 35 other trade unionists in Harare and other major city centres as they awaited a court decision to overturn the ban on their planned demonstration against the government’s two per cent tax on electronic transfers. Police had previously denied the ZCTU’s request for a permit. A Harare magistrate subsequently dismissed the ZCTU’s challenge to the police ban. In August 2019, police arrested 10 union officials who had attempted to lobby the Finance Minister over low pay for teachers, along with the group’s lawyer and a journalist attempting to film the arrest. Several prominent union leaders have also been the subject of abductions, allegedly by security authorities (see Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances). Unions have regularly undertaken strike action under the Mnangagwa administration. The January 2019 fuel protests occurred on the first day of a three-day general strike. Junior doctors at public hospitals went on strike in September 2019 over pay and conditions. According to media reporting, hundreds were fired as a result. Junior doctors had undertaken earlier strike action in March, November and December 2018 (see Health). In mid-April 2018, the government fired 16,000 nurses after they went on strike for better working conditions, but reinstated the nurses after mediation. In May 2018, the government agreed to an increase in the proposed pay rise for public sector employees after teachers’ unions threatened to go on strike. In July 2019, public sector workers threatened to go on strike over wages, amid an inflation crisis. DFAT assesses that trade unionists affiliated with the ZCTU face a moderate risk of discrimination in the form of monitoring, intimidation, arrest, and threatened or actual violence, particularly during periods of labour unrest. This risk is higher for those in leadership roles.

Women Article 17 of the Constitution commits the State to promoting full gender balance in Zimbabwean society, requiring the State to promote the full participation of women in all spheres of society on the basis of equality with men and to take all measures (including legislative measures) needed to ensure that both sexes are equally represented in all institutions and agencies of government at every level. The principle of gender equality is further promoted throughout the Constitution, including in Article 56 (2), which guarantees women and men the right to equal treatment and opportunities; Article 65 (6), which guarantees

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women and men the right to equal remuneration for similar work; and Article 80 (3), which states that all laws, customs, traditions, and cultural practices that infringe on the rights of women conferred by the Constitution are void to the extent of the infringement. The ZGC (see Human Rights Framework) is mandated to monitor issues concerning gender equality; investigate possible violations of rights; receive, consider, and action complaints from the public; recommend changes to laws and practices that lead to gender-based discrimination; advise public and private institutions on steps to ensure gender equality; and secure appropriate redress where rights related to gender have been violated. Despite the appointment of commissioners in 2015, the ZGC has been significantly underfunded and has been criticised for lacking sufficient independence from government. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender, and Community Development is the lead government agency addressing women’s rights and gender equality. The Ministry, supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Women, produced a revised National Gender Policy in 2017. ‘Gender Focal Points’ within government ministries have the role of ensuring that ministries comply with gender parity pledges, although they reportedly lack the capacity and power to do so. Numerous laws seek to promote women’s rights and counter discriminatory traditional practices. Article 26 of the Constitution commits the State to taking appropriate measures to ensure that marriages are not entered into without the free and fair consent of the intending spouses; that children (defined as under 18 years of age) are not pledged in marriage; that there is equality of rights and obligations of spouses during marriage and at its dissolution; and that, in the event of dissolution of a marriage through death or divorce, provision is made for the necessary protection of any children and spouses. The Constitutional Court ruled in 2016 that no individual younger than 18 may enter into marriage, including customary law unions, and struck down a provision of the Marriage Act that allowed girls (but not boys) to marry at age 16. Despite legal prohibitions, human rights observers report that rural families in particular continue to force girls to marry young, and that there is particularly strong support for early marriage among apostolic groups. Child welfare NGOs have reported evidence of underage marriages, particularly in isolated religious communities or among HIV/AIDs orphans who lacked relatives willing or able to take care of them. High rates of unemployment, the dropout of girls from school, and the inability of families to earn a stable income were major reasons cited for child marriage. Families reportedly give girls or young women to other families in marriage to ‘placate evil spirits’, as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes, or to provide economic protection for the family. Some families have reportedly sold their daughters as brides in exchange for food, and younger daughters have at times married their deceased older sister’s husband as a ‘replacement’ bride. A 2014 NGO study found that, because of the cultural emphasis placed on virginity, any loss of virginity – real or perceived, consensual or forced – could result in marriage, including early or forced marriage. According to the US Department of State, in some instances family members had reportedly forced girls to marry men based on the mere suspicion that the two had had sexual intercourse. This cultural practice had applied even in cases of rape, with NGOs reporting numerous instances in which families had concealed rape by facilitating marriages between rapist and victim. Although reportedly decreasing, virginity testing reportedly continued to occur in some regions. Divorce and maintenance laws are equitable, but many women reportedly lack awareness of their rights. The customary practice of patriarchal inheritance means that property tends to revert to the man in case of divorce or to his family in the case of his death. Widows forced to relocate into rural areas are reportedly sometimes ‘inherited’ into marriage with an in-law after the deaths of their spouses. Less than 20 per cent of female farmers are official landowners or named on government lease agreements. No laws limit the participation of women in the political process. Women fully participated in the 30 July 2018 elections as voters and candidates for all parties, although their representation is not in proportion

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to their percentage of the population. Four female presidential candidates competed in the election, representing the People’s Rainbow Coalition, the MDC-T, the #1980 Freedom Movement Zimbabwe, and the United Democratic Movement. Following the elections, women accounted for six of the 21 cabinet minister positions, an increase from 2013, but still well below the equal representation required by the Constitution. Women made up 31 per cent of the National Assembly and Senate, down slightly from 34 per cent in 2013. Women also accounted for six of 12 minister of state positions, six of 13 deputy minister positions, and the position of president of the Senate. At the local government level, women held approximately 19 per cent of councillor positions nationwide. A gender analysis of the election process produced by the ZGC found that men occupied most decision-making positions within the election management system while women occupied mostly administrative and support functions. NGOs reported that decision-making structures and processes in all political parties tended to exclude young women in particular. Observers reported that female candidates faced particularly vitriolic gender-based insults regarding their appearance, alleged sexual proclivity, and other gender-based stereotypes. Several female MDC Alliance candidates reported that some inside the party leadership demanded that the women have sex with them in order for their names to be included on the party candidate list. Women occupy primarily administrative positions in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and national services, although there are currently two female brigadier generals and one female air commodore, and the current Minister of Defence and War Veterans is a woman. Despite a constitutional requirement that both sexes be equally represented in all institutions and agencies of government at every level, there is a general lack of women in decision-making positions. Women’s salaries generally lag behind those of men in most sectors. NGOs have reported that women are often unable to access gender-based benefits such as maternity leave, which are provided for by law. Zimbabwe’s economic decline has particularly affected women, as many work in the informal sector (see Employment). Women have also been affected disproportionately by the government’s forced evictions, demolition of homes and businesses, and takeovers of commercial farms. Articles 65-69 of Division B: Sexual Crimes of the CLCRA cover rape and other sexual offences (sexual crimes against Children are discussed in that section). Article 65 provides for a maximum punishment of life imprisonment for rape. Article 68 disallows being married to the victim to be used as a defence to a rape or a sexual assault charge. Rape remains a significant and widespread problem, including within marriage. Human rights observers report that social stigma and societal perceptions that rape was a ‘fact of life’ continue to inhibit reporting of rape. This is particularly the case in relation to spousal rape, which women are reluctant to report due to fear of losing economic support or of reprisal. Other reasons contributing to a low reporting rate for rape include a lack of adequate and widespread services for rape victims, unfamiliarity with laws relating to sexual offences (particularly in rural areas), and reluctance of police to become involved in domestic disputes (in the case of spousal rapes). Rape victims also face bureaucratic obstacles in accessing treatment. The law requires victims of any form of violence to produce a police report to receive free treatment at government health facilities. This requirement has reportedly prevented many rape victims from receiving necessary medical treatment, including post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent victims from contracting HIV. Adult rape clinics in public hospitals in Harare and receive referrals from police and NGOs and provide medical services including HIV tests, medication for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and pregnancy-related services. These clinics are run as NGOS and do not receive significant financial support from the Ministry of Health and Child Care. Although police refer for prosecution the majority of reported rapes of women (and men) receiving services from the rape centres, few prosecutions reportedly result. When prosecutions do result in convictions, sentences are inconsistent. Rape victims are not consistently offered protection in court. Children born from rape reportedly suffer stigmatisation and marginalisation. The mothers of children

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born from rape are sometimes reluctant to register their births, meaning the children do not have access to social services. Human rights observers have consistently reported the use of rape and sexual violence as a political weapon, including by security forces. Following the nationwide protests in January 2019, at least eight women in Harare told Human Rights Watch (HRW) in separate interviews that multiple uniformed and armed soldiers and police had raped them, some while concealing their identities with masks. One woman said that before they took turns to rape her without using condoms, two soldiers had said she should be raped to ‘make her tell the truth’ about her husband’s possible involvement in opposition politics. Another woman reported that police at her local station had refused to record her complaint, telling her that ‘these things are happening all over the country’. The government responded to the allegations by stating its commitment to accountability and justice for victims and encouraging women to come forward and report the cases. Several similar cases reportedly occurred following the 31 July 2018 national election and around previous elections. The Domestic Violence Act (2006) criminalises domestic violence, which is punishable by a fine and a maximum prison sentence of ten years. Authorities generally consider domestic violence to be a private matter, however, and prosecutions are rare. Human rights observers report that there is a deeply ingrained societal acceptance of the use of violence within relationships as a show of both power and love. Domestic violence rates have reportedly increased in line with Zimbabwe’s ongoing economic decline. Government agencies and women’s rights groups have undertaken public awareness campaigns against domestic violence, including through working with law enforcement agencies, but these campaigns have been largely ineffective in reducing its prevalence. NGOs report that most urban police stations have trained officers to deal with victims of domestic violence, but that stations have a limited ability to respond in the evening and on weekends. A limited number of NGO-run women’s shelters also offer counselling to victims of domestic violence, but these are insufficient to meet demand. There is no specific law criminalising sexual harassment, although Articles 8 (g) and (h) of the Labour Act (2002) prohibit it in the workplace. In-country sources report that sexual harassment is prevalent throughout society, particularly in workplaces and universities. Female university students routinely encounter unwanted physical contact from male students, lecturers and non-academic staff, ranging from touching and inappropriate remarks to, in some instances, rape. DFAT assesses that, despite constitutional and legislative protections, women in Zimbabwe face a moderate risk of societal discrimination due to a number of significant disadvantages that include the threat of gender-based violence and other sexually-based harassment (including from state authorities), and long- standing traditional values and gender roles that limit their full participation in the workplace and community. Women in rural communities are particularly disadvantaged.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Article 78(3) of the Constitution specifically prohibits persons of the same sex from marrying each other. The Constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Section 73 of the CLCRA criminalises as ‘sodomy’ anal sexual intercourse between male persons, or ‘any act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act’. Sodomy is punishable by up to a year’s imprisonment, a fine of up to USD5,000, or both. Section 73 does not distinguish between consensual and non-consensual cases, meaning that the media occasionally misreports some cases of male-on-male or male-on-child rape as ‘homosexual sex’. There are no legislative prohibitions against lesbianism, or in relation to gender identity. The media regularly covers intersex issues, which authorities generally treat as medical rather than identity-related issues.

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While official rhetoric under the Mugabe administration was strongly homophobic, particularly from Mugabe himself, actual prosecutions in relation to consensual same-sex sexual activities were very rare. In many cases where police did arrest LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex) individuals, the charges were usually unclear from the outset and, at most, police would charge individuals with low-level misdemeanours such as loitering, indecency, or public order statutes. Despite the lack of prosecutions, however, the ongoing high-level official rhetoric, frequent homophobic commentary from church leaders and media reporting, and general conservative social attitudes all contributed to a difficult social environment for LGBTI individuals. Human rights observers reported that the criminality and social stigma of same-sex activity left homosexual men in particular vulnerable to blackmail, dismissal from employment or education, eviction from housing, and/or violence or harassment from families, neighbours, or the police. LGBTI individuals were particularly vulnerable to assault in cases where they were in the presence of a crowd, which would depend on the strength of numbers to initiate an attack following a tip-off. In cases where such mob attacks took place in the neighbourhoods of LGBTI individuals, they would usually be followed by property owners issuing eviction notices to the victims. GALZ recorded 170 violations (of all kinds) between 2012-17, but the stigma attached to LGBTI issues means this is likely to understate substantially the true number. There has been a substantial decrease in the level of official hostility towards the LGBTI community under Mnangagwa, particularly in relation to homophobic rhetoric from state officials. President Mnangagwa met with LGBTI advocates following his accession, while ZANU- PF officials also engaged for the first time ahead of the July 2018 elections. LGBTI advocates also report that they have been able to commence a dialogue with police representatives in order to build a better understanding of the community and its needs, including through developing a field manual for policing marginalised communities. Advocates are also working with the media towards more sensitive and objective reporting of LGBTI issues, rather than the sensationalism that was the norm under Mugabe. In April 2018, the LGBTI community was for the first time granted permission to exhibit at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair. Despite these positive signs, there is no indication that constitutional or legislative change on LGBTI issues is on the government’s agenda. In-country sources advise that societal attitudes towards same-sex attraction and/or gender identity remain very conservative, but that these attitudes tend to be based more around a lack of understanding of the issues than on active hostility. Many Zimbabweans are reportedly under the impression that simply identifying as LGBTI is in itself a criminal offence, thus justifying homophobic and transphobic attacks. Human rights violations against LGBTI individuals have continued to occur, including blackmail and extortion from police, discrimination in employment and education, threats of violence in colleges and universities, and intimate partner and family violence. In one high-profile case in September 2018, a deputy headmaster at an elite private school resigned from his position after receiving death threats and protests from parents angered at his public declaration of his sexual orientation. In February 2018, a magistrate convicted two prison inmates of sodomy and gave them each additional six-year prison terms to their existing sentences after they were caught having consensual sex in a cell. While lesbian relationships are not criminalised, they remain socially unacceptable. The 2018 GALZ report on human rights violations reported that intolerance of lesbian relationships was increasingly manifesting in the form of ‘corrective’ rape and other forms of violence, although no accurate figures were available. In September 2018, a 21-year-old suspected lesbian was charged with aggravated indecent assault in Harare after allegedly drugging and sexually abusing her friend on several occasions. The defendant argued that the alleged assault was consensual, and that the complainant made a complaint only after rumours of the relationship reached her family. According to a 2016 study by Trans Research, Education, and Training (TREAT), Zimbabwe’s first transgender advocacy organisation, there are approximately 400 openly transgender people in the country

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(although the true number is likely higher). TREAT reports that the main issues affecting transgender individuals relate to difficulties in changing identity documents to reflect their preferred gender identity; limited access to inclusive health services and affordable medications, particularly hormones; discrimination in housing and employment; and societal violence and harassment. In December 2018, TREAT’s founder Rikki Nathanson (a transgender individual) fled Zimbabwe and sought asylum in the United States following a series of incidents. Police in Bulawayo had arrested Nathanson in January 2014 for using the women’s toilet facilities in a hotel, reportedly stripping her naked in front of five police officers and keeping her in jail for three days. Nathanson subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Minister for Home Affairs, the Commissioner of the ZRP and several other local officials, although the judge who heard the case in mid-2017 had not issued a ruling as of the publication date. Nathanson claimed to have been threatened and warned to drop the case by unidentified persons who broke into her house, and said that she had been tipped off that authorities were likely to arrest her imminently. GALZ is Zimbabwe’s leading LGBTI advocacy organisation, operating since 1990 and registered as a voluntary association. GALZ had around 500 members at its peak in 2000, but numbers have subsequently dropped to around 300 as many members have left Zimbabwe. GALZ’s current membership includes LGBTI individuals from a wide range of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, including from urban townships. GALZ is headquartered in Harare, but runs regular social events, education, and outreach activities nationwide. TREAT appears to be moribund following Nathanson’s departure from Zimbabwe. There are few, if any, other LGBTI service providers or social venues operating openly in Zimbabwe. DFAT assesses that gay men face a moderate risk of official discrimination in that the existence of legislation prohibiting male homosexual acts can be used as a means of harassment, even if prosecutions or legal punishments are not generally pursued. DFAT further assesses that gay men, lesbians, and transgender individuals face a high risk of societal discrimination due to long-standing traditional views about sexuality and gender that limit their full participation in the community and workforce. Such risks may include intimidation, threatened or actual violence from both families and the general public, blackmail, extortion, or discrimination in employment or education. The risk is likely to be higher for those residing in more conservative and/or rural areas.

Children Article 81 of the Constitution guarantees children the right to equal treatment before the law, including the right to be heard; to be given a name and family name; to the prompt provision of a birth certificate (if born in Zimbabwe or a Zimbabwean citizen by descent); to family, parental, or other appropriate care; to protection from economic and sexual exploitation, and from child labour, maltreatment, neglect, or any form of abuse; to education, health care services, nutrition, and shelter; to not be recruited into a militia force or to take part in armed conflict or hostilities; to not be compelled to take part in any political activity; to not be detained except as a measure of last resort, and, if detained, to be held for the shortest appropriate period, kept separate from detained adults; and to be treated in a manner and in conditions that take account of their age (see Detention and Prison). Article 70 of the CLCRA criminalises sexual intercourse with, and indecent acts committed against, young persons, defined as under the age of 16 years. It provides for a punishment of a fine of USD2,000, imprisonment of up to ten years, or both. Article 70 clarifies that children aged below 12 cannot grant consent. Articles 64(2)(a) and (b) of the Act, however, allow a person charged with rape or indecent assault of a person aged between 12 and 14 years to argue that the young person was capable of giving consent to the sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct, and did so. It is unclear whether these provisions are applied differently in cases where the offender is also a minor or only just over the age of consent themselves. Article 83 of the Act criminalises the procurement of a child younger than age 16 for the purposes of

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engaging in unlawful sexual conduct, providing for punishments of a fine of up to USD5,000, up to ten years’ imprisonment, or both. NGOs report that persons charged with facilitating the prostitution of a child are often also charged with statutory rape, indicating that the child was aged under 12 years. Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, are serious problems in Zimbabwe. In 2018, the NGO Childline reportedly received more than 14,500 reports of child abuse via its national helpline, managed more than 5,500 in-person cases at its drop-in facilities across the country, and counselled more than 4,000 children. Just less than half of all reported cases of abuse concerned a child who had been sexually, physically, or emotionally abused, neglected, or forced into marriage (see Women). Approximately twice as many girls reported abuse as boys. Increasing economic hardships, coupled with the effect of drought, have led more girls to resort to prostitution as a means of survival. NGOs report that girls from areas bordering South Africa, Zambia, and Mozambique are often subjected to prostitution in brothels catering to long-distance truck drivers. Government efforts to combat child abuse have generally proved ineffective, due in part to underfunding. The government is continuing to implement a case management protocol developed in 2013 to guide the provision of child welfare services. There are some government and NGO facilities that serve underage victims of sexual assault and abuse. The Labour Amendment Act raised the minimum age for general labour and apprenticeship by boys and girls to 16 years (from 13 and 15 respectively), and declared void and unenforceable apprenticeship contracts entered into by children younger than age 18 without the permission of a guardian. The Act further states that no person younger than age 18 shall perform any work likely to jeopardise that person’s health, safety, or morals, and prohibits forced or compulsory labour with the exception of work for the national youth service. Despite the reformed provisions contained within the Act, and a National Action Plan, child labour remains endemic, primarily in the informal economy. NGOs report that forced labour by children occurred in the agricultural, street vending, herding, forestry, fishing, artisanal gold and chrome mining, and domestic sectors. Adults have also utilised children in the commission of illegal activities, including gambling and drug smuggling. Street children, who live and/or beg on the streets, are highly common in urban areas.Children working in all of these sectors often face hazards to their health and safety, lack necessary equipment and training, and are highly vulnerable to wage exploitation and other forms of abuse. NGOs report that the general lack of free basic Education for children increases the risk of children’s involvement in child labour. Because children are legally required to attend school up to age 12, those aged between 12 and 15 are particularly vulnerable to becoming involved in child labour as they are not required to attend school and not legally permitted to work. In a 2018 HRW report on child labour in tobacco farms, many child workers cited the need to pay school fees or buy basic necessities as reasons for working. Teachers interviewed in the report noted that many children missed school in order to raise funds for the next set of school fees. Zimbabwe has a very high proportion of orphans, due primarily to the HIV/AIDS crisis (see Health). UNICEF estimated in 2016 that 18 per cent of children had lost one or both parents to HIV or other causes. Many orphaned children are cared for by their extended families or live in households headed by children, while others are homeless. Many are not enrolled in school, and some are forced to turn to prostitution for income. Orphaned children suffer discrimination and social stigma, and are vulnerable to abuse, food insecurity, malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. DFAT assesses that the ongoing political and economic dysfunction in Zimbabwe increases the risk of abuse for children, particularly for those without family support and/or those involved in the informal economy. The level of this risk will vary according to geographic location and individual circumstance.

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Persons with Disabilities Articles 22 and 83 of the Constitution guarantee equality for persons with disabilities; prohibit discrimination against them in employment, access to public places, and the provision of services; and commit the State to taking appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities realise their full mental and physical potential. Other articles commit the State to taking necessary measures to ensure the inclusion and representation of persons with disabilities in employment, education, and political bodies. The Disabled Persons Act (1992) is the primary law addressing disability issues. Like other forms of legislation, it has not been aligned with the 2013 Constitution. Neither the Constitution nor the law specify physical, sensory, mental, or intellectual disabilities, and NGOs have lobbied the government to broaden the legal definition of ‘disabled’ to include persons with albinism, epilepsy, and other conditions. Human rights observers report that government institutions are often uninformed about the law and their requirements to implement it. Although two senators are specifically elected to represent persons with disabilities, parliament rarely addresses issues especially affecting persons with disabilities. Parliament does not provide specific line items for persons with disabilities in the various social service ministry budgets. Although the law stipulates that government buildings be accessible, implementation has been slow and most buildings remain inaccessible. There are minimal legal or administrative safeguards to allow persons with disabilities to participate in electoral processes. Administrative arrangements for voter registration at relevant government offices are burdensome, and often necessitate return visits that effectively serve to disenfranchise some persons with disabilities. Access to justice in courts is compromised for persons with hearing disabilities due to a lack of sign language interpreters, particularly in rural areas. NGOs report that three-quarters of children with disabilities have no access to education. Few government schools or education facilities are specifically equipped to cater for children with disabilities, and many refuse to accept them as students. Although some children with disabilities in urban areas are able to obtain informal education through private institutions, these options are generally unavailable for those in rural areas. Children with disabilities are highly vulnerable to sexual abuse. According to NGOs, the public generally consider persons with disabilities to be objects of pity rather than persons with rights. Most persons holding traditional beliefs reportedly view persons with disabilities as bewitched. In many cases, families will hide children with disabilities from public view by confining them to the home. For information on people with mental disabilities, see Health. DFAT assesses that, notwithstanding the constitutional and legislative protections in place, persons with disabilities continue to face considerable official and societal restrictions that limit their ability to participate fully in society. This is particularly the case for children with disabilities.

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4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS

ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE

Extra-Judicial Killings The two most significant recent cases of multiple extra-judicial killings involving security forces relate to the 1 August 2018 post-election demonstrations and the January 2019 fuel protests (see Political System and Political Opinion (actual or imputed)). On 18 December 2018, President Mnangagwa released the 128- page report (‘the Motlanthe Report’) of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1 August 2018 post-election violence (see Political System). In its report, the Commission noted that its approach to the task was that of an independent fact-finding body, not a court of law, and that its findings were based on ‘a balance of probabilities’ rather than a strict burden of proof. The Motlanthe Report found that: - the 1 August 2018 demonstrations were ‘incited, pre-planned, and well organised by the MDC Alliance’; - both the 2013 Constitution and the circumstances on the day justified deployment of the military to assist the police, but the military should have been placed under police command; - the use of live ammunition directly at protesters was clearly unjustified and disproportionate, as was the use of sjamboks, baton sticks, and rifle butts to assault members of the public indiscriminately; - six people died and 35 were injured as a result of military and police actions; - at least six people sustained injuries as a result of actions by the protesters, and there was significant damage to property (including looting). The Motlanthe Report’s recommendations included compensation for all victims of the violence and dependents of the deceased, ‘professional and non-partisan’ training of the police, and a review of standing orders and procedures for military engagement in law and order enforcement operations. The Commission also advocated for: registration of political parties; electoral reforms to enhance transparency and expedite the announcement of election results; and the establishment of a multi-party reconciliation initiative to address the root causes of the post-election violence; as well as highlighting a broader need for national healing. Critics of the Motlanthe Report argued that its approach to the inquiry suggested a lack of impartiality, raising particular concerns that its recommendations on accountability appeared to distinguish between the prosecution of those persons responsible for all alleged crimes committed on 1 August 2018, and the internal investigation and appropriate sanction of members of the military and police found to have been in breach of their professional duties and discipline on that day. In-country sources report that the military has not identified anyone responsible for the killing of demonstrators more than a year on from the 1 August 2018 violence, and there has been very little movement overall on implementing any of the Motlanthe Report’s recommendations.

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In responding to the January 2019 events, Mnangagwa said that, while the loss of life was regrettable, the use of force had been proportionate because the demonstrations had ‘represented a direct threat to the stability of the country’. The government stated its commitment to accountability and justice for the victims of the violence, including through establishing hotlines for complaints. DFAT is not aware, however, of any formal investigations into the use of lethal force by security forces during the protests. Authorities have reported that investigations continue into historic cases of extra-judicial killings and other politically motivated violence committed by security forces, including the 1980s Gukurahundi campaign. There have not been any arrests or charges laid in relation to these events. In April 2019, the government announced that it would take steps to compensate victims of the Gukurahundi, including through exhuming and reburying those killed and buried secretly or in mass graves, and issuing them with death certificates.

Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. The overwhelming majority of disappearances in Zimbabwe are historic in nature. The Gukurahundi campaign resulted in thousands of cases of enforced disappearances of civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. There is little information available on the thousands of Zimbabweans who disappeared during the Independence War. The whereabouts of an opposition political activist and journalist abducted from a Harare barbershop in March 2015 remain unknown. As noted in Political Opinion (actual or imputed), there have been a number of recent cases in which unknown armed assailants (in most cases) have abducted, interrogated, and physically mistreated perceived critics of the government before subsequently releasing them. The MDC reported in late August that 26 officials had been subjected to such abductions and mistreatment. Examples include: - On the night of 13 August 2019, unknown armed men abducted a political activist from his home on the outskirts of Harare, and severely beat him with metal rods on his feet and buttocks before dumping him. During the beating, the men accused him of being involved in the organisation of the protests scheduled for 16 August 2019. The activist, who was hospitalised following the attack, had previously been arrested (along with six others) in May 2019 upon his return from the Maldives where he had attended a capacity-building workshop on non-violent protest tactics (see Civil Society Activists). - On the same night, unknown armed men abducted an MDC activist from his home in a Harare suburb before beating and dumping him. - On the night of 22 August 2019, six armed and masked men who identified themselves as ZRP officers abducted a prominent comedian/political satirist from her home in front of relatives. They reportedly drove her to an unknown place, stripped and beat her, and forced her to perform army drills and drink raw sewage, while questioning her about her partner, colleagues, and employer. The abductors reportedly threatened to kill her mother before dumping the comedian on the outskirts of Harare. The ZRP had previously arrested the woman and a colleague in February 2019 for public nuisance after they appeared in a sketch wearing costumes resembling police uniforms. At the time, authorities reportedly warned her that her comedy was becoming too political. - On the night of 14 September 2019, Dr Peter Magombeyi, the head of the Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors Association disappeared from his home. Dr Magombeyi subsequently reappeared on 20 September, after the government issued a statement of concern for his apparent abduction. Dr Magombeyi required ongoing hospitalisation after his return, with friends and colleagues alleging he

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had been poisoned during his abduction. Dr Magombeyi’s involvement in the ongoing industrial action by doctors and nurses through 2018-19 (see Health and Trade Unionists) led to widespread allegations that his abduction was state-orchestrated. Following his return, authorities initially prevented him from leaving Zimbabwe to receive specialist medical treatment in South Africa, despite a court order declaring this action illegal. Although the ZRP claim that he was needed in Zimbabwe to assist the investigation into his abduction, many allege that he was prevented from leaving the country because of fear that substantial medical tests would reveal the extent of his mistreatment (and confirm the involvement of security authorities). The full facts of the recent abductions remain unclear, including the identity of the perpetrators. While the government’s statement of concern in relation to Dr Magombeyi is a positive development, the government has yet to fully demonstrate its commitment to apprehending and prosecuting those responsible for the abductions, or to preventing any further incidents.

DEATH PENALTY Article 48(2) of the Constitution permits the death penalty to be imposed only on a person convicted of murder committed in aggravating circumstances. The death penalty cannot be imposed on a person who was less than twenty-one years old when the crime was committed; who is more than seventy years old; or who is a woman. Persons sentenced to death have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the penalty from the President. Hanging is the method of execution, although Zimbabwe has not employed an official hangman since 2005. Although Zimbabwe has not carried out an execution since 2005, it is yet to declare an official moratorium. Amnesty International reported that judges passed more than five death sentences in 2018, and that at least 81 people were known to be under sentence of death as of the end of 2018. Official moves on the death penalty have been mixed. In December 2018, the government voted against a UN resolution on a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty. In January 2019, however, the Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry reportedly recommended to Cabinet that it abolish the death penalty due to the lack of increased deterrence and the inevitability of error. Mnangagwa, a former death row inmate during the UDI era, has been vocal in his personal opposition to the death penalty. In March 2018, he exercised the constitutional ‘Power of Mercy’ provisions in commuting to life imprisonment the death sentences of prisoners who had been on death row for ten or more years. A 2017 survey found that 61 per cent of Zimbabweans supported the retention of the death penalty. Eighty per cent, however, said that if the government took leadership in abolishing the death penalty they would accept it as government policy.

TORTURE Zimbabwe is not a signatory to CAT or CAT-OP (see Human Rights Framework). Article 53 of the Constitution states that no person may be subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 86(3)(c) further emphasises the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as an enshrined right that cannot be limited by law. Despite these legal protections, human rights observers continue to report cases of security forces and/or ZANU-PF supporters using physical abuse or torture to intimidate political opponents, or to obtain confessions from suspects in detention. Reported torture methods included beating victims with sticks, clubs, cables, gun butts, sjamboks (a heavy whip), and falanga (beating the soles of the feet), while security forces have also reportedly utilised psychological torture. As noted in Enforced or Involuntary

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Disappearances, those subjected to the recent spate of abductions have experienced physical and psychological abuse amounting in some cases to torture. Human rights observers report that torture and other human rights abuses are particularly likely to occur during periods of national unrest, including during or after elections or political protests. Particular targets of torture include actual and perceived opponents of the government, particularly opposition political activists. One NGO reported that in the eight-month period between January and August 2018, 367 victims of organised violence and torture sought medical treatment and counselling after sustaining injuries in multiple incidents across the country. The NGO reported that approximately half of those claiming to have been tortured were MDC Alliance supporters and around 10 per cent associated with other opposition parties, while the remainder did not indicate their political affiliation. The NGO reported that ZANU-PF supporters committed 35 per cent of the violations, the ZRP 31 per cent, and the ZDF 22 per cent. Human rights observers reported numerous cases of alleged torture in relation to security crackdowns following the 1 August 2018 post-election demonstrations and the January 2019 fuel protests (see Extra-Judicial Killings). Human rights observers have also reported cases in which security forces have detained and tortured illegal diamond miners. One NGO reported that 23 miners had separately sought assistance from them after being caught by security forces attempting to mine at the Chiadzwa mine in Manicaland Province. The security forces had reportedly detained the miners, beaten them with sticks, kicked them, and allowed dogs to attack them. According to NGOs, authorities do not generally investigate thoroughly most allegations of torture or other abuses committed by security forces, and few cases result in prosecution. In April 2017, however, the High Court ordered the state to pay a human rights activist USD150,000 in damages after she was abducted, tortured, and held incommunicado for 21 days in 2008. DFAT is not aware of any other cases in which courts have ruled in favour in cases in which victims have made torture allegations against state authorities. DFAT assesses that security authorities and ZANU-PF activists continue to use torture as a means of intimidation and punishment, particularly against political opponents. Those arrested during political protests face a high risk of being tortured in custody, while those subjected to enforced disappearance face a high risk of experiencing physical and psychological mistreatment that may amount to torture. Individuals who have been subjected to torture at the hand of state authorities or ZANU-PF activists are highly unlikely to receive redress through official channels. DFAT notes that reports of politically related violence are not confined to ZANU-PF.

CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Article 49 of the Constitution guarantees the right not to be detained without trial, and not to be deprived of liberty arbitrarily or without just cause. Article 50 states that any arrested person must be informed of the reason for the arrest at the time; must be permitted to contact a lawyer, family member or anyone else; must be released pending charge or trial unless there are compelling reasons justifying their continued detention; and must be permitted to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest in person before a court and released promptly if the arrest is unlawful. Authorities must bring an arrested person before a court within 48 hours. Arrested persons have the right to remain silent. The law absolves individual security officers from criminal liability regarding unlawful arrests and detention. The April 2017 High Court ruling

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referred to in the previous section found that officials could be sued, however, especially if they had acted unlawfully. The law provides for bail for most accused persons. In 2015, the Constitutional Court declared invalid a section of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act (2006, subsequently amended in 2016) that had allowed prosecutors to veto bail decisions made by the courts and to keep accused persons in custody for up to seven days based on the prosecution’s stated intent to appeal bail. The government responded to the court’s ruling by amending the law to include provisions that allow prosecutors a veto over judicial bail decisions. Prosecutors have reportedly used these provisions to extend the detention of opposition political activists. Human rights observers have continued to report numerous cases in which the government has used arbitrary arrest and detention as tools of intimidation and harassment, including through regularly arresting large numbers of people during anti-government protests. Particular targets for arbitrary arrest include opposition political activists, civil society activists, and journalists (see relevant sections). Civil society groups reported that security forces indiscriminately rounded up and detained hundreds of people for allegedly participating in the January 2019 fuel protests. Police and army personnel reportedly carried out seemingly indiscriminate door-to-door raids in a number of Harare suburbs, forcibly entering homes by breaking doors and windows. Many of those arrested were quickly convicted on charges of public violence and criminal nuisance, in trials criticised by observers as unfair and lacking due process. DFAT understands that a number of senior MDC party officials and ZCTU leaders arrested in connection with the protests remain in custody, while others have been released on bail but remain subject to legal proceedings. Human rights observers also reported a number of cases of arbitrary arrest and detention during and following the 1 August 2018 post-election demonstrations. A number of victims, including the MDC Alliance’s Information and Public Secretary, reported being abducted, assaulted, and subjected to hours-long interrogations in remote locations regarding opposition members’ whereabouts. Prosecutors have declined to bring charges in some cases involving arbitrary arrest. For example, in October 2018, prosecutors declined to charge three ZCTU members in Gweru who police had arrested for demonstrating against government economic measures. In July 2018, a magistrate declined to charge three MDC Alliance members who police had arrested for attempting to observe postal voting at a police camp in Mutare. Authorities reportedly often prevent detainees from having prompt or regular access to their lawyers, including through telling lawyers attempting to visit their clients that detainees or those with authority to grant access are unavailable. In some cases, authorities have reportedly monitored, harassed, and intimidated lawyers attempting to gain access to their clients. In August 2018, for example, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights reported that police had attacked the lawyer of arrested former finance minister and senior MDC Alliance official , and had prevented the lawyer from accompanying Biti to Harare Central Police Station.

Corporal Punishment The Constitutional Court ruled in April 2019, that judicial corporal punishment constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and was therefore illegal under Article 53 of the Constitution. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (2016) had permitted caning as a judicial punishment for males under the age of 18, which had been a common sentence. The law is yet to be amended to incorporate the court’s ruling.

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Corporal punishment is legal and widely utilised in Zimbabwean homes, alternative care settings, schools, and day care centres. The Children’s Act (1972) prohibits ill-treatment and neglect of children but protects the right of parents/guardians to administer ‘reasonable punishment’, while the Education Act (1987) specifically authorises the administration of corporal punishment. The Minister of Primary and Secondary Education announced in March 2019 that the Government was moving to remove corporal punishment in schools through the Education Amendment Bill, which states that under no circumstance is a teacher permitted to beat a child (although it does not explicitly prohibit all corporal punishment of children). A survey conducted in early 2017 found that around three-quarters of Zimbabweans believed that the use of physical force to discipline children was always or sometimes justified. Men and women held similar views, as did rural and regional respondents. In contrast, 80 per cent of respondents believed that it was never justified for a man to beat his wife.

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5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

STATE PROTECTION Article 209 of the Constitution mandates the formation of a National Security Council (NSC), composed of the President, Vice-President, and selected ministers and members of the security services. The NSC’s primary designated functions are to develop a national security policy, and to inform and advise the President on matters relating to national security. The Constitution also mandates that independent Commissions oversee state protection bodies, including the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), and the Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Service (ZPCS). According to international human rights observers, the NSC has never met. The Joint Operations Command, an informal administrative body, has instead discharged the NSC’s functions at national, provincial, and district levels. It is unclear whether any of the other Independent Commissions are operational. Human rights observers report that state protection forces are heavily politicised and lack independence from government. As earlier described, the government has routinely used state authorities to restrict the activities of political opponents, particularly the MDC, and the partisan stance of security forces remains a key feature of political life. Human rights observers have consistently raised concerns that civilian authorities have at times not maintained effective control over security forces, and that impunity for abuse by security forces remains the norm. The government has not established an independent complaints mechanism to investigate allegations of security force misconduct as required by the Constitution. Insufficient funding and limited support restricts the ability of national human rights institutions such as the ZHRC to deliver justice to victims of human rights abuses, particularly involving cases in which state authorities are the perpetrators (see also National Human Rights Institution). All state protection institutions are significantly subject to and affected by Corruption.

Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) Chapter 11, Part 2 of the Constitution (Articles 211-218) sets out the role and functions of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), which consist of an Army and an Air Force. The ZDF is required to be non- partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional, and subordinate to civilian authority. The President is Commander-in-Chief, and appoints a responsible Minister. The President also appoints the ZDF’s Commander, and the Commanders of each service for fixed five-year terms with a two-term limit. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the sole power to authorise the deployment of the ZDF or to determine its operational use. With the President’s authority, the ZDF may be deployed in Zimbabwe in national defence, in support of the ZRP in the maintenance of public order, or in support of the ZRP and other civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster. With the President’s authority, the ZDF can deploy outside Zimbabwe on multilateral peacekeeping operations, to defend allies, in fulfilment of international commitments, or in defence of Zimbabwe’s national security or national interests. The ZDF has an estimated total strength of 30,000 personnel, most of whom serve in the Army. All ZDF personnel are volunteers. The Army has eight brigade-sized formations and district commands in Harare

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and Bulawayo. The government has frequently deployed ZDF personnel in support of ZRP operations, including in response to the 1 August 2018 post-election demonstrations and the January 2019 fuel protests. As noted in Recent history, the ZDF staged a military intervention into domestic politics between 13 November and 18 December 2017 (‘Operation Restore Legacy’) to force Mugabe’s resignation. According to a statement delivered on state television by ZDF’s official spokesperson, the objective of the intervention was to allay public anxiety through removing ‘criminal elements’ that had surrounded Mugabe. The ZDF formally departed the political stage upon Mnangagwa’s assumption of the presidency, but in-country sources have expressed concern that numerous aspects of Zimbabwean society have become increasingly militarised. For example, a number of former military personnel have transitioned into senior government roles: retired general , who played a prominent role in the military intervention in November 2017 as Commander of the ZDF, has served as Vice-President since December 2017; while former Major-General Sibusio Moyo is currently Foreign Minister. Chiwenga also continues to serve concurrently as Vice-President of ZANU-PF, a role he has also held since December 2017, and the ZDF is widely perceived as being a deeply politicised organisation. Mnangagwa oversaw a major shake-up of the ZDF in February 2018 when he retired four generals, including the officer primarily responsible for the November 2017 removal of Mugabe. A government representative said that the four would be appointed to diplomatic posts abroad.

Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Chapter 11, Part 3 of the Constitution (Articles 219-223) and the Police Act (1995) set out the role and functions of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). The ZRP is responsible for detecting, investigating, and preventing crime; preserving internal security; protecting and securing the lives and property of the people; maintaining law and order; and upholding the Constitution and enforcing the law. The ZRP is required to be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional, and subordinate to civilian authority. The Ministry for Home Affairs is responsible for the ZRP; and the President appoints a Commissioner-General of Police in consultation with the Home Affairs Minister. The Commissioner-General has a fixed five-year term with a two-term limit. The ZRP is headquartered in Harare and organised provincially. It has specialised riot, paramilitary, investigative, forensic and ballistics, and intelligence functions. The ZRP does not publish details on its force numbers, but estimates of its size range from 40,000-60,000, including reserves. In-country sources report that, like other state protection forces, the ZRP is a highly politicised organisation. Top police commanders are expected to support and promote ZANU-PF. Political affiliation can influence police investigations, particularly in cases involving criminal and political violence; and ZRP personnel have regularly used POSA and other legislation to restrict freedom of assembly and expression in support of ZANU-PF interests. Poor working conditions, a lack of training and resources, and low salaries mean that Corruption is common in the ZRP, with police often using roadblocks to extort goods or bribes. A May 2015 survey found that most Zimbabweans perceived the ZRP to be the most corrupt institution in the country, with a quarter of respondents reporting having paid a bribe to obtain a service or to avoid problems. Resource and capacity constraints can also limit the ability of police to investigate or deal with ordinary crimes, including those involving violence. Human rights observers and in-country sources report that the ZRP has been weakened as an institution under Mnangagwa. In early 2018, the government forcibly retired 11 senior ZRP officials and reassigned dozens more. In-country sources have suggested that this has resulted in the police losing the confidence of the public, and in a growth in crime due to the emboldening of criminals. Low pay and high inflation are reported to have had a negative impact on police morale. Short supply of petrol has also reduced the capacity of the police.

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Informal Militias Informal state-sponsored militias comprised of war veterans and youth brigades played a prominent role in farm invasions and attacks on opposition party members during the 2000s, particularly in rural areas. The two most prominent militia groups at that time were: the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, made up of actual or self-declared veterans of the independence war; and the Youth Brigades (also known as the Green Bombers), made up of participants or graduates of a National Youth Service (NYS) program established in 2001 for Zimbabweans aged 10-30. The NYS program reportedly provided militia training to approximately 80,000 youths at more than 150 camps nationwide before being suspended in 2007 due to lack of funding. At the height of the farm invasion period in the mid-2000s, security analysts put the numbers of war veterans at around 30,000 active and 10-15,000 inactive members, and the Youth Brigades at around 15,000. The profile of informal militias has reduced considerably in recent years, due in part to the significant reduction in the number of violent farm invasions (see White Zimbabweans). While there were some reports of intimidation by informal militias during the 30 July 2018 elections, interlocutors report this was at a much lower level than had previously been the case. DFAT understands that some prominent individuals and political parties, including the MDC, use youth or other informal militias to protect their political and economic interests, sometimes using violence.

ZANU-PF Activists Human rights observers report that ZANU-PF activists continue to carry out acts of intimidation and politically motivated violence, targeting in particular members of opposition political parties such as the MDC (see also Torture). Ahead of the 30 July 2018 elections, ZANU-PF activists in rural areas dominated by the party reportedly compelled individuals to contribute money towards ZANU-PF political rallies through threats and intimidation, and monitored and reported on persons suspected of supporting opposition political parties (see also Political System). In some constituencies, ZANU-PF supporters threatened to withhold food aid unless villagers could prove that they had voted for ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF activists have often acted with the support or acquiescence of state security forces, and have generally not faced legal sanction. In July 2018, however, the ZRP arrested a number of ZANU-PF supporters in Mashonaland East Province for allegedly threatening to burn down the house of a non-MDC opposition parliamentary candidate.

Judiciary Chapter 8 of the Constitution outlines the role and functions of the judiciary and the courts. The court system comprises the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Labour Court, the Administrative Court, magistrates courts, customary law courts, and other courts established by or under an Act of Parliament. The Chief Justice is head of the judiciary and heads the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The High Court, Labour Court, and Administrative Courts are headed by respective Judge Presidents. The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters, and its decisions on those matters bind all other courts. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal, except in matters over which the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction. The High Court has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters, and has jurisdiction to supervise magistrate courts and other subordinate courts and to review their decisions. The Labour Court and Administrative Courts have jurisdiction over matters of labour and

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employment, and administrative matters respectively. Magistrate courts adjudicate on civil and criminal cases, and customary law courts on the application of customary law. Magistrates hear the vast majority of cases. The Judicial Services Commission (JSC), headed by the Chief Justice, tenders advice to the government on matters related to the judiciary and the administration of justice; and promotes and facilitates the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective, and transparent administration of justice. Article 164 of the Constitution guarantees the judiciary’s independence, while Article 165 sets out its guiding principles. It prohibits members of the judiciary from engaging in political activities, holding office or being a member of any political organisation, soliciting funds for or contributing towards any political organisation, or attending political meetings. The President appoints all judges in consultation with the JSC. The JSC appoints magistrates, and approves the appointment of judicial officers other than magistrates or judges. Judges must retire at the age of 70. Judges may only be removed from office if they demonstrate an inability to perform the functions of their office, due to mental or physical incapacity, for gross incompetence, or for gross misconduct. Article 69 of the Constitution guarantees defendants the right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court. Persons accused of an offence have the constitutional rights: to the presumption of innocence; to be informed promptly of the charge against them; to be given adequate time and facilities to mount a defence; to be represented by a legal practitioner (and to be provided one by the State if necessary); to be present when being tried; to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf; to challenge evidence; and to exercise the right to silence to avoid self- incrimination. In both civil and criminal proceedings, parties are given the option to engage in either English, Shona, or Ndebele (depending on region). In many cases where parties have legal representation, legal representatives will speak in English as many legal terms will not have a Shona or Ndebele equivalent. All court proceedings must be interpreted into a language that the defendant understands. A person who has been tried and convicted of an offence has the right to have the case reviewed by a higher court, or to appeal to a higher court against the conviction and sentence. Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The ZRP serves as the entry point for any matter concerning the criminal justice system. ZRP personnel receive statements from complainants; investigate cases; apprehend suspects; compile briefs of evidence (known variously as ‘dockets’ or ‘Form 242s’); and present suspects to court. Some ZRP personnel also have quasi-judicial roles, responsible for assessing bail applications in minor cases; accepting admissions of guilt on behalf of the court; warning accused persons for minor cases; and summoning witnesses to court. Human rights observers report that authorities often do not respect constitutional rights in practice, particularly in relation to politically sensitive cases. Delays in pre-trial procedures are common due to a shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, and resource and capacity constraints, but normal criminal proceedings still generally proceed from investigation to trial within months. In cases involving the trials of government critics, such as members of opposition political parties or civil society activists, however, prosecuting agents reportedly regularly take excessively long times to submit their cases for trial. In many cases wherein authorities have granted bail to government opponents, they have not concluded investigations and have instead chosen to ‘proceed by way of summons’, leaving the threat of impending prosecution remaining. Some persons accused in this manner have eventually been ordered to appear in court, only to be then informed of further delays. In some politically sensitive cases, government officials have reportedly frequently ignored court orders and delayed bail and access to medical care. Defendants in politically sensitive cases are reportedly more likely to receive fair hearings in lower courts than in higher courts, particularly in urban areas. Observers have reported cases in which judges have used threats and intimidation to force magistrates, particularly in rural areas, to rule in the government’s

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favour in politically sensitive cases, as well as cases in which urban-based junior magistrates have granted opposition party members and civil society activists bail against the government’s wishes. In-country sources and human rights observers report that the judicial sector is highly politicised, and that executive influence and interference remain a problem. NGOs have reported that senior government officials have undermined judicial independence, including by giving farms, land, and homes to judges. The government often refuses to abide by judicial decisions that go against it, and routinely delays payment of court cases or judgements awarded against it in civil cases. A May 2015 survey found that the majority of Zimbabweans perceived judges and magistrates to be involved in Corruption, and that around 20 per cent of civilians had paid a bribe or given a gift to gain assistance from courts. Human rights observers continue to report that judicial corruption is widespread at all levels of the judicial system. In April 2019, Zimbabweans reacted with anger on social media to news that the JSC had placed an order for 64 judicial wigs from a legal outfitters in London, at an equivalent cost of AUD210,225. DFAT assesses that capacity and funding restrictions, corruption, and politicisation restrict the ability of the judiciary to deliver effective justice to citizens. Individuals with politically sensitive cases are less likely to receive a fair trial if their case is high profile or if the case is being heard in a rural area. Ordinary citizens whose case is not politically sensitive are more likely to be able to access justice through the courts, but may find their case subject to delays due to capacity restraints.

Detention and Prison Chapter 11, Part 5 of the Constitution (Articles 227-231) outlines the role and functions of the Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Service (ZPCS), requiring it to be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional, and subordinate to civilian authority. The President appoints a Minister responsible for the Prisons and Correctional Service; and appoints a Commissioner-General of the Prisons and Correctional Service in consultation with the Minister. Zimbabwe’s prison population consists of approximately 17,000 prisoners, spread across 46 main prisons and 26 satellite prisons. The ZPCS’s inspections and audit unit has responsibility for assessing prison conditions and improving the monitoring of prisoners’ rights, but does not release publicly the results of such assessments. The ZHRC and international human rights monitors all have the right to conduct monitoring visits, and have reported that they have been able to meet with prisoners with minimal restrictions and without third parties present. Prisoners and detainees have relatively unrestricted access to visitors, except in maximum-security facilities where remoteness can hamper access by prisoners’ relatives. While there is no prison ombudsman, there are statutory mechanisms to allow alternatives to incarceration for non-violent offenders. Prisoners are able to practise their religion freely: NGOs report that prisoners have sufficient access to chaplains and most prisons offer minority religious services. The ZPCS’s responsibilities include prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration into society, and inmates have opportunities to participate in various forms of life skills and occupational training. Conditions in detention facilities are generally harsh. NGOs report that outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs have contributed to overcrowding in some facilities. In March 2018, President Mnangagwa granted amnesty to approximately 3,000 prisoners, including most women and all juveniles, to address overcrowding. NGOs report that food shortages are widespread (if not life threatening) with protein in short supply, and that prisoners’ access to clean water varies according to prison. Prisoners have access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at nearly every prison. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialised medical personnel and medications, however, prisoners suffer from routine but treatable medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases. Diarrhoea is prevalent in most prisons, and diseases such as measles and tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses

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thrive in those with the poorest conditions. Lighting and ventilation are inadequate, and there are insufficient mattresses, bedding, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene products. Financial constraints mean that the ZPCS has at times been unable to transport prisoners with emergency medical needs to local hospitals. Prisoners with mental health issues are often held together with regular prisoners until a doctor is available to make an assessment. Psychiatric sections are available at some prisons but offer little specialised care. There is one juvenile prison that houses boys only: girls are held together with women. International human rights observers have reported that authorities often hold boys in adult prisons while in remand; and generally send juvenile offenders to prison rather than to reformatory homes as stipulated in the law. NGOs report that juvenile offenders are vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners. Due to overcrowding in remand facilities, authorities often hold pre-trial detainees with convicted prisoners until their bail hearings. While political prisoners are generally held in the main prison population, they may in some cases be held in either isolation or in ‘D’ class solitary confinement as a means of punishment. Although there have been cases in which prison guards have beaten and abused prisoners, NGOs report that the use of excessive force by authorities is not systemic and that the general relationship between prison guards and prisoners has improved in recent years. Political prisoners and detainees, however, reportedly receive a lower standard of treatment than other prisoners and detainees. NGOs have reported cases in which authorities have beaten and physically abused political and civil society activists while they have been in detention. NGOs report that conditions for female prisoners are generally better than those provided for men. Authorities hold women in separate prison wings and provide female guards. NGOs have not reported any cases in which women inmates have reported rapes or other physical abuse. There are reportedly several dozen children under the age of four residing with their incarcerated mothers: these children share their mothers’ food allocation rather than receiving their own. Although pregnant women and nursing mothers do not receive additional care or food rations out of the ZPCS budget, the ZPCS reportedly solicits donations from NGOs and donors to provide them with additional provisions.

INTERNAL RELOCATION Article 66, Sections 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution guarantees Zimbabwean citizens (and others legally present in Zimbabwe) the right to move freely within Zimbabwe; reside in any part of the country; and leave Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean citizens can and do relocate internally for a variety of reasons. Large numbers of citizens have relocated in search of employment, and due to displacement caused by rural evictions, natural disasters, localised conflict (including in relation to state-sponsored election-related violence), and urban evictions. According to international organisations, as of 2018 approximately 113,000 households were displaced throughout the country. Internal displacement in relation to political violence reportedly peaked following the 2008 election, although there were some reports of political opposition members relocating from the Mashonaland provinces following the 2013 and 2018 elections. DFAT understands that Bulawayo offers a safer environment for political opposition members than other parts of the country. In-country sources report that internal relocation is generally easier for single men and family groups than for women, who will generally have less access to financial resources and who are bound by cultural expectations that they will look after their children. Single women are less likely to have access to sufficient support services and may face societal discrimination, particularly in rural areas.

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TREATMENT OF RETURNEES

Exit and Entry Procedures Article 66, Sections 1(a) and (b) of the Constitution guarantee every Zimbabwean citizen the right to enter Zimbabwe, and immunity from expulsion. The Immigration Act (1979) and Immigration Regulations (1998, amended 2005) regulate the entry of persons into Zimbabwe and their departure. The legal instruments prohibit the entry into the country and removal of certain persons, and provide for the control of foreign visitors. All potential entrants are required to make a declaration on an official form to an immigration officer at an official point of entry, and to provide valid travel documents. The Immigration Act gives authorities power to question any person desiring to enter Zimbabwe, to photograph and take the fingerprints and palm prints of any person suspected of being a ‘prohibited person’ (see following paragraphs), and to deny that person entry into the country. Immigration authorities may arrest any person they suspect of having entered Zimbabwe illegally and detain them for up to fourteen days while establishing their status. The Immigration Act restricts entry and exit into and out of Zimbabwe to designated ports of entry/exit, and provides for penalties for violations of up to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. The official ports of entry/exit are: Harare and Bulawayo International Airports; Harare and Bulawayo Railway Stations; and border crossing points at Beitbridge (South Africa), Sango, Forbes, and Nyamapanda (all Mozambique), Chirunda, Kariba, and Victoria Falls (all Zambia), and Plumtree (Botswana). The Department of Immigration and the ZRP, both under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement. As noted in Demography, large numbers of Zimbabweans have left the country for economic reasons in recent decades. A large percentage of those who have departed have gone to neighbouring southern African countries, particularly South Africa, with many departing Zimbabwe through irregular means. Migrants have crossed the South African border illicitly by truck or train, by walking, or by swimming across the Limpopo River. Some female migrants reportedly traded sex for transportation by truckers, or with border guards to secure entry. Many migrants who paid gangs at border crossing points to guide them across the border reportedly had their clothing and belongings stolen, or were subjected to physical or sexual abuse. South African security forces have intercepted and subsequently detained many would-be migrants. It is unclear how many attempted migrants have been forcibly returned to Zimbabwe, or whether they have faced prosecution on return for leaving Zimbabwe illegally. The Immigration Act states that an individual may lose their ‘domicile’ (lawful permanent resident) status in Zimbabwe if they voluntarily depart from and reside outside Zimbabwe with the intention of making their home there; or are absent from Zimbabwe for a continuous period of five years or longer. Taking up residence outside Zimbabwe is regarded as prima facie evidence of such an intention, and the onus of proving otherwise is on the person whose status is in question. Losing domicile status would generally preclude the individual from re-entering Zimbabwe without obtaining a new visa. The Immigration Act lists a number of categories for which a potential entrant would be determined a ‘prohibited person’. These include being a homosexual or a prostitute, or someone who has lived on or knowingly received earnings from prostitution or homosexuality; epileptic or ‘mentally disordered’ persons; deaf, dumb, or blind persons, or those with other physical incapacitations; those infected with or suffering from prescribed diseases; and certain classes of convicted criminals. Human rights observers have expressed concern that a number of these provisions represent human rights breaches and potential constitutional violations. The Immigration Act confirms that Zimbabwean citizens cannot be considered ‘prohibited

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persons’. It is unclear, however, whether authorities might consider as a prohibited person an individual who has lost their domicile status (as discussed above) or a dual national. The Zimbabwe Citizenship Bill (1984; amended 2001 and 2005), which remains in force, prohibits the simultaneous holding of a Zimbabwean citizenship and that of any other country for any citizen, regardless of their place of birth. This conflicts with Section 42(e) of the 2013 Constitution, which allows dual citizenship for those who are citizens by birth, but provides for Parliament to make provision for the prohibition of dual citizenship for those who acquired citizenship by descent or registration. In February 2019, Cabinet approved amendments to the draft Zimbabwe Citizenship Bill to allow dual citizenship for citizens born in Zimbabwe and prohibiting it for descent and registration. When approved by Parliament, this Bill will bring the law into compliance with the 2013 Constitution. In-country sources have reported that there have been numerous cases in recent years in which citizens who have left Zimbabwe and taken up citizenship of their host country have been denied the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote (see Political System). Many dual nationals reportedly keep their dual national status secret when returning to Zimbabwe in order to avoid attracting negative attention from authorities. Like other agencies, immigration and border authorities are significantly underfunded and face significant capacity restraints that can affect their ability to enforce travel restrictions. Authorities at international airports maintain a stronger capacity to uphold entry and exit regulations than those at land borders. International observers report that instances in which authorities interfere with the entry or exit of government critics – including through seizing passports of domestic political opponents, and expelling or denying entry to foreign critics – are occurring less often under Mnangagwa than under Mugabe. In August 2018, however, authorities prevented former finance minister and senior MDC Alliance official Tendai Biti, from leaving for Zambia, instead forcibly returning him to Harare (see also Arbitrary Arrest and Detention).

Conditions for Returnees The International Organization for Migration runs a voluntary assisted return and reintegration program aimed at assisting migrants who wish to return voluntarily to Zimbabwe, including failed asylum seekers. DFAT is unaware of any cases to date in which returnees, including failed asylum seekers, have faced persecution or mistreatment on return.

DOCUMENTATION Article 35 of the Constitution states that persons are Zimbabwean citizens by birth, descent, or registration. It guarantees the entitlement of all citizens to passports and other travel documents, and to birth certificates and other identity documents issued by the State. The Ministry of Home Affairs’ Department of Registrar General (DRG) issues all forms of official documentation, and holds records centrally in its Harare headquarters. The DRG has sub-offices in a large number of locations throughout the country. As with other government bodies, the ongoing economic crisis has had a significant impact on DRG’s operations. In-country sources report that international organisations are working with the government to provide access to identity documents for stateless persons.

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National Identity Card (NIC) The National Registration Act (1976) specifies that all citizens, aliens, and refugees aged 16 and above must register for and carry a national identity card (NIC). NICs are required to obtain a passport, open a bank account, or obtain a driver’s licence. To obtain a card initially, applicants must present to their nearest DRG office their birth certificate, their parent or guardian’s identity card, and a valid passport (where applicable) if a citizen; and their passport and student, work, or residence permit if a non-citizen. NICs are plastic and the size of a standard credit card. The most recent form of the NIC features the Zimbabwean Soapstone bird on a red star in the top left corner, the words ‘Republic of Zimbabwe’ above the words ‘National Registration’ in the top middle, and the national coat of arms in the top right hand corner; an oval shaped hologram on the bottom left corner below the bearer’s photograph, a hologram of the bearer’s photograph below the coat of arms; and the bearer’s fingerprint in the bottom right corner. The card includes the bearer’s ID number, full name, date and place of birth (and village of origin, if applicable), and date of issue. The cards also show the bearer’s National Identity Number, an eleven character alphanumeric code in which the two-digit prefix denotes the district in which the applicant resides or registered for the NIC. DFAT understands that authorities commenced issuing plastic NICs around 2003. Previous NICs were metal, were last issued officially around 2002-03, and are replaced with plastic NICs if reported lost. Many older Zimbabweans reportedly still use metal cards as their primary source of identification, although authorities announced that they would begin phasing out metal cards for identity purposes ahead of the 2018 general elections.

Birth Certificates The legal framework for birth registration is the Birth and Death Registration Act (last updated 2005). Birth certificates are required for identification, travel, education, voting, inheritance, and obtaining social services. There is a legal obligation to register births within 42 days, regardless of whether the child is born in or out of a medical institution. Births can be registered at the civil registrar’s office or any hospital or health centre nationwide by the parents, the occupier of the house, medical staff, or any witness of the birth aged 18 years of older. Registrars record the child’s name, date and place of birth, sex, weight at birth, ethnicity, and the date and place of registration. They also record the mother’s and father’s marital status, date of marriage, ethnicity, and place of usual residence. Possession of birth certificates is far from ubiquitous across Zimbabwe. The 2012 population census data indicated that nearly 40 per cent of school age children did not have a birth certificate, while only one in three children aged younger than five had one. Children in poorer and rural areas are less likely to have birth certificates than are their wealthier and urban counterparts. International observers report that children born of rape are unlikely to have birth certificates, as their mothers are unlikely to register their births due to stigma; while in other cases mothers have been unable to register their children due to the absence of the father or another male relative. Orphaned children who do not obtain a birth certificate at the time of their birth are also often unable to obtain a certificate later on because they are unable to provide enough information regarding their parents, or afford to travel to offices that issue birth certificates. In-country sources also report that there have been cases of authorities refusing to issue birth certificates to the Zimbabwe-born children of dual nationals (see Exit and Entry Procedures). The lack of a birth certificate impedes a child’s ability to acquire identity documents, enrol in school, and access social services (see also Children).

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Marriage Certificates The legal framework for marriage registration is the Marriage Act (1964, last amended 2001) and the Customary Marriages Act (1950). Marrying couples must register their marriage immediately at a Civil registrar’s office. The requirements for marriage registration are the presence of the marrying couple and proof that they are of legal age (18 for both males and females). Information collected includes the date of birth/age of the bride and groom and their usual residence(s), and the date and place of the marriage and registration.

Passports The DRG issues ordinary, diplomatic, and service passports, and temporary travel documents (TTDs). Applicants for passports must provide their birth certificate, NIC, marriage certificate/divorce order (where applicable), two photographs, a citizenship certificate (where applicable), and their previous passport or a police report for a lost and stolen passport (where applicable), as well as photocopies of all documents. Parents or guardians of children aged under 18 must sign section five of the passport application and produce their NIC or valid Zimbabwe passport. Zimbabweans residing abroad can submit passport applications through a Zimbabwean diplomatic mission. According to the DRG website, the current charges for ordinary passports are USD53, USD253 for an urgent passport (3 working days), and USD318 for an express urgent passport (24 hours), and USD38 for a TTD. Ordinary passports are green, and are valid for ten years. International human rights observers have reported that authorities have imposed administrative obstacles in the passport application process for citizens entitled to dual citizenship (see Exit and Entry Procedures), particularly Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizenship. Despite high-profile cases in which courts confirmed the rights of Zimbabweans to hold dual citizenship, many poorer citizens are unable to afford the legal costs of appealing passport and other travel document denials. In-country sources report that passports currently have a wait time of up to two years due to a lack of printing materials.

Police Clearance Certificates The ZRP’s Criminal Investigations Headquarters issue Police Clearance Certificates, which detail a person’s criminal history and list their previous names (if applicable). The certificates, which are valid for six months only, have a ZRP crest at the top centre; and include the signature of the commanding officer (for the Director, Criminal Investigation Department) in the bottom right corner, bar coding in the left bottom corner, an official stamp in the top left corner, and a record number in the top right corner.

PREVALENCE OF FRAUD Article 137 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (2004) penalises the forgery of, or tampering with, documents with the intention of defrauding another person with imprisonment of up to fifteen years and/or a fine. The Ninth Schedule of the Law includes the theft or forgery of a passport or driver’s licence issued by the government of Zimbabwe or any passport, identity document, or driver’s licence issued by a foreign government as an offence involving corruption, organised crime, or harm to the national economy. Article 36(1) of the Immigration Act (1979) penalises the production or use of fraudulent travel documents with a fine and up to ten years’ imprisonment.

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Despite these legal provisions, in-country sources report that document fraud is widespread. Authorities have little capacity to verify claims by applicants, and do not provide information about the outcome of investigations or subsequent prosecutions. Fraud in relation to marriage certificates is reportedly more common than in relation to birth certificates or passports.

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TAB 3

Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression

Version 4.0 January 2019

Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the basis of claim section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below.

Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment on whether, in general: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • Claims are likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

Country of origin information The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability. The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note. All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or before the ‘cut-off’ date(s) in the country information section. Any event taking place or report/article published after these date(s) is not included. All information is publicly accessible or can be made publicly available, and is from generally reliable sources. Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion.

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Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include: • the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source • how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used • the currency and detail of information, and • whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources. Multiple sourcing is used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, so that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided of the issues relevant to this note. Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source, however, is not an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed. Each piece of information is referenced in a brief footnote; full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Advisory Group on Country Information Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 5th Floor Globe House 89 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1PN Email: [email protected] Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s pages of the gov.uk website.

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Contents Assessment ...... 6 1. Introduction ...... 6 1.1 Basis of claim ...... 6 1.2 Points to note ...... 6 2. Consideration of issues ...... 6 2.1 Credibility ...... 6 2.2 Particular social group ...... 6 2.3 Exclusion ...... 7 2.4 Assessment of risk ...... 7 2.5 Protection ...... 9 2.6 Internal relocation ...... 10 2.7 Certification ...... 10 Country information ...... 11 3. Legal context ...... 11 3.1 Constitution ...... 11 3.2 Legislation ...... 11 4. State treatment ...... 13 4.1 Government attitudes ...... 13 4.2 Police / authorities ...... 15 4.3 Avenues for redress ...... 17 5. Societal attitudes and treatment ...... 18 5.1 Political opponents ...... 18 Back to Contents ...... 18 5.2 Societal attitudes in general ...... 18 Back to Contents ...... 19 5.3 Harassment, discrimination and violence ...... 19 5.4 Women ...... 20 5.5 Religious attitudes ...... 21 5.6 Media...... 21 6. Civil society and support services ...... 22 6.1 Civil society (NGOs) ...... 22 6.2 LGBT events ...... 23 6.3 Treatment of civil society ...... 25 7. Access to services ...... 26 7.1 Education, employment and housing ...... 26

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7.2 General medical ...... 28 7.3 HIV/ AIDS ...... 29 7.4 Trans persons ...... 30 8. Freedom of movement ...... 31 8.1 Demography ...... 31 8.2 Legal rights ...... 31 8.3 In-country movement ...... 31 8.4 Foreign travel ...... 32 Terms of Reference ...... 33 Bibliography ...... 34 Sources cited ...... 34 Sources consulted but not cited ...... 37 Version control ...... 38

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Assessment Updated: 23 January 2019 1. Introduction Basis of claim 1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by the state and/or non-state actors because of the person’s actual or perceived sexual orientation and/or gender identity or expression. Points to note 1.2.1 This note provides analysis on the general situation of gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, trans and intersex persons, as well as those perceived as such. They are referred hereafter collectively as ‘LGBTI persons’, though the experiences of each group may differ. 1.2.2 Decision makers must also refer to the Asylum Instructions on Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum Claim and Gender identity and expression, including intersex issues in asylum claims. Back to Contents 2. Consideration of issues Credibility 2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Decision makers must also refer to the Asylum Instructions on Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum Claim and Gender identity and expression, including intersex issues in asylum claims. 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). Back to Contents Particular social group 2.2.1 LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe form a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because they share an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to their identity or conscience that they should not be forced to renounce it, and have a distinct identity which is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. 2.2.2 Although LGBTI persons form a PSG, this does not mean that establishing such membership is sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question to be addressed in each case is whether the particular person will face a real risk of persecution on account of their membership of such a group.

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2.2.3 For further guidance on particular social groups, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents Exclusion 2.3.1 Decision makers must consider whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts. 2.3.2 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and the Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave. Back to Contents Assessment of risk a. General points 2.4.1 Decision makers must establish whether or not an LGBTI person, if returned to their country of origin, will live freely and openly as such. This involves a wide spectrum of conduct which goes beyond merely attracting partners and maintaining relationships with them. Even if LGBTI persons who lived openly would not generally be at risk, decision makers must consider whether there are reasons why the particular person would be at risk. 2.4.2 If it is found that the person will in fact conceal aspects of his or her sexual orientation/identity if returned, decision makers must consider why. 2.4.3 If this will simply be in response to social pressures or for cultural or religious reasons of their own choosing and not because of a fear of persecution, then they may not have a well-founded fear of persecution. If a material reason why the person will resort to concealment is that they genuinely fear that otherwise they will be persecuted, it will be necessary to consider whether that fear is well-founded. 2.4.4 Decision makers should also consider if there are individual- or country- specific factors that could put the person at risk even if they choose to live discreetly because of social or religious pressures and/or whether the steps taken by them would be sufficient to avoid the risk of persecution. Some will not be able to avoid being known or perceived to be LGBTI whilst others will take some steps to conceal but would still be at risk. 2.4.5 For further guidance, see the Asylum Instructions on Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum Claim and Gender identity and expression, including intersex issues in asylum claims. b. State treatment 2.4.6 The Constitution specifically prohibits same sex marriage. Common law prevents gay men and, to a lesser extent, lesbians from fully expressing their sexual orientation. Same-sex sexual relations between men are criminalised and can result in custodial sentences. However, prosecutions are very rare. Same-sex relationships between women are not criminalised. There is no legislation regarding gender identity and transgender people are not legally acknowledged. As a result, a transgender woman is likely to be prosecuted as if they were a man (see legal context).

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2.4.7 Senior figures in the government, particularly former president Robert Mugabe, used anti-LGBTI rhetoric in public addresses. The authorities are also reported to commonly harass LGBTI persons on the grounds of loitering, indecency and public order offences. Additionally, there are reports of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment, as well as police extortion and intimidation. Some members of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, the lead LGBTI advocacy and support group, face harassment and discrimination (see State treatment). 2.4.8 In the country guidance case LZ (homosexuals) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 487 (IAC) (26 January 2012), heard on 13/14 October 2011, the Upper Tribunal held that although some gay men and lesbians suffer discrimination, harassment, intimidation, violence and blackmail from the general public and the police, there is no general risk to gays and lesbians, although personal circumstances may place some persons at risk (para 116). 2.4.9 Personal circumstances which may place some persons at risk include, but are not limited to, LGBTI rights activists and other persons who openly campaign for LGBTI rights in Zimbabwe as well as a positive HIV/AIDS diagnosis. Although not decisive on its own, being ‘openly’ gay may increase risk. Such people face the risk of arbitrary arrests by the police, and harassment by state agents and may be at increased risk of persecution (para 116 of LZ and State treatment). 2.4.10 The situation for LGBTI persons has not significantly changed since LZ was promulgated. In general, state treatment of LGBTI persons, even when taken cumulatively, is not sufficiently serious by its nature and repetition as to amount to persecution or serious harm. 2.4.11 Decision makers must consider each case on its facts. The onus will be on the person to demonstrate why, in their particular circumstances, they would be at real risk from the authorities. c. Societal treatment 2.4.12 Politicians, traditional leaders, and religious leaders have publicly rejected LGBTI people. However, during the Harmonised elections in July 2018, a leading gay rights group noted the decline in the use of hate speech and harassment of the LGBT community, compared to past election periods. Public attitudes are generally intolerant, though there is some variation by geography, age and education. LGBTI persons generally do not openly express their sexuality or gender identity in their workplaces, or within their families. Zimbabwe is deeply religious and traditional, and sexuality generally (homo- or hetero-sexual) is inhibited and unlikely to be publicly expressed. LGBTI persons experience a climate of intimidation, stigma and discrimination which may exclude them from society, public services and job opportunities. Numerous LGBTI persons have lost their jobs, been expelled from education or been evicted once their sexual orientation has been revealed (see Societal attitudes and treatment). 2.4.13 Some persons may also be subject to physical assault, including ‘corrective’ rape, although the evidence does not indicate that such violence is frequent or widespread. However, victims rarely reported such crimes to the police, in part because a fear of being outed is a barrier to reporting abuse, and it is

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difficult to find reference to the numbers and scale of violence against LGBTI persons generally, and in particular lesbians and bisexuals. Although underreporting may make it difficult to ascertain the scale of violence, it does not necessarily mean there is a significant increase in risk to LGBTI persons. Cases of violence against LGBTI persons which are reported, are infrequent and do not appear to follow a set pattern of victimisation. (see State treatment and Societal attitudes and treatment). 2.4.14 Privileged LGBTI persons may be able to be more open about their sexual orientation and identities, but still only within their like-minded social circles (see Societal attitudes in general). 2.4.15 LGBTI persons may also find it difficult to access information about and treatment for HIV and medical care for sexually transmitted diseases (see General medical and HIV/AIDS). 2.4.16 In the country guidance case of LZ, the Upper Tribunal held that although some gay men and lesbians suffer discrimination, harassment, intimidation, violence and blackmail from the general public, there is no general risk to gay men or lesbians, and ‘corrective rape’ is rare, and does not represent a general risk (para 116). 2.4.17 However, the Tribunal went on to find that personal circumstances place some gay men and lesbians at risk. Lesbians, living on their own or together, may face greater difficulties than gay men. Although not decisive on its own, someone who is ‘openly’ gay may be at an increased risk. A positive HIV/AIDS diagnosis may also increase the likelihood of a person facing difficulties such as discrimination, harassment and intimidation (para 116). 2.4.18 The situation has not significantly changed since LZ was promulgated. In general, the societal treatment of LGBTI people in Zimbabwe, even when taken cumulatively, is not sufficiently serious by its nature and repetition as to amount to persecution or serious harm. 2.4.19 However personal circumstances may place some persons at risk; each case must however be considered on its facts. The onus is on the person to demonstrate why, in their particular circumstances, they would be at real risk from non-state actors. 2.4.20 For guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents Protection 2.5.1 Where the person’s fear is of persecution or serious harm at the hands of the state, they will not be able to avail themselves of the protection of the state. 2.5.2 Where the person’s fear is of persecution or serious harm from non-state actors, the Upper Tribunal in LZ found that the police and other state agents are not willing to provide protection (para 116). 2.5.3 For further guidance on assessing the availability or not of state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents

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Internal relocation 2.6.1 Homophobic attitudes are prevalent throughout the country. Where LGBTI persons do encounter local hostility they may be able to avoid this by moving elsewhere, but only if the risk is not present there and if it would not be unduly harsh to expect them to do so (see Freedom of movement). 2.6.2 The Upper Tribunal in LZ found that a gay man or lesbian at risk in his or her community can move elsewhere, either in the same city or to another part of the country. He or she might choose to relocate to where there is relatively greater tolerance, such as Bulawayo, but the choice of a new area is not restricted. The option is excluded only if personal circumstances present risk throughout the country (para 116). 2.6.3 Special attention should be given where the person is a lesbian or perceived as a lesbian, as LZ found that lesbians ‘on their own or together, may face greater difficulties than gay men’ (para 116). 2.6.4 The country situation has not changed significantly since LZ was promulgated. In general, it may be reasonable for a LGBTI person to relocate depending on the facts of the case. 2.6.5 Internal relocation will not be an option if it depends on the person concealing their sexual orientation and/or gender identity in the proposed new location for fear of persecution. 2.6.6 For further guidance, see the Asylum Instructions on Sexual Identity Issues in the Asylum Claim, Gender identity issues in the asylum claim and Gender issues in the asylum claim. Back to Contents Certification 2.7.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 2.7.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims). Back to Contents

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Country information Section 3 updated: 22 January 2019 3. Legal context Constitution 3.1.1 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report 2016 published 11 April 2016 (DFAT report 2016), based on a range of sources, noted: ‘While the Constitution guarantees rights to non-discrimination, privacy, and freedom of expression, thought and association, ZANU-PF firmly opposed the inclusion of constitutional rights for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) persons. The Constitution specifically prohibits same sex marriage.’1 3.1.2 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted in its report dated 7 March 2016 that ‘While welcoming the inclusive non-discrimination provision in the Constitution, the Committee is concerned that national legislation remains inconsistent with the non-discrimination provisions of the Convention. It reiterates its concern about high levels of discrimination against […] lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex children and children affected or infected by HIV/AIDS.’2 The is available here. Back to Contents Legislation 3.2.1 Section 73 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act which became effective from July 2006 criminalises same sex sexual behaviour between men. ‘73 Sodomy ‘(1) Any male person who, with the consent of another male person, knowingly performs with that other person anal sexual intercourse, or any act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act, shall be guilty of sodomy and liable to a fine up to or exceeding level fourteen or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both. ‘(2) Subject to subsection (3), both parties to the performance of an act referred to in subsection (1) may be charged with and convicted of sodomy. ‘(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is declared that the competent charge against a male person who performs anal sexual intercourse with or commits an indecent act upon a young male person – ‘(a) who is below the age of twelve years, shall be aggravated indecent assault or indecent assault, as the case may be; or

1 DFAT, DFAT Report 2016 (paragraph 3.58), 11 April 2016, url. 2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Zimbabwe’ (paragraph 26), 7 March 2016, url.

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‘(b) who is of or above the age of twelve years but below the age of sixteen years and without the consent of such young male person, shall be aggravated indecent assault or indecent assault, as the case may be; or ‘(c) who is of or above the age of twelve years but below the age of sixteen years and with the consent of such young male person, shall be performing an indecent act with a young person.’3 3.2.2 The US State Department (USSD) report 2017 (USSD report 2017) published 20 April 2018 noted: ‘The constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. According to the country’s criminal code “any act involving physical contact between men that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” carries a penalty if convicted of up to one year in prison or a fine up to [US]$5,000… Common law prevents gay men and, to a lesser extent, lesbians from fully expressing their sexual orientation. In some cases, it criminalizes the display of affection between men.’4 3.2.3 An article from Voice of America (VOA) published 12 January 2017, cites a gay rights activist in Zimbabwe, Mojalifa Mokwele ‘ [t]here is no law that states that one cannot be gay. It only becomes a crime once you start committing homosexual acts in public… If you take a look at the constitution in Zimbabwe, it is not a crime to stand in the streets and publicly state that he or she is homosexual. It is not illegal to be gay in Zimbabwe. Being homosexual is only regarded criminal in Zimbabwe once you publicly commit homosexual acts.’5 3.2.4 The Avert website stated the following in relation men who have sex with men (MSM) and HIV in Zimbabwe: ‘Homosexual acts are illegal in Zimbabwe for men who have sex with men (sometimes referred to as MSM), but legal for women who have sex with women. As a consequence of this punitive law, national statistics are rarely available.’6 3.2.5 The Joint submission by Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016, stated: ‘In addition, the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which was gazetted as a law on the 22nd of May 2013 explicitly prohibits same sex marriages in terms of section 78 (3). Transgender individuals …are unable to have their gender identity legally recognized. ‘Further, transgender individuals’ gender identity is not recognized in court proceedings or law enforcement, which can result in dehumanizing and

3 National Legislative Bodies, Zimbabwe: Act No. 23/2004 of 2005 on Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) [Zimbabwe], chapter 9:23, 3 June 2005, url 4 USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 6), 20 April 2018, url 5 VOA, Gay Zimbabweans Fight Stigma, Harsh Laws, 12 January 2017, url 6 Avert, HIV and Aids in Zimbabwe, last updated: 26 March 2018, url

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unfair treatment under the law, leaving transgender women likely to be prosecuted under the “sodomy” law.’7 3.2.6 The Southern Africa Litigation Centre noted in its report dated 27 September 2016 that ‘Zimbabwe does not have a specific law that allows transgender people to change the gender marker on their birth documents, or other official documents’ and ‘There are no laws or policies that provide for hormonal treatment or any other gender-affirming healthcare for transgender people.’8 Back to Contents Section 4 updated: 22 January 2019 4. State treatment Government attitudes 4.1.1 The DFAT report 2016 noted that: ‘Official rhetoric on homosexuality is strongly homophobic. On 28 September 2015, [then] President Mugabe rejected calls from the UN to implement gay rights in Zimbabwe, saying “We (Zimbabweans) are not gays”’ Mugabe has previously described homosexuals as “worse than pigs and dogs.” Allegations of homosexuality are commonly used to sully the personal or professional reputations of business or political rivals, particularly men. On 18 October 2015, a ZANU-PF MP brought defamation proceedings against a ZANU-PF member aligned with a different party faction for allegedly calling him gay. Lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals are also stigmatised.’ 9 4.1.2 The same report noted ‘DFAT assesses that there is a high level of official discrimination … against LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe.’ 10 4.1.3 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2016 – Zimbabwe (HRW 2016 report) published 27 January 2016, stated that the authorities disparaged lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans persons (LGBT) people. The report further noted that ‘Authorities continued to violate rights of LGBT people. A Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission report published in July showed continued hostility and systematic discrimination by police and politicians against LGBT people, driving many underground.’11 4.1.4 The USSD report 2017 stated (regarding the then president) ‘President Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders publicly criticized the LGBTI community, rejecting the promotion of LGBTI rights as contrary to the country’s values, norms, traditions, and beliefs.’12 4.1.5 Robert Mugabe, using a speech at a celebration of his 92nd birthday in 2016, spoke about his attitude to Western views of gay marriage: ‘"If aid [to help

7 UNHRC, Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands (page 2-3), October 2016, url 8 Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Laws and Policies Affecting Transgender Persons in Southern Africa (p.50-1), 24 September 2016, url 9 DFAT, DFAT Report 2016 (paragraph 3.60), 11 April 2016, url. 10 DFAT, DFAT Report 2016 (paragraph 3.62), 11 April 2016, url. 11 HRW, HRW Report 2016 (section Sexual Orientation and Identity), 27 January 2016, url 12USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 6), 20 April 2018, url

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pay for grain and other food], as I understand, is to be given on the basis that we accept the principle of gay marriages, then let that aid stay where it is. We don't want it. It is rotten aid, filthy aid and we won't have anything to do with it."’13 4.1.6 Zimbabwe has rejected calls by European countries at the United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group meeting to embrace homosexuality, but accepted 142 other recommendations that are in line with the national Constitution. In an interview with after the United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group meeting in November 2016, the then Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, said: ‘“With regards to areas that we felt we would not accept, it is issues of gays and homosexuality, which is unlawful in our country,” said VP Mnangagwa. ‘’’We rejected all those. There are a few countries from Europe which recommended that we re-consider our position with regard to adults of same sex marrying each other. That we have rejected.”’14 4.1.7 In the same report, The Herald noted that 142 recommendations in line with the constitution were accepted. Of the two rejected, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Virginia Mabhiza was quoted: “We have rejected two broad categories of recommendations, that is the one to do with marriage between people of the same sex and another one to do with the Rome Statutes. Those are the two that we have outrightly rejected.”15 4.1.8 In November 2017 Robert Mugabe was replaced as president by Emmerson Mnangagwa (CPIN Zimbabwe: Opposition to the government). President Emmerson Mnangagwa gave an interview to CNN at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2018. In an article entitled ‘President Mnangagwa: “Zimbabwe is open for business”' CNN stated: ‘Gay rights not changing any time soon. Same-sex marriage is banned in Zimbabwe, and that doesn't appear to be changing any time soon under Mnangagwa's leadership. ‘"Those people who want it are the people who should canvass for it, but it's not my duty to campaign for this," he said. "In our constitution it is banned -- and it is my duty to obey my constitution."’16 4.1.9 HRW in the world report 2019, covering events of 2018 noted: ‘Ahead of the July 2018 national elections, representatives of the LGBT community in Zimbabwe met with top ruling ZANU-PF party officials. The Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) advocacy group thanked Mnangagwa for this unprecedented meeting and for "understanding" them better than his predecessor Mugabe and the opposition parties.’17 Back to Contents

13 Reuters, Mugabe birthday bash riles critics in drought-hit Zimbabwe, 27 February 2016, url 14 The Herald, Zimbabwe resists gay rights push, 7 November 2016, url 15 The Herald, Zimbabwe resists gay rights push, 7 November 2016, url 16 CNN, President Mnangagwa: Zimbabwe is open for busines', 24 January 2018, url 17 HRW, World report 2019 (section Women’s and girls’ rights), 17 January 2019, url

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Police / authorities 4.2.1 For general information on the function, role and effectiveness of the security services in Zimbabwe, see the country policy and information note on Zimbabwe: Opposition to the government. 4.2.2 The USSD report for 2017 noted that ‘… there were no known cases of prosecutions of consensual same-sex sexual activity.’18 The USSD report 2017 repeated the assessment from the 201419, 201520 and 201621 USSD reports; that there were no known cases of prosecutions of consensual same-sex sexual activity. 4.2.3 The DFAT report 2016 stated ‘The authorities more commonly harass LGBTI persons using loitering, indecency and public order statutes, although violations are under-reported because of the stigma attached to the LGBTI community. In 2014, Gays and Lesbians Zimbabwe (GALZ) reported 41 cases of arbitrary arrest, violence, harassment, unfair dismissal and forcible displacement involving LGBTI persons.’22 4.2.4 The Freedom House report covering events in 201623 and the Human Rights Watch report published in 201624 both noted that the police and security forces regularly harassed LGBT people. 4.2.5 The Joint submission by Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016, stated: ‘Transgender individuals […] are subject to arbitrary arrests and detention, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, and torture. Trans women can be charged with sodomy despite their gender identity. ‘LGBTI individuals, and in particular, transgender women and men, highlighted how arbitrary detention and torture at the hands of law enforcement officials were frequent and harmful. In one case, a transgender woman, who had been arbitrarily detained for three days for having used a female bathroom, was stripped in front of four police officers, verbally mocked and degraded, and paraded around for the amusement of the police officers on duty. A number of LGBTI individuals have reported cases of police abuse, including being doused in cold water, verbally abused, and threatened with arms.’25 4.2.6 In its submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe, GALZ documented that ‘[…] at police stations and detention facilities, LGBTI individuals are intimidated and physically assaulted by police officers. LGBTI individuals in Zimbabwe are often detained for hours at a time, without access to judicial

18 USSD, USSD Report 2017, 20 April 2018, url 19 USSD, USSD Report 2014, 25 June 2015, url 20 USSD, USSD Report 2015, 13 April 2016, url 21 USSD, USSD Report 2016, 3 March 2017, url 22 DFAT, DFAT report 2016, (paragraph 3.59), 11 April 2016, url. 23 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2017 – Zimbabwe’, 16 May 2017, url 24 HRW, ‘SADC: Reverse Downward Slide on Rights’, 30 August 2016, url. 25 UNHRC, Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands (page 2-3), October 2016, url

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recourse. LGBTI individuals are frequently beaten, mocked, and forced to pay bribes in order to escape custody. ‘[…] extortion with impunity against LGBTI individuals in Zimbabwe has been documented on both a state-based and privatized level. Extortion has taken the form of demands for money, personal belongings, or other valuables in order to keep the blackmailer silent. LGBTI individuals often succumb to such extortions due to a fear of being discriminated against, being disowned by their family, or being faced with the possibility of criminal charges due to Section 73 or other relevant laws which discriminate against LGBTI people.’26 4.2.7 In an UN compilation report dated 25 August 2016 submitted to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) it cited the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s 2012 report which expressed concern about state perpetrated acts of violence against LGBT women, urging Zimbabwe to provide them with effective protection from discrimination and violence27. 4.2.8 The DFAT 2016 report noted, ‘The authorities are more sympathetic towards intersex persons; intersex issues …are generally treated as medical rather than identity issues.’28 4.2.9 The USSD report 2017 stated ‘The police reportedly detained and held persons suspected of being gay for up to 48 hours before releasing them. LGBTI advocacy groups also reported police used extortion and threats to intimidate persons based on their sexual orientation. Members of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, the primary organization dedicated to advancing the rights of LGBTI persons, experienced harassment and discrimination.’29 4.2.10 The Constitution of Zimbabwe states that any person arrested or detained who is not released, must be brought before the court as soon as possible and in any event not later than 48 hours. If this is not done, the person must be released immediately unless their detention has been extended by the court 30. For further information on the rights of arrested and detained persons see section 50 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 4.2.11 In relation to prosecutions, the FCO noted in the Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report that ‘A court sentenced one LGBT person to 18 months in jail for “inappropriate conduct”.’31 Among sources consulted (see bibliography), CPIT could find no further information on the nature of this case. Back to Contents

26 GALZ, Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016, url 27 UNHRC, Compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 25 August 2016, paras 34-35, url 28 DFAT, DFAT report 2016 (paragraph 3.61), 11 April 2016, url. 29 USSD, USSD Report 2017, (Section 6), 20 April 2018, url 30 Zimbabwe Government, The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 url 31 FCO, The 2017 report (section Zimbabwe), updated 5 October 2018, url

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Avenues for redress 4.3.1 Information on access to state protection for LGBT persons who were subjected to discrimination or violence was scarce among the sources consulted (see Bibliography). 4.3.2 The DFAT report 2016 stated: ‘Reported cases of violence against LGBTI persons are infrequent.’32 4.3.3 In its submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe, GALZ stated that ‘Zimbabwe has failed to protect LGBTI individuals from numerous human rights abuses within its jurisdiction. By directly curtailing fundamental rights through state action, allowing others to abuse the fundamental rights of the LGBTI community with impunity, and by not protecting sexual minorities from discrimination or guaranteeing their equal protection under law, Zimbabwe is in direct violation of both its own constitution and its international human rights treaty obligations.’33 4.3.4 The joint submission by SRC, GALZ and COC Nederland reports that ‘Law enforcement officials, healthcare service providers, and other institutions are reluctant to work with sexual minorities and sex workers as a result of criminalization and prejudice… Further, sex workers and sexual minorities have little access to recourse when they are subjected to violence, rape, torture, or other forms of mistreatment and abuse at the hands of service providers and law enforcement officials.’34 4.3.5 The same report further added: ‘Sex workers and LGBTI individuals also reported a number of incidents in which law enforcement officials violated their right to remedies and redress on the basis of an individual’s profession, sexual orientation, and/or gender identity. Criminalization and stigmatization has meant that sexual minorities and sex workers are not only at much higher risk of experiencing violence within society; the perpetrators of violence and crimes against these individuals act with impunity. Therefore, sex workers and sexual minorities are reluctant to report cases, abuses and violations with the police and are unlikely to be taken seriously if they do. Lack of redress is particularly pressing for sex workers and for LBTI women who are at extremely high risk of sexual violence at the hands of clients, family members, intimate partners, and others.’ 35 4.3.6 The Southern Africa Litigation Centre website provided details of ongoing cases. In an entry dated 28 July 2017, Zimbabwe: Challenging unlawful arrest of trans woman they stated: ‘On 16 January 2014 a transgender activist was arrested in Bulawayo after entering a female toilet. At the police station she was forced to strip and examined by medical doctors to verify her gender. After spending two nights

32 DFAT, DFAT report 2016 (paragraph 3.62), 11 April 2016, url. 33 GALZ, Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016, url 34 UNHRC, Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands (page 3), October 2016, url 35 UNHRC, Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands (page 5-6), October 2016, url

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in a holding cell, she was charged with criminal nuisance. The criminal charge was later withdrawn. The civil trial on unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution took place from 25 to 27 July 2017. SALC and the Sexual Rights Centre is providing support in this case.’36 Back to Contents Section 5 updated: 22 January 2019 5. Societal attitudes and treatment Political opponents 5.1.1 On 30 April 2016 MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai said he had no intentions of persecuting gays and lesbians should he become the country's president. All Africa reported that ‘Tsvangirai told journalists during a discussion at the Bulawayo press club on Friday [29 April 2016] that he was not gay and was not a personal admirer of gays but insisted the latter were entitled to their freedoms under the country's constitution.’37 5.1.2 Morgan Tsvangirai died in February 2018. For more information regarding the political situation in Zimbabwe see the country policy and information note on Zimbabwe: Opposition to the government. Back to Contents Societal attitudes in general 5.2.1 Afrobarometer reported that, based on data gathered in 2014, that ‘…many politicians, traditional leaders, and religious leaders have been vehement in their rejection of homosexuality. Public attitudes reflect this widespread intolerance: Nine in 10 Zimbabweans (89%) say they would “somewhat dislike” (6%) or “strongly dislike” (83%) having LGBT persons as neighbours’.38 5.2.2 The same report noted that: ‘Intolerance for homosexuals cuts across all walks of life, but some demographic sub-groups are somewhat more tolerant than others […]. Tolerance levels (strongly like/somewhat like/would not care) are somewhat higher among urban residents (13%) than among rural residents (9%). Education seems to affect levels of tolerance: Citizens with post-secondary education are more likely to express tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals (17%) than respondents with secondary (10%), primary (7%), or no formal education (8%). ‘Similarly, younger respondents are more likely to say they would like or not care about having LGBT neighbours: 13% of 18- to 39-year-olds vs. 10% of 40- to 64-year-olds and 7% of those aged 65 and older.

36 The Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Zimbabwe: Challenging unlawful arrest of transgender woman Rights of LGBTI Persons, Ongoing Cases, 28 Jul 2017, url 37 All Africa, Zimbabwe: Tsvangirai Says He Is Not Gay, Will Not Quarrel With Gays If He Becomes President, 30 April 2016, url 38 Afrobarometer, Dispatch No. 124 (p7), November 2016, url

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‘MDC-T supporters are more likely to express tolerance toward homosexuals (16%) than ZANU-PF adherents (6%).’39 5.2.3 The report also noted that: ‘The least intolerant provinces are Bulawayo and Midlands, where 25% and 24%, respectively, say they would like or not mind having LGBT neighbours, whereas in Masvingo and Mashonaland Central, only one in 50 respondents express such tolerance [..]’40 5.2.4 The DFAT report 2016, stated: ‘LGBTI persons generally do not openly express their sexuality or identity in their workplaces, or within their families. DFAT understands that more privileged LGBTI persons are possibly able to be more open about their sexual orientation and identities, but still only within their like-minded social circles. Deeply embedded, traditional cultural (and religious) factors also inhibit the free expression of sexuality in any form, whether an individual identifies as homosexual, heterosexual or otherwise.’41 Back to Contents Harassment, discrimination and violence 5.3.1 The DFAT report 2016, stated: ‘DFAT assesses that there is … a moderate degree of societal discrimination against LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe. Reported cases of violence against LGBTI persons are infrequent and do not appear to follow a set pattern of victimisation.’42 5.3.2 The UN Human Rights Council gathered stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review, one of which was: ‘GALZ stated that… homophobia permeates Zimbabwean society unchecked and manifests itself in different forms, ranging from verbal and physical assault on, to discrimination of, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Refusal by duty bearers and policy makers to address this issue has resulted in the public intolerance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons becoming deeply ingrained in the community and reinforces the general stigmatization of sexual minorities in society.’ 43 5.3.3 Bridging the Gaps, in a 2016 report about its ‘LGBT People Project Zimbabwe’ stated: ‘This climate of criminalisation and intimidation has increased stigma and discrimination against LGBT people, excluding them from society, services and job opportunities.’44 5.3.4 The FCO noted in the Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report that ‘LGBT people faced discrimination, family disownment, displacement from lodgings, unfair labour practices, arrest and harassment by police, blackmail and bullying on social media.’45

39 Afrobarometer, Dispatch No. 124 (p8), November 2016, url 40 Afrobarometer, Dispatch No. 124 (p9), November 2016, url 41 DFAT, DFAT report 2016 (paragraph 3.61), 11 April 2016, url. 42 DFAT, DFAT report 2016 (paragraph 3.62), 11 April 2016, url. 43 UNHRC, The UN Human Rights Council Stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review (paras 25 and 38), 23 August 2016, url 44 Bridging the Gaps, LGBT People Project Zimbabwe, 2016, url 45 FCO, The 2017 report (section Zimbabwe), updated 5 October 2018, url

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5.3.5 The BBC in the article Zimbabwe election: Five things, published 23 July 2018 stated: ‘The director of a gay rights group says there been "a sharp decline in use of hate speech and harassment of the LGBT community" during campaigning in Zimbabwe, where homosexual acts and gay marriage are banned. Mr Mugabe once infamously said gay people were "worse than pigs and dogs" and claimed homosexuality was unAfrican. ‘"LGBTI issues have been used as a tool to divert Zimbabweans from discussing other pressing issues affecting them and a convenient ploy for political leaders facing rampant unemployment, political unrest, and a downward economic spiral," Chester Samba, from Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (Galz), told the BBC News website. ‘"Elections in the past have been characterised by scapegoating a largely invisible and unpopular minority, creating moral panic, which at times easily escalated into a witch-hunt." ‘He admits that no party's manifesto has anything specific on gay rights, though Zanu-PF did invite Galz for a meeting to gauge the challenges the LGBT community faces.’46 Back to Contents Women 5.4.1 The UN Human Rights Council gathered stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review, one of which was: ‘Joint submission 5 [The Sexual Rights Centre, Ottawa, Canada, GALZ – An Association of LGBTI People in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, COC Nederland, Amsterdam, Netherlands] stated that lesbian, bisexual and transgender women were particularly at risk of sexual violence in the form of “corrective” or “curative” rape, where those women were raped by family members under the erroneous belief that this will “cure” their sexuality.’47 5.4.2 The USSD report 2017 stated that some families subjected their LGBTI family members to “corrective rape”, particularly women. This treatment was rarely reported to the police.48 5.4.3 The GALZ March 2017 newsletter stated: ‘While in Harare, it was highlighted that there is an increase of correctional rape or sexual abuse cases.’49 The same newsletter further noted: ‘These cases and many more in which members are being violated, discriminated and verbally abused because of their choice in dressing and because of their body language are the tips of the iceberg. LBT women are compounded by societal expectations.’50 5.4.4 The same source further noted that: ‘There is still need to advance the rights of women as women face violence in public spaces and in their homes and

46 BBC, Zimbabwe election: Five things, 23 July 2018, url 47 UNHRC, The UN Human Rights Council Stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review (paras 25 and 38), 23 August 2016, url 48 USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 6), 20 April 2018, url 49 GALZ, Monthly Newsletter, March 2017, url 50 GALZ, Monthly Newsletter, March 2017, url

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for LBT women it is especially difficult to get justice as fear of being outed is a barrier to reporting abuse.’51 5.4.5 In sources consulted (see Bibliography), CPIT was unable to find reference to the numbers or frequency of violence against LGBTI persons in general or lesbians and bisexual persons in particular. 5.4.6 For background information on the position and treatment of women generally see the country policy and information note on Zimbabwe: women fearing gender-based harm or violence. Back to Contents Religious attitudes 5.5.1 The USSD report 2016 published 3 March 2017 stated: ‘Religious leaders in this traditionally conservative and Christian society encouraged discrimination against LGBTI persons. For example, Walter Magaya, leader of the Healing and Deliverance Ministries, continued to host shows on television and radio during which he “healed” members of the LGBTI community.’52 5.5.2 In contrast to this, the OSF report 2016 stated: ‘One of the SRC’s most successful engagements has been with religious leaders. Sex workers specifically asked the SRC to target clergy because of how influential the church is in creating negative perceptions of them. In essence, they were “sick and tired of being labeled [sic] whores when they came to church.” The SRC organized trainings for 40-50 church leaders at a time, and identified 12 clergy who wanted to engage more deeply. The SRC recognized that if it wanted these individuals to step-up and champion sexual rights in Zimbabwe’s conservative environment, it needed to support them. It started monthly meetings to allow clergy to discuss challenges and ask questions. Since this work began, several clergy have spoken publicly to their congregations and at SRC events about sexual rights, and have provided support to parishioners whose children identify as lesbian or gay.’53 Back to Contents Media 5.6.1 The UN Human Rights Council gathered stakeholder submissions for the November 2016 Universal Periodic Review, which included: ‘Joint submission [JS] 5 [The Sexual Rights Centre, Ottawa, Canada, GALZ – An Association of LGBTI People in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, COC Nederland, Amsterdam, Netherlands] which stated that ‘political leaders and state-sponsored media regularly incited hatred towards gays and lesbians by depicting same-sex relations as immoral.’54

51 GALZ, Monthly Newsletter, March 2017, url 52 USSD, USSD report 2016 (section 6), 3 March 2017, url 53 Open Society Foundations (OSF), No Turning Back: Examining Sex Worker-Led Programs That Protect Health and Rights (p.27), 15 September 2016, url 54 UNHRC, The UN Human Rights Council Stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review (para 25), 23 August 2016, url

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5.6.2 The Daily News article, Call to discuss homosexual teachers, published 1 October 2018 reported on the need for dialogue on LGBTI issues: ‘Secretary-general of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) Raymond Majongwe said Hovelmeier’s [a gay teacher] resignation is an indication that there should be dialogue about homosexual teachers. ‘“As a country we must conduct dialogue over this issue of homosexuality because it is a reality in our country, so we can’t pretend that it’s not there. ‘“The resignation therefore means that wherever he is going to go, he is going to remain homosexual, so we are simply saying to our ministry let’s engage and lets dialogue because just like we have this teacher who is homosexual, there are children as well who are of that sexual orientation… ‘“We need policies in terms of how we handle these people because the moment when we identify somebody who is homosexual, we go after them with arrows and chase them away and that will not kill or deal with the problem… ‘“Let us engage as citizens and see how best we can handle this homosexual matter without calling anyone names, without chasing after them, let us dialogue and see how best we can handle the children and the teachers who are of this sexual orientation...” ‘Zimbabwe Teachers Association (Zimta) chief executive officer Sifiso Ndlovu said the resignation was a good decision as it relieved the tension from the school… ‘“Zimta respects the rights of individuals but we do not support the practice of homosexuality, we need to protect schools in terms of conflict,” he said.’55 See Access to services Back to Contents Section 6 updated: April 2018 6. Civil society and support services Civil society (NGOs) 6.1.1 The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) provided the following (undated) information on their website on the small projects they are involved in: ‘Human Rights and Key Populations Initiative. The key populations initiative has two target groups viz; sex workers and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) groups. Opportunities exist to expand on this work in future to address rights of an expanded cohort. ‘LGBTI Rights Sub-Initiative: The initiative in partnership with Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) focuses on law and human rights responses to LGBTI rights violations and access to reproductive health rights. The initiative also looks at LGBTI as human rights defenders. ZLHR helps in the protection and promotion of LGBTI rights and seeks to increase their understanding of law and human rights including SRHR [sexual and

55 The Daily News, Call to discuss homosexual teachers, 1 October 2018, url

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reproductive health and rights]. The work also involves advocacy towards eradication of stigma in the general communities. The initiative also seeks improved awareness and understanding on legislation and the right to equal opportunities by both the government and the key populations communities.’56 6.1.2 On the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum website the following information was provided in relation to Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ): ‘GALZ is an organization which strives for the attainment of full and equal human, social and economic rights in all aspects of life for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex (LGBTI) persons…today, it remains unique in that it is the only organisation in the country specifically working with people who engage in same-sex sexual activity. Originally a small social club of mostly middle-class professionals, the association has grown over the years and now truly represents the broader LGBTI community in ten centres throughout Zimbabwe. ‘Today, the GALZ Resource Centre in Harare provides professional counselling, entertainment and educational activities for members. GALZ is also actively involved in broader human rights campaigning and in the fight for access to affordable treatment for all people living with HIV or AIDS.’57 6.1.3 GALZ has a website and public facing accounts on Twitter and Facebook which provide information and regular updates on events and campaigns of interest to the LGBT community in Zimbabwe. Its Twitter page states, ‘Promoting, representing and protecting the rights and interests of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgender and Intersex people in Zimbabwe.’58 Back to Contents LGBT events 6.2.1 An undated entry on the GALZ website stated: ‘General homophobia and restrictive legislation make it difficult for LGBTI people in Zimbabwe to feel safe about being open about their sexuality in public spaces and so the community is not yet ready to march onto the streets in numbers and celebrate Pride. However, GALZ members frequently attend pride marches in South Africa, in particular Joburg Pride. ‘The traditional international Gay Pride month of June is generally observed in Zimbabwe by throwing a large party, but the homegrown ZimPride takes place in October in the week running up to the big event of the Zimbabwean gay and lesbian calendar, Miss Jacaranda Queen Drag Pageant, named after the exotic jacaranda tree which comes into vivid purple bloom around this time. ‘Drag pageants were a major part of the Zimbabwean gay and lesbian scene in the 1980s, but the first official Jacaranda Queen took place in 1995. For

56 ZLHR, Special Projects, undated, url 57 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, undated, url 58 Twitter, GALZ, undated (account created January 2013), url

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the first five years, it was organised independently from GALZ but, in 2000, the association took over official control of the event. ‘Traditionally, Jacaranda Queen is held in a public hall although this is becoming increasingly difficult because of acts of violence perpetrated by homophobes, and last-minute cancellations by nervous venue managers. ‘Every year a Queen is chosen along with a First Princess, a Second Princess and a Miss Personality.’59 6.2.2 The GALZ Newsletter from March 2017 stated: ‘International Women’s Day 2017 was celebrated in both Harare and Bulawayo. The management of GALZ decided to honor and host women within the organization and those from other partners’ organizations such as Trans Smart and Pakasipiti in Harare and VOVO in Bulawayo. The events saw a total of 86 participants with 64% being either, lesbian, bisexual women or trangender men. Transgender women and gender nonconforming individuals constituted 16.3% of the guests, the remainder were other invited community members. ‘It was an opportunity for the women and women membership to raise awareness of issues within the lesbian, bisexual and transgender (LBT) community. ‘In Bulawayo, the quorum discussed the opportunities available for women within the organization. Guests shared stories of their lives especially around gender and sexuality. The stories included the day to day challenges that women face and issues they have to deal with in the community (both mainstream and LGBTI).’60 6.2.3 OutRight provided information on the work undertaken by the organisation: ‘In response to the challenging conditions facing LGBTIQ activists, OutRight runs security training workshops in the most affected regions of the world with the aim of providing activists with the tools to be able to handle the most complex environment. The training model is rooted in real experiences and addresses all aspects of security from digital to physical. ‘The most recent of these workshops took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, at the end of 2016 where 18 LGBTIQ activists from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region came together to discuss concepts of security, raise their security concerns and seek solutions. Participants were also able to share experiences and exchange notes on how they dealt with specific security issues. Participants came from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, South Africa, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania. ‘Ricky Nathanson, a transgender activist from Zimbabwe, raised the issue that digital security and learning how to store documents safely was one of the major requirements of the activist community. She highlighted that police raids on LGBTIQ organizations resulted in the confiscation of computers and

59 GALZ, Zimpride, undated, url 60 GALZ, Monthly Newsletter, March 2017, url

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with them confidential information that could expose organizations, and those they work with to undue harm. She stated, “It is really critical that all activists learn how to safeguard themselves and ensure their computers are secure.”’61 6.2.4 Erasing 76 Crimes (a LGBT campaigning site) reported in March 2017 about people attending an open air auditorium: ‘They are Zimbabwe’s gay community, coming together for The Rainbow 263 Film Festival, a two-day event organised by local activists and attended by several international visitors. (Zimbabwe’s international calling code is 263.) ‘This two-day event is the culmination of a week-long program under the “Queer University” banner, where experts quietly flew in to teach film-making skills to select members of the gay community and to empower them financially to bring their own little projects to life.’ 62 Back to Contents Treatment of civil society 6.3.1 The USSD report 2016 stated in regard to civil society generally, not specifically groups that support and advocate on behalf of LGBT people: ‘The government arrested, detained, prosecuted, and harassed members of civil society, including members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).’63 6.3.2 On 15 July 2016, GALZ published a report on their website, ‘An assessment of the impact of state sanctioned and unsanctioned raids on GALZ premises and gatherings’. The executive summary noted: ‘GALZ has been attacked by different kinds of adversaries including but not limited to uniformed police officers, officers in plain clothes, state security agents, youth militia and unidentified groups. GALZ members have been subjected to verbal and physical assaults, confiscation of personal belongings, detentions and arrests. This has had negative ramifications on GALZ and its members and affected the fulfilment of organisational objectives. Fear has been instilled and inculcated amongst its members to the extent that even when they were entitled to receive legal protection, they have preferred to abstain from reporting abuse or injustices perpetrated against them.’64 6.3.3 A report by the Open Society Foundations (OSF), ‘No Turning Back: Examining Sex Worker-Led Programs that Protect Health and Rights’, published 15 September 2016, looked at the Sexual Rights Centre (SRC) in Bulawayo, set up in 2008 by Sian Maseko: ‘The SRC was originally to have a broader sexual rights mandate, but ended up prioritizing work with groups who experience violations and oppression related to sexual rights, including women living with HIV and AIDS, women

61 OutRight, African LGBTIQ Activists Trained on Safety and Security, 24 January 2017, url 62 Erasing 76 Crimes, ‘Under a hidden rainbow …’,14 March 2017, url 63 USSD, USSD report 2016 (Executive Summary), 3 March 2017, url 64 GALZ, An assessment of the impact of state sanctioned and unsanctioned raids on GALZ premises and gatherings, executive summary,15 July 2016, url

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with disabilities, sex workers, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, transgender, and intersex (LGBQTI) community. Given the frequency and magnitude of the abuses these groups faced, Sian believed the organization could have a real impact… ‘The SRC has also organized creative stunts to get people talking about sexual rights. In 2011, it donated 20 pink trash bins to the city of Bulawayo, causing a public sensation. The mayor accepted the gift declaring, “Gays have the right to donate to [the city] council and we have the right to receive from them,” and vowing that anyone who vandalized the bins would be held accountable. While some citizens refused to use them, others expressed appreciation and said the donation was a noble gesture.’65 Back to Contents Section 7 updated: 22 January 2019 7. Access to services Education, employment and housing 7.1.1 In a VOA article, Court Rules in Favour of Dismissed Zimbabwe Worker Linked to Gay Party, published 27 October 2015 ‘A Bulawayo man who had been fired from the civil service for allegedly engaging in homosexual activities has successfully appealed against his dismissal at the Labour Court. ‘Some human rights defenders are welcoming the ruling. ‘Labour Court president Justice Evangelista Kabasa on Monday ruled that Raymond Sibanda’s appeal against dismissal was valid as no one should be dismissed from work on the basis of their sexual orientation. ‘Justice Kabasa said the case against Sibanda had no merit as it involved a moral issue over which there is no absolute right or wrong. ‘Sibanda was employed as a youth officer by the Ministry of Youth and Economic Empowerment and was fired last year after a disciplinary hearing found him guilty of misconduct. ‘This emanated from Sibanda's arrest and payment of an admission-of-guilt fine for a charge of allegedly performing an indecent act in a public place, following a police raid at a hotel in the outskirts of Bulawayo, where he was part of a crowd that attended a Christmas party hosted by the Gays and Lesbians Association of Zimbabwe, commonly known as GALZ, in 2013. ‘Sibanda was dismissed on the basis of misconduct in terms of civil service regulations for, among other things -quote- “putting the name of the ministry into disrespect and disrepute” on the grounds that he was engaging in gay practices…. ‘Although they had argued in their heads of argument that Sibanda’s payment of guilt fine to conduct associated with public indecency and gay activities was enough for the government to sack him, state lawyers from the

65 OSF, No Turning Back: Examining Sex Worker-Led Programs That Protect Health and Rights, 15 September 2016, url

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Attorney General’s civil division, agreed with the court that the dismissal was invalid. ‘The state lawyers said they agreed with the court that the case had no merit but had gone on to represent their client at the insistence of an unnamed departmental head who had wanted to have Sibanda fired as a way sending a message that -quote- “government does not support gay activities.”’66 7.1.2 Amongst sources consulted (see Bibliography), CPIT was unable to find the publication of Justice Evangelista Kabasa’s ruling on the Sibanda case in the Labour Court or any surrounding caselaw. 7.1.3 GALZ director Chester Samba reported in a November 2016 Standard newspaper article that: ‘Numerous LGBTI individuals have reported having their employment discontinued after supervisors and colleagues discovered their sexual orientation. The LGBTI population in Zimbabwe has reported high rates of eviction and homelessness on account of landlords or families discovering their sexual orientation. LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe have reported expulsions due to their sexual orientation or gender identity at both secondary and tertiary education levels; even without expulsion, many LGBTI individuals withdraw from school at an early age due to the effects of discrimination.’67 7.1.4 The USSD report 2017 stated ‘LGBTI persons often left school at an early age due to discrimination. Higher education institutions reportedly threatened to expel students based on their sexual orientation. Members of the LGBTI community also had higher rates of unemployment and homelessness.’68 7.1.5 In an April 2016 document Outright recorded that ‘As a result of the harsh laws and public denunciation, particularly by President Robert Mugabe, members of the LGBT community are routinely stigmatized, discriminated against, denied access to services and benefits […] in practice, state services are often not made available to members of the LGBT community.’69 7.1.6 The same source stated ‘With respect to housing, while there is no explicit legislation that directly promotes, or alternatively infringes upon, the rights of LGBT individuals when it comes to access to housing, it is likely that LGBT individuals open about their sexual orientation or gender identity would be at risk of being discriminated against due to the prevailing prejudices within Zimbabwean society.’70 7.1.7 HRW in the World report 2019, covering events of 2018 noted: ‘…restrictive legislation contributes to stigma and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. In September, a teacher at a

66 VOA, Court Rules in Favour…, 27 October 2015 url 67 The Standard, Zim govt’s same-sex marriages lie exposed, 27 November 2016, url 68 USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 6), 20 April 2018, url 69 OutRight Action International, A Survey of Laws Impacting on the Human Rights of LGBT Persons in Selected South African Countries, 1 April 2016, url 70 OutRight Action International, A Survey of Laws Impacting on the Human Rights of LGBT Persons in Selected South African Countries, 1 April 2016, url

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Harare school who came out as gay resigned after he received death threats from members of the public over his sexual orientation.’71 See State treatment and Societal attitudes and treatment. Back to Contents General medical 7.2.1 The UN Human Rights Council gathered stakeholder submissions for the November 2016 Universal Periodic Review, which included: ‘Joint submission [JS] 5 [The Sexual Rights Centre, Ottawa, Canada, GALZ – An Association of LGBTI People in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, COC Nederland, Amsterdam, Netherlands which in a joint submission to The UN Human Rights Council for their forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review stated that: ‘Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons have reported being threatened, ridiculed, and driven out of health institutions upon disclosing that they have engaged in same-sex relations. This stigmatization prevented sex workers and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons from fully disclosing their specific health needs.’ 72 7.2.2 In an April 2016 document Outright recorded that ‘…consistent with the general public’s perception of homosexuality and transgenderism, many healthcare providers in Zimbabwe are homophobic or transphobic and fail to understand sexual orientation and the needs and concerns of LGBT individuals.’73 7.2.3 The USSD report 2017 stated ‘Many persons who identified themselves as LGBTI did not seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health problems due to fear that health-care providers would shun them or report them to authorities. Since the completion of a nation-wide sensitization program for health-care workers, however, the LGBTI community reported an improvement in health service delivery.’74 7.2.4 In March 2018 Erasing 76 Crimes reported that ‘Activists see Zimbabwe’s new Public Health Bill as progressive, though not as progressive as it should be. It explicitly mentions key populations (those most at risk of HIV infection) and calls for them to the involved in anti-AIDS planning. But Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights notes that LGBT people are not explicitly included in the bill, unlike Ministry of Health documents about the anti-AIDS advisory board.’75 7.2.5 A 2017 study by Hunt J, Bristowe K, Chidyamatare S, et al ‘They will be afraid to touch you’: LGBTI people and sex workers' experiences of accessing healthcare in Zimbabwe, interviewed sixty individuals from key populations from across Zimbabwe (key populations included sex workers and sexual and gender minorities (LGBTI individuals and MSM)).

71 HRW, World report 2019 (section Women’s and girls’ rights), 17 January 2019, url 72 UNHRC, The UN Human Rights Council Stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review (para 72), 23 August 2016, url 73 OutRight Action International, A Survey of Laws Impacting on the Human Rights of LGBT Persons in Selected South African Countries (p.223), 1 April 2016, url 74 USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 6), 20 April 2018, url 75 Erasing 76 Crimes, Zimbabwe progress toward LGBT role in HIV fight, 14 March 2018, url

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Participants were sampled by age (aged at least 18 years), gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and sex worker status from four centres in Zimbabwe. The study found: ‘Three distinct main themes emerged from the data: (1) illnesses have been caused by ‘bad behaviour’ and deserve blame, discouraging key populations from seeking health support: key populations were perceived to have brought illnesses on themselves through sexual behaviour; (2) equal access to healthcare is conditional on conforming to sexual norms: to receive the same access to health and palliative care services as the general population, key populations believed they must pretend, deny or lie about their sexual identity/behaviour and (3) perceptions that healthcare workers were ill- informed about needs of key populations, and personal attitudes impacted on their care delivery: the lack of understanding of, and disrespect for, key populations by health workers resulted in experiences of poor support and provision of care during chronic illness, significantly increasing morbidity and mortality.’76 Back to Contents HIV/ AIDS 7.3.1 The World Health Organisation (WHO) Consolidated Guidelines on HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care for key populations. Updated version, July 2016, commenting on the situation of men who have sex with men generally, not specifically Zimbabwe noted: ‘Men who have sex with men (MSM) have a disproportionate burden of HIV in most countries in the world, even in many countries with generalized HIV epidemics. Worldwide, for MSM, the odds of being infected with HIV are 19.3 times higher than for men in the general population (Baral et al., 2007). Although there are a variety of existing efficacious HIV prevention interventions for MSM, they face political and structural barriers to accessing services in many settings due to their stigmatized and marginalized status. The disproportionate burden of HIV faced by MSM suggests that existing methods of HIV prevention are not sufficient and additional prevention modalities would be helpful.’77 7.3.2 Avert stated the following in relation men who have sex with men (MSM) and HIV in Zimbabwe: ‘Criminalising men who have sex with men drives this vulnerable group away from HIV services. As a result, many do not know their HIV status, let alone access treatment. ‘However, Zimbabwean organisations that support the rights of men who have sex with men and their access to HIV services do exist, such as Gays and Lesbians Zimbabwe (GALZ). Many are routinely punished and shutdown or have their members arrested.

76 Hunt J, Bristowe K, Chidyamatare S, et al, ‘They will be afraid to touch you’ 2017, url 77 WHO, Consolidated Guidelines on HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care for key populations, July 2016, url

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‘UNAIDS reported in 2016 that just one in seven men who have sex with men in Zimbabwe (14.1%) are aware of their status. ‘International donors such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and PEPFAR have attempted to ensure some of their funding is directed towards men who have sex with men. Government restrictions mean this has not materialised.’78 7.3.3 Bridging the Gaps, in a 2016 report about its LGBT People Project Zimbabwe stated: ‘Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate is estimated at 15.2% among the general population. HIV prevalence among men who have sex with men is high. The estimated HIV prevalence among MSM is 17%. Zimbabwe has developed a National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan that recognises the need to prioritise the needs of key populations. However, the legal framework is not supportive for LGBT people which limits the access to HIV and SRHR (sexual and reproductive health rights) services.’79 7.3.4 Bridging the Gaps went on to describe how their ‘project builds on the strong advocacy work of our partners GALZ and SRC to put LGBT people’s health issues on the political agenda and to provide rights-based health services.’ They listed their achievements: • ‘3869 LGBT people are reached with good quality health services (2011- 2015). • 60 staff of health facilities in Harare and Bulawayo were trained to provide LGBT-friendly services (2011-2015) • 11 community events were organized for LGBT people (2011-2015) • 4 advocacy tools were developed, including shadow reports, fact sheets, statements (2011-2015)’ 80 7.3.5 On 30 April 2016, All Africa News noted that the ‘government tried to stop foreign gays and lesbians attending the International Conference on Aids and STI's in Africa (ICASA) in Harare, from displaying their wares, after suspected state security agents pulled down their displays. They were however, allowed to proceed with their exhibition after massive lobbying from local and international human rights organisations.’81 Back to Contents Trans persons 7.4.1 A joint submission by the Sexual Rights Centre, Ottawa, Canada, GALZ –, Zimbabwe and COC Nederland, Amsterdam, Netherlands to The UN Human Rights Council, for their forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review stated: ‘With regard to transgender individuals, there was a lack of

78 Avert, HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe, Last updated: 02 February 2018, url 79 Bridging the Gaps, LGBT People Project Zimbabwe, 2016, url 80 Bridging the Gaps, LGBT People Project Zimbabwe, 2016, url 81 All Africa, Zimbabwe: Tsvangirai Says He Is Not Gay, Will Not Quarrel With Gays If He Becomes President, 30 April 2016, url

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access to gender affirming services including access to hormones, medical equipment such as binders, and to medical procedures such as surgery.’ 82 7.4.2 The Southern Africa Litigation Centre noted in its report dated 27 September 2016 that ‘Transgender people who want to access hormonal treatment usually look to the black market or travel outside Zimbabwe – mainly to South Africa – to access this medication.’83 Back to Contents Section 8 updated: April 2018 8. Freedom of movement Demography 8.1.1 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the World Factbook, updated 26 March 2018, estimated in July 2017 that Zimbabwe has a population of around 13.8 million84. 8.1.2 About a third of the population is in urban areas primarily Harare (population circa 1.5 to 2 million) and Bulawayo (population circa 600,000).85 86 8.1.3 Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated 22 February 2018, noted that ‘Among urban blacks there is a disproportionately large number of males of working age, leaving an excess of older people, women, and children in rural areas.’87 Back to Contents Legal rights 8.2.1 The USSD report 2017 stated ‘The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government restricted these rights.’88 Back to Contents In-country movement 8.3.1 The USSD report 2016 stated ‘Police made in-country movement difficult by regularly mounting checkpoints nationwide along most major routes. In urban areas a single road could have several roadblocks in the span of a few miles. Despite court injunctions against “on-the-spot” fines, police levied fines for minor offenses ranging from five to several hundred dollars and demanded immediate payment.’ 89

82 UNHRC, The UN Human Rights Council Stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review (para 72), 23 August 2016, url 83 Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Laws and Policies Affecting Transgender Persons in Southern Africa, p51, 24 September 2016, url 84 CIA, The World Factbook, updated 26 March 2018, url 85 CIA, The World Factbook, updated 26 March 2018, url 86 Zimbabwe Population Census Office, National Report – Zimbabwe Pop’n Census 2012’), 2012, url 87 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Zimbabwe, (Demographic trends), last updated 22 February 2018, url 88 USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 2d), 20 April 2018, url 89 USSD, USSD Report 2017 (Section 2d), 20 April 2018, url

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8.3.2 The Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World 2018’ report covering events of 2017 stated ‘Police roadblocks within and between cities, at which police frequently stop motorists to demand bribes, have become a serious inconvenience. In December 2017, the government issued a directive to reduce police roadblocks and abolish spot fines.’90 8.3.3 The DFAT report 2016 stated ‘Women’s rights organisations have told DFAT that women in Zimbabwe are generally less able to relocate internally than men. This is because they have less access to financial resources, which impacts their ability to find shelter and food. They are also bound by cultural expectations that they will look after their children.’91 8.3.4 The same reported noted in relation to LGBTI persons ‘DFAT assesses that there are no major restrictions on internal relocation for…LGBTI persons.’92 Back to Contents Foreign travel 8.4.1 The USSD report 2017 stated ‘The constitution provides the right for citizens to enter and leave the country and the right to a passport or other travel documents. The Office of the Registrar General imposed administrative obstacles in the passport application process for citizens entitled to dual citizenship, particularly Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizenship.’93 8.4.2 The Freedom House report 2018 stated ‘Passport offices, which in the past were characterized by long queues and instances of bribery, have since become more efficient. However, in September 2017, the registrar’s office temporarily suspended applications for emergency passports, citing a backlog of over 2,000 applications.’94 Back to Contents

90 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 Zimbabwe Profile, (section G1), 15 March 2018, url 91 DFAT, DFAT report 2016 (paragraph 5.17), 11 April 2016, url. 92 DFAT, DFAT report 2016 (paragraph 5.18), 11 April 2016, url. 93 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2d), 3 March 2017, url 94 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 Zimbabwe Profile, (section G1), 15 March 2018, url

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Terms of Reference A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of what the CPIN seeks to cover. They form the basis for the country information section. The Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Team uses some standardised ToRs, depending on the subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned. For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken: • Legal context o Constitution o Legislation o Legal rights • State attitudes and treatment o Government attitudes o Arrests and detention o Prosecution of same-sex acts o Arrest / prosecution of LGBT persons for other offences o State violence and discrimination o Avenues of redress • Societal attitudes and treatment o Political o General societal attitudes o Violence and discrimination o Religious attitudes o Media • Civic societies / NGOs o LGBT NGOs o LGBT activities o State treatment of LGBT NGOs / events o Societal treatment of LGBT NGOs / events • Access to services o Healthcare o Accommodation o Employment o Education

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Reuters, ‘Mugabe birthday bash riles critics in drought-hit Zimbabwe’, 27 February 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe-idUSKCN0W00GP. Last accessed 22 March 2018 The Standard, ‘Zim govt’s same-sex marriages lie exposed’, 27 November 2016, https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2016/11/27/zim-govts-sex-marriages-lie-exposed/. Last accessed 12 April 2018 Southern Africa Litigation Centre, ‘Laws and Policies Affecting Transgender Persons in Southern Africa’, 24 September 2016, http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/08/Transgender-rights-in-Zimbabwe.pdf UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Zimbabwe’, 7 March 2016, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&Tre atyID=5&TreatyID=10&TreatyID=11&DocTypeID=5. Last accessed: 28 March 2018 The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), ‘Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands’ October 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRZWStakeholdersInfoS26.aspx. Last accessed 21 March 2018 ‘Compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21’, 25 August 2016, https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/188/94/PDF/G1618894.pdf?OpenElement. Last accessed: 23 January 2019 ‘Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Submission by: GALZ: The Association of LGBTI people in Zimbabwe’, October 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/ Pages/UPRZWStakeholdersInfoS26.aspx. Last accessed: 22 March 2018 The UN Human Rights Council Stakeholder submissions for the forthcoming November 2016 Universal Periodic Review, 23 August 2016, https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/187/32/PDF/G1618732.pdf?OpenElement Last accessed: 22 March 2018 United States State Department (USSD), ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 – Zimbabwe’ (USSD Report 2017), 20 April 2018, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt /humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. Last accessed 25 April 2018 ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 – Zimbabwe’ (USSD Report 2016), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dli d=265318. Last accessed: 21 January 2019 ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 – Zimbabwe’,13 April 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dli d=252745. Last accessed: 21 January 2019

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‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014 – Zimbabwe’ (Section 6), 25 June 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2014&dli d=236422. Last accessed: 22 January 2019 Voice of America (VOA), ‘Gay Zimbabweans Fight Stigma, Harsh Laws’, 12 January 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/zimbabwe-gay-rights-lgbt/3673999.html. Last accessed: 21 March 2018 ‘Court Rules in Favour of Dismissed Zimbabwe Worker Linked to Gay Party’, published 27 October 2015, https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe- sexual-orientation-sex-marriage-unconstitutional/3024732.html. Last accessed: 23 January 2019 The World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Consolidated Guidelines on HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care for key populations’, July 2016, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/246200/9789241511124-annexes- eng.pdf;jsessionid=EDA1964208DD80A10A6F4A253DCB31A7?sequence=5. Last accessed: 22 January 2019 Zimbabwe Government, ‘The Constitution of Zimbabwe (amendment number 20)’, 2013, https://parlzim.gov.zw/images/documents/Constitution-of-Zimbabwe- Amendment_No_20_-_14-05-2013.pdf. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, undated, http://www.hrforumzim.org/contact-us/members/gays-and-lesbians-of-zimbabwe- galz/. Last accessed: 22 March 2018 The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Special Projects, undated, https://www.zlhr.org.zw/?page_id=69. Last accessed: 22 March 2018 Zimbabwe Population Census Office, ‘National Report – Zimbabwe Population Census 2012’, 2012, http://www.zimstat.co.zw/sites/default/ files/img/National_Report.pdf. Last accessed 05 April 2018 Back to Contents Sources consulted but not cited Amnesty, ‘Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The state of the world's human rights’, 22 February 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/ documents/pol10/6700/2018/en/ . Last accessed: 29 March 2019 ARC International, ‘Universal Periodic Review – Zimbabwe 2nd Cycle’, 28 December 2016, http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/universal-periodic-review/v- z/zimbabwe-cycle-2/. Last accessed: 29 March 2018 Organisation for Refuge, Asylum and Migration (ORAM), http://oramrefugee.org/. Last accessed: 29 March 2018 Transgender Intersex Africa, http://transgenderintersexafrica.org.za/. Last accessed: 29 March 2019 Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), http://www.wozazimbabwe.org/. Last accessed: 29 March 2018 Back to Contents

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Version control Clearance Below is information on when this note was cleared: • version 4.0 • valid from 29 January 2019

Changes from last version of this note Update of country information and corresponding review of assessment section after an Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) commissioned review in December 2018. Back to Contents

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TAB 4

ZIMBABWE 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic. On July 30, the country elected Emmerson Mnangagwa president in general elections. Despite incremental improvements from past elections, domestic and international observers noted serious concerns and called for further reforms necessary to meet regional and international standards for democratic elections. While the pre-election period saw increased democratic space, numerous factors contributed to a flawed overall election process, including: the Zimbabwe Election Commission’s (ZEC) lack of independence; heavily biased state media favoring the ruling party; voter intimidation; unconstitutional influence of tribal leaders; disenfranchisement of alien and diaspora voters; failure to provide a preliminary voters roll in electronic format; politicization of food aid; security services’ excess use of force; and lack of precision and transparency around the release of election results. On August 26, the chief justice swore in Mnangagwa as president with the constitutional authority to complete a five-year term, scheduled to end in 2023. The election resulted in the formation of a ZANU-PF-led government with a supermajority in the National Assembly but not in the Senate.

Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces.

Human rights issues included arbitrary killings, government-targeted abductions, and arbitrary arrests; torture; harsh prison conditions; criminal libel; censorship; restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association, and movement; government corruption; ineffective government response towards violence against women; and criminalization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) status or conduct.

The government took limited steps toward potential consequences for security- sector officials and nongovernment actors who committed human rights violations, including appointing a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the post- election violence. In December the COI found the military and police culpable for the deaths of six protestors, but it did not identify individual perpetrators, units, or commanders. Impunity remained a problem.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

ZIMBABWE 2 a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings

There were two reported incidents of the government or its agents committing arbitrary or unlawful killings. On August 1, the military killed six unarmed protestors when it responded to an opposition-led election related demonstration in Harare’s central business district (CBD). A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) killed two civilians on February 22 while enforcing a ban on vendors and unlicensed taxi drivers in the CBD. Security-sector forces participated in political violence in the post-election period during the month of August. Security-sector impunity for politically motivated abuses remained a problem.

Impunity for past politically motivated violence also remained a problem. Investigations continued of prior years’ cases of violence resulting in death committed by security forces and ZANU-PF supporters, but by year’s end there were no arrests or charges in these cases.

Unwillingness to acknowledge past atrocities or seek justice for victims continued to affect relations between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups negatively. b. Disappearance

There were no reports of long-term disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

The High Court ordered the government to provide updates on the 2015 disappearance of democracy activist Itai Dzamara, but government officials failed to do so. There were no reports of authorities punishing any perpetrators of previous acts of disappearance. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, there were reports security forces engaged in such practices with impunity and with the implicit support of officials affiliated with the government. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported security forces assaulted and tortured citizens in custody, including targeted assault on and torture of perceived opponents of the government. Throughout the year, police used Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 3 excessive force in apprehending, detaining, and interrogating criminal suspects. In some cases police arrested and charged the victims of violence rather than the perpetrators. Political opponents of President Emmerson Mnangagwa stated security forces arrested, detained, and tortured them after the July 30 election.

Human rights groups reported government agents continued to perpetrate physical and psychological torture. Reported torture methods included beating victims with sticks, clubs, cables, gun butts, sjamboks (a heavy whip), and falanga (beating the soles of the feet).

According to one NGO, from January through August, 367 victims of organized violence and torture sought medical treatment and counseling after sustaining injuries in multiple incidents across the country. The NGO reported ZANU-PF supporters committed 35 percent of the violations, ZRP committed 31 percent, and the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) committed 22 percent. Nearly 39 percent of the cases occurred in the capital, Harare. The majority of victims, more than 51 percent, associated themselves with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance. More than 39 percent did not indicate their political affiliation. The other roughly 10 percent were associated with other smaller independent political parties.

From August 1 to 7, uniformed soldiers systematically assaulted civilians in the Harare CBD and suburbs of , Highfield, Kuwadzana, Seke, and Warren Park, according to the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) and local NGOs. The soldiers accused many of the victims of participating in the August 1 opposition-led protests.

There were also reports of short-term abductions during this same period during which victims were abused. Victims in several Harare suburbs reported assaults and hours-long interrogations in remote locations regarding opposition members’ whereabouts. For example, according to NGO and local news accounts, plain- clothed state security agents abducted MDC Alliance Information and Public Secretary Simbarashe Mujeye and his brother from their Chitungwiza home on August 2. Mujeye claimed the agents handcuffed and beat him while demanding to know the whereabouts of senior MDC leaders. The men then took Mujeye to Harare Central Police station on charges of inciting public violence related to the August 1 protests.

According to a local NGO, from January to June, 23 victims of organized violence and torture sought assistance after security agents found them mining illegally at Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 4 the Chiadzwa diamond mine in Manicaland Province. Victims reported security forces detained them at torture bases, beat them with sticks, kicked them, and sometimes allowed security dogs to attack them.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained harsh due to financial constraints and overcrowding in some of the older facilities. The Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS) struggled to provide adequate food and sanitary conditions and worked with community organizations to help address these issues. The 2013 constitution added prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration into society to ZPCS responsibilities. The ZPCS provided inmates with opportunities to participate in sewing, mechanics, woodworking, and agricultural activities, as well as allows churches and other organizations to teach life skills training.

Physical Conditions: Conditions in prisons, jails, and detention centers were often harsh. There were approximately 17,000 prisoners, spread across 46 main prisons and 26 satellite prisons. While some prisons operated below capacity, NGOs reported that overcrowding continued, due to outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs. In March President Mnangagwa granted amnesty to approximately 3,000 prisoners, including most women and all juveniles, to address overcrowding.

Prison guards occasionally beat and abused prisoners, but NGOs reported that the use of excessive force by prison guards was not systematic. Relations between prison guards and prisoners improved during the year as part of a positive trend NGOs have observed during the past several years.

NGOs reported female prisoners generally fared better than did male prisoners. Authorities held women in separate prison wings and provided women guards. Women generally received more food from their families than did male prisoners. The several dozen children younger than age four living with their incarcerated mothers shared their mothers’ food allocation, rather than receiving their own. NGOs were unaware of women inmates reporting rapes or other physical abuse. With support from NGOs, prisons distributed some supplies such as sanitary pads for women. Officials did not provide pregnant women and nursing mothers with additional care or food rations out of the ZPCS budget, but the ZPCS solicited donations from NGOs and donors for additional provisions.

There was one juvenile prison housing boys only. Girls were held together with women. Authorities also held boys in adult prisons throughout the country while Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 5 in remand. Officials generally tried to place younger boys in separate cells, but NGOs reported older prisoners often physically assaulted the younger boys when left together. Authorities generally sent juveniles to prison rather than to reformatory homes as stipulated in the law, as there is only one adequate reformatory home in the country, located in the Harare suburbs. Juveniles remained vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners.

Prisoners with mental health issues were often held together with regular prisoners until a doctor was available to make an assessment. Psychiatric sections were available at some prisons for these individuals but offered little specialized care.

According to the ZPCS, remand prisons were overcrowded. Authorities often held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners until their bail hearings. Due to fuel shortages, the ZPCS was at times unable to transport pretrial detainees to court hearings, resulting in delayed trials and longer detentions.

According to NGOs, food shortages were widespread in prisons but not life threatening. Prisoners identified as malnourished received additional meals. The harvest of prison farm products provided meals for prisoners. Protein was in short supply, particularly meat. Prisoners’ access to clean water varied by prison.

Diarrhea was prevalent in most prisons. Diseases such as measles, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses thrived in those with the poorest conditions. Lighting and ventilation were inadequate. There were insufficient mattresses, blankets, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene products.

Prisoners had access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at nearly every prison. In partnership with NGOs, the ZPCS offered peer education on HIV/AIDS. The ZPCS tested prisoners for HIV only when requested by prisoners or prison doctors. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialized medical personnel and medications, prisoners suffered from routine but treatable medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases. Due to financial constraints, the ZPCS was at times unable to transport prisoners with emergency medical needs to local hospitals.

Administration: The inspections and audit unit of the ZPCS, intended to assess prison conditions and improve monitoring of prisoners’ rights, did not release the results of such assessments. The ZHRC continued to conduct monitoring visits. There was no prison ombudsman, but there were statutory mechanisms to allow alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 6

Prisoners and detainees had relatively unrestricted access to visitors, except in maximum-security prisons, where remoteness hampered access by prisoners’ relatives. The ZPCS afforded prisoners the opportunity to practice their chosen religion. NGOs reported prisoners had sufficient access to chaplains and most prisons offered minority religious services as well.

Independent Monitoring: The law provides international human rights monitors the right to visit prisons. Church groups and NGOs seeking to provide humanitarian assistance, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, gained access. All organizations working in prisons reported that meetings with prisoners occurred without third parties present and with minimal restrictions. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, although other sections of the law effectively weakened these prohibitions. The government enforced security laws in conflict with the constitution. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society activists and journalists perceived as opposing the government. Security forces frequently arrested large numbers of persons during antigovernment protests.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The constitution provides for a National Security Council (NSC) composed of the president, vice president, and selected ministers and members of the security services. The NSC never met, however. Instead, the Joint Operations Command, an informal administrative body, discharged the functions of the NSC at national, provincial, and district levels. All security-sector chiefs reported directly to the president, who is the commander in chief of all security services.

The ZRP is responsible for maintaining internal law and order. The Department of Immigration and the ZRP, both under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement. Although the ZRP is officially under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the President directed some ZRP roles and missions in response to civil unrest. The and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defense Forces under the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces are responsible for external security, but the government sometimes deployed them as a back-up to police as a show of

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 7 force. The Central Intelligence Organization, under the Office of the Vice President, is responsible for internal and external security.

The military-assisted government transition in November 2017 weakened the ZRP as an institution. In January the government forcibly retired 11 senior ZRP officials and reassigned dozens more in March.

Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces, neither did the government have effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse. There were reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year. For example, the government has not held accountable the ZRP officers who killed two civilians during a protest in Harare on February 22. Likewise, the government has not established an independent complaints mechanism to investigate allegations of security force misconduct as called for in the constitution.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

The law stipulates that arrests require a warrant issued by a court or senior police officer and that police inform an arrested person of the charges before taking the individual into custody. Police did not always respect these rights. The law requires authorities to inform a person at the time of arrest of the reason for the arrest. A preliminary hearing must be held before a magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest. According to the constitution, only a competent court may extend the period of detention.

The law provides for bail for most accused persons. In 2015 the Constitutional Court declared section 121(3) of the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act unconstitutional. According to human rights attorneys, it allowed prosecutors to veto bail decisions made by the courts and keep accused persons in custody for up to seven days based on the prosecution’s stated intent to appeal bail. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling against section 121(3), the government amended the law by including provisions that allow prosecutors a veto over judicial bail decisions. Prosecutors relied on the provisions to extend the detention of opposition political activists.

Authorities often did not allow detainees prompt or regular access to their lawyers and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients that detainees or those with authority to grant access were unavailable. An indigent detainee may apply to the government for an attorney in criminal cases, but these requests only Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 8 apply in capital cases. This occurred with cases involving opposition party members, civil society activists, and ordinary citizens.

The government also monitored, harassed, and intimidated human rights lawyers when they attempted to gain access to their clients.

On August 8, former finance minister and senior MDC Alliance official Tendai Biti was detained trying to flee Zimbabwe via Zambia and forcibly returned to Harare. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) claimed police denied Biti access to legal counsel. Biti was subsequently charged with inciting post- election violence and unlawfully announcing election results. On December 14, a magistrate dropped the incitement of violence charge. His trial for violating electoral law continued at year’s end. Additionally, ZLHR claimed police assaulted Biti’s lawyer and deliberately prevented him from accompanying Biti to Harare Central Police station on August 9.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government used arbitrary arrest and detention as tools of intimidation and harassment, especially against political activists, civil society members, journalists, and ordinary citizens asserting their rights. There were NGO and media reports that security forces arbitrarily arrested political and civil society activists and then released them without charge. On July 13, police arbitrarily arrested three MDC Alliance members when they attempted to observe postal voting at a police camp in Mutare citing trespassing and violation of the electoral act. A magistrate later declined to charge them. Similarly, prosecutors declined to charge three Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) members in Gweru who police arrested for demonstrating against government economic measures on October 11.

The law absolves individual security agents from criminal liability regarding unlawful arrests and detention. Police officers routinely argued that they merely followed orders in conducting arrests and were not responsible for compensating victims of unlawful arrests. In April 2017, however, a High Court judge ruled that officials could be sued, especially if they acted unlawfully. The case related to the abduction and torture of human rights activist Jestina Mukoko, who was held incommunicado by state security officials for 21 days in 2008. On October 5, the High Court ordered the state to pay Mukoko $150,000 in damages.

Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention was limited for nonpolitical prisoners. Delays in pretrial procedures were common, however, due to a shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, the low Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 9 capacity of court officials, and a lack of resources. The constitution provides for the right to bail for detained suspects. Despite this provision, the government routinely opposed bail for political detainees.

Other prisoners remained in prison because they could not afford to pay bail, which remained exorbitant in view of economic conditions in the country. Magistrates rarely exercised the “free bail option” that authorizes them to waive bail for destitute prisoners. Lawyers reported juveniles usually spent more time in pretrial detention than did adults because they could not attend court unless a parent or guardian accompanied them. Authorities occasionally did not notify parents of a juvenile’s arrest or the closest kin of an adult detainee’s arrest. e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but executive influence and interference remained a problem. There continued to be instances where the judiciary demonstrated its independence despite being under intense pressure to conform to government policies.

The government often refused to abide by judicial decisions and routinely delayed payment of court costs or judgments awarded against it in civil cases. Judicial corruption was widespread, extending beyond magistrates and judges. For example, NGOs reported senior government officials undermined judicial independence, including by giving farms and homes to judges.

Magistrates heard the vast majority of cases. Legal experts claimed defendants in politically sensitive cases were more likely to receive a fair hearing in magistrates’ courts than in higher courts. In higher courts justices were more likely to make politicized decisions due to the use of threats and intimidation to force magistrates, particularly rural magistrates, to rule in the government’s favor. In politically charged cases, other judicial officers such as prosecutors and private attorneys also faced pressure, including harassment and intimidation. Some urban-based junior magistrates demonstrated a greater degree of independence and granted opposition party members and civil society activists bail against the government’s wishes.

Trial Procedures

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, but political pressure and corruption frequently compromised this right. By law, defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, although courts did not always respect this Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 10 right. Magistrates or judges held trials without juries. Trials were open to the public except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Assessors-- usually nonlawyers who sit together with a judge to provide either expert advice or guidance on local practices--in lieu of juries, could be appointed in cases in which conviction of an offense could result in a death penalty or lengthy prison sentence. Defendants have the right to a lawyer of their choosing, but most defendants in magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation. In criminal cases an indigent defendant may apply to have the government provide an attorney, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases, in which the government provided an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. Individuals in civil cases may request free legal assistance from the Legal Resources Foundation or the ZLHR. The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association also provided some free legal assistance to women and youth. The law provides for free interpretation, and Shona-English interpretation was generally available. The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense is also provided for by law but was often lacking.

Authorities sometimes denied attorneys’ access to their clients. Defendants have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf and to confront adverse witnesses. Any person arrested or detained for an alleged offense has the right to remain silent and may not be compelled to confess. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to access all government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Authorities did not always respect these rights.

Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The right to appeal both conviction and sentence exists in all cases, and it is automatic in cases in which the death penalty is imposed.

Unlike in normal criminal proceedings, which proceed from investigation to trial within months, in cases of members of political parties or civil society critical of the government, prosecuting agents regularly took abnormally long to submit their cases for trial. In many cases wherein authorities granted bail to government opponents, they did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but instead chose to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the threat of impending prosecution remaining, with the accused person eventually being called to court, only to be informed of further delays. On August 22, a Bindura magistrate ordered the case against MDC Alliance politician Agrippa Mutambara to proceed in this manner after witnesses who accused him of vandalizing a state monument failed to appear in court. The prosecutors and police routinely retained material confiscated from the accused as evidence. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 11

Government officials frequently ignored court orders in such cases, delayed bail and access to medical care, and selectively enforced court orders related to land disputes favorable to those associated with the government.

The public had fair access to the courts of law, particularly the magistrates’ courts, although observers reported occasional physical and procedural impediments, such as limited available seating areas.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons, including opposition party officials, their supporters, NGO workers, journalists, and civil society activists. Authorities held many such individuals for one or two days and released them. Political prisoners and detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or detainees, and prison authorities arbitrarily denied access to political prisoners. There were reports police beat and physically abused political and civil society activists while they were in detention.

In August and September, police arrested more than 30 individuals affiliated with the MDC Alliance for allegedly inciting public violence through involvement in a protest in which six individuals were shot and killed by security forces. A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests. Police released all of these defendants on bail as they await trial.

On January 4, a magistrate court released an American citizen who was arrested in November 2017 and tried on charges of subverting a constitutional government and undermining the authority of and insulting former president Mugabe. The American was held in a maximum-security prison for seven days, and then released on bail with instructions to have very limited social contact. She was ultimately released and allowed to leave the country when the prosecutor failed to present evidence, but the charges remained open.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Civil judicial procedures allow for an independent and impartial judiciary, but the judiciary was subject to political influence and intimidation, particularly in cases involving high-ranking government officials, politically connected individuals, or individuals and organizations seeking remedies for violations of human rights.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 12

Lack of judicial and police resources contributed to problems enforcing domestic court orders.

Property Restitution

The constitution stipulates the government must compensate persons for improvements made on land subsequently taken by the government, but it does not set a timeline for the delivery of compensation. The government rarely provided restitution or compensation for the taking of private property, and police generally did not take action against individuals who seized private property without having secured sanction from the state to do so.

Support was uneven and inconsistent for households resettled from the diamond mining grounds of Marange in Chiadzwa to a government-owned agricultural estate outside Mutare. Since 2010, authorities relocated more than 1,800 families. Each household was entitled to receive $1,000 for relocation, although reportedly only a handful received the money. Most of the relocated families had not received compensation of any kind, including agricultural land, while the government classified them as “people with no recognizable legal rights or claim to the land that they are occupying,” stating that their former land became state land, despite customary and traditional rights to the contrary.

Nearly all white commercial farmers reported the government had not compensated them for losses suffered from the land resettlement program that began in 2000 (see Section 1.f.). f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, or home, but local NGOs reported the government did not respect these prohibitions. Early in the year government officials pressured local chiefs and ZANU-PF loyalists to monitor and report on persons suspected of supporting political parties other than ZANU-PF. Through threats and intimidation, local chiefs and ZANU-PF loyalists also compelled individuals, mostly in rural areas, to contribute money toward ZANU-PF political rallies. On May 16, the High Court ruled that traditional leaders should not interfere in the political process. It further ordered the President of the Chiefs Council, Fortune Charumbira, to retract two statements insisting traditional leaders must support the ruling party in the July

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 13 elections. Charumbira did not make the retractions and challenged the ruling in court.

Government entities manipulated the distribution of government-provided food aid, agricultural inputs, and access to other government assistance programs such as education assistance to exclude suspected political opposition supporters and to compel support for ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF supporters threatened to withhold food aid in constituencies such as Hurungwe, Murehwa, and Gokwe during the run-up to the July 30 elections. For example, Heal Zimbabwe Trust reported that village heads in Hurungwe Ward 9 told their villagers that government-provided maize seed would only be distributed to those citizens who proved they registered to vote and were members of ZANU-PF.

Shortly after President Mnangagwa took office, he announced the government would no longer forcibly displace persons from their homes. In February the government returned Lesbury Estate to tobacco farmer Robert Smart, who was forcibly evicted from his land in June 2017. According to local human rights and humanitarian NGOs, Lesbury Estate was the only land the government returned to its previous owner during the year.

According to the attorney general and Ministry of Lands, beginning in 2000 a description of every white-owned farm in the country was published in state media and the farms effectively became state property. According to the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe (CFU), after authorities published a description of the property, it was transferred to a politically connected individual at the first available opportunity.

CFU reported since 2000 titleholders who lost their homes or properties--where most of their life earnings were invested--were not compensated. As a result of evictions, there were scores of destitute elderly former farmers and former farm workers.

The government established the Zimbabwe Land Commission in 2015 as a mechanism for dispossessed farmers to claim compensation for seized lands. The CFU reported the commission had functioned as an arbiter in zoning disputes, but it had not provided compensation to any of its claimants.

Estimates by the CFU put the number of remaining white commercial farmers at fewer than 400, although the exact number was unknown. Those remaining continued to be targeted, harassed, and threatened with eviction by farm Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 14 beneficiaries, unemployed youth, and individuals hired by those standing to benefit.

In January the government announced it would grant white farmers 99-year leases on their remaining land, but the CFU and other NGOs pointed out the leases do not constitute legal property rights that banks would accept as collateral for loans. CFU reports none of its members had received a 99-year lease, citing in part a cumbersome application process set by the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement.

In March 2017 officials purporting to represent the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement and police arbitrarily demolished and burned the homes of approximately 200 families on Arnold Farm in Mashonaland Central, reportedly owned by former president Mugabe’s family. Farm residents obtained a High Court order to stop the evictions. Police allegedly told lawyers representing the farm residents that they were acting on the orders of their superiors but did not have a High Court order approving the evictions. Antiriot police ordered residents to leave the farm and destroyed property, attacking those who resisted. In August those who remained reported suspected ZANU-PF youth members trespassed on the property and damaged farming equipment before security guards chased them away.

The law permits the interception and monitoring of any communication (including telephone, postal mail, email, and internet traffic) in the course of transmission through a telecommunication, postal, or other system in the country. Civil liberties advocates claimed the government used the law to stifle freedom of speech and target political and civil society activists (see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press

The constitution provides for freedoms of expression and of the media, but the law limits these freedoms in the “interest of defense, public security or professional confidentiality, to the extent that the restriction is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom.” The government continued to arrest, detain, and harass critics, and journalists practiced self-censorship.

Freedom of Expression: There were no official restrictions on individuals criticizing criticize the government or on the discussion of matters of general Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 15 public interest. Authorities, however, remained sensitive to criticism in general, particularly when directed at President Mnangagwa. Persons accused of insulting the president and his office are charged under section 33 (2) (b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform Act), undermining authority of or insulting a president, but this was contested in the Supreme Court on the basis that the section infringed on the right to freedom of expression. The court did not make a final determination on its constitutionality, however, and the law remains in force. On October 26, police cited the law to arrest Wisdom Mkhwananzi after he gave testimony at a commission of inquiry hearing in Bulawayo accusing President Mnangagwa of complicity in the government’s killing of more than 20,000 people in the 1980s known locally as “Gukurahundi.”

On September 29, police arrested Norman Machipisa after he reportedly said President Emmerson Mnangagwa was incapable of running the country. He was charged with contravening section 41(b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform Act) for disorderly conduct. Harare Magistrate Learnmore Mapiye released him on $20 bail and remanded him until October 11. On August 21, police arrested Munyaradzi Shoko and charged him with criminal nuisance for allegedly posting offensive statements on Facebook concerning President Mnangagwa. On August 23, police withdrew charges against Shoko.

Press and Media Freedom: Independent newspapers and commercial radio stations were active and expressed a wide variety of views, although with some restrictions. State-sponsored media, however, were the most prevalent. The Ministry of Media, Information, Publicity, and Broadcasting Services exercised control over state-run media.

Independent newspapers continued to operate freely, although journalists reported practicing self-censorship. Police and journalist unions regularly met in an effort to promote a safe working environment.

On August 3, riot police briefly stopped a press conference where MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa planned to speak on alleged election rigging in the aftermath of the July 30 polls. Broadcasting and Media Services Minister Simon Khaya Moyo intervened, and police departed the venue, after which the press conference proceeded.

The government used accreditation laws to monitor international media journalists’ entry into the country. The government required foreign journalists to obtain permits 60 days before travelling to the country in order to report from the country. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Foreign reporters paid more for permits and accreditation than did their local counterparts. The Zimbabwe Media Commission charged $200 for a foreigner’s 60-day accreditation while local journalists paid $10 for a one-year accreditation. ZEC charged journalists covering the July 30 election an additional $50 fee for further accreditation to election-related events and facilities.

On September 5, media reported government authorities denied a passport application for freelance journalist Violet Gonda. Gonda lived in exile for nearly 15 years, and returned to the country in the aftermath of the 2017 military intervention ending President Robert Mugabe’s rule. Officials at the Registrar General’s office stated they could not process her passport for reasons dating back to 2002 when she worked for London-based SW Radio Africa. Her appeal remained pending at year’s end.

Most international media outlets such as CNN, al-Jazeera, and the BBC continued to operate in the country.

Radio remained the principal medium of public communication, particularly for the rural majority. All urban commercial radio stations licensed in 2015 were operating during the year. Despite their perceived allegiance to ZANU-PF, these stations included independent voices in their programming. The government did not license any community radio stations during the year.

The government-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation--the country’s only domestically based television-broadcasting station--operated one television channel. International satellite television broadcasts were available through private firms but were too expensive for most citizens.

During the year the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) granted three broadcasting licenses, including a content distribution license to the government- controlled Zimbabwe Newspapers Private Limited, and video on demand licenses (dealing with internet video content) to Econet Wireless (operating Kwese TV) and Tel One. On September 7, the BAZ awarded independent media house AMH an online television and radio license.

Violence and Harassment: Security forces, officials, and supporters from the major political parties routinely harassed journalists. On September 4, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) condemned what it stated was the systematic “censorship, banning, or expulsion of journalists from public events.” It stated that

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ZIMBABWE 17 the trend was against the letter and spirit of media freedoms as espoused in the country’s constitution.

On April 30, police arrested and detained Gift Phiri, an editor with the Daily News, after he was seen taking pictures of a ZANU-PF meeting with party polling agents. He was charged with one count of criminal trespassing. Phiri was later released after paying a fine.

On May 24, Deputy Minister of Justice Terrence Mukupe assaulted NewsDay journalist Blessed Mhlanga and his wife during a live radio program. Mhlanga had released a video recording of an internal ZANU-PF meeting in which Mukupe said the military would not recognize opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa as president if he won the July 30 election. When Mhlanga went to police to file a complaint regarding the assault, he learned Mukupe already had made a statement accusing him as the aggressor.

On May 14, MDC Alliance supporters manhandled Tawanda Mudimu, a photographer with state media outlet The Herald, while he covered demonstrations at the party’s headquarters in Harare. According to the MISA-Zimbabwe chapter, MDC Alliance supporters allegedly assaulted Mudimu and demanded he delete the pictures he had taken during opposition demonstrations.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The government maintained censorship through media registration and accreditation laws, although many provisions of the law are inconsistent with the constitution. The law provides the government with extensive powers to control media and suppress free speech by requiring the registration of journalists and prohibiting the “abuse of free expression.” Government-controlled media practiced self-censorship and bias in favor of the ruling party.

Libel/Slander Laws: The Constitutional Court ruled the constitution outlaws criminal defamation. Civil defamation laws remained in force.

Newspapers exercised self-censorship due to government intimidation and the prospect of prosecution under civil libel laws.

National Security: The law grants the government a wide range of legal powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined. For example, the extremely broad Official Secrets Act criminalizes the divulging of any information acquired by government employees in the course of official duties. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Authorities used these laws to restrict publication of information critical of government policies or public officials.

Internet Freedom

The law permits the government to monitor all communications in the country, including internet transmissions. Internet and mobile phone communication in the country was widely available. The government, however, regulated internet and mobile phone communication to curb dissent and increased its share of the information and communications technology market and international gateways. The government regularly monitored and interfered with use of social media. On June 18, the ZPCS summoned prison officer John Mahlabera to a disciplinary hearing for a tweet perceived to be supportive of MDC Alliance President Nelson Chamisa. The prison authorities said Mahlabera’s actions showed disloyalty to President Mnangagwa.

The Interception of Communications Act (ICA) along with the Postal and Telecommunications (Subscriber Registration) Regulations, 2014 (SI 95 of 2014) facilitated eavesdropping and call interception. Under ICA law enforcement officers may apply to the responsible minister for a warrant authorizing law enforcement to intercept communications, including calls, emails, and messages. Using the statutory instrument, officers may apply for interception warrants if they know the identities of individuals whose calls and messages they want to intercept.

According to the International Telecommunication Union, 27.1 percent of the population used the internet in 2017.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government did not restrict academic freedom during the year, however the country’s laws restricted the independence of universities, subjecting them to government influence and providing disciplinary powers over staff and students to university authorities. The country’s president is the chancellor of all eight state- run universities and appoints their vice chancellors. The government has oversight of higher education policy at public universities, and ZANU-PF controls the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education.

The Censorship and Entertainment Controls Board approves scripts by playwrights. Artists who violated provisions of the Censorship and Entertainment Control Act (CECA) received fines and prison sentences. On May 10, Harare Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Magistrate Josephine Sande ordered musician Tawanda Mumanyi to pay a fine of $100 or stay one month in prison for recording a song deemed “obscene and indecent.” Authorities convicted Mumanyi of contravening CECA for the “Kurova Hohwa” song’s sexually suggestive lyrics. b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted these rights.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, or both. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) requires organizers to notify police of their intention to hold a public gathering--defined as 15 or more individuals--seven days in advance. Failure to do so may result in criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law also allows police to prohibit a gathering based on security concerns but requires police to file an affidavit in a magistrate’s court stating the reasons behind the denial. The government enacted POSA after a demonstration resulted in security forces killing six opposition protestors on August 1. A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests.

Although many groups did not seek permits, other groups informed police of their planned events, and police either denied permission or gave no response. The MDC Alliance accused police of using the cholera epidemic in Harare as an excuse to ban large public assemblies to prevent an MDC Alliance rally on September 15. Media reported that from September 16-22 police forcibly removed vendors who refused to comply with orders related to the cholera outbreak to vacate their stalls in the Harare CBD. On October 11, police arrested Peter Mutasa, president of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and 35 trade unionists in Harare and other major city centers as they awaited a court decision to overturn the ban on their planned demonstration against the government’s 2 percent tax on electronic transfers. Police had previously denied ZCTU’s request for a permit, and a Harare magistrate dismissed ZCTU’s challenge to the police ban on October 12.

Authorities often denied requests by civil society, trade unions, religious groups, or political parties other than ZANU-PF to hold public events if the agenda conflicted with government policy positions. There were several reports of political rallies interrupted by opposing political parties.

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On February 26, police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse dozens of National University of Science and Technology students protesting continued strikes by lecturers. Police dogs injured eight students, while police arrested 61 students. A local NGO reported 15 students sought medical treatment after this incident.

Freedom of Association

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. Although the government did not restrict the formation of political parties or unions, ZANU-PF supporters, sometimes with government support or acquiescence, intimidated and harassed members of organizations perceived to be associated with other political parties. For example, a local NGO reported that on July 25, a local councilor in Mbire threatened to have community members beaten and their homes burnt down if they voted for opposition political parties. Local NGOs provided multiple reports similar to this one. c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/. d. Freedom of Movement

The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government restricted these rights. The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern at Tongogara refugee camp, but it interfered with some humanitarian efforts directed at internally displaced persons. The Registrar General continues to delay implementing a joint statelessness study as part of UNHCR’s campaign to end statelessness by 2024.

Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: Security forces detained irregular migrants in prisons with convicted criminals. Prolonged detention for migrants was common. Migrants complained of mistreatment by other prisoners. The government sometimes worked with international organizations to assist the voluntary repatriation of migrants, primarily Mozambicans settled on the border between the countries. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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In-country Movement: Police interrupted freedom of movement with checkpoints less frequently than in 2017 but continued to operate regular checkpoints nationwide along most major routes.

Foreign Travel: The constitution provides the right for citizens to enter and leave the country and the right to a passport or other travel documents. The Office of the Registrar General imposed administrative obstacles in the passport application process for citizens entitled to dual citizenship, particularly Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizenship. Despite high-profile cases in which courts confirmed the rights of Zimbabweans to hold dual citizenship, many poorer citizens could not afford the legal costs of appealing passport and other travel document denials.

Many citizens left the country to settle in other countries. In search of employment, young Zimbabweans routinely settled in South Africa and Botswana. Although South Africa and Botswana repatriated hundreds of them each year, the majority eventually found their way back to these countries. The majority of white citizens who lost their farms beginning in 2000 continued to move to other countries. Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa continued to support white Zimbabwean former farmers by making land available at concessionary rates.

Exile: The constitution prohibits expulsion from the country for all citizens. A number of persons, including former government officials, prominent businessmen, human rights activists, opposition party members, and human rights lawyers, left the country and remained in self-imposed exile due to fear of persecution.

Citizenship: The constitution provides for three different classes of citizenship: by birth, by descent, or by registration. The government deprived some sections of the population of citizenship rights based on the law, which revokes the citizenship of persons who fail to return to the country in any five-year period.

Despite a constitutional provision of citizenship and having voted previously, some persons were denied the right to vote during the July 30 elections because they could not adequately demonstrate their citizenship. An amendment to the Citizenship Act, which would align the law with the 2013 constitution and allow dual citizenship, remained pending in parliament at year’s end. Independent groups estimated that as many as two million citizens might have been Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 22 disenfranchised, including those perceived to have opposition leanings, such as the more than 200,000 former commercial farm workers from neighboring countries and approximately 30,000 mostly white dual nationals. During the year citizens had to sue the government to assert dual citizenship rights. Poor citizens who could not afford the costs of litigation remained disadvantaged.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

According to international organizations, approximately 113,000 households were displaced and more than 250 groups of identified IDPs lived throughout the country. The primary causes of displacement were rural evictions (45.7 percent), natural disasters (27.7 percent), localized conflict (13.3 percent), and urban evictions (13.1 percent). The most significant historical events that created internal displacement included state-sponsored election-related violence, land reform, and Operation Murambatsvina (the government’s eviction of citizens from nonfarming areas in 2005). According to one NGO, Operation Murambatsvina resulted in the destruction of homes and livelihoods affecting an estimated 700,000 persons. Until 2009 the government denied the existence of any IDPs.

In 2014 approximately 15,000 persons were displaced from the vicinity of the Tokwe-Mukosi dam in Masvingo Province. Other recent documented displacements were from disputed farming areas. At year’s end several thousand households in disputed farming areas were at risk of displacement due to verifiable threats or eviction notices. Most of the persons displaced had resided on their land for years without formal offer letters or title deeds. The government provided no resettlement assistance to evicted families and depended primarily on international organizations to do so.

IDPs from previous years remained in near-emergency conditions, with an overwhelming majority living without basic sanitation. IDPs were among the populations at greatest risk of food insecurity. In addition to improved living conditions, IDPs required regularization of their status. Without needing any official documentation, several generations of farm workers originally from neighboring countries previously resided in insular commercial farming communities. With the eviction of farm owners, these farm workers were forced to adjacent communal lands and left without employment as well as health and education services.

Contractors and NGOs independent of the government that carried out food security and other assessments faced challenges in accessing certain rural districts. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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In isolated cases local authorities advised organizations against traveling to farms involved in ownership disputes, where aid workers might be at risk.

Protection of Refugees

Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. According to UNHCR, the country hosted approximately 20,177 refugees and asylum seekers during the year. As of July 31, 13,356 were registered and 58 percent were granted refugee status. The Tongogara refugee camp hosted approximately 12,100 refugees and asylum seekers, with an estimated 100 arrivals each month, primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Burundi.

Freedom of Movement: The government maintained a formal encampment policy requiring refugees to live at the Tongogara refugee camp. Nevertheless, at year’s end more than 943 refugees lived in urban areas, including Harare and Bulawayo, and more than 6,546 Mozambican asylum seekers lived among host communities along the border with Mozambique.

Employment: Refugees in the informal sector had limited employment options due to the encampment policy requiring all refugees to reside in the Tongogara refugee camp. UNHCR partners continued to monitor and explore livestock production for livelihood activities in the camp.

Durable Solutions: While the government did not accept refugees from foreign countries for resettlement, it facilitated the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their home countries by recognizing the Voluntary Repatriation Declaration Form as a valid document for travel purposes. The government also allowed Rwandan refugees, who lost prima facie refugee status following implementation of the 2013 Rwandan cessation clause, to remain in the country pending final arrangements by the government. Additionally, the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees stated that Rwandans with Zimbabwean spouses would be permitted to regularize their stay in the country. Many refugees were unwilling to return to their home countries voluntarily, and resettlement remained the only viable solution for many of them.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

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Although the constitution provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage and conducted by secret ballot, this right was restricted. The political process continued to be heavily biased in favor of the ruling ZANU-PF party, which has dominated politics and government and manipulated electoral results since independence in 1980.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: Most international and local independent observers characterized the July 30 presidential, parliamentary, and local elections as largely free of violence but not meeting the mark for a free and fair election. Political parties and civil society organizations complained of widespread voter disenfranchisement, including of foreign-born and diaspora voters, and the inability to compete on a level playing field. State media coverage was heavily biased in favor of ZANU-PF and provided almost no access to or positive coverage of the opposition. There were reports of voter intimidation, including the collection of voter registration slips by party and tribal leaders in an attempt to undermine the secrecy of the vote. While the law obliges traditional chiefs to be impartial, in rural areas traditional leaders mobilized voters and canvassed support for ZANU-PF. In return traditional leaders continued to receive farms, vehicles, houses, and other benefits. Local NGOs also reported traditional leaders’ selective distribution of agricultural inputs and food aid to reward ZANU-PF supporters and punish opposition voters.

The credibility and independence of ZEC were called into question for allegedly being composed largely of personnel loyal to ZANU-PF. ZEC failed to release a finalized voter’s roll until after the nomination court announced on June 14 the 23 candidates to contest the presidency. The voter’s roll ZEC provided to the MDC Alliance and other opposition parties did not include biometric information and differed from the one used at polling stations on Election Day. ZEC allowed political party representatives a one-time viewing of the printing of presidential ballots but provided no transparency of their storage or transportation to polling stations prior to the election. Ballot papers were printed in an unbalanced layout with the names of 13 candidates in one column and nine in the next to allow Mnangagwa’s name to appear at the top of a column. On July 12, ZEC officials were present at Ross Police Camp in Bulawayo when police officers cast ballots in the presence of supervisors, but they did so without observation from opposition party polling agents in violation of the Electoral Act.

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Voting on Election Day occurred peacefully, with a large voter turnout estimated at 85 percent. Most observers found ZEC-administered polling stations well run by competently trained officers. ZEC successfully accredited 1,209 foreign election observers and journalists in a timely and efficient manner. Some local observers, however, reported the accreditation process to be overly burdensome. On August 1, military personnel killed six unarmed protestors during an opposition-led election-related demonstration in Harare’s CBD. A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests.

On August 3, ZEC released presidential election results, declaring incumbent President Emmerson Mnangagwa the winner with 50.8 percent of the vote. Within 24 hours, ZEC provided polling station level results on CD-ROMs to stakeholders. Statistical analysis by citizen observers found ZEC’s announced presidential results to be within a credible statistical range, although the margin of error indicated a presidential runoff election was also within that range. Leading opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa challenged ZEC’s declaration of Mnangagwa as the winner. ZEC later revised Mnangagwa’s percentage of the vote to 50.6 percent in response to Chamisa’s legal challenge.

On August 22, the Constitutional Court held a hearing to review the challenge to the announced presidential election results. The court denied permits to allow four South African members of Chamisa’s legal team to argue the case. On August 24, the court unanimously determined the petition did not meet the required evidentiary standards. It declared Mnangagwa the winner of the presidential election and ruled that the petitioners had to pay the court costs of the other parties to the case.

On August 26, the chief justice inaugurated Mnangagwa. The ZANU-PF party won an exact two-thirds majority in the 270 member National Assembly but failed to garner a two-thirds majority in the 80-member Senate. The Southern African Development Community, the African Union, and the Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa declared the election free and fair.

Political Parties and Political Participation: An unprecedented number of presidential candidates (23) and political parties (55) contested the July 30 elections. Despite this opening of political space, elements within ZANU-PF and the security forces intimidated and committed abuses against other parties and their supporters and obstructed their activities. Local NGOs reported ZANU-PF youth members and war veterans threatened communities with violence if ZANU-PF candidates lost in the elections. In July police arrested ZANU-PF supporters for Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 26 allegedly threatening to burn the house of United African National Council parliamentary candidate Silver Chiripanyanga in Mashonaland East province. Local NGOs also reported dozens of instances of ZANU-PF supporters removing opposition and independent parties’ campaign signs and materials in wards throughout the country. In June Build Zimbabwe Alliance party leaders posted photos of campaign posters allegedly torn by ZANU-PF supporters in Gweru.

Members of the opposition MDC Alliance also carried out acts of intimidation and committed abuses, although at a much lower rate than did ZANU-PF supporters. MDC Alliance supporters of two rival primary candidates assaulted each other in the Harare suburb of Epworth on June 2. On March 4, supporters of MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa assaulted supporters of Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) Vice President Thokozani Khupe at a party meeting in Bulawayo.

The constitution provides specific political rights for all citizens. Laws, however, are not fully consistent with the constitution and allow discrimination in voter registration to continue. For example, on May 30, the Constitutional Court ruled against amending the Electoral Act to allow up to five million members of the Zimbabwean diaspora to vote from abroad. The court, however, allowed Zimbabweans with dual citizenship to register to vote provided they presented certain identification documents.

Participation of Women and Minorities: No laws limit participation of women or members of minorities in the political process, and they did fully participate as voters and candidates. Women remained largely underrepresented in local and national political offices, and men overwhelmingly held most senior positions in the public sector. Female candidates faced particularly vitriolic gender-based insults regarding appearance, sexual proclivity, and other gender-based stereotypes and faced challenges within their party if running against a male candidate in a primary. Several female candidates from the MDC Alliance reported some inside the party leadership required women to have sex with them in order for their names to appear on the party candidate list. Those who refused found their names left off the list.

Some observers believed that traditional and cultural factors limited the participation of women. Following the July 30 elections, women filled six of 21 cabinet minister positions, an increase from 2013, but well below their 52 percent share of the population and well below the equal representation required by the constitution. Women headed the Ministry of Defense and War Veterans and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Ministry of Youth, Sport, Arts, and Recreation for the first time in the country’s history. Women held six of 12 minister of state positions and six of 13 deputy minister positions. Women made up 31 percent of the National Assembly and Senate, down from 34 percent in 2013. On September 12, the Senate elected a woman as president. In accordance with the constitution, female members of parliament filled all 60 seats reserved for women in the National Assembly. At the local government level, women held approximately 19 percent of councilor positions nationwide.

Four female presidential candidates competed in the July 30 election: former vice president of the People’s Rainbow Coalition, former deputy prime minister Thokozani Khupe of the MDC-T, Melbah Dzapasi of the #1980 Freedom Movement Zimbabwe, and Violet Mariyacha of United Democratic Movement. NGOs noted that young women were mostly excluded from decision-making structures and processes in all political parties.

The law permits blind persons to have an individual with them to assist them in marking their ballots. The National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped (NASCOH) helped provide for handicapped accessibility at polling stations throughout Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Kwekwe, and Mutare during the July elections. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) found 97 percent of observed polling stations made adequate accommodations for persons with disabilities, the elderly, and pregnant or nursing women. Polling officials permitted persons who requested assistance--including blind, illiterate, and elderly persons--to have an individual with them to mark their ballots as the electoral law requires. According to ZESN, 45 percent of polling stations had at least 26 assisted voters.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption, however, the government did not implement the law effectively or impartially, and officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Despite government pronouncements, corruption remained a severe problem. Police frequently arrested citizens for low- level corruption while ignoring reports implicating high-level businesspersons and politicians.

Corruption: Corruption in both the public and private sectors persisted. According to Global Financial Integrity, between 1980 and 2010, the country lost an estimated $12 billion to corruption involving smuggling, illicit financial outflows, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 28 and illegal activities. The country continued to experience both petty and grand corruption, defined respectively by Transparency International Zimbabwe as an “everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- to mid-level public officials” and “an abuse of high-level power by political elites.”

In February President Mnangagwa ordered a mandatory declaration of assets by senior officials. Arrests of senior government officials followed; however, most were Mnangagwa’s political opponents or supporters of Grace Mugabe’s Generation 40 (G-40) faction. In May Mnangagwa created an anticorruption body within the Office of the President to carryout investigations, bypassing the constitutionally mandated Zimbabwe Anticorruption Commission. The administration has since recorded one conviction related to corruption while most of those arrested were released on relaxed bail conditions.

Implementation of the government’s redistribution of expropriated white-owned commercial farms often favored the ZANU-PF elite and continued to lack transparency (see section 1.f.). High-level ZANU-PF officials selected numerous farms and registered them in the names of family members to evade the government’s policy of one farm per official. The government continued to allow individuals aligned with top officials to seize land not designated for acquisition. The government began the mandated comprehensive land audit in October to reflect land ownership accurately. Landowners connected to ZANU-PF routinely sold land to citizens but refused to transfer ownership officially or to develop the land as agreed upon in contracts.

The Minister of Finance announced the government’s intention to reduce the rolls of the civil service, but unqualified persons employed by the Public Service Commission remained on the state payroll. The majority served as youth and gender officers in various ministries and other public entities. According to the most recent audit, illicit salary payments were made to large numbers of persons who were retired, deceased, or otherwise absent from their place of employment. Duplicate personally identifiable information in files indicated some persons received multiple salaries.

From 2016-18, the former minister of transportation faced accusations of embezzlement and improper tenders for procuring $70 million of Boeing airplanes from Malaysia for state-owned airlines without consulting the board or management, and $2.7 billion in improper 2016 tenders for the Chirundu- Beitbridge highway, for which construction had not begun by year’s end.

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Financial Disclosure: The law does not require elected or appointed officials to disclose income or assets. The government did not enforce its policy requiring officials to disclose interests in transactions that form part of their public mandate. Most government departments failed to meet their statutory reporting obligations to parliament under the Public Finance Management Law.

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Such groups were subject to government restrictions, interference, monitoring, confiscation of materials and documentation, and other forms of harassment. Major domestic NGOs included the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, ZESN, Election Resource Center, ZLHR, Zimbabwe Peace Project, ZimRights, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, Women’s Coalition, and Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise.

The government harassed NGOs it believed would expose abuses by government personnel or that opposed government policies, and it continued to use government-controlled media to disparage and attack human rights groups. State media reporting typically dismissed the efforts and recommendations of NGOs critical of government, accusing the NGOs of seeking regime change.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The ZHRC remained underfunded but managed to fulfill some of its constitutionally mandated functions. The ZHRC conducted public outreach throughout the country. Through its website, a hotline, social media platforms, and mobile legal clinics, the ZHRC’s human rights officers conducted public outreach throughout the country and accepted complaints from the public for investigation. The ZHRC, however, did not have sufficient personnel to investigate the number of complaints it received.

In August the ZHRC issued a statement condemning post-election violence, including the August 1 killings of six protestors by security forces, and criticizing the army for attacking civilians. A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests. The statement called upon all political leaders to encourage their followers to respect the political rights and opinions of others and to stop politically motivated human rights violations.

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The government did not overtly attempt to obstruct the ZHRC’s work or deliberately withhold resources based on the commission’s criticism of the government or security services’ actions.

The establishment of the constitutionally mandated National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) remained ongoing. In January President Mnangagwa signed the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission Bill into law to operationalize the commission, whose commissioners were appointed in 2016. The commission consists of nine members who do not yet have staff or offices, although the government has purchased a building to house the commission that was scheduled to be ready for use by year’s end.

The NPRC conducted nationwide stakeholder engagements beginning in February to solicit input from the public and determine its first areas of focus. The NPRC finalized a national strategy document outlining its plans and publically released it in October in a ceremony featuring the vice president and various civil society stakeholders.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: While the law criminalizes sexual offenses, including rape and spousal rape, these crimes remained widespread problems. Almost a quarter of married women who had experienced domestic violence reported sexual violence, while 8 percent reported both physical and sexual violence.

Although conviction of sexual offenses is punishable by lengthy prison sentences, women’s organizations stated that sentences were inconsistent. Rape victims were not consistently afforded protection in court.

Social stigma and societal perceptions that rape was a “fact of life” continued to inhibit reporting of rape. In the case of spousal rape, reporting was even lower due to women’s fear of losing economic support or of reprisal, lack of awareness that spousal rape is a crime, police reluctance to be involved in domestic disputes, and bureaucratic hurdles. Most rural citizens were unfamiliar with laws against domestic violence and sexual offenses. A lack of adequate and widespread services for rape victims also discouraged reporting.

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According to a credible NGO, there were reports of rape being used as a political weapon during the year. In Buhera an MDC polling agent claimed a group of men came to her house in the middle of the night and assaulted and raped her for refusing to sign the vote tabulation form she claimed contained irregularities. In Mutoko a woman claimed three men came to her home demanding to know the candidate she voted for during the July 30 elections. She claimed the men assaulted and raped her when she gave an unfavorable answer. Police arrested one of the men responsible and the court case was pending at year’s end.

Female political leaders were targeted physically or through threats and intimidation. MDC Alliance youth members attacked MDC-T vice president Thokozani Khupe with stones and attempted to burn a hut she entered while in a village outside Buhera for the funeral of MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai on February 20. ZEC Chairwoman Priscilla Chigumba faced frequent harassment on social media during the July electoral period. On September 12, MDC Alliance members of parliament verbally heckled Chigumba for allegedly enabling President Mnangagwa’s election victory, prompting security personnel to escort her from the parliament building for her safety.

Children born from rape suffered stigmatization and marginalization. The mothers of children resulting from rape sometimes were reluctant to register the births, and, therefore, such children did not have access to social services.

The adult rape clinics in public hospitals in Harare and Mutare were run as NGOs and did not receive a significant amount of financial support from the Ministry of Health and Child Care. The clinics received referrals from police and NGOs. They administered HIV tests, provided medication for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and provided medical services for pregnancy. Although police referred for prosecution the majority of reported rapes of women and men who received services from the rape centers, very few individuals were prosecuted.

Despite the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act in 2006, domestic violence remained a serious problem, especially intimate partner violence perpetrated by men against women. Although conviction of domestic violence is punishable by a fine and a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, authorities generally considered it a private matter, and prosecution was rare.

The joint government-NGO Anti-Domestic Violence Council as a whole was ineffective due to lack of funding and the unavailability of information on prevailing trends of domestic violence, although its members were active in raising Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 32 domestic violence awareness. NGOs reported the council was not involved in much of their programmatic work.

The government continued a public awareness campaign against domestic violence. Several women’s rights groups worked with law enforcement agencies and provided training and literature on domestic violence as well as shelters and counseling for women. According to NGOs, most urban police stations had trained officers to deal with victims of domestic violence, but stations had a limited ability to respond on evenings and weekends. The law requires victims of any form of violence to produce a police report to receive treatment without cost at government health facilities. This requirement prevented many rape victims from receiving necessary medical treatment, including post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent victims from contracting HIV.

Other Harmful Traditional Practices: Virginity testing, although reportedly decreasing, continued to occur in some regions during the year.

Sexual Harassment: No specific law criminalizes sexual harassment, but labor law prohibits the practice in the workplace. Media reported that sexual harassment was prevalent in universities, workplaces, and parliament. The Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender, and Community Development acknowledged that lack of sexual harassment policies at higher education institutions was a major cause for concern. This occurred after a student advocacy group, the Female Students Network, revealed incidents of gender-based violence and sexual harassment against students in a 2015 survey. Female college students reported they routinely encountered unwanted physical contact from male students, lecturers, and nonacademic staff, ranging from touching and inappropriate remarks to rape. Of the 3,425 students interviewed, 94 percent indicated they had experienced sexual harassment, while 16 percent reported having been forced into unprotected sex with lecturers or other staff.

Coercion in Population Control: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization.

Discrimination: The constitution provides for the same legal status and rights for women as for men. The constitution’s bill of rights, in the section on the rights of women, states that all “laws, customs, traditions, and practices that infringe the rights of women conferred by this constitution are void to the extent of the infringement.” There is also an institutional framework to address women’s rights and gender equality through the Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender, and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Community Development and the Gender Commission--one of the independent commissions established under the constitution. Despite the appointment of commissioners in 2015, the commission received only minimal funding from the government and lacked sufficient independence from the ministry. The commission conducted an observation mission during the July elections and produced a gender analysis of the election process. It found men occupied most decision-making positions within the election management system while women occupied mostly administrative and support functions.

In 2017, the Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender, and Community, with support from the UN Development Program and UN Women, unveiled a revised National Gender Policy calling for greater gender equality and demanding an end to gender discrimination. Despite laws aimed at enhancing women’s rights and countering certain discriminatory traditional practices, women remained disadvantaged in society.

The law recognizes a woman’s right to own property, but very few women owned property due to the customary practice of patriarchal inheritance. Less than 20 percent of female farmers were official landowners or named on government lease agreements. Divorce and maintenance laws were equitable, but many women lacked awareness of their rights, and in traditional practice property reverts to the man in case of divorce or to his family in case of his death.

Women have the right to register their children’s births, although either the father or another male relative must be present. If the father or other male relative refuses to register the child, the child may be deprived of a birth certificate, which limits the child’s ability to acquire identity documents, enroll in school, and access social services.

Women and children were adversely affected by the government’s forced evictions, demolition of homes and businesses, and takeover of commercial farms. Widows, when forced to relocate to rural areas, were sometimes “inherited” into marriages with an in-law after the deaths of their spouses.

The government gave qualified women access to training in the armed forces and national service, where they occupied primarily administrative positions. In the Zimbabwe Defense Forces, there were two women brigadier generals appointed in 2013 and 2016 respectively, and one female air commodore appointed in 2016. Women comprised 35 percent of personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions. The Minister of Defense and War Veterans, Oppah Minchiguri, is a woman. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Children

Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from birth in the country and from either parent, and all births are to be registered with the Births and Deaths Registry. The 2012 population census data show that just one in three children younger than age five possessed a birth certificate. Of urban children younger than age five, 55 percent possessed a birth certificate, compared with 25 percent of rural children. Approximately 39 percent of school age children did not have birth certificates. Lack of birth certificates impeded access to public services, such as education and health care, resulting in many children being unable to attend school and increasing their vulnerability to exploitation. For additional information, see Appendix C.

Education: Primary education is not compulsory, free, or universal. The constitution states that every citizen and permanent resident of the country has a right to a basic state-funded education but adds a caveat that the state “must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of the resources available to it.” According to the 2012 population census, 87 percent of all children attended primary school. School attendance was only slightly higher in urban than in rural areas, and enrollment for children older than 14 was in decline. Urban and rural equity in primary school attendance rates disappeared at the secondary school level. Rural secondary education attendance (44 percent) trailed behind urban attendance (72 percent) by a wide margin.

Child Abuse: Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, continued to be serious problems. In 2017 the NGO Childline received more than 14,500 reports of child abuse via its national helpline. Childline managed more than 5,500 in-person cases at its drop-in facilities across the country and counseled more than 4,000 children. Just less than half of all reported cases of abuse concerned a child who had been sexually, physically, or emotionally abused, neglected, or forced into marriage. Approximately twice as many girls reported abuse as boys.

It is legal for parents and schools to inflict corporal punishment on boys but not on girls. The constitution provides that “no person may be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” but the courts had not interpreted the clause nor determined whether it applied to corporal punishment. In addition the Constitutional Court deferred ruling on the constitutionality of caning juvenile offenders as judicial punishment. While the issue remained pending, magistrates

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ZIMBABWE 35 could impose corporal punishment on juvenile offenders but normally imposed strict conditions on its application.

Government efforts to combat child abuse continued to be inadequate and underfunded. The government continued to implement a case management protocol developed in 2013 to guide the provision of child welfare services. In addition there were facilities that served underage victims of sexual assault and abuse.

Early and Forced Marriage: The constitution declares anyone younger than age 18 a child. In 2016 the Constitutional Court ruled no individual younger than age 18 may enter into marriage, including customary law unions. The court also struck down a provision of the Marriage Act that allowed girls but not boys to marry at age 16.

Despite legal prohibitions, mostly rural families continued to force girls to marry. According to the 2012 population census, almost one in four teenage girls were married. Child welfare NGOs reported evidence of underage marriages, particularly in isolated religious communities or among HIV/AIDS orphans who had no relatives willing or able to take care of them. High rates of unemployment, the dropout of girls from school, and the inability of families to earn a stable income were major causes of child marriage.

Families gave girls or young women to other families in marriage to avenge spirits, as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes, or to provide economic protection for the family. Some families sold their daughters as brides in exchange for food, and younger daughters at times married their deceased older sister’s husband as a “replacement” bride. An NGO study published in 2014 found that because of the cultural emphasis placed on virginity, any loss of virginity--real or perceived, consensual or forced--could result in marriage, including early or forced marriage. In some instances family members forced a girl to marry a man based on the mere suspicion that the two had had sexual intercourse. This cultural practice even applied in cases of rape, and the study found numerous instances in which families concealed rape by facilitating the marriage between rapist and victim.

For additional information, see Appendix C.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: Conviction of statutory rape, legally defined as sexual intercourse with a child younger than age 12, carries a fine of $2,000, up to Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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10 years’ imprisonment, or both. A person in possession of child pornography may be charged with public indecency and if convicted faces a fine of $600, imprisonment up to six months, or both. A person convicted of procuring a child younger than age 16 for purposes of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct is liable to a fine up to $5,000, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. Persons charged with facilitating the prostitution of a child often were also charged with statutory rape. A parent or guardian convicted of allowing a child younger than age 18 to associate with or become a prostitute may face up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Girls from towns bordering South Africa, Zambia, and Mozambique were subjected to prostitution in brothels that catered to long-distance truck drivers. Increasing economic hardships coupled with the effects of drought also led more girls to turn to prostitution.

Displaced Children: Approximately 10,000 children were displaced from the Tokwe-Mukosi dam area in Masvingo Province (see section 2.d.). The disruption of their parents’ livelihoods negatively affected the children’s access to health care and schooling.

A 2016 UNICEF report estimated 18 percent of children had lost one or both parents to HIV or other causes. The proportion of orphans in the country remained very high. Many orphans were cared for by their extended family or lived in households headed by children.

Orphaned children were more likely to be abused, not enrolled in school, suffer discrimination and social stigma, and be vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. Some children were forced to turn to prostitution for income. Orphaned children often were unable to obtain birth certificates because they could not provide enough information regarding their parents or afford to travel to offices that issued birth certificates. Orphans were often homeless.

International Child Abductions: The country is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child- Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data.html.

Anti-Semitism

The Jewish community numbered approximately 150 persons. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

Persons with Disabilities

The constitution and law prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to public places, and the provision of services, including education and health care. The constitution and law do not specifically address air travel or other transportation. They do not specify physical, sensory, mental, or intellectual disabilities. NGOs continued to lobby to broaden the legal definition of “disabled” to include persons with albinism, epilepsy, and other conditions. NGOs also petitioned the government to align the Disabled Persons Act with the constitution. Government institutions often were uninformed and did not implement the law. The law stipulates that government buildings be accessible to persons with disabilities, but its implementation was slow.

NASCOH reported that access to justice in courts was compromised for persons with hearing disabilities due to a lack of sign language interpreters. Persons with disabilities living in rural settings faced even greater challenges.

Although two senators were elected to represent persons with disabilities, parliament rarely addressed problems especially affecting persons with disabilities. Parliament does not provide specific line items for persons with disabilities in the various social service ministry budgets.

Most persons holding traditional beliefs viewed persons with disabilities as bewitched, and in extreme cases families hid children with disabilities from visitors. According to NASCOH, the public considered persons with disabilities to be objects of pity rather than persons with rights. NASCOH reported that 75 percent of children with disabilities had no access to education.

There were very few government-sponsored education facilities dedicated to persons with disabilities. Educational institutions discriminated against children with disabilities. Essential services, including sign language interpreters, Braille materials, and ramps, were not available and prevented children with disabilities from attending school. Many schools refused to accept children with certain disabilities. Schools that accepted students with disabilities offered very little in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 38 the way of nonacademic facilities for those accepted as compared with their counterparts without disabilities. Many urban children with disabilities obtained informal education through private institutions, but these options were generally unavailable for persons with disabilities in rural areas. Government programs, such as the basic education assistance module intended to benefit children with disabilities, failed to address adequately the root causes of their systematic exclusion.

Women with disabilities faced compounded discrimination, resulting in limited access to services, reduced opportunities for civic and economic participation, and increased vulnerability to violence.

Persons with mental disabilities also experienced inadequate medical care and a lack of health services. There were eight centralized mental health institutions in the country with a total capacity of more than 1,300 residents, in addition to the three special institutions run by the ZPCS for long-term residents and those considered dangerous to society. Residents in the eight centralized institutions received cursory screening, and most waited for at least one year for a full medical review.

A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals resulted in persons with mental disabilities not being properly diagnosed and not receiving adequate therapy. There were few certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and teaching in the country. NGOs reported that getting access to mental health services was slow and frustrating. They reported persons with mental disabilities suffered from extremely poor living conditions, due in part to shortages of food, water, clothing, and sanitation.

Prison inmates in facilities run by the ZPCS were not necessarily convicted prisoners. Two doctors examined inmates with psychiatric conditions. The doctors were required to confirm a mental disability and recommend an individual for release or return to a mental institution. Inmates with mental disabilities routinely waited as long as three years for evaluation.

There were minimal legal or administrative safeguards to allow participation in the electoral processes by persons with disabilities. Administrative arrangements for voter registration at relevant government offices were burdensome, involving long queues, several hours or days of waiting, and necessary return visits that effectively served to disenfranchise some persons with disabilities.

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National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group made up 82 percent of the population, Ndebele 14 percent, whites and Asians less than 1 percent, and other ethnic and racial groups 3 percent. In a shift from past speeches and broadcasts, government leaders discouraged hatred of whites, proclaimed an end to former president Mugabe’s “era of land seizures,” and vowed to compensate white farmers who lost land under the program. In the lead-up to July 30 elections, neither the ruling nor opposition parties publically disparaged any race.

Historical tension between the Shona majority and the Ndebele minority resulted in marginalization of the Ndebele by the Shona-dominated government. During the year senior political leaders refrained from attacking each other along ethnic lines to consolidate support ahead of the July 30 elections. Within the Shona majority, the Zezuru, who dominated the government under Mugabe, reportedly harbored resentment toward the Karanga after Mnangagwa, an ethnic Karanga, became president.

Some government officials continued to blame the country’s economic and political problems on the white minority and western countries. Police seldom arrested government officials or charged them with infringing upon minority rights, particularly the property rights of the minority white commercial farmers or wildlife conservancy owners targeted in the land redistribution program.

In March the government changed its policy regarding its enforcement of the 2007 indigenization law requiring 51 percent indigenous ownership of companies, and in some cases no longer required all businesses to comply with the 51-49 percent rule. The law defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as any person, or the descendant of such person, who before the date of the country’s independence in 1980 was disadvantaged. Legal experts criticized the law as unfairly discriminatory and a violation of the constitution.

Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. According to the criminal code, “any act involving physical contact between men that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” carries a penalty if convicted of up to one year in prison or a fine up to $5,000. Despite that, there were no known cases of prosecutions of consensual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 40 same-sex sexual activity. Common law prevents gay men and, to a lesser extent, lesbians from fully expressing their sexual orientation. Members of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), the primary organization dedicated to advancing the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons, experienced harassment and discrimination.

LGBTI persons were vulnerable to blackmail because of the criminality and stigma of same-sex activity. LGBTI advocacy organizations reported blackmail and being “outed” as two of the most common forms of repression of LGBTI persons. It was common for blackmailers to threaten to reveal one’s sexual identity to police, the church, or family if the victim refuses to render payment.

According to GALZ, LGBTI persons often left school at an early age due to discrimination. Higher education institutions reportedly threatened to expel students based on their sexual orientation. Members of the LGBTI community also had higher rates of unemployment and homelessness. On September 21, a deputy headmaster at an elite private primary and secondary school publicly declared his sexual orientation. Parents protested the proclamation and hired attorneys to file suit, demanding the educator’s resignation. He tendered his resignation September 28 after receiving death threats and threats of physical harm to his person and his pets.

GALZ reports that many persons who identified themselves as LGBTI did not seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health problems due to fear that health-care providers would shun them or report them to authorities.

HIV and AIDS Social Stigma

The government has a national HIV/AIDS policy that prohibits discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, and the law prohibits discrimination against workers with HIV/AIDS in the private sector and parastatals. Despite these provisions, societal discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS remained a problem. Local NGOs reported persons affected by HIV/AIDS faced discrimination in health services, education, and employment. Although there was an active information campaign to destigmatize HIV/AIDS by international and local NGOs, the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, and the National AIDS Council, such ostracism and criticism continued.

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In the 2015 Demographic Health Survey, 22 percent of women and 20 percent of men reported they held discriminatory attitudes towards those living with HIV/AIDS.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Inexplicable disappearances and killings, sometimes involving mutilation of the victim, often were attributed to customary or traditional rituals, in some cases involving a healer who requested a human body part to complete a required task. Police generally rejected the “ritual killing” explanation, despite its being commonly used in society and the press.

Promotion of Acts of Discrimination

Throughout the year government-controlled media no longer continued to vilify white citizens and blame them for the country’s problems, as was common practice under former president Mugabe.

Section 7. Worker Rights a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

While the law provides for the right of private-sector workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively, other provisions of law and economic realities (i.e., lack of ability to pay dues) abrogated these rights. Public- sector workers may not form or join trade unions but may form associations that bargain collectively and strike. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, provides that the labor court handle complaints of such discrimination, and may direct reinstatement of workers fired due to such discrimination.

The law provides for the registrar of the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare to supervise the election of officers of workers’ and employers’ organizations, to cancel or postpone elections, and to change the venue of an election. The law also grants the minister extensive powers to regulate union activities such as collecting dues and paying staff salaries, and making decisions concerning the equipment and property that may be purchased by trade unions. The minister has the authority to veto collective bargaining agreements perceived to be harmful to the economy as well as to appoint an investigator who may, without prior notice, enter trade union premises, question any employee, and inspect and copy any books, records, or other documents. The Labor Amendment Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Act empowers the minister to order an investigation of a trade union or employers’ organization and to appoint an administrator to run its affairs.

The law strictly regulates the right to strike. Strikes are limited to disputes regarding work issues. The law provides that a majority of the employees must agree to strike by voting in a secret ballot. Strike procedure requirements include a mandatory 30-day reconciliation period and referral to binding arbitration (in essential services and in nonessential services where the parties agree or where the dispute involves rights). Following an attempt to conciliate a dispute of interest and a labor officer’s issuance of a certificate of no settlement, the party proposing a collective job action must provide 14 days’ written notice of intent to resort to such action, including specifying the grounds for the intended action, in order legally to call a strike. No provisions prohibit employers from hiring replacement workers in the event of a strike.

Police and army members are the only legally recognized essential services employees and may not strike, but the law allows the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare to declare any nonessential service an essential service if a strike is deemed a danger to the population. No provisions prohibit employers from hiring replacement workers in the event of a strike. The law also allows employers to sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes, with penalties for conviction that include fines, up to five years’ imprisonment, or both. The constitution does not extend the right of collective bargaining to security forces. In late 2014 the government, employer organizations, and union representatives, according to the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), signed an agreement detailing how government security forces should conduct themselves in the event of a strike or other collective action.

Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise and industry levels. At the enterprise level, work councils negotiate collective agreements, which become binding if approved by 50 percent of the workers in the bargaining unit. Industry-level bargaining takes place within the framework of the National Employment Councils (NEC). Unions representing at least 50 percent of the workers may bargain with the authorization of the Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare. The law encourages the creation of workers’ committees in enterprises where less than 50 percent of workers are unionized.

To go into effect, the ministry must announce collective bargaining agreements, thus giving the minister the power to veto the agreement. The Labor Amendment Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Act expands the minister’s power to veto a collective bargaining agreement if the minister deems it to be “contrary to public interest.” Workers and employers at the enterprise level also may come to a binding agreement outside of the official framework. Despite this provision, the ministry could block indefinitely any collective bargaining agreement if it was not announced officially.

Although the law does not permit national civil servants to collectively bargain, the Apex Council, a group of public service associations, represented civil servants in job-related negotiations with the Public Service Commission.

The Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare did not effectively enforce applicable laws. Penalties for conviction of violations of freedom of association or collective bargaining laws range from a fine to imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years but were insufficient to deter violations. Administrative and judicial procedures often were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.

The government did not respect the workers’ right to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively. Worker organizations were loosely affiliated with political parties, and the leading opposition party MDC-T rose out of the labor movement.

Government interference with trade union activity was common. Authorities frequently withheld or delayed the registration certificate for a number of unions. Police and state intelligence services regularly attended and monitored trade union activities such as meetings. Police or ZANU-PF supporters sometimes prevented unions from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities. The International Labor Organization noted that the government took some steps to address the concerns raised by a 2010 commission of inquiry. The inquiry found the government responsible for serious violations of fundamental rights by its security forces, including a clear pattern of intimidation that included arrests, detentions, violence, and torture against members nationwide of the ZCTU- -an umbrella group of unions with historical ties to the opposition MDC-T. The ZFTU has historical ties to the ruling ZANU-PF.

Although the law does not require unions to notify police of public gatherings, police required such notification. If the ZCTU attempted to hold an event not authorized by police, the ZRP attended and dispersed participants, telling them the event was not authorized and then might post armed police officers around

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ZCTU’s offices--even if the event was not ZCTU-organized (see section 2.b., Freedom of Assembly).

Although the ministry conducted training for security forces on the Public Order and Security Act, the training did not change security-sector attitudes. By law, the government could fine and imprison union members for organizing an illegal strike, and unions risked a 12-month suspension of their registration for minor infractions.

Unions exercised their right to strike. Mnangagwa’s government faced its first major labor dispute when junior doctors at public hospitals went on a month-long crippling strike in March demanding better pay and working conditions. In mid- April the government fired 16,000 nurses after they went on strike for better working conditions a day after junior doctors ended their strike.

Teachers unions, including the Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) and the Amalgamated Rural Teachers’ Union (Artuz), threatened to go on strike in May citing the government’s proposed 10 percent public sector pay increase as insufficient. Based in part on the actions of the teachers unions, the government agreed to increase the raise to 17.5 percent. Artuz and others viewed the raise as insufficient and petitioned the government in October to pay their teachers in U.S. dollars.

There were reports that some ZCTU affiliates were able to engage in collective bargaining with employers without interference from the government. Nevertheless, members of the ZCTU stated employers did not recognize their affiliates within the NECs. Workers’ committees existed in parallel with trade unions. Their role was to negotiate shop floor grievances, while that of the trade unions was to negotiate industry-level problems, notably wages. Trade unions regarded the existence of such a parallel body as an arrangement that employers potentially could use to undermine the role of the unions.

According to International Trade Union Confederation reports, employers frequently abused institutional weakness by creating a deadlock in the bargaining process, i.e., by forcing the referral of the dispute to arbitration and then to court, forestalling a decision within a reasonable timeframe. Agricultural workers experienced verbal and physical attacks by employers during negotiations. Due to the criminalization of informal economy workers and politicization of their operating spaces, reports described attacks and harassments. Police in September, citing a cholera outbreak, relocated street vendors to a designated area in the city. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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Police forcibly removed those vendors who refused to leave their stalls. In some cases vendors reported police stole their wares or stood by and allowed others to loot their goods. The ZCTU reported cases against Chinese employers that did not follow labor law regarding protective clothing. These same employers also denied labor unions access to job sites to provide education to their employees. b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, with exceptions for work for the national youth service and forced prison labor. The Labor Amendment Act defines forced labor as “any work or services which a person is required to perform against his or her will under the threat of some form of punishment.” Forced prison labor includes “any labor required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court” as well as what “is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance or management of the place at which he is detained.”

Conviction of forced labor is punishable by a fine, two years’ imprisonment, or both; such penalties were insufficient to deter violations. A 2014 law prescribes punishment of not less than 10 years’ imprisonment and, with aggravating circumstances, up to imprisonment for life, for conviction of human trafficking-- including labor trafficking. The law does not clearly define the crime of trafficking in persons and requires transportation of the victim, which further limits the cases in which the regulation could be applied.

The government did not effectively enforce the law. There were no reports the government attempted to prevent and eliminate forced labor during the year. There were no data on the numbers of adult victims removed from forced labor, if any. The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations reported cases of workers fired without compensation and, specifically in the farming sector, workers forced to work without wages or other compensation. Most workers did not receive regular wages and in some cases, only part of their allowances, such as a transportation allowance to facilitate the commute to work.

Forced labor, including by children, occurred, although the extent of the problem was unknown. Adults and children were subjected to forced labor in agriculture and domestic service in rural areas, as well as domestic servitude in cities and towns (see section 7.c.).

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Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/. c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The Labor Amendment Act of 2015 sets the minimum age for general labor at ages 13 to 16. The law increases the minimum age for apprenticeship from 15 to 16 and declares void and unenforceable formal apprenticeship contracts entered into by children younger than age 18 without the assistance of a guardian. The law further states that no person younger than age 18 shall perform any work likely to jeopardize that person’s health, safety, or morals.

The government did not effectively enforce the law. The Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing child labor laws, but the department lacked personnel and commitment to carry out inspections or other monitoring. Penalties, including fines and imprisonment, were not sufficient to deter violations. The government took limited steps to combat child labor during the year, mostly involving encouragement and monitoring of children’s school attendance.

Despite the government’s National Action Plan, child labor remained endemic. Child labor occurred primarily in the informal sectors. Inspectors received no training addressing child labor and did not closely monitor it. Forced labor by children occurred in the agricultural, street vending, herding, forestry, fishing, artisanal gold and chrome mining, and domestic sectors. Children also were used in the commission of illegal activities, including gambling and drug smuggling.

Although it is mandated by the 2013 constitution, there was a lack of free basic education for children, increasing the risk of children’s involvement in child labor. Children were required to attend school only up to age 12 which made children ages 12 through 15 particularly vulnerable to child labor as they were not required to attend school and not legally permitted to work. In a 2018 Human Rights Watch report on child labor on tobacco farms, many child workers cited the need to pay school fees or buy basic necessities as reasons why they worked. Teachers interviewed in the report noted that children missed school in order to raise funds for the next set of school fees. The Coalition Against Child Labor in Zimbabwe (CACLAZ) and the Zimbabwe National Council for the Welfare of Children set up Child Labor Free Zones in 28 schools in three wards in the region, known for its tea plantations. The purpose of these Child Labor Free Zones was to create areas free of child labor by taking children out of labor and integrating them Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 47 into schools. The PTUZ and the CACLAZ served 92 former child laborers through such schools in 2017. In 2017 the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare conducted investigations that resulted in removing 73 children from commercial sexual exploitation.

“Street children,” meaning children who live or work on the streets, were commonplace in urban areas. Some children escorted parents with disabilities to elicit sympathy while begging, but many had parents without disabilities who used the children to generate additional income.

Children often faced hazards to their health and safety and lacked necessary equipment and training. Working on farms, in particular tea plantations, exposed children to bad weather, dangerous chemicals, and the use of heavy machinery. Most children involved in mining worked for themselves, a family member, or someone in the community. Exposure to hazardous materials, particularly mercury, was on the rise in the informal mining sector. The ZCTU and CACLAZ have reached out to teachers unions as teachers regularly interacted with children and could be among the first to notice signs of abuse.

Some employers did not pay wages to child domestic workers, claiming they were assisting a child from a rural home by providing room and board. Some employers paid with goods instead of cash while others paid the parents for a child’s work. See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/. d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

The law prohibits employment or occupational discrimination based on race, color, gender, tribe, political opinion, creed, place of origin, disability, HIV status, and pregnancy. The law does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination regarding age, language, citizenship, social origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or non-HIV-related communicable diseases. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to race, gender, disability, sexual orientation (see section 6), and political affiliation for civil servants.

The constitution provides for the same legal status and rights for women as for men. Labor legislation prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer may be held liable for civil remedies if found to be in violation of provisions against “unfair labor practices,” including sexual harassment. The law Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 48 does not specify penalties for conviction of such violations. Women commonly faced sexual harassment in the workplace (see section 6).

There were no formal complaints of wage discrimination filed with the Ministry of Labor; however, women’s salaries lagged behind those of men in most sectors, and women faced discrimination on the basis of gender, when seeking maternity leave provided for by law, and other gender-based benefits. Unions expressed their concern regarding wage disparity between management and employees.

There was a relative lack of women in decision-making positions, despite a constitutional requirement that both genders be equally represented in all institutions and agencies of government at every level. In 2014 the share of women in wage employment in the nonagricultural sector was 37 percent, while their share in senior and middle management was 24 percent.

Employment discrimination against migrant workers occurred, especially those employed in the informal sector. Discrimination with respect to political affiliation also occurred.

Banks targeted union workers for dismissal, according to the ZCTU. Persons with HIV/AIDS and albinism and LGBTI persons faced discrimination in employment. Employers discriminated against members of minority ethnic groups who they often perceived as opposition supporters. Disabled persons faced social and employment discrimination and lack of access to many workplaces. Members of trade unions and workers committees often perceived they were targeted specifically for adverse employment action and that workers themselves feared the consequences of participating in trade unions or workers committees. e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The NECs set the minimum wage for all industrial sectors through a bipartite agreement between employers and labor unions. The minimum wage seldom exceeded the poverty line, when it was followed.

The law does not provide for a standard workweek, but it prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour continuous rest period a week. The maximum legal workweek is negotiated between unions and employers in each sector. No worker is allowed to work more than 12 continuous hours. The law prescribes that workers receive not less than twice their standard remuneration for working on a public holiday or on their rest day. The law provides workers paid public holidays and annual leave Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 49 upon one year of service with an employer. The government sets safety and health standards on an industry-specific basis. The public service commission sets conditions of employment in the public sector.

Labor law does not differentiate among workers based on sector or industry. The labor law does not apply to the informal sector, which includes a large majority of the labor force. The law applies to migrant laborers if they are in the formal sector. There were no reports of discrimination against migrant laborers in the formal sector.

Occupational safety and health standards were up-to-date and appropriate for the main industries in the country. In 2015 the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) commissioned an occupational health center in the capital and a mobile clinic to monitor the health of miners and industrial workers. The law provides for workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

The Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and work hours laws for each sector, but the standards were not enforced effectively due to inadequate monitoring systems and a labor inspector shortage. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce labor laws, including those covering children. The Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council, a quasi-governmental advisory body to the NSSA, regulated working conditions. Budgetary constraints and staffing shortages, as well as its status as an advisory council, made it largely ineffective. Penalties for violations of wage or hours-of-work restrictions range from a fine to imprisonment but were insufficient to deter violations. Penalties for occupational safety and health violations were not harmonized and fall within the jurisdiction of numerous ministries.

Most injuries and deaths occurred in the mining sector. The ZFTU reported that workers at iron smelters often suffered burns due to a lack of protective clothing. Lack of adequate protective clothing was also an issue for workers in the informal sector. The NSSA attributed the high injury and fatality rates to low investment in occupational safety and health, noncompliance with rules and regulations, and low levels of awareness of occupational safety and health matters.

Employers paid many agricultural and domestic workers below the minimum wage. The ZCTU reported many agricultural workers earned $72 per month. Many public servants also earned less than the poverty line. During the year there Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

ZIMBABWE 50 was pervasive partial payment or nonpayment of salaries in both the public and private sectors. According to a report by the Labor and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe that analyzed data from ZCTU-affiliated union representatives at 442 companies, 54 percent of employees had gone at least 13 months without pay. All employees went at least three months without pay, and 16 percent had gone 25 or more months without pay.

There was little or no enforcement of the workhours law, particularly for agricultural and domestic workers. According to the 2014 Labor Force Survey, 28 percent of the employed population worked excessive hours, defined as more than 48 hours per week. Although workers were generally unlikely to complain to authorities of violations due to fear of losing their jobs, some exceptions occurred.

Poor health and safety standards in the workplace were common problems faced by workers in both the formal and informal sectors due to lack of enforcement. Abuses by the management at certain foreign-owned enterprises and companies owned by well-connected politicians were common, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of workers; poor working conditions; underpayment or nonpayment of wages; unfair dismissal; and firing without notice. Workers’ committee members of a foreign-owned mining company reported fear and serious victimization, including arbitrary nonrenewal of contracts, dismissals without charges, late payment of salaries, and insufficient provision of protective clothing. The ZCTU’s Health and Social Welfare Department engaged employers on occupational health and safety-related workplace needs. No information was available on the treatment of foreign and migrant workers. The government considered many commercial farm workers to be foreigners because one or both parents were born in another country.

Due to the growth of the informal mining sector, artisanal miners, including children, were increasingly exposed to chemicals and environmental waste. An estimated 1.5 million persons were engaged in artisanal mining, defined as mining activities carried out using low technology or with minimal machinery, according to the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-scale Miners Council.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

TAB 5

ZIMBABWE 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic. President Robert Mugabe, his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, and its authoritarian security sector have dominated the country since independence in 1980. Presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2013 were free of the widespread violence of the 2008 elections, but the process was neither fair nor credible. Numerous factors contributed to a deeply flawed election process: a hastily convened and politically compromised Constitutional Court that unilaterally declared the election date before key electoral reforms were in place; heavily biased state media; a voter registration process that did not comply with the law and that skewed registration towards supporters of the ruling party; partisan statements and actions by security forces, including active-duty personnel running for office in contravention of the law; limitations on international observers; failure to provide a publicly useful voters register; and a chaotic, separate voting process for the security sector. The elections resulted in the formation of a unitary ZANU- PF government led by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF supermajorities in both houses of parliament. ZANU-PF used intimidation and targeted violence again to retain some parliamentary seats during by-elections.

Civilian authorities failed at times to maintain effective control over the security forces.

The most important human rights problems remained the government’s targeting members of non-ZANU-PF parties and civil society activists for abduction, arrest, torture, abuse, and harassment; partisan application of the rule of law by security forces and the judiciary; and restrictions on civil liberties, including freedoms of expression and assembly.

There were many other human rights problems. Prison conditions were harsh. The government’s expropriation of private property continued. Executive political influence on and interference in the judiciary continued, and the government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights. The government generally failed to investigate or prosecute state security or ZANU-PF supporters responsible for violence. Authorities restricted freedoms of expression, press, assembly, association, and movement. The government evicted citizens, invaded farms and private businesses and properties, and demolished informal marketplaces and settlements. The government arrested, detained, prosecuted, and harassed

ZIMBABWE 2 members of civil society, including members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Government corruption remained widespread, including at the local level. Violence and discrimination against women; child abuse; and trafficking of men, women, and children were problems. Discrimination against persons with disabilities; racial and ethnic minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons; and persons with HIV/AIDS continued. The government also interfered with labor-related events.

The government took limited steps to punish security sector officials and ZANU- PF supporters who committed violations, but impunity was a problem.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings

There were reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Police units sometimes organized or participated in political violence. Security sector impunity for politically motivated abuses remained a problem.

For example, on February 5, police detectives reportedly shot and killed Passmore Mazariro, whom police suspected of cell phone theft, at his home in Harare. They forced entry into Mazariro’s house and ordered him to lie on his stomach. One of the detectives then allegedly shot and killed him.

Impunity for past politically motivated violence remained a problem. Investigations continued of prior years’ cases of violence resulting in death committed by security forces and ZANU-PF supporters, but by year’s end no one had been arrested or charged in these cases.

There were no advances in holding legally accountable those responsible for the deaths of at least 19 citizens who died of injuries sustained during the 2008 political violence that targeted opposition party members; more than 270 others were also killed that year. Observers believed the primary perpetrators of the violence were members of ZANU-PF, including the party’s youth militia, and individuals identifying themselves as war veterans.

Unwillingness to acknowledge past atrocities or seek justice for victims continued to influence Shona-Ndebele relations negatively. Approximately 20,000 persons

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 3 were killed during the 1980s because of a government-sanctioned crackdown on persons believed to be insurgents in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. b. Disappearance

There were no reports of long-term politically motivated disappearances. Although the High Court ordered the government to provide updates on the 2015 disappearance of democracy activist Itai Dzamara, government officials failed to do so. There were no reports of authorities punishing any perpetrators of previous acts of disappearance. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, security forces engaged in such practices with impunity and with the implicit support of officials affiliated with ZANU-PF. Police used excessive force in apprehending, detaining, and interrogating criminal suspects. According to NGOs, security forces assaulted and tortured citizens in custody, including perceived opponents of ZANU-PF. In some cases police arrested and charged the victims of violence instead of perpetrators.

Human rights groups reported the continuance of physical and psychological torture perpetrated by security agents and ZANU-PF supporters. Reported torture methods included beating victims with sticks, clubs, whips, cables, and sjamboks (a heavy whip); burning; falanga (beating the soles of the feet); electric shocks; solitary confinement; sleep deprivation; and forcing victims into sex acts.

According to one NGO, from January through August, 493 victims of organized violence and torture sought medical treatment and counseling after sustaining injuries in separate incidents across the country. The NGO reported the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) was responsible for 66 percent of the violations, while ZANU-PF supporters were responsible for 25 percent of the violations. Nearly 49 percent of the cases occurred in the capital, Harare. Although the majority of victims did not indicate their political affiliation, more than 30 percent of all victims associated themselves with the Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai (MDC-T), Zimbabwe People First, or other opposition political parties.

On February 17, state security agents allegedly abducted a People’s Democratic Party (PDP) official in the town of Gwanda. An NGO reported they forced the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 4 victim into a truck and drove off. State security agents allegedly tortured the victim, releasing him after PDP officials made a report to the Gwanda police.

On September 12, six alleged state security agents abducted Tajumuka/Sesjikile activist Sylvanos Mudzvova from his Harare home in view of his wife and children. These men reportedly blindfolded Mudzvova and subjected him to electric shocks to his feet and genitals while interrogating him. He was left unconscious several miles outside of Harare.

Police used excessive force to disperse demonstrators, resulting in injuries.

For example, on February 18, police used tear gas and water cannon to disperse hundreds of war veterans planning a march on ZANU-PF’s headquarters.

On August 26, police used tear gas, water cannons, and batons to disperse an estimated crowd of 150 demonstrators who gathered for a march calling for electoral reforms. According to one NGO, 43 persons sought medical assistance after sustaining injuries while participating in the demonstration. The NGO reported police arrested 70 persons, 20 of whom sustained injuries that required medical attention.

ZANU-PF supporters--often with tacit support from police or government officials--continued to assault and mistreat scores of persons, including civil society activists and known opposition political party members and their families, especially in Harare neighborhoods and nearby towns. Presidential Spokesman and Information Ministry Permanent Secretary George Charamba threatened to deploy ZANU-PF militia on antigovernment protesters instead of regular police. Violent confrontations between youth groups of the ZANU-PF (known as “Chipangano”) and opposition political parties continued, particularly in urban areas. ZANU-PF supporters were the primary instigators of political violence.

On September 26, media reported ZANU-PF activists tortured and detained peaceful marchers at ZANU-PF headquarters, including MDC-T legislators protesting against Mugabe, before releasing them to police.

The courts punished some ZANU-PF supporters accused of political violence. Police investigated and arrested four ZANU-PF activists implicated in abducting, torturing, and robbing MDC-T supporter Stewart Chandimhara on June 18. On September 9, the Rusape Magistrates’ Court charged the four men with kidnapping and robbery. Their cases were pending at year’s end.

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Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained harsh, partly due to overcrowding in older urban remand facilities, and the Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS) struggled to provide adequate food and sanitary conditions. The 2013 constitution added prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration into society to ZPCS responsibilities.

Physical Conditions: There were approximately 17,000 prisoners, spread across 46 main prisons and 26 satellite prisons. While some prisons operated below capacity, NGOs reported overcrowding continued due to outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs.

Prison guards occasionally beat and abused prisoners, but NGOs reported that the use of excessive force by prison guards was not systematic and that senior prison officials increased efforts to address the problem.

NGOs reported female prisoners generally fared better than male prisoners. Authorities held women in separate prison wings and provided women guards. Women generally received more food from their families than did male prisoners. The several dozen children under age three living with their incarcerated mothers were required to share their mothers’ food allocation. NGOs were unaware of women inmates reporting rapes or other physical abuse. NGOs suggested either women guards were more diligent in protecting women prisoners from abuse or that female prisoners did not report abuse. With support from NGOs, prisons distributed some sanitary supplies for women, although prison officials often reserved some of these supplies for themselves. Officials did not provide pregnant women and nursing mothers with additional care or food rations, but the ZPCS solicited donations from NGOs and donors for additional provisions.

There was one juvenile prison housing boys only. Girls were held together with women. Authorities held boys in adult prisons throughout the country while in remand. Officials generally tried to place younger boys in separate cells. Authorities generally sent juveniles to prison rather than to reformatory homes as stipulated in the law. Juveniles were particularly vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners.

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According to the ZPCS, remand prisons were overcrowded. Conditions in prisons, jails, and detention centers were often harsh. Authorities often held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners until their bail hearings.

Food shortages were widespread but not life threatening. Prisoners identified as malnourished received additional meals. The harvest of prison farm products provided meals for prisoners. Prisoners had limited access to clean water.

Poor sanitary conditions contributed to disease, including diarrhea, measles, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses. Lighting and ventilation were inadequate. There were insufficient mattresses, blankets, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene products.

Prisoners had access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at every facility. In partnership with NGOs, the ZPCS offered peer education on HIV/AIDS. The ZPCS tested prisoners for HIV only when requested by prisoners or prison doctors. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialized medical personnel and medications, prisoners suffered from routine but treatable medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases.

Those detained for politically motivated reasons were held at police stations for days while their court dates or bail hearings were pending.

Administration: The ZPCS established an inspections and audit unit to assess prison conditions and improve monitoring of prisoners’ rights, but the unit did not release the results of such assessments. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) increased the number of monitoring visits it conducted in prisons. There was no prison ombudsman, but there were statutory mechanisms to allow alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders.

Record keeping on prisoners was inadequate. Prisoners moved from one facility to another were occasionally lost in the ZPCS’ administrative system for weeks or months. Authorities permitted prisoners to submit complaints without censorship, but investigations were rare.

Prisoners and detainees had relatively unrestricted access to visitors, except in maximum-security prisons, where geographic constraints hampered access by relatives of prisoners.

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Independent Monitoring: The law provides international human rights monitors the right to visit prisons. Church groups and NGOs seeking to provide humanitarian assistance gained access. All organizations working in prisons reported that meetings with prisoners occurred without third parties present and with minimal restrictions. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, although other sections of the law effectively weakened these prohibitions. The government enforced security laws in conflict with the constitution. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society activists perceived as opposing the ZANU-PF party. Security forces frequently arrested large numbers of persons during antigovernment protests. State security agents often arrested opposition activists from their homes at night, refused to identify themselves, and used unmarked and untraceable vehicles.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The constitution provides for a National Security Council (NSC) composed of the president, vice president, and selected ministers and members of the security services. The NSC, chaired by the president, is responsible for setting security policies and advises the government on all security-related matters. The ZRP is responsible for maintaining internal law and order. The Department of Immigration and the ZRP are primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement. Although the ZRP is officially under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the President controlled some ZRP roles and missions. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defense Forces under the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces are responsible for external security, but the government sometimes deployed them as a back-up to the police as a show of force. For example, in July the Zimbabwe Defense Forces deployed army personnel in response to the riots at the Beitbridge border post. The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), under the Office of the Vice President, is responsible for internal and external security. All security sector chiefs report directly to the president, who is commander in chief of all security services.

Implicit assurances of impunity and a culture of disregard for human rights contributed to police use of excessive force in apprehending and detaining criminal suspects. Ignorance of the provisions of the constitution also compromised the quality of police work. Police were ill equipped, underpaid (frequently in arrears),

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 8 and poorly trained, particularly at the lower levels. A lack of sufficient fuel and resources reduced police effectiveness. Poor working conditions, low salaries, and high rates of dismissal resulted in corruption and high turnover. The government changed pay dates for security forces on a month-to-month basis.

The constitution calls for a government body to investigate complaints against the police. Despite this provision, there were no internal or external entities to investigate abuse by the security forces. Authorities reportedly investigated and arrested corrupt police officers for criminal activity but also punished or arrested police officers on arbitrary charges for failing to obtain or share illicitly gained funds.

Government efforts to reform the security forces were minimal, and there were no reports of disciplinary actions against security officers who erred in ZANU-PF’s favor in their official conduct. Training on allegiance to ZANU-PF for securing the country’s sovereignty was commonplace, while authorities rarely provided training on nonpartisan implementation of the rule of law or human rights.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

The law stipulates that arrests require a warrant issued by either a court or senior police officer and that police inform an arrested person of the charges before taking the individual into custody. Police did not respect these rights. The law requires authorities to inform a person at the time of arrest of the reason for the arrest. A preliminary hearing must be held before a magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest. According to the constitution, only a competent court may extend the period of detention.

The law provides for bail for most accused persons. In 2015 the Constitutional Court declared section 121(3) of the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act unconstitutional. According to human rights attorneys, it allowed prosecutors to veto bail decisions made by the courts and keep accused persons in custody for up to seven days based on the prosecution’s stated intent to appeal bail. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling against section 121(3), the government amended the law by including provisions that allow prosecutors a veto over judicial bail decisions. Prosecutors relied on the provisions to extend the detention of opposition political activists.

Authorities often did not allow detainees prompt or regular access to their lawyers and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients that detainees or

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 9 those with authority to grant access were unavailable. An indigent detainee may apply to the government for an attorney in criminal cases, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases. This occurred with cases involving opposition party members, civil society activists, and ordinary citizens. In contrast with previous years, there were no reported cases of detainees held incommunicado.

The government also harassed and intimidated human rights lawyers when they attempted to gain access to their clients.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government used arbitrary arrest and detention as tools of intimidation and harassment, especially against political activists, civil society members, journalists, and ordinary citizens asserting their rights. There were numerous reports that security forces arbitrarily arrested political and civil society activists and then released them the next day without charge.

After a nationwide protest in July, police arrested Pastor Evan Mawarire, leader of the social media movement #ThisFlag. He was initially charged with inciting violence after he organized the protest and later charged with “attempting to overthrow the government by unconstitutional means.” Police also arrested protest leader Promise Mkwananzi several times during a three-month period, detaining him on charges ranging from failure to stop at a police checkpoint to public violence.

In September police arrested opposition Member of Parliament for Mutasa North Trevor Saruwaka for leading an antigovernment demonstration organized by a coalition of opposition parties.

Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention was limited for nonpolitical prisoners. Delays in pretrial procedures were common, however, due to a shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, the low capacity of court officials, and a lack of resources. The constitution provides for the right to bail for detained suspects. Despite this provision, the government routinely opposed bail for political detainees. For example, after the arrest in early July of Occupy Africa Unity Square movement leader Linda Masarira, the government denied her bail for nearly three months while she awaited her trial.

Other prisoners remained in prison because they could not afford to pay bail, which remained exorbitant in view of economic conditions in the country. Magistrates rarely exercised the “free bail option” that authorizes them to waive bail for destitute prisoners. Lawyers reported juveniles usually spent more time in

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 10 pretrial detention than adults because they could not attend court unless a parent or guardian accompanied them. Authorities occasionally did not notify parents of a juvenile’s arrest or the closest kin of an adult detainee’s arrest.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: The law provides arrested persons with the right to be brought before the courts within 48 hours of arrest. Political and civic leaders routinely challenged the lawfulness of their arrests in court. In July police arrested Pastor Evan Mawarire on charges of inciting violence. His lawyers argued successfully that prosecutors then presented different charges to the court from those read out to Mawarire when he was first arrested. The magistrate ruled that prosecutors must read out charges against an accused person at the first appearance in court.

The law absolves individual security agents from criminal liability regarding unlawful arrests and detention. Police officers routinely argued that they merely followed orders in conducting arrests and were not responsible for compensating victims of unlawful arrests. e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but executive influence and interference remained a problem. For example, on September 3, President Mugabe publicly criticized judges as “negligent and reckless” for having approved public protests during his absence from the country. As was the case in 2015, however, there were instances where the judiciary demonstrated its independence despite being under intense pressure to conform to government policies.

The government often refused to abide by judicial decisions and routinely delayed payment of court costs or judgments awarded against it in civil cases. Judicial corruption was widespread, extending beyond magistrates and judges. For example, NGOs reported senior government officials undermined judicial independence, including by giving farms and homes to judges.

Magistrates heard the vast majority of cases. Legal experts claimed defendants in politically sensitive cases were more likely to receive a fair hearing in magistrates’ courts than in higher courts, in which justices were more likely to make politicized decisions. ZANU-PF sympathizers used threats and intimidation to force magistrates, particularly rural magistrates, to rule in the government’s favor. In politically charged cases, other judicial officers such as prosecutors and private attorneys also faced pressure, including harassment and intimidation. Some urban-

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 11 based junior magistrates demonstrated a greater degree of independence and granted opposition party members and civil society activists bail against the government’s wishes.

Trial Procedures

The constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, but political pressure and corruption frequently compromised this right. By law defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, although courts did not always respect this right. Magistrates or judges held trials without juries. Trials were open to the public except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Assessors, in lieu of juries, could be appointed in cases in which conviction of an offense could result in a death penalty or lengthy prison sentence. Defendants have the right to a lawyer of their choosing, but most defendants in magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation. In criminal cases an indigent defendant may apply to have the government provide an attorney, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases, in which the government provided an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. Individuals in civil cases may request free legal assistance from the Legal Resources Foundation or the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association also provides some free legal assistance to women and youth. Free interpretation is provided for by law, and Shona-English interpretation was generally available. The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense is also provided for by law but was often lacking.

Authorities sometimes denied attorneys access to their clients, especially in cases in which those detained were alleging torture. Defendants have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf and to confront adverse witnesses. Any person arrested or detained for an alleged offense has the right to remain silent and may not be compelled to confess. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to access all government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Authorities did not always respect these rights.

Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The right to appeal against both conviction and sentence exists in all cases, and it is automatic in cases in which the death penalty is imposed. No groups were denied those rights.

Unlike in normal criminal proceedings, which proceed from investigation to trial within months, in cases of members of political parties or civil society critical of

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ZANU-PF, prosecuting agents regularly took abnormally long to submit their cases for trial. As with many other cases in which authorities granted bail to government opponents (see section 1.d.), they did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but instead chose to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the threat of impending prosecution remaining, with the accused person eventually being called to court, only to be informed of further delays. The prosecutors and police routinely retained material confiscated from the accused as evidence.

Government officials frequently ignored court orders in such cases, delayed bail and access to medical care, and selectively enforced court orders related to land disputes favorable to those associated with ZANU-PF.

The public had fair access to the courts of law, particularly the magistrates’ courts, although observers reported occasional physical and procedural impediments.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons, including opposition party officials, their supporters, NGO workers, and civil society activists. Authorities held many such individuals for one or two days and released them. Political prisoners and detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or detainees, and prison authorities arbitrarily denied access to political prisoners. There were reports police beat and physically abused political and civil society activists while they were in detention.

On September 17, police arrested six protesters participating in demonstrations organized by the National Electoral Reform Agenda. While appearing at the Mbare Magistrates’ Court two days later, the protesters’ lawyers took pictures of their clients’ lacerated backsides. The protesters reported police beat them while in detention with rubber truncheons and denied them medical attention.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Civil judicial procedures allow for an independent and impartial judiciary, but the judiciary was subject to political influence and intimidation, particularly in cases involving high-ranking government officials, politically connected individuals, or individuals and organizations seeking remedies for violations of human rights.

Lack of judicial and police resources contributed to problems enforcing domestic court orders.

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Property Restitution

The constitution stipulates the government must compensate persons for improvements made on land subsequently taken by the government, but it does not set a timeline for the delivery of compensation. The government rarely provided restitution or compensation for the taking of private property, and police did not take action against individuals who seized private property without having secured sanction from the state to do so.

Support was uneven and inconsistent for households resettled from the diamond mining grounds of Marange in Chiadzwa to a government-owned agricultural estate outside Mutare. Since 2010 authorities relocated more than 1,800 families. Each household was entitled to receive $1,000 for relocation, although reportedly only a handful received the money. Most of the relocated families had not received compensation of any kind, including agricultural land, while the government classified them as “people with no recognizable legal rights or claim to the land that they are occupying,” citing their former land as now state land, despite customary and traditional rights to the contrary. The government held mining companies responsible for restitution and did not complete appraisal of the land and property lost by each family for the purpose of property restitution. The mining companies insisted the government was responsible. Relocated families reportedly did not have access to adequate social services, including education and health facilities. In addition an estimated 2,510 families remained without a timeframe or destination for their impending relocation at year’s end.

The government also failed to compensate most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) relocated forcibly from the Tokwe-Mukosi area during flooding in 2014. Approximately 3,125 families were legally entitled to compensation. f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution and law prohibit such actions, but the government did not respect these prohibitions. Government officials pressured local chiefs and ZANU-PF loyalists to monitor and report on persons suspected of supporting political parties other than ZANU-PF. Through threats and intimidation, local chiefs and ZANU- PF loyalists also compelled individuals, mostly in rural areas, to contribute money toward President Mugabe’s birthday celebrations.

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Government entities manipulated the distribution of government-provided food aid, agricultural inputs, and access to other government assistance programs such as education assistance to exclude suspected political opposition supporters and to compel support for ZANU-PF.

In September the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission announced ZANU-PF was interfering in the distribution of government food aid for personal political gain at the expense of deserving beneficiaries. An NGO reported that more than 122 incidents of partisan distribution of food aid took place across the country from January to July.

The government forcibly displaced persons from their homes, often without providing adequate notice, consulting victims, or providing alternative accommodation. According to local human rights and humanitarian NGOs, sporadic evictions continued. In September police evicted approximately 50 families from a farm in Darwendale. Media reported police accused the families of illegal settlement and burned the families’ houses, personal property, and food.

Land seizures remained a serious problem. According to the attorney general and Ministry of Lands, every white-owned farm in the country was gazetted (officially announced as available in state media) and effectively became state property. According to the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe, after authorities gazetted a property, it was transferred to a politically connected individual at the first available opportunity. The exact number of remaining white commercial farmers was unknown; those remaining continued to be targeted, harassed, and threatened with eviction by farm beneficiaries, unemployed youth, and individuals hired by those standing to benefit. Abuse of the land reform laws continued, with invasions and seizures of noncommercial land on the privately owned wildlife conservancies and with the collusion of high-ranking government officials and provincial ZANU-PF party structures and leaders.

Titleholders who lost their homes or properties--where most of their life earnings were invested--were not compensated. By 2013 between 180 and 230 farmers had accepted settlements worth 5 to 10 percent of the value of their investments. As a result, like their former farm workers whom the new farm owners evicted, there were scores of destitute elderly former farmers.

Farm allocations continued to be politicized and used as a reward for political support to ZANU-PF. Beneficiaries divided many reallocated farms near cities for

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 15 sale as small residential lots and sold them for personal gain without any compensation to the titleholders.

For example, in 2014 Raymond Ndhlukula, deputy chief secretary in the President’s Office, seized a farm near Figtree, Matabeleland South, while police watched. David Conolly, the lawful owner of the property, approached the courts for protection and received a High Court injunction against the seizure. When Conolly confronted Ndhlukula regarding the court order, Conolly alleged Ndhlukula stated he was a senior civil servant and “white people could not come before the courts of Zimbabwe regarding land matters.” Ndhlukula’s workers eventually forced Conolly off the property. Conolly filed an urgent high court application regarding the seizure of his farm, and Ndhlukula was found in contempt of the court order, which Ndhlukula appealed. On September 13, Lands and Rural Resettlement Minister Douglas Mombeshora filed for Conolly’s eviction--giving him seven workdays to vacate the property--even though the case remained before the Supreme Court.

On February 3, a ZANU-PF provincial chairperson reportedly seized a farm in Masvingo belonging to Yvonne Goddard, a widow who had lived on the farm for 45 years. The ZANU-PF official justified the invasion by arguing the seizure was lawful as the farm was underutilized.

ZANU-PF supporters also forcibly seized the property of nonwhite landowners. For example, in August dozens of youth linked to ZANU-PF invaded the farm of Victor Matemadanda, secretary of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), after he lost favor with the ruling party.

There were other reports of farmers forced off their farms, despite being in possession of a court order allowing them to remain on the property, and denied the opportunity to collect their personal belongings. Black farm workers were beaten, intimidated, or displaced. Police in most cases did not intervene while invaders and looters carried on their activities, nor did police enforce court judgments evicting squatters on illegally seized properties.

The law permits the interception and monitoring of any communication (including telephone, postal mail, e-mail, and internet traffic) in the course of transmission through a telecommunication, postal, or other system in the country. Civil liberties advocates claimed the government used the law to stifle freedom of speech and target political and civil society activists.

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Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The constitution provides for freedoms of expression and of the media, but the law limits these freedoms in the “interest of defense, public safety, public order, state economic interests, public morality, and public health.” The government continued to arrest, detain, and harass critics, and journalists practiced self- censorship.

Freedom of Speech and Expression: Security authorities restricted freedom of speech and arrested individuals, particularly those who made or publicized comments critical of President Mugabe or made political statements opposing ZANU-PF or the government’s agenda. CIO agents and informers routinely monitored political and other meetings. Authorities targeted persons deemed to be critical of the government for harassment, abduction, interrogation, and physical abuse.

Government authorities arrested individuals for violating Section 33 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, routinely invoked against political and human rights activists as well as ordinary citizens for allegedly undermining the authority of or insulting the president.

On July 27, police arrested Douglas Mahiya, the ZNLWVA secretary for information and publicity, as well as four others for denigrating President Mugabe in a communique issued after a July 18 meeting. The government also accused Mahiya of undermining President Mugabe’s authority during an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation transmitted on July 21. Their trial was pending at year’s end.

Press and Media Freedoms: The government restricted freedom of the press. The Ministry of Media, Information, and Publicity exercised control over state-run media. High-ranking ZANU-PF officials used these media to threaten violence against critics of the government.

Despite threats and pressure from the government, independent newspapers continued to operate.

Security services also prevented journalists from covering events that would expose government excesses. On January 7, Presidential Spokesman and

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Information Ministry Permanent Secretary George Charamba threatened to take action against privately owned media outfits, warning journalists against reporting on allegations of security sector officials interfering with ZANU-PF internal succession politics. Information Minister Christopher Mushohwe also warned journalists not to write on security sector issues.

The Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe Chapter (MISA-Zim) issued a statement criticizing the “ongoing police onslaught” against journalists during nationwide protests and demonstrations. MISA-Zim reported police assaulted or harassed more than 12 journalists from local and international media organizations while covering demonstrations between July 6 and September 12. On August 26, police arrested and detained photojournalist James Jemwa for more than five days at Chikurubi Maximum Prison for covering demonstrations in Harare.

The government used accreditation laws to prevent international media journalists’ entry into the country. For example, on July 8, authorities deported two Sky News journalists for entering the country without accreditation. Presidential Spokesman and Information Ministry Permanent Secretary Charamba told AFP “their deportation should serve as a warning to foreign journalists who may attempt to sneak into the country without permits.” Government officials detained the two Sky News journalists overnight at Harare International Airport before deporting them the next morning. Most international media outlets such as CNN, al-Jazeera, and the BBC, however, continued to operate in the country.

Radio remained the principal medium of public communication, particularly for the rural majority. Star FM and ZiFM, both radio stations with close links to ZANU-PF, continued broadcast operations. Despite their perceived allegiance to ZANU-PF, the two stations included independent voices in their programming. Of the eight urban commercial radio stations licensed by the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) in 2015, four had started operating by September.

The government did not license any community radio stations during the year, despite previous years’ promises by officials to do so.

The government-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, the country’s only domestically based television broadcasting station, operated one television channel. International satellite television broadcasts were available through private firms but were too expensive for most citizens.

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Violence and Harassment: Security forces arbitrarily harassed and arrested journalists who reported unfavorably on government policies or security operations. Senior ZANU-PF officials also criticized local and foreign independent media for allegedly biased reporting that discredited President Mugabe and misrepresented the country’s political and economic conditions.

On July 6, Marimba police detained Alpha Media Holdings journalists Elias Mambo, Tafadzwa Ufumeli, and Richard Chidza and freelance journalist Godwin Mangudya, who were covering protests in the Mufakose suburb of Harare. On August 3, members of the riot police assaulted journalists covering protests by unemployed graduates. As the marchers approached parliament, police beat a group of seven journalists with baton sticks.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The government used the law to control media content and the licensing of journalists, although many provisions of the law are inconsistent with the constitution. The law provides the government with extensive powers to control media and suppress free speech by requiring the registration of journalists and prohibiting the “abuse of free expression.”

On July 4, the BAZ issued a warning to broadcasters not to broadcast “programs that incite, encourage, or glamorize violence or brutality.” The notice stated that broadcasters must avoid broadcasting “obscene and undesirable comments” from participants, callers, and audiences in accordance with section 26 of the Broadcasting Services (Licensing and Content) Regulations.

Libel/Slander Laws: The Constitutional Court ruled the previous constitution outlaws criminal defamation. Civil defamation laws remain in force.

On February 3, the Constitutional Court ruled all laws assigning criminal penalties for conviction of defamation contradict constitutional provisions for press freedom, including Section 96 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. The ruling was in response to a lawsuit brought by MISA-Zim and four journalists, including Nqaba Matshazi. In 2011 police arrested Matshazi and his editor, Nevanji Madanhire, of the private independent weekly newspaper The Standard on charges of criminally defaming Munyaradzi Kereke, chairman of a defunct health insurance company and a prominent ZANU-PF official.

Newspapers also exercised self-censorship due to government intimidation and the prospect of prosecution under civil libel laws.

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National Security: The law grants the government a wide range of legal powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined. For example, the extremely broad Official Secrets Act makes it a crime to divulge any information acquired in the course of official duties. Authorities used these laws to restrict publication of information critical of government policies or public officials.

Internet Freedom

The law permits the government to monitor all communications in the country, including internet transmissions, and the government sometimes restricted access to the internet. For example, the government blocked Blackberry’s internet services for Blackberries registered in the country, including its encrypted messaging service that prevented enforcement of the law, allowing the government to intercept and monitor communications.

Despite the restrictive environment for traditional media, internet and mobile phone communication in the country was widely available. The government, however, threatened to regulate internet and mobile phone communication to curb dissent.

On April 3, the government-controlled Sunday Mail newspaper quoted President Mugabe as saying the government needed to stop “abuses on the internet” and would emulate China in the use of security measures to regulate access to certain websites.

The government regularly monitored and interfered with use of social media. For example, on July 6, a local internet service provider (ISP) stated the government instructed local ISPs and mobile telecommunications companies to slow down their service and to hinder the instant messaging platform, WhatsApp, following a planned day of nationwide protests. The government instructed companies to return service to normal later that same day. Government authorities publicly denied having issued the instruction. Telecommunication service providers interviewed by journalists refused to reveal the cause of the outage.

On July 7, the Posts and Telecommunications Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), the national telecommunications regulator, published a statement warning members of the public against what it termed “social media abuse.” POTRAZ announced that any person caught in possession of, generating, sharing, or passing

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Parliamentary and legal watchdog Veritas stated regulations under the Interception of Communications Act (ICA) along with the Postal and Telecommunications (Subscriber Registration) Regulations, 2014 (SI 95 of 2014) facilitated eavesdropping and call interception. Under ICA law, enforcement officers may apply to the responsible minister for a warrant authorizing law enforcement to intercept communications, including calls, e-mails, and messages. Using the statutory instrument, officers may apply for interception warrants if they know the identities of individuals whose calls and messages they want to intercept.

According to the International Telecommunication Union, 16.4 percent of the population used the internet in 2015.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government restricted academic freedom. The country’s president is the chancellor of all eight state-run universities and appoints their vice chancellors. The government has oversight of higher education policy at public universities, and ZANU-PF controls the Ministry of Higher Education. The law restricts the independence of universities, subjecting them to government influence and providing disciplinary powers over staff and students to university authorities.

CIO personnel at times assumed faculty and other positions, or posed as students, at public and some private universities to intimidate and gather intelligence on faculty and students who criticized government policies and actions. CIO officers regularly attended classes in which noted MDC activists were lecturers or students. In response both faculty and students often practiced self-censorship.

On February 23, the Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (RTUZ) reported security officials routinely visited rural schools ahead of visits by senior ZANU-PF officials to ensure that teachers delivered the “correct lessons” to students. RTUZ representatives stated these actions created significant stress on teachers and negatively affected their performance in classrooms.

State-run universities frequently cancelled scheduled events organized by foreign embassies and refused public lectures by foreign diplomats.

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The government on occasion restricted human rights activists from using cultural platforms to criticize the ruling party, the president, or political violence.

On March 10, the Zimbabwe Censorship Board upheld its 2015 decision to prohibit distribution of a feature-length documentary focused on the drafting of the 2013 constitution. The documentary, Democrats, followed two politicians appointed to lead the country through the constitutional reform process. In a March letter to Upfront Films, the acting secretary of the Censorship Board announced DVDs of the film were banned and prohibited because the film “is not suitable for public showing as previously recommended.” b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right.

The Public Order and Security Act requires organizers to notify police of their intention to hold a public gathering--defined as 15 or more individuals--seven days in advance. Failure to do so may result in criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law also allows police to prohibit a gathering based on security concerns but requires police to file an affidavit in a magistrates’ court stating the reasons behind the denial. Although many groups did not seek permits, other groups informed police of their planned events, and the police either denied permission or gave no response.

Authorities often denied requests by civil society, trade unions, religious groups, or political parties other than ZANU-PF to hold public events if the agenda conflicted with ZANU-PF policy positions. There were few reports of political rallies interrupted by opposing political parties.

On August 24, opposition supporters held a demonstration against police brutality that turned violent when police fired tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowd. The police used force against passersby not involved in the protest, including one American citizen who was hit with a baton by police. On August 26, police used tear gas and batons to disperse a crowd of demonstrators who gathered for a march calling for electoral reforms. Even though opposition leaders received High Court approval to proceed with the demonstration, police dispersed protesters using tear gas. Less than one week later, the government passed Statutory

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Instrument 101a, banning all demonstrations in the Harare Central Police District during a two-week period. Although the High Court ruled the ban unconstitutional on a technicality September 7, police announced a Proposed Prohibition Order on all public demonstrations in central Harare during a one-month period.

On August 15, the RTUZ began a 120-mile march to Harare to protest poor working conditions in rural schools. The RTUZ abandoned its march several days later, citing intimidation by state security agents.

On September 25, police disrupted a peaceful meeting of the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) in Mutare and arrested 19 of ZINASU’s student leaders. Police released 17 of the 19 leaders after a court found their arrests to be unlawful. The remaining two leaders faced charges of not notifying the police of a public gathering and insulting or undermining the president.

ZANU-PF trained and deployed youths to harass and disrupt the activities of opposition political party members, labor groups, student movements, civic groups, and journalists considered critical of ZANU-PF.

For example, on January 19, police disrupted an MDC-T meeting in Mbare. Several ZANU-PF youths entered the complex and reportedly assaulted MDC-T participants, injuring five.

Freedom of Association

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. Although the government did not restrict the formation of political parties or unions, security forces and ZANU-PF supporters continued to interfere with their activities. ZANU-PF supporters, sometimes with government support or acquiescence, intimidated and abused members of organizations perceived to be associated with other political parties. In addition to intimidation and harassment, ZANU-PF supporters sometimes burned to the ground the homes of individuals perceived to be associated with opposition political parties.

Persons suspected of being security force members visited the offices and inquired into the activities of churches, numerous NGOs, and other organizations believed to oppose government policies. Organizations generally were free of governmental interference only if the government viewed their activities as apolitical or supportive of ZANU-PF.

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See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/. d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government restricted these rights. The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern, but it interfered with some humanitarian efforts directed at IDPs.

Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: Security forces detained irregular migrants in prisons with convicted criminals. The government provided no alternatives to detention, and prolonged detention for migrants was common. Migrants complained of mistreatment by other prisoners.

In-country Movement: Police made in-country movement difficult by regularly mounting checkpoints nationwide along most major routes. In urban areas a single road could have several roadblocks in the span of a few miles. Despite court injunctions against “on-the-spot” fines, police levied fines for minor offenses ranging from five to several hundred dollars and demanded immediate payment. Pro-ZANU-PF police chiefs retained and failed to account for money collected at checkpoints. The government did not account for overall revenue collected as fines from these roadblocks in the national budget.

Foreign Travel: The constitution provides the right for citizens to enter and leave the country and the right to a passport or other travel documents. The Office of the Registrar General imposed administrative obstacles in the passport application process for citizens entitled to dual citizenship, particularly Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizenship. Despite high-profile cases in which courts confirmed the rights of Zimbabweans to hold dual citizenship, many poorer citizens could not afford the legal costs of appealing passport and other travel document denials.

Exile: The constitution prohibits expulsion from the country for all citizens. Nevertheless, a number of persons, including former government officials,

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 24 prominent businessmen, human rights activists, opposition party members, and human rights lawyers, left the country and remained in self-imposed exile due to fear of persecution.

Emigration and Repatriation: Many citizens left the country to settle in other countries. The majority of white citizens who lost their farms beginning in 2000 continued to move to other countries. Zambia continued to support white Zimbabwean former farmers by making land available at concessionary rates. In search of employment, young Zimbabweans routinely settled in South Africa and Botswana. Although South Africa and Botswana repatriated hundreds of them each year, a majority of these individuals eventually found their way back to these countries.

Citizenship: The constitution provides for three different classes of citizenship: by birth, by descent, or by registration. The government deprived some sections of the population of citizenship rights based on the law, which revokes the citizenship of persons who fail to return to the country in any five-year period.

Despite a constitutional provision of citizenship and having voted previously, some persons were denied the right to vote during the 2013 elections because they could not adequately demonstrate their citizenship. In contravention of a 2002 High Court ruling that overturned laws barring dual citizenship, independent groups estimated that as many as two million citizens might have been disenfranchised, including those perceived to have anti-ZANU-PF leanings, such as the more than 200,000 former commercial farm workers from neighboring countries and approximately 30,000 mostly white dual nationals.

Internally Displaced Persons

According to international organizations, approximately 113,000 households were displaced, and more than 250 groups of identified IDPs lived throughout the country. The primary causes of displacement were natural disasters (27.7 percent), localized conflict (13.3 percent), rural evictions (45.7 percent), and urban evictions (13.1 percent). The most significant historical events that created internal displacement included state-sponsored election-related violence, land reform, and Operation Murambatsvina (the government’s eviction of citizens from nonfarming areas in 2005). According to one NGO, Murambatsvina resulted in the destruction of homes and livelihoods affecting an estimated 700,000 persons. Until 2009 the government denied the existence of any IDPs.

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In 2014 approximately 15,000 persons were displaced from the vicinity of the Tokwe-Mukosi dam in Masvingo Province. Authorities first moved the IDPs to the Chingwizi transit camp and then to resettlement plots. IDPs continued to lack adequate shelter, food, and water. There were also inadequate health, education, and sanitation facilities in the camp.

Other recent documented displacements were from disputed farming areas. At year’s end several thousand households in disputed farming areas were at risk of displacement due to verifiable threats or eviction notices. Most of the persons displaced had resided on their land for years without formal offer letters or title deeds. Eviction notices often were served in the presence of police or army personnel. The government’s campaign of forced evictions and the demolition of homes and businesses continued during the year under the land reform policy. The government provided no resettlement assistance to evicted families and depended primarily on international organizations to do so.

The overall rate of displacement increased due to urban evictions as well as continued farm evictions in rural areas. IDPs from previous years remained in near-emergency conditions, with an overwhelming majority living without basic sanitation. IDPs were among the populations at greatest risk of food insecurity. In addition to improved living conditions, IDPs required regularization of their status. Without needing any official documentation, several generations of farm workers originally from neighboring countries previously resided in insular commercial farming communities. With the eviction of farm owners, these farm workers were forced to adjacent communal lands and left without employment as well as health and education services.

Government-led humanitarian assistance programs were insufficient to meet the needs of targeted populations and subject to increased politicization during the year. Farm inputs and food aid occasionally were channeled through patronage networks or denied to those perceived as supporting ZANU-PF’s opponents. Despite this discrimination, the government generally cooperated with international agencies and NGOs providing humanitarian assistance.

Contractors and NGOs independent of the government that carried out food security and other assessments faced challenges in accessing certain rural districts. In isolated cases local authorities advised organizations against traveling to farms involved in ownership disputes, where aid workers might be at risk.

Protection of Refugees

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Access to Asylum: The country’s laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. According to UNHCR, the country hosted approximately 8,800 refugees and asylum seekers during the year.

Freedom of movement: The government maintained a formal encampment policy requiring refugees to live at the Tongogara refugee camp. Nevertheless, at year’s end more than 1,000 refugees lived in urban areas, including Harare and Bulawayo.

Employment: Refugees in the informal sector had limited employment options due to the encampment policy requiring all refugees to reside in the Tongogara refugee camp.

Durable Solutions: While the government did not accept refugees from foreign countries for resettlement, it facilitated the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their home countries by recognizing the Voluntary Repatriation Declaration Form as a valid document for travel purposes. The government also allowed Rwandan refugees, who lost prima facie refugee status following implementation of the 2013 Rwandan cessation clause, to remain in the country. Many refugees were unwilling to return to their home countries voluntarily, and resettlement remained the only viable solution for many of them.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Although the constitution provides citizens with the right to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage and conducted by secret ballot, this right was restricted. The political process continued to be heavily biased in favor of the ruling ZANU-PF party, which has dominated politics and government and manipulated electoral results since independence in 1980.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: Aside from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), international and local independent observers characterized the 2013 harmonized presidential, parliamentary, and local elections as largely free of violence but not credible reflections of the people’s will. Before the election various political parties and civil society organizations

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 27 complained of widespread voter disenfranchisement in opposition urban strongholds. The Constitutional Court set the 2013 date for elections. Participating political parties, including the two MDCs that were part of the coalition government, contested the date in court. ZANU-PF ministers in government opposed and stalled the pre-election legal, political, media, and security sector reforms mandated by the SADC-sponsored Global Political Agreement between ZANU-PF and the two MDCs. Parliament failed to pass laws to improve the fairness of the elections, while certain government elements failed to implement other election laws. Despite a constitutional provision of citizenship, large groups of the population were refused registration as voters because of their foreign ancestry. Other contraventions of the electoral act included a truncated special voter registration period, partisan public statements by senior security force officers, and active-duty police officers running for public office in contravention of the law.

While the law obliges traditional chiefs to be impartial, in rural areas ZANU-PF used traditional leaders to mobilize voters and canvass support. In return traditional leaders continued to receive farms, vehicles, houses, and other benefits.

The credibility and independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) were called into question for allegedly being composed largely of personnel from the pro-ZANU-PF security sector. The ZEC failed to provide an electronic copy of the voter register to any of the opposition political parties as required by law, but it supplied one hard copy of the voters roll to the MDC-T late on election day. The ZEC also failed to respond, as required by law, to legal and formal complaints by opposition parties with respect to its role in monitoring the media, postal voting procedures, and the number of ballots printed and distributed. When the ZEC released the election results, President Mugabe won with more than 61 percent of the vote, and he was inaugurated three weeks later. President Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party won a two-thirds majority in the 350-member parliament, resulting in a unitary ZANU-PF government weeks after his inauguration. The SADC declared the election free, and the AU followed suit.

Other problems with the elections included restrictions on non-ZANU-PF party candidates, domestic media bias in favor of ZANU-PF, denial of permission for some foreign journalists to cover the elections, the failure of the registrar general and the ZEC to provide for open inspection of voter rolls, the courts’ failure to settle electoral matters before the elections’ date, and numerous discrepancies with the voter register, such as irregular registration patterns between urban and rural

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 28 areas, as well as questionably large numbers of voters older than 100 and very low numbers of youth voters.

The ZEC held numerous by-elections during the year. Most observers found polling days were peaceful and the ZEC administered them well. Numerous irregularities undermined the credibility of the elections, however, including efforts by some traditional leaders to coerce and intimidate their communities into voting for ZANU-PF candidates, sporadic violence and intimidation in the pre-election environment, media coverage skewed toward ZANU-PF, police presence inside polling stations, and allegations of vote buying.

Since the 2013 election, ZANU-PF has won all 34 House of Assembly by- elections. Twenty-seven vacancies arose due to expulsions of party members, and seven vacancies arose due to deaths of incumbents. In the Senate ZANU-PF replaced seven expelled party members and one deceased senator. ZANU-PF also won all local government by-elections in the same period. In September independent candidate for the Norton by-election Temba Mliswa accused the ZEC of failing in its constitutional mandate to provide for an even electoral environment. Mliswa reported police imposed unlawful and unfair conditions on opposition candidates’ campaigns but not on ZANU-PF candidates’ campaigns. On October 22, Mliswa won the Norton by-election by a significant margin.

Political Parties and Political Participation: Although the constitution allows for multiple parties, elements within ZANU-PF and the security forces intimidated and committed abuses against other parties and their supporters and obstructed their activities. In contravention of the law, active members of the police and army openly campaigned for and ran as ZANU-PF candidates in the elections. The government routinely interfered with MDC-T-led local governments. In Harare the local government minister blocked the hiring of James Mushore as the town clerk even though the city followed proper procedures to fill the position. The minister temporarily suspended Harare’s mayor for insisting that Mushore commence work as town clerk.

The constitution provides specific political rights for all citizens. Laws, however, are not fully consistent with the constitution and allow discrimination in voter registration to continue. Authorities treat citizens with dual citizenship claims as “aliens.” These citizens must overcome administrative obstacles in order to renounce their foreign citizenship, which is required before they may register to vote.

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Participation of Women and Minorities: Women remained largely underrepresented in local and national politics, and men overwhelmingly held most senior positions in the public sector. Following the 2013 elections, women filled three of 24 cabinet minister positions in the cabinet, well below their 52-percent share of the population, as recorded in the 2012 census, and well below the equal representation required by the constitution. Women held four of 12 minister of state positions and six of 24 deputy minister positions. NGOs noted the cabinet minister positions occupied by women were less influential. Women made up nearly 48 percent of the Senate and 32 percent of the National Assembly. In accordance with the constitution, all 60 seats reserved for women in the National Assembly were filled by female members of parliament. At the local government level, women held approximately 17 percent of councilor positions nationwide. Men also dominated the judiciary; fewer than one-third of Supreme Court and High Court judges were women. Women were a minority among judicial officers, such as prosecutors, in lower courts.

The ZANU-PF congress allotted women one-third of party positions and reserved 50 positions for women on the party’s 180-member central committee, one of the party’s most powerful organizations. In 2015 the ZANU-PF Women’s League passed a resolution calling on the party to amend its constitution to accommodate the appointment of a female vice president, which ZANU-PF’s legal affairs department ignored. MDC-T President Morgan Tsvangirai reportedly appointed two additional male vice presidents to neutralize the influence of his longstanding female Vice President Thokozani Khupe. In April, Joice Mujuru formed the Zimbabwe People First political party, becoming the sole female leader of a mainstream opposition party.

NGOs noted that young women were mostly excluded from decision-making structures and processes in all political parties.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

Although the law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively or impartially, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Despite government pronouncements, corruption remained a severe problem. Transparency International released a report on corruption in the country that found the country was losing at least $1 billion a year to corruption at citizens’ expense. Local-level service delivery--for example, through the police, local councils, vehicle inspection department, and education department--had become the face of corruption, and

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 30 paying bribes to access services had become the new norm. Police frequently arrested citizens for low-level corruption while ignoring reports implicating high- level businesspersons and politicians.

Corruption: Corruption occurred at every level of the police force but took different forms, depending on position, rank, or location. At the junior levels, to augment their low salaries, corrupt officers extorted nominal to exorbitant fines from the public for various claimed offenses. Armed police routinely erected roadblocks, claiming to be looking for criminals or smuggled goods. In many cases police arbitrarily seized goods for their own consumption or extracted bribes from commuters. Municipal police in urban areas often raided vendors and confiscated their wares for personal use. Generally no records of the confiscated goods existed, despite the law’s requiring it.

Implementation of the government’s redistribution of expropriated white-owned commercial farms often favored the ZANU-PF elite and continued to lack transparency (see section 1.f.). High-level ZANU-PF officials selected numerous farms and registered them in the names of family members to evade the government’s policy of one farm per official. The government continued to allow individuals aligned with top officials to seize land not designated for acquisition. The government had yet to issue the mandated comprehensive land audit to reflect land ownership accurately.

In July, Vice President Phelekezela Mhpoko personally ordered the release from a Harare police station of two public officials detained on corruption charges. When police initially resisted Mhpoko’s demands, the vice president drove to the police station. His aides reportedly assaulted the police and forced them to release both public officials.

There were reports that ZANU-PF officials in the government discriminated against, harassed, or removed persons perceived to be opposition supporters from the civil service and the military (see section 7.d.). The government reassigned and demoted officials viewed as sympathetic to Zimbabwe People First leader Joice Mujuru.

It remained common for the ZANU-PF minister of local government to appoint ZANU-PF supporters to bureaucratic positions in local governments. City public administrators earned hugely inflated salaries. In most rural areas, the government appointed ZANU-PF activists as “special interest” councilors. In September the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 31 local government minister suspended elected opposition councilors in Bulawayo based on allegations of corruption.

The Minister of Finance announced the government’s intention to reduce the rolls of the civil service, but unqualified persons employed by the Public Service Commission remained on the state payroll. The majority served as youth and gender officers in various ministries and other public entities. According to the most recent audit, illicit salary payments were made to large numbers of persons who were retired, deceased, or otherwise absent from their place of employment. Uncovered duplicate personally identifiable information in files indicated some persons received more than one salary.

Corruption was especially pervasive in local government, where officials abused their positions and government resources openly and with impunity. Local councilors’ allocation of land lots for residential and commercial use led to numerous allegations of bribery attempts. Police arrested and charged some low- level land barons but not politicians benefiting from the deals. Government officials also demanded bribes or excessive fees for “expediting” paperwork, including birth certificates, passports, and driver’s licenses. Councilors practiced nepotism in hiring general council workers and in land allocation. Allegations of corruption continued against both ZANU-PF and MDC-T councilors. Most council employees were members of the political party dominating that council.

Prosecutions for corruption continued but were selective and generally seen as politically motivated. The government targeted MDC-T officials, persons who had fallen out of favor with ZANU-PF, and individuals without high-level political backing. Despite President Mugabe’s public allegations of corruption against senior ZANU-PF members, security officials made only a few arrests of low-level party members.

Financial Disclosure: The law does not require elected or appointed officials to disclose income or assets. The government did not enforce its policy requiring officials to disclose interests in transactions that form part of their public mandate. Most government departments failed to meet their statutory reporting obligations to parliament under the Public Finance Management law.

Public Access to Information: Citizens generally were unable to access government information. Although the government asserted that the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act was intended to improve public access to government information, the act contains provisions that restrict freedom of

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 32 speech and press, and these elements of the act were the ones the government enforced most vigorously. The act restricts the information citizens may request from public offices.

While the law permits access to some government records, it also imposes nominal fees for administrative costs involved in retrieving the records that many citizens found burdensome. In addition citizens often faced burdensome and complicated regulations to obtain access to government buildings where records are kept, including parliament, where security officers often turned away citizens for “wrong dress.”

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Such groups were subject to government restrictions, interference, monitoring, confiscation of materials and documentation, and other forms of harassment. Major domestic NGOs included the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ZLHR, Zimbabwe Peace Project, ZimRights, Students Solidarity Trust, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, and Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise.

The government harassed NGOs it believed would expose abuses by government personnel or that opposed government policies, and it continued to use government-controlled media to disparage and attack human rights groups. State media reporting typically dismissed the efforts and recommendations of NGOs critical of government, accusing the NGOs of seeking regime change.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) remained underfunded but managed to fulfill some of its constitutionally mandated functions. For example, the ZHRC stated police violated the rights of citizens through the use of excessive force during demonstrations in August. The ZHRC called upon authorities to prosecute any perpetrators of human rights violations and encouraged members of the public to file formal complaints with the commission if they had suffered police abuse. Government media attacked the ZHRC for the statement. The ZHRC investigated allegations of ZANU-PF officials denying opposition party supporters food aid. In a public statement, the ZHRC chairperson criticized ruling party politicians for interfering in the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 33 distribution of food aid for personal political gain at the expense of deserving beneficiaries.

The constitution calls for the establishment of a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission to operate during a 10-year period with the goal of ensuring post- conflict justice, healing, and reconciliation. On February 24, President Mugabe swore in members of the commission. Although the government presented to parliament a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission bill, civil society organizations and citizens advocated for its withdrawal, citing concerns regarding limitations placed on the commission’s authority.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: While the law criminalizes sexual offenses, including rape and spousal rape, these crimes remained widespread problems. Spousal rape received less attention than physical violence against women. Almost a quarter of married women who had experienced domestic violence reported sexual violence, while 8 percent reported both physical and sexual violence. The 2015 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) indicated approximately 35 percent of women had experienced physical violence at some time in their lives, while almost 15 percent had experienced physical violence in the last 12 months. The survey also revealed that married women were more likely to experience physical violence, while husbands/partners were the most commonly reported perpetrator (54 percent), followed by former husbands/partners (23 percent). Lack of education increased women’s vulnerability to physical violence.

Although conviction of sexual offenses is punishable by lengthy prison sentences, women’s organizations stated that sentences were inconsistent. Rape victims were not consistently afforded protection in court.

Social stigma and societal perceptions that rape was a “fact of life” continued to inhibit reporting of rape. In the case of spousal rape, reporting was even lower due to women’s fear of losing economic support or of reprisal, lack of awareness that spousal rape is a crime, police reluctance to be involved in domestic disputes, and bureaucratic hurdles. Most rural citizens were unfamiliar with laws against domestic violence and sexual offenses. A lack of adequate and widespread services for rape victims also discouraged reporting.

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Government officials, including police, did not always act on reported rape cases if the perpetrators were aligned with ZANU-PF. In one high-profile case, a ZANU- PF legislator in the House of Assembly, Munyaradzi Kereke, was convicted of raping his 11-year-old niece in 2010. In July, Kereke was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. The attorney general at the time declined to prosecute the case on the grounds that there was no evidence linking the legislator to the offense. When the victim’s guardian conducted a private prosecution, the prosecutor general made further attempts to block prosecution. Finally, the Constitutional Court forced the prosecutor general to grant the requisite permission for private prosecution, resulting in Kereke’s subsequent conviction.

According to a credible NGO, there were no reports of rape or sexual harassment being used as a political weapon during the year.

Children born from rape suffered stigmatization and marginalization. The mothers of children resulting from rape sometimes were reluctant to register the births, and such children did not have access to social services.

The adult rape clinics in public hospitals in Harare and Mutare were run as NGOs and did not receive a substantial amount of financial support from the Ministry of Health. The clinics received referrals from police and NGOs. They administered HIV tests, provided medication for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and provided medical services for pregnancy. Although police referred the majority of reported rapes of women and men who received services from the rape centers for prosecution, very few were prosecuted. Private clinics and clinics supported by NGOs and bilateral and multilateral development partners emerged in the past few years to provide medical assistance to survivors of rape. There were also NGOs that provided psychosocial support to survivors of sexual and gender- based violence.

Despite the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act in 2006 that criminalized acts of domestic violence, domestic violence remained a serious problem, especially intimate partner violence perpetrated by men against women. Although conviction of domestic violence is punishable by a fine and a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, authorities generally considered it a private matter, and prosecution was rare.

Most cases of domestic violence went unreported due to traditional sensitivities, victims’ fear of abandonment without support, police reluctance to intervene, and the expectation that perpetrators would not be tried or convicted. There were

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 35 newspaper reports of wife killings and a few other media reports of prosecutions and convictions for such crimes.

The joint government-NGO Anti-Domestic Violence Council as a whole was ineffective due to lack of funding and the unavailability of information on prevailing trends of domestic violence, although its members were active in raising domestic violence awareness.

The government continued a public awareness campaign against domestic violence. Several women’s rights groups worked with law enforcement agencies and provided training and literature on domestic violence as well as shelters and counseling for women. The high turnover rate within the police force demanded a continuous level of training that could not be met. While public awareness increased, other problems emerged. For example, the form required to report domestic violence was difficult to complete, and victims were often required to make their own photocopies due to police budgetary constraints. The law requires victims of any form of violence to produce a police report to receive treatment without cost at government health facilities. This requirement prevented many rape victims from receiving necessary medical treatment, including post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent victims from contracting HIV.

A local NGO, Musasa Project, which provides emergency shelter and related services for women and girls, handled a monthly average of 2,100 cases of violence. Musasa reported that 50 percent of their clients were girls under age 18.

Other Harmful Traditional Practices: Virginity testing, although reportedly decreasing, continued to occur in some parts the country during the year.

Sexual Harassment: No specific law criminalizes sexual harassment, but labor law prohibits the practice in the workplace. Media reported that sexual harassment was prevalent in universities, workplaces, and parliament. The Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender, and Community Development acknowledged that lack of sexual harassment policies at higher education institutions was a major cause for concern. This occurred after a student advocacy group, the Female Students Network, revealed incidents of gender-based violence and sexual harassment against students. Female college students reported they routinely encountered unwanted physical contact from male students, lecturers, and nonacademic staff, ranging from touching and inappropriate remarks to rape. Of the 3,425 students’ interviewed, 94 percent indicated they had experienced sexual harassment, while 16 percent reported having been forced into unprotected sex with lecturers or other

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 36 staff. Some students also reported having been subjected to date rape in relationships with older men, mostly lecturers and other staff. At least 80 percent of tertiary education institutions did not have a sexual harassment policy to protect students. More than half of students said they would not report gender-based violence and sexual harassment because they feared retaliation, among other reasons.

Reproductive Rights: Couples and individuals have the right to decide the number, spacing, and timing of their children; manage their reproductive health; and have access to the information and means to do so, free from discrimination, coercion, and violence. According to the 2015 DHS, the contraceptive prevalence rate was 66.5 percent. The DHS also reported that 22 percent of girls and women ages 15 to 19 had begun childbearing. Inadequate medical facilities, an advanced HIV/AIDS epidemic, and a shortage of well-trained health-care professionals contributed to the high maternal mortality rate of 651 deaths per 100,000 live births for the period 2008-15 (DHS estimate). The DHS demonstrated continued improvements in maternal health. The percentage of women who received antenatal care from a trained provider and had skilled birth attendance increased to 93 percent and 78 percent, respectively, up from 90 percent and 66 percent in the 2010-11 DHS report. While antenatal care attendance was almost the same between rural and urban areas, skilled birth attendance was much lower in rural areas, 71 percent compared with 93 percent in urban areas.

Discrimination: The constitution provides for the same legal status and rights for women as for men. The constitution’s bill of rights, in the section on the rights of women, states that all “laws, customs, traditions, and practices that infringe the rights of women conferred by this constitution are void to the extent of the infringement.” There is also an institutional framework to address women’s rights and gender equality through the Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender, and Community Development and the Gender Commission--one of the independent commissions established under the constitution. Despite the appointment of commissioners in June 2015, the commission received only minimal funding from the government and lacked sufficient independence from the ministry. Despite laws aimed at enhancing women’s rights and countering certain discriminatory traditional practices, women remained disadvantaged in society. Economic dependency and prevailing social norms prevented rural women in particular from combating societal discrimination and from participating equally in the civic and economic life of the country.

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The law recognizes a woman’s right to own property, but very few women owned property due to the customary practice of patriarchal inheritance. Less than 20 percent of female farmers were official landowners or named on government lease agreements. Divorce and maintenance laws were equitable, but many women lacked awareness of their rights. Onerous requirements to register for identification documents disadvantaged women, who often lacked the resources or time to fulfill all requirements. Without proper identification, many women were unable to access services or register to vote.

Women have the right to register their children’s births, although either the father or another male relative must be present. If the father or other male relative refuses to register the child, the child may be deprived of a birth certificate, which limits the child’s ability to acquire identify documents and enroll in school. Discrimination with respect to women’s employment also occurred.

Women and children were adversely affected by the government’s forced evictions, demolition of homes and businesses, and takeover of commercial farms. Widows, when forced to relocate to rural areas, were sometimes “inherited” into marriages with an in-law after the deaths of their spouses.

The government gave qualified women access to training in the armed forces and national service, where they occupied primarily administrative positions.

Women remained underrepresented in the media sector, and media coverage of gender and women’s issues was very limited. Objectification of women and perpetuation of gender stereotypes were common in the media.

The United Kingdom Department for International Development’s 2011 Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis Report indicated women experienced extensive economic discrimination, including in access to employment, credit, pay, and owning or managing businesses. The 2015 SADC Gender Barometer reported women constituted 54 percent of unskilled labor, while men made up 59 percent of the professional labor force. More than six of 10 women did not own a home or land.

Women also faced higher levels of food insecurity throughout the country, exacerbated by recent drought. Women accounted for 86 percent of farmers, and 59 percent of women engaged in communal farming, making them particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

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Children

Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from birth in the country and from either parent, and all births are to be registered with the Births and Deaths Registry. The 2012 population census data showed that just one in three children under age five possessed a birth certificate. Of urban children under age five, 55 percent possessed a birth certificate, while 25 percent of rural children did. Children under the care of parents older than age 20 were significantly more likely to have their births registered than were children of younger parents. Many orphaned children were unable to obtain birth certificates. Children of unregistered parents were also less likely to obtain birth certificates. Lack of birth certificates impeded access to public services, such as education and health care, resulting in many children being unable to attend school and increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.

Education: Primary education is not compulsory, free, or universal. The constitution states that every citizen and permanent resident of the country has a right to a basic state-funded education but adds a caveat that the state “must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of the resources available to it.” According to the 2012 population census, 87 percent of all children attended primary school. School attendance was only slightly higher in urban than in rural areas, and enrollment for children older than 14 was in decline. Urban and rural equity in primary school attendance rates disappeared at the secondary school level. Rural secondary education attendance (44 percent) trailed behind urban attendance (72 percent) by a wide margin. Relatively high and increasing school fees were the main reason for lack of attendance after age 14, particularly affecting girls ages 17 and 18. According to the 2012 government-led DHS, only 52 percent of girls age 17 attended school, compared with 64 percent of boys. Reports that schools turned away students with unpaid fees continued.

Child Abuse: Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, continued to be serious problems. In 2015 the NGO Childline counseled more than 12,000 children directly affected by abuse through their hotline service. Most of the substantive calls concerned sexual and physical abuse, generally inflicted by a relative or someone who lived with the child. A third of all calls related to cases of child neglect, an increase from previous years as families struggled to respond to food insecurity and unemployment issues. Childline also managed more than 7,000 in-person cases at their drop-in facilities throughout the country. Approximately twice as many girls reported abuse as boys. According to the 2011 National Baseline Survey on Life Experiences of Adolescents Preliminary Report, approximately 9 percent of girls and slightly less than 2 percent of boys

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 39 between ages 13 and 17 reported experiencing sexual violence in the previous 12 months. Older adolescents reported that one-third of girls and nearly one-tenth of boys experienced sexual violence during childhood. The survey defined sexual violence as unwanted sexual touching, unwanted attempted sex, physically forced sex, and pressured sex.

It is legal for parents and schools to inflict corporal punishment on boys but not girls. The constitution provides that “no person may be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” but the courts had not interpreted the clause nor determined whether it applied to corporal punishment. In addition the Constitutional Court deferred ruling on the constitutionality of caning juvenile offenders as judicial punishment. While the issue remained pending, magistrates may impose corporal punishment on juvenile offenders.

Government efforts to combat child abuse continued to be inadequate and underfunded. The government continued to implement a case management protocol developed in 2013 to guide the provision of child welfare services. In addition there were facilities that served underage victims of sexual assault and abuse.

Early and Forced Marriage: The constitution declares anyone under age 18 a child. On January 20, the Constitutional Court ruled no individual under age 18 may enter into marriage, including customary law unions. The court also struck down a provision of the Marriage Act that allowed girls but not boys to marry at age 16. Despite this ruling, laws on marriage--including the Marriage Act and Customary Law Marriages Act--required further reform in order to align them with the Constitutional Court ruling.

Despite legal prohibitions, mostly rural families continued to force girls to marry. According to the 2012 population census, almost one in four teenage girls were married. Child welfare NGOs reported evidence of underage marriages, particularly in isolated religious communities or among HIV/AIDS orphans who had no relatives willing or able to take care of them. High rates of unemployment, the dropout of girls from school, and the inability of families to earn a stable income were major causes of child marriage.

Families gave girls or young women to other families in marriage to avenge spirits, as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes, or when promised to others--to provide economic protection for the family. Some families sold their daughters as brides in exchange for food, and younger daughters at times married their deceased

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 40 older sister’s husband as a “replacement” bride. An NGO study published in 2014 found that because of the cultural emphasis placed on virginity, any loss of virginity--real or perceived, consensual or forced--could result in marriage, including early or forced marriage. In some instances family members forced a girl to marry a man based on the mere suspicion that the two had had sexual intercourse. This cultural practice even applied in cases of rape, and the study found numerous instances in which families concealed rape by facilitating the marriage between rapist and victim.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: Conviction of statutory rape, legally defined as sexual intercourse with a child under age 12, carries a fine of $2,000, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. A person in possession of child pornography may be charged with public indecency and if convicted faces a fine of $600, imprisonment up to six months, or both. A person convicted of procuring a child under age 16 for purposes of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct is liable to a fine up to $5,000, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. Persons charged with facilitating the prostitution of a child often were also charged with statutory rape. A parent or guardian convicted of allowing a child under age 18 to associate with or become a prostitute may face up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Girls from towns bordering South Africa, Zambia, and Mozambique were subjected to prostitution in brothels that catered to long-distance truck drivers. Increasing economic hardships coupled with the effects of drought also led more girls to turn to prostitution.

Displaced Children: Approximately 10,000 children were displaced from the Tokwe-Mukosi dam area in Masvingo Province (see section 2.d.). The disruption of their parents’ livelihoods negatively affected the children’s access to health care and schooling.

The UN Children’s Fund 2005-10 report estimated 25 percent of children had lost one or both parents to HIV or other causes. The proportion of orphans in the country remained very high. Many orphans were cared for by their extended family or lived in households headed by children.

Orphaned children were more likely to be abused, not enrolled in school, suffer discrimination and social stigma, and be vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. Some children were forced to turn to prostitution for income. Orphaned children often were unable to obtain birth certificates because they could not provide enough information regarding their parents or afford to travel to offices that issued birth certificates. Orphans were often homeless.

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A UN Children’s Fund report stated that government support of the poor “suffered from a severe lack of human and financial resources” and was “in urgent need of review and revival to meet the growing needs of children.”

International Child Abductions: The country is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/legal/compliance.html.

Anti-Semitism

The Jewish community numbered approximately 150 persons. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

Persons with Disabilities

The constitution and law prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to public places, and the provision of services, including education and health care. The constitution and law do not specifically address air travel or other transportation. They do not specify physical, sensory, mental, or intellectual disabilities. NGOs continued to lobby to broaden the legal definition of “disabled” to include persons with albinism, epilepsy, and other conditions. Government institutions often were uninformed and did not implement the law. The lack of resources devoted to training and education severely hampered the ability of persons with disabilities to compete for scarce jobs. The law stipulates that government buildings be accessible to persons with disabilities, but implementation was slow.

The National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped (NASCOH) drafted a National Policy on Disabilities in 2009, but the government had not approved the policy. Persons with disabilities faced harsh societal discrimination and exclusion, as well as poor service delivery from state bodies. For example, NASCOH reported that access to justice in courts was compromised for persons with hearing disabilities due to a lack of sign language interpreters. Persons with disabilities living in rural settings faced even greater challenges.

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Although two senators were elected to represent persons with disabilities, parliament rarely addressed problems especially affecting persons with disabilities. Parliament does not provide specific line items for persons with disabilities in the various social service ministry budgets.

Most persons holding traditional beliefs viewed persons with disabilities as bewitched, and in extreme cases families hid children with disabilities from visitors. According to NASCOH, the public considered persons with disabilities to be objects of pity rather than persons with rights.

There were very few government-sponsored education facilities dedicated to persons with disabilities. Educational institutions discriminated against children with disabilities. Essential services, including sign language interpreters, Braille materials, and ramps, were not available and prevented children with disabilities from attending school. Many schools refused to accept children with certain disabilities. Schools that accepted students with disabilities offered very little in the way of nonacademic facilities for those accepted as compared with their counterparts without disabilities. Many urban children with disabilities obtained informal education through private institutions, but these options were generally unavailable for persons with disabilities in rural areas. Government programs, such as the basic education assistance module intended to benefit children with disabilities, failed to address adequately the root causes of their systematic exclusion. NASCOH reported that 75 percent of children with disabilities had no access to education.

Women with disabilities faced compounded discrimination, resulting in limited access to services, reduced opportunities for civic and economic participation and increased vulnerability to violence.

Persons with mental disabilities also suffered from inadequate medical care and a lack of health services. There were eight centralized mental health institutions in the country with a total capacity of more than 1,300 residents, in addition to the three special institutions run by the ZPCS for long-term residents and those considered dangerous to society. Residents in the eight centralized institutions received cursory screening, and most waited for at least one year for a full medical review.

A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals resulted in persons with mental disabilities not being properly diagnosed and not receiving

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 43 adequate therapy. There were few certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and teaching in the country. NGOs reported that getting access to mental health services was slow and frustrating. They reported persons with mental disabilities suffered from extremely poor living conditions, due in part to shortages of food, water, clothing, and sanitation. Budgetary constraints and limited capacity at these institutions resulted in families keeping persons with mental disabilities at home where family members cared for them.

Prison inmates in the three facilities run by the ZPCS were not necessarily convicted prisoners. Two doctors examined inmates with psychiatric conditions. The doctors were required to confirm a mental disability and recommend an individual for release or return to a mental institution. Inmates with mental disabilities routinely waited as long as three years for evaluation.

There were minimal legal or administrative safeguards to allow participation in the electoral processes by persons with disabilities. Administrative arrangements for voter registration at relevant government offices were burdensome, involving long queues, several hours or days of waiting, and necessary return visits that effectively served to disenfranchise some persons with disabilities. The law permits blind persons to bring an individual with them in marking their ballots.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group made up 82 percent of the population, Ndebele 14 percent, whites and Asians less than 1 percent, and other ethnic and racial groups 3 percent. ZANU-PF leaders often encouraged hatred of whites through public speeches and broadcasts. This created tension between ZANU-PF supporters and whites. Historical tension between the Shona majority and the Ndebele minority resulted in marginalization of the Ndebele by the Shona-dominated government. During the 2013 elections, the mainstream MDC-T often accused Welshman Ncube of the Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube (MDC-N) of campaigning on a tribal platform. In turn the smaller MDC-N complained of continued victimization and neglect of the minority Ndebele by the Shona-dominated MDC-T and ZANU-PF.

The government continued its attempts to blame the country’s economic and political problems on the white minority and western countries. Police seldom arrested ZANU-PF supporters or charged them with infringing upon minority rights, particularly the property rights of the minority white commercial farmers or wildlife conservancy owners targeted in the land redistribution program.

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The government enforced few of the provisions or timelines in the 2007 indigenization law, and no businesses were forced to transfer ownership. The law defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as any person, or the descendant of such person, who before the date of the country’s independence in 1980 was disadvantaged. The official purpose of the indigenization law was to increase the participation of indigenous citizens in the economy, including at least 51 percent indigenous ownership of all businesses. Legal experts criticized the law as unfairly discriminatory and a violation of the constitution.

Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. According to the country’s criminal code, “any act involving physical contact between men that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” carries a penalty if convicted of up to one year in prison or a fine up to $5,000. Despite that, there were no known cases of prosecutions of consensual same-sex sexual activity. Common law prevents gay men and, to a lesser extent, lesbians from fully expressing their sexual orientation. In some cases it criminalizes the display of affection between men.

President Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders publicly criticized the LGBTI community, rejecting the promotion of LGBTI rights as contrary to the country’s values, norms, traditions, and beliefs.

The police reportedly detained and held persons suspected of being gay for up to 48 hours before releasing them. LGBTI advocacy groups also reported police used extortion and threats to intimidate persons based on their sexual orientation. Members of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, the primary organization dedicated to advancing the rights of LGBTI persons, experienced harassment and discrimination.

Religious leaders in this traditionally conservative and Christian society encouraged discrimination against LGBTI persons. For example, Walter Magaya, leader of the Healing and Deliverance Ministries, continued to host shows on television and radio during which he “healed” members of the LGBTI community.

LGBTI persons reported widespread societal discrimination based on sexual orientation. In response to social pressure, some families subjected their LGBTI

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 45 members to “corrective” rape and forced marriages to encourage heterosexual conduct. Women in particular were subjected to rape by male family members. Victims rarely reported such crimes to police.

LGBTI persons often left school at an early age due to discrimination. Higher education institutions reportedly threatened to expel students based on their sexual orientation. Members of the LGBTI community also had higher rates of unemployment and homelessness. Many persons who identified themselves as LGBTI did not seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health problems due to fear that health-care providers would shun them or report them to authorities. Since the completion of a nation-wide sensitization program for health-care workers, however, the LGBTI community reported an improvement in health service delivery.

HIV and AIDS Social Stigma

The government has a national HIV/AIDS policy that prohibits discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, and the law prohibits discrimination against workers with HIV/AIDS in the private sector and parastatals. Despite these provisions, societal discrimination against persons affected by HIV/AIDS remained a problem. Local NGOs reported persons affected by HIV/AIDS faced discrimination in health services, education, and employment. Although there was an active information campaign to destigmatize HIV/AIDS by international and local NGOs, the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, and the National AIDS Council, such ostracism and criticism continued.

In the 2015 DHS, 22 percent of women and 20 percent of men reported they held discriminatory attitudes towards those living with HIV/AIDS.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Inexplicable disappearances and killings, sometimes involving mutilation of the victim, often were attributed to customary or traditional rituals, in some cases involving a healer who requested a human body part to complete a required task. Police generally rejected the “ritual killing” explanation, despite its being commonly used in society and the press.

Promotion of Acts of Discrimination

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Throughout the year government-controlled media continued to vilify white citizens and blame them for the country’s problems. President Mugabe was complicit in vilifying white citizens and urged the eviction of remaining white farmers.

Section 7. Worker Rights a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

While the law provides for the right of private-sector workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively, other provisions of law abrogated these rights. Public-sector workers may not form or join trade unions but may form associations that bargain collectively and strike. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, provides that the labor court handle complaints of such discrimination, and may direct reinstatement of workers fired due to such discrimination.

The law provides for the registrar of the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare to supervise the election of officers of workers’ and employers’ organizations, to cancel or postpone elections, and to change the venue of an election. The law also grants the minister extensive powers to regulate union activities. For example, the minister has the authority to veto collective bargaining agreements perceived to be harmful to the economy as well as to appoint an investigator who can, without prior notice, enter trade union premises, question any employee, and inspect and copy any books, records, or other documents. The Labor Amendment Act empowers the minister to order an investigation of a trade union or employers’ organization and to appoint an administrator to run its affairs. There were no reports of investigations during the year.

The law strictly regulates the right to strike. Strikes are limited to disputes of interest. The law provides that a majority of the employees must agree to strike by voting in a secret ballot. Strike procedure requirements include a mandatory 30- day reconciliation period and referral to binding arbitration (in essential services and in nonessential services where the parties agree or where the dispute involves rights). Following an attempt to conciliate a dispute of interest and a labor officer’s issuance of a certificate of no settlement, the party proposing a collective job action must provide 14 days’ written notice of intent to resort to such action, including specifying the grounds for the intended action, in order legally to call a strike. In April and May, more than 4,000 National Railway of Zimbabwe (NRZ) workers went on a spontaneous strike to protest 15 months of salary arrears.

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Members of the police and army are the only legally recognized essential services employees and may not strike, but the law allows the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare to declare any nonessential service an essential service if a strike is deemed a danger to the population. No provisions prohibit employers from hiring replacement workers in the event of strike. The NRZ hired replacement workers when employees went on strike in April and May. The law also allows employers to sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes, with penalties for conviction that include fines, up to five years’ imprisonment, or both. The constitution does not extend the right of collective bargaining to security forces. In late 2014 the government, employer organizations, and union representatives, according to the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), signed an agreement detailing how government security forces should conduct themselves in the event of a strike or other collective action.

Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise and industry levels. At the enterprise level, work councils negotiate collective agreements, which become binding if approved by 50 percent of the workers in the bargaining unit. Industry level bargaining takes place within the framework of the National Employment Councils (NEC). Unions representing at least 50 percent of the workers may bargain with the authorization of the Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare. The law encourages the creation of workers’ committees in enterprises where less than 50 percent of workers are unionized.

To go into effect, the ministry must announce collective bargaining agreements, thus giving the minister the power to veto the agreement. The Labor Amendment Act expands the minister’s power to veto a collective bargaining agreement if the minister deems it to be “contrary to public interest.” Workers and employers at the enterprise level also may come to a binding agreement outside of the official framework. Despite this provision, the ministry could block indefinitely any collective bargaining agreement if it was not announced officially.

Although the law does not permit national civil servants to collectively bargain, the Apex Council, a group of public service associations, represents civil servants in job-related negotiations with the Public Service Commission. In January the council threatened a nationwide strike before successfully negotiating a basic salary adjustment for civil servants.

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The Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare did not effectively enforce applicable laws. Penalties for conviction of violations of freedom of association or collective bargaining laws range from a fine to imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years but were insufficient to deter violations. Administrative and judicial procedures often were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.

The government did not respect the workers’ right to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively. In January, ZRP officers beat protesters and arrested three RTUZ leaders following a demonstration regarding delayed payment of civil servant salaries and annual bonuses. In July the government publicly threatened violence against anyone participating in a nationwide strike. Worker organizations are loosely affiliated with political parties.

Government interference with trade union activity was common. Authorities frequently withheld or delayed the registration certificate for a number of unions. Police and state intelligence services regularly attended and monitored trade union activities such as meetings. Police or ZANU-PF supporters sometimes prevented unions from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities. The International Labor Organization noted that the government took some steps to address the concerns raised by a 2010 commission of inquiry. The inquiry found the government responsible for serious violations of fundamental rights by its security forces, including a clear pattern of intimidation that included arrests, detentions, violence, and torture against members nationwide of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)--an umbrella group of unions affiliated with the opposition MDC-T.

Although the law does not require unions to notify police of public gatherings, police required such notification. Police permitted the ZCTU to march in the country’s six regional capitals early in the year.

In September police twice banned all demonstrations in the Harare Central Police District in response to social movement protests, which included union members.

Although the ministry conducted training for security forces on the Public Order and Security Act, the training did not change security sector attitudes. By law the government could fine and imprison union members for organizing an illegal strike, and unions risked a 12-month suspension of their registration for minor infractions.

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There were reports that some ZCTU affiliates were able to engage in collective bargaining with employers without interference from the government. Nevertheless, members of the ZCTU stated employers did not recognize their affiliates within the NECs. Workers’ committees existed in parallel with trade unions. Their role was to negotiate shop floor grievances, while that of the trade unions was to negotiate industry level problems, notably wages. Trade unions regarded the existence of such a parallel body as an arrangement that employers potentially could use to undermine the role of the unions.

According to International Trade Union Confederation reports, employers frequently abused institutional weakness by creating a deadlock in the bargaining process, i.e., by forcing the referral of the dispute to arbitration and then to court, forestalling a decision in a reasonable timeframe. Agricultural workers experienced verbal and physical attacks by employers during negotiations. The ZFTU reported 280 cases of physical violence against workers at Chinese-owned companies. b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, with exceptions for work for the national youth service and forced prison labor. The Labor Amendment Act defines forced labor as “any work or services which a person is required to perform against his or her will under the threat of some form of punishment,” the first such legal definition in the country. Forced prison labor includes “any labor required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court” as well as what “is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance or management of the place at which he is detained.”

Conviction of forced labor is punishable by a fine, two years’ imprisonment, or both; such penalties were insufficient to deter violations. A 2014 law prescribes punishment of not less than 10 years’ imprisonment and, with aggravating circumstances, up to imprisonment for life, for conviction of human trafficking-- including labor trafficking. The law does not clearly define the crime of trafficking in persons and requires transportation of the victim, which further limits the cases in which the regulation could be applied.

The government did not effectively enforce the law. There were no reports that the government attempted to prevent and eliminate forced labor during the year. There were no data on the numbers of victims removed from forced labor, if any.

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Forced labor, including by children, occurred, although the extent of the problem was unknown. Adults and children were subjected to forced labor in agriculture and domestic service in rural areas, as well as domestic servitude in cities and towns (see section 7.c.).

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/. c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The Labor Amendment Act increases the minimum age for general labor from 13 to 16. The law increases the minimum age for apprenticeship from 15 to 16 and declares void and unenforceable formal apprenticeship contracts entered into by children under age 18 without the assistance of a guardian. The law further states that no person under age 18 shall perform any work likely to jeopardize that person’s health, safety, or morals.

The laws were not effectively enforced. The Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing child labor laws, but the department lacked personnel and commitment to carry out inspections or other monitoring. Penalties, including fines not exceeding $400, imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, were not sufficient to deter violations. There was no government action to combat child labor during the year. In 2015 NGO Coalition against Child Labor in Zimbabwe completed a two-year program wherein it returned 2,150 child laborers to school in the Chiredzi region.

Child labor remained endemic and was on the rise. Child labor occurred primarily in the informal sectors. Inspectors received no training addressing child labor and did not closely monitor it. Children worked in agriculture, fishing, cattle herding, forestry, informal mining, as domestic staff and street vendors, and in other parts of the informal sector. The Vendors Initiative for Social and Economic Transformation conducted a survey of its membership that revealed more than 4,000 child street vendors.

According to a 2014 report compiled by ZimStat, the governmental statistics agency, 30 percent of children ages five to nine and 60 percent of children ages 10 to 14 were engaged in economic activity at least one hour per week. Seven percent of children ages five to nine and 12 percent of children ages 10 to 14 worked 21 hours or more per week in economic child labor. Ninety-seven percent of the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 51 children involved in economic child labor resided in rural areas, and 96 percent were employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

Children often faced hazards to their health and safety and lacked necessary equipment and training. Working on farms exposed children to bad weather, dangerous chemicals, and the use of heavy machinery. Most children involved in mining worked for themselves, a family member, or someone in the community. Exposure to hazardous materials, particularly mercury, was on the rise in the informal mining sector.

Forced labor by children occurred in the agricultural, artisanal gold and chrome mining, and domestic sectors. Children also were used in the commission of illegal activities, including gambling and drug smuggling. Some employers did not pay wages to child domestic workers, claiming they were assisting a child from a rural home by providing room and board. Some employers paid the parents for a child’s work. Relatives often took children orphaned by HIV/AIDS into their homes but used them as domestic workers without pay.

See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/. d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

The law prohibits employment or occupational discrimination based on race, color, gender, tribe, political opinion, creed, place of origin, disability, HIV status, or pregnancy. The law does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination regarding age, language, citizenship, social origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or non-HIV related communicable diseases. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to race, gender, disability, and sexual orientation (see section 6).

The constitution provides for the same legal status and rights for women as for men. Labor legislation prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer may be held liable for civil remedies if found to be in violation of provisions against “unfair labor practices,” including sexual harassment. The law does not specify penalties for conviction of such violations. Women commonly faced sexual harassment in the workplace (see section 6).

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There were no formal complaints of wage discrimination filed with the Ministry of Labor; however, women’s salaries lagged behind those of men in most sectors. Unions expressed their concern regarding wage disparity between management and employees.

There was a relative lack of women in decision-making positions, despite a constitutional requirement that both genders be equally represented in all institutions and agencies of government at every level. In 2014 the share of women in wage employment in the nonagricultural sector was 37 percent, while their share in senior and middle management was 24 percent.

Discrimination against migrant workers occurred, especially those employed in the informal sector. Discrimination with respect to political affiliation also occurred. In 2015 a village headman in was fired for being affiliated with the MDC-T. Also in 2015 a headman in Makoni Central denied a MDC-T-affiliated applicant a job in the rural health clinic because he said the clinic could not employ an opposition party member.

Banks targeted union workers for dismissal, according to the ZCTU. Persons with HIV/AIDS and LGBTI persons faced discrimination in employment. White farmers were sometimes deprived of their livelihoods and property through illegal farm seizures. Employers discriminated against members of minority ethnic groups who they often perceived as opposition supporters. Disabled persons faced social and employment discrimination and lack of access to many workplaces. e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The NECs set the minimum wage for all industrial sectors through a bipartite agreement between employers and labor unions. According to the ZCTU, available statistics showed that as of September 2015 the average monthly wage was $246, down from $304 in 2013. The lowest paid public service workers earned $375 a month in 2015. According to ZimStat, the food poverty line for a family of five in April was $153, and the total consumption poverty line in April was $481. In 2014, 42 percent of paid employees earned above the food poverty line amounts, while only 4 percent earned above the total consumption poverty line amount.

The law does not provide for a standard workweek, but it prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour continuous rest period a week. The maximum legal workweek is negotiated between unions and employers in each sector. No worker is allowed to

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 53 work more than 12 continuous hours. According to the Labor Force Survey, 28 percent of the employed population worked excessive hours, defined as more than 48 hours per week. The law prescribes that workers receive not less than twice their standard remuneration for working on a public holiday or on Sunday. The government sets safety and health standards on an industry-specific basis. The public service commission sets conditions of employment in the public sector.

Labor law does not differentiate between workers based on sector or industry. The labor law does not apply to the informal sector, composed of an estimated 95 percent of the labor force. The law applies to migrant laborers if they are in the formal sector. There were no reports of discrimination against migrant laborers in the formal sector.

Occupational safety and health standards were current and appropriate for the main industries in the country. In 2015 the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) commissioned an occupational health center in the capital and a mobile clinic to monitor the health of miners and industrial workers. Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

The Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and work hours laws for each sector, but the standards were not enforced effectively due to inadequate monitoring systems and a labor inspector shortage. According to the International Labor Organization, there were fewer than 125 labor inspectors responsible for investigating labor- related violations and for enforcing labor laws, including those covering children. The Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council, a quasi-governmental advisory body to the NSSA, regulated working conditions. Budgetary constraints and staffing shortages, as well as its status as an advisory council, made it largely ineffective. Penalties for violations of wage or hours of work restrictions range from a fine to imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years. Such penalties were insufficient to deter violations. Penalties for occupational safety and health violations were not harmonized and fall within the jurisdiction of numerous ministries.

NSSA statistics showed there were 5,380 workplace injuries and 54 fatalities in 2015, down from 5,491 and 98, respectively, in 2014. Most injuries and deaths occurred in the mining sector. The ZFTU reported that workers at iron smelters often suffered burns due to a lack of protective clothing. The NSSA attributed the high injury and fatality rates to low investment in occupational safety and health,

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 54 noncompliance with rules and regulations, and low levels of awareness of occupational safety and health matters.

Employers paid many agricultural and domestic workers below the minimum wage. The ZCTU reported many agricultural workers earned $72 per month. Many public servants also earned less than the poverty line. During the year there was pervasive partial payment or nonpayment of salaries in both the public and private sectors. According to a report by the Labor and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe that analyzed data from ZCTU-affiliated union representatives at 442 companies, 54 percent of employees had gone at least 13 months without pay. All employees went at least three months without pay, and 16 percent had gone 25 or more months without pay.

There was little or no enforcement of the workhours law, particularly for agricultural and domestic workers. Although workers were generally unlikely to complain to authorities of violations due to fear of losing their jobs, some exceptions occurred. In 2013 Sabout Haulage drivers took their employer to the Constitutional Court for infringing on their right to fair and safe labor practices and the right to be paid overtime. The case was pending at year’s end.

Poor health and safety standards in the workplace were common problems faced by workers in both the formal and informal sectors due to lack of enforcement. Abuses by the management at certain foreign-owned enterprises and companies owned by well-connected politicians were common, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of workers; poor working conditions; underpayment or nonpayment of wages; unfair dismissal; and firing without notice. Workers’ committee members of a foreign-owned mining company reported fear and serious victimization, including arbitrary nonrenewal of contracts, dismissals without charges, late payment of salaries, and insufficient provision of protective clothing. No information was available on the treatment of foreign and migrant workers. The government considered many commercial farm workers to be foreigners because one or both parents were born in another country.

Due to the growth of the informal mining sector, artisanal miners, including children, were increasingly exposed to chemicals and environmental waste. An estimated 1.5 million persons were engaged in artisanal mining, defined as mining activities carried out using low technology or with minimal machinery, according to the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Council.

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TAB 6

ZIMBABWE 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic. President Robert Mugabe, his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, and its authoritarian security sector have dominated the country since independence in 1980. Presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2013 were free of the widespread violence of the 2008 elections, but the process was neither fair nor credible. Numerous factors contributed to a deeply flawed election process: A unilateral declaration of the election date by the hastily convened and politically compromised Constitutional Court, formed after the country adopted a new constitution; heavily biased state media; a voter registration process that did not comply with the law and that skewed registration towards supporters of the ruling party; partisan statements and actions by security forces, and active-duty personnel standing for office in contravention of the law; limitations on international observers; failure to provide a publicly useful voters’ register; and a chaotic separate voting process for the security sector. The elections resulted in the formation of a unitary ZANU-PF government led by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF supermajorities in both houses of Parliament. ZANU-PF used intimidation and targeted violence to retain some parliamentary seats during 2015 by-elections. Civilian authorities failed at times to maintain effective control over the security forces.

The most important human rights problems remained the government’s targeting members of non-ZANU-PF parties and civil society activists for abduction, arrest, torture, abuse, and harassment; partisan application of the rule of law by security forces and the judiciary; and restrictions on civil liberties.

There were many other human rights problems. Prison conditions were harsh. The government’s expropriation of private property continued. Executive political influence and interference in the judiciary continued, and the government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights. The government generally failed to investigate or prosecute state security or ZANU-PF supporters responsible for violence. Authorities restricted freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement. The government continued to evict citizens; invade farms, private businesses and properties; and demolish informal marketplaces and settlements. The government arrested, detained, prosecuted, and harassed nongovernmental organization (NGO) members. Government corruption remained widespread, including at the local level. Violence and discrimination against women; child

ZIMBABWE 2 abuse; trafficking of men, women, and children; and discrimination against persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons, and persons with HIV/AIDS were problems. The government interfered with labor-related events.

The government took limited steps to punish security sector officials and ZANU- PF supporters who committed violations, but impunity continued to be a problem.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Progress in cases from previous years was slow, and most cases remained open. Police units sometimes organized or participated in political violence. Security sector impunity stemming from politically motivated abuses remained a problem.

On April 23, three Criminal Investigation Department police officers arrested Robert Takawira for suspected theft. The officers severely beat Takawira with baton sticks before taking him to a police station where they denied him medical attention. On April 24, he died from those injuries while in police custody.

With few exceptions, investigations remained pending for previous cases of violence resulting in death committed by security forces and ZANU-PF supporters.

On April 24, ZANU-PF supporters and state security agents allegedly killed Pepukai Mudzembiri, Zaka North District Chairperson of the Democratic Change- Tsvangirai (MDC-T). Police investigators stated that he was killed in a hit-and-run accident, a point disputed by human rights organizations and MDC-T party officials. A ZANU-PF supporter reportedly threatened Mudzembiri with abduction and death before the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Impunity for past politically motivated violence remained a problem. Police and the prosecutor general failed to arrest or prosecute senior or well-known ZANU-PF supporters for violence in previous years.

There were limited advances in holding legally accountable those responsible for the killings of at least 19 citizens who died of injuries sustained during the 2008 political violence that targeted opposition party members; more than 270 others

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 3 also were killed that year. Observers believed the primary perpetrators of the violence were members of ZANU-PF, including the party’s youth militia, and individuals identifying themselves as war veterans.

Unwillingness to acknowledge past atrocities continued to influence Shona- Ndebele relations negatively. In 2012 ZANU-PF then defense minister Emmerson Mnangagwa referred to the 1980s mass killings of Ndebele Zimbabweans known as the Gukurahundi as a “closed chapter.” (Approximately 20,000 persons were killed during the 1980s because of a government-sanctioned crackdown on persons believed to be insurgents in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions.) b. Disappearance

There were credible reports of politically motivated abductions and attempted abductions during the year. There were no reports of authorities punishing any perpetrators.

On March 9, suspected state security agents abducted Itai Dzamara, a journalist and democracy activist known for leading a small, peaceful protest movement from a barbershop in Glen View, a Harare suburb. The agents allegedly handcuffed Dzamara before forcing him into a truck with obscured license plates. Dzamara’s whereabouts were unknown since authorities did not provide information regarding his abduction. International community and human rights attorneys urged to no avail the government to investigate his disappearance. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, security forces continued to engage in such practices with impunity and with the implicit support of officials affiliated with ZANU-PF. Police used excessive force in apprehending, detaining, and interrogating criminal suspects. According to NGOs, security forces reportedly assaulted and tortured citizens in custody, including perceived opponents of ZANU-PF. In some cases police arrested the victims of violence and charged victims with crimes instead of perpetrators.

Human rights groups reported the continuance of physical and psychological torture perpetrated by security agents and ZANU-PF supporters. Reported torture methods included beating victims with sticks, clubs, whips, cables, and sjamboks

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(a heavy whip); burning; falanga (beating the soles of the feet); use of electric shocks; solitary confinement; and sleep deprivation.

According to one NGO, from January through September, 155 persons sought treatment for injuries and trauma sustained from security force abuse, compared with 169 persons in 2014. During the same period, the NGO reported that 165 persons sought treatment for injuries and trauma sustained from abuse by ZANU- PF supporters, compared with 88 persons in 2014. Nearly 40 percent of the cases took place in Harare, and the vast majority of the victims were affiliated with the MDC-T.

In November 2014 police assaulted human rights lawyer Kennedy Masiye in Africa Unity Square in downtown Harare. Masiye represented Itai Dzamara and went to the square to investigate reports that police assaulted Dzamara. Upon entering the park and finding Dzamara unconscious, Masiye attempted to telephone for an ambulance. Uniformed police officers then ran in his direction, and although he produced his legal credentials, struck him with fists and batons. Masiye’s arm was broken during the beating.

Police occasionally used excessive force to disperse demonstrators, resulting in injuries. On April 17, police assaulted Sydney Chisi, a youth activist, during a demonstration in Harare against xenophobic violence in South Africa. Video of the event taken by a bystander clearly showed police officers striking Chisi repeatedly with batons while he lay helplessly on the ground. Chisi was briefly hospitalized and later filed criminal and civil cases against the officers involved.

ZANU-PF supporters--often with tacit support from police--continued to assault and mistreat scores of persons, including civil society activists and known Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) members and their families, especially in Harare neighborhoods and nearby towns. Violent confrontations between youth groups of the ZANU-PF (known as “Chipangano”) and the MDC-T, or the MDC- Ncube (MDC-N) continued, particularly in urban areas. ZANU-PF supporters were the primary instigators of political violence.

On April 23, ZANU-PF supporters attacked 13 MDC-T supporters, including Member of Parliament (MP) Costa Machingauta, in the Glen View suburb of Harare. The victims reported being attacked on their way to and from a rally addressed by Morgan Tsvangirai. Machingauta was hospitalized for three days for a head injury that required 21 stitches.

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The courts punished some ZANU-PF supporters accused of political violence and ordered compensation to their victims. In April the High Court convicted seven ZANU-PF activists of the 2008 torture of seven MDC-T supporters and ordered them to pay a combined $11,000 (U.S. currency used in the country) in compensation.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained harsh, partly due to overcrowding in older urban remand facilities, and the Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS) struggled to provide adequate food and sanitary conditions. The country’s 2013 constitution added prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration into society to ZPCS responsibilities.

Physical Conditions: There were approximately 18,900 prisoners, including approximately 600 women and 50 juveniles, spread across 46 main prisons and 26 satellite prisons. While some prisons operated below capacity, NGOs reported overcrowding continued due to outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs.

On March 13, more than 900 inmates rioted over poor prison conditions and food shortages in Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. Prison guards killed at least five prisoners during the riot. Some prisoners alleged authorities tortured them following the riot.

The independent Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) visited Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison on March 18 in order to inspect prison conditions that allegedly led to the riot. It recommended authorities mobilize resources to improve conditions and provide for prisoners’ basic needs.

Prison guards occasionally beat and abused prisoners, but NGOs reported the use of excessive force by prison guards was not systematic and that senior prison officials increased efforts to address the problem.

NGOs reported that female prisoners generally fared better than did male prisoners. Authorities held women in separate prison wings and provided for women guards. Women generally received more food from their families than did male prisoners. The several dozen children under age three living with their incarcerated mothers, however, were required to share their mothers’ food allocation. NGOs were unaware of women inmates reporting rapes or physical abuse, which were more common among the male inmate population. NGOs

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 6 suggested that women guards were more diligent about protecting women prisoners from abuse or that female prisoners did not report abuse. Prisons, with support from NGOs, provided sanitary supplies for women. Officials did not provide pregnant and nursing mothers with additional care or food rations, but the ZPCS solicited donations from NGOs and donors for additional provisions.

There was one juvenile prison housing boys only. Girls were held together with women. Authorities held boys in adult prisons throughout the country while in remand. Officials generally tried to place younger boys in separate cells. Authorities generally sent juveniles to prison rather than to reformatory homes, as stipulated in the law. Juveniles were particularly vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners.

According to the ZPCS, remand prisons were overcrowded, and conditions were by design harsher than in newer facilities. Authorities often held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners until their bail hearings.

Food shortages were widespread but not life threatening. Prisoners identified as malnourished received additional meals. The harvest of prison farm products provided meals for prisoners, while the sale of some high-value crops such as tobacco allowed authorities to address some supply shortages. Prisoners had limited access to clean water.

Poor sanitary conditions contributed to disease, including diarrhea, measles, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses. Lighting and ventilation were inadequate. There were insufficient mattresses, blankets, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene products.

Prisoners had access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at every facility. The ZPCS offered peer education on HIV/AIDS and tested prisoners for HIV only when requested by prisoners or prison doctors. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialized medical personnel and medications, prisoners suffered from routine but treatable medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases.

Those detained for politically motivated reasons were held at police stations for days while their court dates or bail hearings were pending.

Administration: There was no prison ombudsman, but there were statutory mechanisms to allow alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders.

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Approximately 130 probation officers under the Ministry of Labor and Social Services addressed the status and circumstances of confinement for juvenile offenders.

Authorities permitted prisoners to submit complaints, but investigations were rare. The ZPCS continued to assess prison conditions periodically but did not release the results of such assessments.

Prisoners and detainees had relatively unrestricted access to visitors, except in maximum-security prisons, where geographic constraints hampered access by relatives of prisoners. One exception occurred in July when approximately 50 activists attempted to visit vendors jailed by police during city clean-up operations. Police arrested six of the activists.

The ZHRC investigated credible allegations of inhuman conditions (see Physical Conditions subsection).

Independent Monitoring: The law provides international human rights monitors the right to visit prisons. Church groups and NGOs seeking to provide humanitarian assistance gained access. All organizations working in prisons reported that their meetings with prisoners occurred without third parties present, and there were minimal restrictions on them. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, although some laws effectively weakened these prohibitions. Despite the law, security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society activists perceived as opposing the ZANU-PF party. The government continued to enforce laws in conflict with the constitution.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The constitution provides for a National Security Council (NSC) composed of the president, vice president, and selected ministers and members of the security services. The NSC, chaired by the president, is responsible for setting security policies and advises the government on all security-related problems. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is responsible for maintaining law and order. The Department of Immigration and the ZRP are primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement. Although the ZRP is officially under the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 8 authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the President controlled some ZRP roles and missions. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defense Forces under the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces are responsible for external security, but the government sometimes used them for domestic operations. The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), under the Office of the Vice President, is responsible for internal and external security. All security sector chiefs report directly to the president, who is commander in chief of all security services.

Implicit assurances of impunity and a culture of disregard for human rights contributed to police use of excessive force in apprehending and detaining criminal suspects. Ignorance of the provisions of the constitution compromised the quality of police work. Police were ill equipped, underpaid, and poorly trained, particularly at the lower levels. A lack of sufficient fuel and resources reduced police effectiveness. Poor working conditions, low salaries, and high rates of dismissal resulted in corruption and high turnover. The government changed pay dates for security forces on a month-to-month basis.

There were no internal or external entities to investigate abuse by the security forces. There were reports authorities investigated and arrested corrupt police officers for criminal activity during the year, but there were also reports of police officers punished or arrested on arbitrary charges for failing to obtain or share illicitly gained funds. State-controlled media reported that at least 300 traffic police officers were fired for corruption, including receiving bribes from motorists, in 2014.

Government efforts to reform the security forces were minimal, and there were no reports of disciplinary actions against security officers who erred in ZANU-PF’s favor in their official conduct. Training on allegiance to ZANU-PF for securing the country’s sovereignty was commonplace, while authorities rarely provided training on nonpartisan implementation of the rule of law or human rights.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

The law stipulates that arrests require a warrant issued either by a court or senior police officer and that police inform an arrested person of the charges before taking the individual into custody, but police did not respect these rights. The law requires authorities to inform a person at the time of arrest of the reason for the arrest and a preliminary hearing before a magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest.

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According to the constitution, only a competent court may extend the period of detention.

On July 27, a magistrate ordered the release of three civil society leaders whom police arrested on July 25 and held in excess of 48 hours.

The law provides for bail for most accused persons. On September 23, the constitutional court declared section 121(3) of the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act unconstitutional. According to human rights attorneys, section 121 (3) allowed prosecutors to veto bail decisions made by the courts and keep accused persons in custody for up to seven days based on the prosecution’s stated intent to appeal bail.

Authorities often did not allow detainees prompt or regular access to their lawyers and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients that detainees or those with authority to grant access were unavailable. An indigent detainee may apply to have the government provide an attorney in criminal cases, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases. This occurred with cases involving MDC members, civil society activists, and ordinary citizens. In contrast with previous years, there were no reported cases of detainees held incommunicado.

The government also continued to harass and intimidate human rights lawyers when they attempted to gain access to their clients.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention as tools of intimidation and harassment, especially against political activists, civil society members, journalists, and ordinary citizens asserting their rights. There were numerous reports that security forces arbitrarily arrested political and civil society activists and then released them the next day without charge.

On July 24, authorities arrested three civil society activists for allegedly failing to comply with an officer’s directive while attempting to visit 16 jailed vendors at Harare Remand Prison. On July 25, authorities arrested another three activists at the Rotten Row Magistrates Court when they attempted to pay bail for those arrested the previous day.

Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention continued to be limited. Delays in pretrial procedures were still common, however, due to a continued shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, the low capacity of court officials, and a lack of resources.

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Other prisoners remained in prison because they could not afford to pay bail, which remained exorbitant in view of economic conditions in the country. Magistrates rarely exercised the “free bail option” in which they have discretion to waive bail for destitute prisoners. Lawyers reported juveniles usually spent more time in pretrial detention than did adults because they could not attend court unless a parent or guardian accompanied them. Authorities occasionally did not notify parents of a juvenile’s arrest or the closest kin of an adult detainee’s arrest. e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but executive influence and interference remained a problem. As was the case in 2014, however, the judiciary demonstrated greater independence despite being under intense pressure to conform to government policies.

On March 12, the High Court ruled that Raymond Ndhlukula, a high-ranking official in the President’s Office, was in contempt of a court order barring him from seizing a farm from its lawful owner. The court noted that contempt is a serious infraction that “strikes at the heart of the rule of law,” and sentenced Ndhlukula to 90 days in prison suspended on the condition that he vacate the farm. Ndhlukula appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court.

The government often refused to abide by judicial decisions and routinely delayed payment of court costs or judgments awarded against it in civil cases. Judicial corruption was widespread, extending beyond magistrates and judges. NGOs reported that senior government officials continued to undermine judicial independence, including by giving farms and homes to judges.

Magistrates heard the vast majority of cases. Legal experts claimed defendants in politically sensitive cases were more likely to receive a fair hearing in magistrates’ courts than in higher courts, where justices were more likely to make politicized decisions. ZANU-PF sympathizers used threats and intimidation to force magistrates, particularly rural magistrates, to rule in the government’s favor. In politically charged cases, other judicial officers not covered by the law, such as prosecutors and private attorneys, also faced pressure, including harassment and intimidation. Some urban-based junior magistrates demonstrated a greater degree of independence and granted MDC and civil society activists bail against the government’s wishes.

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Trial Procedures

The constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, but political pressure frequently compromised this right. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence under the law, although courts did not always respect this right. Magistrates or judges held trials without juries, and trials were open to the public except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Assessors, in lieu of juries, could be appointed in cases in which the offense could result in a death penalty or lengthy prison sentence. Every defendant has the right to a lawyer of his or her choosing, but most defendants in magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation. In criminal cases an indigent defendant may apply to have the government provide an attorney, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases, where the government provided an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. Individuals in civil cases may request free legal assistance from the Legal Resources Foundation or the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association also provides some free legal assistance to women and youth. Free interpretation is provided for by law, and Shona/English interpretation was generally available. The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense is also provided for by law, but in practice was often lacking.

Authorities sometimes denied attorneys access to their clients, especially in cases when those detained were alleging torture. Defendants have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf and to confront adverse witnesses. Any person arrested or detained for an alleged offense has the right to remain silent and may not to be compelled to confess. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to access all government-held evidence relevant to their cases. In practice authorities did not always respect these rights.

Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The right to appeal against both conviction and sentence exists in all cases, and it is automatic in cases in which the death penalty is imposed. No groups were denied those rights.

Unlike in normal criminal proceedings, which proceed from investigation to trial within months, in cases of members of political parties or civil society critical of ZANU-PF, prosecuting agents regularly took abnormally long to bring accused persons to trial. As with many other cases in which authorities granted bail to government opponents (see section 1.d.), they did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but instead chose to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 12 threat of impending prosecution remaining, with the accused person eventually being called to court, only to be informed of further delays. The prosecutors and police routinely retained material confiscated from the accused as evidence.

Government officials frequently ignored court orders in such cases, delayed bail and access to medical care, and selectively enforced court orders related to land disputes favorable to those associated with ZANU-PF.

The public had fair access to the courts of law, particularly the magistrates’ courts, although observers reported occasional physical and procedural impediments.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons throughout the year, including opposition party officials, their supporters, NGO workers, and civil society activists. Authorities held many such individuals for one or two days and released them. Political prisoners and detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or detainees, and prison authorities arbitrarily denied access to political prisoners. There were reports police beat and physically abused political and civil society activists while they were in detention.

On January 27, a Chiredzi magistrate convicted four Chingwizi internally displaced persons (IDPs) on charges of committing public violence stemming from an altercation with police officers in August 2014, and sentenced them to five years in prison. Credible NGOs issued statements that at least one of the IDPs, Mike Mudyanembwa, was not present during the altercation and that the government falsely charged him. According to these NGOs, the underlying reason for his incarceration was his efforts to mobilize the community of IDPs in opposition to resettlement without compensation. The four remained incarcerated at year’s end.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Civil judicial procedures allow for an independent and impartial judiciary, but the judiciary was subject to political influence and intimidation, particularly in cases involving high-ranking government officials, politically connected individuals, or individuals and organizations seeking remedies for violations of human rights.

Lack of judicial and police resources contributed to problems enforcing domestic court orders.

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Property Restitution

The constitution stipulates the government must compensate persons for improvements made on land subsequently taken by the government, but does not set a timeline for the delivery of compensation. The government rarely provided restitution or compensation for the taking of private property, and police did not take action against individuals who seized private property without having secured sanction from the state to do so.

Support was uneven and inconsistent for households resettled from the allocated diamond mining grounds of Marange in Chiadzwa to a government-owned agricultural estate outside Mutare. As of year’s end, authorities had relocated more than 1,800 families, including dozens who did not obtain houses. Each household was entitled to receive $1,000 for relocation, although reportedly only a handful received the money. Most of the relocated families did not receive any compensation, while the government classified them as “people with no recognizable legal rights or claim to the land that they are occupying,” citing their former land as now state land, despite customary and traditional rights to the contrary. The government did not complete appraisal of the land and property lost by each family for the purpose of property restitution. In addition an estimated 2,510 families remained without a timeframe or destination for their impending relocation.

The government also failed to compensate most of the IDPs relocated forcefully from the Tokwe-Mukosi area during flooding in February 2014. Approximately 3,125 families were legally entitled to compensation. f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution and law prohibit such actions, but the government did not respect these prohibitions. Government officials pressured local chiefs and ZANU-PF loyalists to monitor and report on persons suspected of supporting political parties other than ZANU-PF. The government forcibly displaced persons from their homes. Government entities manipulated the distribution of government-provided food aid, agricultural inputs, and access to other government assistance programs to exclude suspected MDC supporters and to compel support for ZANU-PF.

The law permits the interception and monitoring of any communication (including telephone, postal mail, e-mail, and internet traffic) in the course of transmission

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 14 through a telecommunication, postal, or other system in the country. Civil liberties advocates claimed the government used the law to stifle freedom of speech and target political and civil society activists.

According to local human rights and humanitarian NGOs, sporadic evictions continued during the year. In January police evicted approximately 400 families from farms in Mazowe. Media reported the evictions were carried out to accommodate plans to expand the first family’s holdings in the area.

Land seizures remained a serious problem. According to the attorney general and Ministry of Lands, every white-owned farm in the country was gazetted (officially announced as available in state media) and effectively state property. According to the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe, after a property was gazetted, it was transferred to a politically connected individual at the first available opportunity. The exact number of remaining white commercial farmers was unknown; those remaining continued to be targeted, harassed, and threatened with eviction by farm beneficiaries, unemployed youth, and individuals hired by those standing to benefit. Abuse of the land reform laws continued, with invasions and seizures of noncommercial land on the privately owned wildlife conservancies in Masvingo Province and with the collusion of high-ranking government officials and provincial ZANU-PF party structures and leaders.

White-owned farms were gazetted and almost all forcibly seized. Title deed holders who lost their homes or properties--where most of their life earnings were invested--were not compensated. Approximately 180 to 230 farmers accepted a settlement worth 5 to 10 percent of the value of their investment. As a result, like their former farm workers whom the new beneficiaries of the farms evicted, there were scores of destitute elderly former farmers.

Farm allocations continued to be politicized and used as a reward for political support to ZANU-PF. Beneficiaries divided many reallocated farms near cities for sale as small residential lots and sold them for personal gain without any compensation to the title deed holders.

In August 2014 Raymond Ndhlukula, deputy chief secretary in the president’s office, seized a farm near Figtree, Matabeleland South, while police watched. David Conolly, the lawful owner of the property, approached the courts for protection and received a high court injunction against the seizure. When Conolly confronted Ndhlukula about the high court order, Conolly alleged Ndhlukula stated he was a senior civil servant and “white people could not come before the courts of

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Zimbabwe regarding land matters.” Ndhlukula’s workers camped out on the property, intimidating Conolly and eventually forcing him off the property. Conolly filed an urgent High Court application regarding the seizure of his farm, and Ndhlukula was found to be in contempt of the court order. Ndhlukula appealed the High Court decision, however, and the matter was pending in the Supreme Court and numerous lower courts at year’s end.

There were other reports of farmers forced off their farms, despite being in possession of a court order allowing them to remain on the property, and denied the opportunity to collect their personal belongings. Black farm workers on white- owned farms were beaten, intimidated, or displaced. Police in most cases did not intervene while invaders and looters carried on their activities, nor did police enforce court judgments evicting squatters on illegally seized properties.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, but the law limits these freedoms in the “interest of defense, public safety, public order, state economic interests, public morality, and public health.” The government continued to arrest, detain, and harass critics, and journalists practiced self-censorship.

Freedom of Speech and Expression: Security authorities continued to restrict freedom of speech and arrest individuals, particularly those who made or publicized comments critical of President Mugabe or made political statements opposing ZANU-PF or the government’s agenda. CIO agents and informers routinely monitored political and other meetings. Authorities targeted persons deemed to be critical of the government for harassment, abduction, interrogation, and physical abuse.

The ZLHR stated that by June it had assisted more than 110 individuals whom police had arrested for violating Section 33 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, which authorities routinely invoked against political and human rights activists as well as ordinary citizens for allegedly undermining the authority of or insulting the president.

On January 28, the Constitutional Court dismissed cases brought by the state against several citizens for insulting the president, including against MDC-T Secretary General Douglas Mwonzora. The ZLHR challenged the constitutionality

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 16 of section 33. On April 15, Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa stated that the state would continue enforcing the law. In 2014 the court ruled that section 33 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act violated sections of the previous constitution--which was still being applied to cases filed prior to the enactment of the 2013 constitution--as did section 31, which criminalizes publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the state. In previous years authorities arrested and charged several journalists under the criminal code.

Press and Media Freedoms: The government continued to restrict freedom of the press. The Ministry of Media, Information, and Publicity continued to exercise control over the state-run media. High-ranking ZANU-PF officials used these media to threaten violence against critics of the government.

Despite threats and pressure from the government, independent newspapers continued to operate. The Zimbabwe Media Commission, which conducts media regulation, registration, and accreditation, licensed independent newspapers and magazines. During the year authorities threatened independent media vendors and confiscated copies of their newspapers. Security services also prevented print journalists from covering events that would expose government excesses.

On June 23, freelance journalist Patrick Chitongo was convicted and sentenced to several months in prison for publishing The Southern Mirror newspaper without a registration certificate, a requirement under section 72 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. On July 2, Chitongo was released on $200 bail pending the outcome of his appeal.

On July 27, police barred journalists from the independent newspaper Daily News from covering an event presided over by First Lady Grace Mugabe in Mazowe.

The government appeared to relax accreditation laws previously used to prevent international media organizations’ entry into the country, if those outlets were perceived to be critical of authorities. International media outlets such as CNN, al- Jazeera, and the BBC continued to operate in the country.

Radio remained the principal medium of public communication, particularly for the rural majority. Star FM and ZiFM, both radio stations with close links to ZANU-PF and licensed to operate, continued broadcast operations. Despite their perceived allegiance to ZANU-PF, the two stations continued to include independent voices in their programming. In early March the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) licensed eight additional radio stations following its

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 17 invitation for applications in early 2012. All of the companies that received licenses had close links to ZANU-PF, and none of the owners had a history of editorial independence.

The government did not license any community radio stations during the year despite previous years’ promises by government officials to do so. Authorities routinely harassed individuals and organizations that announced intentions to start community radio initiatives.

On June 15, police questioned Wilson Maposa, producer with Wezhira Community Radio Initiative, on suspicion that the initiative owned broadcasting equipment. According to the Broadcasting Services Act, it is illegal to broadcast without a license issued by BAZ. Two weeks later, two unarmed police officers visited the radio initiative’s offices and conducted a search but found no broadcasting equipment. Wezhira officials stated, however, that police threatened to return, seize their equipment, and close them down.

The government-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, the country’s only domestically based television broadcasting station, operated two television channels. International satellite television broadcasts were available through private firms but were too expensive for most citizens.

Violence and Harassment: Security forces arbitrarily harassed and arrested journalists who reported unfavorably on government policies or security operations. Senior ZANU-PF officials also criticized local and foreign independent media for allegedly biased reporting that discredited the president and misrepresented the country’s political and economic conditions.

On February 20, photojournalist Angela Jimu served the Ministry of Home Affairs with a letter of intention to sue police for unlawful assault and arrest. In August 2014 police assaulted and detained Jimu, who was covering an opposition party- led demonstration and photographing efforts by police to suppress the demonstration, including by assault on and arrest of demonstrators. Police seized her camera and later released Jimu without charge and returned her camera.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The government continued to use the law to control media content and the licensing of journalists, although many provisions of the law are inconsistent with the constitution. The main provisions of the law give the government extensive powers to control the media and suppress free speech by

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On May 28, then Minister of Media, Information, and Broadcasting Services threatened to use legal instruments to force journalists to observe ethical practices. Moyo’s threats came days after a story by the privately owned Newsday newspaper alleging that the president owed businessman Ray Kaukonde $30 million. Moyo accused Newsday of using invented sources to support falsehoods and said the fabrications appeared aimed at inciting public disaffection against President Mugabe.

Libel/Slander Laws: The constitutional court ruled that the previous constitution outlaws criminal defamation. Civil defamation laws remain in force, and criminal defamation laws remain on the statute books. The criminal code makes it an offense to publish or communicate false statements prejudicial to the state. The law allows authorities to monitor and censor “the publication of false statements that will engender feelings of hostility towards--or cause hatred, contempt, or ridicule of--the president or acting president.” Any person who “insults the president or communicates falsehoods” is subject to imprisonment.

Newspapers also exercised self-censorship due to government intimidation and the prospect of prosecution under criminal libel laws.

National Security: The law grants the government a wide range of legal powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined. For example, the extremely broad Official Secrets Act makes it a crime to divulge any information acquired in the course of official duties. Authorities used these laws to restrict publication of information that criticized government policies or public officials.

On June 24, government-controlled media quoted legal experts issuing threats to former presidential affairs minister for breaching the Official Secrets Act after he disclosed to the independent media operations of some state security agents. Section 4 of the Official Secrets Act makes it a criminal offense for any person to disclose a secret official code, document, or other information that has been entrusted in confidence to that person in the service of the state.

Internet Freedom

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The law permits the government to monitor all communications in the country, including internet transmissions, and the government sometimes restricted access to the internet. For example the government blocked Blackberry’s internet services for Zimbabwean-registered Blackberries, including its encrypted messaging service that prevented enforcement of the law allowing the government to intercept and monitor communications.

Despite the restrictive environment for the traditional media, internet and mobile telephone communication in the country were widely available and nominally free from government interference.

Although there was no concrete evidence of systematic internet filtering in the country, Freedom House reported some instances of surveillance and censorship.

On May 29, the state withdrew charges against Edmund Kudzayi, who was arrested in June on charges of “attempting to subvert a constitutionally elected government or alternatively attempting to commit an act of insurgency, banditry, sabotage, or terrorism.” The charges stemmed from posts he allegedly made on Facebook using an account in the name Baba Jukwa. Authorities also charged Kudzayi with undermining the president’s authority.

According to the International Telecommunication Union, 18.5 percent of the population used the internet in 2013, although many more individuals might have had access through their mobile phones.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government continued to restrict academic freedom. The president is the chancellor of all eight state-run universities and appoints their vice chancellors. The government has oversight of higher education policy at public universities, and ZANU-PF controls the Ministry of Higher Education. The law restricts the independence of universities, subjecting them to government influence and extending the disciplinary powers of university authorities over staff and students.

CIO personnel at times assumed faculty and other positions or posed as students at public and some private universities to intimidate and gather intelligence on faculty and students who criticized government policies and actions. CIO officers regularly attended classes in which noted MDC activists were lecturers or students. In response both faculty and students often practiced self-censorship.

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State-run universities frequently cancelled scheduled events organized by foreign embassies and refused public lectures by foreign diplomats.

The government on occasion restricted human rights activists from using cultural platforms to criticize the ruling party, the president, or political violence.

Authorities continued a ban on the low budget film “Kumasowe” because the film dealt with a “sensitive issue.” The film documented the highly publicized violent clashes between members of a religious group and police officers in May 2014.

The Zimbabwe Censorship Board maintained its ban on the foreign-funded performance of the award winning play No Voice, No Choice. Authorities banned the play in 2012, and an appeal to the Supreme Court remained pending. b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right.

The Public Order and Security Act requires that organizers notify police of their intention to hold a public gathering--defined as 15 or more individuals--seven days in advance. Failure to do so may result in criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law also allows police to prohibit a gathering based on security concerns but requires police to file an affidavit in a magistrates court stating the reasons behind the denial. Although many groups did not seek permits, other groups informed police of their planned events and the police either denied permission or gave no response.

Authorities often denied requests by civil society, trade unions, or political parties other than ZANU-PF to hold public events if the agenda conflicted with ZANU-PF policy positions. There were few reports of political rallies interrupted by opposing political parties.

On January 24, police in Bulawayo blocked a Gukurahundi memorial prayer event. According to press reports, police had earlier prohibited the public gathering because of the risk that it would create public disorder. Organizers attempted to hold the event anyway, and riot police dispersed them.

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ZANU-PF trained and deployed youths and war veterans to harass and disrupt the activities of MDC members, labor groups, student movements, civic groups, and journalists considered critical of ZANU-PF.

Freedom of Association

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. Although the government did not restrict the formation of political parties or unions, security forces and ZANU-PF supporters continued to interfere with their activities. ZANU-PF supporters, sometimes with government support or acquiescence, intimidated and abused members of organizations perceived to be associated with other political parties. Persons suspected of being security force members visited the offices and inquired into the activities of churches, numerous NGOs, and other organizations believed to oppose government policies. Organizations generally were free of governmental interference only if the government viewed their activities as apolitical or supportive of ZANU-PF. c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/. d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government restricted these rights. The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern, but it interfered with some humanitarian efforts directed at IDPs.

In-country Movement: Police made in-country movement difficult by regularly mounting checkpoints nationwide along most major routes. In urban areas a single road could have several roadblocks in the span of a few miles. Despite court injunctions against “on-the-spot” fines, police levied fines for minor offenses ranging from five to several hundred dollars and demanded immediate payment. Pro-ZANU-PF police chiefs retained and failed to account for money collected at checkpoints. Prior to elections in 2013, the finance minister reported to parliament

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 22 that the treasury had not received revenue expected from police fines. Government officials criticized a subsequent High Court pronouncement that police must transfer collected fines to the treasury.

Foreign Travel: The constitution provides the right for Zimbabwean citizens to enter and leave the country, and the right to a passport or other travel documents. In practice the Office of the Registrar General imposed administrative obstacles in the passport application process for citizens entitled to dual citizenship, particularly Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizenship. Despite high profile cases in which courts confirmed the rights of Zimbabweans to hold dual citizenship, many poorer citizens could not afford the legal costs of appealing passport and travel document denials.

Exile: The constitution prohibits expulsion from the country for all citizens. Nevertheless a number of persons, including former government officials, prominent businessmen, human rights activists, MDC-T/N members, and human rights lawyers, left the country and remained in self-imposed exile due to fear of persecution.

Citizenship: The constitution provides for three different classes of citizenship: by birth, by descent, or by registration. The government deprived some sectors of the population of citizenship rights based on the law, which revokes the citizenship of persons who fail to return to the country in any five-year period.

Despite a constitutional provision of citizenship and having voted previously, some persons were denied the right to vote during the 2013 elections because they could not adequately demonstrate their citizenship. In contravention of a 2002 High Court ruling that overturned laws barring dual citizenship, independent groups estimated that as many as two million citizens might have been disenfranchised, including those perceived to have anti-ZANU-PF leanings, such as the more than 200,000 former commercial farm workers from neighboring countries and approximately 30,000 mostly white dual nationals.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center’s 2009 estimate, approximately 600,000 persons remained displaced because of government policies, including state-sponsored election-related violence, land reform, and Operation Murambatsvina (the government’s evictions of citizens from nonfarming areas in 2005). According to a 2010 assessment, Murambatsvina was

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 23 the cause of displacement for approximately one-third of the IDPs. More recent estimates were unavailable due to the government’s sensitivity about the problem. Until 2009 the government denied the existence of any IDPs.

In 2014 approximately 15,000 persons were displaced from the vicinity of the Tokwe-Mukosi dam in Masvingo Province. Authorities moved the IDPs to the Chingwizi transit camp, which lacked adequate shelter, food, and water. There were also inadequate health, educational, and sanitation facilities in the camp. In August 2014 the government barred humanitarian organizations and NGOs from entering the camp while it embarked on a two-week program of forced resettlement. There were reports that the government denied the IDPs food, water, and sanitation facilities for two days and that it assaulted IDPs in Chingwizi in order to force them to move. The permanent resettlement area had inadequate infrastructure to support thousands of persons forcefully moved there. According to a credible NGO, food assistance was last made available to the IDPs in December 2014, and water, shelter, and adequate schools continued to be lacking.

Other recent documented displacements were from disputed farming areas. At year’s end several thousand households in disputed farming areas were at risk of displacement due to verifiable threats or eviction notices. Most of the persons displaced had resided on their land for years without formal offer letters or title deeds. Eviction notices often were served in the presence of police or army personnel. The government’s campaign of forced evictions and the demolition of homes and businesses continued during the year under the land reform policy. The government provided no resettlement assistance to evicted families and depended primarily on international organizations to do so.

The overall rate of displacement remained steady, but IDPs from previous years remained in near-emergency conditions, with an overwhelming majority living without basic sanitation. In addition to improved living conditions, IDPs required regularization of their status. Without needing any official documentation, several generations of farm workers originally from neighboring countries previously resided in insular commercial farming communities that met their health, labor, and education needs.

Government-led humanitarian assistance programs were insufficient to meet the needs of targeted populations and subject to increased politicization during the year. Farm inputs and food aid occasionally were channeled through patronage networks or denied to those perceived as supporting ZANU-PF’s opponents.

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Despite this discrimination, the government generally cooperated with international agencies and NGOs providing humanitarian assistance.

Contractors and NGOs independent of the government that carried out food security and other assessments faced challenges in accessing certain rural districts. In isolated cases local authorities advised organizations against traveling to farms involved in ownership disputes, where aid workers might be at risk.

Protection of Refugees

Access to Asylum: The country’s laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. According to UNHCR, the country hosted approximately 9,700 refugees and asylum seekers during the year.

Refugee Abuse: The government maintained a formal encampment policy requiring refugees to live at the Tongogara refugee camp. Nevertheless more than 1,000 refugees lived in urban areas, including Harare and Bulawayo at year’s end. Refugees living in urban areas without the permission of the government remained at risk of arrest and return to the refugee camp.

Employment: Refugees in the informal sector had limited employment options due to the encampment policy requiring all refugees to reside in the Tongogara refugee camp. Refugees with specialized skills, such as lawyers, laboratory technicians, nurses, and doctors, were allowed to obtain work permits and even to work for the government.

Durable Solutions: While the government did not accept refugees from foreign countries for resettlement, it facilitated the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their home countries by recognizing the Voluntary Repatriation Declaration Form as a valid document for travel purposes. The government also conducted exemption interviews for Rwandan refugees who lost prima facie refugee status following implementation of the 2013 Rwandan cessation clause, which provides for refugee status to end once fundamental and durable changes have taken place in Rwanda and the circumstances that led to flight no longer exist. Many refugees were unwilling to return to their home countries voluntarily, and resettlement remained the only viable solution for many of them.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

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Although the constitution provides citizens with the right to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage, this right was restricted. The political process continued to be heavily biased in favor of the president’s ZANU-PF, which has dominated politics and government and manipulated electoral results since independence in 1980.

Both the ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC-T removed from their parties MPs accused of opposing their respective leaders.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: Aside from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), international and local independent observers characterized the 2013 harmonized presidential, parliamentary, and local elections as largely free of violence but not a credible reflection of the people’s will. Before the election, various political parties and civil society organizations complained of widespread voter disenfranchisement in opposition urban strongholds. The Constitutional Court set the 2013 date for elections. Participating political parties, including the two MDCs that were part of the coalition government, contested the date in court. ZANU-PF ministers in government opposed and stalled the pre-election legal, political, media, and security sector reforms mandated by the SADC-sponsored Global Political Agreement. Parliament failed to pass laws promoting the fairness of the election, while certain government elements failed to implement other election laws. Despite a constitutional provision of citizenship, large sections of the population were refused registration as voters because of their foreign ancestry. Other contraventions of the country’s electoral act included a truncated special voter registration period, partisan public statements by senior security force officers, and active-duty police officers running for public office in contravention of the law.

While the law obliges traditional chiefs to be impartial, in rural areas ZANU-PF used traditional leaders to mobilize voters and canvass support. In return traditional leaders continued to receive farms, vehicles, houses, and other benefits.

The credibility and independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was called into question for allegedly being composed largely of personnel from the pro-ZANU-PF security sector. The ZEC failed to provide an electronic copy of the voter register to any of the opposition political parties as required by law but managed to supply one hard copy of the voters roll to the MDC-T late on election day. The ZEC also failed to respond, as required by law, to legal and formal

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 26 complaints by opposition parties with respect to its role in monitoring the media, postal voting procedures, and the number of ballot papers printed and distributed. When the ZEC released the election results, Mugabe won with more than 61 percent of the vote, and he was inaugurated three weeks later. Mugabe’s ZANU- PF party won a two-thirds majority in the 350-member parliament, resulting in a unitary ZANU-PF government weeks after his inauguration. The SADC declared the election free, and the AU followed suit.

Other problems with the elections included restrictions on non-ZANU-PF party candidates, domestic media bias in favor of ZANU-PF, denial of permission for some foreign journalists to cover the elections, the failure of the registrar general and the ZEC to provide for open inspection of voter rolls, the courts’ failure to settle electoral matters before the elections’ date, and numerous discrepancies with the voter register, such as registration patterns between urban and rural areas, questionably large numbers of voters older than 100, and very low numbers of youths.

ZEC held numerous by-elections during the year. Most observers found that polling days were peaceful and that ZEC administered them well. Numerous irregularities undermined the credibility of the elections, however, including efforts by some traditional leaders to coerce and intimidate their communities into voting for ZANU-PF candidates, sporadic violence and intimidation in the pre-election environment, media coverage skewed toward ZANU-PF, police presence inside polling stations, and allegations of vote buying.

The June 10 by-election in Hurungwe West constituency, for example, was marred by reports of violence and intimidation during the pre-election period. The contest pitted ousted ZANU-PF MP Temba Mliswa running as an independent against ZANU-PF’s candidate Keith Guzah. ZANU-PF supporters assaulted and intimidated Mliswa’s supporters, including his farmworkers. Senior ZANU-PF officials also warned traditional leaders not to associate with Mliswa, and ZANU- PF supporters assaulted at least two headmen during a public gathering to reinforce the message. Based on its investigation, the ZHRC concluded the possibility of a truly free and fair election in Hurungwe West was “remote.”

Political Parties and Political Participation: Although the constitution allows for multiple parties, elements within ZANU-PF and the security forces intimidated and committed abuses against other parties and their supporters and obstructed their activities. In contravention of the law, active members of the police and army

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 27 openly campaigned for and ran as ZANU-PF candidates in the elections. The government routinely interfered with MDC-T-led local governments.

Participation of Women and Minorities: Women remained largely underrepresented in local and national politics, and men overwhelmingly held most senior positions in the public sector. Following the 2013 elections, women filled three of 26 cabinet minister positions in the cabinet, or 11.5 percent of ministers, well below their 52 percent share of the population, as recorded in the 2012 census, and well below the equal representation required by the constitution. Women held three of 13 ministers of state positions and five of 24 deputy minister positions. NGOs also noted the cabinet minister positions occupied by women were less influential. Sixty women were elected to the House of Assembly through proportional representation in accordance with the constitution, increasing women’s share of seats from 20 percent to 35 percent.

The same pattern existed for rural and urban councils. Women were elected to only 323 of 1,958 councilor positions nationwide in 2013, for 16 percent representation. Men also dominated the judiciary, with less than a third of Supreme Court and high court judges being women, as well as a minority among judicial officers, such as prosecutors, in lower courts.

The ZANU-PF congress allotted women one-third of party positions and reserved 50 positions for women on the party’s 180-member central committee, which was one of the party’s most powerful organizations. NGOs noted that young women were mostly excluded from decision-making structures and processes in all political parties. In December 2014 Vice President Joice Mujuru was also ousted from ZANU-PF and replaced by a man.

The constitution guarantees specific political rights for all citizens. Laws, however, are not fully consistent with the constitution, and allow discrimination in voter registration to continue. Authorities treat citizens with dual citizenship claims as “aliens.” These citizens must overcome administrative obstacles in order to renounce their foreign citizenship, which is required before they may register to vote.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively or impartially, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Despite government pronouncements,

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Corruption: Corruption occurred at every level of the police force but took different forms, depending on position, rank, or location. At the junior levels, to augment their low salaries, corrupt officers extorted nominal to exorbitant fines from the public for various claimed offenses. Armed police routinely erected roadblocks, claiming to be looking for criminals or smuggled goods. In many cases police arbitrarily seized goods for their own consumption or extracted bribes from commuters. Municipal police in urban areas often raided vendors and confiscated their wares for personal use. Generally no records of the confiscated goods existed, despite the law’s requiring it. In August the courts ordered municipal police to compensate vendors whose wares were confiscated but unaccounted for in official records.

Implementation of the government’s redistribution of expropriated white-owned commercial farms often favored the ZANU-PF elite and continued to lack transparency (see section 1.f.). High-level ZANU-PF officials selected numerous farms and registered them in the names of family members to evade the government’s policy of one farm per official. The government continued to allow individuals aligned with top officials to seize land not designated for acquisition. The government had yet to issue the mandated comprehensive land audit to reflect land ownership accurately.

Senior executives in state-owned enterprises earned salaries and benefits up to $500,000 per month. The government alleged corruption and misuse of public funds in the Public Service Medical Aid Society (a medical insurance company), the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, the Grain Marketing Board, Air Zimbabwe, and Harare City Council, among others. The individuals implicated were politically well connected, and state prosecutors brought only one of the cases--the Air Zimbabwe case--to trial. The case continued as of September.

There were reports that ZANU-PF officials in the government discriminated against, harassed, or removed persons perceived to be MDC supporters from the civil service and the military (see section 7.d.).

It remained common for the ZANU-PF minister of local government to appoint ZANU-PF supporters to bureaucratic positions in local governments. City public administrators reportedly earned hugely inflated salaries. In most rural areas, the

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Unqualified persons employed by the Public Service Commission remained on the state payroll. The majority served as Youth and Gender Officers in various ministries and other public entities. According to the most recent audit, illicit salary payments were made to large numbers of persons who were retired, deceased, or otherwise absent from their place of employment. Duplicate personally identifiable information and files were also uncovered indicating some persons received more than one salary.

Corruption was especially pervasive in local government, where officials abused their positions and government resources openly and with impunity. Local councilors’ allocation of land lots for residential and commercial use led to numerous allegations of bribery attempts and rent-seeking opportunities. Police arrested and charged some low-level land barons but not politicians benefiting from the deals. Government officials also demanded bribes or excessive fees for “expediting” paperwork, including birth certificates, passports, and driver’s licenses. Councilors practiced nepotism in hiring general council workers and in land allocation. Allegations of corruption continued regarding both ZANU-PF and MDC-T councilors. Most council employees were members of the political party dominating that council.

Prosecutions for corruption continued but were selective and generally seen as politically motivated. The government targeted MDC-T officials, persons who had fallen out of favor with ZANU-PF, and individuals without high-level political backing.

Financial Disclosure: The law does not require elected or appointed officials to disclose income or assets. While government policy requires officials to disclose interests in transactions that form part of their public mandate, this policy was not enforced.

Public Access to Information: Citizens generally were unable to access government information. Although the government asserted that the law intended to improve public access to government information, the law contains provisions that restrict freedom of speech and press, and these elements of the law were the ones the government enforced most vigorously. The Access to Information and

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Protection of Privacy Act restricts the information citizens may request from public offices. During parliamentary debate about the Reserve Bank Debt Assumption Bill, opposition MPs requested that bank administrators disclose the list of persons who benefitted from the state loans. They responded it was not in the public’s interest to disclose such information.

While the law permits access to some government records, it also imposes nominal fees for administrative costs involved in retrieving the records that many citizens found burdensome. In addition citizens often faced burdensome and complicated regulations to obtain access to government buildings where records are kept, including parliament, where security officers often turned away citizens for “wrong dress.”

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Such groups were subject to government restrictions, interference, monitoring, confiscation of materials and documentation, and other forms of harassment. Major domestic NGOs included the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ZLHR, Zimbabwe Peace Project, ZimRights, National Constitutional Assembly, Students Solidarity Trust, and Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise.

The government harassed NGOs it believed would expose abuses by government personnel or which opposed government policies, and it continued to use government-controlled media to disparage and attack human rights groups. Articles typically dismissed the efforts and recommendations of NGOs that criticized the government, and their authors charged that the real NGO agenda was regime change.

Police arrested or detained local NGO members and harassed their leaders, often in connection with NGO meetings or demonstrations.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The ZHRC remained underfunded but managed to fulfill some of its constitutionally mandated functions. For example, the ZHRC investigated allegations of pre-election violence and intimidation in the Hurungwe West constituency ahead of the June 10 by-elections. Their report detailed that “high levels of repression, threats, intimidation, and violence” were

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 31 affecting the right of citizens to vote for non-ZANU-PF candidates and concluded that the possibility of a free and fair election in the constituency was remote. The ZHRC also directed the ZRP commissioner general to investigate the suspected criminal violations of human rights that occurred in Hurungwe West.

The constitution called for the Organ of National Healing, a ZANU-PF-connected, organization based in the Office of the President to evolve into a neutral peace and reconciliation commission. Due to a lack of political will and funding, the commission had not been formed by year’s end.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The constitution’s bill of rights provides that no person may be deprived of fundamental rights, such as the right to life, personal liberty, security of person, freedom of assembly and association, equality, and political and socioeconomic rights. It prohibits discrimination based on one’s race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, color, creed, gender, or disability. The bill of rights may not be arbitrarily amended and, in the section on the rights of women, states that all “laws, customs, traditions, and practices that infringe the rights of women conferred by this constitution are void to the extent of the infringement.” Nevertheless, discrimination against women and persons with disabilities persisted. The government and ZANU-PF continued to infringe on the right to due process, citizenship, and property ownership in ways that affected the white minority disproportionately.

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: While the law criminalizes rape, including spousal rape, the law was not effectively enforced, and rape remained a widespread problem. Sexual offenses, including rape, are punishable by lengthy prison sentences, although women’s organizations stated that the sentences of those convicted were inconsistent. Rape victims seldom received protection in court.

Victims reported few cases of rape due to social stigma and societal perceptions that rape was simply a “fact of life” that could not be challenged. A lack of services for rape victims also discouraged reporting. Victims reported even fewer cases of spousal rape because of fear of losing economic support, fear of reprisal, lack of awareness that spousal rape was a crime, police reluctance to be involved in domestic disputes, and bureaucratic hurdles. Most rural citizens were unfamiliar with laws against domestic violence and sexual offenses. Chiefs of local

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Police sometimes did not act on reported rape cases if the perpetrators were aligned with ZANU-PF or if the rape was used as a political tool against non-ZANU-PF members, as occurred during the 2008 election. Unlike the 2008 elections, which resulted in numerous cases of politically motivated gang rapes, there were very few reports of rape used as a political weapon during the 2013 elections period.

The media frequently published stories criticizing rape and reporting convictions. In September the Chronicle newspaper reported that a Harare magistrate sentenced Greatness Tapfuma, a prominent local pastor, to 30 years in prison for raping a female minor. During the sentencing the magistrate expressed concern regarding the prevalence of rape cases committed by religious leaders. In May a man age 19 was sentenced to 210 hours of community service for impregnating a girl age 12.

Children born from rape suffered stigmatization and marginalization. The mothers of children resulting from rape sometimes were reluctant to register the births, and such children did not have access to social services.

The adult rape clinics in public hospitals in Harare and Mutare were run as NGOs and did not receive a substantial amount of financial support from the Ministry of Health. The clinics received referrals from police and NGOs. They administered HIV tests, provided medication for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and provided medical services for pregnancy. Although police referred the majority of reported rapes of women and men who received services from the rape centers for prosecution, very few were prosecuted. Private clinics and clinics supported by NGOs and bilateral and multilateral development partners emerged in the past few years to provide medical assistance to survivors of rape. There were also NGOs that provided psychosocial support to survivors of sexual and gender- based violence through assistance from the Integrated Support Program, a multidonor effort funded by international aid donors and managed by the UN Population Fund.

In June 2014 the government launched an anti-rape campaign that included a national action plan to combat the problem. The plan focuses on rape prevention services, researching the problem, and increasing coordination between government agencies and civic groups working on the problem. Women’s organizations contended that the government was not likely to implement the plan due to resource constraints.

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Gender-based violence was prevalent in society. The law criminalizes domestic violence, which was a serious problem, especially intimate partner violence perpetrated by men against women. Although domestic violence is punishable by a fine and a maximum prison sentence of 10 years, authorities generally considered it a private matter, so prosecution was rare. Most cases of domestic violence went unreported due to traditional sensitivities, victims’ fear of abandonment without support, police reluctance to intervene, and the expectation that perpetrators would not be tried or convicted. There were newspaper reports of wife killings and a few other media reports of prosecutions and convictions for such crimes.

The joint government-NGO Anti-Domestic Violence Council as a whole was ineffective due to lack of funding and the unavailability of information on prevailing trends of domestic violence, although its members were active in raising domestic violence awareness.

The government continued a public awareness campaign against domestic violence. Several women’s rights groups worked with law enforcement agencies and provided training and literature on domestic violence as well as shelters and counseling for women. The high turnover rate within the police force demanded a continuous level of training that could not be met. While public awareness increased, other problems emerged. For example, the form required to report domestic violence was difficult to complete, and victims were often required to make their own photocopies due to police budgetary constraints. The law requires victims of any form of violence to produce a police report to receive treatment without cost at government health facilities. This requirement prevented many rape victims from receiving necessary medical treatment, including postexposure prophylaxis to prevent victims from contracting HIV.

A local NGO, Musasa Project, which provides emergency shelter and related services for women, handled a monthly average of 1,684 cases of violence against women. Musasa reported that 77 percent of their clients were girls under age 18.

The Judicial Service Commission established a Multi-Sectoral Protocol on Sexual Abuse in 2012 in partnership with 11 government bodies. The protocol details the respective roles and responsibilities of different government agencies in responding to adult and child sexual and gender-based violence cases. The government must rely upon external funding and assistance to implement the protocol.

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Other Harmful Traditional Practices: Virginity testing, although reportedly decreasing, continued to occur in some parts the country during the year.

Sexual Harassment: The law does not criminalize sexual harassment, but labor law prohibits the practice in the workplace. Media reported that sexual harassment was prevalent in universities, workplaces, and parliament. In October, Patrick Ndhlovu, a Zimbabwe Power Company supervisor, appeared before a Mbare magistrate’s court on charges of indecent assault after allegations that he used his position to threaten and sexually harass female subordinates. On December 5, Mbare Magistrate Zihove ruled the prosecution had failed to prove its case and acquitted Zdhlovu.

Reproductive Rights: Couples and individuals have the right to decide the number, spacing, and timing of their children; manage their reproductive health; and have access to the information and means to do so, free from discrimination, coercion, and violence. According to the 2014 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the contraceptive prevalence rate was 67 percent. The adolescent birth rate was estimated at 112 per 1,000 for women and girls ages 15 to 19 from 1999 to 2012. Inadequate medical facilities, an advanced HIV/AIDS epidemic, poorly trained health-care professionals, and a shortage of health professionals contributed to a high maternal mortality rate of 470 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2013. The MICS reported that maternal health improved significantly between 2010 and 2014. Antenatal care attendance and skilled birth attendance increased to 94 percent and 80 percent respectively. While antenatal care attendance was almost the same between rural and urban areas, skilled birth attendance was much lower in rural areas, 75 percent compared with 93 percent in urban areas. No information was available on whether women were equally diagnosed and treated for sexually transmitted infections.

Discrimination: The law provides for the same legal status and rights for women as for men. Despite laws aimed at enhancing women’s rights and countering certain discriminatory traditional practices, however, women remained disadvantaged in society. Economic dependency and prevailing social norms prevented rural women in particular from combating societal discrimination.

The law recognizes a woman’s right to own property, but very few women did so because of patriarchal inheritance rights under customary practice. Less than 20 percent of female farmers were official landowners or named on government lease agreements, although there was improvement in the registration of women as landowners during the year. Divorce and maintenance laws were equitable, but

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 35 many women lacked awareness of their rights. Women have the right to register their children’s births, although either the father or a male relative must be present. Discrimination with respect to women’s employment also occurred (see section 7.d.).

Women and children were adversely affected by the government’s forced evictions, demolition of homes and businesses, and takeover of commercial farms. Widows, when forced to relocate to rural areas, were sometimes “inherited” into marriages with an in-law after the deaths of their spouses.

The government gave qualified women access to training in the armed forces and national service, where they continued to occupy primarily administrative positions.

The United Kingdom Department for International Development’s 2011 Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis Report reported that women experienced extensive economic discrimination, including in access to employment, credit, pay, and owning or managing businesses. Despite being responsible for 53 percent of all economic activity in the country, including 75 percent of all agricultural labor, three-quarters of households headed by a woman were “poor” or “very poor.”

Children

Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from birth in the country and from either parent, and all births are to be registered with the Births and Deaths Registry. According to the 2012 government-led Demographic Health Survey (DHS), 17.7 percent of children under age two had a birth certificate and 39 percent had their births registered. The numbers increased with children’s age: 40.2 percent of children between the ages of two and four had birth certificates, and 56 percent had their birth registered. Children in urban and in wealthier households were more likely to have their birth registered than were children in rural households. Children under the care of parents older than age 20 were significantly more likely to have their births registered than were children of younger parents. Many orphaned children were unable to obtain birth certificates. Children of unregistered parents were also less likely to obtain birth certificates. Lack of birth certificates impeded access to public services, such as education and health care, resulting in many children being unable to attend school and increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.

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Education: Primary education is not compulsory, free, or universal. The constitution states that every citizen and permanent resident of the country has a right to a basic state-funded education but adds a caveat that the state “must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of the resources available to it.” According to the DHS, 94 percent of girls and 90 percent of boys between ages 10 and 14 attended primary school. School attendance was only slightly higher in urban than in rural areas, and enrollment for children older than 14 was in decline. Relatively high and increasing school fees were the main reason for lack of attendance after age 14, particularly affecting girls ages 17 and 18. Only 52 percent of girls age 17 attended school, compared with 64 percent of boys. Reports that schools turned away students with unpaid fees continued.

Child Abuse: Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, continued to be serious problems. In 2014 the NGO Childline counseled more than 16,000 children directly affected by abuse. Most of the substantive calls concerned sexual and physical abuse, generally inflicted by a relative or someone who lived with the child. Approximately twice as many girls reported abuse as boys. The ZRP stated there were reports of 1,494 juvenile rape cases between January and May 2014, and 3,297 reports of juvenile rape cases in 2013. According to the 2011 National Baseline Survey on Life Experiences of Adolescents Preliminary Report (NBSLEA), approximately 9 percent of girls and slightly less than 2 percent of boys between the ages of 13 and 17 reported experiencing sexual violence in the previous 12 months. Older adolescents reported that one-third of girls and nearly one-tenth of boys experienced sexual violence during childhood. The NBSLEA defined sexual violence as unwanted sexual touching, unwanted attempted sex, physically forced sex, and pressured sex.

It is legal for parents and schools to inflict corporal punishment on boys, but not girls. The constitution provides that “no person may be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” but the courts had not interpreted the clause and determined whether it applied to corporal punishment. The press quoted the deputy minister of primary and secondary education as stating that corporal punishment in schools was unconstitutional, but existing laws allowed for the practice.

Government efforts to combat child abuse continued to be inadequate and underfunded, but there were some improvements. In 2013 the government developed a case management protocol to guide the provision of child welfare services and began implementation of the policy during the year. In addition there were facilities that served underage victims of sexual assault and abuse.

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Early and Forced Marriage: Despite legal prohibitions, families primarily among the rural population continued to force girls to marry. Families gave young women to other families in marriage to avenge spirits, as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes, or when promised to others--to provide economic protection for the family. Some families sold their daughters as brides in exchange for food, and younger daughters at times married their deceased older sister’s husband as a “replacement” bride. An NGO study published in March 2014 found that because of the cultural emphasis placed on virginity, any loss of virginity--real or perceived, consensual or forced--could result in marriage, including early or forced marriage. In some instances family members forced a girl to marry a man based on the mere suspicion that the two had had sexual intercourse. This cultural practice even applied in cases of rape, and the study found numerous instances in which families concealed rape by facilitating the marriage between rapist and victim.

The legal age for a civil marriage is 18, but girls who are 16 and 17 may marry with parental approval. Customary marriage, recognized under the law, does not require a minimum marriage age for either boys or girls. The criminal code prohibits sexual relations with persons younger than age 18, however. According to the DHS study, 21.7 percent of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 were married. According to the 2014 MICS, 5 percent of girls and women ages 15-49 were married before 15, while 33 percent of women ages 20-49 were married before 18. Child welfare NGOs reported they occasionally saw evidence of underage marriages, particularly in isolated religious communities or among HIV/AIDS orphans who had no relatives willing or able to take care of them. The constitution declares anyone under age 18 a child, but the Customary Marriages Act was not amended to reflect the constitutional change.

On January 14, two women challenged the constitutionality of laws permitting child marriage before the Constitutional Court. During the hearing the chief justice indicated that the laws permitting the practice were clearly unconstitutional, but the court reserved judgement in the case and had yet to issue a formal ruling at year’s end.

On July 31, First Lady Grace Mugabe launched the Zimbabwean chapter of the AU Campaign to End Child Marriages. She called on the minister of justice and legal affairs to align marriage laws to the constitution and suggested stricter penalties for offenders. She also urged stakeholders to develop an action plan to end child marriages.

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Sexual Exploitation of Children: Statutory rape, legally defined as sexual intercourse with a child under age 12, carries a fine of $2,000, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. A person in possession of child pornography may be charged with public indecency and face a fine of $600, imprisonment up to six months, or both. A person procuring a child under age 16 for purposes of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct is liable to a fine up to $5,000 or imprisonment of up to 10 years, or both. Persons charged with facilitating the prostitution of a child often were also charged with statutory rape. A parent or guardian who causes or allows a child under age 18 to associate with or become a prostitute may face up to 10 years in prison. Girls from towns bordering South Africa, Zambia, and Mozambique were subjected to prostitution in brothels that catered to long- distance truck drivers.

Displaced Children: Approximately 10,000 children were displaced from the Tokwe-Mukosi dam area in Masvingo Province (see section 2.d.). The disruption of their parents’ livelihoods and health and education services affected these children negatively.

UNICEF’s 2005-10 report estimated that one-quarter of all children had lost one or both parents to HIV or other causes. The proportion of orphans in the country remained very high. The vast majority of orphans were cared for by their extended family or lived in households headed by children.

Orphaned children were more likely to be abused; not enrolled in school; suffer discrimination and social stigma; and be vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. Some children were forced to turn to prostitution for income. Orphaned children often were unable to obtain birth certificates because they could not provide enough information about their parents. Orphans often lived in the streets.

A UNICEF report stated that government support of the poor “suffered from a severe lack of human and financial resources” and was “in urgent need of review and revival to meet the growing needs of children.”

International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

Anti-Semitism

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The Jewish community numbered approximately 150 persons. There were no known reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

Persons with Disabilities

The constitution and law prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to public places, and the provision of services, including education and health care. The constitution and law do not specifically address air travel, other transportation, or health care. They do not specify physical, sensory, mental, or intellectual disabilities. NGOs continued to lobby to include persons with albinism in the definition of “disabled” under the law. Government institutions often were uninformed and did not implement the law. The lack of resources devoted to training and education severely hampered the ability of persons with disabilities to compete for scarce jobs. The law stipulates that government buildings be accessible to persons with disabilities, but implementation was slow. Persons with disabilities faced harsh societal discrimination and exclusion, as well as poor service delivery from state bodies. For example, the National Council for the Hard of Hearing reported that access to justice in courts was compromised for persons with hearing disabilities due to a lack of sign language interpreters. Persons with disabilities living in rural settings faced even greater challenges.

Although two senators were elected to represent persons with disabilities, parliament rarely addressed problems affecting persons with disabilities. Parliament does not provide specific line items for persons with disabilities in the various social service ministry budgets.

Most persons holding traditional beliefs viewed persons with disabilities as bewitched, and in extreme cases families hid children with disabilities from visitors. According to the National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped, the public considered persons with disabilities as objects of pity rather than persons with rights; they constituted a forgotten and invisible group.

There were very few government-sponsored education facilities dedicated to persons with disabilities. Educational institutions discriminated against children

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 40 with disabilities. Essential services, including sign language interpreters, Braille materials, and ramps, were not available, and prevented children with disabilities from attending school. Many schools refused to accept children with certain disabilities. Schools that accepted students with disabilities offered very little in the way of nonacademic facilities for those accepted as compared with their counterparts without disabilities. Many urban children with disabilities obtained informal education through private institutions, but these options were generally unavailable for persons with disabilities in rural areas. Government programs, such as the basic education assistance module, intended to benefit children with disabilities, failed to address adequately the root causes of their systematic exclusion. The National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped reported that 75 percent of children with disabilities had no access to education.

Persons with mental disabilities also suffered from inadequate medical care and a lack of health services. There were eight centralized mental health institutions in the country with a total capacity of more than 1,300 patients, in addition to the three special institutions run by the ZPCS for long-term patients and those considered dangerous to society. Inpatients in the eight centralized institutions received cursory screening, and most waited for at least one year for a full medical review.

A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals resulted in patients not being properly diagnosed and not receiving adequate therapy. There were four or fewer certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and teaching in the country. There was a 50 percent vacancy rate for psychiatric nurses. The mental institution in Bulawayo provided more than 90 percent of the available psychiatric services. NGOs reported that getting access to these services was slow and frustrating. NGOs reported that patients suffered from extremely poor living conditions due in part to shortages of food, water, clothing, and sanitation. Budgetary constraints and limited capacity at these institutions resulted in families keeping persons with mental disabilities at home, sometimes in chains and without treatment, and cared for by family.

Prison inmates in the three facilities run by the ZPCS were not necessarily convicted prisoners. Two doctors examined inmates with psychiatric conditions. The doctors were required to confirm a mental disability and recommend a patient for release or return to a mental institution. Prisoners with mental disabilities routinely waited as long as three years for evaluation.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 41

A five-year program launched in 2009 by the National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped provided civic education to persons with disabilities with the goal of encouraging greater civic participation. There were minimal legal or administrative safeguards to allow participation in the electoral processes by persons with disabilities. Administrative arrangements for voter registration at relevant government offices were burdensome, involving long queues, several hours or days of waiting, and necessary return visits, which effectively served to disenfranchise some persons with disabilities. The organizations reported that only 20 percent of eligible voters with disabilities had the identity documents required to vote. On election day in 2013, voting stations in many rural areas were in places inaccessible to persons with disabilities. The law permits blind persons to bring an individual to assist in marking their ballots, and therefore compromises ballot secrecy.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group makes up 82 percent of the population, Ndebele 14 percent, whites and Asians less than 1 percent, and other ethnic groups 3 percent. ZANU-PF leaders often encouraged hatred against whites through public speeches and other broadcasts. This created tension between ZANU-PF supporters and whites. Historical tension between the Shona majority and the Ndebele minority resulted in marginalization of the Ndebele by the Shona- dominated government. During the 2013 elections, the mainstream MDC-T often accused Welshman Ncube of the MDC-N (an Ndebele) of campaigning on a tribal platform. In turn the smaller MDC-N complained of continued victimization and neglect of the minority Ndebele by the Shona-dominated MDC-T and ZANU-PF.

The government continued its attempts to blame the country’s economic and political problems on the white minority and western countries. Police seldom arrested ZANU-PF supporters or charged them with infringing upon minority rights, particularly the property rights of the minority white commercial farmers or wildlife conservancy owners targeted in the land redistribution program.

The government enforced few of the provisions or timelines in the 2007 indigenization law, and no businesses were forced to transfer ownership. The law defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as any person, or the descendant of such person, who before the date of the country’s independence in 1980 was disadvantaged. The official purpose of the indigenization law was to increase the participation of indigenous citizens in the economy, including at least 51 percent

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 42 indigenous ownership of all businesses. Legal experts criticized the law as unfairly discriminatory and a violation of the constitution.

Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. According to the country’s criminal code, “any act involving physical contact between men that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” carries a penalty of up to one year in prison or a fine up to $5,000. Despite that, there were no known cases of prosecutions of consensual same-sex sexual activity. Common law prevents gay men and, to a lesser extent, lesbians from fully expressing their sexual orientation. In some cases it criminalizes the display of affection between men.

The president and ZANU-PF leaders publicly criticized the LGBTI community. On September 28, the president stated, “we are not gays” during his remarks at the UN General Assembly and rejected the promotion of LGBTI rights, which he said were contrary to the country’s values, norms, traditions, and beliefs.

Members of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), the primary organization dedicated to advancing the rights of LGBTI persons, experienced harassment and discrimination. In December 2014 a group of intruders forced their way into the private year-end event of GALZ, attacking, robbing, and leaving 35 attendees injured. In contrast the Bulawayo-based Sexual Rights Center (SRC), an organization similarly dedicated to advancing the rights of “sexual minorities,” reported minimal harassment.

Religious leaders in this traditionally conservative and Christian society encouraged discrimination against LGBTI persons. In March, Walter Magaya, leader of the Healing and Deliverance Ministries, stated that gays and lesbians were “spiritually afflicted and just like all evil spirits, they need deliverance.”

LGBTI persons reported widespread societal discrimination based on sexual orientation. In response to social pressure, some families reportedly subjected their LGBTI members to “corrective” rape and forced marriages to encourage heterosexual conduct. Women in particular were subjected to rape by male family members. Victims rarely reported such crimes to police. LGBTI persons often left school at an early age due to discrimination and had higher rates of unemployment and homelessness. Many persons who identified themselves as LGBTI did not

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 43 seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health problems due to fear that health providers would shun them or report them to authorities.

HIV and AIDS Social Stigma

The government has a national HIV/AIDS policy that prohibits discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, and the law prohibits discrimination against workers with HIV/AIDS in the private sector and parastatals. Despite these provisions, societal discrimination against persons affected by HIV/AIDS remained a problem. Although there was an active information campaign to destigmatize HIV/AID by international and local NGOs, the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, and the National AIDS Council, such ostracism and criticism continued.

In the 2010-11 DHS, 22 percent of women and 20 percent of men reported they held discriminatory attitudes towards those living with HIV.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Inexplicable disappearances and killings, sometimes involving mutilation of the victim, often were attributed to customary or traditional rituals, in some cases involving a healer who requested a human body part to complete a required task. Police generally rejected the “ritual killing” explanation, despite its being commonly used in society and the press.

Promotion of Acts of Discrimination

Throughout the year government-controlled media continued to vilify white citizens and blame them for the country’s problems. The president was complicit in actions to vilify white citizens and urged the eviction of remaining white farmers.

Section 7. Worker Rights a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

While the law provides for the right of private sector workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively, other provisions of law abrogated these rights. Public sector workers may not form or join trade unions but may form associations that bargain collectively and strike. The law prohibits

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 44 antiunion discrimination, provides that the labor court handle complaints of such discrimination, and may direct reinstatement of workers fired due to such discrimination.

The law gives the registrar of the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare the power to supervise the election of officers of workers’ and employers’ organizations, to cancel or postpone elections, and to change the venue of an election. The law also grants the minister extensive powers to regulate union activities. For example, the minister has the authority to veto collective bargaining agreements perceived to be harmful to the economy as well as to appoint an investigator who can, without prior notice, enter trade union premises, question any employee, and inspect and copy any books, records, or other documents. The Labor Amendment Act enacted during the year empowers the minister to order an investigation of a trade union or employers’ organization and to appoint an administrator to run its affairs.

The law strictly regulates the right to strike. Strikes are limited to disputes of interest. The law provides that a majority of the employees must agree to strike by voting in a secret ballot. Strike procedure requirements include a mandatory 30- day reconciliation period and referral to binding arbitration (in essential services and in nonessential services where the parties agree or where the dispute is over rights). Employees must observe a 14-day advance notice requirement in order to call a legal strike. In April and May Gweru city council workers went on strike demanding unpaid back pay and bonuses.

Members of the police and army are the only legally recognized “essential services employees” and may not strike, but the law allows the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare to declare any nonessential service an essential service if a strike is deemed a danger to the population. No provisions prohibit employers from hiring replacement workers in the event of strike. The law also allows employers to sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes, with penalties that include fines, imprisonment for up to five years, or both. The constitution does not extend the right of collective bargaining to security forces. In late 2014 the government, employer organizations, and union representatives, according to the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), signed an agreement detailing how government security forces should conduct themselves in the event of a strike or other collective action.

Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise and industry

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 45 levels. At the enterprise level, work councils negotiate collective agreements, which become binding if approved by 50 percent of the workers in the bargaining unit. Industry level bargaining takes place within the framework of the National Employment Councils (NEC). Unions representing at least 50 percent of the workers may bargain with the authorization of the Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare. The law encourages the creation of workers’ committees in enterprises where less than 50 percent of workers are unionized.

To go into effect, the ministry must announce collective bargaining agreements, thus giving the minister the power to veto the agreement. The Labor Amendment Act expands the minister’s power to veto a collective bargaining agreement if it is deemed to be “contrary to public interest.” Workers and employers at the enterprise level also may come to a binding agreement outside of the official framework. Despite this provision, the ministry could block indefinitely any collective bargaining agreement if it was not announced officially.

Although the law does not permit national civil servants to collectively bargain, the Apex Council, a group of public service associations, represents civil servants in job-related negotiations with the Public Service Commission. In January the Apex Council successfully negotiated a basic salary adjustment for civil servants after threatening a nationwide strike.

The Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare did not effectively enforce applicable laws. Penalties for violations of freedom of association or collective bargaining laws ranged from a fine to imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years but were insufficient to deter violations. Administrative and judicial procedures often were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.

The government did not respect the worker rights to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively. In July the National Railways of Zimbabwe parastatal blocked 229 employees in Mutare from forming a workers committee to address employee concerns. In Mutare a local politician with interests in transportation and retail reportedly chose his workers at ZANU-PF political rallies and threatened them with dismissal if they unionized. Worker organizations were not independent of the government and political parties.

Government interference with trade union activity was common. Authorities frequently withheld or delayed the registration certificate for a number of unions. Police and state intelligence services regularly attended and monitored trade union activities. Police or ZANU-PF supporters sometimes prevented unions from

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 46 holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities. The International Labor Organization noted that the government took some steps to address the concerns raised by a 2010 commission of inquiry. The inquiry found the government responsible for serious violations of fundamental rights by its security forces, including a clear pattern of intimidation that included arrests, detentions, violence, and torture, against members nationwide of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)--an umbrella group of unions. Despite the International Labor Organization urging the government to implement the commission’s recommendations, the government continued to deny ZCTU and its affiliates the right to commemorate important events and to hold procession marches for the rights of workers.

Although the law does not require unions to notify police of public gatherings, police required such notification. Authorities often denied permission to unions or used force to suppress strikes. Police frequently denied the ZCTU its right to demonstrate. In April police denied a ZCTU demonstration against planned wage freezes. On August 8, police denied a ZCTU application to demonstrate in Harare against job losses, citing insufficient capacity to provide adequately for public safety. When the ZCTU attempted to demonstrate anyway, police temporarily detained their leadership, taking them into police custody and transporting them to various locations outside the city center. Police also denied a proposed follow-up demonstration on August 22. The ZCTU appealed to the High Court, which granted it the right to demonstrate. Authorities also frequently denied authorization for demonstrations planned by ZCTU regional groups.

In February police barred the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe from conducting a march in commemoration of Global Action Day, which recognizes the right for workers to strike. In June police denied the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe permission to demonstrate, forcing the union to appeal to the High Court. The appeal was successful and the union held a demonstration and presented a petition to parliament seeking a stay of orders to clear vendors from the streets.

Although the ministry conducted training for security forces on the Public Order and Security Act, the training did not change security sector attitudes. By law the government could fine and imprison union members for organizing a strike and unions risked a 12-month suspension of their registration for minor infractions.

There were reports that some ZCTU affiliates were able to engage in collective bargaining with employers without interference from the government.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 47

Nevertheless, members of the ZCTU stated that employers did not recognize their affiliates within the NECs. Workers’ committees existed in parallel with trade unions. Their role was to negotiate on shop floor grievances, while that of the trade unions was to negotiate industry level problems, notably wages. Trade unions regarded the existence of such a parallel body as an arrangement that employers could potentially use to undermine the role of the unions.

According to International Trade Union Confederation reports, employers frequently abused institutional weakness by creating a deadlock in the bargaining process, i.e., by forcing the referral of the dispute to arbitration and then to court, forestalling a decision in a reasonable timeframe. Agricultural workers experienced verbal and physical attacks by employers during negotiations. The ZFTU made claims of antiunion discrimination against Sakunda Logistics and argued that union members were specifically targeted for dismissal during July retrenchments. b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, with exceptions for work for the national youth service and forced prison labor. The Labor Amendment Act defines forced labor as “any work or services which a person is required to perform against his or her will under the threat of some form of punishment,” the first such legal definition in the country. Forced prison labor includes “any labor required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court” as well as what “is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance or management of the place at which he is detained.”

Forced labor is punishable by a fine, two years’ imprisonment, or both; such penalties were insufficient to deter violations. A law passed in June 2014 prescribes punishment of not less than10 years’ imprisonment and, with aggravating circumstances, up to imprisonment for life, for human trafficking-- including labor trafficking. The law does not clearly define the crime of trafficking in persons and requires transportation of the victim, which further limits the cases where the regulation could be applied.

There were no reports that the government attempted to prevent and eliminate forced labor during the year. There were no data on the numbers of victims removed from forced labor.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 48

Forced labor, including by children, occurred although the extent of the problem was unknown. Adults and children were subjected to forced labor in agriculture and domestic service in rural areas, as well as domestic servitude in cities and towns (see section 7.c.).

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/. c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The Labor Amendment Act increases the minimum age for general labor from 13 to 16. The law increases the minimum age for apprenticeship from ages 15 to 16 and declares void and unenforceable formal apprenticeship contracts entered into by children under age 18 without the assistance of a guardian. The law further states that no person under age 18 shall perform any work likely to jeopardize that person’s health, safety, or morals.

The laws were not effectively enforced. The Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing child labor laws, but the department lacked personnel and commitment to carry out inspections or other monitoring. Penalties, which include fines not exceeding $400, imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, were not sufficient to deter violations. There was no government action to combat child labor during the year. The NGO Coalition Against Child Labor in Zimbabwe completed a two-year program where it returned 2,150 child laborers to school in the Chiredzi region of the country.

Child labor remained endemic and was on the rise. Child labor occurred primarily in the informal sectors. Inspectors received no training addressing child labor and did not closely monitor it. Children worked in agriculture, fishing, cattle herding, forestry, informal mining, as domestic staff and street vendors, and in other parts of the informal sector.

According to a 2014 Child Labor Report compiled by ZimStat, 30 percent of children ages five to nine and 60 percent of children ages 10 to 14 were engaged in economic activity at least one hour per week. Seven percent of children ages five to nine and 12 percent of children ages 10 to 14 worked 21 hours or more per week in economic child labor. Ninety-seven percent of the children involved in economic child labor resided in rural areas, and 96 percent were employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 49

Children often faced hazards to their health and safety and lacked necessary equipment and training. Working on farms exposed children to bad weather, dangerous chemicals, and the use of heavy machinery. Most children involved in mining worked for themselves, a family member, or someone in the community. Exposure to hazardous chemicals, particularly mercury, was on the rise in the informal mining sector.

Forced labor by children occurred in the agricultural, artisanal gold and chrome mining, and domestic sectors. Children also were used in the commission of illegal activities, including gambling and drug smuggling. Some employers did not pay wages to child domestic workers, claiming that they were assisting a child from a rural home by providing housing and board. Some employers paid the parents for a child’s work. Relatives often took children orphaned by HIV/AIDS into their homes but used them as domestics without pay. See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/. d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment or Occupation

The law prohibits employment or occupational discrimination based on race, color, gender, tribe, political opinion, creed, place of origin, disability, HIV status, or pregnancy. The law does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination regarding age, language, citizenship, social origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to race, sex, gender, disability, and sexual orientation (see section 6).

Labor legislation prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer may be held liable for civil remedies if found to be in violation of provisions against “unfair labor practices,” including sexual harassment. The law does not specify penalties for such violations. Women commonly faced sexual harassment in the workplace. Government enforcement was not effective, and there were no reports of any prosecutions during the year.

Discrimination against migrant workers occurred, especially those employed in the informal sector. Discrimination with respect to political affiliation also occurred. In May a village headman in Marondera was fired for being affiliated with the MDC-T. In June a headman in Makoni Central denied a MDC-T-affiliated

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 50 applicant a job in the rural health clinic because he said the clinic could not employ an opposition party member.

In March, two union members were fired after leading demonstrations against the National Railway of Zimbabwe for its failure to pay salaries for 16 months. Police also arrested the two on charges of insulting the president. e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The NECs set the minimum wage for all industrial sectors through a bipartite agreement between employers and labor unions. According to the ZCTU, available statistics show as of September the average monthly wage was $246, down from $304.37 in 2013, however. The lowest paid public service workers earned $375 a month. According to the 2014 Labor Force Survey (LFS), the food poverty line and total consumption poverty line amount for a family of five in May 2014 were $158 and $508, respectively. Forty-two percent of paid employees earned above the food poverty line amounts, while only 4 percent earned above the total consumption poverty line amount.

The law does not provide for a standard workweek, but it does prescribe a minimum of one 24-hour continuous rest period a week. The maximum legal workweek is negotiated between unions and employers in each sector. No worker is allowed to work more than 12 continuous hours. According to the LFS, 28 percent of the employed population worked excessive hours, defined as more than 48 hours per week. The law prescribes that workers receive not less than twice their standard remuneration for working on a public holiday or on Sunday. The government sets safety and health standards on an industry-specific basis. The public service commission sets conditions of employment in the public sector. Labor law does not differentiate between workers based on sector or industry.

Occupational safety and health standards were current and appropriate for the main industries in the country. In June the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) commissioned an occupational health center in the capital and a mobile clinic to monitor the health of miners and industrial workers. Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

The Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and work hours laws for each sector, but the standards were not enforced effectively due to ineffective monitoring systems and

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 51 a labor inspector shortage. There were approximately 125 labor inspectors responsible for investigating labor-related violations and for enforcing labor laws, including those covering children. The Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council, a quasigovernmental advisory body to the NSSA, regulated working conditions. Budgetary constraints and staffing shortages, as well as its status as an advisory council, made it largely ineffective. Penalties for violations of wage or hours of work restrictions ranged from a fine to imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years. Such penalties were insufficient to deter violations. Penalties for occupational safety and health violations were not harmonized and fall within the jurisdiction of numerous ministries.

NSSA statistics showed that there were 5,491 work-related injuries and 98 fatalities in 2014, most of which occurred in the mining sector. The NSSA attributed the high rates to low investment in occupational safety and health, noncompliance with rules and regulations, and low levels of awareness of occupational safety and health matters.

Many agricultural and domestic workers were paid below the minimum wage. Many public servants also earned less than the poverty line. During the year there was pervasive partial payment or nonpayment of salaries in both the public and private sectors. In September some Harare Municipal Workers Union members threatened legal action over four months of back pay. Grain Marketing Board employees had gone without pay for eight months as of September.

There was little or no enforcement of the workhours law, particularly for agricultural and domestic workers. Although workers were generally unlikely to complain to authorities about violations due to fear of losing their jobs, some exceptions occurred. In 2013 Sabout Haulage drivers took their employer to the constitutional court for infringing on their right to fair and safe labor practices and the right to be paid overtime. The case remained pending before the court.

Poor health and safety standards in the workplace were common problems faced by workers in both formal and informal sectors due to lack of enforcement. Abuses by the management at certain foreign-owned enterprises and companies owned by well-connected politicians were common, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of workers; poor working conditions; underpayment or nonpayment of wages; unfair dismissal; and firing without notice. Workers’ committee members of a foreign-owned mining company reported fear and serious victimization, including arbitrary nonrenewal of contracts, dismissals without charges, late payment of salaries, and insufficient provision of protective clothing.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ZIMBABWE 52

No information was available on the treatment of foreign and migrant workers. The government considered many commercial farm workers to be foreigners because one or both parents were born in another country.

Due to the growth of the informal mining sector, artisanal miners, including children, were increasingly exposed to chemicals and environmental waste. An estimated 1.5 million persons were engaged in artisanal mining, defined as mining activities carried out using low technology or with minimal machinery, according to the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Council.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

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HIV AND AIDS IN ZIMBABWE

KEY POINTS

Zimbabwe has a high HIV prevalence. Unprotected heterosexual sex continues to be the main transmission route for new infections.

The illegal nature of sex work and homosexuality in Zimbabwe presents huge Feedback barriers for sex workers and men who have sex with men from accessing HIV services. Nearly every pregnant woman now has access to antiretroviral medicines thanks to the success of PMTCT services in Zimbabwe – also contributing to a decline of new infections among infants. Over three quarters of HIV expenditure in Zimbabwe comes from international donor sources.

https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 1/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert Explore this page to nd out more about groups most affected by HIV, testing and counselling, prevention programmes, antiretroviral treatment availability, civil society’s role, HIV and tuberculosis, barriers to the HIV response, funding and the future of HIV in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV prevalences in sub-Saharan Africa at 12.7%, with 1.3 million people living with HIV in 2018.1

The HIV epidemic in Zimbabwe is generalised and is largely driven by unprotected heterosexual sex. Women are disproportionately affected, particularly adolescent girls and young women. However, there are growing epidemics among key populations such as sex workers and men who have sex with men who are at higher risk of HIV. National data on these populations is sparse as only a minimal amount of data is collected and reported in national documents.

In 2018, new infections dropped to 38,000 from 79,000 in 2010, with behaviour change communication, high treatment coverage and prevention of mother-to-child transmission services thought to be responsible for this decline. Deaths from AIDS-related illnesses continue to fall – from 61,000 in 2013 to 22,000 in 2018.2 Feedback

Groups most affected by HIV in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean HIV epidemic is largely driven by unprotected heterosexual sex. But there are now growing epidemics among key populations(/node/451) who are at higher risk of HIV.5 National data on https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 2/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert these populations is sparse. Only a minimal amount of data is collected and reported in national documents.

Women

An estimated 740,000 women were living with HIV in Zimbabwe in 2017.3

Gender inequality is present within relationships and marriages, and drives HIV infections. For example, only 69% of men believe a woman has the right to refuse sexual intercourse if she knows he has sex with other women. And although in the minority, 23% of females believe women do not have the right to ask their partner to use a condom if he has a sexually transmitted infection (STI).4

More than a third of women who have been married have experienced physical or sexual violence from their partner.5 This prevents women from being able to negotiate using a condom, and puts them at higher biological risk of HIV.

In 2015, 14% of women reported experiencing sexual violence at least once in their lifetime and 8% reported experiencing it in the last 12 months.6

In terms of broader reproductive health, Zimbabwe fares better. Zimbabwe has the lowest reported unmet need for family planning among married women in sub-Saharan Africa (15.2%).7

Young people

Among young women, HIV prevalence increases with age, with 2.7% of women aged 15-17 living with HIV, increasing to 13.9% of women age 23-24. Among young men, HIV prevalence holds steady at around 2.5% until the age of 23-24 when it increases to 6%.8

However, as only 64% of young women (15-24) and 47.5% of young men have ever tested for HIV, prevalence among this group could be signicantly higher.9

In 2015, 17% of young women aged 15-19 in Zimbabwe reported having had sex with a man 10 years older in the past 12 months. This 'sugar-daddy' culture can contribute to an elevated risk of HIV for young women as they are exposed to older men who may be more likely to have HIV, or who hold the power in the relationship and determine condom use.10

Only 46% of young women and 47% of young men have comprehensive knowledge about HIV, limiting their ability to take control of their sexual health.11 Feedback

Sex workers

More than half of all sex workers in Zimbabwe are living with HIV. The most recent data in 2017 recorded prevalence of 56.2%.12 This is concerning in an environment where condoms are being conscated and gender inequality makes condom negotiation difcult.

Despite this, some progress is being made; the number of sex workers reached with HIV prevention programmes in Zimbabwe has more than doubled in recent years, from 7,300 in 2014 to 16,900 in 2015.13 https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 3/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert Sex work is illegal in the country, with police often using their powers to intimidate, arrest and harass sex workers. This exacerbates sex workers’ vulnerability to HIV as fear of arrest often stops sex workers from accessing health services. Findings on police harassment and abuse by the Centre for Sexual Health, HIV and AIDS Research in 2016 found 20% of female sex workers in Zimbabwe experienced violence from the police in the past year.14

In addition, the possession of condoms is used as proof of sex work, with many sex workers reporting being arrested due to their work, or having their condoms conscated. This hampers sex workers' ability to negotiate condom use with clients, heightening their risk of HIV.15

However, a criminal case against nine sex workers in 2015, which found in the sex workers’ favour due to the absence of a client being present at their time of arrest was widely reported in Zimbabwe’s media as signifying that the police were no longer allowed to arrest sex workers. In a survey of just under 3,000 female sex workers, around 50% reported having been stopped by the police in 2013, but by 2016, among this same group of sex workers, 30% reported being stopped.16

We used to be rounded up in the streets even if we were caught just “standing there, but now they can’t do that unless there is a client there as well. So cops are nding it hard to arrest us. I’m sure it will also make them think and realise that we are also human beings. ”

- Female sex worker in Zimbabwe.17

Sex workers, and the organisations representing them, have minimal involvement in the Zimbabwean response to HIV. This marginalises them and prevents them from accessing services. Better inclusion of sex worker-led groups in HIV prevention initiatives would help improve the health of sex workers and the population as a whole.

Men who have sex with men (MSM)

Homosexual acts are illegal in Zimbabwe for men who have sex with men (sometimes referred to as MSM)

(http://www.avert.org/node/382), but legal for women who have sex with women. As a consequence of thFeedback is punitive law, national statistics are rarely available.

Criminalising men who have sex with men drives this vulnerable group away from HIV services. As a result, many do not know their HIV status, let alone access treatment.

However, Zimbabwean organisations that support the rights of men who have sex with men and their access to HIV services do exist, such as Gays and Lesbians Zimbabwe (GALZ). Many are routinely punished and shutdown or have their members arrested.

https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 4/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert UNAIDS reported in 2017 that just one in seven men who have sex with men in Zimbabwe (14.1%) are aware of their status.18

International donors such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and PEPFAR have attempted to ensure some of their funding is directed towards men who have sex with men. Government restrictions mean this has not materialised.

HIV testing and counselling (HTC) in Zimbabwe

It is estimated that 75% of people living with HIV in 2016 knew their status.19. However, there is a large discrepancy between men and women, with 76% of women and girls living with HIV aware of their status, compared to 68% of positive men and boys.20

The number of HIV tests carried out in Zimbabwe has increased from 1.9 million in 2011 to 2.2 million in 2015, although this gure is below the government’s intended target of 2.5 million.21

The Zimbabwe Demographic Heath Survey 2015 (ZDHS 2015) shows an increase in testing, with 49% of women reporting being tested in the last 12 months compared to 34% in 2011. Among men, this increased from 21% in 2011 to 36% in 2015.22

It is thought that masculinity norms in Zimbabwe inhibit men from getting tested and engaging in treatment.23 However, conducting testing in men’s places of work has been found to boost testing among men, with a 2013 trial reporting a 53% uptake when workplace testing was offered.24

Scaling up self testing in Zimbabwe

Another way to increase testing, particularly among hard-to-reach groups, is self- testing. In 2015, Population Services International and UNITAID began HIV Self- Testing Africa (STAR), a four-year project to scale up self-testing in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia.

In the rst year, nearly 380,000 free HIV self-test kits were distributed in 27 districts in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Results suggest self-testing is enabling more young people (aged 16–24 years) and men to be aware of their HIV status. In the rst year, young people comprised 28% of Feedback self-tests and resulted in testing coverage among this age group increasing by 39% in the project’s catchment areas. Men accounted for 44% of self-test users, and testing coverage increased by 28% in testing areas. Among those using the kits in Zimbabwe, 23% were rst-time testers.25

HIV prevention programmes in Zimbabwe

https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 5/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert The number of people aquiring HIV each year is falling in Zimbabwe, although levels are still relatively high. In 2017, there were 41,000 new infections, compared to 73,000 in 2010.26

Zimbabwe's National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan 2011-2015 saw the country adopt a Combination Prevention Strategy approach, which focuses on a number of areas to prevent new infections. This approach remains in place and includes prevention of mother-to-child transmission, voluntary medical male circumcision, behaviour change communication, condom programming and STI management.

In 2015, as the 2011-2015 strategic plan came to an end, Zimbabwe held a national consultation to explore how the country’s prevention responses can be revitalised. As a result, it is currently developing a regional roadmap with South Africa and Kenya to increase HIV prevention services and investment.27

Condom availability and use

The availability and distribution of condoms in Zimbabwe is good, with 109.4 million male condoms and 5.6 million female condoms distributed in 2015.28 This equates to 33 male condoms per man per year, making Zimbabwe one of only ve countries to meet or exceed the United Nations Population Fund’s regional benchmark of 30 male condoms per man per year.29

Use of condoms in multiple concurrent partnerships (when one or both partners have sexual relationships with other people) remains low. Survey data from 2015 reported that, of respondents who had two or more sexual partners in the past 12 months, only 50% of women and 37% of men used a condom the last time they had sex.30 However, this is a slight increase from the 2010/2011 survey, which reported 48% of women and 33% of men in multiple concurrent partnerships using a condom the last time they had sex.31

HIV education and approach to sex education

Findings from 2015 suggest knowledge of HIV prevention is increasing in Zimbabwe, particularly among men.

Knowledge of HIV is generally widespread, with 84% of women and 88% of men questioned aware that HIV may be prevented by using condoms during sex.32.

However, some misconceptions about HIV transmission remain, with 16% of women and men wrongly thinking that HIV can be transmitted by mosquito bites, 7% believing a person can become infected by sharing food with a person who has HIV, and 5% suggesting HIV can be transmitted by supernatural means.33 Feedback

The Zimbabwe National Behaviour Change Programme

In 2015, 2.4 million people in Zimbabwe were reached with messages about HIV and 44% were referred for integrated HIV services.34

The programme targets sexually active people and members of key affected populations, and has scaled-up efforts to reach schools, workplaces and community-

https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 6/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert centred activities. In prisons for example, both staff and inmates have been trained in the programme in order to pass on knowledge to others.35

However, recent reductions in the number of new HIV infections in the country are thought to be due to a reduction in the number of people with multiple sexual partners. This shows a shift towards making conscious behavioural changes in light of a serious HIV epidemic.36

Despite this, men are still 14 times more likely to have multiple sexual partners than women.37

Prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT)

In 2014, Zimbabwe rolled out Option B+, whereby HIV-positive mothers receive antiretroviral drugs for life in line with WHO treatment guidelines - a promising move for Zimbabwe's HIV response.38

As a result, in 2017, over 95% of pregnant women living with HIV in Zimbabwe received antiretroviral treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission.39

In 2015, mother-to-child transmission was estimated to account for 6.39% of all new HIV infections in children aged 0-14 years. The number of new infections in this age group has itself fallen from 12,000 in 2010 to 4,900 in 2015.40 In 2015 HIV prevalence among this age group was 1.8%. When broken down more specically by age, prevalence among 0-4 year olds was 1.1% and 2.7% among 10-14 years.41

Despite the expansion of PMTCT services, only 54.9% of infants born to HIV-positive mothers received an HIV test within the rst two months of life.42

Voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC)

Despite Zimbabwe being one of UNAIDS’ priority countries for the scale up of voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC), and VMMC being listed in the country's National Combination Prevention Strategy,43 Zimbabwe currently has one of the poorest VMMC coverage rates in sub-Saharan Africa with 14.3% of men aged 15-49 circumcised as of 2017.44

By 2018, Zimbabwe aims to reach 1.3 million men with VMMC (80% of 13-29 year olds)45 As of 2016, it had only achieved 46.3% of this target group.46 Feedback But 2015 survey data did nd HIV prevalence to be lower among men who are circumcised (7.6%) than those who are not (11%), a change from previous ndings when it was found to be higher. This suggests that, where available, the intervention is working.47

A study on how to encourage uptake among adolescents recommended promoting VMMC as an intelligent lifestyle choice rather than a medical intervention. Various youth campaigns on radio, social media and in schools, including celebrity endorsements, have been running over the last few years to this effect.48

https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 7/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert Using football to engage adolescent men has also proven successful. A study conducted at 26 schools in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, found that a soccer programme called Make-The-Cut-Plus, more than doubled the odds of service uptake.49

Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP)

Zimbabwe is currently implementing ongoing demonstration and research projects to investigate the uptake and impact of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). PrEP uses antiretroviral drugs to protect HIV- negative people from HIV.

In Zimbabwe, this has been specically targeted at young women and girls among whom HIV prevalence is high.50 UNAIDS recorded 403 people living with HIV in Zimbabwe accessing PrEP treatment as a method of HIV prevention in 2016.51 The total target number for current trials is 3,000-3,300.52

Antiretroviral treatment (ART) availability in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is one of the sub-Saharan African countries with the greatest access to antiretroviral treatment (ART), with 84% of all people living with HIV on treatment.53

In 2016, the country adopted a ‘treat all’ policy towards ART, meaning all people should be started on treatment immediately, regardless of their CD4 count.54 It is thought that 9,000 people are initiating treatment every month.55

In 2015, it was estimated that 65% of women living with HIV were on treatment compared to 54% of men.56 This has resulted in Zimbabwean men being less likely than women to be virally suppressed.57

In 2017, 89% of children (0-14 years) living with HIV had access to ART.58 It is hoped the introduction of specialised ARV pellets for children being piloted by Zimbabwe will increase treatment coverage for this age group further.59

Zimbabwe is scaling up viral load testing, which is key to measuring viral suppression. This expansion is partly due to South Africa leveraging its market weight to reduce viral load testing prices to a maximum of US$ 9.40 per test, making it more affordable for low and middle income countries.60 However, budgetary issues, weak infrastructure and capacity challenges means viral load testing is far from routine, and existing facilities are mostly located in cities.61 Feedback HELP US HELP OTHERS

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Civil society's role in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, the long-standing ruling party Zanu-PF and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the country, particularly those working on human rights and governance issues, have had an adversarial relationship, imbued with mutual mistrust.62

The contested elections of 2013 resulted in some concessions from government who granted CSOs the right to freedom of assembly and association, freedom to demonstrate and petition, freedom of conscience, and freedom of expression.63

Despite these gains, the government continues to constrain the efforts of many CSOs. For instance, the government can restrict specic CSO activities if deemed contrary to ‘national security’, has criminalised activities relating to the promotion of LGBT rights, and limits the type of activities non-local CSOs can engage in if they receive foreign funding. Such hostile regulations mean many ‘controversial’, rights-based organisations cease to exist, rebrand, or switch to less sensitive work.64

HIV and tuberculosis (TB) in Zimbabwe

Tuberculosis (TB) remains a major issue for people living with HIV in Zimbabwe, with the country ranked in the top 30 high burden TB countries by the World Health Organization. 65

In 2015, 70% of people diagnosed with TB were HIV positive. The incidence of TB in Zimbabwe has increased dramatically in recent years, with TB now being the most common cause of death for people living with HIV.66

However, Zimbabwe has had an increase in tuberculosis treatment success, from 79% of people with TB Feedback reaching successful outcomes in 2014 to 83% in 2015. This has been the result of increased integration between HIV and TB services.67

Barriers to the HIV response in Zimbabwe

Social and cultural barriers

Polygamous relationships are commonplace in Zimbabwe. According to 2011 data, 20% of those in such a relationship were living with HIV, compared to 16% of those in a monogamous relationship.68 However, a https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 9/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert new national survey in 2015 did not include data on this.

Gender-based violence (GBV) persists among Zimbabwean society and within households. Survey results from 2015 on GBV found 39% of women and 33% of men thought a husband was justied in beating his wife for at least one of the following reasons: burning the food, leaving the house without telling him, arguing with him, neglecting the children or refusing sex with him. Tolerance of wife beating is declining though, as these gures stood at 48% of women and 37% of men in 2005.69 GBV is closely linked to inability to negotiate condom use, and greater vulnerability to HIV.

Legal and data collection barriers

The illegal nature of sex work and homosexuality presents huge barriers for these populations in accessing HIV services to take care of their health. It also means that the country is unaware of the demographics of people living with HIV, meaning targeted prevention, testing and treatment services are impossible. If people who are living with HIV cannot access treatment to prevent onwards transmission, this allows HIV to continue as a public health issue.

Stigma and discrimination

Stigma and discrimination towards people living with HIV in Zimbabwe remains rife – with one study nding that 65% of people living with HIV had experienced them.70

Survey data from 2015 found 22% of women and 20% of men who were aware of HIV had discriminatory attitudes towards people living with HIV. Around 6% of women and 9% of men did not think children living with HIV should be allowed to attend school with children who are HIV negative. Additionally, 19% of women and 16% of men would not buy fresh vegetables from a shopkeeper with HIV.71

Funding for the HIV response in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean government collects an AIDS levy, which is made up of 3% payee and corporate tax which contributes considerably to the domestic share of funding for the national HIV response.72 However, 86% of HIV funding(http://www.avert.org/node/353) in Zimbabwe still came from international sources in 2016.73

In 2015, Zimbabwe produced a national HIV investment case promoting effective, efcient and sustainable investments in its HIV responses by targeting specic locations and populations.74 Feedback The future of HIV in Zimbabwe

PMTCT services are proving successful, and this effort must be maintained in order to end child infections. However, VMMC coverage continues to fall behind other countries in the region.

Without data on HIV among key population groups such as men who have sex with men, there is little evidence to inform prevention interventions, or how to encourage people to use HIV services.

https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 10/12 3/2/2020 HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe | Avert The fact that there is no statutory requirement to enforce data reporting by all sectors also hampers monitoring and evaluation75, as does continued, persistent discrimination and criminalisation of men who have sex with men and others from the LGBT community.

HIV education and knowledge could be more wide-reaching, with schools responsible for providing the education that young people need. This is especially important in a culture where patriarchy, gender inequality, polygamous relationships and a sugar daddy culture persist.

The diminishing international funding for the HIV response also poses a threat to Zimbabwe’s progress on HIV, particularly in relation to HIV prevention.

References

Last updated: 20 February 2020 Last full review: 31 January 2018 Next full review: 30 January 2021

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https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/zimbabwe 12/12

TAB 8

Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 DOI 10.1186/s12889-016-3044-7

RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Factors associated with late presentation for HIV/AIDS care in Harare City, Zimbabwe, 2015 Howard Nyika1, Owen Mugurungi2, Gerald Shambira1, Notion Tafara Gombe1, Donewell Bangure1*, More Mungati1 and Mufuta Tshimanga1

Abstract Background: Despite widespread awareness and publicity concerning Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) care and advances in treatment, many patients still present late in their HIV disease. Preliminary review of the Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) registers at Wilkins and Beatrice Road Hospitals, both located in Harare, indicated that 67 and 71 % of patients enrolled into HIV/AIDS care presented late with baseline CD4 of <200 cells/uL and/or WHO stage 3 and 4 respectively. We therefore sought to explore factors associated with late presentation in Harare City. Methods: We conducted a 1:1 unmatched case control study where a case was an HIV positive individual (>18 years) with a baseline CD4 of <200/uL or who had WHO clinical stage 3 or 4 at first presentation to OI/ART centres in 2014 and; a control was HIV positive individual (>18 years) who had a baseline CD4 of >200/uL or WHO clinical stage 1 or 2 at first presentation in 2014. Written informed consent was obtained from all study participants. Results: A total of 268 participants were recruited (134 cases and 134 controls). Independent risk factors for late presentation for HIV/AIDS care were illness being reason for test (Adjusted Odds Ratio [aOR] =7.68, 95 % CI = 4.08, 14.75); Being male (aOR = 2.84, 95 % CI = 1.50, 5.40) and; experienced HIV stigma (aOR = 2.99, 95 % CI = 1.54, 5.79). Independent protective factors were receiving information on HIV (aOR = 0.37, 95 % CI = 0.18, 0.78) and earning more than US$250 per month (aOR = 0.32, 95 % CI = 0.76, 0.67). Median duration between first reported HIV positive test result and enrolment into pre-ART care was 2 days (Q1 =1 day;Q3 =30days) among cases and 30 days (Q1 =3 days;Q3 = 75 days) among controls. Conclusion: Late presentation for HIV/AIDS care in Harare City was a result of factors that relate to the patient’ssex, reason for getting a test, receiving HIV related information, experiencing stigma and monthly income. Based on this evidence we recommended targeted interventions to optimize early access to testing and enrolment into care. Keywords: HIV/AIDS, Late presentation, Harare City, Zimbabwe

Background 2004, there has been a rapid scale up in provision of anti- Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is a lentivirus retroviral therapy (ART) and close to 37 % of those in that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, a con- need had access to it [2]. Despite significant investment in dition in humans in which the immune system fails to increasing awareness concerning HIV care and advances contain life-threatening infection, which would otherwise in treatment, many patients still present late in their HIV be dealt with in non-infected individuals [1]. Sub-Saharan disease with either an AIDS defining illness or a CD4 Africa remains the hardest hit region, with estimates ran- count of <200 cells/uL [3]. Clients presenting late for care ging up to 22.5 million people living with the virus. Since have been found to have less favorable outcomes than those who initiate early [4]. HIV positive individuals with advanced HIV disease at the time of ART initiation are * Correspondence: [email protected] 1Department of Community Medicine, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, susceptible to treatment failure, pose a significant financial Zimbabwe Full list of author information is available at the end of the article

© 2016 Nyika et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated. Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 Page 2 of 7

burden on the health system and have a higher likelihood Methods of early mortality [5-8]. A 1:1 unmatched case control study was conducted to In addition, research suggests that a higher cumulative determine factors associated with late presentation to risk of HIV transmission by late presenters exists, thus HIV/aids Care. This was a retrospective study design, posing a significant burden to other individuals, consid- which considered study participants on the basis of their ering that earlier presentation and initiation on ARVs outcome status (late or early presentation to HIV/AIDS might lead to viral load suppression thereby reducing care). Once the exposures had been ascertained and risk of transmission [5]. compared (by computing odds ratios), the differences A cross sectional study conducted at a Ugandan rural between cases and controls were tested for statistical clinic reported that approximately 40 % of the ART pa- significance. tients presented with WHO stage 4 infections and male The selection of participants was done between January sex and poor education were significant risk factors for and March 2015, while interviews took place from 1 to late presentation [9]. This might result in switching to 31st of May 2015. more expensive second line regimens and increased risk Case: is an HIV positive individual (≥18 years) with a of transmission to other individuals [10]. baseline CD4 count of <200/uL or who had WHO clinical stage 3 or 4 at the time of first presentation to Wilkins Background of the study and Beatrice Road Opportunistic Infections clinics be- Zimbabwe adopted the 2013 World Health Organization tween January and December 2014. antiretroviral therapy guidelines in September 2013. Pre- Control: is HIV positive individual (≥18 years) who viously, 2010 WHO guidelines had been in use. During had a baseline CD4 count of >200/uL or WHO clinical the conduct of the study, the 2013 guidelines were still stage 1 or 2 at the time of first presentation to Wilkins in use and were used as the basis for enrolling patients and Beatrice Road Opportunistic Infections clinics between into care. The guidelines, state that patients be enrolled January and December 2014. into care with CD4 < 500 cells/uL. Harare City is the capital of the Republic of Zimbabwe Working definitions and is the largest city in the country. The city is situated Late presentation from an immunological point of view to the north east of Zimbabwe in Harare Metropolitan is enrollment into HIV/AIDS care with a CD4 count of Province and has an estimated population of 1 860 219 <200 cells/uL. Enrollment into care is being entered into residing in six divisional districts [11]. The city has 12 the Pre-ART register at a health facility and assigned an polyclinics, seven primary care clinics, 15 satellite clinics, OI/ART number. Clinically, late presentation is defined 6 family health service clinics, 4 dental clinics and 2 in- as enrolment into care with an AIDS defining illness as fectious disease hospitals, namely Beatrice Road Hospital prescribed by the World Health Organization and is and Wilkins Hospital. classified as Stage 3 and 4. Clinical staging is done by The City also has a specialized Genito-Urinary Centre the observing clinician and recorded on the patient’s for treatment of STIs located at Wilkins Hospital. Facilities Opportunistic Infections Care Booklet at presentation to in the city offer a wide range of programmes including the facility. TB/HIV Care, PMTCT, Reproductive Health and STI Pre- vention and Treatment. Programme data indicates that Key informants the leading cause of death in the city in 2014 were HIV- These were HIV program managers and facility managers, related illnesses (39 %) [12]. Comprehensive OI/ART ser- and had specific knowledge about HIV program in Harare vices have been decentralized to 90 % of the clinics from City. They included Beatrice and Wilkins Hospitals Medical the two infectious disease hospitals and the city recorded Superintendents, Hospital Matrons of the two institutions, an increase to 86 % of all HIV positive pregnant women the Sisters in Charge of the Opportunistic Infections at accessing care for Prevention of Mother to Child Trans- both hospitals and a Primary Care Counsellor at each mission -PMTCT (Option B+) at the end of 2014 [12]. institution. Late presentation to HIV/AIDS care is of importance from both a clinical and public health point of view in Patient record review Harare City. In 2014, a total of a total of 797 and 1098 The patients OI/ART Care booklets (“the Green book”) new adult in initiations were done at Wilkins and Beatrice for each participant i.e. both cases and controls were Road Hospitals respectively. Preliminary review of the reviewed for the following ART registers at both institutions indicated that 67 and 71 % of patients presented late with baseline CD4 of <200  To ascertain baseline CD4 count at first cells/uL or WHO stage 3 and 4 despite adoption of guide- presentation to the facility after an HIV lines recommending initiation at CD4 < 500 cells/uL. positive test. Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 Page 3 of 7

 To ascertain the WHO clinical staging at first elicit information on the city’sHIVprogram;from presentation to OI/ART clinics. inputs, processes, outputs and outcome. The questionnaire was pretested at Parirenyatwa Central Patients on ART at Wilkins and Beatrice Road Hospitals Hospital Opportunistic Infections clinic to check for ap- who were available on the study days, and who agreed to propriateness and structure of questions, and whether the participate and were well enough to take part, were in- intended data was being collected. The time taken to cluded in the study. administer the questionnaire was also considered. Questionnaires were checked for completeness and Sample size determination internal consistency before being created in Epi info Sample size was calculated using Fleiss formula in the version 7 for data analysis. The Epi Info software was StatCalc™ function of Epi Info® 7. used to analyse quantitative data. Means, frequencies, proportions, odds ratios (OR), and their 95 % confi- dence intervals (CI), were generated. Odds ratio (OR) P ¼ p ðÞOR =1 þ ½Šp ðÞOR − 1 1 2 2 that did not include the value 1 in the 95 % confidence interval were considered statistically significant. Forward Where: stepwise logistic regression analysis was done to determine independent factors associated with late presentation. p1 = proportion of exposed with disease Qualitative data were sorted and analyzed thematically. p2 = proportion of unexposed with disease In terms of results utilization, written reports were OR = Calculated odds ratio form previous study [13] given to Beatrice and Wilkins Infectious Diseases Hospital Medical Superintendents, Director City Health Depart- A 1:1 unmatched case control study, with a 95 % Confi- ment, Director AIDS and TB Unit and HSO. Presentation dence Interval and 80 % power was conducted in Harare of results was done to the Director of Health Services City. A minimum sample size of 122 cases and 122 con- Harare City and hospital superintendents. trols was calculated. Assuming a 10 % non-response rate, the minimum total sample size was 268. Therefore the Results minimum sample size calculated was 134 cases and 134 A total of 134 cases and 134 controls were recruited into controls. the study. Cases and controls were comparable in terms A total of 268 records were reviewed i.e. every partici- of socio-demographic characteristics except for sex and pant’s record. A total of 8 key informants were purposively religion where cases were more likely to be male and recruited into the study. subscribe to an apostolic sect (Table 1). The majority of cases (66 %) enrolled through the outpatient depart- Sampling ment and the least (2 %) enrolled through the PMTCT The OI/ART register which captures all patients enrolled programme. The majority of controls (53 %) entered into care and had been allocated an OI/ART number was through voluntary counseling and testing (New Start used as the sampling frame. Proportional sampling was Centre) offered at both institutions (Fig. 1). done in accordance with the enrolled patients at each fa- The median baseline CD4 count at first presentation to cility. Cases were randomly recruited from OI/ART regis- the OI/ART clinic among cases was 61 cells/uL (Q1 =34; ter into the study using random number tables. Controls Q3 = 110), with the maximum CD4 count value being were randomly recruited from the OI/ART register using 612 cells/uL of blood and the minimum value being 3 the same method after creating a separate list extracted cells/uL of blood. Among the controls, the median CD4 from the same register. count was 367 cells/uL (Q1 = 301; Q3 = 505), the maxi- Key informants were purposively selected at the two mum value being 1200 cell/uL and the least value was institutions due to their knowledge on HIV/AIDS pro- 201 cells/uL (Fig. 2). The median duration between testing gramming, management and performance monitoring positive (reported) and enrolling into care among cases and evaluation. A desk review for all the 268 records was 2 days (Q1 =1; Q3 = 30) with a maximum delay of (134 cases and 134 controls) was done. 180 days. The median duration from testing positive and enrolling into care among controls was 30 days (Q1 =3; Pretesting data collection instrument Q3 = 75) and the maximum duration was 320 days (Fig. 3). A pre-tested interviewer administered, semi-structured, Forward stepwise logistic regression was conducted questionnaire was used to collect data from cases and to determine independent factors associated with late controls. Checklists were used to identify baseline CD4 presentation for HIV/AIDS Care in Harare City. Inde- count and baseline WHO clinical stage at first presenta- pendent risk factors for late presentation for HIV/AIDS tion. An interview guide for key informants was used to care were illness being reason for test (aOR = 7.68, 95 % Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 Page 4 of 7

Table 1 Socio-demographic characteristics of study participants, Harare City, Zimbabwe, 2015 Variable Category Cases Controls p-value n = 134 (%) n = 134 (%) Sex Male 77 (57) 42 (31) <0.01 Female 57 (43) 92 (69) Age <20 2 (1) 0 (0) 0.42 20–29 31 (23) 38 (28) 30–39 59 (44) 60 (45) 40–49 30 (22) 29 (22) 50+ 12 (9) 7 (5)

Median age 35 (Q1 = 30, Q3 = 40) 34 (Q1 = 30, Q3 = 43) Marital status Single 24 (18) 17 (13) 0.32 Divorced 18 (13) 18 (13) Married 70 (52) 78 (58) Widowed 22 (16) 21 (16) Place of residence High density surbub 89 (66) 89 (66) 0.91 Medium density 30 (22) 31 (24) Low density surbub 15 (11) 14 (10) Highest level of education None 3 (2) 1 (1) 0.08 Primary 27 (20) 18 (13) Secondary 86 (64) 99 (74) Tertiary 18 (14) 16 (12) Religion Pentecostal 42 (33) 54 (40) <0.05 Apostolic 47 (35) 27 (21) Orthodox 20 (15) 16 (12) Traditional 7 (8) 9 (8) Protestant 13 (9) 25 (19) None 5 (3) 3 (1)

Fig. 2 Baseline CD4 cell count at first presentation for HIV/AIDS care Fig. 1 Point of entry for HIV/AIDS care, Harare City, 2015 in Harare City, 2015 (n = 268) Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 Page 5 of 7

Discussion CD4 count determination is important when making decisions on starting ART using the 2013 guidelines. In this study, the presentation of cases within median CD4 count of 61 cells/uL reaffirms the fact that CD4 count at presentation by patients in resource limited settings remains critically low and is an indication of late presen- tation [14]. Furthermore, the median delay for care after testing positive varied between cases and controls (2 days and 30 days respectively). This is consistent with what was found out in Kenya during a community testing cam- paign where there was a delay between testing and linkage to care [7]. The delay was attributed to lack of training on the part of service providers. The period between testing and linking to care is critical as it may result in loss to fol- Fig. 3 Duration between reported first HIV positive test and low up of patients, therefore jeopardizing their health. enrollment into care, Harare City, 2015 (n = 268) Having an HIV test due to illness was an independent risk factor associated with late presentation to HIV/ AIDS care in Harare City. This factor was the most sig- CI = 4.08, 14.75); Being male (aOR = 2.84, 95 % CI = nificant in this study. This finding is similar to what 1.50, 5.40) and; experienced HIV stigma (aOR = 2.99, Abaynew et al., found out where illness at first HIV posi- 95 % CI = 1.54, 5.79). Independent protective factors tive test was significantly associated with late presentation were receiving information on HIV (aOR = 0.37, 95 % (OR = 2.61, 95 % CI = 1.26, 5.43) [13]. This is also sup- CI = 0.18, 0.78), earning more than US$250 per month ported by evidence from India where 83 % of participants (aOR = 0.32, 95 % CI = 0.76, 0.67) (Table 2). classified as late presenters had an AIDS defining illness The HIV focal person mentioned that all health facilities or a sexually transmitted infection [14]. This could mean were implementing the 2013 WHO OI/ART Guidelines, that individuals are only coming to testing centers primar- which were fully adopted in January 2014. Hospital ma- ily when they have developed AIDS related conditions. trons indicated that 90 % of all staff which include doctors, The public health message derived from this finding is nurses and counsellors had all been trained in HIV Inter- that late presentation might be a direct consequence of grated Training focusing on support and supervision and late diagnosis of HIV and ultimately late linkage to care monitoring and evaluation. The city implements mentor- and treatment. ship visits on a "week in week out" basis. The average wait- Experiencing stigma as a result of being HIV positive ing time for patients was less than 10 min per facility. was independently associated with presenting late to A total of 27 sites initiate ART and have CD4 machines HIV/AIDS care (OR = 2.99, 95 % CI = 1.54, 5.79). This onsite. Support and supervision is conducted once every may be due to the fact there might be loss of material quarter to all facilities. Majority of the key informants (8) and/or emotional benefits if one’s status is known in the mentioned that fear of HIV related stigma was the main community, particularly in Harare City, where some oc- reason for late presentation for care. The least number of cupations such as pirate taxi driving and vending are respondents (4) mentioned that lack of disclosure to rela- accompanied by verbal abuse thus patients who are in tives could be a possible reason for late presentation for these occupations are stigmatized by their peers in the care. same trades [15]. This finding gives credence to over- whelming evidence that HIV related stigma is a hindrance to early presentation for care in Africa and beyond [16–18]. In this study, being male was an independent risk fac- Table 2 Independent factors for late presentation for HIV/AIDS tor for presenting late for HIV/AIDS care in Harare City. care, Harare City, Zimbabwe, 2015 Several studies have also reported low uptake of HIV Variable aOR 95 % C.I P-value services among men as compared to women in different Illness reason for HIV test 7.68 4.08, 14.75 <0.01 settings [19–22]. This finding supports the notion that Experienced HIV stigma 2.99 1.54, 5.79 <0.01 men generally do not seek testing and counseling ser- Being male 2.84 1.50, 5.40 <0.01 vices on a routine basis, thus leading to late diagnosis of HIV when they are already on late stage disease progres- Received information on HIV 0.37 0.18, 0.78 0.01 sion. Haskew et al., reported that men had 1.4 times Earned more than $250 per month 0.32 0.76, 0.67 <0.01 higher odds of presenting to the clinic late in the course Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 Page 6 of 7

of HIV infection compared to women [9]. This finding which could have affected generalizability of the study may also be explained in the general sense, that women results. This was minimized by selecting a large sample have more contact with the health facility on a more size and proportionately recruiting respondents from the routine basis than men. Women attended antenatal care study sites. clinics and other maternal and child health related clinics hence are more likely to be tested as service provided in Conclusions the continuum of care. The introduction of Option B+ on Multiple factors were associated with late presentation Harare City has also increased the likelihood of early pres- to HIV/ADIS care in Harare City. Getting an HIV test entation among women. Mujumdar et al., in a study of due to illness, being male and experiencing HIV related an HIV-1 infected population in rural India found out stigma were identified independent risk factors associ- that males were twice as likely to present late more ated with late presentation in the city. Receiving infor- than females [14]. mation on HIV and earning more than US$250 monthly Patients are likely to access information about HIV were independent protective factors associated with late through the visual and print media and crucially when presentation for HIV/AIDS care in the city. The findings they go for routine HIV testing and counseling at VCT of this study guided AIDS and TB programme managers, centres situated around the city or at outpatient depart- particularly the Prevention, Testing and Counseling sec- ments at clinics. Ndawitz et al., in Cameroon reported that tion on addressing late presentation in Harare City. living in a region with higher comprehensive knowledge of HIV/AIDS was associated with not initiating ART Ethical consideration late (aOR = 0.8, 95 % CI = 0.6, 1.0) [21]. This suggests Ethical clearance was obtained from the Joint Research that information dissemination hugely increases aware- Ethics Committee for College of Health Sciences and ness of the risks associated with HIV and this provides Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals (JREC 131/15). Permis- an opportunity for public health practitioners to craft sion to conduct the study was obtained from Harare City messages for specific at risk populations in Harare City. Council Health Department, Health Studies Office and the The print and electronic media also play an active role Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe (MRCZ B/875). in reaching out to communities and facilitate behavior Written informed consent was obtained from study partici- change. pants. The completed questionnaires were secured in a In this study, those who earned more than US$250 locker. Study participants were treated with dignity, re- were less likely to present late for HIV/AIDS care. It is gardless of race, gender, political or religious affiliation. plausible that when income is high, this might also recip- No names or addresses of participants were used in the rocate into better access to health services. Louis et al., in study. Confidentiality was maintained throughout the Haiti reported that poverty i.e. earning below the poverty study. Participation was voluntary and there were no datum line was significantly associated with late presenta- financial gains for participating in the study. tion for HIV care at ART initiating clinics [22]. Further- more, those who earn below the poverty datum line are likely to be self-employed hence do not have access to Consent to publish work related testing and counseling services, which are Consent to publish was obtain from the Medical Research enjoyed by their formally employed counterparts. Also, Council of Zimbabwe and also obtained from study those who earn less are likely to be more preoccupied with participants. selling their wares that they may not be cognizant of the need to visit the health facility regularly [23]. In the study Availability of data and materials by Louis, it was also reported that harsh poverty was a Datasets and materials available via Dropbox® and can theme of all of the respondents. With this in mind, be shared upon request. programme managers in Harare City ought to find strat- egies to encourage routine testing and counseling. Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Authors’ contributions Limitations of the study HN: conception, design, acquisition, analysis and interpretation of data and The study relied on patients’ self-reporting of historical drafting the manuscript. GS: conception, design, acquisition, analysis and interpretation of data and drafting the manuscript. OM: conception, design, events, thus creating recall bias. This was minimized by data collection, analysis, interpretation and reviewing of several drafts of the selecting patients initiated in the 2014 cohort, who were manuscript for important intellectual content. DB: conception, design, more likely to remember events more vividly. Character- reviewing of several drafts of the manuscript for important intellectual content. MT, MM and NG had oversight of all stages of the research and istics of patients who never attended OI/ART clinics at critically reviewed the final draft for important intellectual content. All Beatrice and Wilkins Hospital could not be established, authors read and approved the final manuscript. Nyika et al. BMC Public Health (2016) 16:369 Page 7 of 7

Acknowledgements 20. Bonjour MA, Montagne M, Zambrano M, Molina G, Lippuner C, Wadskier FG, We wish to express our sincere gratitude to the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) Tami A. Determinants of late disease-stage presentation at diagnosis of HIV department of Community Medicine academic and non-academic staff for infection in Venezuela: a case-case comparison. AIDS Res Ther. 2008;5(6). the support and guidance they provided during the conduct of this study. 21. Ndawinz JD, Chaix B, Koulla-Shiro S, Delaporte E, Okouda B, Abanda A, The following organizations also deserve recognition Health Studies Office Supervie V. Factors associated with late antiretroviral therapy initiation in (HSO), Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the AIDS and Cameroon: a representative multilevel analysis. J Antimicrob Chemother. TB Unit, Ministry of Health and Child Care and Harare City Health Department. 2013;68(6):1388–99. 22. Louis C, Ivers LC, Smith Fawzi MC, Freedberg KA, Castro A. Late presentation Author details for HIV care in central Haiti: factors limiting access to care. AIDS Care. 1Department of Community Medicine, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 2007;19(4):487–91. Zimbabwe. 2Ministry of Health and Child Care, AIDS and TB Unit, Harare, 23. Ddamulira JBM, Rutebemberwa E, Tumushabe E, Nuwaha F. Factors Zimbabwe. associated with delayed diagnosis of HIV infection in Mukono District, Uganda. East Afr Med J. 2009;86(9):411–6. Received: 14 October 2015 Accepted: 28 April 2016

References 1. UNAIDS. UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. 2010. 2. Krentz HB, Auld MC, Gil MJ. The high cost of medical care for patients who present late (CD4< 200 cells/μL) with HIV infection. HIV Med. 2004;5(2):93–8. 3. Sterling TR, Chaisson RE, Moore RD. HIV-1 RNA, CD4 T-lymphocytes, and clinical response to highly active antiretroviral therapy. Aids. 2001;15(17):2251–7. 4. Castilla J, Sobrino P, de la Fuente L, Noguer I, Guerra L, Parras F. Late diagnosis of HIV infection in the era of highly active antiretroviral therapy: consequences for AIDS incidence. Aids. 2002;16(14):1945–51. 5. Sterling T, Chaisson R, Keruly J, Moore R. Improved outcomes with earlier initiation of HAART: longer follow-up of an observational cohort study. In: 10th Conference on Retroviral and Opportunistic Infections, Boston; 2003. p. 10–14. 6. Dennis AM, Napravnik S, Seña AC, Eron JJ. Late entry to HIV care among Latinos compared with non-Latinos in a southeastern US cohort. Clin Infect Dis. 2011;53(5):480–7. 7. Haskew J, Turner K, Rø G, Ho A, Kimanga D, Sharif S. Stage of HIV presentation at initial clinic visit following a community-based HIV testing campaign in rural Kenya. BMC Public Health. 2015;15(1):16. 8. Lanoy E, Mary-Krause M, Tattevin P, Perbost I, Poizot-Martin I, Dupont C, ANRS C004 French Hospital Database on HIV Clinical Epidemiological Group. Frequency, determinants and consequences of delayed access to care for HIV infection in France. Antivir Ther. 2007;12(1):89. 9. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). HIV Prevalence estimates- United States, 2006. MMWR. 2008;57(39):1073–6. 10. Krawczyk CS, Funkhouser E, Kilby JM, Kaslow RA, Bey AK, Vermund SH. Factors associated with delayed initiation of HIV medical care among infected persons attending a southern HIV/AIDS clinic. South Med J. 2006;99(5):472. 11. Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency National Census Report, 2012. Copyright. Zimstat 2012. 12. City of Harare Progress Report on HIV/PMTCT indicators. City of Harare Health Department; 2014. 13. Abaynew Y, Deribew A, Deribe K. Factors associated with late presentation to HIV/AIDS care in South Wollo ZoneEthiopia: a case-control study. AIDS Res Ther. 2011;8(1):8. 14. Mojumdar K, Vajpayee M, Chauhan NK, Mendiratta S. Late presenters to HIV care and treatment, identification of associated risk factors in HIV-1 infected Indian population. BMC Public Health. 2010;10(1):416. 15. Chakrapani V, Newman PA, Shunmugam M, Kurian AK, Dubrow R. Barriers to free antiretroviral treatment access for female sex workers in Chennai, Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central India. Aids Patient Care STDS. 2009;23(11):973–80. and we will help you at every step: 16. Lawn SD, Myer L, Orrell C, Bekker LG, Wood R. Early mortality among adults accessing a community-based antiretroviral service in South Africa: • We accept pre-submission inquiries – implications for programme design. Aids. 2005;19(18):2141 8. • Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal 17. Kranzer K, Zeinecker J, Ginsberg P, Orrell C, Kalawe NN, Lawn SD, Wood R. • We provide round the clock customer support Linkage to HIV care and antiretroviral therapy in Cape Town, South Africa. PLoS One. 2010;5(11):e13801. • Convenient online submission 18. Samet JH, Freedberg KA, Savetsky JB, Sullivan LM, Stein MD. Understanding • Thorough peer review delay to medical care for HIV infection: the long-term non-presenter. Aids. • Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 2001;15(1):77–85. 19. Camoni L, Raimondo M, Regine V, Salfa MC, Suligoi B. Late presenters • Maximum visibility for your research among persons with a new HIV diagnosis in Italy, 2010–2011. BMC Public Health. 2013;13(1):281. Submit your manuscript at www.biomedcentral.com/submit

TAB 9

A SURVEY OF LAWS IMPACTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS IN SELECTED SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

March 16, 2016

OutRight Action International wishes to acknowledge with thanks the invaluable contributions to the report provided on a pro bono basis by the international law firms of Milbank and Webber Wentzel, with the support of the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice, and the African Affairs Committee, of the New York Bar Association.

Immigration

No literature was specifically found on whether LGBT individuals or same-sex couples are overtly discriminated against in the context of immigration. However, given the general historical record in Zambia of discrimination and violence towards persons based on their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity, it is likely that Zambia’s current immigration policy favors the exclusion of individuals and couples thought to be LGBT. Furthermore, the language of the Zambian Immigration and Deportation Act suggests the potential for discrimination, given that it contains prohibitions against immigration by certain broad categories of individuals, which categories could be open to abuse if read broadly in order to discriminate against LGBT individuals.209 Accordingly, explicit, permissive legislation would likely be needed in order to ensure the rights of LGBT individuals and same-sex couples to immigrate to Zambia and to apply for permanent residence.

Military Service

Similar to immigration, no literature was specifically found on whether LGBT individuals are permitted to openly serve in the Zambian military, and the Zambian Defense Act does not contain any express or direct discriminatory provisions against LGBT individuals. However, the current criminalization and religious and political condemnation of LGBT individuals within Zambia makes it unlikely that LGBT individuals are permitted to openly serve in the military, and the Zambian Defense Act does contain certain statutory sections with nebulous definitions within which exists the potential for abuse of LGBT individuals in the military.210 Similar to the immigration area, it is likely that explicit policies are required to ensure that LGBT individuals that openly express their sexual orientation or gender identity do not suffer discrimination or repercussions as a result of their service in the military.

E. Zimbabwe

1. Background

Homosexuality and transgenderism are highly sensitive issues in Zimbabwe where homosexuality is politicized and publicly criticized by both religious leaders and government authorities and homosexual acts between men, including hand holding, hugging and kissing, are criminal offenses.211 As a result of the harsh laws and public denunciation, particularly by President Robert Mugabe, members of the LGBT community are routinely stigmatized, discriminated against, denied access to services and benefits and subjected to assault and harassment. President Mugabe has even gone so far as to threaten to behead gay citizens, denouncing tolerance for homosexuality as “unnatural” and criticizing LGBT individuals as “worse than pigs, goats and birds.”212

2. Constitutional Anti-Discrimination

After nearly four years of drafting, Zimbabwe’s new Constitution became fully operational following the swearing-in ceremony of President Mugabe on August 22, 2013.213

209 Immigration and Deportation Act, 2010, Section 35(1), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4d64.html (“Any person who belongs to a class set out in the Second Schedule shall be a prohibited immigrant in relation to Zambia ….”). The cross-referenced Second Schedule makes no explicit reference to LGBT individuals, but has a broad range of categories of individuals, and the potential exists for a broad interpretation of any of the less clearly defined categories to include LGBT individuals. See id. at Second Schedule. 210 See, e.g., Defence Act, Cap. 106, Section 69, available at http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Defence%20Act.pdf (imposing criminal liability by court-martial and imprisonment of up to two years for “disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent or unnatural kind”). Without express definition of such “disgraceful conduct”, it is possible for a military court to make any interpretation as to what behavior falls under this category. 211 LGBTQNation, “Mugabe says China aid doesn’t require Zimbabwe to embrace ‘homosexuality.’” September 3, 2014. Available at http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/09/mugabe-says-china-aid-doesnt-require-zimbabwe-to-embrace- homosexuality/. See also the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] Section 73, which prohibits “anal sexual intercourse” and “physical contact” between men. Although the law does not explicitly extend to homosexual women, in practice lesbians are subjected to the same victimization, censure and police harassment as gay men. 212 Breanna Goodman, “Condemn Zimbabwean President’s Threat to Behead Gay Citizens.” Available at http://forcechange.com/70676/condemn-zimbabwean-presidents-threat-to-behead-gay-citizens/ 213 “New Constitution Fully Operation After Swearing-in of Mugabe.” August 24, 2013. Available at http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/jb_new-constitution-fully-operational-after-swearing-in-of-mugabe/

The new Constitution, which replaced the Lancaster House Constitution crafted in 1979, contains a general equality and non-discrimination clause, which provides that “[e]very person has the right not to be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner on such grounds as their nationality, race, colour, tribe, place of birth, ethnic or social origin, language, class, religious belief, political affiliation, opinion, custom, culture, sex, gender, marital status, age, pregnancy, disability or economic or social status, or whether they were born in or out of wedlock.”214 Sexual orientation and gender identity, however, were intentionally omitted from the final draft of the anti-discrimination provision.215 According to Dr. Alex Magaisa, an expert adviser to the Parliamentary Select Committee that was responsible for drafting the Constitution, similar phrases such as “natural difference, “circumstance of birth” and “any other status” were likewise removed at the insistence of the anti-gay rights lobby, which felt that any such phrases were “back-door” attempts to bring “gay rights” into the new Constitution.216 As such, the new Constitution does not affirmatively protect the right to non-discrimination based on real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the Constitution expressly states that “Persons of the same sex are prohibited from marrying each other.”217

3. Legislation

Privacy

Although the Zimbabwe Constitution provides for a right to privacy,218 which has been interpreted in the United States and elsewhere to protect sexual acts between consenting adults of the same sex from interference by the state, Section 73 of the Criminal Law Act specifically prohibits any male person from knowingly performing anal sexual intercourse with another male person, “or any other act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act.”219 Prior to the codification of the Criminal Law in 2006, common law and customary laws similarly prevented gay men, and to some extent lesbians, from expressing their sexual orientation and engaging in consensual same- sex conduct.220

The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, which was enacted in order to consolidate and amend the law relating to procedure and evidence in criminal cases, similarly contains a provision that expands upon the charges for which a person charged with sodomy or assault with intent to commit sodomy may be found guilty, including indecent assault, assault, committing an unnatural offence, or contravening sections 3, 4, 8 or 15 of the Sexual Offences Act.221 Likewise, the Magistrates Court Act was amended in 2001 in order to include “sodomy” in the definition of a “sexual offence.” Under this Act, a magistrate is empowered to enact a punishment for a sexual offence of imprisonment for a period not to exceed twenty years or a significant fine.222

Same-Sex Marriage

214 Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 56: Equality and non-discrimination, available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf 215 “All you need to know about final draft constitution.” Zimbabwe Daily. July 23, 2012. Available at http://www.thezimbabwedaily.com/opinion/12659-all-you-need-to-know-about-final-draft-constitution.html 216 Id.

217 Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 4.78. 218 Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 57. Right to privacy. 219 Criminal Law Act, Section 73. Sodomy. Available at https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/zwe/2006/criminal_law_codification_and_reform_act_html/ criminal_law_codification_and_reform_act.pdf 220 Zimbabwe 2012 Human Rights Report. Available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country- chapters/zimbabwe 221 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Section 211 Charge of Rape and Other Sexual Offences and Assaults, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zw/zw039en.pdf See also Sexual Offences Act, available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/95/SEXUAL_OFFENCES_ACT_9_21.pdf 222 Magistrates Court Act. Part III, Section 51 Special jurisdiction as to punishment. Available at http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/sexoff010817.pdf

Following President Mugabe’s public declarations against homosexuality, a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage was officially implemented in Zimbabwe in 2013 with the inclusion of Section 4.78 of the constitution, which reads: “[P]ersons of the same sex are prohibited from marrying each other.”223 Zimbabwe’s Marriage Act likewise does not provide for the recognition of same-sex marriages in other countries.224

Adoption

Prospective adoptive parents who are citizens or legal residents of Zimbabwe must be married and over the age of 25 in order to adopt in Zimbabwe. Single woman over 25 may also adopt if approved by the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. Single men may only adopt family members and must also be approved by the Minister.225 Although not explicitly stated, the strict eligibility requirements for adoptive parents indicate that same-sex couples and LGBT individuals would not be permitted to adopt children in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the United States Bureau of Consular Affairs Intercountry Adoption Agency has confirmed that the Zimbabwe government will not permit the adoption of Zimbabwean children by American gay, lesbian, or same-sex couples.226

Access to Employment, Healthcare and Housing

The new Constitution provides that: “[t]he State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must endeavor to secure (a) full employment [and] (b) the removal of restrictions that unnecessarily inhibit or prevent people from working and otherwise engaging in gainful economic activities.”227 However, similar to the general anti-discrimination clause of the new Constitution, national labor and employment legislation fails to specifically prohibit discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Section 5 of the Labour Act reads: “[n]o employer shall discriminate against any employee or prospective employee on grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed, gender, pregnancy, HIV/AIDS status or, subject to the Disabled Persons Act, any disability referred to in the definition of ‘disabled person.’”228 Sexual orientation and gender identity are, however, noticeably absent from this list. Further, the stigma surrounding homosexuality and transgenderism has created de facto barriers to employment for members of the LGBT community.229

Similarly, Section 29(2) of the new Constitution provides that: “[t]he State must take appropriate, fair and reasonable measures to ensure that no person is refused emergency medical treatment at any health institution.”230 However, in practice, state services are often not made available to members of the LGBT community.231 Furthermore, consistent with the general public’s perception of homosexuality and transgenderism, many healthcare providers in Zimbabwe are homophobic or transphobic and fail to understand sexual orientation and the needs and concerns of LGBT individuals.232 As a result, even if they are not explicitly denied access to medical services, persons who identify as LGBT often fail to seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health issues out of fear of being shunned and persecuted.233

223 Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 4.78. See also “Zimbabwe’s new constitution makes gay marriage a ‘crime’.” Gay Star News,

January 31, 2013. Available at http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-new-constitution-makes- gay-marriage-crime310113 224 Zimbabwe Marriage Act. Available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/zimbabwe/marriage.htm 225 Intercountry Adoption: Zimbabwe. Available at http://www.passportsusa.com/family/adoption/country/country_351.html 226 “Intercountry Adoption: Zimbabwe.” Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Available at https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/zimbabwe.html 227 Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 24. Work and labour relations. 228 Labour Act. Part II, Section 5. Protection of employees against discrimination, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c47019f2.html 229 “Report on Discrimination against Women in Zimbabwe based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, available at http://www.iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/559-1.pdf 230 Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 29. Health services. 231 Vincent Mabvurira, Petronila Dadirai Motsi, Tawanda Masuka and Etiya Edith Chigondo, “The ‘politics’ of sexual identities in Zimbabwe: A Social Work perspective?” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. 2, No. 13. July 2012. Available at http://digilib.buse.ac.zw/xmlui/handle/11196/265 232 Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Zimbabwe. January 2013. 233 Id.

With respect to housing, while there is no explicit legislation that directly promotes, or alternatively infringes upon, the rights of LGBT individuals when it comes to access to housing, it is likely that LGBT individuals open about their sexual orientation or gender identity would be at risk of being discriminated against due to the prevailing prejudices within Zimbabwean society.

HIV/AIDS

The Zimbabwe government established a National AIDS Council in 1999 that has since issued various plans, including, most recently, the Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan, to address the precarious HIV and AIDS situation in the country, where, according to 2014 estimates, approximately 1.6 million Zimbabweans were living with HIV or AIDS, equivalent to about 16.7% of the country’s adults aged 15 to 49.234 More recently, the Zimbabwean government has, in connection with the Zimbabwe HIV and AIDS Activities Union Community Trust, helped to launch an HIV community monitoring initiative, a program led by people living with HIV with the intention of monitoring access to and availability of AIDS services in the country’s health care centers.235 Likewise, Dr. Owen Mugurungi, the HIV and tuberculosis director at the Zimbabwean Ministry of Health, for the first time recently stated that gay men should be included in HIV and AIDS strategies, particularly men engaging in gay sex in prisons.236

However, while the intention behind the Plan and the Community Trust is to combat discrimination and drastically reduce new infections and AIDS-related deaths, other national legislation, such as the Sexual Offences Act, directly discriminates against LGBT individuals that are living with HIV or AIDS. For example, Section 16 of the Sexual Offences Act provides that “[w]here a person is convicted of…sodomy …and it is proved that, at the time of the offence, the convicted person was infected with HIV, whether or not he was aware of his infection, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years.”237

Expression and Assembly

The new Constitution specifically provides for freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to demonstrate and petition.238 However, government authorities continue to utilize repressive legislation to restrict these freedoms, particularly as they relate to members of the LGBT community or anyone speaking out against non-discrimination based on real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. Specifically, government leaders have used the Public Order and Security Act (“POSA”), the Criminal Law Act, the Private Voluntary Organization (“PVO”) Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act to search private offices and dwellings without a warrant, ban lawful public meetings and gatherings, revoke operating licenses and deregister organizations.239 For example, it was only after a lengthy court trial that the Harare Magistrates Court in February 2015 found Martha Tholanah, chairperson of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (“GALZ”), a non-governmental organization, not guilty of the charge of running an “unregistered” organization in contravention of Article 6 of the PVO Act, which requires that all private voluntary organizations register with the PVO board.240 Similarly, in March 2015, police arrested two GALZ officials on charges of organizing a media training workshop without police clearance, in violation of POSA.241

234 UNAIDS: Zimbabwe. Available at http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/zimbabwe 235 “Zimbabwe: Patients to Monitor Aids Services At Hospital”, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201503010273.html 236 “Zimbabwe: Health minister calls for better healthcare for men having sex in prison” available at http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/01/09/zimbabwe-health-minister-calls-for-better-healthcare-for-men-having- sex-in-prison/ 237 Sexual Offences Act. Part V, Section 16. Sentence for certain offences where offender is infected with HIV. 238 See Zimbabwe Constitution. Section 58. Freedom of assembly and association, Section 59. Freedom to demonstrate and petition and Section 61. Freedom of expression and freedom of media. 239 “The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act: Two Years On.” Media Institute of Southern Africa, available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/zimbabwe-aippa-report.pdf 240 Human Rights Watch World Report 2015: Zimbabwe. Available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country- chapters/zimbabwe 241 Id.

Similarly, Chapter 10:04 of the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act prohibits the importation, keeping and distribution of publications that are undesirable (defined as “indecent or obscene or is offensive or harmful to public morals”). By extension, possession of most homosexual activity-related material would likely fall into this category.242

Immigration

Enacted for the purpose of regulating the entry and departure of persons into and out of the country, the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act specifically discriminates against and provides for the prohibition and removal of individuals who are, or are perceived to be, lesbian or gay from the country. Section 14 of the Act states that, among others, the following persons are “prohibited persons” for purposes of the Act: “(a) any person or class of persons deemed by the Minister, on economic grounds or on account of standards or habits of life, to be undesirable inhabitants or to be unsuited to the requirements of Zimbabwe” and “(f) any person who (i) is a prostitute or homosexual; or (ii) lives or has lived on, or knowingly receives or has received any part of the earnings of prostitution or homosexuality; or (iii) has procured persons for immoral purposes.”243

Military Service

No literature was specifically found on whether LGBT people are permitted to openly serve in the Zimbabwe military, and the Zimbabwe Defence Act does not include any explicit prohibitions against LGBT individuals serving in the military.244 However, LGBT individuals who choose to be open about their sexual orientation or gender identity while serving in the military would likely be subject to discrimination and prejudice given the prevailing societal attitude, and such persons could leave themselves open to criminal charges. Moreover, the public criticism of homosexuality (and to a lesser extend transgenderism) by government leaders such as President Mugabe further compounds the problem and creates a more hostile environment for LGBT individuals who may choose to serve in the military.

III. LEGAL CHALLENGE: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL TREATY ANALYSIS

242 Censorship and Entertainments Control Act [Chapter 10:04], available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c46e6ec2.pdf 243 Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act. Part III, Section 14. Prohibited persons, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/zimbabwe/citizenship.htm 244 See Defence Act. Available at http://www.zimlii.org/zw/legislation/consolidated- act/11%3A02/DEFENCE_ACT_11_02.pdf

TAB 10

1/22/2020 HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries

HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries HIV is not a crime

HIV is not a crime | Photo: Pixabay

10 June 2019 14:21 GMT Roger Pebody Share this:

HIV criminalization continues: a global review has found that HIV-related arrests, investigations, prosecutions and convictions have ever occurred in at least 72 countries, with recent cases occurring in 49 countries, including 14 in which the law appeared to be applied for the rst time.

The HIV Justice Network’s review concerns cases in which either the criminal or similar law is applied to people living with HIV based on HIV-positive status. Either via HIV-specic criminal statutes (29 countries), general criminal or similar laws (37 countries), or both (6 countries). Such laws typically criminalize non-disclosure of HIV status to a sexual partner, potential or perceived exposure to HIV, or transmission of HIV.

https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/hiv-criminalization-is-happening-in-72-countries/ 1/5 1/22/2020 HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries HIV criminalization ‘is a pervasive illustration of how state-sponsored stigma and discrimination works against a marginalized group of people with immutable characteristics,’ says HIV Justice Network.

‘As well as being a human rights issue of global concern, HIV criminalisation is a barrier to universal access to HIV prevention, testing, treatment and care.’

Where is it happening?

Between October 2015 and December 2018, at least 913 people living with HIV were arrested, prosecuted, convicted or acquitted in 49 countries. The largest numbers of cases were reported in the Russian Federation (at least 314 cases), Belarus (249), United States (158), Ukraine (29), Canada (27), Zimbabwe (16), Czech Republic (15), United Kingdom (13), France (12) and Taiwan (11).

To estimate where the criminal law appears to be disproportionately applied, the researchers analysed the number of known recent cases according to the estimated number of diagnosed people living with HIV in a country. They identied 15 criminalization hotspots: countries in which the number of cases was equal to or greater than 0.5 in 10,000 per capita of diagnosed individuals.

Belarus (139 in 10,000)

Czech Republic (55 in 10,000)

New Zealand (10 in 10,000)

Canada (4 in 10,000)

Sweden (4 in 10,000)

Russian Federation (3 in 10,000)

Taiwan (3 in 10,000)

Ukraine (2 in 10,000)

Australia (2 in 10,000)

Switzerland (2 in 10,000)

England and Wales (1 in 10,000)

Kazakhstan (1 in 10,000)

United States (1 in 10,000)

France (0.8 in 10,000)

Italy (0.5 in 10,000)

Their analysis suggests that recent HIV criminalization cases do not reect the demographics of local epidemics, with the likelihood of prosecution exacerbated by discrimination against marginalized populations on the basis of drug use, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, immigration status, sex work and/or sexuality.

Cases in the United States also appear to disproportionately impact people already in the purview of the criminal justice system, such as prisoners, and people living in poverty, including homeless people, with a high number of cases related to ‘HIV exposure’ via biting or spitting during arrest or whilst incarcerated. https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/hiv-criminalization-is-happening-in-72-countries/ 2/5 1/22/2020 HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries Women with HIV

Recent reports of increased numbers of cases in sub-Saharan Africa and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia illustrate what advocates have long-feared: that women are more likely to be prosecuted (and less likely to have adequate legal representation), since they are often the rst in a relationship to know their status as a result of routine HIV testing during pregnancy, and are less likely to be able to safely disclose their HIV-positive status to their partner due to gendered power inequalities. Women with HIV also face the possibility of being prosecuted for passing HIV on to their child during pregnancy, birth or breastfeeding.

In addition, migrants from high HIV prevalence regions (such as sub-Saharan Africa and eastern Europe) appear to be disproportionately prosecuted in Canada, northern and western Europe and Australasia, and usually have limited access to adequate legal representation.

Non-citizens are also likely to be deported to their country of origin after serving their sentence even if they have family ties in their adopted country.

HIV-specic laws continue to exist in at least 75 countries, including many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (29 countries) and eastern Europe and Central Asia (18).

Advocacy success

Nonetheless, during the period covered by the report, promising developments in case law, law reform and policy have occurred, most often as a direct result of advocacy from individuals and organizations working to end the inappropriate use of the criminal law to regulate and punish people living with HIV.

HIV-specic laws have been repealed in Victoria, Australia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The latter decision followed eight years of eective civil society lobbying and nurturing of supportive parliamentarians.

Laws have been modernised in seven jurisdictions. For example, Belarus’ law previously made exposure of HIV a crime, regardless of disclosure of HIV status, condom use or whether the sexual partner wanted the prosecution to take place. As a result of advocacy by the community organisation People PLUS, the government announced in December 2018 that a person with HIV will no longer be held criminally liable for HIV exposure or transmission if they disclose their HIV-positive status and their partner consents.

The US state of Colorado used to hand out longer sentences to individuals convicted of sex work, solicitation of a sex work or rape, if that person had been diagnosed with HIV at the time of the oence.

Following several years of researching, consulting, organising, lobbying and negotiating by a coalition of campaigners, these laws were changed in 2016. The sex work provisions were removed, while the tougher sentences for HIV-positive individuals convicted of rape were somewhat lessened.

More success

Other jurisdictions modernising their laws in recent years are Switzerland, Norway, California, Michigan and North Carolina.

Several proposed laws have been withdrawn. In Malawi, a proposed law was initially welcomed by feminists, but perceptions of the law’s impact changed after consultations between legal activists and grassroots networks of women living with HIV, examining the legislation in detail. As it became clear to local women how

https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/hiv-criminalization-is-happening-in-72-countries/ 3/5 1/22/2020 HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries the vague provisions on ‘wilful transmission’ could play out in their lives, they decided to take up advocacy against it and the parliament withdrew that part of the law.

International activists facilitated the development of Mexican network of 44 civil society organisations (La Red Mexicana), which has had several successes, including the withdrawal of proposed laws in three Mexican states and the country’s supreme court declaring a law in Veracruz to be unconstitutional. A proposed law has also been withdrawn in Brazil and a Kenyan statute ruled to be unconstitutional.

In addition, precedent-setting cases in Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden and Morocco have the potential to limit the overly broad application of the law through the recognition of up-to-date HIV-related science on the real risks of transmission.

This article rst appeared on aidsmap and has been republished here with permission.

Roger Pebody is the managing editor of NAM – aidsmap.

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Tony Hicks Just because someone had HIV and is convicted of a crime does not mean they were convicted because they had HIV.

One of the cases in Australia was because a Surgeon deliberately ghosted the condom during sex so he could attempt to infect his 'one night stand' with HIV. Like · Reply · 30w

Amanda Sol DeWork This must be a joke! Haha good one... Like · Reply · 31w

Paul Brownsey "HIV is not a crime," sayd the sub-headline.

Nor is any of the criminalisation simply for having HIV. Like · Reply · 32w

Facebook Comments Plugin https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/hiv-criminalization-is-happening-in-72-countries/ 4/5 1/22/2020 HIV criminalization is happening in 72 countries

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