Pathway to Prosperity Zimbabwe Case Study Part I: Inclusive Societies

GLOBAL INDEX OF PROSPERITY INDEX ECONOMIC OPENNESS

2021 CREATING THE PATHWAYS FROM POVERTY TO PROSPERITY

ABOUT THE LEGATUM INSTITUTE

The Legatum Institute is a London-based think-tank with a bold vision to create a global movement of people committed to creating the pathways from poverty to prosperity and the transformation of society. We seek to do this by raising up leaders of character, restoring an ethical vitality to all sectors of society, and developing the practical solutions and data tools that will help build inclusive and peaceful societies with open economies and empowered people. • Our Centre for Metrics creates indexes and datasets to measure and explain how poverty and prosperity are changing. • Our Research Programmes analyse the many complex drivers of poverty and prosperity at the local, national and global level.

• Our Practical Programmes identify the actions required to enable transformational change.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Stephen Brien is Director of Policy at the Legatum Institute. Preksha Dugar is a Research Analyst at the Legatum Institute. Daniel Herring is a Senior Analyst at the Legatum Institute. Ed King is a Research Analyst at the Legatum Institute. Carlos Montes is a Fellow at the Legatum Institute. Alistair Morrison is a Fellow at the Legatum Institute. The authors would also like to thank Ernest Moyo and Rebecca Mwabvu, both of the Higher Life Foundation, for their contribution to this work. The views expressed in this report are those of the Legatum Institute and do not necessarily reflect those of HLF.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A diverse range of experts were engaged in this work. This broad collaboration enabled a comprehensive range of views which the Legatum Institute captured and synthesised. The views expressed in this report, therefore, are those of the Legatum Institute and do not necessarily reflect the individual views of these advisors. The Legatum Institute would like to thank the following advisors who helped with the report: Victor Bhoroma (Economic analyst), Tafadzwa Chikumbu (Transparency International Zimbabwe), Admos Chimhowu (University of Manchester), Wellington Chimwaradze (Unilever), Innocent Chirisa (University of Zimbabwe), Ben Freeth (Mike Campbell Foundation), Evelyn Garwe (Zimbabwean Council of Higher Education), Keith Jefferis (International Growth Centre), Talent Jumo (Katswe Sistahood Foundation), Susan Kaksukunya (DHL Zimbabwe), Godfrey Kanyenze (Labour and Economic Development Research Institute), Gibbs Kanyongo (Duquesne University, Pittsburgh), R. Mukami Kariuki (Country Manager, The World Bank Group), Tendai Jeremiah Malunga (Bureau Veritas), Portia Manangazira (Ministry of Health and Social Care), Jeanette Manjengwa (University of Zimbabwe), Godfrey Maringira (University of Edinburgh), Abedinigo Marufu (Zimbabwe Forestry Commission), Abraham Matamanda (University of the Free State), Vakai Matutu (National Aids Council), Alexander Maune (UNISA), Evan Mawarire (ThisFlag Citizen’s Movement), Grasian Mkodzongi (University of Cape Town), Jeffrey Moyo (Thomson Reuters Foundation), Bhekinkosi Moyo (Wits University), Chipo Mubaya (Future Africa), Davison Muchadenyika (The World Bank Group), Deprose Muchena (Amnesty International), Rashweat Mukundu (Africa Adviser at International Media), Tichaona Mushayandebvu (UNIDO), Daniel Mususa (Biomedical Research and Training Institute), Patience Mutopo (Chinhoyi University of Technology), Mutanana Ngonidzashe (Zimbabwe Open University), Memory Nguwi (Industrial Psychology Consultants), Walter Odero (AfDB Country Economist), Robin Palmer (Mokoro), Brian Raftopoulos (Solidarity Peace Trust), Craig Richardson (Winston-Salem State University), Paidamoyo Saurombe (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights), Beatrice Schlee (Freiburg University), Ian Scoones (Institute of Development Studies), Edward Shizha (Wilfrid Laurier University), Sibangani Shumba (Save the Children), Mark Simpson (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study), Joram Tarusarira (University of Groningen), Jee-A van der Linde (NKC African Economics), Chikwature Whatmore (Mutare Polytechnic), Simon Wittich (World Vision), Janet Zhou (ZIMCODD)

The Legatum Institute would particularly like to thank the team at the SIVIO Institute who provided invaluable support and advice throughout the research and drafting process.

The Legatum Institute would like to thank the Legatum Foundation for their sponsorship. Learn more about the Legatum Foundation at www.legatum.org.

©2021 The Legatum Institute Foundation. All rights reserved. The word ‘Legatum’ and the Legatum charioteer logo are the subjects of trade mark registrations of Legatum Limited. Whilst every care has been taken in the preparation of this report, no responsibility can be taken for any error or omission contained herein.

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Cover image: Shutterstock.comm CONTENTS

Executive Summary...... 3

Introduction...... 19

Safety and Security ...... 25

Personal Freedom ...... 39

Governance ...... 53

Social Capital...... 75

Conclusion...... 87

Appendix...... 90

| 1 2 | Credit (gettyimages.co.uk) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe's history, natural wealth, and the resourcefulness of its people mean it is uniquely positioned to become one of the most prosperous countries in Africa. The key to unlocking this potential lies in large part in capitalising on the skills of the highly educated population and sustainably developing its rich natural resources, as already demonstrated by Zimbabwe's capacity for agriculture and mining. The nation’s prosperity is best underpinned by an inclusive society, where formal and informal institutions serve the public good. The pathway to prosperity will be most effective under stewardship of a state that acts as an enabler of political rights, personal freedoms and safety and security, in order to facilitate economic growth and social wellbeing. The purpose of this report is to provide a detailed assessment of Zimbabwe's formal and informal institutions and policies in oder to identify the binding constraints to future development as well as the actions that could enable the nation to progress towards prosperity. This is the first of three reports that are structured around the domains of the Legatum Prosperity IndexTM. It focuses on the Inclusive Societies domain, which captures the relationship structures that exist within a society, between and among individuals and broader institutions, and the degree to which they either enable or obstruct societal cohesion and collective development. These social and legal institutions are essential to protecting the fundamental freedoms of individuals, and their ability to flourish. In an inclusive society: • People live in peace, free from the threat of violence, oppression, and crime. • Everyone’s inherent dignity is respected, and freedom of speech and assembly are protected. • Governing institutions act with integrity, are accountable to citizens, and are subject to the rule of law. • Stable families and supportive communities build the bonds of trust needed for society to flourish. Areas within this domain range from the relationship between the citizen and the state, to the degree to which violence permeates societal norms, the interaction of freedoms of different groups and individuals, and the way in which individuals interact with one another, their communities, institutions, and nations. These issues have been a practical consideration for the majority of modern human experience, as well as a subject of academic study. The report includes recommendations on the type of actions to take to achieve improvements in each of these different elements of the Inclusive Societies domain. However, the report recognises that most of these individual improvements are only possible as part of a more comprehensive reform programme. The report proposes that such a programme could transform Zimbabwe into one of the most prosperous countries in Africa.

| 3 SAFETY AND SECURITY (AFRICAN RANK 23RD)

In the Legatum Institute's Global Prosperity Index, Zimbabwe ranks 23rd for Safety and Security in Africa, and 106th in the world. While Zimbabwe has managed to contain its civil conflicts, and terrorism, it has struggled with violent crime and politically related terror.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where citizens can live their lives, knowing they are safe from crime and security risks. Political violence and terror must become a remnant of the past, and criminal activities will need to reduce dramatically. The police force must be properly resourced and trained professionally in community policing, to become more effective in reducing crime. War and Civil Conflict (African Rank 19th)

Zimbabwe ranks 19th for War and Civil Conflict in Africa, an improvement from 31st from 10 years ago. There has been no interstate conflict in recent years, with the Second Congo War (1998 – 2003) being Zimbabwe's most recent involvement in such conflict in international warfare. Internally, there have been instances of martial violence in the past, such as, Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. However, the most significant factor affecting Zimbabwe's War and Civil Conflict ranking are the large number of Zimbabweans living abroad in refugee like conditions, mainly as a result of domestic, political, and economic conditions. Terrorism (African Rank 26th)

Zimbabwe ranks 26th in Africa for Terrorism, largely driven by domestic incidents. The Global Terrorism Database includes a number of incidents in 2017 and 2018, such as a grenade attack directed towards a ZANU-PF campaign rally. Politically Related Terror and Violence (African Rank 25th)

Zimbabwe ranks 25th for Politically Related Terror and Violence in Africa and 97th in the world. We have seen a reduction in incidents of politically motivated terror and violence following the implementation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), but this improvement has stalled in recent years.1 There has been extensive use of political intimidation by the state and paramilitaries, including violence, alleged torture and rape, as well as growing use of the military to suppress civil unrest. Perpetrators of politically motivated violence are rarely sanctioned. The police have become increasingly politicised, and are generally absolved from responsibility for unlawful arrests and other crimes.

Key recommendation – Police professionalism: Increasing the professionalism and training of the police force, could help ensure they are a politically independent force whose primary roles are the protection of citizens. This should be coupled with a review, investigation of their capabilities for the enforcement of crime, building strong cases for the courts and enforcing rulings by the independent judiciary. Professionalism of the police could be reinforced by greater emphasis on merit-based recruitment, and basing remuneration increases on qualifications and further training.

Key recommendation – Police code of conduct: The role of the police as the protector of citizens could be enhanced by establishing a new Police Code of Conduct, which would include zero tolerance of corruption or maltreatment of suspects. The code could be implemented by providing human rights training and education for all members of the security forces and other state agencies.

4 | Key recommendation – Police Complaints Unit: Respect for civil liberties could be reinforced by an autonomous Police Complaints Unit, which could enact thorough investigations into cases of human rights abuses, and consequently improve access to justice for victims of police brutality.

Key recommendation – Immunity Protections: Legislation that currently absolves individual security agents from criminal liability for unlawful arrests and/or detention could be reformed to increase accountability.

Violent Crime (African Rank 45th)

Zimbabwe ranks 45th for Violent Crime in Africa. It has a high rate of murder and homicide cases partly driven by gangs, conflict over gold, and the relaxation of legislation around illegal mining. While cases are known to be under-reported and data is sometimes unavailable, violent crime including murder has also increased. Law enforcement is weak, and the police force is both under-resourced and perceived as being corrupt.2 Continued cooperation between the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and traditional leaders is necessary to advance community policing and take steps to tackle violent crime.

Key recommendation – Police mandate: Systems and processes should be implemented to ensure more efficient investigation and prosecution of violent crimes. These could include re- allocation of transport and equipment resources in favour of regular anti-crime policing, and the introduction and greater use of digital policing tools.

Key recommendation – Police organisation: The size of the police force should be reviewed. Introducing better pay and conditions (linked to performance and training) could improve effectiveness. The Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice should appoint a professional executive to oversee overlapping institutional reforms across policing and justice.

Key recommendation – Community Policing: Strengthening community relations and listening to and addressing the public safety concerns of residents would lead to more positive interactions with urban and rural youth and better community policing. This would require strengthening cooperation between the ZRP and traditional leaders.

Property Crime (African Rank 20th)

Zimbabwe ranks 20th in Africa for Property Crime. Widespread poverty and unemployment have driven increased housebreaking, robbery, and theft. This has had a major impact on business, particularly electricity and telecoms companies, which have had equipment vandalised in the search for metals such as copper. Many robberies, juvenile delinquencies, and petty crimes, are consequences of the economy's inability to provide jobs for many Zimbabweans – leading people to resort to crime to survive

Key recommendation – Corruption-fighting capacity: Adopting technologies within the ZRP system to track and curb corruption would be an effective way to strengthen police capacity in this area.

| 5 PERSONAL FREEDOM (AFRICAN RANK 44TH)

Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Personal Freedom. It performs poorly for freedom of assembly and association, and in freedom of speech and access to information. While the 2013 Constitution protects civil liberties, in many cases these protections are not respected by the security forces or enforced by the judiciary.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where essential personal freedoms and civil liberties are respected, not only in the Constitution and legislation, but also in the practice of the Government and security services. Every citizen would feel confident and free in the protection of essential rights such as security and liberty, privacy, equal treatment under the law, due process and access to a fair trial. Law enforcement powers, including the police, would be used in the defence of public order and to protect human dignity and uphold the human rights of all citizens. Agency (African Rank 40th)

Zimbabwe ranks 40th for Agency in Africa. Constitutional civil liberties are not uniformly protected, as implementation is restricted by the manipulation of procedures and political interference. Recently, satisfaction with freedom has declined, with the country declining to 42nd in Africa.3

The judiciary is not able to prevent the state from infringing on civil liberties. There is little protection from illegitimate use of force or infringement of due process in the courts. Roadblocks have become even more pervasive in the context of COVID-19 and they affect the ability of people to travel around the country.

The Interception and Communications Act 2007 and the Cybersecurity and Data Protection Bill 2020 have limited citizens' right to privacy4, and oversight institutions are unable to serve as a check on infringements of civil liberties, due to capacity and financial constraints. As a result of a number of practices, including the security surveillance of civil society organisations, the right to privacy is often not respected. Although Afrobarometer polls show that 70% of Zimbabweans think that government should not monitor private communications,5 there is compulsory registration of SIM cards, and information on mobile users is maintained on a centralised database.

Recommendation – Oversight institutions: Increasing the capacity, independence and financial resources of oversight and complaint institutions would empower them to provide support for the protection of essential civil liberties.

Freedom of Assembly and Association (African Rank 50th)

Zimbabwe ranks 50th for Freedom of Assembly and Association in Africa. The right to assembly guaranteed in the 2013 Constitution has not been respected in practice. The UN Special Rapporteur has noted that, in balancing freedom of assembly with maintaining order the “general presumption that prevails is in favour of maintaining law and order”.6

The police have new powers under the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPO) to prohibit and regulate assemblies and they require advance notice of public gatherings. These powers were used to restrict MDC protests in 2019 and activist groups have faced threats to their personal safety, protests leading to violent repression.

6 | The restrictions on freedom to organise have also impacted the process to register NGOs. This process has been characterised by the UN Special Rapporteur as “onerous, lengthy and complex in nature requiring a significant amount of detailed information of the association.”7 If an application is denied, there is no opportunity to appeal.8 The president is considering additional legislation to further constraint the activities of NGOs.

Key recommendation – Freedom to assemble: The freedom to assemble should be strengthened by amending those aspects of MOPA and other legislation that obstruct civil liberties.

Key recommendation – Freedom to organise: Removing the hurdles on the creation of civil society organisations, in particular the ease with which they can register with the Government, would make it easier for trade unions and civil society to organise.

Freedom of Speech and Access to Information (African Rank 44th)

Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Freedom of Speech and Access to Information. The 2013 Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the media, but these freedoms are curtailed by other existing laws and are not supported by the state. As a result, 76% of survey respondents think that people have to be careful what they say in politics and 58% of people think that they are not at all free to criticise the president. Caution (self-censorship) about political speech was more common among young respondents (age 18-35).9

Freedom of expression has been limited by the narrow range of actors in the media space, with the largest concentration of media being in the hands of government.10 Diversity has improved in social media, however, there are risks of surveillance and control. As a result of government restrictions on press freedom, MISA Zimbabwe argues that recent police harassment of journalists during the pandemic lockdown, has led to “an atmosphere of anxiety and self-censorship among journalists which would compromise objective reporting.”11

Key recommendation – Media registration: Ministers should not deny registration of newspapers or other news organisations. Registration of media outlets would be better managed through a non-political, arms-length government body.

Key recommendation – Internet shutdowns: The Government should not use internet shutdowns as a means of controlling access to information.

Key recommendation – State-owned media: State-owned media should be independent public-service broadcasters and run at an arms-length from government, with funding free from political interference.

| 7 Absence of Legal Discrimination (African Rank 42nd)

Zimbabwe ranks 42nd in Africa for Absence of Legal Discrimination. Section 56 of the Constitution establishes equality and non-discrimination. Despite that, 62% of interviewees said in 2017 that people are often or always treated unequally.12 In relation to gender issues, Article 17 of the Constitution commits the Government to full gender equality. However, there are many barriers; for example most women do not have fair access to land. Most women do not own land, despite constituting a large part of the people working the land.13

Religious activities are constrained by various laws resticting freedoms of assembly, expression and association. Freedom House finds that “congregations perceived to be critical of the Government have faced harassment.”14

Key recommendation – Economic rights of women: Ensuring greater opportunities for women to own land and improving protections for widows, especially where marriages have not been formally registered, would help realise the principles of equality enshrined in the Constitution.

Social Tolerance (African Rank 36th)

Zimbabwe ranks 36th in Africa for Social Tolerance. Zimbabwe is near the global median in terms of tolerance of ethnic minorities. Aside from tension between the white and black population, the main ethnic tension in Zimbabwe exists between the majority Shona, and the Ndebele. Perceived tolerance of migrants has declined somewhat over the last decade, with Zimbabwe ranking 33rd in Africa.

An area of relative weakness is in the perceived tolerance of LGBT individuals. In a recent Gallup poll, just 7% of Zimbabweans surveyed say that their area is a good place for LGBT individuals to live (41st in Africa).15 For LGBT individuals, there are “long-standing traditional views about sexuality and gender that limit their full participation in the community and workforce.”16 Problems are more acute for those in rural or conservative areas.

However, there has been some recent progress; Gays and Lesbians Zimbabwe (GALZ) have stated that “there is growing tolerance of LGBTI in Zimbabwe especially amongst younger people in urban areas who have grown up with the knowledge that gay and lesbian people exist within their midst.”17

8 | GOVERNANCE (AFRICAN RANK 40TH)

Zimbabwe ranks 40th in Africa for Governance. This is driven by the weak performance on government effectiveness (African rank 44th) and executive constraints (African rank 44th), which in turn is partly explained by the ruling party's control of the Zimbabwean state uninterrupted for more than 40 years, except during the 2009-2013 Government of National Unity.

ZANU-PF and the security forces are closely intertwined, and they have been highly effective both in suppressing constraints on executive power (whether from the legislature, or the judiciary) and in preventing the transfers of power to other political groups. Monopoly control of the state has contributed to a significant weakening of government effectiveness and integrity, with the state often used for party and personal gain.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where power is shared between different stakeholders for the public good, there are meaningful checks and balances on how power can be exercised in the political, institutional and economic spheres, and the military is separate from party politics and focused solely on its security role. A competent and independent judiciary would guarantee that everyone, including the state, is subject to the rule of law, with no political interference in judicial processes. This environment would help ensure the Government delivers public services with integrity and competence. Executive Constraints (African Rank 44th)

Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Executive Constraints. Checks on executive power were written into the 2013 Constitution, but these constraints are not respected in practice, since oversight bodies lack independence, resources, and appropriate finacial capacity. The ruling party controls the state, and it has remained in power since independence, more than 40 years ago, except for a short power sharing Government of National Unity (2009-2013).

Neither Parliament nor the judiciary act as an effective countervailing power. The executive resorts frequently to statutory instruments. Ministers often refuse to be held to account by Parliament; inconvenient court orders are ignored; and reports from the Office of the Auditor General which are critical of the executive party are generally not followed.

The structures of ZANU-PF and the security forces are intertwined, with the security forces ensuring that the ruling party stays in power. The security forces benefit from the ruling party's control of the state and occupy important business and political positions in the country.18,19 Improving governance will mean ensuring that the state does not belong as of right to any political party and is not intertwined with the military.

Key recommendation – Constraints on the Executive: Increasing Parliament’s legislative and executive oversight capacity would improve the overall quality of governance. This could be enhanced by increasing MPs’ access to policy-relevant information including government documents.

Key recommendation – Security forces: Governance would be further enhanced by separating the security forces from party politics and the running of the state, while retaining their operational autonomy on security issues, including promotions.

| 9 Key recommendation – Oversight bodies: Executive constraints could be further enhanced by giving full political support, operational independence and securing funding for oversight bodies, including: Justice Department, Human Rights Commission, Office of the Auditor General, Attorney General, Anti-Corruption Commission, etc.

Political Accountability (African Rank 31st)

Zimbabwe ranks 31st in Africa for Political Accountability. ZANU-PF inherited a strong state and acquired broad legitimacy through its leadership in the War of Liberation and initial successes in education and health. The land reform programme was also partly a response to political pressures and demands and brought further legitimacy to the ruling party in Zimbabwe. ZANU- PF has build on this legitimacy, using state resources (including the security forces) to undermine opposition groups and ensure that it remains in power.

Nevertheless, the use of the state for political and private gains, economic mismanagement and economic crises have affected the legitimacy of the Government, resulting in contested elections and the Government of National Unity of 2009-2013. Today, however, the political opposition is weak and fragmented: the Movement for Democratic Change has suffered from intimidation and internal disputes and has been affected by corruption. On the other hand, opposition parties still control many local governments especially in urban areas, and churches and faith groups have helped to hold the state to account and support reconciliation.

Polarisation of society, distrust and fear do not allow for a constructive dialogue between government, the opposition and other stakeholders. There are very few effective complaint mechanisms to support government accountability. Elections are compromised by biases in the Electoral Commission, violence, misuse of state resources and coercion. In the 2018 election, EU observers noted numerous issues including violence, errors in the final results, and a lack of independence in the state media and electoral commission.20

The Government should commit to, and in practice, respond to the demands and priorities of all its citizens, and particularly of the most vulnerable – including rural constituencies. It should also respond to the demands of other groups for a more open economy, the rule of law, respect of civil liberties, curbing of corruption and a more competent and responsive state. Such responsiveness is best ensured by robust political accountability.

Key recommendation – Political party regulation: Regulations and laws should be enacted to support the role of political parties in channeling the views of citizens. The financing of political parties should be strictly regulated, with all donations and electoral spending made transparent.

Key recommendation – Electoral regulation: In order to support the integrity of future elections, the legal and regulatory framework covering the electoral process should be revised to strengthen the independence and capacity of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.

10 | Rule of Law (African Rank 30th)

Zimbabwe ranks 30th in Africa for Rule of Law. While the rule of law is constitutionally protected, there are a few constraints on the use of emergency powers and the judiciary is not independent of the state: key judicial appointments are controlled by the Government, patronage is widely used to subvert judicial independence, inconvenient rulings are simply ignored and access to justice for unfair incarcerations is hard to obtain. As a result, the administration of the law is often influenced by the interests of the ruling party, rather than the public interest. Most recently, the President has sought the power to appoint judicial officers (including the Prosecutor General) directly and without oversight.21

Despite these severe weaknesses, Zimbabwe retains some aspects of a strong legal system. There are good lawyers, the result of a strong professional legal culture in the past, and some judges who rule with autonomy, particularly in the high court.22 For these strengths to be fully operational in practice, the Government should commit itself to be bound by the law, and to honour judicial rulings, ensure equal treatment of all under the law, and limit the use of emergency powers.

Key recommendation – Judicial independence: The independence of the judiciary can be enhanced by more transparent mechanisms to ensure the meritocratic appointment of judges, based on professional qualifications and integrity. Procedures to protect the independence and impartiality of judges could also include clarifying the length of the term of office, security of tenure during that term, remuneration and pensions, pension rights, etc.

Key recommendation – Judicial integrity: The integrity of the judiciary could also be strengthened by ensuring clear processes for disqualification and removal from office, and broader institutional conditions.

Recommendation – Access to justice: The rule of law can be strengthened by making access to justice widespread and uniform. This would include ensuring defendants in politically sensitive cases receive a fair hearing in higher courts, and by improving access to justice for victims of police brutality, particularly where people are incarcerated unjustly for long periods.

Government Integrity (African Rank 35th)

Zimbabwe ranks 35th for Government Integrity in Africa and 139th in the world. The fact that the ruling party has been able to limit political accountability and executive constraints for over 40 years has contributed to an environment where the state has been captured by the ruling party. Officials have used the State for personal gain and political patronage, helping to maintain the ruling party in power by using the state to reward supporters.

As a result, corruption is endemic throughout Zimbabwean society, and was recognised as such by the new government. The economic costs of corruption are high. Civil service appointments are driven by political patronage, leading to a dramatic decline in state capability and in the competence of government departments and agencies. There is no enforcement of internal financial controls, and the use of extra-budgetary resources is pervasive.

State dysfunction has resulted in several periods of economic crises (including the second highest inflation in the world) that have severely reduced the remuneration of key public workers, | 11 creating a climate of bribery. More than 100 state-owned companies and several ruling-party linked cartels crowd out private competition and investment.23 They also have large wage bills and are heavily indebted, relying on substantial government transfers to survive.

A number of oversight institutions are in place, but effectively sanctioning corrupt officials is difficult. The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the Auditor General have undertaken some important investigations of high-profile corruption cases, but their investigations are often politically directed or not pursued by the prosecuting authority, or parliament. In addition, a lack of resources has curtailed the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies, and there is evidence of a lack of political will to support their efforts.

Expert surveys suggest that publicised laws and government data and government policy are not easily accessible to private companies and the public.

Key recommendation – Opportunities for reducing corruption: One of the most effective ways to reduce corruption is to engineer it out of the system. This can include eliminating the discretionary decision-making and burdensome administrative procedures that support bribery; and instead relying on automation and using e-government systems for large procurement processes, revenue collection, licensing and administrative procedures.

Key recommendation – Anti-corruption measures: Strong public efforts to counteract corruption are an important part of reducing it. This includes implementing a meaningful zero tolerance policy for corruption throughout government, whereby it is run for the benefit of all Zimbabweans, not for party or private gains. This commitment can be reinforced by ensuring that all incidents of corruption in government are fully investigated and prosecuted speedily by independent courts, with support from internal audits, the auditor general and an anti-corruption commission. Further supporting measures could include: formalising clear procedural guidance on the Government’s anti-corruption policies; introducing a whistle-blower law; and strengthening the independence and capacity of enforcement agencies such as the ZACC.

Key recommendation – Government transparency: Government integrity can also be enhanced by greater transparency. In addition to setting clear expectations on transparency, this would require strengthening the capacity of institutions to provide public access to information and data such as the publication and auditing of government expenditure and asset declaration for public officials.

Government Effectiveness (African Rank 44th)

Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Government Effectiveness. ZANU-PF inherited a strong but unequal state and used this to deliver substantial health and education gains for the majority of the population in the 1980s and 1990s. It also instituted broad-based land reform. However, over time, government effectiveness has been eroded by patronage in civil service appointments, corruption and economic crises.

Civil service and state-owned enterprise appointments have been driven by political patronage rather than merit, leading to a dramatic decline in state capability and in the competence of government departments and agencies. There is a weak capacity for prioritisation and implementation and weak enforcement of internal financial controls, and the use of extra- budgetary resources is pervasive. 12 | Poor salaries and working conditions have made it difficult to retain qualified staff, which has resulted in many teachers, health workers and skilled civil servants leaving the country, particularly after the 2008 crisis.

Government departments and agencies often pursue narrow political objectives, rather than national priorities. As a result of all these factors, service delivery by both national and local government is poor across nearly all areas of government, from utilities to health and education and both in national and local government. This has a knock-on impact on all citizens, particularly the most vulnerable, who are in greater need of accessible services such as in education and health.

To compound this, policy co-ordination is neither smooth nor effective, and is exacerbated by policy and party differences between local and national government and by overlaps, duplication and conflicts between different parts of the national government and between national and local government.

Key recommendation – Professional leadership. The competence of professional leadership across government departments and agencies is the most effective driver of government effectiveness. Effective leadership appointments will be critical to the success of the national transformation. Hence, a merit-based process should be established for appointing senior officials, based on proven integrity, focusing on the public good and public service and professional experience and competence, rather than political affiliation or patronage. The 2019- 2020 Public Service Commission Action Plan provides a good starting point. A strengthened Public Service Commission should monitor these appointments, proposing a temporary salary structure and recording experiences in different departments to identify and disseminate best practice.

Key recommendation – Focus the administration on citizen-centred service: Priority should be given to understanding the key needs of citizens, particularly the most vulnerable, and to identifying ways to make the provision of services to vulnerable people more relevant, easier, accessible and corruption free. Leaders should embed and foster a new civil service ethos that demonstrates a commitment to service, empathy and transparency, so as to bring public services closer to all Zimbabweans.

There is also potential to devolve more budget powers and powers of appointment to local governments. Providing more accountability to local citizens over local issues, including urban land granting, would improve effectiveness.

Another practical means of increasing government effectiveness is to digitise services, ensuring the internet becomes a backbone for government services. The Government should take early steps to support the provision of digital services following the successful model of countries like Estonia and India. This would require the gradual introduction of a digital citizen ID, stringent data privacy protection legislation and the adoption of the X-Road infrastructure. Regulatory Quality (African Rank 45th)

Zimbabwe’s governments perceived ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations to promote private sector development is particularly weak. This is partly explained by the same factors that generally explained a poor government effectiveness and civil service capacity (patronage, endemic corruption, lack of resources) but also by weak legislation. | 13 Furthermore, complex regulation structures, overlapping mandates and lack of independence and transparency compound the existing challenges. The lack of access to, and poor availability of public information add to the problem of transparency of the regulatory framework. There are many regulations, but enforcement is inconsistent, thereby accentuating the need for institutional bodies and practices covering impact assessments of existing and new regulations.

Key recommendation – Implement regulatory impact assessments: Create a centralised office responsible for ensuring the quality of regulatory impact assessments across government.

SOCIAL CAPITAL (AFRICAN RANK 36TH)

Zimbabwe ranks 36th for Social Capital in Africa, and 130th in the world. Over the past decade, social capital has seen a considerable improvement, held together by strength in Zimbabwe’s social networks and its culture of personal and family relationships. However, the rankings on institutional trust (African rank 51st) and interpersonal trust (African rank 48th) are low.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is a nation at ease with itself, where the issues that had divided it in the past, including internal conflicts, have been confronted and resolved. National reconciliation must be achieved, and a strong sense of Ubuntu has been restored. People need to be predisposed to trust each other, participate in civic society, and the nation’s institutions need to earn the trust and confidence of the public. Personal and Family Relationships (African Rank 15th)

Zimbabwe ranks 15th for Personal and Family Relationships in Africa. These have traditionally been strong, due to the Ubuntu philosophy. This philosophy has ensured, for example, that orphaned children are cared for by the extended family. However, it is under threat due to urbanisation. Social Networks (African Rank 12th)

Zimbabwe ranks 12th in Africa for the strength of Social Networks. This is an area of strength for Zimbabwe, and the country has performed well over the last 10 years, rising from 37th place. It reflects a strong culture of helping other households. Community and social networks are an essential component of social action in Zimbabwe, bringing people together and making individuals more aware of their social and cultural identity.24 The defining philosophy of Zimbabwean community culture is Ubuntu, which means that someone’s wellbeing is defined by the wellbeing of others around them. Interpersonal Trust (African Rank 48th)

Zimbabwe ranks 48th in Africa for Interpersonal Trust. Many people think that one must be careful, rather than trustful, in interactions with others. This is partly because of political and ethnic tensions, but also by the stresses created by the health and economic crisis. Economic inequality is also a major contributor to lack of trust. Strengthening Interpersonal trust is key to rebuilding Zimbabwe.

14 | Key recommendation – Dialogue between communities: Trust and reconciliation can be developed in a bottom-up way at a community level. It is worth supporting projects at the grassroots levels, that focus on reconciliation and promote co-operation and dialogue, especially in local communities through traditional leaders – invoking ubuntu.

Institutional Trust (African Rank 51st)

Zimbabwe ranks 51st in Africa for Institutional Trust. Public trust in politicians is particularly low (African rank 54th).25 Confidence in financial institutions, national government, the military and the local police are also low by African standards.

The low trust in politicians reflects the economic and political crisis and political polarisation in the country. The low level of trust in politicians has a direct impact on the economic situation, such as in relation to trust in the new local currency. The trust in the police and military is low, but it has improved in the last 10 years. Since 2010, more than half of Zimbabweans have consistently said that “most” or “all” police officials are corrupt.26 According to the 2019 Global Corruption Barometer, 24% of people who encountered the police paid bribes to officers in Zimbabwe in the last year.27 According to another recent survey, just half of the population thinks that the military acts professionally and respects citizens’ rights.28

Institutions and bodies created to combat these issues, have not been able to fulfil their mandate. In contrast to these state bodies, other institutions such as citizens’ wards councillors, churches and village heads were identified as ‘very important’ and ‘socially close’.29 Regaining the trust of citizens in institutions will most likely be a by-product of reforms in governance and the security services. These institutions will become more trustworthy as they become more accountable to the public and are seen to function for the common good.

Key recommendation – Electoral Violence Commission: Fully embracing and implementing the recommendations of the Commission would help strengthen institutional trust.

Civic and Social Participation (African Rank 21st)

Zimbabwe ranks 21st in Africa for Civic and Social Participation. While Zimbabwe has a developed philanthropic sector,30 donations to charities are limited. It is more common to give money to family and friends. In a recent survey, 20% of respondents said that they did not give because they did not trust the recipient organisations, while 49% said they did not give due to lack of disposable income.31

Zimbabwe has a high degree of informal volunteering, with many of the poor helping to deliver programmes for which they themselves are eligible for. In recent years, volunteers have filled gaps in government services. The church plays a major part in building social capital, providing many services as well as being a meeting place for multiple groups of people.

83% of all adults interviewed preferred to “choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections” rather than by “other methods.”32 Furthermore, 61% of the respondents believed that “voting helps improve lives.”33 This is consistent with high voter turnouts. However, there is some evidence that youth participation in the 2018 elections was low.34 Their political participation in other local level activities is higher.35 Knowledge and information about elections and voting is not very prevalent or well-designed, to reach all levels of society effectively.

| 15 Key recommendation – Youth political participation: Leadership training and education in elections and governance processes could help ensure active and purposeful engagement by young Zimbabweans.36 Resources and support should be given to youth-led initiatives that are reaching out to young people.37

Recommendation – Civic Education: Delivering civic education programmes in schools and in community venues could promote national reconciliation, and widen knowledge and participation among citizens, which could lead to an informed and active citizenry.

LOOKING AHEAD

The recommendations set out in this report reflect the basis for a resetting of the social contract, to enable Zimbabwe to tackle its social and economic challenges in a sustainable way. To do so will require a change of heart and shift in perspective of many different stakeholders, so that they share a vision for Zimbabwe based on a common commitment to establish a set of rules and norms that work in the interests of all segments of society.

A prerequisite for Zimbabwe to achieve prosperity is the security of all persons and property. The Government should seek to foster a culture of respect for human life that refrains from using violence to resolve personal and community disputes. The police and security services should be focused primarily on the safety and needs of the people and be even-handed in their prevention of and prosecution of crime. This would create a sense of policing by consent, with greater community involvement in improved safety and security, as well as increasing public confidence in the police.

For Zimbabwe to be prosperous, essential personal freedoms must be respected by government and protected by an independent judiciary. The respect of these essential freedoms will contribute to the legitimacy of the Government and to trust and reconciliation in the country.

A reform in governance is the key to putting Zimbabwe on the path to prosperity. The president tweeted on November 2nd, 2020: “Let me be very clear. If you engage in or promote corruption, you will be arrested and prosecuted. There are no excuses for corruption. No one is above the law.” In order to achieve this, it is important that the state becomes autonomous and separate from the ruling party. There also needs to be genuine adherence to the rule of law and civil liberties, with the state bound by law that is enforced by a fully independent judiciary. The integrity of the judiciary should be unquestioned, and rulings applied fairly to all citizens and the state, with no political interference.

Improving interpersonal and institutional trust is an important part of creating a pathway to prosperity in Zimbabwe. A prosperous Zimbabwe should have an inclusive culture that embraces and celebrates difference and political plurality. There should be a rich network of civil society groups and widespread citizens’ participation in civic and democratic processes. Their active presence is a critical component of ensuring a balance between state and society.

The journey is undoubtedly a long one, yet feasible and worthwhile.

16 | Endnotes

1 Both CIRI Human Rights and Amnesty International score Zimbabwe poorly for torture and political terror. 2 Afrobarometer polls 3 Gallup World Poll, 2019. 4 The Right of Privacy in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO, et al 2016, and PEN International, Media Insti- tute of Southernn Africa submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection to the right of freedom of opinion and expression 5 “Majority of Zimbabweans want government out of private communications, religious speech,” Afrobarometer, Dispatch no. 165, 2017. 6 “Visit to Zimbabwe – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (A/HRC/44/50/Add.2),” United Nations Human Rights Council, June 24, 2020. 7 “End of Mission Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, on his visit to Zimbabwe (17-27 September 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, September 27, 2019. 8 Ibid. 9 “Fear and trust: explaining professed popular trust in Zimbabwe’s presidents,” Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 399, 20 October, 2020. 10 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019. 11 Sneha Singh, “Zimbabwe press freedom suffers under pandemic,” International Press Institute¸ August 7, 2020. 12 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 13 Jeffrey Moyo, “Zimbabwe: Women face discrimination in land ownership,” aa.com, September 7, 2019. 14 Freedom in the World 2020. Zimbabwe. 15 Gallup World Poll, 2019. 16 “DFAT Country Information Report Zimbabwe,” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 19, 2019. 17 “About,” galz.org. 18 Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe: Regional Politics and Dynamics,” Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, Politics, March 2019, p.8 19 Sabine Donner et al, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 20 “Election Observation Mission: Final Report, Republic of Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018,” European Union, October 2018 p. 1. 21 Lovejoy Mutongwiza, “Zimbabwe’s ‘New Dispensation’ destroys hope on human rights,” London School of Eco- nomics, February 28, 2020 22 Based on expert interviews 23 "Public Enterprise Reform in Zimbabwe under the Transitional Stabilisation Programme: A Review," IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM). Volume 22, Issue 3. Ser. VI, March 2020, p. 1-7. 24 “Eucharia Gomba, “Child-headed Households in Rural Zimbabwe: Perceptions of Shona Orphaned Children,” Theses and Dissertations 331, University of Incarnate Word, May 2018 25 World Economic Forum 26 Nicholas Simpson and Matthias Krönke, “Police in Zimbabwe: Helping hand or iron fist?,” Afrobarometer Dispatch no.296, May 6, 2019. 27 “Africa,” Transparency International, 10th Edition 2019. 28 Simangele Moyo-Nyede, “Most Zimbabweans trust the army but reject military rule, don’t feel free to voice criticism,” Afrobarometer Dispatch, no.195 March 20, 2018. 29 “Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa,” Oxford Policy Management for the PtoP project, 2013, p. 56. 30 Thulani Mswelanto, “Zimbabwe,” The Global Philanthropy Environment Index, last accessed October 19, 2020. 31 Eddah Jowah, “Perceptions of Giving: Findings From a Survey on Giving by Zimbabweans,” SIVIO Institute, March 2020. 32 Michael Bratton and Eldred V. Masunungure, “Public attitudes toward Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections: Downbeat yet hopeful?” Afrobarometer Policy Papers 47, June 2018, p. 2. 33 Ibid. 34 Hillary Musarurwa, “What’s stopping Zimbabwe’s young people from participating in elections?” The Conversa- tion, March 6, 2018. 35 Eddah Jowah, “Perceptions of Giving: Findings From a Survey on Giving by Zimbabweans,” SIVIO Institute, March 2020. 36 Hillary Musarurwa, “What’s stopping Zimbabwe’s young people from participating in elections?” The Conversa- tion, March 6, 2018. 37 Ibid. | 17 18 | Credit (gettyimages.co.uk) INTRODUCTION

The Legatum Institute’s mission is to create the pathways from poverty to prosperity, by fostering open economies, inclusive societies and empowered people. Our work is focused on understanding how prosperity is created, and providing the research, ideas and metrics to help leaders make informed choices. We believe that prosperity is the result of economic and social wellbeing working together. Zimbabwe's history, natural resources, wealth, and the resourcefulness of its people means it is uniquely positioned to become one of the most prosperous countries in Africa. The key to doing so is to unlock the potential in the highly educated population and the rich resources of its lands, in terms of the already demonstrated capacity for agriculture and mining. This report is the first of three that collectively assess the current level of prosperity in Zimbabwe, identify the binding constraints to future institutional, social and economic development, as well as the type of actions needed to put Zimbabwe in the road to prosperity, with the ambition of achieving global median-prosperity by 2050 – while recognising that most of these individual improvements are possible only as part of a credible comprehensive reform programme. This first report addresses the relationship structures that exist within Zimbabwean society, between and among individuals and broader institutions, and what is required to develop a truly inclusive society.

PROSPERITY

True prosperity is when all people have the opportunity to thrive. It is underpinned by an inclusive society, with a strong social contract that protects the fundamental liberties and security of every individual. It is driven by an open economy that harnesses ideas and talent to create sustainable pathways out of poverty. It is built by empowered people, who create a society that promotes wellbeing. True prosperity allows everyone to fulfil their unique potential, playing their part in strengthening communities and nations. Ultimately, prosperity is not solely about what we have; it is also about who we become.

Prosperity is a multifaceted concept, which Legatum Institute’s Global Prosperity IndexTM seeks to measure, explore, and understand. The framework of the Index captures prosperity through three domains, which are the essential foundations of prosperity:

• Prosperity is underpinned by an Inclusive Society, with a strong social contract that protects the fundamental liberties and security of every individual;

• Prosperity is driven by an Open Economy that harness ideas and talent to create sustainable pathways out of poverty

• Prosperity is built by Empowered People, who create a society that promotes wellbeing.

Within each of the three domains there are four component pillars that between then capture the twelve essential themes of prosperity. (See figure below).

| 19 The Domains and Pillars of Prosperity

Pillars Domains Domains Pillars I nve ic t & E stm om n n n l e o v n c S c e S ir t E y a o it a l e n r m s a m E s I n e u f t c c e e c u r A n n pr et Q e i n t se Mark u e t t c l o e r a C ur y r on ct i d u l p i itio astr t ns & Infr N u v y o s n i e E v P e d S e P o r F e c e n r r i e o s e w i e o t o t d n ie p a o a s c m l m u E d E

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ZIMBABWE CONTEXT

Zimbabwe currently ranks 35th out of 54 countries in Africa for prosperity, and 143rd of 167 countries globally. The nation has been experiencing an economic and humanitarian crisis. Income per capita has declined from roughly 20% of the global average in the early 1980s to less than 10% today. Zimbabwe has been dependent on three main industries: agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. These industries were highly interdependent, requiring an extensive and effective infrastructure of power, water and transport links to support the production and freight of goods across the country. A persistent lack of investment in these industries and supporting infrastructure has led to their decline. The population has missed out on the economic and social wellbeing gains achieved by its more successful neighbours, and the state has been mired in institutional, economic and political challenges for decades.

Having started its journey as an independent nation with pride and hope, Zimbabwe’s society has become divided. Polarisation and political struggles have resulted in violent episodes in the last 40 years that have created deep divisions in the country. Personal freedoms are weak, the Government acts without much constraint, and corruption is widespread. Confidence in politicians and the police is low. Political intolerance has become a dominant culture in Zimbabwe, resulting in closed networks and lack of dialogue between different political positions, thus denying its citizens the win-win opportunities, which could turn Zimbabwe into one of the most prosperous country in Africa.

In the early years of independence, Zimbabwe made significant gains in social wellbeing, with policies focused on health and education. However, from the late 1980s to mid-2000s Zimbabwe suffered a major decline in health outcomes. The HIV/AIDS epidemic was the primary reason for this decline, but health outcomes were also affected by a sharp deterioration in the effectiveness of the healthcare system, leading to increased deaths and illness in areas such as maternal and neonatal health. Over recent years, living conditions have worsened, due to the economic crisis and by difficulties in the agricultural sector. The country has little resilience to droughts and other environmental shocks, and Cyclone Idai and the ongoing drought have had a devastating impact, leaving more than half the population food insecure. 20 | After the long rule of President Mugabe, the Government that came into office after the July 2018 elections launched Vision 2030, with the goal of becoming an “Upper Middle Income Society by 2030, for an empowered and prosperous Zimbabwe”. It adopted a Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP), which focused on strengthening fiscal management, reducing the monetary financing of the debt and reshaping the command agriculture programme. Notwithstanding the aim to implement the TSP, increased fiscal deficits led again led to hyperinflation in 2019/20. However, during 2020, both the deficit and the hyperinflation were contained.

In November 2020, the Government issued a new plan: National Development Strategy – 1 (2021-25), as a follow-on from the TSP. The purpose of the plan is to set out the prerequisites for Zimbabwe to achieve middle-income status by 2030. While the World Bank welcomed the plan, they also noted that “what matters most is the quality of their implementation and the buy-in from stakeholders.”1

Achieving such an ambition will require a significant transformation. This report sets out a granular picture of what is required. The potential is realisable, albeit most likely over a somewhat longer time-frame, and it requires institutional and political reform to underpin the socio- economic transformation.

ZIMBABWE POTENTIAL

Zimbabwe's history, natural resources, wealth, and the resourcefulness of its people mean it is uniquely positioned to follow these examples and become one of the most prosperous countries in Africa. The key to doing so is to unlock the potential in the highly educated population and the rich resources of its lands, in terms of the already demonstrated capacity for agriculture and mining. Zimbabwe has the potential to progress on all three domains of prosperity, to become a mid-prosperity nation.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is that of a nation at ease with itself, where the issues that have divided it in the past have been confronted and resolved, and where political violence has become a remnant of the past. In the economic sphere, the potential for a prosperous Zimbabwe is to have macroeconomic policy that delivers price stability and fiscal sustainability, allowing individuals and businesses to carry out their normal economic activities and transactions without the fear of dramatic instability. With a more open economy, sustained economic growth can, over the coming decades, take Zimbabwe on a path to a solid upper middle-income status, such as Peru today, or even Costa Rica or Malaysia.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where majority of people can earn enough to afford a decent living standard, with access to sufficient food, shelter, and basic services, where indoor pollution has been eliminated, and the nation's water and forest resources are stewarded sustainably. It is also one where people can better take care of their own health and expect an extended lifespan with fewer diseases and disabilities, with access to well-resourced health services. The potential also exists whereby completing secondary education is the norm, and school leavers are fully literate and numerate.

The aims for Zimbabwe, as set out, are very feasible, but require deliberate choices and sustained effort. While it has already seen improvement, the pathway to mid-level prosperity is a long one. For Zimbabwe, to achieve a level of prosperity in 2050 comparable to that currently of Botswana, South Africa or Namibia, it would need to be in the top 10 most-improved countries for prosperity for the three straight decades. To achieve this, the pathway to prosperity will require transformation on political, economic and social fronts.

| 21 ASSESSING ZIMBABWE

This report focuses on the Inclusive Societies domain of the Prosperity Index, which captures the relationship structures that exist within a society, between and among individuals and broader institutions, and the degree to which they either enable or obstruct societal cohesion and collective development. These social and legal institutions are essential in protecting the fundamental freedoms of individuals, and their ability to flourish.

In an inclusive society:

• People live in peace, free from the threat of violence, oppression, and crime.

• Everyone’s inherent dignity is respected, and freedom of speech and assembly are protected.

• Governing institutions act with integrity, are accountable to citizens, and are subject to the rule of law.

• Stable families and supportive communities build the bonds of trust needed for society to flourish.

Areas within this domain range from the relationship between the citizen and the state, to the degree to which violence permeates societal norms, the interaction of freedoms of different groups and individuals, and the way in which individuals interact with one another, their communities, institutions, and nations. These issues have been a practical consideration for the majority of modern human experience, as well as a subject of academic study. This domain consists of four pillars: Safety and Security, Personal Freedom, Governance, and Social Capital:

• Safety and Security captures the degree to which individuals and communities are free from war and civil conflict, terrorism, politically related terror and violence, violent crime, and property crime.

• Personal Freedom reflects basic legal rights (agency), individual liberties (freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech and access to information), the absence of legal discrimination and the degree of social tolerance experienced in a society.

• Governance encompasses the extent to which there are restraints on power, and whether governments operate effectively and without corruption.

• Social Capital captures the personal and family relationships, social networks and cohesion a society experiences when there is high institutional trust, and people respect and engage with one another (civic and social participation).

22 | Pillars and elements of the Inclusive Societies domain

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A P So E

The following chapters examine in detail Zimbabwe’s performance across the four pillars and the discrete elements that constitute our measure of Inclusive Societies. We examine past performance, present conditions, and identify how the Government might strengthen opportunities and overcome potential challenges moving forward.

As part of our analysis, we have chosen a set of regional and global comparator countries that are at a similar level of development, or because they provide an aspirational benchmark: Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia.

In carrying out this assessment we have relied on three major sources of information. The first is the Legatum Prosperity IndexTM, which uses global datasets from sources such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum and International Monetary Fund. We use this to benchmark Zimbabwe’s African performance on a wide range of indicators. (The rankings in this report are for countries of the African Union, based on the 2020 Prosperity Index.) The second source has been a wide-ranging literature review, where we reviewed academic articles, reports, and news articles to provide a solid evidence-base for this report. Thirdly, we interviewed 50 experts, based in Zimbabwe and around the world. This group consisted of civil servants, journalists, businesspeople, academics, NGO representatives and others. These varied sources of information gave us a broad and rich perspective on the challenges facing Zimbabwe, and some of the opportunities for reform.

Endnotes

1 Zvamaida Murwira, “World Bank lauds Zim reforms,” The Herald, 13 November, 2020.

| 23 24 | Credit (gettyimages.co.uk) SAFETY AND SECURITY (AFRICAN RANK 23RD)

The presence or absence of violent and other criminal activities determines how safe and secure the population is. The lives of individuals and the security of their property are at risk in a society where these activities are present, both through their current prevalence and long-lasting effects. In short, a nation, community or society can prosper only in an environment that provides safety and security to its citizens.

For a society or community to be truly safe and secure, there must be an absence of both domestic and national security risks. The effects of war, civil conflict, and terrorism can be pervasive. The damage done by such events reaches far beyond the event itself; communities must rebuild themselves, cope with grief, and address psychological traumas arising from the atmosphere created.

Zimbabwe ranks 23rd for Safety and Security in Africa, and 106th in the world. Zimbabwe's ranking for Violent Crime is particularly poor at 45th. However, the most salient safety and security challenge it faces relates to the high levels of politically related terror and violence. Nonetheless, Zimbabwe has managed to contain civil conflict, both domestically and internationally. The other bright spot in Zimbabwe’s security landscape is the lack of terrorism.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where citizens can live their lives, knowing they are safe from crime and security risks. Political violence has become a remnant of the past, and criminal activities have subsided dramatically. The police force has been properly resourced and trained professionally in community policing, becoming more effective in reducing crime.

Elements of Safety and Security War and Civil Conflict – the impact on people of organised conflicts affecting a country, both internally and externally, in terms of deaths, injuries, intensity of conflict, and human displacement. Terrorism – the deliberate and targeted harm inflicted by non-state actors on a nation’s population, taking into account the number of incidents, injuries, and deaths that result. The costs of attacks on business are also taken into consideration. Politically Related Terror and Violence – the extent to which people live in fear of, or suffer from, terror and violence inflicted by the state or other political bodies. Extrajudicial killings, unlawful disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment are all ways in which terror and violence are applied for political purposes. Violent Crime – the level to which violent domestic crime affects the citizens of a country. Whilst the availability of reliable data is a constraint on the accurate measurement of levels of violent crime, homicides, rape, and the degree to which violence is resorted to are all significant areas in which violent crime can impact the security of individuals and communities. Property Crime – the level to which property crime, such as burglary, organised crime, or the impact of crime on business, destabilises the security of individuals and affects both the wealth and wellbeing of individuals.

| 25 WAR AND CIVIL CONFLICT (AFRICAN RANK: 19TH)

This measures the impact of organised conflicts affecting a country, both internal and external, on people, in terms of deaths, injuries, intensity of conflict, and human displacement.

Zimbabwe ranks 19th in Africa for War and Civil Conflict, improving from 31st a decade ago. There has been no interstate conflict in recent years, with Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Second Congo War (1998 – 2003) seen as the most prominent conflict in the last 20 years. Internally, there has been some instance of civil and ethnic tension, including in relation to white farmers, but nothing on a large scale. However, the political and economic situation has resulted in a proportion of the population living in refugee-like situations in countries such as South Africa.

Civil and ethnic tension

There have been no outbreaks of civil or ethnic warfare, but there has been some civil violence and tensions with the white community, and rivalries between the Shona and Ndebeles. Since 2000, antagonism towards the small white community, particularly white farmers, has been high. This has included reports of soldiers and police violating property rights of white farmers with the threat of violence.1,2 On the other hand, partnerships in agriculture projects between white and black farmers have become increasingly common.3 Furthermore, there is the expectation that President Mnangagwa will work towards reducing these tensions.

Ethnic tensions between the Shona and Ndebele remain high, partly as the result of the trauma from the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s, known as the Gukurahundi. However, according to OSAC’s 2019 report, ethnic violence between the two groups is rare, but within-tribe political fights, which are sometimes violent, are much more frequent.4

Refugees

The refugee crisis in Zimbabwe is a very significant issue. There have been four notable major waves of migration into South Africa: in 1980 after ZANU-PF’s victory, in 1983 after the Matabeleland massacres, from 2000 – 2008 as a result of the economic crisis, and in recent years due to political violence.5 According to UNHCR, today, the number of citizens fleeing

Figure 1: Refugees per 1,000,000 population (origin country)

Weaker Stronger 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 Global Median 200 100 0

Ghana Kenya Malawi Ethiopia Namibia Zambia Mauritius Morocco Botswana Tanzania Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019 Note that Burundi had 33,000 refugees and Rwanda had 19,500 per 1,000,000 of the population 26 | Zimbabwe has decreased since its peak in 2011, falling from 25,048 people to 15,629 people in 2018, with South Africa continuing to receive the highest numbers of asylum applications in the sub-region.6,7 This has occurred as a result of the economic crisis, political violence, and health emergencies.

Policies and laws that apply to refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa are largely progressive, with special permits granted to allow economic migrants from Zimbabwe to work and live in the country. Local churches have proven to be vital in providing shelter, food, and employment opportunities to refugees in South Africa. While laws and institutions are in place, Zimbabwean refugees often struggle to access their rights to the established social protections due to corruption, capacity constraints, application rejections, and the continued challenges facing civil society organisations. TERRORISM (AFRICAN RANK: 26TH)

This measures the deliberate and targeted harm inflicted by non-state actors on a nation’s population, taking into account the number of incidents, injuries, and deaths that result. The costs of attacks on business are also taken into consideration.

Zimbabwe ranks 26th in Africa for Terrorism. Although Zimbabwe has been largely unaffected by international terrorism, there have been a number of domestic incidents in the recent years as recorded by the Global Terrorism Database, including a grenade attack into a ZANU-PF campaign rally and three other political attacks registered in 2017.

In 2018 an unknown group detonated a grenade at the White City Stadium in Bulawayo, targeting a national rally of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic-Front (ZANU-PF) resulting the two deaths, and 47 injuries, which included Vice-Presidents Constantino Chiwenga and Kembo Mohadi.8 Following this attack, two months later, the home of a Movement for Democratic Change Alliance agent’s house was set on fire. No groups have claimed responsibility for either of the attacks.9 It should also be noted that Islamic State and Jihadist presence in Mozambique may pose a future threat to Zimbabwe.10

Zimbabwe has an established legislative system in place to combat terrorism and has been an active member in international co-operation efforts to participate in intelligence sharing and combating money-laundering and other forms of terrorist financing.11 The country is also party to several conventions on combatting terrorism.12

One such body Zimbabwe has been working with is the Financial Action Taskforce Global Community (FATF), which is responsible for international standards on anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism. The 2016 FATF Report identified some gaps in Zimbabwe’s systems competency in dealing with these issues, and the Government was given five years to address them. As of 2020, it addressed almost all the legislative and institutional gaps noted by the FATF, leading the country to be rated fully or largely compliant in 33 out of the 40 recommendations, which is one of the best technical compliance ratings in the region.13

POLITICALLY RELATED TERROR AND VIOLENCE (AFRICAN RANK: 25TH)

This measures the extent to which people live in fear of, or suffer from, terror and violence inflicted by the state or other political bodies. Extrajudicial killings, unlawful disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment are all ways in which terror and violence are applied for political means.

| 27 Zimbabwe ranks 25th in Africa for Politically Related Terror and Violence. Zimbabwe ranks midway on political terror in a group of African comparator countries (Figure 2). The use of torture and political violence and repression is reported by civil society groups, including Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights,14 as a form of political intimidation by the Government. Generally, there appears to be little accountability for the perpetrators of violence.

Political terror

Political violence became more prominent a few years after independence. There have been reports of extrajudicial executions of more than 20,000 people during the Gukuraundi massacres.15 During the 2008 elections, ZANU-PF supporters are alleged to have killed hundreds of perceived MDC activists.16 There was a reduction in political violence between 2010 to 2015, however this improvement has stalled in recent years.

Figure 2: Political Terror

Weaker Stronger 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 Global Median 2.5 2.0 Index (1-5) 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0

Kenya Ghana Malawi Burundi Ethiopia Zambia Rwanda Namibia Tanzania Morocco Mauritius Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: Amnesty International & US State Department Political Terror Scale

There was considerable violence in the post-election protests in 2018, around fuel prices in 2019, and further civil violence in 2020. Human Rights Watch reported that in 2019 security forces responded by killing 17 people, raping 17 women, shooting and injuring 81 people, and arresting over 1,000 suspected protesters during door-to-door raids.17

Amnesty International has documented the use of torture and abduction as a means of political control in Zimbabwe, as well as the recent torture of female opposition leaders.18 Similarly, the Human Rights NGO Forum has documented 92 abductions and beatings, 88 gunshot wounds or dog bites, and 893 cases of assault since 2017.19 According to human rights groups, reported torture methods include beating victims with sticks, clubs, cables, gun butts, sjamboks (heavy whips), and even pouring corrosive substances onto their skin.20

Many people fear political violence and intimidation, with 52% of the adult population expressing fear of political intimidation, while 34% fearing violence. MDC-T supporters (69%) were more likely than ZANU-PF affiliates (28%) to say that they fear political intimidation or violence during election campaigns.

28 | Political imprisonment

Citizens working at civil society organisations, members of the opposition, and journalists, often face imprisonment based on their political beliefs. The Government has been quick to arrest opposition members before court orders have been issued, while leaving ruling party members secure in their positions. This is the case even where there is overwhelming evidence of violation of the rule of law.21

Examples of political imprisonment On August 1, 2018, when opposition supporters took to the streets to protest the delay in announcing the election results, President Mnangagwa ordered soldiers onto the streets, killing six protestors as a result. In 2019, the security forces launched a violent clampdown on the opposition and civil society when protests broke out as a result of escalating fuel prices.22 The Government has responded with ordering partial internet shutdowns, and warning participants that they will be treated like “terrorists”, threatening them with jail. All of these actions targeted freedom of speech. In February 2019, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reported extensive human rights violations during the crackdown, documenting 954 arrests.23 In 2020, human rights groups documented at least 22 cases in which activists were charged with treason or subversion.24 The worsening economic situation has led to more protests, and therefore more incarcerations. While authorities appear to tolerate some of these actions, leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and the Amalgamated Rural Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe were charged with subversion, attributing it to their role in the organisation of January’s mass protests.25 In 2020, the whistle blowing journalist Hopewell Chin’ono exposed alleged corruption on coronavirus response supplies. He was arrested and remained in custody for at least 45 days before being granted bail.26

Political imprisonment has also been used to silence the voices of journalists and opposition leaders who criticise the ZANU-PF. In early 2019, NGOs reported the arrest of at least 1,000 political and civil activists, with another 150 arrests in the Summer for alleged involvement in planned demonstrations in Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, and other cities.27 This violence affects civil society organisations. In wake of protests, several activist groups faced threats to their personal safety and security, leading them to self-censor. This has supressed civic society who lost most of their support base and their ability to organise.28

Key recommendation – Police Complaints Unit: Respect for civil liberties could be reinforced by an autonomous Police Complaints Unit, which could enact thorough investigations into cases of human rights abuses, and consequently improve access to justice for victims of police brutality.

| 29 Accountability

Zimbabwean security forces generally are not prosecuted for politically related violence and terror. Laws forgiving excesses of security forces were put in place in 1987 following the Matabeleland massacres, with clemency laws forgiving torture and other offences enacted in 2000 and 2002.29

Commissions set up to investigate political violence have done little to hold perpetrators to account. Following the 2008 election violence, Section 252 of the Constitution was enacted to provide for the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, to promote healing, reconciliation, unity, and cohesion. In early 2018, President Mnangagwa also signed the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act.30 However, these acts have not yet resulted in practical actions.

One positive development is that President Mnangagwa set up the Motlande Commission of Inquiry, following the post-election violence in 2018, where six people died as a result of the actions by state security forces.31,32 As a result of this, the ZRP ensured that junior police officers would go on refresher training courses. The retraining (and imparting) of skills is also one of the recommendations by the Motlanthe Commission, which noted that police officers should be given skills and capacity and be professionally retrained.33

The Government has not established an independent complaints mechanism to investigate allegations against security forces misconduct as called for in the constitution.34

Key recommendation – Immunity Protections: Legislation that currently absolves individual security agents from criminal liability regarding unlawful arrests and detention could be reformed to increase accountability.

No security personnel have been arrested for their role and involvement in the violence in 2018 and 2019.35 According to the 2020 Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) report, the Zimbabwe Republic Police tops the list of public violence perpetrators in Zimbabwe, closely followed by the ruling ZANU-PF party.36

Key recommendation – Police Professionalism: Increasing the professionalism and training the of the police force could help ensure they are a politically independent force whose primary role is the protection of citizens. This should be coupled with a review of their capabilities for the enforcement of rulings by the independent judiciary, and strengthen their capacity to build strong cases for the courts. Professionalisation of the police could be further reinforced by greater emphasis on merit-based recruitment, and basing remuneration increases on qualifications and further training.

Key recommendation – Police code of conduct: The role of the police as the protector of citizens could be enhanced by establishing a new Police Code of Conduct, which would include zero corruption and no maltreatment of suspects. The code could be implemented by providing human rights training and education for all members of the security forces and other state agencies.

30 | Zimbabwe has not ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degradation Treatment or Punishment (UNICAT), or the UN Convention on Torture. At present, there is no specific law that criminalises torture in Zimbabwe.37

For Zimbabwe, reducing political violence relies on addressing underlying political tensions and also enhancing police training and professionalism, so that situations can be defused, rather than being allowed to escalate.

VIOLENT CRIME (AFRICAN RANK: 45TH)

This measures the level to which violent domestic crime affects the citizens of a country. Whilst the availability of reliable data is a constraint on the accurate measurement of the levels of violent crime, homicides, and rape in Zimbabwe, the degree to which violence is resorted to significantly impacts the security of individuals and communities

Zimbabwe ranks 45th in Africa for Violent Crime. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime argues that the scale of killings, violence, and larger trends in Zimbabwe are difficult to gauge due to unavailability of data and underreporting.38 The Overseas Security Advisory Council concludes that violent crime in Zimbabwe has increased by 10-20% in recent years, leading the US Department of State to assess Harare as a high threat location for detected crime.39

Figure 3: Intentional homicides Figure 4: Safety walking alone at night

Weaker Stronger Stronger Weaker 40 90

35 80

30 70 Global Median 60 25 50 20 40

15 Percentage 30 10 20 homicides /100,000 population 5 Global Median 10 0 0

Kenya Ghana Malawi GhanaKenya Malawi Namibia BurundiZambia EthiopiaRwanda Rwanda Burundi Ethiopia ZambiaNamibia Botswana Tanzania Morocco Mauritius Tanzania Mauritius Morocco Botswana Zimbabwe Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Mozambique South Africa Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2017 Source: Gallup 2019

While Zimbabwe’s homicide rate remains significantly below South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, it is still very high, at 43rd in Africa. The relatively high rate of homicides (see Figure 3) is related to gangs and conflicts in relation to artisanal mining, particularly gold. This includes more than 100 murders in the Kadona mines between August and October 2019.40

It has also been reported that groups of Mashurugwi (the umbrella term to refer to all the gold mining gangs that emerged elsewhere in Zimbabwe), are widely engaged in violent activities, not only towards rival machete gangs, but civilians as well, leading to several reports of children being killed, women raped and men maimed in attacks by these gangs.41 | 31 In addition, research conducted by the Zimbabwe Women Resource Centre and Network highlighted that domestic violence accounts for more than 60% of murder cases that go through the high court in Harare.42

Key recommendation – Community Policing: Better community policing could come from Increasing positive interaction with urban and rural youth, strengthening community relations, and listening to and addressing the public safety concerns of residents. This would require strengthening cooperation between the ZRP and traditional leaders.

Case Study – Gang violence Gang warfare has been on the rise since 2017 with hundreds of people being killed across the country in wars as rival gangs fight for control of gold mines.43 The Zimbabwe Peace Project noted the killings of a 105 people in the mining town of Kadoma, with hundreds of others severely injured in machete attacks between August and October 2019.44 Violence perpetrated by machete-wielding artisanal miners is on the rise in Zimbabwe, as gangs battle to control small-scale gold mines.45 Relaxation on the laws of illegal mining, which was decriminalised in 2017, has led to an “an outpouring of violence as the gangs have become a law unto themselves.”46 Zimbabwe's laws also do not recognise artisanal mining, meaning that a lack of regulations to protect artisanal miners has left them open to gang violence.47 To combat this, the police have banned unauthorised possession of dangerous weapons (including machetes), have targeted illegal mining hotspots, and arrested more than 1,500 illegal panners.48 While police units have put out statements discussing deployment of the force in areas where criminal activities around illegal extraction of gold were occurring, some have been accused of colluding with gangs and receiving bribes. Some reports suggest machete gangsters periodically drive in and out of Zororo, a prime spot for machete violence, where they buy and take away consignments of up to 50 machetes a trip, concealed in boxes. They are allowed to pass through roadblocks easily, as they bribe the police.49

Key recommendation – Police mandate: Systems and processes to ensure more efficient investigation and prosecution of violent crimes could be introduced. These could include re- allocation of transport and equipment resources in favour of regular anti-crime policing, and the introduction of greater use of digital policing tools.

Key recommendation – Police organisation: The size of the police force could be reviewed. Introducing better pay and conditions (linked to performance and training) could improve effectiveness. The Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice should appoint a professional executive to oversee overlapping institutional reforms across policing and justice.

32 | PROPERTY CRIME (AFRICAN RANK: 20TH)

This measures the level to which property crime, such as burglary, organised crime, or the impact of crime on business, destabilises the security of individuals and affects both the wealth and wellbeing of individuals.

Zimbabwe ranks 20th in Africa for Property Crime. There has been a significant increase in property crime in the last two years, driven partly by the worsening economy. Many incidents around robbery, juvenile delinquencies, and petty crime, related to unemployment, leading people to resort to crime as a means of survival. Telecommunication and electricity companies have also been affected by property crime (Figure 5). Community policing units have been established to tackle this increase in crime.

Figure 5: Property stolen

Weaker Stronger 45 40 35 30 25 20 Percentage 15 Global Median 10 5 0

Malawi Kenya Ghana Zambia Rwanda Namibia Burundi Ethiopia Botswana Tanzania Morocco Mauritius Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: Gallup 2019

Petty theft is common in Zimbabwe, with mugging, pickpocketing, and jewellery theft occurring commonly in city centres. Between 2017-2018, housebreaking cases increased by 20%, car theft by 27%, robberies by 34%, and other thefts by 49%.50 The rate of property crimes, such as vandalism and theft, stood at 65%. The rate of those mugged or robbed was 60%, whilst the rate of home invasions was 68%, all classified as “high”.51 Statements from the police have also revealed a surge in the number of criminals using unmarked or stolen vehicles to commit crime.52 These smash-and-grab incidents can include theft from unattended vehicles, and attacks at intersections at night, usually at intersections with faulty traffic lights.53

According to OSAC’s 2020 Crime and Safety Report, the need for genuine US Dollars for export or exchange on the international markets is also a prime motivation behind the constant criminal threat to the citizens and tourists.54 The increased use of mobile transactions has all led to an emergence of bank card fraud and card cloning, due to which losses of at least $200,000 have been accrued.55 This is exacerbated by lack of secure technology. More than 50% of Zimbabwean banks have adopted chip-based payment cards which are considered less secure than the new magnetic technology, falling prey to breaches and fraud.56,57

| 33 Business impact

Firms have been an increasing target of robberies, thefts, vandalism, and arson. However, the situation in Zimbabwe is better than in comparable nations. In 2019, firms affected by theft and vandalism in Zimbabwe lost an estimated 4.6% of their sales, compared to an 11.1% loss of sales in Morocco, 8% in Mozambique, and 5% in Kenya.58 The percentage of firms in Zimbabwe identifying theft, crime, and disorder as a major constraint to doing business is 7.4%, a figure much lower than the sub-Saharan Africa levels of 24.2%, and the global rate of 20.3%.59

Network vandalism in telecommunications and electricity TelOne has experienced an increase in thefts and vandalism of its infrastructure, especially of copper cable wires.60 The rise of copper prices has led to a surge in illicit copper dealings across the country. As part of research conducted on the impact of network vandalism in Zimbabwe, 67% of participants interviewed pointed to high unemployment as the root cause for this vandalism. Unemployed youth are resorting to stealing copper wires and cables from the organisation to make ends meet.61 The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), has also experienced increased levels of vandalism with reports of 927 transformers been vandalised or stolen in the Northern Region, 625 in the Western Region, 525 in Harare Region and 94 in the Eastern Region.62 The Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company (ZETDC) also claimed that up to 30,000 households are without power due to vandalism of about 4,000 transformers, cables, and associated materials, needing about 15 million U.S. dollars to replace the stolen and vandalised materials.63

Government efforts

The Government has taken steps in combating property theft, by setting up specialised units, imposing strict penalties, enforcing community policing, and involving community leaders to employ a multi-faceted approach to solving overall property crime.64,65

The police use community policing as one of its most important strategies to counter property crime, and has set up the Neighbourhood Watch Committee (NWS), Crime Consultative Committees (CCCs), Home Officer’s Scheme (HOS), Junior Call, police bases/posts, suggestion boxes, hotlines, and social media platforms, to enhance its crime prevention and awareness strategy. To ensure that this strategy is carried out effectively in the rural areas, the police collaborate with with traditional community leaders to recruit proxies to assist with policing along with their ability to mobilisie businessmen to provide funding given the lack of police resources in these regions.66

Key recommendation – Corruption-fighting capacity: Adopting technologies within the ZRP system to track and curb corruption would be an effective way to strengthen police capacity in this area.

34 | Endnotes

1 Xolisani Ncube, “Beitbridge farm saga deepens,” The Standard, Jan17, 2016. 2 Jan Raath, “White farm seized for Robert Mugabe ally,” The Times, June 28, 2017, “Riot Police Storm Farm, Throw Out White Farmer to Make Way for Bishop Manhanga,” New Zimbabwe, June 22, 2017. 3 Kevin Sieff, “Zimbabwe seized white farmers’ land. Now some are being invited back.” The Washington Post, September 14, 2015;“Zimbabwe: Treatment of white, or non-indigenous, minorities by authorities and society; availability of state protection (2015-July 2017)” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, August 11, 2017. 4 “Zimbabwe 2019 Crime and Safety Report,” Overseas Security Advisory Council, May 17, 2019. 5 Nicola de Jager and Catherine Musuva, “The inflex of Zimbabweans into South Africa: a crisis of governance that spills over,” Africa Review 8, no.1, October 23, 2015. 6 “Refugee population by country or territory of origin – Zimbabwe,” The World Bank Data Bank, last accessed September 28, 2020. 7 “South Africa Multi-Country Office,” Southern Africa, Operations, UNHCR, reporting.unhcr.org, last accessed September 28, 2020. 8 “Zimbabwe President Mnangagwa says he was ‘inches’ from Bulawayo explosion,” BBC News, June 24, 2018. 9 “Global Terrorism Index 2019,” Institute for Economics and Peace, November 2019. 10 Peter Fabricius, “How serious is the Islamic State threat to attack South Africa,” Institute for Security Studies, July 23, 2020. 11 Princeton N. Lyman , “The War on Terrorism in Africa” in Africa in World Politics, ed. By John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, (Boulder: West View Press, 2017) January 3, 2017. 12 Fortune Chimbaru, “Country Report Zimbabwe,” Resource Material Series, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, no.71, March 2007, p. 67-75. 13 “Not funding terrorism, Says RBZ Chief,” The Herald, May 11, 2020. 14 “Suspected state security agents abduct, torture Zimbabwe civil society activist,” Club of Mozambique, August 2019. 15 Dewa Mavhinga, “Reversing Zimbabwe’s Dismal Rights Record Since 1980,” Zimbabwe Independent¸ April 18, 2020. 16 Ibid. 17 “Zimbabwe, Events of 2019,” Country-Chapters, hrw.org, last accessed September 28, 2020. 18 “Open for Business, Close for Dissent,” Amnesty International, February 2019. Zimbabwe: Ruthless crackdown on freedom of assembly exposes intolerance for dissent,” Amnesty International, February 8, 2019. 19 Shingai Nyoka, “‘Tortured Zimbabwe, abductees’ may face prosecution,” BBC News, May 19, 2020. 20 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 21 “BTI 2020 Country Report — Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 12. 22 Ibid, p. 29. 23 “Zimbabwe,” 2020, Freedom in the World, Zimbabwe, Freedom House, last accessed September 28, 2020. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 “Hopewell Chin’ono: Whistle-blowing Zimbabwean journalist arrested,” BBC News, July 20, 2020. 27 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 28 Maureen Kademaunga, “Civic Activism in the Post-Mugabe Era,” Carnegie Europe¸ October 24, 2019. 29 “Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland massacres,” BBC News, April 11, 2018. 30 “BTI 2020 Country Report — Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 36. 31 Dewa Mavhinga, “Reversing Zimbabwe’s Dismal Rights Record Since 1980,” Zimbabwe Independent¸ April 18, 2020. 32 Ishmael Mugari and Emeka E. Obioha, “Patterns, Costs, and Implications of Police Abuse to Citizens’ Rights in the Republic of Zimbabwe,” Social Sciences 7, no.116, (July 16, 2018) p. 12. 33 Bulawayo Bureau, “Police reforms shape up,” The Herald, 04 June, 2019. 34 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 35 Dewa Mavhinga, “Reversing Zimbabwe’s Dismal Rights Record Since 1980,” Zimbabwe Independent¸ April 18, 2020. 36 “Monthly Monitoring Report,” Zimbabwe Peace Project, March 2020. 37 “Anti Impunity Update- 30 June 2019,” Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, July 1, 2019. 38 “Global study on Homicide,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019. 39 “2020 Crime and Safety Report,” Overseas Security Advisory Council, April 14, 2020. 40 Robert Tapfumaneyi, "Zimbabwe: Statistics show 105 murders reported in Kadoma’s mines," New Zimbabwe, 12 November 2019. / | 35 41 Simukai Tinhu, “Why is Zimbabwe doing so little to tackle growing gang violence,” African Arguments, February 19, 2020. 42 International: Femicide and the Scales of Injustice,” Gender Links, December 2, 2014. 43 Kevin Samaita, “Machete-wielding gangs hold Zimbabwe gold mines hostage,” Business Day, January 2, 2020. 44 Ibid 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Gamuchirai Masiyiwa, “In Zimbabwe, Violence Follows Unregistered Gold Miners,” Global Press Journal, Decem- ber 8, 2019. 48 Brenna Matendere, “Machete Violence - Militias Now for Hire,” The Standard, January 26, 2020. 49 Ibid. 50 “Latest crime data: More Zimbabweans turning to crime as economic woes mount,” Newzwire, May 24, 2019. 51 “Crime in Harare, Zimbabwe,” Zimbabwe, Crime, numbeo.com. 52 Emmanuel Kafe, “Armed robberies: Police unleash the big guns,” The Sunday Mail, February 23, 2020. 53 “Zimbabwe 2020 Crime and Safety Report,” Overseas Security Advisory Council, April 14, 2020. 54 Ibid. 55 “Zimbabwe’s cash shortage sparks rise in bank card fraud,” News24, July 2, 2018. 56 Ibid. 57 Livingstone Marufu, “Local banks in 50pc EMV technology adoption,” Business Times, September 11, 2019. 58 “Losses due to theft and vandalism (% of annual sales of affected firms) – Zimbabwe,” World Bank Data Bank, last accessed September 28, 2020. 59 “Zimbabwe,” Explore economies, data, Enterprisesurveys.com last accessed September 28, 2020. 60 “TelOne decries vandalism, thefts,” The Herald, November 1, 2018. 61 Anthony Tapiwa Mazikana, “The Impact of Network Vandalism in Zimbabwe,” SSRN, September 24, 2019. 62 Elia Ntali, “Stiffer Penalties for Electricity Theft,” 263Chat.com, February 5, 2020. 63 “Zimbabwe power utility decries vandalism of infrastructure as nation faces power shortages,” Xinhau, May 24, 2019. 64 “Criminal Investigation Department,” Specialised Units, Zimbabwe Republic Police, zrp.gov.zw, last accessed September 28, 2020. 65 Ibid. 66 Whitehead Zikhali, “Community Policing And Crime Prevention: Evaluating The Role Of Traditional Leaders Under Chief Madliwa In Nkayi District, Zimbabwe,” International Journal for Climate Justice and Social Democracy 8, no. 4, November 2019, p. 109-122.

36 | | 37 Credit (Shutterstock.com) 38 | Credit (gettyimages.co.uk) PERSONAL FREEDOM (AFRICAN RANK 44TH)

Freedom is important because it enables people to pursue their ambitions and follow their own paths in life. With freedom also comes the responsibility for their actions. Societies that foster strong civil rights and freedoms enjoy increased levels of both happiness and life satisfaction among their residents. A society benefits from higher levels of income when its residents’ personal liberties are protected and when it is welcoming of the diversity that stimulates innovation. Civil and political freedoms, such as freedom of speech and elections, help promote economic security. Uncertainty associated with lack of respect for human rights makes the return on investment more insecure and volatile. Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Personal Freedom. It performs poorly for freedom of assembly and association and freedom of speech and access to information. While the 2013 Constitution protects civil liberties, in many cases these protections are not respected by the security forces or enforced by the judiciary. The overall legal framework of personal freedom serves to protect the Government and limit political accountability. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act effectively criminalises free speech, and the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act effectively criminalises public meetings. The Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) outlaws the publication of anything deemed “likely to cause alarm and despondency”. Similarly, Zimbabwe’s authorities frequently use Section 22 of the Criminal Law act provision on “subverting a constitutional government,” to prosecute those suspected of organising protests. A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where essential personal freedoms and civil liberties are respected, not only in the Constitution and legislation, but also in the practice of the Government and security services. Every citizen needs to feel confident and free of fear knowing that their essential rights are protected, including to security and liberty, privacy, equal treatment under the law, right of due process and access to a fair trial.

Elements of Personal Freedom Agency – the degree to which individuals are free from coercion or restriction and are free to move. At its heart, an individual experiences agency if they have the freedom to act independently and make their own choices. Forced bondage and slavery, unlawful imprisonment, restrictions on movement, and numerous other factors can act as impediments on agency. Freedom of Assembly and Association – the degree to which people have the freedom to assemble with others in public spaces to express opinions freely, with autonomy from the state, and to form collective interest organisations. Freedom of Speech and Access to Information – the ability of people to express political opinion without reproach and the extent to which the media is censored and independent from/ not influenced by the ruling government. The diversity of media views and access to media are also crucial factors underpinning the freedom of speech and access to information. Absence of Legal Discrimination – the level of discrimination in law or by government and whether the law protects individuals and groups from suffering discrimination. This dimension captures multiple factors, including gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, and economic background, as well as the degree to which courts and civil justice exhibit overt or covert bias and discrimination. Social Tolerance – the extent to which societies are tolerant of differences within the population, and the level of tension arising over these differences. Societal discrimination and intolerance can engender serious issues within a society, and are a significant inhibitor of an individual’s de facto freedoms. AGENCY (AFRICAN RANK: 40TH)

Agency captures the degree to which individuals are free from coercion or restriction and are free to move. At its heart, an individual experiences agency if they have the freedom to act independently and make their own free choices. Forced bondage and slavery, unlawful imprisonment, restrictions on movement, and numerous other factors can act as impediments on agency.

Zimbabwe ranks 40th in Africa for Agency. Constitutional civil liberties are not uniformly protected, because implementation can be restricted by the manipulation of procedures and political interference. The judiciary are not able to prevent the state from infringing on civil liberties. There is limited protection from illegitimate use of force or due process in courts. Recently, satisfaction with freedom has declined, with the country now ranking 42nd in Africa.1

Figure 6 and Figure 7 show that Zimbabwe's performance in due process and rights and satisfaction with freedom is relatively low compared to other African countries.

Figure 6: Due process and rights Figure 7: Satisfaction with freedom

Stronger Weaker Stronger Weaker 0.7 100 90 0.6 Global Median 80 0.5 70 Global Median 60 0.4 50 0.3

Percentage 40

Expert survey (0-1) Expert survey 0.2 30 20 0.1 10 0.0 0

GhanaMalawiKenya Kenya GhanaMalawi Namibia Rwanda Zambia Ethiopia Burundi Rwanda Zambia EthiopiaNamibia Burundi BotswanaMauritius Morocco Tanzania Mauritius Tanzania Botswana Morocco Zimbabwe Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Mozambique South Africa Source: World Justice Project (Rule of Law Index) 2020 Source: Gallup 2019

Freedom from interference with privacy

The Interception and Communications Act 2007 and the Cybersecurity and Data Protection Bill 2020 damage the citizen's right to privacy, giving a legal basis for surveillance of communications.2 The Law allows for the Government to intercept and monitor any form of transmission.3 There is compulsory registration of SIM cards, and information on mobile users is kept on a centralised database.4 As a result, the right to privacy is often not respected. For example, civil society organisations are often under surveillance. Afrobarometer polls show that 70% of Zimbabweans think that government should not monitor private communications.5

Article 25 of the Constitution protects the institution of the family, while Article 57 protects the right to privacy. However, the Government does not appear to consistently respect these rights.6 According to the US State Department, throughout 2019, government officials have pressured local chiefs and ZANU loyalists to spy on people thought to support other political parties.7 Intelligence agencies are not bound by laws that place limits on their powers, and are not overseen by independent bodies.8 Despite the Constitution (Article 224) stating that any intelligence service must be non-partisan, a number of observers agree that intelligence agencies respond to the ruling party.9 40 | Recommendation – Oversight Institutions: Increasing the capacity and financial resources of oversight and complaint institutions would help ensure that these bodies can foster the protection of essential civil liberties.

Freedom of movement

Freedom of movement in Zimbabwe has an African rank of 31st. The Constitution provides for freedom of movement, but in practice, there are a number of restraints. To suppress protests, the Zimbabwean authorities have used roadblocks extensively10 and police checkpoints are used along many major routes throughout the country.11 During protests in Harare in August 2019, “police and armed soldiers searched buses, taxis and private vehicles at checkpoints and randomly asking for identity documents”.12 Furthermore, ahead of demonstrations in July 2020, security forces constructed roadblocks in Harare and other major cities.13

The 2020 lockdown in response to the coronavirus has further curtailed freedom of movement within Zimbabwe, and has been criticised by human rights groups for being ineffective at limiting the spread of the virus, instead compounding the human rights situation.14 A shortage of passports also constrains freedom to leave the country. In 2019, the Government reported a 50,000 passport shortage, suggesting that applicants reapply in 2022.15

One improvement in the freedom of movement in Zimbabwe has been the extending of citizenship to stateless peoples who either lacked birth certificates or IDs. This has also included the reintroduction of the recognition of dual citizenship, which had been curtailed in 1983. The 2013 Constitution removed the prohibition on dual citizenship for those that had dual citizenship at birth.16

Freedom from forced labour

Article 55 of the Constitution guarantees freedom from forced labour. The Labour Relations Amendment Act carries a punishment of two years prison time for those found guilty of criminalised forced labour.17 This is very low compared to South Africa, which prescribes penalties of up to life imprisonment and fines of up to US$7 million.18

Given this ineffective enforcement, there are many reported cases of forced labour.19 Examples of forced labour have been reported in agriculture, mining, and domestic servitude, although the full extent of the scale of forced labour is unknown.20 This is compounded by the vagueness of the definition of human trafficking crimes as a movement-based crime, rather than in-line with international law.21 A high burden of proof means that few crimes are classified as human trafficking.22

| 41 FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION (AFRICAN RANK: 50TH)

Freedom of Assembly and Association measures the degree to which people have the freedom to assemble with others in public spaces to express opinions freely, with autonomy from the State, and to form collective interest organisations.

Zimbabwe ranks 50th in Africa for Freedom of Assembly and Association. Despite the 2013 Constitution guaranteeing the right to assembly, these rights are often not respected in practice. Activist groups face threats to their personal safety. Protests have led to violent repression.

Figure 8: Right to associate and organise Figure 9: Autonomy from the State

Stronger Weaker Stronger Weaker 12 1.0 0.9 Global Median 10 0.8 0.7 8 0.6 Global Median 6 0.5

Index (0-1) 0.4 Coding 0-12 Coding 4 0.3 0.2 2 0.1

0 0.0

Kenya Ghana MalawiKenya Ghana Malawi Zambia Namibia Zambia Ethiopia RwandaBurundi Namibia Tanzania MoroccoEthiopiaRwanda Burundi Mauritius Botswana MoroccoTanzania Mauritius Botswana Zimbabwe Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique SouthMozambique Africa Source: Freedom House 2020 Source: Varities of Democracy 2019

Guarantee of assembly and association

Article 58 of the constitution guarantees the right of assembly and association. The Government is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which supports the rights to peaceful assembly and association.23 Despite these protections, the Government has historically had quite severe restrictions on the freedom of assembly. The now repealed Public Order and Security Act (POSA) led to several complaints. While the recent replacement of the POSA with the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPO) in August 2019 has removed some of the most severe restrictions, many still remain, including those giving police the power to prohibit and regulate assemblies. The Act also requires cumbersome advance notice of public gatherings.24

The Special Rapporteur to the United Nations, in their 2019 report, observed that:

“in the management of assemblies, the general presumption that prevails is in favour of maintaining law and order rather than facilitating and guaranteeing the holding of assemblies and enabling the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.”25

Muleya Mwananyanda, Deputy Regional Director at Amnesty International said that “the Zimbabwean authorities will never be able to convince anyone that the country is open for business if they continue to crackdown on anyone who dares to criticise them.”26 There have also been cases of the internet being shut down, in order to slow the spread of protests.27

42 | Under MOPA, many groups seeking to meet have not been issued permits. In August 2019, police “issued prohibition orders against dozens of planned, nationwide MDC demonstrations … citing reasonable suspicion the protests would result in violence and property damage”.28 The MDC national secretary and deputy secretary were charged with “violating POSA’s clause about complying with a prohibition order when they met in downtown Harare”.29

Key recommendation – Freedom to assemble: The freedom to assemble should be strengthened by amending those aspects of MOPA and other legislation that obstruct civil liberties.

According to the 2020 Freedom House report, due process does not prevail in civil and criminal matters, as courts tend to generally protect the interests of the ruling party. Decisions ruling against police and other security personnel are rare. The High Court ruling to uphold a police-ban on protests led by the opposition in 2019, was seen as a strong indicator of the trend of the court supporting police-bans on demonstrations.30

Autonomy from the State

The right of civil society organisations (CSOs) to organise has been constrained. Ahead of the 2008 elections, Amnesty International Zimbabwe reported that CSOs operate under constant surveillance by state security organisations. Tactics include intelligence operatives questioning guests and staff of organisations by way of harassment and intimidation.31

Registration of organisations can take a long time. Under the burdensome rules set out in the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO), it can take from 3 months to a year to set up an NGO. Furthermore, many NGOs in rural areas have had to obtain police clearance or sign an MOU with the District Administrator.32 The process has been described as “onerous, lengthy and complex in nature requiring a significant amount of detailed information of the association”.33 If an application is denied, there is no appeal process.34

Under the PVO, there is Ministerial power to interfere in the internal governance of an association for a number of reasons, including if “it is necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest”.35 In addition, a Minister can inspect “any aspect of the affairs or activities” of any an association.36 To avoid some of these problems, many NGOs register as Trusts under the Deeds Registries Act.37

Government interference is most pronounced where organisations’ messages contradict government policy. Other NGOs have been accused of partisan activities and have had to sign MOUs with local authorities to carry out humanitarian activities.38

Trade unions’ rights are guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 65), and Zimbabwe has also ratified the ILO right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98). However, the Labour Act gives the Government power to veto collective bargaining agreements it considers harmful to the economy, as well as the power to regulate the internal operations of trade unions. Consequently, in practice, there are major restrictions to the right to organise.39

| 43 Striking workers have faced dismissal in some instances, and leaders of labour unions faced extra-legal abductions and abuse in 2019.40 Strikes are banned in essential industries, which the Minister of Labour is able to define.41 The UN Special Rapporteur listed a number of examples of intimidation and violence, such as:42

• The alleged abduction of Dr. Peter Magombeyi (acting president of the Zimbabwe Hospitals Doctors Association), who led strikes over poor working conditions and pay for medical professionals in 2019.43

• The dismissal of nurses in the nationwide strikes of 2018, where the dismissal was later reversed by the courts.44

• The arrest of 14 members of the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe, following a strike in 2018 after protests over low wages and the economic situation.45

According the Special Rapporteur, “Union leaders have expressed that they are living in a toxic environment of constant retaliation and fear”.46

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION (AFRICAN RANK: 44TH)

Freedom of Speech and Access to Information captures the ability of people to express political opinion without reproach and the extent to which the media is censored and is independent from and not influenced by the ruling government.

Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Freedom of Speech and Access to Information. The 2013 Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedoms of the media, but these are curtailed by existing legislation and are not enforced by the state.

Freedom of expression has been limited by the narrow range of actors in the media space, with the largest concentration of media being in the hands of government.47 As a result of government restrictions on press freedom, MISA Zimbabwe argues that recent police harassment of journalists during the pandemic lockdown, has led to “an atmosphere of anxiety and self-censorship among journalists which would compromise objective reporting.”48 According to Freedom House, “official monitoring of public gatherings, prosecution of offenses like insulting or undermining the president, and the threat of political violence serve as deterrents to unfettered speech.”49

Freedom of speech

Section 61 of the 2013 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and communicate ideas and other information. Freedom of expression extends to academic freedom, freedom of artistic expression and scientific research and creativity. However, in practice, a number of laws are not aligned to the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution,50 including sections of the Criminal Law, the Maintenance of Peace Order Act, etc.

Zimbabwe's legislative framework and implementation has resulted in a situation where Afrobarometer found that 76% of respondents think that people always/often have to be careful what they say in politics and 58% of people think that they are not at all free to criticise the president (with a further 16% responding ‘not very free’). Caution (self-censorship) about political speech was more common among young respondents (age 18-35).51

44 | Press freedom

At independence, Zimbabwe inherited harsh laws designed to consolidate white rule, including the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) and the Official Secrets Act (OSA), which limited freedom of expression.52 Beginning in 2009, under the Government of National Unity (GNU), there was a loosening of media restrictions, with foreign broadcasters such as the BBC and CNN allowed back into the country.53 In 2010, several new newspapers that were registered and allowed to publish.54 However, media freedom has since regressed, resulting in multiple arrests of journalists.

Sections 61 and 62 of the Constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the media. This encompasses the confidentiality of journalistic sources of information and freedom of electronic media, such as broadcast media (subject to State licensing).55 State licencing of media is meant to be independent. However, there are a number of laws that restrict freedoms. The Criminal Law Act, for example, “severely limits what journalists may publish and imposes harsh penalties on those that violate the act, including long prison sentences”.56 Fines of up to US$5,000 or 20 years in prison have been dealt to people found guilty of publishing false statements.57

The 2002 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) restricted the ability of journalists to investigate corruption.58 Since the establishment of AIPPA, journalists and media houses have had their registration denied or revoked.59 The AIPPA was replaced by Freedom of Information Act in July 2020, which is regarded as a better piece of legislation, albeit including some very restrictive provisions.60

Figure 10: Press freedom from physical repression

Weaker Stronger 60

40 Global Median 30

Index (0-100) 20

Kenya Malawi Ghana Burundi Rwanda Zambia Ethiopia Namibia Morocco Tanzania Mauritius Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: Reporters without Borders 2020

The courts have sometimes stood opposed to these controls. For example, in June 2019 the High Court ruled that state-controlled news organisations were reporting in a biased way, such that they breached Section 61 of the Constitution.

| 45 Media diversity

Freedom of expression has been limited by the narrow range of actors in the media space, with the largest concentration of media being in the hands of government.61 Mainstream media diversity is limited. The only television station is run by the state. Print media is also largely controlled by the state. Radio ownership is dominated by a few players, who are either government or individuals connected to the ruling party.62 Media diversity has improved by social media; however, there are risks of Government surveillance and control.

Key recommendation – State-owned media: State-owned media should be independent public-service broadcasters and run at an arms-length from government, with funding free from political interference.

The internet has opened up opportunities for expression and organisation, as well as undermined the monopoly position of state media. The Government has sometimes shut down the internet to prevent protestors gathering.63 In 2019, during the fuel price hikes, the Zimbabwean government ordered a three-day shutdown of the internet, disrupting many forms of communication.64 It has also arrested people for critical posts on social media, leading to a degree of self-censorship.65

Key recommendation – Internet shutdowns: The Government should not use internet shutdowns as a means of controlling access to information.

ABSENCE OF LEGAL DISCRIMINATION (AFRICAN RANK: 42ND)

Absence of Legal Discrimination assesses the level of discrimination in law or by government and whether the law protects individuals and groups from suffering discrimination. This dimension captures multiple factors, including gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity and economic background.

Zimbabwe ranks 42nd in Africa for Absence of Legal Discrimination. Section 56 of the Constitution promotes equality and non-discrimination. Despite that, in a 2017 survey, 62% of interviewees said in 2017 that people are often or always treated unequally.66

46 | Figure 11: Equal treatment and absence of discrimination

Stronger Weaker 0.8

0.7 Global Median 0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3 Expert survey (0-1) Expert survey 0.2

0.1

0.0

Ghana Malawi Kenya Rwanda Namibia Burundi Zambia Ethiopia Morocco Botswana Mauritius Tanzania Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: World Justice 2020 Project (Rule of Law Index)

Article 17 of the Constitution commits the Government to full gender equality. According to the UNDP Gender Inequality Index, Zimbabwe ranks 125th out of 159 countries.67 There are some positive results for women. For example, there are 60 reserved seats for women in Parliament, and women make up 31% of Parliament.68,69 One of the major challenges for women’s rights is unfair access to land. Most women do not own land, despite constituting a large share of the people working the land.70 Furthermore, many widows lose access to their land after their husbands die, because many marriages are unregistered which cause difficulties in court when asserting ownership of land.71

Key recommendation – Economic rights of women: Ensuring greater opportunities for women to own land and improving protections for widows, especially where marriages have not been formally registered, would help enshrine the principles of equality in the Constitution.

Article 60 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, which includes freedom of thought, opinion, religion or belief, and the freedom to practice those beliefs. Religious activities are constrained by the restrictive laws regarding freedoms of assembly, expression and association. Freedom House finds that “congregations perceived to be critical of the Government have faced harassment.”72

Gay marriage is specifically prohibited by the constitution, and under President Mugabe there was a high degree of hostility towards the LGBT community. However, in spite of this hostility, prosecutions of consensual same-sex relationships were rare.73 Where prosecutions were made, individuals would often be charged for low-level misdemeanours.74 Under President Mnangagwa, this situation appears to be improving.75 He has personally met with LGBT representatives to discuss their challenges.

| 47 SOCIAL TOLERANCE (AFRICAN RANK: 36TH)

The extent to which societies are tolerant of differences within the population, and the level of tension arising over these differences. Societal discrimination and intolerance can engender serious issues within a society and are a significant inhibitor of an individual’s de facto freedoms.

Zimbabwe ranks 36th for Social Tolerance, near the global median in terms of tolerance of ethnic minorities. On the other hand, perceived tolerance of migrants has declined somewhat over the last decade, ranking 33rd in Africa.

Figure 12: Perceived tolerance of ethnic minorities

Stronger Weaker 90 80 Global Median 70 60 50 40 Percentage 30 20 10 0

Kenya Malawi Ghana Rwanda Ethiopia Burundi Zambia Namibia Mauritius Botswana Tanzania Morocco Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: Gallup 2019

Zimbabwe is near the global median in terms of tolerance of ethnic minorities (see Figure 12). Aside from tensions between the white and black population, the main ethnic tension in Zimbabwe exists between the Shona, who make up majority of the population, and the Ndebele. Animosity exists between these two groups as a result of historical conflicts, including the Gukurahundi massacre. Politically, the Ndebele people have been associated with the MDC opposition party, and this is also a factor of tension.

In a recent Gallup survey, just 7% of Zimbabweans surveyed say that their area is a good place for LGBT individuals to live. For LGBT individuals, there are “long-standing traditional views about sexuality and gender that limit their full participation in the community and workforce.”76 For example, while lesbian relationships are not illegal, there are many examples of intolerance, including rape and other forms of violence.77 Politicians have not actively tried to address homophobia in Zimbabwean society, and in the past it is alleged that LGBT peoples have been used as scapegoats.78

However, there has been some recent progress. Gays and Lesbians Zimbabwe (GALZ) have stated that “there is growing tolerance of LGBTI in Zimbabwe especially amongst younger people in urban areas who have grown up with the knowledge that gay and lesbian people exist within their midst”.79

48 | Endnotes

1 Gallup World Poll, 2019. 2 The Right of Privacy in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO, et al 2016. and PEN International, Media Insti- tute of Southernn Africa submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection to the right of freedom of opinion and expression. 3 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 4 “The Right to Privacy,” Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the Digital Society of Zimbabwe, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, and Privacy International, March 2016. 5 “Majority of Zimbabweans want government out of private communications, religious speech,” Afrobarometer, Dispatch no. 165, 2017. 6 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 7 Ibid. 8 “The Right to Privacy in Zimbabwe,” Privacy International, March 2016. 9 Ibid. 10 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 11 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 12 “Several injured as Zimbabwean police, protesters clash in Harare,” ENCA, August 16, 2019. 13 “Zimbabwe: Security forces set up roadblocks in Harare ahead of planned demonstrations on July 31 /update 1,” GardaWorld, July 30, 2020. 14 “Press Statement: Illegalities, Human Rights Violations and Inadequacy of Measures In Response To,” Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, April 23, 2020. 15 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019. 16 “Zimbabwe,” Citizen Rights in Africa Initiative, last accessed September 29, 2020. 17 “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Zimbabwe,” United States Department of State, June 2019. 18 “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: South Africa,” United States Department of State, 2019. 19 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019, p. 43. 20 Ibid. 21 “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Zimbabwe,” United States Department of State, 2019 . 22 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019, p. 43. 23 “End of Mission Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, on his visit to Zimbabwe (17-27 September 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, September 27, 2019. 24 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 25 “Visit to Zimbabwe – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (A/HRC/44/50/Add.2),” United Nations Human Rights Council, June 24, 2020. 26 “Zimbabwe: Ruthless crackdown on freedom of assembly exposes intolerance for dissent,” Amnesty Internation- al¸ February 8, 2019. 27 “End of Mission Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, on his visit to Zimbabwe (17-27 September 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, September 27, 2019. 28 “Zimbabwe 2019 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 2019, p. 19. 29 Ibid. 30 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 31 “Zimbabwe: Harassment and intimidation as election looms,” Amnesty International UK¸ March 26, 2008. 32 Teldah Mawarire, “After Elections, Hard Work Starts for Zimbabwe’s Civil Society,” Inter Press Service News Agency, July 27, 2018. 33 “End of Mission Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, on his visit to Zimbabwe (17-27 September 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, September 27, 2019. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 40 Ibid. | 49 41 Ibid. 42 “End of Mission Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, on his visit to Zimbabwe (17-27 September 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, September 27, 2019. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019. 48 Sneha Singh, “Zimbabwe press freedom suffers under pandemic,” International Press Institute¸ August 7, 2020. 49 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 50 Analysis included in “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe” MISA Zimbabwe, 2019. 51 “Fear and trust: explaining professed popular trust in Zimbabwe’s presidents,” Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 399, 20 October, 2020. 52 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019, p. 5. 53 Amin Kamete, A Decade of Zimbabwe, (BRILL: April 25, 2019) p.23 54 Ibid, p. 38. 55 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019, p. 7. 56 Sabine Donner et al, “BTI Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 57 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019, p. 8. 58 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 59 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019, p. 10; Based on expert interviews, 60 “AIPPA scrapped…New Freedom of Information Bill signed into law,” The Herald¸ July 2, 2020. 61 Hlengiwe Dube, “Freedom of Expression in Zimbabwe,” MISA Zimbabwe, December 31, 2019. 62 F Ndlovu ‘Zimbabwe media capture,’ 2017, accessed 26 November 2019. 63 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 64 James Griffiths, “Internet shutdowns aren’t just Africa’s problem. They’re happening worldwide,” CNN, January 18, 2019. 65 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 66 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 67 Sabine Donner et al, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018 68 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 69 “DFAT Country Information Report Zimbabwe,” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 19, 2019. 70 Jeffrey Moyo, “Zimbabwe: Women face discrimination in land ownership,” aa.com, September 7, 2019. 71 “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Zimbabwe,” Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2020. 72 Freedom in the World 2020. Zimbabwe. 73 “DFAT Country Information Report Zimbabwe,” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 19, 2019. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 “Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, Version 4.0,” United Kingdom Home Office, January 2019 p. 20. 79 “About,” galz.org, https://galz.org/faq/

50 | | 51 52 | Credit (gettyimages.co.uk) GOVERNANCE (AFRICAN RANK 40TH)

A stable and trustworthy state is one of the central components of political stability and economic development. The more culturally embedded the rule of law and good governance becomes, the more effective these measures are in promoting and supporting a healthy political, economic and social environment.

The importance of strong governmental institutions to long-run economic growth cannot be overstated; institutional capacity is more important to long-term success than discrete policy choices. Economic progress is not possible without the firm foundation of the rule of law. Failure to respect the rule of law will result in depressed domestic and foreign investment, and cronyism in the business environment, leading people to rely primarily on personal networks and patronage rather than the strength of their own ideas.

Minimising corruption is also critical to the functioning of a society. High levels of corruption are associated with higher levels of poverty and income inequality. Corruption corrodes trust. A culture of trust invariably takes time to become established and is most effective if strong norms, such as trust, respect, and diligence are embedded in a culture, rather than imposed from some outside force as part of a treaty or international agreement.

Zimbabwe ranks 40th for Governance. The nation’s weak governance is explained by the near- total control of the state by ZANU-PF, the ruling party. ZANU-PF sees itself as the natural ruler of Zimbabwe, given the crucial role it played in the liberation struggle. The party has been extremely effective in fusing its interests with those of the military and the police, capturing economic power, and suppressing independent checks and balances on their power, whether by from opposing political forces, the legislature, the judiciary or the electoral transfers of power. The State has provided access to resources for party members, and these have been used for personal gain.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is one where power is shared between different stakeholders for the public good, with meaningful constraints on how power can be exercised in the political, institutional and economic spheres, and where the military is separate from party politics with a focus on security. A competent and independent judiciary would guarantee that everyone, including the state, is subject to the rule of law, with no political interference in judicial processes. The Government would deliver public services with integrity and competence.

| 53 Elements of Governance Executive Constraints – the level of checks and balances, and separation of powers – especially with respect to the executive. For effective executive constraints to be in place, a government must not only have checks and balances and separation of powers, but be free from military involvement, and effective sanctions must be in place for misconduct within office. Political Accountability – the degree to which the public can hold public institutions accountable, capturing the degree of political pluralism, and other mechanisms of accountability. Rule of Law – the fairness, independence, and effectiveness of the judiciary (in applying both civil and criminal law), along with the degree to which the state itself and every citizen are subject to the law. Government Integrity – the integrity of a government, encompassing both the absence of corruption, and the degree to which government acts for the public good and fosters civic participation and engagement through open information and transparent practices. Government Effectiveness – a combination of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, and the competence of officials. Regulatory Quality – all aspects of the running of the regulatory state – whether it is burdensome and impedes private sector development, and whether it is smoothly and efficiently run.

EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS (AFRICAN RANK: 44TH)

A well-functioning government relies on clearly defined, separated powers and an appropriate level of external checks and balances on the executive, from bodies such as the judiciary, media, and civil society. Appropriate action also needs to be taken when officials violate their power. This measure accounts for the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of the executive, such as through the separation of powers into different bodies, and the degree to which there are checks and balances in practice.

Zimbabwe ranks 44th in Africa for Executive Constraints. Checks on executive power exist in the 2013 Constitution, but these checks and balances are not uniformly respected in practice. The ruling party controls the state, and it has remained in power since independence, more than 40 years ago, except for the short power sharing Government of National Unity (2009-2013).

ZANU-PF and the security forces took control of a strong state after independence through the War of Liberation and appear intent on retaining this political power indefinitely, as a way to protect the social gains that have been achieved, especially the land reform. As ZANU-PF and the security forces are closely intertwined, they have all the means to avoid a transfer of power to another political party. The state is fully controlled by ZANU-PF and the security forces. Legislation does not limit the powers of the executive.

54 | Figure 13: Executive powers are effectively limited by the judiciary and legislature

Stronger Weaker 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 Global Median 1.0 0.8 0.6 Expert survey (0-3) Expert survey 0.4 0.2 0.0

Ghana Malawi Kenya Namibia Rwanda Ethiopia Zambia Burundi Mauritius Botswana Morocco Tanzania Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: World Justice Project (Rule of Law Index) 2020

Constitutional changes under President Mugabe There were several constitutional changes designed to concentrate Executive power: — The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 4) Act, 1984 introduced the Office of Ombudsman and reconstituted the Judicial Services Commission, bringing the judiciary under Executive influence. — Perhaps the most far-reaching amendment to the 1980 document was the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 7) Act, 1987 (Act No. 23 of 1987). This set the stage for Robert Mugabe’s increasingly powerful executive presidency and abolished the office of the Prime Minister. The original Lancaster House Constitution provided for a largely ceremonial president, with most of the executive political powers concentrated in the office of the Prime Minister. The new executive President was to hold office for a period of six years with a provision for re-election with no term limits. — Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 12) Act, 1993 re-organised the prison services, the public services, and the armed services, reducing their independence.

From 1980 through to the 1990s, there has been a “continual process of concentrating more and more power in the presidency, and the top circle of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)”.1 There were a number of constitutional amendments between 1980 and 2005, many of which had the purpose of increasing the powers of the executive. The 2013 Constitution, with a strong focus on separation of powers, has not changed the situation in practice.

Key recommendation – Constraints on the Executive: Increasing Parliament’s legislative and executive oversight capacity would increase the overall quality of governance. This could be enhanced by increasing MPs’ access to policy-relevant information including government documents.

| 55 ZANU-PF's control of Parliament has allowed the Government to pass a wide range of legislation that increases the executive power. Furthermore, the executive acts extensively through statutory instruments, rather than legislation, avoiding proper parliamentary scrutiny. This contributes to hasty and poorly thought-out regulations. Ministers often refuse to be held accountable to parliament.

The judiciary is not independent of the state: key judicial appointments are controlled by the Government and when the judgement goes against the Government, the Government is often free to ignore the judgement. Most recently, the President has been seeking to gain the power to appoint judicial officers directly and without oversight, including the Prosecutor General.2 Following the failure to appoint his own justice, President Mnangagwa amended the Constitution to allow the President to select the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and the Judge President of the High Court.

Independent Offices There are six nominally independent bodies meant to check breaches of executive power, including the Auditor General, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), and the Electoral Commission of Zimbabwe.3 Most of these positions are appointed by the President, limiting their ability to be truly independent. However, the Auditor General and the CHRAJ have been partially effective in calling out government abuses of power. The Auditor General, Mildred Chiri, is well-respected and has produced a number of reports that expose government corruption. After being sacked by President Mugabe in 2017, she was rehired by President Mnangagwa, following Parliament’s rejection of her replacement. However, she lacks the key powers to fight corruption. The Auditor General can only identify irregularities but does not have the power to prosecute.4

Recommendation – Oversight bodies: Executive constraints could be further enhanced by giving full political support, operational independence and secure funding to oversight bodies, including: Justice Department, Human Rights Commission, Office of the Auditor General, Attorney General, Anti-Corruption Commission, etc.

Military

The security forces are intertwined with ZANU-PF and play a major role in protecting the ruling party. ZANU-PF is based on the military structures, personnel and culture of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The security forces ensure the continuous rule of ZANU-PF and the protections of the gains of the war of liberation. The security forces enjoy patronage from the state, and they occupy important positions in agriculture, mining, finance, transport, energy, and the state-owned companies.5,6

The security forces have also helped to legitimise the ZANU-PF governments. “The liberation war legacy and the role of the war veterans have been at the heart of ZANU- PF’s legitimizing national discourse throughout the postcolonial period, even if there have been ongoing internal conflicts between the veterans and the political leadership.”7

56 | The connections between ZANU-PF and the security forces have always been very close. Brian Raftopoulos observes: "for most analysts the Zimbabwean military were central to Mugabe’s authoritarian rule, playing a key role in preventing a constitutional change of government through elections for most of the 2000s, including the 'silent military coup' of the electoral violence around the 2008 elections in which opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai won the presidential election but was denied the right to take up state power by the military.”8 In 2017, the military was instrumental in securing the resignation from President Mugabe. This situation also evidenced some division in the military, particularly in relation to the G40 group.9

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (AFRICAN RANK: 31ST)

Political Accountability is important for promoting democracy and ensuring prosperity. It provides a democratic means to monitor government conduct and prevent both the concentration of power and collusion between the state and big businesses. Our measure of Political Accountability captures the degree to which the public can hold public institutions to account, and covers a range of mechanisms of accountability such as periodic elections and the degree of political pluralism.

Zimbabwe ranks 31st in Africa for Political Accountability. ZANU-PF inherited a strong state and acquired broad legitimacy through its leadership in the War of Liberation and initial successes in education, health and land reform. ZANU-PF has used state resources, including the security forces, to undermine opposition groups and ensure that it remains in power.

The use of the state for political and private gains, economic mismanagement and economic crises has affected the legitimacy of the Government. Political and social groups, particularly in urban areas, have united to put pressure on the Government, resulting in contested elections and the Government of National Unity of 2009-2013. However, today the political opposition is weak and fragmented: the opposition Movement for Democratic Change has suffered from intimidation and internal disputes, and has been affected by corruption. Still, opposition parties control many local governments especially in urban areas. Churches and faith groups have helped to hold the state to account and support reconciliation.

Polarisation of society, distrust and fear do not allow for a dialogue between government, the opposition and other stakeholders. There are very few effective complaint mechanisms to support government accountability. Elections are compromised by biases in the Electoral Commission, violence, misuse of state resources and coercion. In the 2018 election, EU observers noted numerous issues including violence, errors in the final results, and a lack of independence in the state media and electoral commission.10

Ruling party legitimacy

One reason political accountability is weak in Zimbabwe is that ZANU-PF inherited a strong capable and repressive state, while it also gained considerable legitimacy from the War of Liberation. The land reform was also a key policy that provided ZANU-PF with greater legitimacy. Land reform responded to the demands of war veterans and citizens and resulted in a fairer land distribution. It brought further legitimacy to the Government, particularly in the eyes of the rural | 57 population. ZANU-PF sees its legitimacy deriving from its role in liberating Zimbabwe, not from an electoral mandate.

ZANU-PF and the military have been able to capture the state to ensure that they can rule indefinitely to protect Zimbabwe’s liberation. Their monopoly in the use of force allows them to repress political opposition or block any potential change of governments. ZANU-PF draws significant external support from other liberation movements in the region (especially the ANC in South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia) and from its recent conflict with the West in relation to the land reform. According to one expert: “[A]n important rhetorical move that is often made on the part of the ruling party is to insist that all of its opposition, as well as civil society and NGOs, are part of a nefarious regime change agenda, and sanctions lend a heavy credence to that cause and further fuel the polarisation within the country.”11

Political competition

The narrative of the War of Liberation used by ZANU-PF and their capacity to co-opt, infiltrate, or use violence against opposition groups, and their control of state resources have made it very difficult for a strong political competitor to emerge and endure. Political competition has been absorbed by ZANU (as in the 1987 ZANU-ZAPU merger), infiltrated (as with MDC), or has been a victim of intimidation or political violence.

The GNU 2009-2013 was formed by ZANU-PF and opposition parties with support from Southern African Development Community. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was a result of political and social groups (particularly in urban areas) coming together to oppose the Government in the context of a severe economic crisis. Power sharing brought some limited political accountability, but the gains were short-lived with the return of ZANU-PF’s monopoly on power in 2013.

Since the 2009-2013 GNU, the MDC has declined in standing, and now the opposition is weak and divided. The transfer of political power has been often contested, but the military and security forces ensured that ZANU-PF remains in power. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change has suffered from intense internal disputes and has itself been affected by corruption.

The Movement for Democratic Change The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in 1999, following the demands of advocacy groups, trade unions, parts of interest groups and students for a reform of the constitution and greater democratisation.12 Its first success was leading a successful campaign to overturn ZANU-PF’s proposed constitution in 2000. This was a blow to the Government and the first time ZANU-PF had faced real opposition. It also won the first round in the 2008 elections (it did not participate in the second round) and later formed a Government of National Unity with ZANU-PF. However, despite these successes, the MDC is now divided and is no longer seen as a viable alternative government.13 According to one academic: “the cumulative effects of state repression, violence, state infiltration, the effects of repeated party splits and the loss of financial support from former donors greatly weakened the structures and capacity of the various MDC formations.”14 In particular, the use of violence and the infighting for positions within the MDC has destroyed much of its credibility and unity. In the 2018 election, there were three opposition alliances, including the MDC Alliance and MDC-T. Furthermore, the Government used the “change” narrative and co- opted many of the MDC’s policies, making the MDC less relevant. 58 | Impartiality of Elections

The Electoral Commission has acted in ways that have favoured the ruling party through non-transparent decisions on revising and delimiting electoral boundaries, voter registration, distribution of voting stations and the disenfranchisement of the Diaspora.

Figure 14: Political participation and rights

Weaker Stronger 7

5 Global Median 4

3 Coding (1-7) Coding

Kenya Malawi Ghana Burundi Rwanda Ethiopia Zambia Namibia Morocco Tanzania Botswana Mauritius Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: Freedom House 2020

Despite the 2013 constitution guaranteeing political rights for Zimbabweans, elections are subject to manipulation through violence, intimidation, and corruption of the electoral body.15 The independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is questioned. Currently it is led by a former military leader.

The 2018 elections were considered more credible than previous elections, although there were still examples of irregularities. The EU, for example, noted that though the elections were competitive and political freedoms were respected,16 there were also a number of irregularities.17 As a result, “many aspects of the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe failed to meet international standards.”18 In addition, the SADC “identified difficulty accessing voter rolls, pro-government bias by the state media, contested postal voting, and the denial of the diaspora’s right to vote".19

The pre-election Afrobarometer survey reported that 33% of rural citizens and 26% of urban residents indicated that they had come across someone who demanded to see the serial number on their registration slips.20

Electoral financing is not regulated. There are no spending limits, no compulsory requirement to report contributions and spending, and no requirement to publish financial reports.21 This is in contrast to 90% of countries that require financial reporting by parties and/or candidates. International observers concluded that “there is a complete lack of reporting requirements and transparency mechanisms . . . undermining the ability of candidates to campaign on a level playing field.”22

| 59 Key recommendation – Political Party Regulation: Regulations and laws should be enacted to support the role of political parties to channel the voice and accountability of citizens, including strictly regulating their financing. All donations and electoral spending should be made transparent.

Key recommendation – Electoral Regulation: In order to support the integrity of future elections, the legal and regulatory framework covering the electoral process should be revised to strengthen the independence and capacity of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.

Public accountability

The lack of opposition and undermining of institutions means the Government faces no real public accountability. State institutions and government officials are not subject to political accountability. Opponents of the regime are often portrayed as unpatriotic tools of a Western regime-change agenda and threats to national security.

One source of limited accountability has been churches and faith groups. The experience with the Organ of National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (part of the General Political Agreement) has been largely positive. Some churches promoted healing and reconciliation while challenging the authority of the state. Ongoing efforts exist to hold government to account by the remnants of an independent media, the legal profession, trade unions and civil society organisations.

Polarisation of society, distrust and fear do not allow for a dialogue between government, the opposition, and other stakeholders. The discourse often features accusations that one side is resorting to political violence and pervasive corruption, while the other side is accused of being subordinate to Western interests and supporting a return to colonial times.

The Government should commit to, and in practice, respond to the demands and priorities of all its citizens, and particularly of the most vulnerable, including rural constituencies. It should also respond to the demands of other groups for a more open economy, the rule of law, the respect of civil liberties, curbing of corruption and a competent and responsive state.

RULE OF LAW (AFRICAN RANK: 30TH)

An independent, impartial, and effective judiciary is a cornerstone of democracy, as it ensures that the law, both civil and criminal, is being fairly and appropriately applied. It also means that business disputes are settled in an open, unbiased, transparent, and predictable manner, which is essential for business development and investment. There needs to be a level playing field for both state agents and firms so that firms can thrive. Our measure of the Rule of Law captures these elements, along with the accountability of the public to the law.

Zimbabwe ranks 30th in Africa for Rule of Law. While the rule of law is constitutionally protected, the judiciary is not independent of the state; key judicial appointments are controlled by the Government, and patronage is widely used to subvert judicial independence. As a result, administration of the law is often influenced by the interests of the ruling party, rather than public interest.

Most recently, the President has sought the power to appoint judicial officers (including the Prosecutor General) directly and without oversight.23 Despite these severe weaknesses, Zimbabwe 60 | retains some aspects of a strong legal system. There are good lawyers, the result of a strong professional legal culture in the past, and some judges who rule with autonomy, particularly in the high court.24

Figure 15: Judicial independence

Stronger Weaker 7

Expert survey (1-7) Expert survey 2

Ghana Kenya Malawi Rwanda Namibia Ethiopia Zambia Burundi Mauritius Botswana Tanzania Morocco Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Global median Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2019

Government bound by the rule of law

The rule of law in Zimbabwe has been consistently weakened, as the executive has created legislation for its own benefit. Rule of law does not constrain the ruling party or state institutions in any meaningful way, and inconvenient court orders are not complied with. This was also evident in the land reform process, when President Mugabe’s government dismissed the rule of law as a peripheral matter.25

Zimbabwe’s courts came into conflict with the executive in connection with the invasions of white owned farms in 2000. When the High Court upheld the property rights of the white farmers, the Government ignored the Court’s orders and attacked the credibility of the judiciary. Several justices were forced to step down. In order to keep the loyalty of existing judges, many were reportedly given farms that had been forcibly taken from white farmers.26

Furthermore, when white farmers took the Government to the SADC Tribunal in 2007, the tribunal found that the Zimbabwe Government had violated the SADC Treaty in that white farmers had been discriminated against on the grounds of race. The Zimbabwe Government did not enforce the judgement, and the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe affirmed the Government’s ability to compulsorily seize land.27

Independence of judiciary

The judiciary is not independent of the state; key judicial appointments are controlled by the Government, and patronage is widely used to subvert judicial independence.

Public interviews are carried out in the appointment of judges, but the best candidate is not always picked. Many of the judges recently appointed are reported not to meet minimum professional standards: there were “candidates that openly admitted they had never been in a court of law in their professional lives, or could not tell the difference between elementary court | 61 procedures such as a court application and a court action.”28 President Mnangagwa has sought greater influence over the appointment of judges in Zimbabwe. Following the failure to appoint his own justice, President Mnangagwa has sought to amend the Constitution to allow to make key appointments without critical oversight.29

Key recommendation – Judicial Independence: The independence of the judiciary can be enhanced by more transparent mechanisms to ensure the appointment of impartial judges, based on professional qualification and integrity. Procedures to protect the independence of judiciary could also include clarifying the length of the term of office, security of tenure during that term, remuneration and pensions.

Judiciary upholding the law

Zimbabwe has some aspects of a strong legal system. There are good lawyers, elements of a strong professional legal culture, and some judges who are independent. While the appeal courts do not often decide against the Government, the High Court does sometimes issue judgements against the Government.30 There are cases where the rule of law has been upheld, however, judges are also prone to corruption, especially in the magistrates’ courts.

Key recommendation – Judicial Integrity: The integrity of the judiciary could also be strengthened by ensuring clear processes for disqualification and removal from office, and broader institutional conditions.

Examples of recent court judgements upholding the Rule of Law - Activist Evan Mawarire was arrested in July 2016 for inciting public violence in terms of section 3616 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. He had attempted to rally citizens to stand up for their constitutional rights under his “This Flag” movement. During the trial, his charge was changed to that of subverting a constitutionally elected government. He was later released after the magistrate ruled that his arrest was unconstitutional. - Jestina Mukoko was similarly accused of trying to overthrow the Government of Zimbabwe; however, it was ruled that the use of torture to obtain evidence was unconstitutional and she was released from police custody. Despite this ruling, neither the state agents who kidnapped and tortured her, nor the state for which these agents work, were held accountable.31

62 | GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY (AFRICAN RANK: 35TH)

Corruption has a serious and significant negative economic impact, reducing public trust and the legitimacy of the state. It raises inequality, discourages private sector development, and, by reducing government revenue, limits the ability of governments to invest in productivity-enhancing projects. Transparency supports public accountability and helps build trust in the Government, which in turn supports social stability and economic growth. Our measure considers corruption within each branch of government and public office, and it also measures transparency, capturing the degree to which government fosters citizens’ participation and engagement through open information and transparent practices.

Zimbabwe ranks 35th for Government Integrity in Africa and 139th in the world. The fact that the ruling party has been able to limit political accountability and executive constraints over 40 years has contributed to an environment where corruption is endemic throughout Zimbabwean society. Due to a lack of political accountability, the state has been captured by the ruling party, and security forced have also become emmeshed in corruption. Transparency International reports a high degree of corruption in the police.

A number of oversight institutions exist, but sanctioning corrupt officials proves difficult. The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the Auditor General carry some important investigations of high-profile corruption cases, but their investigations are often not continued by the prosecuting authority, or parliament. In addition, a lack of resources has curtailed the effectiveness of the anticorruption agencies, and there is evidence of a lack of political will to support their efforts. Expert surveys suggest that publicised laws and government data and government policy are not easily accessible to private companies and the public.

Figure 16: Use of public office for private gain Figure 17: Diversion of public funds

Stronger Weaker Stronger Weaker 2.0 6 1.8 5 1.6 1.4 Global Median 4 1.2 Global Median 1.0 3 0.8 2 Expert survey (1-7) Expert survey Expert survey (0-4) Expert survey 0.6 0.4 1 0.2 0.0 0

MalawiGhana Kenya GhanaKenya Malawi Rwanda Namibia Ethiopia Zambia Burundi Rwanda EthiopiaNamibia ZambiaBurundi MauritiusBotswana Morocco Tanzania BotswanaMoroccoMauritius Tanzania Zimbabwe Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique South Africa Mozambique Source: World Justice Project (Rule of Law Index) 2020 Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2019

Corruption has become endemic in Zimbabwean society because longstanding one-party control of the state has allowed both the suppression of executive constraints and oversight and there are often no sanctions for those engaged in corruption. The use of public office for private gain and diversion of funds is pervasive at all levels of government.

| 63 Poor civil servant remuneration due to economic crises, has exacerbated corruption, with many officials using bribes as a means of supplementing very low incomes. Additionally, state financial resources have been captured for party and personal gain. Extensive use of extra-budgetary resources contributes to the lack of transparency that results in high levels of corruption.

Key recommendation – Opportunities for reducing corruption: One of the most effective ways to reduce corruption is to engineer it out of the system. This can include eliminating discretionary decision-making and burdensome administrative procedures that support bribery, and instead relying on automation and using e-government systems for large procurement processes, revenue collection, licensing and administrative procedures.

Examples of corruption Corruption in endemic in Zimbabwe. A 2017 study broke corruption down into the following categories: 34% bribery, 22% embezzlement, 16% fraud, 14% nepotism, 10% extortion and 4% other.32 Many people pay bribes to public services including police registrars, land services, the judiciary, utilities, education and taxes officials An Afrobarometer survey reported that a quarter of surveyed Zimbabweans who had tried to obtain an identity-related document had paid at least one bribe in order to do so, while 10% had paid a bribe in order to acquire water, sanitation services, or an electrical connection.33 Government programmes are often used to reward those loyal to the ruling party, such as in relation to the land reforms, or agricultural subsidies. In mining, there have been major issues with the incidents of bribery in the issuing of mining licences/claims. In 2011, Finance Minister Tendai Biti noted “it is worrying that there is no connection whatsoever between diamond exports made by Zimbabwe and the revenues realised thereof.”34 Referencing US$1 billion in unaccounted diamond-related national treasury revenue, Biti attributed corruption, misappropriation and a lack of transparency for the systematic underselling of diamonds and the failure to recoup losses.35

Corruption in government has helped ZANU-PF to consolidate its political base by using the state to reward supporters. Appointments to the civil service and state-owned companies appointments have been driven by this political patronage. ZANU-PF uses the patronage of the state to repay those who support the regime. Cartels and state-owned enterprises are awarded to supporters of the ruling party.

Cost of corruption

The cost of corruption is high. A 2019 Transparency International Zimbabwe report estimated that Zimbabwe loses close to $1.8 billion to corruption annually (equivalent to 14% of 2019 GDP).36

Civil service appointments are driven by political patronage, leading to a dramatic decline in state capability and in the competence of government departments and agencies. There is no enforcement of internal financial controls, and the use of extra-budgetary resources is pervasive. State disfunction has resulted in several periods of economic crisis (including the second highest inflation in the world) that have decimated the remuneration of key public workers, fostering a resort to bribes.

64 | The cost of corruption is not only the direct cost but the fact that corruption often introduces inefficiencies in the entire economic systems, either by promoting cartels, providing unfair advantages (taxes, tariffs, exchange rates) or contributing to macro-economic imbalances. For example, there are around 100 state-owned companies and several cartels that crowd out private competition.37 Many of these organisations have large wage bills and are heavily indebted relying on substantial government transfers to survive.

Tackling corruption

On paper, Zimbabwe has a reasonably robust institutional and statutory infrastructure in place for tackling corruption. Nonetheless, corruption is pervasive. The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (established in 2004) and the Auditor General have had the independence to investigate a number of high-profile corruption cases. However, successful prosecutions have been few. Recently, the Prosecutor General has stated that key judiciary institutions have been captured by cartels.38

Although guaranteed independence by the Constitution, in practice anticorruption institutions suffer from political intervention by the executive. This is despite the President stating a commitment to fighting corruption. The President has also established an Anti-Corruption Unit, with the aim of assisting with the fight against corruption. The Government is also tackling ghost workers through biometric registration of public sector workers.

Key recommendation – Anti-corruption measures: Strong public efforts to counteract corruption are an important part of reducing it. This includes implementing a meaningful zero tolerance policy for corruption throughout government, whereby it is run for the benefit of all Zimbabweans, not for party or private gains. This commitment can be reinforced by ensuring all incidents of corruption in government are fully investigated and prosecuted speedily by independent courts, with support from internal audits, the auditor general and an anti-corruption commission. Further supporting measures could include: formalising clear procedural guidance on the Government’s anticorruption policies; introducing a whistle-blower law; and strengthening the independence and capacity of enforcement agencies such as the ZACC.

Barriers to reform

Some observers argue that the main obstacle to corruption reform is that the President is not fully committed to reform. They argue that the President is “paying lip service to reforms in the hope of securing international support but staunchly refusing to implement any measures that might harm his and his closest supporters’ political and economic interests”.39

Anti-corruption efforts require the support of the police, the prosecuting authority and Parliament. ZANU-PF politicians have attempted to divert Parliamentary attempts to probe how money may have been misused in the import of maize at nearly three times the market price.40 These efforts also need to be backed by financial and administrative resources.

| 65 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS (AFRICAN RANK: 44TH)

Government Effectiveness includes, but extends beyond, the efficient use of resources and spending through effective government policy design and implementation, to also consider the ability of a government to enact its stated strategies. Our measure includes the quality of public services, the quality of government officials, and their independence from government pressures.

Zimbabwe ranks 44th for Government Effectiveness in Africa. ZANU inherited a strong but unequal state and used this to deliver substantial health and education gains for the majority of the population in the 1980s and 1990s. It also instituted a broad-based land reform. However, over time, government effectiveness has been eroded by patronage in civil service appointments, corruption and economic crises.

Civil service and parastatal appointments have been driven by political patronage rather than merit, leading to a dramatic decline in state capability and in the competence of government departments and agencies. There is a weak capacity for prioritisation and implementation and weak enforcement of internal financial controls, and the use of extra-budgetary resources is pervasive.

This decline in state capability has resulted in several periods of economic crisis (including the second highest inflation in the world in 2009) that decimated the remuneration of key public workers. Poor salaries and working conditions have made it difficult to retain qualified staff, which has resulted in many teachers, health workers and skilled civil servants leaving the country, particularly after the 2008 crisis.

Government departments and agencies often pursue narrow political objectives, rather than national priorities. As a result of all these factors, service delivery is poor across nearly all areas of government, from utilities to health and education and both in national and local government.

Figure 18: Efficiency of government spending Figure 19: Government quality and credibility

Stronger Weaker Stronger Weaker 6 1.0

5 0.5

4 0.0 Global Median Global Median 3 -0.5

2 -1.0 Index (-2.5 - +2.5) Expert survey (1-7) Expert survey

1 -1.5

0 -2.0

Ghana Kenya Malawi GhanaKenya Malawi Rwanda BurundiEthiopia Namibia Zambia RwandaNamibia ZambiaEthiopia Burundi TanzaniaBotswana MoroccoMauritius Mauritius Botswana Morocco Tanzania Zimbabwe Zimbabwe South AfricaMozambique South Africa Mozambique Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2019 Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2018

66 | Government effectiveness over time

In 1980, the new Zimbabwean government inherited a repressive and unequal but strong state and transformed it to deliver substantial health and education gains in the 1980s and early 1990s. It also implemented an ambitious land reform.

However, partly because of the lack of checks and balances, appointments in the civil service and state-owned companies were driven by political patronage rather than merit, leading to a dramatic decline in state capability and in the competence of government departments and agencies. This contributed to the 2008 economic crisis, which resulted in the Government losing its capacity to pay adequate salaries to key workers and the near collapse of education and health services.

The Government of National Unity in 2009 was relatively successful in improving government effectiveness, particularly in macro-economic management, through de-facto dollarization (stabilisation and return to economic growth) and in the health and education sectors (albeit with considerable donor support). However, the GNU was not transformational. Many ministers were tainted by corruption, and spending was not prioritised as well as it could have been. According to one author, many government ministers would drive the "classiest and expensive vehicles”, despite civil servants “earning salaries below the poverty line.”41

Public expenditure

In Zimbabwe, much government expenditure takes place outside the budgetary process, meaning that the Government is unable to keep proper track or control of these expenditures with accountability. Spending on pro-poor activities is also unfocussed. For example, Zimbabwe has registered one of the highest agricultural subsidies in the world, but many of these subsidies have not been targeted.42 Similarly, Zimbabwe relies excessively in the payment of fees in schools and hospitals, limiting access for the poor. In terms of spending in capital investment, this accounted for less than 10% of total public spending between 2011 and 2016.43,44 As a result, the state of infrastructure, whether it is classrooms, hospitals, or roads, is very poor. Experts rate Zimbabwe’s efficiency of government spending as one of the lowest in Africa.

Timeliness and availability of government data is poor, not only in relation to inflation but also in relation to public debt. Despite being a constitutional requirement, no report has been submitted to Parliament on public debt.45

Service delivery

Service delivery is poor across nearly all areas of government, from utilities to health and education and in both national and local government. While Zimbabwe produces no shortage of policy documents and strategies, implementation and service delivery is poor. Experts rank the Zimbabwean Government’s credibility and quality at the very bottom of a list of African countries, ahead of only Burundi.46

As a result of these challenges, there is increasing reliance on the international community for delivery of what would ordinarily be basic government services. For example, the UK Department for International Trade and Development makes a significant investment in Zimbabwe’s water and sanitation programmes, to increase the number of water-points each year.47

One opportunity for the Government is to ensure the internet becomes a backbone for government services. The Government should take early steps to support the provision of digital services following the successful model of countries like Estonia and India. This requires the gradual introduction of a digital citizen ID, stringent data privacy protection legislation and the adoption of the X-Road infrastructure.

| 67 Professional civil service

The competence of officials and the quality of the civil service have deteriorated dramatically, given the ruling party control of civil service appointments, pervasive corruption and poor pay following economic collapse. Political patronage and pervasive corruption do not provide the right set of incentives to qualified staff. The economic situation has left the state with few resources to pay civil servants, substantially reducing capacity. This environment has not provided the right incentives to retain qualified staff and the civil service has lost substantial capacity. The dramatic deterioration of public sector wages in 2020 could further affect conditions in the civil service. The human resource situation in the public sector is particularly serious and has been compounded by the massive emigration of qualified doctors, nurses, and teachers.48 In many cases, people are barely able to make enough to live on, or even to commute to work in situations where they are willing.49

The new government has focussed on this issues through a Public Service Commission Strategic Plan 2019-2020, “A New Public Service for a New Economy”, which focuses on the values of servant leadership, high ethics, inclusiveness, entrepreneurship, professionalism, high performance, innovation and accountability. However, given the context, implementation will be difficult. The 1989 Kavran Report on Public Service Commission in Zimbabwe, noted that the example set by high quality leaders is the best way to foster “the values of public service, delivering for citizens in a transparent way and preventing corruption and dishonesty in their services.”

Key recommendation – Professional leadership: The degree of professional leadership across government departments and agencies is the most impactful driver of government effectiveness. Making good appointments will be critical to the success of the national transformation. Hence, a merit-based process should be established for appointing senior officials, based on proven integrity, focus on the public good and public service and professional experience and competence, not because of political affiliation or patronage. The 2019-2020 Public Service Commission Action Plan provides a good starting point. A strengthened Public Service Commission should monitor these appointments, proposing a temporary salary structure and recording experiences in different departments to identify and disseminate best practice.

Policy co-ordination

Policy co-ordination in Zimbabwe is not smooth or effective, and is challenged by policy and party disagreements, overlaps, and conflicts between local and national government. Some areas of policy receive excessive political interference, whilst others suffer from a total lack of political will to implement reforms in other areas. The US, EU and UN have all noted a recent lack of political will to implement credible reforms.50,51,52

68 | REGULATORY QUALITY (AFRICAN RANK: 45TH)

Regulatory Quality encompasses all aspects of the running of the regulatory state – whether it is burdensome and impedes private sector development, or whether it is smoothly and efficiently run. Our Regulatory Quality measure encompasses both the quality of, and burden imposed by, governmental regulation.

The Zimbabwe government's perceived ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations to promote private sector development is particularly weak (African rank 49th). This is partly explained by the same factors that generally explained a poor government effectiveness and civil service capacity (patronage, endemic corruption, lack of resources) but also by weak legislation. Furthermore, complex regulation structures, overlapping mandates and lack of independence and transparency, have further weakened regulatory quality. The lack of access to, and poor availability of, public information add to the problem of transparency of the regulatory framework. There are many regulations, but enforcement is inconsistent.

Figure 20: Enforcement of regulations

Stronger Weaker 0.8

0.7

0.6 Global Median 0.5

0.4

0.3 Expert survey (0-1) Expert survey 0.2

0.1

0.0

Ghana Kenya Malawi Rwanda Zambia Namibia Burundi Ethiopia Mauritius Tanzania Botswana Morocco Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: World Justice Project (Rule of Law Index) 2020

Regulatory bodies operate across government. In infrastructure there are bodies that monitor civil aviation (CAAZ), railways (NRZ), electric power (ZERA), and ICT services (POTRAZ).53 The Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) oversees public entities.54

These regulatory bodies lack independence and transparency, and often lack integrity. For example, PRAZ often fails to prevent the manipulation of public procurement for personal gain.55 Zimbawe's Reserve Bank is not independent from the Government.56

In addition,many of these regulatory organisations lack a clearly defined role and authority. For example, while responsibility for technical standards for road construction and safety lies with the Department of Roads, responsibility for oversight of the road transport industry rests with several different entities.57 Similarly, there is often duplication in their regulatory functions that impedes the efficient development of regulation, such as the significant overlap in the responsibilities between Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe, and the Postal and Communications Authority.58

| 69 Furthermore, a 2018 government survey found that most government departments offer poor transparency and access to public information. This is exemplified by the fact that the Government departments often do not have basic information on their websites. POTRAZ, did not even have a website at the time of the survey and did not respond to any information requests.59

There is also a weak process to develop regulations, which often do not follow proper consultations, and lack a comprehensive framework to carry out impact assessments. However, the Government has stated its intention to change this.60

Recommendation – Implement regulatory impact assessments: Create a centralised office responsible for ensuring the quality of regulatory impact assessments across government.

Credit (Shutterstock.com)

President Emmerson Mnangagwa delivers his inaugural speech at the National Sports Stadium in Harare, Zimbabwe, 2017 70 | Endnotes

1 “Zimbabwe Country Report 2020,” reports, bti-project.org. 2 Lovejoy Mutongwiza, “Zimbabwe’s ‘New Dispensation’ destroys hope on human rights,” London School of Eco- nomics, February 28, 2020. 3 The other three are the National Council on Civil Education, the National Media Commission, and the National Development Planning Commission. 4 Khotso Mokoena Ndlovu, “An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Office of the Auditor General In Promoting Sound Pubic Sector Auditing in Zimbabwe,” Midlands State University, 2016, p. 49. 5 Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe: Regional Politics and Dynamics,” Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, Politics, March 2019, p.8 6 Sabine Donner et al, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 7 Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe: Regional Politics and Dynamics,” Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, Politics, March 2019, p.8 8 Ibid. 9 Blessing-Miles Tendi, “The Motivations and Dynamics of Zimbabwe’s 2017 Military Coup,” African Affairs 119, no. 474, January, 2019, p. 13. 10 “Election Observation Mission: Final Report, Republic of Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018,” European Union, October 2018, p. 1. 11 Simukai Chigudu, “International Development Committee, Oral evidence: DFID’s Work in Zimbabwe, HC 1878,” United Kingdom Parliament, February 5, 2019. 12 Sabine Donner et al, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 13 Stephen Chan “International Development Committee, Oral evidence: DFID’s Work in Zimbabwe, HC 1878,” United Kingdom Parliament, February 5, 2019. 14 Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe: Regional Politics and Dynamics,” Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, Politics, March 2019, p. 16. 15 Sabine Donner et al, “BTI 2018 Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. 16 “Election Observation Mission: Final Report, Republic of Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018,” European Union, October 2018, p.1. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 “Zimbabwe,” Freedom House, 2020, last accessed September 28, 2020. 20 “Summary of Results: Pre-Election Final Survey June/July 2018,” Mass Public Opinion Institute, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and Afrobarometer, 2018. 21 “Political Party and Campaign Finance in Zimbabwe,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems, July 2019. 22 “Election Observation Mission: Final Report, Republic of Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018,” European Union, October 2018, p. 3 and 23. 23 Lovejoy Mutongwiza, “Zimbabwe’s ‘New Dispensation’ destroys hope on human rights,” London School of Eco- nomics, February 28, 2020. 24 Based on expert interviews 25 “Enforcing the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe,” Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, September 2001, p. 4. 26 “”Our Hands Are Tied,” Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe,” Human Rights Watch¸ November 8, 2008. 27 Ibid. 28 Cyril Zenda, “Is Zimbabwe’s new leader stifling judicial freedom?” TRT World, June 27, 2019. 29 Ibid. 30 Based on expert interviews 31 Karissa Johnson, “The Fall of Human Rights: Case Study of Zimbabwe,” University of Pretoria, November 2017. 32 Nyoni Thabani, “The Curse of Corruption in Zimbabwe,” International Journal of Advanced Research and Publica- tions 1, no.5, November 2017. 33 “DFAT Country Information Report Zimbabwe,” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 19, 2019. 34 “Zimbabwe Finance Minister says diamond export and revenue figures do not add up,” Diamond Dealers Club, July 27, 2011. 35 Clemence Manyukwe, “Diamonds worth US$1 bn missing,” The Financial Gazette, August 12, 2011. 36 Evans Mathanda, “US $2bn lost to graft annually,” The Independent, January 24, 2020. 37 “Parastatals in Zimbabwe,” Government of Zimbabwe. 38 “Corruption Fight Scuttled By Cartels - Prosecutor General,” AllAfrica, 11 February, 2020. 39 Alexander H. Noyes, “A New Zimbabwe, Assessing Continuity and Change After Mugabe,” RAND Corporation, 2020. | 71 40 Siphosami Malunga, “Zimbabwe: corruption and patronage do more damage than sanctions,” The Africa Report, October 25, 2019. 41 Treda Mukuhlani, “Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity: Successes and Challenges in Restoring Peace and Order” Journal of Power, Politics and Governance 2, no. 2, 2014, p. 169-180. 42 Zimbabwe Public Expenditure Review with a Focus on Agriculture, 2017. World Bank and Government of Zimba- bwe. 43 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 44 “A downward spiral of public services,” Good Governance Africa, April 20, 2018. 45 “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2020 Article IV Consultation with Zimbabwe,” IMF, February 26, 2020 46 Worldwide Governance Indicators 47 “DFID’s Assistance to Zimbabwe,” House of Commons, International Development Committee, 16 March 2020 48 Kathrin A. Plangemannet al, “Zimbabwe Public Administration Review – Policy Note,” World Bank Report No. 69042-ZW, June 2012. 49 Jocelyn Alexander, “International Development Committee, Oral evidence: DFID’s Work in Zimbabwe, HC 1878,” United Kingdom Parliament, February 5, 2019. 50 “Zimbabwe- Council conclusions,” Council of the European Union 3747th Meeting, February 17, 2020. 51 “Message to the Congress on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Zimbabwe,” United States of America White House, March 4, 2020. 52 “End of Mission Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, on his visit to Zimbabwe (17-27 September 2019),” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner¸ September 27, 2019. 53 “Zimbabwe Infrastructure Report 2019,” African Development Bank Group, 2019, p. 39. 54 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 55 Ibid. 56 “A case for independence of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,” Mushoriwa Pasi, February 1, 2019. 57 “BTI 2020 Country Report- Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 40. 58 Ibid, p. 32. 59 “Zimbabwe Transparency Assessment 2018,” MISA Zimbabwe, October 8, 2018. 60 “2019 Investment Climate Statements: Zimbabwe,” U.S. Department of State, 2019.

72 | | 73 Credit (Shutterstock.com) 74 | Credit (Shutterstock.com) SOCIAL CAPITAL (AFRICAN RANK 36TH)

Social capital represents the networks and the cohesion a society experiences when people trust and respect one another – considering effectively functioning social groups, encompassing interpersonal relationships, a shared sense of identity, norms, values, trust, co-operation, and reciprocity.

A person’s wellbeing is best provided for in a society where people trust one another and have the support of their friends and family. Societies with lower levels of trust tend to experience lower levels of economic growth. Thus, the word ‘capital’ in ‘social capital’ highlights the contribution of social networks as an asset that produces economic returns and improves wellbeing.

Zimbabwe ranks 36th for Social Capital in Africa, and 130th in the world. Over the past decade, social capital has seen a considerable improvement, held together by the strength of Zimbabwe’s social networks and its embedded culture of personal and family relationships. The defining philosophy of Zimbabwean family and community culture is Ubuntu, which means that someone’s wellbeing is defined by the wellbeing of others around them.

A prosperous Zimbabwe is that of a nation at ease with itself, the issues that had divided it in the past, including internal conflicts, have been confronted and resolved. National reconciliation has been achieved and a strong sense of Ubuntu has been restored. People are predisposed to trust each other, participate in civic society, and the nation’s institutions have earned the trust and confidence of the public.

Elements of Social Capital Personal and Family Relationships – the strength of the closest-knit personal relationships and family ties. These relationships form the core structure that individuals can turn to for support emotionally, mentally, and financially on a daily basis. Social Networks – the strength of and opportunities provided by ties that an individual has with people in their wider network. These ties are a vital part of social support, and these networks can bolster bridging capital when social and community networks straddle different strata within society. Local social networks depend on building and maintaining relationships with other individuals and families, including neighbours. Interpersonal Trust – the amount of trust within a society, encompassing the degree to which people trust strangers and those outside their known social sphere. Institutional Trust – the degree to which individuals trust their institutions. Trust in institutions is an important foundation upon which the legitimacy and stability of political systems are built, with the trust of numerous institutions essential for true institutional trust. Civic and Social Participation – the amount to which people participate within a society, broadly split into the civic and social spheres.

| 75 PERSONAL AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (AFRICAN RANK: 15TH)

This measures the strength of the closest-knit personal relationships and family ties. These relationships form the core structure that individuals can turn to for support emotionally, mentally, and financially daily basis.

Zimbabwe ranks 15th in Africa for Personal and Family Relationships. These relationships, especially in relation to help from family and friends in times of crisis, have traditionally been strong in Zimbabwe, due to the Ubuntu philosophy. Indeed, reports from the World Value Survey show that in terms of importance to Zimbabweans, family ranks the highest at 97%.1 Children are rarely abandoned in Zimbawe, and are considered part of an extended family system. In the event of orphanhood, the philosophy of Ubuntu has helped children to be cared for and looked after by the entire extended family. Especially in rural areas, it is common for extended families to take care of children, without asking for government assistance or getting involved in legal processes.2

Considering the economic, social, and political crises that have beleaguered Zimbabwe, extended family networks and relationships have proven to be resilient.3 In an international survey on the percentage of people who receive help from friends and family when in trouble, Zimbabwe ranks 15th in Africa (see Figure 21).4

Figure 21: Help from family and friends when in trouble

Stronger Weaker 100 90 Global Median 80 70 60 50

Percentage 40 30 20 10 0

Ghana Kenya Malawi Namibia Ethiopia Zambia Rwanda Burundi Mauritius Botswana Tanzania Morocco Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: Gallup 2019

However, the philosophy of Ubuntu is under threat due to urbanization, increased mobility and economic hardship.5 For example, some families have broken down due to spousal separation, and the search of better livelihoods. These trends have been particularly visible in areas with an increase in female-led households, such as Chiredzi in Masvingo, Lower Gweru in Midlands and Matabeleland areas.

Family breakdown has also been exacerbated by disease. HIV and AIDS has led to an increase in child-headed households and grandparent-headed households in Zimbabwe. The National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children estimates that there are about 50,000 households that are headed by a child under 18 years.6 Upon the death of a parent or both parents, family custodians are immediately appointed to take care of the remaining family. Due to competing needs and the economic environment, this has led to the neglect of vulnerable families, 76 | sometimes resulting in child headed families and destitute children. These family structures can make children vulnerable to several forms of abuse, exploitation and deprivation.7 The ingrained practice of absorption of vulnerable children is now under threat due to the large number of children who are reliant on family networks more than ever.8

While Zimbabwe has a well-established legal framework against child abuse in place, in the absence of Ubuntu, the African Child Policy Forum argues that Zimbabwe has performed poorly on the provisions made in national laws for the protection of children.9

SOCIAL NETWORKS (AFRICAN RANK: 12TH)

This measures the strength of, and opportunities provided by, ties that an individual has with people in their wider network. These ties are a vital part of social support, and these networks can bolster bridging capital when social and community networks straddle different strata within society. Local social networks depend on building and maintaining relationships with other individuals and families, including neighbours.

Zimbabwe ranks 12th in Africa for the strength of Social Networks. This is an area that Zimbabwe has seen a total transformation over the last 10 years, rising from 37th place. It reflects a strong culture of helping other households; community and social networks are an essential component of social action in Zimbabwe, bringing people together and making individuals more aware of their social and cultural identity.10

Role of social networks and communities

Support from social networks in Zimbabwe goes beyond families, to include the wider community where individuals live, which includes friends, support groups, neighbours, the church, and other informal economic networks such as funeral societies and savings groups.11 Studies reveal very high levels of community social capital and reciprocal care amongst poor in Zimbabwe.12 According to Gallup polling, 36% of respondents financially helped another household in the last year, the fifth highest in Africa (see Figure 22).13

Figure 22: Helped another household

Stronger Weaker 45 40 35 30 25 20 Percentage 15 10 5 0

Kenya Ghana Malawi Zambia Namibia Ethiopia Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Botswana Mauritius Morocco Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: Gallup 2019

| 77 Social networks in Zimbabwe are central to managing drought, financial losses, health expenses, and land expenses. Zimbabweans tend to turn to their social networks in their communities for financial support.

Analysis of household responses to shocks in communal and re-settled areas found that 42% of the respondents relied on support from kin and non-kin social networks, compared to just 14% who relied only on the household’s own labour, borrowing, or sale of assets. Households were particularly reliant on kin-based relations, especially blood relations.14 Friends are also a great source of support.15 For example, when there is a funeral in a community, it is common for the whole church and neighbourhood to contribute to food or funds. Mukando, an Eco cash product designed to mobilize group savings, evidences how a commercial product can utilize Zimbabwe's culture of strong inderdependent social networks.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST (AFRICAN RANK: 48TH)

This measures the amount of trust within a society, encompassing the degree to which people trust strangers and those outside their known social sphere.

Despite the strength of Zimbabwe's close community ties, it ranks a low 48th in Africa for interpersonal trust. This is driven by a culture of caution rather than trust in strangers, partly because of political and ethnic tensions but also due to stresses created by the health and economic crises. Economic inequality is also a major contributor to lack of trust. Strengthening Interpersonal trust is key to rebuilding Zimbabwe.

Figure 23: Generalised interpersonal trust

Stronger Weaker 60

30 Global Median Percentage 20

Malawi Kenya Ghana Burundi Ethiopia Namibia Rwanda Zambia Mauritius Tanzania Botswana Morocco Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Source: Integrated Values Survey, Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, and Latinobarómetro 2019

Political and ethnic tensions

Zimbabweans focus on the need for caution in their interactions with strangers. This may be partly a reflection of the great stresses in the last 20 years from political and economic crises and ethnic conflicts, including internal migrations, the legacy of political violence, and 78 | the displacements created by Operation Murambatsvina (which led to an uprooting and displacement of half a million of Zimbabwe’s poorest citizens).16 The high level of economic inequality also contributes to weak interpersonal trust.

Impact of HIV/AIDS

Alongside its health impacts, the HIV/AIDs epidemic has also led to a supression of interpersonal trust, particularly for the Northern Ndebele, where infection rates are highest. Zimbabweans have altered their inherent value systems of placing trust in their community, to be more cautious of inter-group interaction, due to the stigma and unawareness around who is infected, making the infected even further isolated from other groups.17

However, community engagement and trust are critical to fighting HIV/AIDs. Research findings from community engagement programs in Zimbabwe have shown that “fighting HIV and AIDS cannot be separated from other traditional practices that discourage individualism in addressing social problems.”18 For Zimbabwe to effectively fight this, traditional medical practices need to be harnessed by rebuilding trust and involving the local community to create an enabling environment.

Key recommendation – Dialogue between communities: Trust and reconciliation can be developed in a bottom-up way at a community level. It is worth supporting projects at the grassroots levels, that focus on reconciliation and promote co-operation and dialogue, especially in local communities through traditional leaders – invoking ubuntu.

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (AFRICAN RANK: 51ST)

This is the degree to which individuals trust their institutions. Trust in institutions is an important foundation upon which the legitimacy and stability of political systems are built, with the trust of numerous institutions essential for true institutional trust.

Zimbabwe ranks 51st in Africa for Institutional Trust. This low ranking is driven by low public trust in politicians (African rank 54th).19 Confidence in financial institutions, national government, the military and the local police are also low by African standards; although trust in both the police and military has improved in the last 10 years. In contrast to these, other institutions such as citizens’ wards councillors, churches and village heads were identified as ‘very important’ and ‘socially close’.20

The low trust in politicians reflects the economic and political crisis that the country suffers and the political polarisation in the country. This level of trust in politicians has a direct impact on the economic situation, for example in relation to trust in the new local currency. In 2018, Zimbabwe’s presidential elections were meant to usher in change, with the promise of free and fair elections seeing voters head to the polls in large numbers. Unfortunately, under the new government, the economic crises and political violence have been aggravated. This has raised issues of legitimacy for politicians, not only of the ruling party but also of the opposition.21

| 79 Figure 24: Institutional Trust score

Stronger Weaker 100 90 80 70 60 Global Median 50 40 Element score 30 20 10 0

Kenya Ghana Malawi Rwanda Burundi Ethiopia Namibia Zambia Tanzania Mauritius Botswana Morocco Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: Prosperity Index 2020

According to Gallup, Zimbabweans overall have less confidence in the national government after President’s Mugabe’s exit and are more likely to perceive widespread corruption within government. These findings suggest that distrust in politicians goes beyond just a distrust in President Mugabe.22

Recommendation – Electoral Violence Commission: Fully embracing and implementing the recommendations of the Electoral Violence Commission would help strengthen institutional trust.

Corruption continues to be a major cause of lack of confidence in government. President Mnangagwa has promised to tackle corruption, but many do not trust that this will happen. For example, in May 2018 an Afrobarometer survey found that 48% thought that President Mnangagwa’s fight against corruption was genuine, while 39% felt that the move was aimed at punishing political rivals.23

Confidence in local police and military

The police have been implicated in numerous violations of civil and human rights, which include arbitrary arrests, detention, assault, excessive use of force, and corruption.24 As a result, public trust in police is low. According to Afrobarometer, while over the past 20 years, trust in the ZRP has increased significantly from 36% in 1999 to 54% in 2018, it has never exceeded 65%.25 The most significant constraints seem to be in the area of corruption. Since 2010, more than half of Zimbabweans have consistently said that “most” or “all” police officials are corrupt.26 According to the 2019 Global Corruption Barometer, 24% of people who encountered the police paid bribes to officers in Zimbabwe in the last year.27

The involvement of the military in civilian politics dates back to the struggle for independence. The military’s role is entrenched in Zimbabwe’s political fabric. Afrobarometer’s 2018 dispatch found 73% of respondents feel “not very free” or “not at all free” to voice criticism of the army, with only half of the population thinking that the military generally acts professional and respects rights of the citizens.28 80 | Confidence in judicial system and courts

Zimbabwe’s ruling party has weakened the independence of the judiciary at several points in time in Zimbabwe’s history. However, according to BTI, the judiciary is seen as one of the last independent institutions.29 The Government has accused some judges of allowing anti- government protests and has challenged their right to intervene in “internal ZANU-PF party matters”.30 The judiciary has, in some cases, ruled against the ruling party’s political interests.31

Regaining the trust of citizens in institutions will most likely be a by-product of reforms in governance and the security services. These institutions will become more trustworthy as they become more accountable to the public and are seen to function for the common good.

CIVIC & SOCIAL PARTICIPATION (AFRICAN RANK: 21ST)

The extent to which people participate actively within a society, including civic and social spheres.

Zimbabwe ranks 21st in Africa for Civic and Social Participation. There is a high level of informal volunteering, but low levels of charitable giving. Civic participation is also seen in high voter turnouts, albeit with less engagement by younger Zimbabweans.

Donating money to charity

While Zimbabwe has a developed philanthropic sector, donating money to charities is limited.32 It is far more common to give to family and friends. In a recent survey, 20% of respondents said that they did not give because they did not trust the recipient organisations, while 49% said they did not give due to lack of disposable income.33

In terms of who money was given to, 91% gave money to an immediate family, 61% gave it to an extended family member, 46% gave it to a non-family member, 64% gave it to church, and 22% gave it to an organisation.34

A disincentive to donating is the lack of tax incentives for individuals or corporations for donating to charitable or public benefit organizations. The law does not provide for exempt status to Private Voluntary Organizations. Zimbabweans also often do not think that charities are worth the extra attention or money, especially with more important stressors surrounding them, such as caring for family, rising inflation, and HIV. The culture of giving exists, but its existence is restricted to interpersonal networks.35

In urban communities, “businesses usually do not support philanthropic organizations working on advocacy initiatives, because of a fear of being labelled as “merchants of regime change” or deregistered.”36 However, urban dwellers are more likely to trust charities and their activities.

In rural areas, charities are similarly often mistrusted and perceived as ‘agents of an illegal regime change.’ Hence, there is limited participation in philanthropic organizations. For example, in the Mashonaland provinces some traditional leaders have been regarded as supporters of ZANU-PF and have discouraged and intimidated villagers to stop them attending activities carried out by philanthropic organizations. Punishments can include anything from violence to forced eviction.37

| 81 Volunteering

In Zimbabwe informal volunteerism is embedded in the culture. Communities have extensive indigenous networks of support, which exist without external funding or organizations.38 These groups include church groups, burial societies, rotating credit societies, farmer’s groups, sport and dance clubs, youth clubs, and women’s groups.39 In recent years, volunteers have filled gaps in government services.

The volunteering is often carried out by those who are poor but are still willing to serve their community. The concept of the Zunde ramambo (chief’s granary) aims to address food shortages for the poor and those in need.40 These various forms of indigenous volunteerism are also underpinned by Ubuntu, which demands that society assists whenever someone is in need.

Figure 25: Volunteering

Stronger Weaker 60

Percentage Global Median 20

Kenya Ghana Malawi Zambia Ethiopia Rwanda Burundi Namibia Mauritius Botswana Tanzania Morocco Zimbabwe Mozambique South Africa Source: Gallup 2019

One survey respondent in Zimbabwe noted that “voluntarism in Zimbabwe is very difficult, you don’t have food at your home and you are taking care of someone’s children in another village and so on, you are walking, it’s hot, you leave your family, you lose the opportunity of sustaining your family, your children.”41 SAFAIDS notes that the typical volunteer in Zimbabwe is very vulnerable and would often personally qualify to be a beneficiary of the programmes for which they volunteer.42

Religion plays a big role in building social capital. There are high participation rates of religious organizations in Zimbabwe, at 68.1%.43 Most Zimbabweans register as Christian, although it is impossible to find the exact number of Christians because Christianity and local traditions have become a syncretic religion of its own.44 The church plays a major part in building social capital, providing many services as well as being a meeting place for multiple groups of people.

Electoral engagement

In the 2018 elections, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) revealed an average 75% voter turnout.45 The country invited official observers from 46 countries and 15 international organizations, and, for the first time since 2002, observers from the EU, the Commonwealth, and the US were present.46

82 | In a pre-election poll conducted by the Afrobarometer, Zimbabweans also placed a strong faith in democratic elections,47 83% of all adults interviewed in the survey preferred to “choose our leaders in this country through "regular, open, and honest elections”, rather than by “other methods”.48 Furthermore, 61% of the respondents believed that “voting helps improve lives”.49

Recent studies have explored the level of youth participation (as candidates, voters, and activists) in Zimbabwe’s elections and governance processes. Evidence showed that youth participation in the 2018 elections was low, hampered by restrictive political parties and a lack of interest, information, and funds.50

A third of the young people interviewed said that they had not taken part in activities such as rallies, council meetings and meetings within communities. A quarter of them said they did not participate often, while only a fifth said they did so extremely often.

Political parties were cited as the main reason (67%) that prevented meaningful youth participation. For example, only 17% believed that political parties were creating spaces and making an effort to level the playing field so that they could participate in elections.51 Much of this reluctance can also be seen as the effect of the violent nature of Zimbabwean politics.52

However, young people have increased their contacts with local government councillors from 6% in 2012 to 20% in 2017,53 and have also increased political participation in many other local level activities.54

Key recommendation – Youth political participation: Leadership training and training in elections and governance processes could help ensure active and purposeful engagement by young Zimbabweans.55 Resources and support should be given to youth-led initiatives that are reaching out to young people.56

Key recommendation – Civic Education: Delivering civic education programmes in schools and in community venues could promote national reconciliation, and widen knowledge and participation among citizens, which could lead to an informed and active citizenry.

| 83 Endnotes 1 Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version: Madrid: JD Systems Institute/ 2 “Assessment Report of the alternative care system for children in Zimbabwe,” SOS Children’s Villages Interna- tional, 2014 p. 33. 3 Noreen Kudzanai Wini Dari, “Empowerment and Accountability and Multi-layered Contexts of Influences: Parent- ing and Avoidance of Harm in Harare, Zimbabew,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy 39, no. 3, August 22, 2018, p.380–393. 4 Gallup World Poll 5 “Assessment Report of the alternative care system for children in Zimbabwe,” SOS Children’s Villages Interna- tional, 2014. 6 “Programme of Support for the National Action Plan for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children,” Jimat Consult Private Limited, May 2010. 7 “Assessment Report of the alternative care system for children in Zimbabwe,” SOS Children’s Villages Interna- tional, 2014. 8 Milton Gwakwa, “The Melting Pot: Where are we! The Demise of the Extended Family System in Zimbabwe: A Case of Chivhu Rural Communities in Chief Neshangwe Area,” European Scientific Journal, Special edition, August, 2014, p. 358. 9 “In-dept Review of Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Child Marriage in Zimbabwe,” Plan International, July 2015. 10 “Eucharia Gomba, “Child-headed Households in Rural Zimbabwe: Perceptions of Shona Orphaned Children,” Theses and Dissertations 331, University of Incarnate Word, May 2018. 11 “Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe country case study report,” Oxford Policy Management Protection to Production, 2013, p. 56. 12 Vhumani Magezi, “Making community development at grassroots reality: Church-driven development approach in Zimbabwe’s context of severe poverty,” In die Skriflig/In Luce Verbi 51, no. 1, February 2017, p.11. 13 Gallup 14 “Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe country case study report,” Oxford Policy Management Protection to Production, 2013, p. 55. 15 Ibid. 16 Anthony Caito, “Determinants of the Generalized Trust Radius in Scripted Fragile Sub-Saharan African States,” Dissertations 1499, 2018, p. 214. 17 Ibid, p. 287. 18 Christina Tafadzwa Dzimiri, Patrick Dzimiri and Kezia Batisaia, “Fighting against HIV and AIDS within a resource constrained rural setting: a case study of the Ruvheneko Programme in Chirumhanzu, Zimbabwe,” Sahara J: Jour- nal of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDs 16, no. 1, p. 25-34. 19 World Economic Forum 20 “Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa,” Oxford Policy Management for the PtoP project, 2013, p. 56. 21 Piers Pigou, “After Elections, Zimbabwe Government’s Legitimacy in Limbo,” International Crisis Group, August 21, 2018. 22 Grant Buckles, “Confidence Flags in Zimbabwe Ahead of First Post-Mugabe Vote,” Gallup, July 27, 2018. 23 “BTI Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 24 Dewa Mavhinga, “UN Expert ‘Shocked’ by Abuses in Zimbabwe,” Human Rights Watch, September 27, 2019. 25 Nicholas Simpson and Matthias Krönke, “Police in Zimbabwe: Helping hand or iron fist?,” Afrobarometer Dispatch no.296, May 6, 2019. 26 Ibid. 27 “Africa,” Transparency International, 10th Edition 2019. 28 Simangele Moyo-Nyede, “Most Zimbabweans trust the army but reject military rule, don’t feel free to voice criticism,” Afrobarometer Dispatch, no.195 March 20, 2018. 29 “BTI Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Thulani Mswelanto, “Zimbabwe,” The Global Philanthropy Environment Index, last accessed October 19, 2020. 33 Eddah Jowah, “Perceptions of Giving: Findings From a Survey on Giving by Zimbabweans,” SIVIO Institute, March 2020. 34 Ibid, p. 5. 35 Erica Bornstein, “The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe,” Political 84 | and Legal Anthropology Review 28, no. 2, November 2005. 36 Thulani Mswelanto, “Country Report 2018: Zimbabwe,” Global Philanthropy Environment Index, 2018, p. 8. 37 Ibid. 38 K. Scott et al, “In what ways do communities support optimal antiretroviral treatment in Zimbabwe?” Health Promotion International 29, no. 4, December, 2014, p. 645-654. 39 Catherin Campbell et al, “Social capital and AIDS competent communities: evidence from eastern Zimbabwe,” HCD Working Papers Series, 4, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011. 40 Edwin Kaseke and Jotham Dhemba, “Community mobilization, volunteerism and the fight against HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe,” Research Partnerships Build the Service Field in Africa: Special Issue on Civic Service in the Southern African Development Community ed. Leila Patel and Rodreck Mupedziswa (Johannesburg: Volunteer and Service Enquiry Southern Africa, The Social Work Practitioner-Researcher, Journal of Social Development in Africa. A joint issue of The Social Work Practitioner-Researcher, University of Johannesburg and the Journal of Social Develop- ment in Africa, School of Social Work, University of Zimbabwe, 2007) p. 85-100. Leila Patel, “Theoretical perspectives on the political economy of civic service,” in Perold, H, Stroud, S & Sherraden, M (eds) Service Enquiry: Service in the 21st Century. Johannesburg: Global Service Institute and Volunteer and Service Enquiry Southern Africa. 41 Cathrine Madziva and Martha Chinouya, “’This word volunteer is killing us’: Making sense of volunteering in social welfare provision for orphans and vulnerable children in rural Zimbabwe,” International Social Work, November 12, 2016, p. 7. 42 “Community interventions in Zambia: Faith-based responses to OVCs,” SAFAIDS¸ 2004 43 Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version, Madrid: JD Systems Institute. 44 Ibid; Joanna Thomas, “About the Culture of Zimbabwe, Africa,” USA Today, updated April 20, 2018.

45 “Zimbabwe poll records 75 percent voter turnout,” New Zimbabwe, July 31, 2018. 46 Knox Chitiyo, “Zimbabwe’s Elections Were Meant to Kickstart a New Era. Here’s Why They Fell Short,” Time¸ August 6, 2018. 47 Michael Bratton and Eldred V. Masunungure, “Public attitudes toward Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections: Downbeat yet hopeful?” Afrobarometer Policy Papers 47, June 2018, p. 2. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid, p.3. 50 Hillary Musarurwa, “What’s stopping Zimbabwe’s young people from participating in elections?” The Conversa- tion, March 6, 2018. 51 Ibid. 52 “Social Capital and Active Citizenship in Zimbabwean Youth: Changes from 2012 to 2017,” Research and Advocacy Unit, May 2018, p. 7. 53 Ibid, p. 11 54 Eddah Jowah, “Perceptions of Giving: Findings From a Survey on Giving by Zimbabweans,” SIVIO Institute, March 2020. 55 Hillary Musarurwa, “What’s stopping Zimbabwe’s young people from participating in elections?” The Conversa- tion, March 6, 2018.

56 Ibid.

| 85 86 | Credit (Shutterstock.com) CONCLUSION

Given its starting point, Zimbabwe’s future pathway from poverty to prosperity has many components. True prosperity is about much more than economic success and material wealth, it also requires strong performing institutions and a broadly accepted social contract. The recommendations set out in this report lay out what Zimbabwe needs to do to tackle institutional challenges in a sustinable way. This will require a change of heart and a shift in perspective for many different stakeholders, so that each can become accommodating of the perspectives of the other, based on a common commitment to establish a set of rules and norms that work in the interests of all segments of society.

Since independence, Zimbabwe has had to contend with institutional crises, a stagnant economy, persistent poverty and the impact of external shocks such as recurring droughts. The myriad of reforms Zimbabwe should undertake will need to be addressed pragmatically, with an initial and single-minded focus on the most binding constraints. These include the need for economic and social reform. However, the success of these will be dependent on the quality of government, the underlying security of the country and the degrees of liberty and social engagement of the citizenry, hence the focus of this report on building inclusive societies.

The basis on which all institutional reforms rest is accountable government. Without accountability as part of the social contract, governments tend to become corrupt and inefficient. No other meaningful reform can happen without government accountability. A single-minded focus on the integrity and capacity of the state as a driving force in the development process is key to success. In order to achieve this, it is important that the state becomes autonomous and separate from the ruling party.

There also needs to be genuine adherence to the rule of law and civil liberties, with the state bound by law enforced by a fully independent judiciary. The integrity of the judiciary should be unquestioned, and rulings applied fairly to all citizens and the state, with no political interference. Respect of essential freedoms will contribute to the legitimacy of the Government and to trust and reconciliation in the country. An inclusive culture that embraces and celebrates difference and political plurality will enable a rich network of civil society groups and widespread citizens’ participation in civic and democratic processes. Their active presence will be a critical component of ensuring a balance between state and society.

The missing component in many development plans around the world, including those supported by international organisations, is a focus on state integrity and capacity. While there is usually great attention paid to strategies, policies, laws, and plans, it is ultimately the way that a state operates in practice that matters most to outcomes. Success depends on state actors behaving with integrity, focusing on the public good, empathising with citizens, having the technical capacity to deliver projects effectively, working collaboratively on a common mission and finding solutions while experimenting and innovating.

| 87 There is a need for social and political consensus, in order to build a capable civil service protected from corruption. Such political consensus would produce a social compact to support the merit-based selection of enterprising officials to lead government departments and agencies, with strong adherence to the rule a law, backed by the enforcement actions of an independent and competent judiciary. The state needs to be reoriented towards serving its citizens and stewarding the resources of the country. Moving away from a state dominated by vested interests and towards a state responsive to citizens’ needs is the single biggest challenge that Zimbabwe faces on the road to prosperity.

As reported by the 1989 Kavran Report on Public Service Commission in Zimbabwe, the example set by high quality managers is the best way to foster “the values of public service, delivering for citizens in a transparent way and preventing corruption and dishonesty in their services.” The officials should be responsible not only for delivering on the key priorities, but they will also need to ensure that in their day-to-day interactions they embed and foster a new civil service ethos - one that demonstrates a commitment to service and empathy, embraces transparency and brings public services closer to all Zimbabweans, for example, through digitalisation.

Civil servants should also be responsible for enforcing a policy of zero-tolerance for corruption. If managers are found to be involved in corrupt activities, they should be investigated by the appropriate institutions. Officials should be responsible for ensuring that their departments have clear strategies for becoming corruption-free within a short timeline.

Given the constraints in state capacity that the Government faces, it is essential to focus on only a few national priorities. A substantial part of the Government’s technical capacity should be targeted at coordinating private sector delivery of developmental outcomes in rural areas, for example, ensuring that mining companies provide support for eco-tourism or rural infrastructure in communal areas.

Specific individuals should be made responsible for delivering the outcomes associated with these priorities – even when these outcomes involve different departments. The outcomes and targets for each of these priorities should be publicised broadly, to encourage active participation as well as monitoring by the public.

A competent state needs to have civil servants who work for the country as a whole and who possess an ethos of service and empathy towards citizens, factors that are all critical in the successful delivery of services and gaining citizens’ trust. A service culture among civil servants is especially needed in a country like Zimbabwe.

A citizen-centred and service-oriented state will give priority to understanding the key needs of citizens, particularly the most vulnerable. It will seek ways to make the provision of services to vulnerable people more relevant, easier, accessible, and corruption-free. These changes in how the state operates need to be accompanied by a communication campaign that encourages citizens to demand high standards from the Government.

Civil servants should be expected to leave their offices and visit the front line of service delivery to understand better citizens’ needs and to work collaboratively with citizens in the co-design of services, ensuring that these services are relevant to users. Designing policies or services that do not incorporate the feedback of users can result in significant waste of resources, which Zimbabwe cannot afford.

The rapid development of digital services offers a radical opportunity to make public services available in ways that are simpler, more transparent and bribe free. Digital services have great potential to facilitate the provision of services in remote areas of the country. For example, telemedicine can greatly improve access to health services. The focus of the digital provision initiative should not be the technology or the gadgets per se, but on identifying which are the 88 | services that are most needed in rural areas and which are the best ways to provide services to those areas (including the upgrading of mobile infrastructure). For Zimbabwe, the challenge of securing impetus for reform should not be underestimated. For nearly all dimensions of reform, including those that would benefit the majority of the population, there are powerful groups with vested interests. For example – as in other countries – political reform is resisted by the elites; market liberalisation is opposed by incumbent enterprises that run the existing systems; liberalisation of foreign investment is resisted by dominant domestic firms; changes to land policy are viewed with suspicion by traditional and regional authorities; and finally subsidy and price reform is opposed by beneficiaries, even those who as citizens would benefit from the resulting higher levels of public investment and lower prices of agricultural products.

To be effective, reform will need to be packaged in a way that offers a bright enough future for all to warrant the challenges and sacrifices needed to get there. Nonetheless, Zimbabwe has substantial potential that could be harnessed to ensure its population can compete successfully in the world economy. There are a wide range of opportunities for Zimbabwe to drive economic growth and prosperity in the coming years. The journey is undoubtedly a long one, yet feasible and worthwhile.

| 89 Credit (Shutterstock.com) APPENDIX Credit (Shutterstock.com) Zimbabwe: Inclusive Societies score 43.6 (40th)

Pillar Inclusive Societies score over time Rank - AU (1 to 54) Score Performance 2020 2010 10-year trend 2020 46 36th 45 40th 44 Safety and Security 23 46.5 63.5 43 42 44th 43rd 40th 41st 44th 41 46th 40 47th 39 Personal Freedom 44 25.8 33.1 38 48th 37 36 Inclusive Societies score Inclusive 35 50th 22.5 30.8 34 Governance 40 33 32 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Index Year Social Capital 36 39.2 47.1

Score Rank - AU (1 to 54) Breakdown of performance 10-year rank change 2010 10-year trend 2020 2020

Inclusive Societies 33.5 43.6 40 10

Safety and Security 46.5 63.5 23 23

War and Civil Conflict 82.9 84.9 19 12

Terrorism 97.0 96.5 26 4

Politically Related Terror and Violence 8.0 62.1 25 28

Violent Crime 29.9 33.1 45 1

Property Crime 54.8 51.2 20 8

Personal Freedom 25.8 33.1 44 7

Agency 21.2 34.5 40 12

Freedom of Assembly and Association 24.0 21.3 50 2

Freedom of Speech and Access to Information 30.3 40.7 44 3

Absence of Legal Discrimination 23.9 33.1 42 5

Social Tolerance 32.2 36.3 36 3

Governance 22.5 30.8 40 10

Executive Constraints 19.8 25.4 44 6

Political Accountability 29.0 47.2 31 16

Rule of Law 34.4 37.0 30 6

Government Integrity 27.9 30.5 35 5

Government Effectiveness 9.0 24.1 44 9

Regulatory Quality 17.7 23.1 45 5

Social Capital 39.2 47.1 36 9

Personal and Family Relationships 68.0 60.8 15 -

Social Networks 53.9 66.2 12 25

Interpersonal Trust 28.7 28.3 48 8

Institutional Trust 18.7 34.3 51 1

Civic and Social Participation 27.0 45.9 21 17

92 | Zimbabwe: Safety and Security (23rd): Element and indicator scores

Italics: Indicator contains imputed values Value AU Rank Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 War and Civil Conflict (19th) 20% 82.9 84.9 31 19 Terrorism (26th) 15% 97.0 96.5 30 26

deaths deaths Two-sided conflict deaths UCDP /1,000,000 0.5 0.0000 0.0000 1 1 Terrorism deaths GTD /1,000,000 2.0 0.1118 0.0273 30 24 population population injuries coding, CSP 1.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 GTD /1,000,000 1.0 0.2093 0.6557 34 34 Civil and ethnic war 0-9 Terrorism injuries population people incidents Conflict-driven internal displacement IDMC /1,000,000 1.0 0.0000 0.0000 1 1 Terrorism incidents GTD /1,000,000 0.5 0.1123 0.0962 35 24 population population people US $ /billion US UNHCR /1,000,000 1.0 ###### 723.9782 40 30 GTD 1.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 Refugees (origin country) Property cost of terrorism 2010 $ population

Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Politically Related Terror and 30% 8.0 62.1 53 25 Violent Crime (45th) 25% 29.9 33.1 46 45 Violence (25th) homicides index, PTS 2.0 4.5 3.0 49 21 UNODC /100,000 2.0 8.2 6.7 44 43 Political terror 1-5 Intentional homicides population

coding, expert survey, CIRIGHTS 1.0 0.0 2.0 43 1 WJP 1.0 0.37 0.39 38 30 Extrajudicial killings 0-2 Dispute settlement through violence 0-1

coding, CIRIGHTS 1.0 0.0 0.0 22 33 Gallup percentage 1.0 40.8 45.1 46 41 Use of torture 0-2 Safety walking alone at night

coding, index, CIRIGHTS 1.0 0.0 2.0 51 1 WomStat 1.0 4.0 4.0 27 22 Disappearance cases 0-2 Physical security of women 0-4

coding, CIRIGHTS 0.5 0.0 1.0 40 16 Political imprisonment 0-2

deaths One-sided conflict deaths UCDP /1,000,000 0.5 4.0 0.2 49 40 population

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Property Crime (20th) 10% 54.8 51.2 28 20 #N/A #N/A ## ##

Property stolen Gallup percentage 2.0 26.7 26.0 38 28

expert survey, WEF 0.5 3.9 4.4 37 13 Business costs of crime and violence 1-7

expert survey, WEF 1.0 5.8 4.8 10 11 Business costs of organised crime 1-7

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 #N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

| 93 Zimbabwe: Personal Freedom (44th): Element and indicator scores

Italics: Indicator contains imputed values Value AU Rank Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 Freedom of Assembly and Agency (40th) 25% 21.2 34.5 52 40 20% 24.0 21.3 48 50 Association (50th)

coding, coding, FH 1.0 2.0 5.0 51 35 FH 1.0 3.0 3.0 42 39 Personal autonomy and individual rights 0-16 Right to associate and organise 0-12

expert survey, expert survey, WJP 1.0 0.27 0.36 45 32 WJP 1.0 0.21 0.30 54 52 Due process and rights 0-1 Guarantee of assembly and association 0-1

coding, index, CIRIGHTS 1.0 0.0 2.0 50 31 V-DEM 1.0 0.47 0.32 39 47 Freedom of movement 0-4 Autonomy from the state 0-1

coding, WomStat 1.0 12.0 12.0 22 22 Women's agency 0-16

Freedom from arbitrary interference with expert survey, WJP 1.0 0.04 0.11 53 49 privacy 0-1

index, V-DEM 1.0 0.84 0.72 8 20 Freedom from forced labour 0-1

index, GSI 1.0 20.8 19.0 38 41 Government response to slavery -10-100

Satisfaction with freedom Gallup percentage 1.0 40.8 62.7 51 42

Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Freedom of Speech and Access Absence of Legal 20% 30.3 40.7 47 44 20% 23.9 33.1 47 42 to Information (44th) Discrimination (42nd)

index, expert survey, FH 1.0 84.0 74.0 49 40 WJP 1.0 0.36 0.45 52 46 Press freedom from government censorship 0-100 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination 0-1

index, expert survey, RsF 1.0 38.1 41.0 41 37 WJP 0.5 0.54 0.41 24 43 Press freedom from physical repression 0-100 Non-discriminatory civil justice 0-1

expert survey, Freedom from hiring and workplace expert survey, Freedom of opinion and expression WJP 1.0 0.19 0.27 54 52 WJP 1.0 0.43 0.47 44 42 0-1 discrimination 0-1

coding, coding, V-DEM 0.5 0.0 2.0 45 28 ILGA 1.0 0.0 0.0 23 22 Government media censorship 0-4 LGBT rights 0-3

coding, Protection of women's workplace, education coding, Alternative sources of information V-DEM 1.0 0.43 0.54 42 45 WomStat 1.0 9.0 9.0 28 24 0-4 and family rights 0-8

coding, expert survey, V-DEM 0.5 2.0 2.0 29 24 WJP 1.0 0.55 0.49 39 45 Political diversity of media perspectives 0-3 Freedom of belief and religion 0-1

Government religious intimidation and index, Pew 1.0 0.6 0.1 51 18 hostility 0-1

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Social Tolerance (36th) 15% 32.2 36.3 39 36 #N/A #N/A ## ##

Perceived tolerance of ethnic minorities Gallup percentage 1.0 53.0 67.0 39 25

Perceived tolerance of LGBT individuals Gallup percentage 1.0 7.0 7.0 27 41

Perceived tolerance of immigrants Gallup percentage 1.0 65.0 59.0 22 33

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 #N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

94 | Zimbabwe: Governance (40th): Element and indicator scores

Italics: Indicator contains imputed values Value AU Rank Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 Executive Constraints (44th) 15% 19.8 25.4 50 44 Political Accountability (31st) 15% 29.0 47.2 47 31

Executive powers are effectively limited by the expert survey, Consensus on democracy and a market expert survey, WJP 2.0 0.87 0.96 50 44 BTI 1.0 3.0 4.0 46 37 judiciary and legislature 0-3 economy as a goal 1-10

Government powers are subject to expert survey, coding, WJP 1.0 0.81 1.18 50 31 Political participation and rights FH 0.5 6.0 5.0 33 25 independent and non-governmental checks 0-3 1-7

expert survey, expert survey, WJP 1.0 0.10 0.24 54 53 CSP 1.0 -4.0 4.0 42 27 Transition of power is subject to the law 0-1 Democracy level -10-10

index, expert survey, FI 0.5 4.2 3.3 28 32 WJP 1.0 0.41 0.45 38 31 Military involvement in rule of law and politics 0-10 Complaint mechanisms 0-1

Government officials are sanctioned for expert survey, WJP 1.0 0.36 0.35 33 35 misconduct 0-1

Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Rule of Law (30th) 15% 34.4 37.0 36 30 Government Integrity (35th) 20% 27.9 30.5 40 35

expert survey, expert survey, WEF 1.0 2.0 3.0 51 33 WJP 2.0 0.89 1.00 36 33 Judicial independence 1-7 Use of public office for private gain 0-4

expert survey, expert survey, WJP 3.0 2.43 2.46 32 32 WEF 0.5 2.2 2.5 46 38 Civil justice 0-6 Diversion of public funds 1-7

index, expert survey, FI 2.0 5.0 5.0 21 20 WJP 0.5 0.40 0.37 27 31 Integrity of the legal system 0-10 Right to information 0-1

expert survey, expert survey, WEF 0.5 3.5 3.3 28 36 WJP 1.0 0.2 0.2 32 41 Efficiency of dispute settlement 1-7 Publicised laws and government data 0-1

expert survey, WEF 0.5 3.5 3.2 40 37 Transparency of government policy 1-7

index, IBP 0.5 20.0 49.0 31 9 Budget transparency 0-100

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Government Effectiveness 20% 9.0 24.1 53 44 Regulatory Quality (45th) 15% 17.7 23.1 50 45 (44th)

index, index, WGI 2.0 -1.5 -1.2 48 40 WGI 1.0 -2.1 -1.6 52 49 Government quality and credibility -2.5 - +2.5 Regulatory quality -2.5 - +2.5

expert survey, expert survey, BTI 1.0 2.0 3.0 48 42 WJP 1.0 0.34 0.43 46 23 Prioritisation 1-10 Enforcement of regulations 0-1

expert survey, Efficiency of legal framework in challenging expert survey, Efficiency of government spending WEF 0.5 1.7 1.7 54 54 WEF 1.0 2.1 2.5 54 44 1-7 regulations 1-7

expert survey, expert survey, BTI 1.0 1.0 3.0 53 35 WJP 1.0 0.37 0.30 31 44 Efficient use of assets 1-10 Delay in administrative proceedings 0-1

expert survey, BTI 1.0 1.0 3.0 52 44 Implementation 1-10

expert survey, BTI 1.0 1.0 4.0 51 28 Policy learning 1-10

expert survey, BTI 1.0 2.0 3.0 49 41 Policy coordination 1-10

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 #N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

| 95 Zimbabwe: Social Capital (36th): Element and indicator scores

Italics: Indicator contains imputed values Value AU Rank Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Source Unit Weight 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 2010 10-yr trend 2020 2010 2020 Personal and Family 20% 68.0 60.8 15 15 Social Networks (12th) 20% 53.9 66.2 37 12 Relationships (15th)

Help from family and friends when in trouble Gallup percentage 2.0 81.0 76.0 15 15 Respect Gallup percentage 2.0 81.0 82.0 28 30

Family give positive energy Gallup percentage 1.0 67.0 63.0 13 26 Opportunity to make friends Gallup percentage 1.0 64.0 79.0 37 7

Helped another household Gallup percentage 0.5 20.0 36.0 25 5

Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Interpersonal Trust (48th) 20% 28.7 28.3 40 48 Institutional Trust (51st) 20% 18.7 34.3 52 51

Generalised interpersonal trust IVS&Bar percentage 1.0 11.9 8.3 43 50 Confidence in local police Gallup percentage 2.0 34.0 56.0 53 40

expert survey, Gallup percentage 0.5 53.0 59.0 30 28 WEF 2.0 1.4 1.6 54 54 Helped a stranger Public trust in politicians 1-7

Confidence in financial institutions and banks Gallup percentage 1.0 35.0 28.0 51 53

Confidence in judicial system and courts Gallup percentage 1.0 26.0 52.0 51 34

Confidence in national government Gallup percentage 1.0 29.0 46.0 48 44

Confidence in military Gallup percentage 0.5 31.0 61.0 52 42

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 Civic and Social Participation 20% 27.0 45.9 38 21 #N/A #N/A ## ## (21st)

Donated money to charity Gallup percentage 1.5 9.0 13.0 46 42

percentage IDEA 1.5 40.8 83.1 36 8 Voter turnout (adjusted)

Volunteering Gallup percentage 1.0 19.0 20.0 24 33

Voiced opinion to a public official Gallup percentage 0.5 10.0 20.0 51 34

Source Unit Unit Value AU Rank Source Unit Weight Value AU Rank 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 2,010.0 10-yr trend 2,020.0 2010 2020 #N/A #N/A ## ## #N/A #N/A ## ##

96 | List of data sources and acronyms

Code Organisation

Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation BTI Index CII Chinn-Ito Index

CSP Center for Systemic Peace

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation

FH Freedom House

FI Fraser Institute

GSMA Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association International Benchmarking Network IBNWS for Water and Sanitation Utilities IBP International Budget Partnership

IMF International Monetary Fund International Telecommunications ITU Union UNCTAD United Nations Trade Data United Nations Energy Statistics UNESD Database WBDB World Bank Doing Business Index

WBDI World Bank Development Indicators

WBES World Bank Enterprise Surveys World Bank Logistics Performance WBLPI Index WEF World Economic Forum

WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators

WJP World Justice Project

WTO World Trade Organisation

You can find the Global Index of Economic Openness report and methodology at https://li.com/research/open-economies/global- index-of-economic-openness/downloads/ LEGATUM INSTITUTE 11 Charles Street London W1J 5DW United Kingdom t: +44 (0) 20 7148 5400

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ISBN 978-1-911125-66-2

9 781911 125662

January 2021