The Management of the Mobilization of English Armies: Edward I to Edward In By Ralph Anthony Kaner A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of York, History Department August, 1999 ABSTRACT This thesis examines government administrative action that can be described as 'management', in the context of the logistics of mobilizing royal armies during the reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III. Its purpose is to contribute to understanding of how fourteenth-century government worked. Mobilization required the issuing of detailed instructions for administrative actions to be taken by individuals. The actions covered recruiting, arranging transport, and providing for supplies. Government's objective was to assemble armed forces at a particular place and time. Merely issuing the instructions did not guarantee that all would be fulfilled, or achievement of the overall objective. Government had to make on-going arrangements to try to ensure that orders were obeyed, to correct failures, to monitor progress, and, if necessary, to modify plans in good time. Those arrangements, and consequent actions, are the 'management' that is studied. The detailed management of mobilizations for eight selected campaigns, from Edward I's Second Welsh War (1282-3), to Edward III's Reims campaign in 1359- 1360, is described. Recruitment, transport and supplies are considered, first in relation to each other for individual mobilizations. They are then considered as separate themes, followed by a discussion of the coordination of planning, in Chapter 9. The thesis shows that in mobilizing armies Edwardian government made good use of practical management techniques. Planning was coordinated. Plans were by and large based on realistic, deliberately collected, quantitative information. Progress and other reports were required, and acted upon. 'Progress chaser' appointments were made to supervise executive action. 'Privatisation' was used pragmatically, particularly in 1359. Chapter 10, 'Conclusion', argues that, though in mobilization as in other fields, what are remembered are administrative failures, in fact Edwardian government was managerially sophisticated enough to be able to mobilize its armies effectively. This ability to manage effectively may therefore be more true of its general administration than sometimes appears. 2 CONTENTS Acknowledgements 4 Abbreviations 5 Chapter 1: Introduction 6 Chapter 2 : The Second Welsh War, 1282-1283 26 Chapter 3 : The Scots War of 1301 42 Chapter 4 : Edward II, Scotland, and the War of 1322 54 Bannockburn 54 The War of 1322 60 Chapter 5 : The War of Saint-Sardos, 1324-1325 82 Chapter 6 : Edward HI and Scotland, 1336 105 Chapter 7: Crecy and Calais 129 Chapter 8 : The Reims Campaign, 1359-1360 169 Chapter 9 : Analysis 193 Introduction 193 Recruitment 195 Transport 208 Supplies 217 Planning - 230 Chapter 10 : Conclusion 235 Bibliography 257 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The fact that this thesis has ultimately appeared owes much to several people: in particular to Mark Orrnrod's tolerance and patience; to Jennifer's frequent rescue interventions with my word-processor; to Philip's encouragement to have a go, but keep a sense of proportion; and, critically, to Benedict's technical wizardry with computers. To all of them I express my debt and, especially, my gratitude. 4 ABBREVIATIONS BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research BL British Library CCR Calendar of Close Rolls CFR Calendar of Fine Rolls CPR Calendar of Patent Rolls CVChR Calendar of Various Chancery Rolls EcHR Economic History Review EGov.atW The English Government at Work 1327-1336, J. F. Willard and W. A. Morris (eds.), (3 vols. [Vol. If, W. A. Morris and J. R. Strayer, (eds.); Vol. III, J. F. Willard, W. A. Morris and W. H. Dunham (eds.)], Cambridge, Mass., 1940-1950) EHR English Historical Review Foedera Foedera, Conventiones, Literae etc., ed. T. Rymer, (3 vols., London, 1816-1830) Par!. Writs The Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, ed. F. Palgrave, (4 vols., London 1827-1834) Rot. Scot. Rotuli Scotiae in Turni Londinensi etc., ed. D. Macpherson and others, (London, 1814). TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION This thesis addresses the government's management of the logistical aspects of fourteenth-century mobilizations. A simplified description of the process that had to be managed could run as follows. Once the king, usually with the support of his council, had decided to raise an army, obviously planning would have to take place. First, numbers to be mobilized, where the muster should be, and when, had to be determined. It seems reasonable to assume that these decisions would be the province of the royal command. Next, a consequential view had to be taken of what supplies, and how much of each, the government should provide. For a campaign overseas, a calculation of the transport needed had to be made. These estimates would be worked out by experienced household and central staff. The staff would then subdivide the total figures; detailed allocations of what should be required of each would be made to a large number of individuals. Orders would be sent to them via chancery writs. The writs carried instructions as to quantities, place, timing, as appropriate. The recipients of these instructions would then obey them, taking the necessary action. The result, in theory, would be that the mobilization took place as planned. It is a seemingly universal experience that, especially in large-scale administration, something will go wrong. It was not sufficient merely to issue orders: steps had to be taken to try to ensure that instructions were obeyed, to monitor progress and to correct failures - that is, to manage. That management is the subject of this thesis. The action to be managed comprised recruiting and assembling suitably equipped soldiers, arranging for at least their initial supplies, providing transport, and planning the appropriate coordination of these operations. Individuals' performance of their allocated tasks had to be watched, controlled and, if inadequate, admonished and corrected. These are the matters with which this thesis is concerned. It does not study the processes of the taking of the original policy decision and the consequent issuing of orders. Nor does it consider, except incidentally, wider issues such as war finance, military obligation, campaign success or failure, or the economic and political context of war. Its objective is to examine how, once the impleiterning orders had been issued, 6 the process of mobilization of armies was managed, through what agencies, and with what degree of sophistication and success. By comparison with the time of Henry ILI the next three reigns, from the accession of his son in 1272 to the death of his great-grandson in 1377, were a period of frequent, large-scale wars. Preparing for and conducting them absorbed much of the energies and attention of the royal government. Its efforts to command the human, financial and economic resources of England for these wars had wide-ranging consequences: J. R. Maddicott says of the period 1294-1341, '...the pressure brought by war, particularly the pressure of taxation, shaped the economic and political development of England." Discussion of the Edwardian wars has therefore concerned itself primarily with the changing nature of warfare itself, with the wars' implications for the balance of constitutional and political power, with their social and economic effects, and usually only incidentally with the administrative details of the actual mobilization of the armies. In the 'Introduction' to The Medieval Military Revolution the editors A. Ay-ton and J. L. Price write 'It has become customary to see the late thirteenth century as marking the start of a "new age" of war, as paid armies were mobilized for ambitious, large-scale wars and the costs of war soared to levels not previously experienced...'. However, they comment also, 'Just how far the later thirteenth century marked a watershed in European warfare is open to debate: 2 In this debate,3 attention naturally tends to be directed to the nature, size and components of the armies that took the field, rather than to the management of the process that brought them there. That aspect is not one of the subjects of the essays edited by Ayton and Price. C. J. Rogers is primarily concerned with the part played by the development of the use of artillery in baule.4 General histories of medieval warfare, being mainly interested in war itself like 1 J. R. Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294. 1341 (Past and Present Supplement 1, 1975), p. 1. 2 A. Ayton and J. L. Price (eds.), The Medieval Military Revolution. State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (London, 1995), p. 12. 3 M. Prestwich discusses the origins of and participants in this debate in the final chapter of his Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience (London, 1996), pp. 334-346, under the heading 'Conclusion: A Military Revolution ?'. 4 C. J. Rogers, 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War', The Journal ofMilitary History, LV (1993), pp. 258-275. 7 those of Oman5 or Contamine,6 touch only incidentally on recruitment. The same is broadly true of the essentially narrative histories of the Hundred Years War such as those of C. T. Allman& and J. Sumption.8 M. R. Powicke's detailed examinations of the processes of recruitment come in studies of the bases of military duty,9 and so see them more in that context than as expressions of the mechanics of administration. N. B. Lewis's articles l° are particularly concerned with the discharge of feudal obligation and the content of indentured service. A. E. Prince's study of recruitment" looks at the numbers of men in the armies, and his general survey 12 covers the range of administrative orders issued for actions to mobilize men and ships.