Review No. 81

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Load more

Review no. 81 Press Review 16 –30 November 2014 Table of Contents Pages Terrorism in Africa Algeria - L’Algérie face au financement du terrorisme à l’ère du « narco-djihadisme » 4 - Reprise du dialogue intermalien: Lamamra appelle à saisir la chance des négociations d'Alger pour parvenir à la paix 6 Egypt - Egypt, the Most Important Arab Nation, Is an ISIS Target 8 - Sinai and terrorism 15 - Jihadist group 'Soldiers of Egypt' claims responsibility for attack on police near university 17 - Keep politics and religion separate 19 - Sinai-based jihadist group rebranded as Islamic State's official arm 22 Kenya - Kenya bus attack survivor tells how gunmen selected their victims 25 - Mosque Raids Crossed Line: Kenya Muslims 28 Libya - ISIS comes to Libya 31 Mali - es camps d’entrainement djihadistes se sont reformés au nord Mali Nigeria - Jonathan in London, Promises to End Boko Haram Terrorism Soon 39 - Boko Haram has 60,000 fighters- Insider 42 - Nigeria’s angerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence 44 Somalia Somali-American who helped Mogadishu govt killed 48 South Sudan - Turmoil in the Horn of Africa is interconnected 50 Tunisia - How Tunisia Will Succeed 52 2 Terrorism in the World Azerbaïzan - Un vivier pour l'Etat islamique 55 Canada - Opinion: There's no link between terrorism and multiculturalism 56 - Canada in tightrope walk on terrorism 58 France - Une étude dresse Les discours terroristes ont changé, les djihadistes aussi 60 - jihadisme, nouveau totalitarisme 63 - «L’Occidental qui veut quitter le califat signe son arrêt de mort» 64 Germany - 'Ready to die': Father and sons leave Germany to fight ISIS 67 India - L'Etat islamique, un casse-tête pour l'Inde 70 Syria - Islamic State group recruits, exploits children 74 - jihad 2.0 : la stratégie de communication de l'Etat islamique et d'Al-Qaida sur internet 77 Pakistan - Pakistan’s counter-terrorism plan may have created a monster 80 United Kingdom - Opinion: Strategies against terrorism aren't working 83 Yemen - Al-Qaida in Yemen denounces Islamic State 86 3 Terrorism in Africa Algeria L’Algérie face au financement du terrorisme à l’ère du « narco- djihadisme » le 30 novembre 2014 Les terroristes d’Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) et d’autres groupes colla- borent avec les cartels de la drogue colombiens. C’est ce qu’affirme le journal éco- nomique International Business Times (IBT), ce dimanche 30 novembre. Les chiffres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (Onu), rapportés par IBT, font état d’impor- tantes commissions touchées par les groupes terroristes. En effet, 15% du prix d’un gramme de cocaïne vendu, va « dans les poches de djihadistes ». Un business lucratif Une source algérienne proche du dossier nous apprend que le trafic de drogue constitue, au même titre que les enlèvements contre rançon, une des sources prin- cipales du financement du terrorisme dans la région du Sahel. ans les faits, ces groupes terroristes sont payés par les trafiquants de drogue pour protéger et ache- miner des convois de drogue vers le littoral nord-africain, poursuit notre source. La drogue est ensuite transportée vers l’Europe, à travers les réseaux « mafieux » du crime organisé. Le journal IBT décrit également ce phénomène dans son article, ce qui vient corroborer la position officielle de l’Algérie sur la question. Une connexion entre les trafiquants de drogue, les terroristes et le crime organisé En plus de cette coopération entre les différents acteurs, d’autres éléments per- mettent de mettre en exergue la relation entre le trafic de drogue, le terrorisme et le crime organisé. Selon IBT, qui cite l’agence américaine de lutte contre la drogue, la EA, plusieurs rencontres entre des chefs d’Aqmi et des représentants des re- 4 belles colombiens des Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) ont eu lieu dans la région du Sahel. Le journal rapporte également que la police espagnole considère cette bande sahé- lienne comme « la principale voie d’accès de la cocaïne vers l’Espagne ». Pis, notre source en Algérie affirme que certains chefs de groupes terroristes sont eux- mêmes issus du milieu du trafic de drogue : c’est le cas du leader du Mouvement pour l’unicité du djihad en Afrique de l’ouest (MUJAO) qui s’autofinance en partie par le biais de ces activités, d’où l’expression de « narco-terrorisme », ajoute-t-elle. Le Sahel, un « no man’s land » propice au trafic Selon IBT, les producteurs de drogue transportent leur drogue par avion, une mé- thode surnommée « Air Cocaïne », vers des pays pauvres, gangrenés par la corrup- tion et où l’Etat est faible, principalement la Guinée Bissau, la Sierra Léone et la Mauritanie. e là, les dits « narco-djihadistes » prennent le relais en acheminant les cargaisons par route à travers les zones qu’ils contrôlent dans un triangle qui inclut l’ouest de la Libye, le Niger, le sud de l’Algérie, le Mali et l’est de la Maurita- nie, toujours selon IBT. Cette zone du Sahel, vaste et difficile à contrôler, est devenue une plaque tour- nante pour le trafic de drogue, qui alimente les groupes terroristes de la région. L’Algérie, selon notre source, n’a cessé d’attirer l’attention sur l’aggravation de ce phénomène durant ces dernières années. Les réponses de l’Algérie Le récent déploiement massif de l’Armée nationale populaire (ANP) pour lutter contre la contrebande vise en fait essentiellement à stopper ce phénomène. En effet, en plus de la sécurisation des frontières, l’ANP entreprend des opérations pour stopper la contrebande et le trafic de drogue. Ce rôle, dévolu aux corps des Gendarmes gardes-frontières (GGF) et aux ouanes algériennes, est désormais également assumé par les forces militaires du pays. Par ailleurs, l’Algérie est partie à la Convention sur le financement du terrorisme et aux différents instruments internationaux dans le domaine, rappelle la même source. C’est dans cette optique que la loi 05-01 du 06 février 2005 sur la préven- tion et la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme et le blanchiment d’argent, fait actuellement l’objet d’une révision, indique notre source. En effet, les amende- ments en cours de préparation visent à mettre l’arsenal juridique national au diapa- son des recommandations du Groupe d’action financière (GAFI), rattaché au G8. Cette initiative a pour objectif d’accroître la surveillance, la prévention et la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme. http://www.tsa-algerie.com/ 5 Reprise du dialogue intermalien: Lamamra appelle à saisir la chance des négociations d'Alger pour parvenir à la paix le 22 novembre Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ramtane Lamamra Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ramtane Lamamra, a appelé, jeudi à Alger, les différentes parties maliennes à «saisir la chance» du processus des négociations d'Alger pour parvenir à un accord de paix global et définitif en vue du retour à la stabilité au Mali. «Le processus d'Alger est une chance et il nous appartient de la saisir. Nous devons être à la hauteur des responsabilités que le destin et les circonstances nous ont as- signées afin de relever le défi de la paix», a déclaré M. Lamamra lors des travaux du 4e round du dialogue intermalien inclusif entre le gouvernement malien et les re- présentants des groupes politico-militaires de la région du nord du Mali. Il appartient «aux Maliens eux-mêmes de faire la paix», a-t-il dit, soulignant qu'il incombait au groupe de la médiation, dont l'Algérie est le chef de file, d'aider les Maliens à «se parler, à s'écouter et à se comprendre mutuellement pour pouvoir emprunter le chemin de la paix, jalonnée d'embûches». «Nous ne pouvons pas en tant qu'équipe de médiation assumer à votre place la responsabilité historique», afin de parvenir à la paix et la stabilité au Mali, a dit M. Lamamra, à l'adresse des parties maliennes. 6 «Nous allons y mettre le cœur, la raison, la persuasion et l'esprit de la responsabili- té de tous pour l'instauration de la paix et de la stabilité au Mali», a-t-il assuré. M. Lamamra a indiqué que la poursuite, durant les prochains jours de ces négocia- tions à huis clos, allait permettre de poser de solides fondations à même d'assurer un climat de confiance pour avancer. Abordant la position de l'Etat malien, le chef de la diplomatie malienne, Abdoulay iop, a déclaré que le gouvernement malien «ne ménagera aucun effort» pour sor- tir le pays des «ténèbres de la violence, de la haine et de la destruction» pour res- taurer la paix et la sécurité. Selon lui, l'espoir est «d'autant plus permis» que la situation sur le terrain est «relativement calme, certes fragile, exception faite de quelques actes ignobles commis de temps à autre par des terroristes qui visent précisément à ralentir le processus de paix d'Alger». «Face à ces ennemis de la paix, nous ne devons en aucun cas nous détourner de notre noble mission de contribuer qualitativement au rétablissement de la souve- raineté et la restauration de la paix au Mali», a-t-il soutenu. Même démarche du côté des mouvements politico-militaires de la région du nord du Mali qui ont réaffirmé leur «ferme» détermination à œuvrer pour parvenir à la paix et la stabilité au Mali. «Nous réaffirmons notre ferme détermination à œuvrer à trouver une solution adé- quate, prioritairement pacifique, dans le cadre des aspirations légitimes des popu- lations de l'Azawad (nord du Mali)», a indiqué le représentant de la coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA), Ambayri Ag Aissa, lors de ce 4e round du dia- logue entre le gouvernement malien et les représentants des groupes politico- militaires de la région du nord du Mali ayant adhéré au processus de négociations sous la conduite de l'Algérie, chef de file de la médiation.
Recommended publications
  • Five Years of Egypt's War on Terror

    Five Years of Egypt's War on Terror

    FIVE YEARS OF EGYPT’S WAR ON TERROR The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) is dedicated to influencing policy toward the Middle East and North Africa through rigorous research and targeted advocacy efforts that promote local voices. TIMEP is fully registered and acknowledged under Section501(c)(3) in the District of Columbia. For more information about TIMEP’s mission, programming, or upcoming events, please visit timep.org. This report is the product of the collaborative efforts of TIMEP's staff and fellows. Cover image: A security checkpoint in the Egyptian Western Desert and the Bahariya Oasis in Siwa, Egypt, May 15, 2015 (photo by Amr Abdallah Dalsh for Reuters) CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 TERRORISM 5 COUNTER-TERRORISM 10 LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 14 FINDINGS 15 TERRORISM 17 ACROSS EGYPT: Intensification and evolution in terror attacks after 2013 17 NORTH SINAI: Violence has become an entrenched insurgency 19 MAINLAND: Low-scale violence gives way to sporadic, deadly attacks 26 COUNTER-TERRORISM 35 ACROSS EGYPT: Tens of thousands of citizens ensnared in the war on terror 35 NORTH SINAI: Continuous military occupation 36 MAINLAND: Sweeping and broad crackdown 39 LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 43 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL CONTEXT: The war on terror trumps rule of law 43 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT: The war on terror as pretext for political consolidation 46 GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT: Continued global support 49 FINDINGS 52 METHODOLOGY 54 Egypt Security Watch 3 Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror INTRODUCTION On July 24, 2013, then-Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El Sisi asked for a popular mandate to fight terrorism, marking the declaration of the “war on terror” that has lasted five years.
  • EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2018 Global Coalition to Protect CONTENTS GCPEA Abbreviations

    EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2018 Global Coalition to Protect CONTENTS GCPEA Abbreviations

    Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack GCPEA **Embargoed until May 10, 2018, 1pm EST** EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2018 Global Coalition to Protect CONTENTS GCPEA Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................2 Education from Attack Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................4 This study is published by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), which was formed in Methodology ................................................................................................................................16 2010 by organizations working in the fields of education in emergencies and conflict-affected contexts, higher education, protection, and international human rights and humanitarian law that were concerned about ongoing Global Overview ...........................................................................................................................24 attacks on educational institutions, their students, and staff in countries affected by conflict and insecurity. Recommendations .......................................................................................................................64 GCPEA is a coalition of organizations that includes: co-chairs Human Rights Watch and Save the Children, the Country Profiles ............................................................................................................................74
  • Overall Risk Level

    Overall Risk Level

    Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 EGYPT Overall risk level High Reconsider travel Can be dangerous and may present unexpected security risks Travel is possible, but there is a potential for disruptions Overview Emergency Numbers Medical 123 Upcoming Events 30 August 2021 - 14 September 2021 Medium risk: Chinese officials suspend flights from Paris and Cairo on 30 August-13 September - Update Air China flight CA934 from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG) in France to Tianjin Binhai Airport (TSN/ZBTJ) in China and Egyptair flight MS953 from Cairo Airport (CAI/HECA) in Egypt to Hangzhou Xiaoshan Airport (HGH/ZSHC) in China will be suspended from 30 August for two weeks, due to COVID-19. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / Egypt 2 Travel Advisories Medium risk: Militant attacks in mainland Egypt Exercise caution for travel to Egypt until further notice because of potential attacks by militant groups. Domestic and international terror groups, including the Islamic State (IS), have proved that they have both the capability and intent to strike security and tourist sites within mainland Egypt, including Cairo, Giza, and 6th of October City since 2013. At least five militant attacks occurred in Cairo in 2019, killing at least 25 people and injuring 54 others. These attacks mostly targeted security forces, unlike some of the attacks from previous years, which struck places popular with tourists – including a roadside bomb attack targeting Vietnamese nationals on a tour bus near the Giza pyramids (28 December 2018), knife attacks targeting hotels and beachgoers in the resort city of Hurghada (14 July 2017 and 8 January 2016) and a suicide bombing outside Karnak Temple in Luxor (10 June 2015).
  • Mapping Egyptian Islamism

    Mapping Egyptian Islamism

    Mapping Egyptian Islamism Samuel Tadros December 2014 Research Report Mapping Egyptian Islamism By Samuel Tadros © 2014 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publications, please visit Hudson’s website, www.hudson.org ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE Hudson Institute is an independent research organization promoting new ideas for the advancement of global security, prosperity and freedom. Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law. Hudson seeks to guide public policy makers and global leaders in government and business through a vigorous program of publications, conferences, policy briefings and recommendations. Visit www.hudson.org for more information. Hudson Institute 1015 15th Street, N.W. Sixth Floor Washington, D.C. 20005 P: 202.974.2400 [email protected] Acknowledgments This project was funded by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. I would like to express my gratitude to Nadia Schadlow for her continuous support for this project since it was first proposed and throughout the last two years. I could not have wished for a better place to conduct this research than the Hudson Institute. The Hudson Institute’s dedication to innovative research that challenges conventional wisdom has provided me with the working environment and intellectual freedom necessary to complete this study. This research would not have been completed without the support of the Hudson Institute’s management team: Kenneth Weinstein, John Walters, Lewis Libby, David Tell, Daniel McKivergan, Thereza Austria, Kevin Searcy, Kim Bowling, Carolyn Stewart, Rebecca Baker, and Rob Cole.
  • The Return of Egypt

    The Return of Egypt

    The Return of Egypt. Internal challenges and Regional Game Edited by Stefano M. Torelli ISBN 978-88-98014-83-5 © 2015 Edizioni Epoké Firs edition: 2015 Edizioni Epoké. Via N. Bixio, 5 15067, Novi Ligure (AL) http://www.edizioniepoke.it [email protected] ISPI. Via Clerici, 5 20121, Milano www.ispionline.it Graphic project and layout: Edoardo Traverso I edition. All Rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) is an independent think tank dedicated to being a resource for government officials, business executives, journalists, civil servants, students and the public at large wishing to better understand international issues. It monitors geopolitical areas as well as major trends in international affairs. Founded in Milan in 1934, ISPI is the only Italian Institute – and one of the few in Europe – to place research activities side by side to training, organization of international conferences, and the analysis of the international environment for businesses. Comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis is achieved through close collaboration with experts (academics and non-academics alike) in political, economic, legal, historical and strategic studies and through an ever-growing network of think tanks, research centers and Universities in Europe and beyond. Contents Introduction Paolo Magri .................................................................................... 9 1. Al-Sisi’s Egypt: The State Triumphant Marina Ottaway ............................................................................ 15 2. What People Want: Egypt’s Domestic Challenges Andrea Teti ..................................................................................
  • The Socioeconomic Dimension of Islamist Radicalization in Egypt and Tunisia

    The Socioeconomic Dimension of Islamist Radicalization in Egypt and Tunisia

    No. 45 Working Papers Working The Socioeconomic Dimension of Islamist Radicalization in Egypt and Tunisia Clara-Auguste Süß/Ahmad Noor Aakhunzzada February 2019 1 The Socioeconomic Dimension of Islamist Radicalization in Egypt and Tunisia1 Clara-Auguste Süß and Ahmad Noor Aakhunzzada ABSTRACT Based on a comprehensive study of both academic publications and grey literature and informed by social movement theory, this working paper analyzes processes of Islamist radicalization in Egypt and Tunisia. It develops a theoretical framework that identifies key mechanisms that link socioeconomic factors and Islamist radicalization, and systemati- cally reviews the existing research in order to identify evidence that supports the rele- vance of each of the different mechanisms. More specifically, we distinguish between socioeconomic grievances, socioeconomic opportunities and framing processes that build on socioeconomic narratives. Socioeconomic grievances can drive radicalization processes (a) by motivating individuals or groups to use violent tactics or join violent groups, and (b) by contributing to the delegitimization of the state, which, in turn, can legitimize the use of violence. Socioeconomic opportunities, which are basically consti- tuted by the (relative) absence of the state and of state services, can contribute to radi- calization (a) by facilitating the generation of material resources by violent groups, and (b) by providing radical groups with the opportunity to attract supporters and followers by offering social services. Even
  • Terror in the Sinai

    Terror in the Sinai

    TERROR IN THE SINAI EMILY DYER | OREN KESSLER Foreword by Mohannad Sabry Published in 2014 by The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society 8th Floor, Parker Tower 43-49 Parker Street London WC2B 5PS Registered charity no. 1140489 Tel: +44 (0)20 7340 4520 www.henryjacksonsociety.org © The Henry Jackson Society 2014 The Henry Jackson Society All rights reserved The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily indicative of those of The Henry Jackson Society or its Trustees Terror in the Sinai By Emily Dyer and Oren Kessler ISBN 978-1-909035-14-0 £15.00 where sold All rights reserved Front Cover Image: Looking north along Egypt-Israel border north of Eilat, by Wilson44691 (Own work) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons TERROR IN THE SINAI EMILY DYER | OREN KESSLER with research assistance by Kit Waterman and Samuel James Abbott Foreword by Mohannad Sabry Terror in the Sinai The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society is a cross-partisan think-tank based in London. Our founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British, European, and American commitment towards freedom; liberty; constitutional democracy; human rights; governmental and institutional reform; and a robust foreign, security, and defence policy and transatlantic alliance. The Henry Jackson Society is a company limited by guarantee, registered in England and Wales under company number 07465741, and a charity registered in England and Wales under registered charity number 1140489. For more information about The Henry Jackson Society activities; our research programme; and public events, please see: www.henryjacksonsociety.org.
  • Jihadism Expansion in Egypt After 2011 on the Example of Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis, Sinai Province and Other Structures

    Jihadism Expansion in Egypt After 2011 on the Example of Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis, Sinai Province and Other Structures

    Marta Stempień JIHADISM EXPANSION IN EGYPT AFTER 2011 ON THE EXAMPLE OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS, SINAI PROVINCE AND OTHER STRUCTURES INTRODUCTION The escalation of terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula has gained wide- spread interest of the international community in recent years. However, this is not a new phenomenon, but only a manifestation of long-term growth of the role of extremism, perceived by marginalised communities as part of the fight against state power. We can differentiate four major periods in the history of the proliferation of jihadism on the territory of the Sinai Peninsula. The first of them covers the years 2004–2011 in which sporadic terrorist attacks occurred, although resulting in numerous victims. This phase ended with the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’1, as a result of which – after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak – the power was taken over by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Spectacular attacks gave way to smaller attacks on infrastructure targets. There was also an influx of terrorists through the Israeli-Egyptian border. The third period began in June 2012 after Muhammad Morsi, associ- ated with the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected to the post of president. In August 2012 a military operation (Operation Sinai) was launched, resumed in 1 Despite the disputes about the name itself, ‘Arab Spring’ commonly refers to mass demonstrations which started in December 2010 in Tunisia. In the majority of coun- tries the situation remained at the level of protests and self-immolations, while in others the protests were accompanied by a change in the system of government.
  • Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt

    Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt

    Wright State University CORE Scholar Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2017 Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt Andrew Robert Dickerson Wright State University Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all Part of the International Relations Commons Repository Citation Dickerson, Andrew Robert, "Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt" (2017). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 1835. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/1835 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By Andrew Robert Dickerson B.A., Wright State University, 2013 2017 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL July 27, 2017 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Andrew Robert Dickerson ENTITLED Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. ______________________________ Vaughn Shannon, PhD, Thesis Director ______________________________ Laura Luehrmann, PhD, Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics Committee on Final Examination: _____________________________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Department of Political Science _____________________________________ Liam Anderson, Ph.D. Department of Political Science ______________________________________ Awad Halabi, Ph.D.
  • Terror in the Sinai

    Terror in the Sinai

    TERROR IN THE SINAI EMILY DYER | OREN KESSLER Foreword by Mohannad Sabry Published in 2014 by The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society 8th Floor, Parker Tower 43-49 Parker Street London WC2B 5PS Registered charity no. 1140489 Tel: +44 (0)20 7340 4520 www.henryjacksonsociety.org © The Henry Jackson Society 2014 The Henry Jackson Society All rights reserved The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily indicative of those of The Henry Jackson Society or its Trustees Terror in the Sinai By Emily Dyer and Oren Kessler ISBN 978-1-909035-14-0 £15.00 where sold All rights reserved Front Cover Image: Looking north along Egypt-Israel border north of Eilat, by Wilson44691 (Own work) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons TERROR IN THE SINAI EMILY DYER | OREN KESSLER with research assistance by Kit Waterman and Samuel James Abbott Foreword by Mohannad Sabry Terror in the Sinai The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society is a cross-partisan think-tank based in London. Our founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British, European, and American commitment towards freedom; liberty; constitutional democracy; human rights; governmental and institutional reform; and a robust foreign, security, and defence policy and transatlantic alliance. The Henry Jackson Society is a company limited by guarantee, registered in England and Wales under company number 07465741, and a charity registered in England and Wales under registered charity number 1140489. For more information about The Henry Jackson Society activities; our research programme; and public events, please see: www.henryjacksonsociety.org.
  • Télécharger Le Coi Focus

    Télécharger Le Coi Focus

    COMMISSARIAAT-GENERAAL VOOR DE VLUCHTELINGEN EN DE STAATLOZEN COI Focus EGYPTE Veiligheidssituatie 11 december 2019 (update) Cedoca Oorspronkelijke taal: Nederlands DISCLAIMER: Dit COI-product is geschreven door de documentatie- en researchdienst This COI-product has been written by Cedoca, the Documentation and Cedoca van het CGVS en geeft informatie voor de behandeling van Research Department of the CGRS, and it provides information for the individuele verzoeken om internationale bescherming. Het document bevat processing of individual applications for international protection. The geen beleidsrichtlijnen of opinies en oordeelt niet over de waarde van het document does not contain policy guidelines or opinions and does not pass verzoek om internationale bescherming. Het volgt de richtlijnen van de judgment on the merits of the application for international protection. It follows Europese Unie voor de behandeling van informatie over herkomstlanden van the Common EU Guidelines for processing country of origin information (April april 2008 en is opgesteld conform de van kracht zijnde wettelijke bepalingen. 2008) and is written in accordance with the statutory legal provisions. De auteur heeft de tekst gebaseerd op een zo ruim mogelijk aanbod aan The author has based the text on a wide range of public information selected zorgvuldig geselecteerde publieke informatie en heeft de bronnen aan elkaar with care and with a permanent concern for crosschecking sources. Even getoetst. Het document probeert alle relevante aspecten van het onderwerp though the document tries to cover all the relevant aspects of the subject, the te behandelen, maar is niet noodzakelijk exhaustief. Als bepaalde text is not necessarily exhaustive. If certain events, people or organisations gebeurtenissen, personen of organisaties niet vernoemd worden, betekent dit are not mentioned, this does not mean that they did not exist.
  • Destination Report

    Destination Report

    DESTINATION REPORT EGYPT ©2019 GLOBAL RESCUE LLC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. The information contained herein represents our best understanding of the information presented. Global Rescue do not assume any liability for any errors or omissions and do not guarantee against loss or risk from its use. As a condition for receiving the information, you agree to use the information at your own risk and to hold Global Rescue harmless for any and all loss or damage sustained by you. This material may not be reproduced, distributed, copied or sold, unless expressly permitted in writing. GENERAL OVERVIEW Egypt developed as a civilization more than 5,000 years ago in large part due to its natural resources and geography. The country has been under the control of many empires, the most recent being the British, and it became an independent state in 1952. Hosni Mubarak became president in 1981 and ruled the country in an authoritarian manner until February 2011. Protests that began in January 2011 drew global attention to frustrations with the government, as did subsequent violence between protesters and police forces. Mubarak stepped down from power 18 days after the uprising began. Power was transferred to the military with the aim of transitioning towards a political system based on democratic institutions. Elections took place in June 2012, but in July 2013, the military removed the president from power after massive demonstrations calling for his resignation. A new president was elected in May 2014. With over 82 million citizens, Egypt has the third largest population in Africa. Nearly 90 percent of citizens identify as Muslim, while the other 10 percent are Coptic Christian.