Review No. 81

Review no. 81

Press Review 16 –30 November 2014

Table of Contents Pages

Terrorism in Africa

Algeria - L’Algérie face au financement du terrorisme à l’ère du « narco-djihadisme » 4 - Reprise du dialogue intermalien: Lamamra appelle à saisir la chance des négociations d'Alger pour parvenir à la paix 6

Egypt - Egypt, the Most Important Arab Nation, Is an ISIS Target 8 - Sinai and terrorism 15 - Jihadist group 'Soldiers of Egypt' claims responsibility for attack on police near university 17 - Keep politics and religion separate 19 - Sinai-based jihadist group rebranded as Islamic State's official arm 22

Kenya - Kenya bus attack survivor tells how gunmen selected their victims 25 - Mosque Raids Crossed Line: Kenya Muslims 28

Libya - ISIS comes to Libya 31

Mali - es camps d’entrainement djihadistes se sont reformés au nord Mali Nigeria - Jonathan in London, Promises to End Boko Haram Terrorism Soon 39 - Boko Haram has 60,000 fighters- Insider 42 - Nigeria’s angerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence 44

Somalia Somali-American who helped Mogadishu govt killed 48

South Sudan - Turmoil in the Horn of Africa is interconnected 50

Tunisia - How Tunisia Will Succeed 52

Terrorism in the World

Azerbaïzan - Un vivier pour l'Etat islamique 55

Canada - Opinion: There's no link between terrorism and multiculturalism 56 - Canada in tightrope walk on terrorism 58

France - Une étude dresse Les discours terroristes ont changé, les djihadistes aussi 60 - jihadisme, nouveau totalitarisme 63 - «L’Occidental qui veut quitter le califat signe son arrêt de mort» 64

Germany - 'Ready to die': Father and sons leave Germany to fight ISIS 67

India - L'Etat islamique, un casse-tête pour l'Inde 70

Syria - Islamic State group recruits, exploits children 74 - jihad 2.0 : la stratégie de communication de l'Etat islamique et d'Al-Qaida sur internet 77

Pakistan - Pakistan’s counter-terrorism plan may have created a monster 80

United Kingdom - Opinion: Strategies against terrorism aren't working 83

Yemen - Al-Qaida in Yemen denounces Islamic State 86

Terrorism in Africa

Algeria

L’Algérie face au financement du terrorisme à l’ère du « narco- djihadisme » le 30 novembre 2014

Les terroristes d’Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) et d’autres groupes colla- borent avec les cartels de la drogue colombiens. C’est ce qu’affirme le journal éco- nomique International Business Times (IBT), ce dimanche 30 novembre. Les chiffres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (Onu), rapportés par IBT, font état d’impor- tantes commissions touchées par les groupes terroristes. En effet, 15% du prix d’un gramme de cocaïne vendu, va « dans les poches de djihadistes ». Un business lucratif Une source algérienne proche du dossier nous apprend que le trafic de drogue constitue, au même titre que les enlèvements contre rançon, une des sources principales du financement du terrorisme dans la région du Sahel. ans les faits, ces groupes terroristes sont payés par les trafiquants de drogue pour protéger et ache- miner des convois de drogue vers le littoral nord-africain, poursuit notre source. La drogue est ensuite transportée vers l’Europe, à travers les réseaux « mafieux » du crime organisé. Le journal IBT décrit également ce phénomène dans son article, ce qui vient corroborer la position officielle de l’Algérie sur la question. Une connexion entre les trafiquants de drogue, les terroristes et le crime organisé En plus de cette coopération entre les différents acteurs, d’autres éléments permettent de mettre en exergue la relation entre le trafic de drogue, le terrorisme et le crime organisé. Selon IBT, qui cite l’agence américaine de lutte contre la drogue, la EA, plusieurs rencontres entre des chefs d’Aqmi et des représentants des re-

belles colombiens des Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) ont eu lieu dans la région du Sahel. Le journal rapporte également que la police espagnole considère cette bande sahé- lienne comme « la principale voie d’accès de la cocaïne vers l’Espagne ». Pis, notre source en Algérie affirme que certains chefs de groupes terroristes sont eux- mêmes issus du milieu du trafic de drogue : c’est le cas du leader du Mouvement pour l’unicité du djihad en Afrique de l’ouest (MUJAO) qui s’autofinance en partie par le biais de ces activités, d’où l’expression de « narco-terrorisme », ajoute-t-elle. Le Sahel, un « no man’s land » propice au trafic Selon IBT, les producteurs de drogue transportent leur drogue par avion, une mé- thode surnommée « Air Cocaïne », vers des pays pauvres, gangrenés par la corruption et où l’Etat est faible, principalement la Guinée Bissau, la Sierra Léone et la Mauritanie. e là, les dits « narco-djihadistes » prennent le relais en acheminant les cargaisons par route à travers les zones qu’ils contrôlent dans un triangle qui inclut l’ouest de la Libye, le Niger, le sud de l’Algérie, le Mali et l’est de la Maurita- nie, toujours selon IBT. Cette zone du Sahel, vaste et difficile à contrôler, est devenue une plaque tour- nante pour le trafic de drogue, qui alimente les groupes terroristes de la région. L’Algérie, selon notre source, n’a cessé d’attirer l’attention sur l’aggravation de ce phénomène durant ces dernières années. Les réponses de l’Algérie Le récent déploiement massif de l’Armée nationale populaire (ANP) pour lutter contre la contrebande vise en fait essentiellement à stopper ce phénomène. En effet, en plus de la sécurisation des frontières, l’ANP entreprend des opérations pour stopper la contrebande et le trafic de drogue. Ce rôle, dévolu aux corps des Gendarmes gardes-frontières (GGF) et aux ouanes algériennes, est désormais également assumé par les forces militaires du pays. Par ailleurs, l’Algérie est partie à la Convention sur le financement du terrorisme et aux différents instruments internationaux dans le domaine, rappelle la même source. C’est dans cette optique que la loi 05-01 du 06 février 2005 sur la préven- tion et la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme et le blanchiment d’argent, fait actuellement l’objet d’une révision, indique notre source. En effet, les amende- ments en cours de préparation visent à mettre l’arsenal juridique national au diapa- son des recommandations du Groupe d’action financière (GAFI), rattaché auG8. Cette initiative a pour objectif d’accroître la surveillance, la prévention et la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme. http://www.tsa-algerie.com/

Reprise du dialogue intermalien: Lamamra appelle à saisir la chance des négociations d'Alger pour parvenir à la paix le 22 novembre

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ramtane Lamamra Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ramtane Lamamra, a appelé, jeudi à Alger, les différentes parties maliennes à «saisir la chance» du processus des négociations d'Alger pour parvenir à un accord de paix global et définitif en vue du retour à la stabilité au Mali. «Le processus d'Alger est une chance et il nous appartient de la saisir. Nous devons être à la hauteur des responsabilités que le destin et les circonstances nous ont as- signées afin de relever le défi de la paix», a déclaré M. Lamamra lors des travaux du 4e round du dialogue intermalien inclusif entre le gouvernement malien et les re- présentants des groupes politico-militaires de la région du nord du Mali. Il appartient «aux Maliens eux-mêmes de faire la paix», a-t-il dit, soulignant qu'il incombait au groupe de la médiation, dont l'Algérie est le chef de file, d'aider les Maliens à «se parler, à s'écouter et à se comprendre mutuellement pour pouvoir emprunter le chemin de la paix, jalonnée d'embûches». «Nous ne pouvons pas en tant qu'équipe de médiation assumer à votre place la responsabilité historique», afin de parvenir à la paix et la stabilité au Mali, a dit M. Lamamra, à l'adresse des parties maliennes.

«Nous allons y mettre le cœur, la raison, la persuasion et l'esprit de la responsabili- té de tous pour l'instauration de la paix et de la stabilité au Mali», a-t-il assuré. M. Lamamra a indiqué que la poursuite, durant les prochains jours de ces négocia- tions à huis clos, allait permettre de poser de solides fondations à même d'assurer un climat de confiance pour avancer. Abordant la position de l'Etat malien, le chef de la diplomatie malienne, Abdoulay iop, a déclaré que le gouvernement malien «ne ménagera aucun effort» pour sortir le pays des «ténèbres de la violence, de la haine et de la destruction» pour res- taurer la paix et la sécurité. Selon lui, l'espoir est «d'autant plus permis» que la situation sur le terrain est «relativement calme, certes fragile, exception faite de quelques actes ignobles commis de temps à autre par des terroristes qui visent précisément à ralentir le processus de paix d'Alger». «Face à ces ennemis de la paix, nous ne devons en aucun cas nous détourner de notre noble mission de contribuer qualitativement au rétablissement de la souve- raineté et la restauration de la paix au Mali», a-t-il soutenu. Même démarche du côté des mouvements politico-militaires de la région du nord du Mali qui ont réaffirmé leur «ferme» détermination à œuvrer pour parvenir à la paix et la stabilité au Mali. «Nous réaffirmons notre ferme détermination à œuvrer à trouver une solution adé- quate, prioritairement pacifique, dans le cadre des aspirations légitimes des popu- lations de l'Azawad (nord du Mali)», a indiqué le représentant de la coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA), Ambayri Ag Aissa, lors de ce 4e round du dialogue entre le gouvernement malien et les représentants des groupes politico- militaires de la région du nord du Mali ayant adhéré au processus de négociations sous la conduite de l'Algérie, chef de file de la médiation. Assistent également à ce round du dialogue, la Cedeao, l'ONU, l'UA, l'OCI, l'UE, le Burkina Faso, la Mauritanie, le Niger, le Tchad et le Nigeria, en tant que parties de la médiation. La CMA regroupe, selon un de ses représentant, la Coordination pour le peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), la Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résis- tance (CM-FPR), le Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), le Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) et le Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA, dissident). http://www.depechesdumali.com/

Egypt

g pt, the ost mportant Arab ation, s an S S arget November 24, 2014

Egypt has historically been one of the most stable countries in the Middle East. Today, a er the failed 2011 Arab Spring and shake-up of official power, Egypt’s economy is crippled. The tourism industry is dead. Many other vital sectors are in a bad shape, like electricity and gas. Half of the population is on or below the poverty line. Not surprisingly, ISIS has made inroads. Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (or ABM), the main insurgent group in Egypt, declared allegiance to ISIS earlier this month, and Egyp- tian affairs experts fear that Egypt is descending into the kind of violence that has crippled state authorities elsewhere. Not only that, Egypt’s in uence in the region and its position as a staging ground for Holy Land attacks makes this substantially different than the ISIS targeting of fringe areas. The gradual escalation of violence in Egypt, and particularly in Northern Sinai, is extremely concerning and could herald a new chapter of violent internal con ict for a country that has hitherto been largely peaceful, said r. Nussaibah Younis, a senior research associate at Project On Middle East emocracy. Related: ath to ihad— rom Upscale airo to S S eheadings Egypt is the leading country in the Arab world and a major country in both the Islamic world and Africa. When the Free Officers took over Egypt in 1952, similar movements emerged in Iraq, Yemen and Libya. When Egypt’s Nasser leaned to the le , most of the Arab world did as well. When he fought Israel, many other Arabs followed. When Egypt agreed on peace with Israel, others eventually did, too. If Egypt is rocked by Islamic extremism, shock waves will sweep the entire

Middle East. Last October, 31 Egyptian soldiers and police officers were killed in a single day. Si- nai governorate of the Islamic State declared its responsibility for the attack in a graphic video. In the same month, three people were beheaded by the militants a er being accused of spying for Israel. Early in November, eight navy sailors went missing a er an attack in the Mediterranean Sea. These events forced the government to declare a state of emergency in Sinai, impose a nighttime curfew, and evac- uate the population in the border with the Gaza strip to build a security zone. In October 2014 alone the ABM group is believed to have carried out a dozen attacks against Egyptian security forces . Their recent pledge to join ISIS isex- pected to give them the resources necessary to expand the insurgency, said Jacob Kennedy, anintelligence analyst at AIG - Global Security Operations Center. Ajnad Misr, a Giza-based Salafist militant group, has claimed responsibility for over a dozen attacks in Cairo and Giza in 2014 and has allegedly worked with ABM. The Arab Gas Pipeline has been blown up nine times this year, Kennedy, said.

While Egypt is facing a surging rebellion in its eastern border, another threat is esca- lating from the west. Egypt faces a low-level but potentially combustible security situation on its Western border with Libya, which has become one of the world’s biggest open-air arms markets. In July, Libyan militants killed 21 Egyptian border guards manning the frontier between the two countries, said Oren Kessler, deputy director of research at the Foundation for efense of emocracies. Related: he oup in g pt—a reater ailure than orsi Like other countries emerging from a long dictatorship, Egypt came to realize that it was one thing to get rid of an unscrupulous ruler and another to reform a society

that was crippled by decades of mismanagement and corruption. The overpopula- tion, combined with high exposure to the information revolution, the lack of jobs to satisfy angry young Egyptians, and the highly organized Islamic groups led to the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the political life in post Mubarak’s Egypt. November 24, 2014 It is hard to believe that the country that produced one of the greatest peaceful pro -democracy revolutions in modern history in January and February 2011 has unrav- eled within three years into an ISIS-inspired insurgency and another dictatorship. Authoritarianism under the command of a strong executive, which we may refer to as a 'Pharaoh Syndrome,' seems to be a hallmark of Egypt's leaders in the modern era, said Nicholas A. Heras, a Middle East researcher at the Center for a New American Security, Washington C. Egypt, the North African nation of 87 million people, the most populous in the Arab world, has been in turmoil. The government changed hands from President Mubar- ak in February 2011 to the army. Then it went to Mohammed Morsi, the first-ever elected civilian Muslim Brotherhood president in 2012, to General Sisi, the army chief, in a widely popular coup in July 2013. Mohammed Morsi’s regime was a turning point in Egypt’s history. A er winning the presidential and the two house parliamentary elections, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the mother organization of the largest and the oldest Islamic party in the Arab world, managed to alienate everybody in Egypt with its authoritarian style of governance, including youth, women, the le , the army, the judiciary, the Nassi- rists, the media, the Christians, the other opposition parties, the former regime loyalists, al-Azhar and even the Islamic Salafists. A constitution was dra ed and ratified hastily. By the end of June 2013, an uprising erupted that supported a coup that overthrew Morsi. The Muslim Brothers are the most hated political group in Egypt today, said r. Abdelmonem Said Aly, the chairman of the board of the Regional Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo. Soon a er, a massive crackdown against the Brotherhood followed. President Mor- si was detained then put on trial. The group’s leadership, including its spiritual leader, was arrested. When the group was officially banned, its assets were confiscated and its media organizations shut down. It was labeled a terrorist organization by internal and foreign bodies and a state of emergency was declared. The constitution was suspended and another was ratified. The parliament was dissolved.

Because of its populist roots, civilians paid the price. Tens of thousands of the groups’ members and supporters were arrested. Some estimate the number of de- tainees as 40,000. Military tribunals were placed in charge of their trials. In one case, 529 members were sentenced to death. It has been estimated that no fewer

than 3,000 people were killed in the street violence since the coup. The group had never suffered such a severe suppression since the Nasser era in the 1960s. Every observer of Egypt must be deeply alarmed by the sharp polarization that is dividing the country. Egypt is wracked by severe repression and growing militarism. There is clearly a popular groundswell of support for President al Sisi, but it is based on a frightened mass, populist fear, creating the perfect cocktail for the emergence of a new, even harsher authoritarianism, said William Youmans, an assistant professor at George Washington University. Before the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood had an armed wing, but since then, it has declared peaceful means in building its political party. It is undeniable that some of its members and supporters have used violence and sabotage during riots, yet no one proved the group has endorsed such a policy. The continued persis- tence of non-violent protest speaks to the movement’s continued commitment to utilize peaceful means of societal change, said Youssef Chouhoud, a doctoral fellow at the University of Southern California. Not everyone is so sure this will be always the case. The removal of the democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi from power through a military coup has been a radicalizing experience for members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists who now believe that they will never be allowed to gain power in Egypt through democratic means, r. Younis said. I expect there to be a growth of violent Islamist insurgency in Egypt. Egypt is on a fast track towards full scale insurgency, because it is not allowing any public space for those hundreds of thousands of supporters of Islamist parties to express their disaffection with the current political reality. Those voices are being pushed under- ground and some are being radicalized. The military coup in Egypt has certainly provided ISIS and Al Qaeda with further material for their propaganda, because it is seen as evidence that no secular government would ever allow Islamists to take power and that democracy is therefore a sham, she added. Yet, Sisi’s crackdown didn’t just target Islamists or the Muslim Brotherhood. Vice President Mohammed al-Baradei, the Nobel Peace prize winner, resigned. Two leaders of the 2011 revolution, Ahmed Maher and Alaa Abdul Fattah, were imprisoned. Three Al Jazeera reporters were imprisoned as well. Most recently, a popular actor was accused of treason by lawyers loyal to the government for criticizing Sisi’s regime. As the military regime and its loyalists on the ground squeeze out dissent, political opposition is forced into the shadows. Meanwhile, the people with the best chance of saving the country, the activists who brought the end of Mubarak, are being si- lenced and pushed further into the margins we will see it become even more of a police state run by the military. Egypt, I fear, is sacrificing its future, added Youmans.

Egypt's Outlawed Muslim Brotherhood Condemns Sinai Attacks

Since Sisi’s coup, the new Pharaoh has perfected his image. A nationwide campaign is being conducted to present General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as the man who saved Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood. He now enjoys presidential and parliamentary authorities combined. Some observers refuse the comparison. It is unfair to describe Sisi as a new Pharaoh. Pharaohs did great things to Egypt but Sisi is a mere dictator that only cares about power and consolidating his autocratic regime, said r. Khalil al-Anani, an Egyptian professor at Georgetown University. If there is any historical precedent for Egypt’s crackdown on Islamists, it may be events in Algeria, twenty years ago. In ecember 1991, the Algerian army forced the reformist President to resign a er an Islamic party won the first round of the general election. Soon a erward, a decade-long civil war began that claimed about 150,000 lives and le deep dividing wounds in the Algerian society. The Algerian army is still in power as it has been since 1965. Whether or not Sisi’s Egyptian military will remain as long has yet to be seen. The Egyptian military has a lot of interests and seeks to protect them. It doesn't care much about people's rights or interests. The July 3 2013 coup is the main vehicle for radicalization for not only Islamists but all young revolutionaries who are driven now by despair and are disillusioned. Sisi's repressive policies could turn Egypt into a new Algeria where radicals would use violence against the state and society, r. al-Anani said. Some argue that Sisi’s coup helped the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood. The military’s takeover certainly delegitimized the revolution’s more genuine elements of calls for democratic change, Kennedy said. The military did not give Egyptians a chance to vote and remove the Muslim Brotherhood from power peacefully. The

military dissolved the Islamist-led Parliament days before the election even took place, exposing a power struggle that ultimately doomed the nation’s bid for democracy from the beginning. Kennedy said Sisi’s oppressive regime has only made the Muslim Brotherhood stronger. Once reviled, the Brotherhood is now the underdog, wronged by military thugs in an unlawful power play. There is a grave risk in crushing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with implications for the region and the world. The group claims it has 600,000 members, but some say only 100,000 are truly committed. Whatever number used, it is the largest Is- lamist party in the Arab world. Since its formation in 1928, it has survived numerous suppression campaigns by several Egyptian governments. These campaigns only succeeded in producing splintering hardline groups that terrorized Egypt, the region and the world. One of those products was the current chief of al-Qaeda, Ayman al- awahiri, who joined the Muslim Brotherhood at age 14 during the 1960s and saw his com- rades detained, tortured and executed under President Nasser’s government. He then formed his first secret cell to overthrow the regime. Another example is the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayub al-Masri, who also joined the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a teenager. When awahiri formed his al-Jihad organization, the group assassinated former Egyptian president Sadat in October 1981. A er this, a military crackdown was launched against the brotherhood and al-Masri became further radicalized by joining awahiri’s splinter group, providing him formative training for his own leadership in terror organizations now dominating Middle East politics. Related: ountries ith the iggest error argets on heir ac s While Egypt is in desperate need of stability and control, authoritarian politics is the wrong answer. There was certainly a radicalizing impact that resulted from the illegitimate ouster of a legitimately elected president, Kennedy said. I do believe the next iteration of severe radicalization is teetering dangerously above already- rising Salafi jihadism and (extremist) Islamism in the country. Sisi’s harsh stance against Islamists, however, will suppress the group’s logistical functions, operational mobility and ideological freedoms, which in turn will produce the similar oppressive environment that facilitated awahiri and al-Masri’s radical Islamic development, added Mr. Kennedy. The nightmare of Egyptian security planners is an organized, armed rebellion against the al-Sisi government on the Egyptian mainland, not necessarily in the Si- nai, where the country's huge urban population is located and where the competi- tion for essential resources such as water, electricity, food, jobs, etc. will be fierc- est, Heras said. These very real and widely-felt existential concerns, which are

severely exacerbated by the weak Egyptian economy, are strong factors that could collapse the al-Sisi government, and its potential successors , he added. It will be interesting to see what happens when the Gulf spigot runs dry and Sisi must rely on domestic factors to shore up the economy, Chouhoud said. Clearly, if the economy goes south, his popularity will wane. The prospect of that scenario grows in likelihood the longer the tourism sector remains depressed—and there doesn’t seem to be any indication that the ethnocentrism and suspicion of foreign- ers that is in part keeping tourists away from Egypt will abate anytime soon. http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/

Sinai and terrorism 23 Nov 2014 Military and security measures are needed to control terrorism in Sinai. But a long- term solution must address the economic and social dimension of the problems in the peninsula Egypt launched in Sinai the most vigorous anti-terrorist campaign ever undertaken in the country. The attack on 24 October, which killed 31 military, has been the trig- ger of this broad offensive of muscular means, including the establishment of a buffer zone 500 meters wide along the 14 kilometre of border with the Gaza Strip. The goal is to better control the border area, infested by smuggling activities of all kinds, including an illicit arms trade and the movement of terrorists. The sophistica- tion of the attack of 24 October convinced the Egyptian authorities of the existence of foreign aid, via the Gaza Strip, to jihadist groups operating in Sinai. Although no foreign terrorist organisation has been officially blamed, the "Islamic State" has o en been quoted to have made contact with, and tried to assist in the preparation of attacks, the terrorist group of Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, the most dangerous in Egypt today, which claimed responsibility on 15 November for the deadly attack of 24 October. The border with the Gaza Strip, therefore, has been in the crosshairs of the Egyp- tian authorities for several months. Hence the idea of creating a buffer zonein northeast Sinai, which involves the demolition of 802 homes and the displacement of 1,156 families. According to security sources, the creation of the buffer zone has so far helped to discover 117 smuggling tunnels. Not to mention hundreds others that had been destroyed by the army in recent months. Needless to say that military and security measures are needed to curb the wave of terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula. But a long-term solution must also address the multifaceted economic and social sources of the problem. The first is the economic backwardness of the peninsula, which suffers, despite repeated government promises, from a lack of economic development. Sinai has o en been the object of attention of governments when terrorist attacks are committed. This attention o en leads to the announcement of financial allocations for development projects and to create jobs in order to reduce the high unemployment rate among young bedouins. But these projects are rarely brought to comple- tion or o en fall into oblivion once security seems to be restored. They re-emerge with a new explosion of violence. One of the main obstacles to the eradication of terrorism in Sinai is the illicit trade of all kinds of products, including weapons, through tunnels with the Gaza Strip. However, this illegal activity is a source of "bread and butter" for many members of bedouin tribes at a time when the poverty rate has reached 45 percent in Sinai, according to the 2013 figures of the Social Fund for evelopment.

Under these conditions, a security fight against terrorism cannot be effective if it is not accompanied by a specific plan of economic development, according to an es- tablished schedule, that compensates for financial losses caused by the destruction of smuggling tunnels. Government also neglects infrastructure and basic services such as health and education, which are necessary to better link the bedouin to their country and strengthen their sense of citizenship. An almost exclusively security vision in dealing with Sinai affairs and the feeling of being le behind has led several young bedouin to marry religious extremism and the use of violence against the state and its representatives. Helped by a steep ge- ography and a neighbourhood — the Gaza Strip — in favour of the spread of extremism and terrorism, Islamist militancy in Sinai would be hard to put down without a comprehensive plan, for the long term, that takes into account both security concerns and the economic and social aspects of the particular situation of the peninsula. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/116196/Opinion/Sinai-and- terrorism.aspx

ihadist group 'Soldiers of g pt' claims responsibilit for attac on police near universit November 20, 2014

Ajnad Misr, or the "Soldiers of Egypt," has claimed credit for a terrorist attack on a police post near Helwan University in Cairo earlier today. Initial accounts say that five policemen were injured in the bombing, and several other bystanders were wounded as they ed the scene. Ajnad Misr released its claim of responsibility on its official Twitter feed, and the claim was also picked up by other jihadist websites. The group first claimed attacks earlier this year. In a statement issued on Jan. 24, Ajnad Misr said it was responsi-

ble for two attacks that occurred in November 2013, as well as subsequent attacks in January. The jihadist organization then executed a string of additional attacks in Cairo and elsewhere in the months that followed, mainly focusing on Egyptian security personnel. The bombing outside of a university is consistent with Ajnad Misr's modus operan- di, as it has targeted security personnel in and around universities in the past. The jihadist organization struck Cairo University in October, and its justifications were nearly identical to those offered for today's bombing. "This blessed operation comes a er a rise in killing and maltreatment incidents against students," Ajnad Misr said in a statement released a er the bombings last month. "And we have been avoiding targeting the criminal apparatus near universities ... til it was proven that they are carrying out systematic crimes against students without justification," the statement reads. In its statement claiming responsibility, Ajnad Misr justified today's attack by saying that it witnessed female students being dragged away by security forces. A Twitter feed that claims to serve as Ajnad Misr's media arm posted an image of women being dragged away, saying today's attack was revenge for the "sisters" who were assaulted. The image can be seen above. Ajnad Misr has repeatedly stated that it is attempting to avoid civilian casualties as it lashes out at Egyptian officials. In April, for instance, the group said that it de- layed the detonation of one of its bombs near Cairo University because it wanted to avoid striking the civilians in the area. Ajnad made the same claim in October, saying that it used less powerful explosives in order to avoid innocent citizens. Another Egyptian jihadist group, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM), or Ansar Jerusalem, is headquartered in the Sinai, and a faction from the group has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State, an al Qaeda offshoot that controls large portions of Iraq and Syr- ia. ABM has rebranded itself as the Islamic State's province in the Sinai. In the past, ABM has described Ajnad Misr as "our brothers," but it is not clear what, if any, relationship there is between the two organizations currently. Ajnad Misr has not sworn allegiance to the Islamic State, and many details about the group remain unknown.

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/

Keep politics and religion separate The fact is that militant groups have their origins in ‘political Islam’ and in the Mus- lim Brotherhood

Egyptian Secretary General of Muslim brotherhood Mahmoud Hussein, (C), leaders of the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party, President Mohammed Morsy (R), and Secretary general Saad al-Katatni (L) address a press conference a er the Mus- lim Brotherhood Shura Council meeting in Cairo, Egypt, 30 April 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood announced on 30 April that the new Freedom and Justice Party will be representing the Muslim Brotherhood, contesting up to 50 per cent of the parliament seats, in the upcoming elections scheduled for September. The group approved a programme for their Freedom and Justice Party, which they decided to form following the January 25 uprising that forced former president Hosni Mubarak and his government out of power. EPA/KHALE ELFIQI Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US, the received wisdom amongst the western public has been that there’s a link between Islam and terrorism. Media hype, stereotyping, political populism and other attacks like the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the London transportation network attacks of 2005 rein- forced that perception. Some voices of reason, particularly academics and analysts who have long studied political Islam , went unheard. The latter used to argue that not all Islamist movements are terrorist, but focussed less on the fact that Muslims (almost a fi h of humanity) are not generally violent. That bit was le to politicians, placating some Arab and Muslim countries incriminated in the Islamic terrorism campaigns.

More than a decade a er 9/11, the West is fighting terrorism again in Syria and Iraq — as shown by its campaign against aesh (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). Yet, this time the jaded argument by pundits is propagated by politicians in the US and Europe. With Turkey and Qatar on the same page, the argument now is that you need to appease moderate Islamists to be able to conquer militant Islamists. Ironically, liberals and progressives are adopting the same argument even though it contradicts the basic principle of modernism : separation of religion from politics. Unfortunately, the only conclusion that looks more plausible is that of security and intelligence veterans: all these groups originated from the Muslim Brotherhood. Some academics and analysts who argued that way before were labelled as pundits with a security mentality . The fact is that ALL these militant groups have their origins in political Islam . My first-hand experience in the 1970s and early 1980s makes that a firm fact for me, as all those who led the Jama’ah Islamiya (or Islamic Group) in university in Egypt from which Islamic Jihad and other groups emerged became prominent leaders of the Brotherhood. Even the leading ideologue of terrorism who inherited Osama Bin Laden’s mantle — Ayman Al awahri — is the nephew of a prominent political Islamist allied to the Brotherhood — Mahfuz Az- zam. Essam Aryan, Helmi Gazzar, and others were Emirs of the Jama’ah during my — and their — university years. The Brotherhood and its affiliates played a key role in recruiting jihadists who went to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1980s to fight alongside the Mujahideen, and later formed Al Qaida to fight back in their own countries and against the West. octors’ syndicates in Cairo — dominated by Jama’ah, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood — witnessed queues of people wanting to donate to the Mujahideen (now terrorists) or volunteering to join them. That was welcome then, as they fought against the Sovi- et occupation of Afghanistan, and nobody anticipated they might attack the US or fight the Anglo-Saxon occupation of Iraq years later. It’s too difficult to say what’s the best strategy to eradicate terrorist groups like aesh, the Ansar Al Shariah in Libya and Tunisia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabab in Somalia etc. Yet, without confronting the roots of the violent ideology adopted by these groups, not much can be expected from the current military campaign against aesh. Libya is actually an example of the ambiguity in the fight against militant Islamists, as US and major European countries insist on including Islamists in the post-Muammar Gaddafi ruling structure in Libya while those Islamists terrorise people because they voted them out. No wonder that Ansar Al Shariah in Tunisia is on the US list of terrorist groups while Ansar Al Shariah in Libya isn’t — even though it’s thought to be behind the assassination of the American ambassador in the Benghazi attack. It might be good for global finance and economy to develop Islamic products to get investments from Muslims wary of usurious derivatives of the mainstream financial system. Yet, it could be dangerous to apply this in politics by propagating politi-

cal Islam. Ask Egyptians, and now Libyans, what they got from the Muslim Brother- hood in power. Flagging Turkey as an example of moderate Islam ruling a country is not plausible — it’s not like Iran. Bazarites (upper middle class Iranian businessmen) collaborating with clerics is the perfect example of Islamisation of politics, just like the Brotherhood and groups that emerged from it. Political Islam had an appeal for decades as many bought the simple slogan Islam is the solution against mostly totalitarian regimes in Arab countries. People aspir- ing for justice and looking forward to a better future supported Islamists and the hard nucleus of their organised groups gathered more followers. Everybody was under the impression that political Islam is the only alternative to existing regimes and other weakened political forces in the region. But all these perceived delu- sions faltered as the Muslim Brotherhood was tested in power and revealed the its vile principles and practices. Unless a serious approach to keep politics and religion separate is adopted, we will see many Irans, aeshes and Afghanistans in the Mid- dle East. http://gulfnews.com/

Sinai-based jihadist group rebranded as slamic State's official arm November 14, 2014

On Nov. 10, an unidentified jihadist from Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM), otherwise known as Ansar Jerusalem, declared his group's allegiance to Abu Bakr al Bagh- dadi, who leads the Islamic State. As The Long War Journal reported at the time, ABM quickly began marketing itself on its official Twitter feed as the Islamic State's wilayat, meaning province (or state), in the Sinai. The group's Twitter feed was subsequently taken down, but quickly replaced as part of a regular cat and mouse game played by the social media company and the jihadists. Earlier today, the Sinai jihadists returned to Twitter with a new video that shows the group again marketing itself as the Islamic State's official wilayat. The banner shown above was used to advertise the video on Twitter. The video, which is nearly 30 minutes long, shows the Islamic State's clear in u- ence in terms of branding and production style. It is possible, if not likely, that Islamic State media operatives created the video. Little is known about the ABM faction that swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al Bagh- dadi earlier this week. And the organization's latest production does not offer any additional details on how the relationship is actually organized. According to credible reports, while an ABM faction in the Sinai has been itching to join the Islamic State since earlier this year, another ABM group in the Nile Val- ley remains loyal to al Qaeda's senior leadership. Baghdadi and the Islamic State are attempting to usurp the authority of any non- aligned jihadists by claiming that, once the group's "caliphate" has spread into new a territory, existing jihadist organizations are nullified. This is the significance of the Sinai jihadists being rebranded as the Islamic State's official arm inside Egypt. According to Baghdadi and his supporters, now that the Islamic State has a

presence inside the Sinai, all other jihadists and even all other Muslims who live there owe their loyalty to Baghdadi's representatives. In an audio message released earlier this week, Baghdadi said that his group would identify a leader for each one of its so-called provinces, including in the Sinai. It is not immediately clear if any such leader is shown in the video. Towards the beginning of the new video, as well as in scenes therea er, the Sinai jihadists execute alleged spies in a brutal fashion. For some unknown reason, however, the group decided not to show scenes from a previous video produced this past summer in which the Sinai jihadists beheaded several men accused of being spies. ABM's beheading video was likely in uenced by the Islamic State, which had decapitated an American journalist shortly beforehand. See LWJ report, Ansar Jerusalem beheads 4 Egyptians accused of being Israeli 'spies'. Much of the Sinai jihadists' new video focuses on the group's attacks against Egyptian security forces, using mortars, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IE s) and other weapons in its assaults. Special effects have been added to highlight the devastation wrought by some of the jihadists' attacks. The video highlights the jihadists' animosity for the US (showing a clip of Presi- dent Obama), Israel, as well as the Egyptian government and military. A screen shot of the Twitter page on which the video was first posted can be seen below. Also shown are various pictures taken from scenes in the video. A witter feed representing A in the Sinai reappeared online earlier toda :

he video shows Sinai jihadists firing mortars

he scene immediatel above was repla ed in slow-motion and bac wards

A jihadist is shown with his face obscured to protect his identit . He is wearing a shirt that is made to loo li e the slamic State's flag: http://www.longwarjournal.org/

Kenya

Ken a bus attac survivor tells how gunmen selected their victims Al-Shabaab extremists singled out and killed 28 passengers who could not recite Islamic creed, Kenyan police say Associated Press in Nairobi theguardian.com, Sunday 23 November 2014

The bus that was attacked by gunmen is brought to the police station in Mandera town, north-eastern Kenya. Photograph: EPA

One gunman shot from the right, one from the le , each killing the non-Muslims lying in a line on the ground, growing closer and closer to ouglas Ochwodho, who was in the middle. And then the shooting stopped. Apparently each gunman thought the other shot Ochwodho. He lay perfectly still until the 20 Islamic extremists le , and he appears to be the only survivor of those who had been selected for death. Somalia’s Islamic extremist rebels, al-Shabaab, attacked a bus in northern Kenya at dawn Saturday, singling out and killing 28 passengers who could not recite an Is- lamic creed and were assumed to be non-Muslims, Kenyan police said. Those who could not say the Shahada, a tenet of the Muslim faith, were shot at close range, Ochwodho said. Nineteen men and nine women were killed in the bus attack, said Kenyan police chief avid Kimaiyo.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the killings through its radio station in Soma- lia, saying it was in retaliation for raids by Kenyan security forces carried out earlier this week on four mosques at the Kenyan coast. Kenya’s military said it responded to the killings with air strikes later on Saturday that destroyed the attackers’ camp in Somalia and killed 45 rebels. The United States condemns in the strongest terms today’s horrific attack in Ken- ya by the terrorist group al-Shabab against innocent civilians, said Bernadette Meehan, the spokeswoman for the National Security Council in Washington. The United States stands with our Kenyan partners in the effort to counter the threat of terrorism and affirms our ongoing commitment to working with all Ken- yans to combat these atrocities, her statement said. The UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, also condemned the attack. The bus travelling to the capital, Nairobi, with 60 passengers was hijacked about 31 miles from the town of Mandera near Kenya’s border with Somalia, said two police officers who insisted on anonymity because they were ordered not to speak to the press. The attackers first tried to wave the bus down but it did not stop, so the gunmen sprayed it with bullets, said the police. When that did not work they shot a rocket propelled grenade at it, the officers said. The gunmen took control of the vehicle and forced it off the road where they ordered all the passengers out of the vehicle and separated those who appeared to be non-Muslims – mostly non-Somalis – from the rest. The survivor, ouglas Ochwodho, a non-Muslim head teacher of a private primary school in Mandera, said he was travelling home for the Christmas vacation since school had closed. Ochwodho said the passengers who did not look Somali were separated from the others. The non-Somali passengers were then asked to recite the Shahada, an Is- lamic creed declaring oneness with God. Those who could not recite the creed were ordered to lie down. Ochwodho was among those who had to lie on the ground. Two gunmen started shooting those on the ground one gunman started from the le and other from the right, Ochwodho said. When they reached him they were confused on whether either had shot him, he said. Ochwodho lay still until the gunmen le , he said. He then ran back to the road and got a li from a pick-up truck back to Mandera. He spoke from a hospital bed where he was being treated for shock. Seventeen of the 28 dead were teachers, according to the police commander in

Mandera county. A shortage of personnel and lack of equipment led to a slow response by police when the information was received, said officers. They said the attackers had more sophisticated weaponry than the police who waited for military reinforce- ments before responding. Kenya has been hit by a series of gun and bomb attacks blamed on al-Shabaab, who are linked to al-Qaida, since it sent troops into Somalia in October 2011. Au- thorities say there have been at least 135 attacks by al-Shabaab since then, including the assault on Nairobi’s upscale Westgate Mall in September 2013 in which 67 people were killed. Al-Shabaab said it was responsible for other attacks on Kenya’s coast earlier this year which killed at least 90 people. Al-Shabaab is becoming more entrenched and a graver threat to Kenya, warned the International Crisis Group in a September report to mark the anniversary of the Westgate attack. The report said the Islamic extremists are taking advantage of long-standing grievances of Kenya’s Muslim community, such as official discrim- ination and marginalisation. Kenya has been struggling to contain growing extremism in the country. Earlier this week the authorities shut down four mosques at the Kenyan coast a er police alleged they found explosives and a gun when they raided the places of worship. Some Muslims believe the police planted the weapons to justify closing the mosques, Kheled Khalifa, a human rights official said Friday warning that methods being used to tackle extremism by government will increase support for radicals. One person was killed during the raid on two of the mosques on Monday. Police said they shot dead a young man trying to hurl a grenade at them. The government had previously said the four mosques were recruitment centers for al-Shabaab. http://www.theguardian.com/

osque Raids rossed Line: Ken a uslims 20 November 2014 00:00

NAIROBI – Recent police raids targeting Kenya mosques have outraged the country’s Muslim community, seeing authorities as crossing the red line and demand- ing a unified stance to end such tactics of targeting Muslim places of worship in the name fighting terrorism. If the police had a problem with some individuals, it should have arrested them as individuals instead of conducting dramatic raids on mosques and announcing their closure, Abdullahi Abdi, the chairman of the National Muslim Leaders Forum, told OnIslam.net. Muslims are not happy at all and now see the government as their enemy, he added, terming police raids as crossing the red line . He termed police tactic as counterproductive, saying it has made Muslims in Kenya feel as being unfairly targeted in the name of fighting terrorism. Abdi cautioned that the extreme action taken by police in raiding the mosques and arresting hundreds of youth will result in radicalizing many Muslims. Muslim places of prayer deserve respect and sanctity which should not be violated by police, he said. The government has intelligence machinery to identify individuals who may be

causing trouble but attacking mosques is unacceptable. Abdi’s comments echoed a growing anger among Kenyan Muslims following four raids that targeted mosques this week. On Monday and Wednesday, hundreds of heavily-armed paramilitary police de- scended on Musa, Sakina, Swafaa and Minaa mosques in the Coastal city of Mom- basa and arrested hundreds of youths. A 20 year old high school student was killed by police in one of the raids. Police claimed that the mosques are being controlled by irresponsible youths who preach extremists messages and threaten the security of the country. They have also accused Muslim youths in the mosques of fuelling insecurity inci- dences, such as assassinations of people working with the government in its counterterrorism activities. Police claimed that they the mosque raids yielded an assortment of weapons in the mosques, a claim that was rejected by many Muslims in Kenya. On his part, Billow Kerrow, an outspoken Muslim leader who sits in the management committee of Nairobi’s Jamia Mosque, the largest in Kenya termed the attack as totally misguided and provocative. He expressed doubts about police claims of seizing dangerous weapons in the mosques, saying police are trying to manipulate public opinion in their favour and justifying the criminal raids. Lost rust For many Muslims, the latest raids have been deemed as a pretext by the Kenyan government to win the support of the west for fighting terrorism . Attacking mosques is a grave crime, Human Rights defender and Mombasa Coun- ty Senator Hassan Omar said. It appears that the government is keen to hype the insecurity threats from Mus- lims to win more diplomatic and financial support from western countries. He said the heavy-handed approach will backfire on the security agencies as more Muslims feel being targeted. We need smart and targeted approaches that go a er those who are committing criminal acts in the name of the Islamic cause. But attacking mosques and arresting everyone one on sight won’t work. It will only escalate the problem, Omar added. Yusuf Mohammed, a Muslim trader in Nairobi, has also voiced scepticism over police claims of finding weapons in the raided mosques, including grenades, petrol bombs, and guns. He insisted that police planted the weapons inside the mosque to justify their crim-

inal attack on the houses of worship and garner support from Kenyans "It is just like the classic case where police used to plant drugs on people they had arrested in order to build a phony case against them. There is no way people can hide weapons in mosques which are open to everyone to enter. This appears to be disinformation by police," he said. Editorials in the Kenyan media as well as commentators have criticised the heavy- handed approach by police to attack the mosque terming the move as counterproductive. Using raw force and seizing every youth in sight and labelling them Al-Shabaab is counterproductive. Moreover, there is danger in opening up religious ri s as the crackdown targets members of one faith. It behoves the police and other security teams involved in the operation to exercise restraint, read the editorial of aily Nation, the largest and most in uential daily in Kenya. Macharia Gaitho, an in uential commentator in Kenya, has also warned against the government’s heavy-handed approach to Muslims. The more the government reacts with a heavy hand, the more the moderate voices of reason within the Muslim community are isolated and drowned out, and the more the hardliners spread their tentacles, Gaitho wrote. On the other hand, Mombasa County Commissioner Nelson Marwa had defended the operation. He told Daily Nation newspaper that while the government is fully aware of the respect the mosques ought to be accorded, but it will not sit back whenever they are misused by individuals with evil motives. He said security agencies will also ush out radical youths, who have taken over some mosques and ensure that such mosques are run by responsible people who have no links with criminal activities Kenya Muslims have been sensing eradication of their rights a er their country was involved in the so-called war on terrorism in East Africa. Supported by UK and US, Kenya's anti-terror police have been accused of targeting innocent Muslims with arbitrary arrests and disappearances. Muslims problems increased following last September Westgate mall attack in which more than 60 people were killed, the attack which was claimed by Somalia's militant al Shabaab group. http://www.onislam.net/

Libya

S S comes to Lib a November 18, 2014

S ORY H HL H S ISIS has taken over erna, Libya, a city of 100,000 on the Mediterranean coast " erna today looks identical to Raqqa, the ISIS headquarters town in Syria" an analyst says erna, marginalized during the Gadhafi era, has a long history of Islamist radicalism ( ) -- The black ag of ISIS ies over government buildings. Police cars carry the group's insignia. The local football stadium is used for public executions. A town in Syria or Iraq? No. A city on the coast of the Mediterranean, in Libya. Fighters loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are now in complete control of the city of erna, population of about 100,000, not far from the Egyptian border and just about 200 miles from the southern shores of the European Union. The fighters are taking advantage of political chaos to rapidly expand their presence westwards along the coast, Libyan sources tell CNN.

Map showing location of Derna in Libya The sources say the erna branch of ISIS counts 800 fighters and operates half a dozen camps on the outskirts of the town, as well as larger facilities in the nearby Green Mountains, where fighters from across North Africa are being trained. It has been bolstered by the return to Libya from Syria and Iraq of up to 300 Libyan jihadists who were part of ISIS' al Battar Brigade -- deployed at first in eir Ezzor in Syria and then Mosul in Iraq. These fighters supported the Shura Council for the Youth of Islam in erna, a pro-ISIS faction. The council had been competing for superiority with another militant group, the Abu Salem Brigade, some of whose fighters' loyalties lay with al Qaeda, according to Noman Benotman, a former Libyan jihadist now involved in counter-terrorism for the Quilliam Foundation. Al Qaeda's top envoy in Libya, Abdulbasit Azuz, le erna a er U.S. Special Forces captured Ahmed Abu Khatallah, an alleged ringleader of the Benghazi attacks in June. Azuz is now believed to be in Syria, Benotman told CNN. Amateur video from the end of October showed a large crowd of militants affiliated with the Shura Council for the Youth of Islam chanting their allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The new ISIS wing in erna calls itself the "Barqa" provincial division of the Islamic State, the name given to the eastern region of Libya when Islamic rule replaced the Roman Empire. The Libyan branch of ISIS now has a tight grip on the city, controlling the courts, all aspects of administration, education, and the local radio. " erna today looks identical to Raqqa, the ISIS headquarters town in Syria," Benotman told CNN. "ISIS pose a serious threat in Libya. They are well on the way to creating an Islamic emirate in eastern Libya," Benotman said.

Judges, journalists and army officers have been among dozens targeted for assassination in erna this year. Similarities to S ria

erna has a long history of Islamist radicalism. Marginalized during the Gadhafi era, it contributed more foreign fighters per capita to al Qaeda in Iraq than any other town in the Middle East. It has also provided scores of fighters for ISIS in Syria. In another disturbing similarity with Syria, the bodies of three anti-ISIS activists were found beheaded in the town last week. The group has beheaded many in Syr- ia, including Western journalists and aid workers. Two months ago ISIS leader Baghdadi helped orchestrate the take-over of erna by dispatching one of his senior aides, Abu Nabil al Anbari, an Iraqi ISIS veteran who had spent time with Baghdadi, in a U.S. detention facility in Iraq, according to Be- notman. Helped by Abu al-Baraa el-Azdi, a Saudi preacher who has become erna's top religious judge, al Anbari's efforts have borne fruit. Last week a new pan-Libyan group calling itself "Mujahideen of Libya" declared allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, claiming it was sub-divided into three provinces: Barqa, Tripoli, and Fezzan (southwest Libya). The ISIS leader responded by calling all supporters in Libya to join what he called the newest administrative region of the Islamic caliphate. According to Aaron elin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Islamic State's new province in Libya "could have some level of viability, at least in the short term" because fighters there are well-positioned to fund themselves through "trafficking, smuggling and other black market activities." Libyan fighters loyal to ISIS have expanded their presence westwards along the coast, forming chapters in al Bayda, Benghazi (where the Islamist umbrella group Ansar al Shariah already holds sway), Sirte, al-Khums and even Tripoli, Benotman told CNN. The erna wing of the Islamic State in Libya is the prime suspect in a suicide bombing last week in Tobruk, the temporary home of Libya's internationally recognized parliament near the Egyptian border. One person was killed and 14 wounded. The

group is also suspected of carrying out a car bombing outside Labraq air force base in Al-Bayda, the same day, killing four. On Sunday the erna wing claimed it had previously dispatched nine suicide bomb- ers from Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to carry out attacks against Libyan security forces in and around Benghazi. Several of the attacks appear to correspond to previously unclaimed suicide bombings in the area, including a twin-attack on a Libyan special forces camp in Benghazi on July 23 and an October 2 attack on a military checkpoint near Benina airport. Also on Sunday, an ISIS-linked Twitter account suggested the Tripoli wing was responsible for car bomb attacks last Thursday outside the Egyptian and UAE embas- sies in the capital, according to the SITE Intelligence group. In its audio message last week, the Mujahideen of Libya threatened "the secularists and parliamentarians and their pillars from the police, army...." "We have prepared for you from the most bitter of cups, and the worst of deaths," it said. oncerns in g pt Islamist-leaning militias from Misrata seized control of Tripoli in the summer, forcing the parliament to relocate. They are suspected of shipping arms to ISIS fighters in the east of Libya. Benotman says the Libyan air force destroyed one of those shipments earlier this month CNN was not able to independently confirm the arms shipments. But there are other signs that more secular forces in Libya are beginning to strike back at ISIS supporters. Libyan air force jets bombed their positions in erna last week. According to Benotman, they struck five Islamic State positions in the area, including command centers and training camps, killing six fighters and injuring 20. "Most of the local population in erna are opposed to the takeover by the Islamic State, but, with the complete absence of any central government presence, they are not in a position to do much for now. Local tribes are reluctant to move against them because people have relatives who have joined their ranks," Benotman told CNN. Egypt, which has strongly backed the anti-Islamist coalition in Tobruk, has grown increasingly concerned about the ISIS presence in eastern Libya. In July gunmen suspected of being part of Ansar Beit al Maqdis, an Egyptian jihadi group, attacked an Egyptian desert border post, killing 21 soldiers. Ansar Beit al Maqdis has also pledged allegiance to ISIS -- raising concerns that it may cooperate with the Islamic State supporters in Libya. Egyptian officials say a significant number of Ansar al Beit's weapons originated in Libya. Back in August British Prime Minister avid Cameron warned that if ISIS "succeeds, we would be facing a terrorist state on the shores of the Mediterranean." He may

not have imagined that months later ISIS would have an outpost not far from the shores of southern Europe. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/isis-libya/

Mali

es camps d’entrainement djihadistes se sont reformés au nord ali ovembre 2 4 ’après les services de renseignement français, les groupes terroristes se sont re- mobilisés au nord du Mali depuis le début du retrait des troupes de Serval. Malgré l’intervention coup de poing des militaires de la force Barkhane contre un campement terroriste dans le massif du Tigharghar fin octobre, la situation demeure ex- trêmement précaire dans le nord du pays.

ébut novembre, le ministre de la défense français Jean-Yves Le rian a été reçu discrètement par le président algérien Abdelaziz Boute ika pendant une heure. Au programme de cette rencontre, la situation sécuritaire dans la région sahélienne et tout particulièrement au Mali. Aqmi, le retour epuis la fin officielle de l’opération Serval en Juillet 2014 et le retrait des troupes françaises, les groupes djihadistes se sont renforcés au nord du pays. es camps d’entrainement se reforment notamment dans le massif de Tigharghar devenu une zone de stationnement des groupes armés entre les villes de Kidal et de Tessalit. Fin octobre, les militaires français de l’opération régionale Barkhane qui a rempla-

cé Serval y ont mené une offensive contre le campement d'un important groupe djihadiste. Bilan, un soldat français et vingt-quatre terroristes ont été tués au cours de violents accrochages. Une remobilisation qui s’accompagne d’une recru- descence des attaques qui ont fait notamment 34 victimes dans les rangs de la force de maintien de la paix de l’Onu (Minusma). La diffusion de la vidéo de l’otage français Serge Lazarevic capturé en 2011 est un moyen de plus pour Aqmi de réaffirmer sa présence dans la zone sahélienne au moment où l’Etat islamique joue la concurrence sur la scène internationale. En juillet, 2014, Aqmi a publiquement rejeté l'annonce par l'EI de la création d'un califat. Le groupe a renouvelé son allégeance au chef d’Al-Qaïda Ayman al- awahiri, en con it ouvert avec le chef de l'EI Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi. ans un communiqué rendu public en septembre 2014, Aqmi déclarait soutenir l’Etat islamique sans pour autant lui prêter allégeance. ashington contre les ran ons Par ailleurs, la vidéo de Serge Lazarevic dont Paris exige la libération relance la polémique sur le versement des rançons. « Une source de revenus considérable qui, pendant des années, a contribué à pérenniser la présence d’Aqmi dans cette zone » explique Lemine Ould Salem, auteur du livre « Le Ben Laden du Sahara » consacré au parcours de Mokhtar Belmokhtar, l'émir d'Aqmi. Si, au Quai d’Orsay, le mot d’ordre officiel est « pas de rançon », la pratique est toute autre. Opposée à toute libération de prisonniers djihadistes détenues par les autorités de Bama- ko, Paris se retrouve acculée. Un sujet qui vaut aux responsables français de se faire régulièrement épingler par les Etats-Unis qui refusent de payer pour les libé- rations d'otages. En septembre dernier, Barack Obama s’était irrité contre cette pratique dans les colonnes du New York Times : «Le président français, François Hollande, dit que son pays ne paie pas de rançons aux terroristes, alors qu'en réa- lité, il le fait». Pour Washington, tout versement supplémentaire pourrait contribuer à renforcer un peu plus le nouvel élan pris par Aqmi dans la zone saharo- sahélienne. Au Quai d’Orsay, on considère aujourd’hui que le retour en force d’Aqmi dans la zone s’appuie principalement sur deux grandes figures : Iyad ag Ghali et Abdel- krim al-Targui (le Touareg) de son vrai nom Hamada ag-Hama. Le premier est un ancien rebelle touareg converti au salafisme. A la tête du groupe radical Ansar- ine, il a contrôlé pendant près de dix mois le nord du Mali avec ses alliés d’Aqmi et du Mujao avant le déclenchement de l’opération Serval. Selon le ministère des affaires étrangères, il se trouverait aujourd’hui dans le sud algérien où il bénéficie de protections. Le deuxième, Abdelkrim al-Targui, le neveu d’Iyad Ag Ghali, dirige la katiba d’Aqmi, "Al-Ansar", qui détiendrait aujourd’hui Serge Lazarevic. Il sert notamment de courroie de transmission et d'intermédiaire entre Aqmi et son oncle. Les groupes contrôlés par ces deux hommes s’alimentent aujourd’hui en armes et en effectifs depuis le sud libyen devenu un véritable repère de djihadistes.

es négociations au point mort Le retour en force des terroristes intervient alors que les pourparlers d’Alger entre les groupes rebelles du nord et les autorités de Bamako ont, pour l’instant, échoué à faire émerger toute solution politique. Les rivalités entre les différents mouvements qui participent aux négociations ralentissent considérablement le processus. u côté de la diplomatie française, on estime que le président malien Ibrahim Bou- bacar Keïta joue le jeu des négociations même s’il est affaibli en interne notamment par d’importants scandales financiers. Par ailleurs, la présence de personnali- tés proches des djihadistes dans les instances de pouvoir constitue une difficulté supplémentaire et brouille le jeu diplomatique malien. A Bamako, de nombreux observateurs critiquent notamment la présence d’Ahmada Ag Bibi sur les bancs de l’Assemblée nationale. Ce touareg issu de la tribu des Ifoghas est très proche d’Iyad Ag Ghali et s’est fait élire en 2013 sous la bannière du RPM, le parti d’IBK. Reste que la solution politique au problème nord malien demeure inéxorablement entre les mains du grand voisin algérien qui considère cette zone comme son aire d’in uence privilégiée. Pour les négociations, IBK est en communication permanente avec le ministre algérien des affaires étrangères Ramtane Lamamra en charge de la médiation du con it depuis juin 2014. La mainmise d’Al- ger sur le dossier nord malien pourrait, à terme, poser problème pour Paris qui sou- haite intervenir dans le sud libyen. En effet le puissant RS (services de renseignement) algérien demeure résolument opposé à toute intervention dans ce pays. http://mondafrique.com/

Nigeria

onathan in London, romises to nd o o Haram errorism Soon

22 ov 2 4

The country's anti-terrorism campaign took centre stage in London on Friday with President Goodluck Jonathan promising that the federal government, its armed forces and other security agencies would strive hard to end the ability of terrorist Boko Haram to capture and hold any Nigerian territory.

Jonathan spoke at the opening of President Goodluck Jonathan the meeting of Nigeria's Honorary International Investment Council (HIIC), in London. The President’s assurance to the international community came on the same day that the Nigerian Army, in a morale-boosting effort, announced the promotion of three officers from the rank of Captain to Major in recognition of their exceptional gallantry in the fight against Boko Haram terrorists. Jonathan assured the gathering that the armed forces and security agencies were making steady gains in recovering areas recently taken by Boko Haram. "We are improving on security. For about a week now, there have been no reports of Boko Haram seizing more territory. Rather, we are steadily pushing them back. The impression being created by sections of the media that the situation is worsen- ing is not true. I can assure you that it will never get worse," Jonathan told his audience. He called for greater support from the National Assembly in his administration's efforts at curbing terrorism, insurgency and insecurity in the country. He told members of the council headed by Baroness Lynda Chalker that he had offered himself for re-election in 2015. The president told Chalker that he was convinced that with four more years in office, he would consolidate on the positive national reforms initiated by his administration and take them to a point where they would be irreversible for the good of all Nigerians. "As you already know, I have indicated my willingness to carry on for another four years if I am given the opportunity so that we can carry forward some of the re-

forms we have been talking about," the President said. Jonathan cited the expansion of transportation infrastructure, improvement of local content in Nigeria's oil industry, more inclusive economic growth, job creation and national security which are on the agenda of the meeting as some of the areas in which his administration still hoped to achieve further improvements. "We cannot move the economy forward without good infrastructure. We have been working very hard in that area. We have improved our road network significantly. In the next three to four years, we should be able to resurface almost all federal roads in the country and begin new ones. "We are improving our airport terminals and aviation security. Reforms are also ongoing at our ports to drastically reduce the time required for import clearance for- malities. "In the rail sector, we may require private sector funds to quicken the pace of development. Our goal is to link all state capitals by rail. It may not be an objective that can be achieved by a single administration, but we want to lay a solid foundation that others can build on. "We are also promoting the increase of local content in our oil industry, because that is the only way in which our people will benefit more from the industry and begin to see themselves as true stakeholders who need to protect and help in the development of our oil and gas resources," Jonathan averred. He thanked Chalker and other members of the council for their valuable advice to the federal government over the years. To be successful, leaders must take decisions based on adequate information and sound advice. Having had the personal benefit of interacting with you all as Vice President and President since 2007 has helped me a lot" the president noted. The meeting, according to the statement, later went into a closed door session to receive briefings, updates and presentations from relevant ministers and council members.

o rash of A Helicopter …

The Chief of Air Staff, in response to incessant air crashes involving NAF aircra near the theatre of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram terrorists in the North-east, on Friday assured that their planes are in sound operational condition. Amosu gave this assurance while speaking to journalists a er the decoration of 35 Group Captains to the rank of Air Commodores at the NAF Headquarters in Abuja. He further assured that the Air Force in line with their top-notch standard in adher- ing to a strict maintenance culture would provide safe platforms for ying.

He said: Today is a day of mixed celebrations while we are still mourning the death of our colleagues that lost their lives during the unfortunate helicopter accidents, equally we have to consider elevating very senior officers so that we can continue to render service to the nation. When it comes to air cra the issue of age, you can think about it but what you must focus on is service ability status. You could have an aircra : the B52 today how old? But it is still being effectively utilized for war." The Air Force Chief explained that based on the culture that had been developed over the years, NAF are to provide very safe platforms for ying, adding, "we are very cautious of the need to be efficient, even in terms of delivering air power to support our ground forces." According to him, the Airforce is focused on the need to enhance airli capability the effort is to ensure that the C130 eet came up with the G222, noting that there had been a lot of huge efforts on tactical transportation. In a related development, the military has denied a report that a helicopter owned by the NAF crashed in Adamawa State. In a post on its twitter, the Nigeria efence Headquarters states that Contrary to a report making the rounds, there was no crash involving any helicopter or air plane of the Nigerian Airforce today as reported in some social media channels. It will be recalled that NAF in the past weeks has witnessed issues of air crashes or near air mishaps close to the counter-terrorism war against Boko Haram terrorists. In a matter of days last week, two NAF aircra crashed in outskirts of Yola, Adama- wa State, on Tuesday and Thursday respectively. Arm romotes hree for allantr against o o Haram… The Nigerian Army on Friday announced the promotion of three officers from the rank of Captain to Major in recognition of their exceptional gallantry in the fight against Boko Haram and as a morale-boosting effort. The irector of Army Public Relations ( APR), Brig-Gen. Olajide Laleye, made this announcement in Abuja while briefing journalists on the activities lined up for the forthcoming Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Annual Conference, to be held next month in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. Laleye listed the three outstanding officers who were recognised for bravery in the face of growing criticism of the Service for alleged acts of cowardice and indisci- pline as Captains IA Manga, AH Ali and Y Micah. It is my pleasure to announce the elevation from the rank of Captain to Major of three brave officers who have shown aggressive posture and uncommon gallantry in the face of the enemy particularly in the counter-terrorism operations. http://www.thisdaylive.com/

o o Haram has 60,000 fighters- nsider

ARTICLE | NOVEMBER 17, 2014 - 3:13PM

There are indications that the Boko Haram sect has about 60,000 fighters, including underage insurgents.

A top source, who is central to the initial peace talks with the sect, gave these rare insights. The source explained why the war against Boko Haram is difficult and what the government can do to tackle the insurgency.

The source said: Boko Haram has nearly 10,000 ideological army and over 50,000 conscripts, including 40 per cent underage. We are not even counting numerous sect members in Abuja, Kano, Bauchi and in different parts of Nigeria, West Africa and as far as Sudan.

Most of them prefer to die in battle than to be back to their camps safely due to the endemic indoctrination within the cult group.

This is the reason why I always say here and everywhere that this crisis is far from over. The only thing for now: Ya Allah protect us and unite us to defeat our ene- mies.

The sect is also said to be operating active cells in Kogi, Lagos with many members in Abuja, Kano, Bauchi and in different parts of the country, West Africa and as far as Sudan.

The source decried the increasing insurgency in the North-East and the deterio- rating humanitarian situation.

According to the source, The crisis is far more serious than it is being reported. Last week, his father’s friend and former SS colleague was slaughtered by Boko Haram in Hawul, his son drove to the scene to pick his father’s corpse and he was killed too.

Yes, they are now in Hawul, few kilometres to Biu. My mum’s twin sister is missing in the past two days, she ran away from Boko Haram to the bush in Garkida. Many of my relatives have ed to the mountains, some barefooted. Nigeria is at war. There is indeed a silent humanitarian emergency in the North-East that is being shielded from the rest of the world.

The highly-placed source asked all Nigerians to come together, irrespective of political leanings, to address the insurgency in the North-East.

The source added: Gwoza, Sambisa and Mandara mountains are the vortex of Boko Haram insurgency. Until we take these areas, we have a lot more to do. Boko Haram has very active cells in different parts of the north including Lagos and Kogi. What is important in my opinion is for Nigerians (leaders and the led) to figure out what is responsible for the problem in the first place.

The blame game started from Jonathan and everyone and political parties started pointing fingers at one another. When I spoke to the Commander-In-Chief in May/ June, I saw the level of his ignorance, I was alarmed. This ignorance is not only with the president alone, even our religious and traditional leaders in the north have continued to miss the live wire that feeds the insurgency.

We have reached a stage where we can no longer manage this problem, not only because of an important leader like Jonathan but he inherited failed institutions. Today, Boko Haram and IS are in contact and people are even surprised when it was confirmed. But some of us said it repeatedly in the media. This is a problem that needs all Nigerians to be on board. I blame the National Assembly the most for not insisting on accountability from the military and the executive arm. Alas, they are equally not accountable to Nigerians.

The people in the North-East do not care about the conspiracy theories we peddle here, they just want to survive another horrifying day. http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/

igeria’s angerous 201 lections: Limiting the Violence A21 Nov 2014 X U V SU ARY A R O A O S Nigeria’s presidential, parliamentary and state gubernatorial and assembly elections, scheduled for February 2015, will be more contentious than usual. Tensions within and between the two major political parties, competing claims to the presidency between northern and Niger elta politicians and along religious lines, the grim radical Islamist Boko Haram insurgency and increasing communal violence in several northern states, along with inadequate preparations by the electoral commission and apparent bias by security agencies, suggest the country is heading toward a very volatile and vicious electoral contest. If this violent trend continues, and particularly if the vote is close, marred or followed by widespread violence, it would deepen Nigeria’s already grave security and governance crises. The government, its agencies and all other national figures must work urgently to ensure that the vote is not conducted in an explosive situation as this could further destabilise the country. Nigerian elections are traditionally fiercely contested, but in 2015, risks of violence are particularly high. This will be the first nationwide contest essentially between two parties – the ruling People’s emocratic Party (P P) and the opposition All Pro- gressives Congress (APC) – since the return to civilian rule in 1999. While a genuine contest is a welcome sign of progress for Nigeria’s democracy (thanks to the emergence last year of the APC, a merger of the four largest opposition parties), increasingly acrimonious relations between the two parties could engender even fiercer clashes among their supporters once campaigning formally starts in ecember. Factional feuds within both parties could degenerate into violence during their national and state primaries. Competing claims to the presidency, between northern leaders and their Niger elta counterparts, could also result in violence in either or both regions, particularly a er the polls. As in 2011, clashes could erupt in some northern states if the APC, whose frontrunners are all northerners, loses the polls there is similarly a high risk of violence if the P P loses the presidency, particularly in the Niger elta, home region of the party’s candidate, President Goodluck Jona- than. The Boko Haram insurgency and the state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe could prevent voting in parts of those north-eastern states. If this occurs, the opposition APC, which has large following in those (and other northern) states, could lose a significant number of votes, reject the presidential polls’ outcome and question the elected government’s legitimacy. An election not held in all states may also fall short of the constitutional requirements for electing a president, namely that the winner score 25 per cent of the votes in two-thirds of the 36 states, there- by raising serious legal disputes. Equally worrying are the increasing availability of firearms, the rise in communal violence across several northern states since 2013

and deepening criminality in the Niger elta. eficiencies in electoral preparations are also compounding the risks of violence. Proposed amendments to the 2010 Electoral Act, including provisions for establishment of an election offences tribunal, which were intended to prevent or punish electoral offences including violence, remain stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament). There is no certainty they will be passed in time to have meaningful impact on the polls. Repeated assurances by the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Com- mission (INEC), Professor Attahiru Jega, that the polls will be an improvement on the past, are not entirely supported by realities on ground. There are growing fears that INEC may not be able to produce an updated and credible voter register before the polls. The commission’s decision to create 30,000 new polling units, mostly in northern states, was widely rejected by southern leaders and groups who feared Jega, a northerner, was handing his home region an electoral advantage. INEC’s decision to put the new polling units on hold has not entirely dispelled southern misgivings. Amid such lack of confidence, an election conducted with an incom- plete voter register will certainly be disputed. Actions by the police and other security services, all controlled by the federal government, could also aggravate tensions around the polls and undermine the credi- bility of their outcomes. The conduct of some senior police officers, notably in Riv- ers state, has raised fears that the agency could be manipulated to serve the P P’s interests. Similarly, some actions and pronouncements by the epartment of State Security ( SS) – Nigeria’s main domestic intelligence agency – have raised concerns about institutional bias. If these agencies act or are perceived to act in a partisan manner, they could undermine free and fair polls and heighten the risks of violence, particularly a er the vote. With only three months before elections, the government cannot engage in long- term structural efforts to improve the quality of the vote, but it can and must be encouraged to urgently take several steps to limit the risk of widespread violence. These include increasing efforts to contain the Boko Haram insurgency, paying special attention to the police to improve the security environment, reinforcing the capacities of the INEC to restore confidence in the electoral process, and along with all politicians, avoid playing the religious card and reducing tensions within and between the parties. The government – President Goodluck Jonathan, the federal leg- islature, INEC and security agencies – must bear the greatest responsibility for implementing these measures, but other national and political figures, including civil society, as well as international partners must also rally to stop the slide. R O A O S o the government of resident oodluc onathan: 1. Step up efforts to contain the con ict in the north east and ensure elections are

held in all states, particularly by strengthening security services, improving coordination with state governments and implementing regional security arrangements in concert with neighbouring countries. 2. irect publicly the heads of the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies to act lawfully and impartially with all parties and individuals participating inthe elections. o the president, major political parties and their candidates: 3. Avoid in ammatory rhetoric, publicly denounce violence, pledge to respect rules, in particular the Code of Conduct for Political Parties, and pursue grievances through lawful channels. 4. Respect party constitutions and particularly allow democratic candidate selec- tions. o leaders of regional, ethnic and religious groups: 5. Organise national, regional, ethnic and inter-faith public forums to jointly and publicly commit to non-violence, and establish channels of communication and contingency plans to respond to large-scale communal violence. o the ational Assembl : 6. Ensure speedy passage of the amended Electoral Act. 7. Approve urgently supplementary funds for INEC to meet its logistical requirements. o the ndependent ational lectoral ommission: 8. Intensify efforts to build relations with all parties, particularly opposition parties, including holding constant consultations to discuss and explain major decisions, sparing no effort in trying to increase confidence and ensuring transparent relations with all parties, individuals and civil society. o the igeria olice orce and other securit agencies: 9. Improve security arrangements for the elections by training more personnel for election duties and strengthening capacity to gather information, monitor developments and analyse threats strengthen ongoing efforts to curb the in ux and availability of illegal arms particularly in violence-prone areas and ensure the newly es- tablished Elections Security Planning and Monitoring Unit is well resourced, firmly led and instructed on international best practices. 10. irect publicly all officers to ensure neutrality in relations with all parties and apply exemplary sanctions against any officer who fails to comply. o civil societ organisations and mass media: 11. Engage more actively with youth leaders especially in poor urban and rural are-

as, strengthen participatory early warning and early response systems, and raise timely alerts of possible violence. 12. Ensure factual and balanced reporting of all election-related developments, and avoid publishing hateful, divisive and in ammatory statements. o the U , U and other international partners: 13. Sustain ongoing capacity building programs for major institutions involved in the elections, particularly INEC and the police, and increase technical and financial support to relevant civil society organisations. 14. eploy observer missions for longer periods before and a er the votes to monitor the process more comprehensively. 15. Create a common donor forum for collectively messaging and pressuring President Jonathan, political parties and their candidates, security agencies and all other stakeholders to act lawfully and prevent or mitigate violence. a ar/Abuja/ russels, 21 ovember 2014 http://www.crisisgroup.org/

Somalia

Somali-American who helped ogadishu govt illed November 19, 2014 Associated Press MOGA ISHU, Somalia (AP) — Gunmen shot and killed a Somali-American from Minnesota who had le a well-paying job in the U.S. to help the edgling city government in Mogadishu, an official and relative said Wednesday. Abdullahi Ali Anshur, 60, was an engineer helping the Mogadishu government with urban planning and drainage systems. He was killed a er armed militants from the Islamic extremist group al-Shabab stopped his vehicle and sprayed it with bullets on Monday, police Capt. Mohamed Hussein said. Anshur was buried in Mogadishu on Wednesday. He had le his work in Minneso- ta to help Mogadishu's municipal government, said a relative who insisted on anonymity for security reasons. Anshur had held a similar job in Mogadishu more than two decades ago before the Somali government collapsed in the early 1990s. Many Somalis who ed the country's chaos for the U.S. and Europe have recently returned to Mogadishu to use their expertise to help the country move past decades of war and Anshur's killing has sent shock waves through that community. One British-Somali man who returned to Mogadishu to open a cafe called Anshur's death discouraging. "Insecurity is the biggest threat for now," said Ahmed Mohamed. A Somali-American in Mogadishu, Hussein Ali, said such attacks leave U.S. and Eu- ropean Somalis scared and disappointed. "It makes many of us contemplate leaving Mogadishu," he said. Anshur was a graduate of California State University and UCLA. He had arrived in Mogadishu last year, his relative said. Al-Shabab, an ultra-conservative Islamic militant group that wants to run Somalia by its strict interpretation of Shariah law, once ruled nearly all of Mogadishu. The group was forced out of the capital in 2011 but continues to carry out insurgent attacks and targeted murders. In a separate incident, armed assailants shot and killed a freelance journalist in the central Somali town of Galkayo on Tuesday evening. Three journalists have been murdered in targeted killings this year, according to the National Union of Somali Journalists, which condemned the shooting. Journalists face attacks by al- Shabab, government figures and powerful businessmen, the group said. Omar Jamal, a longtime advocate for Minnesota's Somali community, said Anshur was his mentor and the two o en met for coffee in the mornings. He described

Anshur as a well-educated and gentle person. "He had a bigger view in life," Jamal said. "He was very strongly against terrorism, very strongly against al-Shabab. He was a very nationalistic, loving human being." - See more at: http://www.shepherdstownchronicle.com/

South Sudan

urmoil in the Horn of Africa is interconnected Nov. 21, 2014 | 12:11 AM Another refugee and internally displaced person crisis is looming in the Horn of Af- rica. This time it is coming from and taking place in South Sudan. Having been independent for just over three years following its separation from Sudan, South Sudan now faces a catastrophe of its own making. The large displacement of South Sudanese could result in millions of people facing famine.In mid- ecember 2013 con ict broke out in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, between South Suda- nese President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s mostly inka supporters and former Vice Presi- dent Riek Machar’s mostly Nuer followers. Machar had served as vice president of South Sudan until Kiir removed him from office in July 2013. The situation quickly deteriorated into a broader ethnic con ict between the inka and the Nuer that enveloped most of the eastern part of South Sudan. Cease-fire agreements have been breached and the violence in the country continues. The most devastating impact has been the massive displacement of the South Su- danese people. South Sudan, which has a population of about 11 million people, currently has almost 1.5 million internally displaced persons. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that, since the outbreak of the con ict in ecember 2013, some 194,000 South Sudanese have ed to neighboring Ethiopia. There they joined about 63,000 of their countrymen who had already ed following an earlier con ict in the region. The fighting has also caused some 130,000 South Sudanese to ee to Uganda, another 107,000 to depart for Sudan, and 44,000 to seek refuge in Kenya. A number of experts familiar with the situation in South Sudan suggest that the total refugee ow to neighboring countries could reach as high as 2 million people. Should this occur, it would overwhelm the efforts of the UNHCR, neighboring governments and humanitarian organizations. While the UNHCR seeks to care for the refugees in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya, the internally displaced persons in South Sudan rely on the insufficient efforts of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to meet their food and shelter needs. More than 100,000 of them have sought protection at the military bases operated by the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. The Gambella region of Ethiopia has borne the brunt of the refugee in ux and can be expected to receive many more refugees if the con ict continues a er the rainy season comes to an end. Ethiopia has considerable experience with refugees from South Sudan. Gambella is not strategically located in terms of the Ethiopian government’s control of the country. Unless the number of new arrivals increases expo- nentially, the situation will not likely pose a threat to the security of Ethiopia. This is

primarily a humanitarian crisis that we are witnessing. The first priority is to end the fighting in South Sudan so that internally displaced persons can begin to return home and refugees can come back home from neighboring countries. This will not happen until the government and rebel leaders agree to put the needs of the South Sudanese people before their own hunger for personal power. Reaching such an outcome will require that the international community – especially the United States, the European Union, China and South Sudan’s neighbors – increase the sanctions and pressure on the leaders of all the parties that are involved in the current con ict. Until the combatants lay down their arms and begin a process that will result in a viable government that engages in national reconciliation, the international community needs to provide additional funding for organizations such as the UNHCR, the World Food Program, and non-governmental groups to assist those internally displaced persons and refugees who have been caught in the middle of the fighting. The Horn of Africa has been one of the most con ict-prone regions in the world since the end of World War II. The situation in South Sudan over the past year underscores this point and underscores the fragility of the broader region as well. In- evitably, con ict in one country in the Horn of Africa has negative implications for neighboring countries. avid Shinn served for 37 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, including as U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. He is now an adjunct professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George

Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/

Tunisia

How unisia ill Succeed NOV. 19, 2014 TUNIS — In this time of great change in the Arab region, political struggles are o en viewed exclusively through an ideological lens, creating the impression of a binary choice between Islamists and secularists. But the fundamental choice facing the citizens living through this tumultuous period in Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Libya is not between Islamism and secularism, but between democracy and despotism. The binary view also overlooks the considerable pluralism within the political trends in both Tunisia and other Arab countries. Islamists are not only diverse in type, but have also evolved over the last century. Whereas their primary focus was once on protecting religious freedom and defending an identity that had under- gone repression, many Islamists have come to participate in political parties whose principal focus is economic and social programs aimed at protecting individual rights and achieving social justice. For my own party, Ennahda (which means renaissance), the Oct. 26 legislative elections in Tunisia were not about the role of Islam in society. They were an opportunity to address issues of unemployment, more inclusive economic growth, security, regional development and income inequality — in other words, the bread -and-butter issues that matter to ordinary Tunisians. When Ennahda conceded defeat in the parliamentary elections to the Nidaa Tounes party last month, the at- mosphere at our party headquarters was not downcast, but festive — a testament to our belief that this was nonetheless a victory for Tunisian democracy. Establishing the people’s sovereignty through the ballot box was one of the most important aims of the 2011 revolution, and of the Ennahda party itself. Holding our second free and fair election was, regardless of the result, a key step to securing Tunisia’s long-term democratic future. The dictatorships of Habib Bourguiba and ine el-Abidine Ben Ali that together lasted nearly 50 years led to endemic corruption, repression of dissent and disas- trous economic underdevelopment. Tunisia’s democratic transition involves establishing institutions that will protect the interests of citizens. Without the commitment of Islamists like Ennahda to dialogue, cooperation and compromise, Tunisia would not have remained the sole peaceful island in a turbulent region. But democracy means more than just elections. Ennahda supports the concept of a strong civil authority, as defined in Tunisia’s Constitution, where the state is the guarantor of all freedoms and rights. This fabric, with a clear made in Tunisia label, is what will make the democratic transition succeed. And it includes the con- tribution of reformist Islam, to which my party adheres and which has argued, for

more than 150 years, that democracy and Islam are not in con ict. Today, in Tuni- sia, we are proving that true. Most of the political spectrum in our country is evolving toward more centrist and pragmatic politics. The reduction of the elections to an Islamist/secularist di- chotomy is unhelpful and inaccurate. In fact, most secularist parties, including Ni- daa Tounes, reject the label of laïcité, or secularism, as unhelpfully polarizing. Continue reading the main story It would be a grave mistake to respond to the threat of terrorism and extremism by forcibly excluding religious values from public life. This kind of repression has been at the root of terrorism in our region. Under the former presidents of Tuni- sia, the institutions of mainstream reformist Islamic thought were shut down or restricted, leaving the way for extremist ideas to fill the vacuum. Young people growing up in the Ben Ali era had no reference points for moderate Tunisian Islamic thought, and some turned to extremism. The threat of terrorism then became a convenient card the regime could wave every time the international community pressured it to respect human rights or introduce political reform. The mistaken bargain of maintaining stability in the Arab world by sacrificing freedom ended up undermining both. The solution to extremism is not less freedom, but more. The solution to terrorism is not less religion it is freedom of religion and the cultivation of moderate, balanced religious thought. Muslim democrats have an important role to play in com- bating the spread of extremist interpretations by upholding democratic values of freedom and pluralism. In many countries in my region, losing power — through an election or otherwise — used to entail imprisonment, mass repression or worse. In some, it still may, but today, we have a new Tunisia, in which politics is pluralistic, our differences are resolved through mediation, and no individual party monopolizes authority. Ennahda has demonstrated its commitment to consensual democracy: We shared power when in office and handed over power to a technocratic government to guarantee free elections. For next month’s presidential election, we have chosen to neither field nor back a candidate, because we judged that this abstention would help maintain the equilibrium necessary for the healthy development of our democracy. Tunisia still faces a daunting task. The Constitution, with its vision of a separation of powers and newly accountable institutions, has yet to be implemented. The truth and dignity commission has just begun its work toward providing justice to the victims of the Ben Ali dictatorship this process is vital to healing the wounds of the past.

Tunisia will need the cooperation of all political parties to tackle much-needed reforms of economic subsidies and public administration, and of our banking system and investment laws. Consensus has got us this far, but Tunisia will need an inclusive, democratic approach if it is to solve the problems that are the legacy of dictatorship. Nearly four years have passed since a man named Mohamed Bouazizi so des- paired of the system that he set himself on fire in protest. With every decision we make, politicians in Tunisia must never forget what he died for. We need to protect freedom and dignity, and provide hope and opportunity. This was the dream of the Tunisian Awakening, and it is how Tunisia will succeed today. http://www.nytimes.com/

Terrorism in the World

Azerbaïzan

Un vivier pour l' tat islamique 2 novembre 2 4 En Azerbaïdjan, l'organisation de l'Etat islamique peut compter sur un réseau de financement et d'en- voi de combattants. C'est générale- ment la pauvreté et les inégalités sociales qui poussent les sympathi- sants dans les bras de cette organisation, explique un expert.

"En Azerbaïdjan, les groupes islamistes radicaux ont développé un réseau d'affaires, comprenant des magasins et des centres commerciaux, dont une partie des revenus est expédiée en Syrie et à l'Etat islamique (EI), a affirmé Mouba- riz Gourbanly, le président du comité d'Etat chargé des relations avec les organisations religieuses, cité par le Fond Strateguitcheskoï Koultoury (portail d'information russe). Selon les données des services spéciaux azerbaïdjanais, le revenu annuel de ce business est de 5 millions de dollars, qui financent "la propagande, la publication de livres, le salaire des membres de ces groupes et les pots-de-vin aux fonctionnaires", révèle l'expert Aïdyn Alizadé. Ce dernier attribue la prolifération de l'idéologie islamiste fondamentaliste "à l'iniquité sociale, aux traditions populaires arriérées, à la pauvreté et au chômage". 'aucuns estiment, en Azerbaïdjan, qu'un tel succès du business des mouvances radicales serait impossible sans un soutien au sein des or- ganes de pouvoir. Selon le site d'opposition azerbaïdjanais Haqqin, les partisans de l'EI, sponsorisés par l'Arabie Saoudite, le Qatar et Bahreïn, compteraient 40 000 personnes dans leurs rangs. Selon les médias de Bakou, de 100 à 300 ressortissants azerbaïdjanais combattent au sein de l'EI, et les morts se comptent par dizaines. "Toutes occupées qu'elles étaient à combattre une opposition politique traditionnelle, aujourd'hui en miettes, les autorités ont été totalement aveugles à un danger bien plus réel", déplore le titre. http://www.courrierinternational.com/

Canada

Opinion: here's no lin between terrorism and multiculturalism

November 27, 2014

A Canadian ag ies in the wind at Granville Island in Vancouver, B.C., on Monday June 30, 2014. arr l c / he anadian ressHAREA JUSTCOMMENTPRINT Farid Rohani ( Building a peaceful democracy Opinion, Nov. 24) contends that the recent terror attacks in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa should prompt us to re- think our shared democracy with a view to protecting the pluralist, inclusive and tolerant values that underpin it. Yet Rohani makes a pernicious link between these heinous acts and Canadian multiculturalism. He establishes this false association by suggesting that the Canadian multicultural framework has seen activists promote group traditions as having more importance than individual freedoms, and suggests it creates an environment that enables terrorists to propagate their views. He further states that multiculturalism is being used to create different groups that contest our tolerant democracy. It has been increasingly common for detractors of multiculturalism to make such claims without identifying the culprits. Rohani does precisely this and, regrettably,

contributes to the spread of what he describes as quiet intolerance, the very thing about which he expresses concern. His observation will end up inviting unfair generalizations about minority religious groups that will fuel the divisions that he suggests he seeks to remedy. Rohani implies that such things as forced and arranged marriages, honour killings and teaching of hate toward other religions or toward homosexuals or death war- rants against apostates are also to be attributed to awed communications about what pluralism and multiculturalism entail. In general, such things are far more prevalent in non-democratic societies that reject diversity and multiculturalism. The individuals who engage in such egregious acts for the most part wish to erode multiculturalism and replace it with a model of society that would limit individual freedoms and undermine intercultural harmony. Rohani specifically singles out newcomers to Canada as being particularly exposed to distortion about our national identity and values. So what would he make of the fact that the killings in Ottawa and St-Jean-sur-Richelieu were carried out by individuals born and raised in Canada? Indeed, newcomers value the opportunity to live in our democracy and there is no evidence that they are more likely than non- immigrants to want to undermine it. Rohani complains that it has been a lack of discussion, understanding and education on the concept of unity in our diversity that has led to the problems we now face. Again, the reality is that since the introduction of multiculturalism, there has been ongoing debate about such matters. A September 2014 national survey conducted for the Canadian Race Relations Foundation reveals that a majority of Canadians agree that multiculturalism makes it easier for immigrants to adopt shared Cana- dian values and that it brings people together more than it divides them. While the debate must continue, it is not wise to base it on misleading assumptions about the aws of multiculturalism. Yet another generalization leads Rohani to demand that our religious schools — all of them — teach the necessities of democratic citizenship, equality of the sexes, freedom of religion, freedom of choice and human rights. Again, no examples are offered as to what all the religious schools are teaching that would result in students holding discriminatory views. Moreover, it seems to be assumed that students in secular schools require no such education. Rohani issues a dire warning that the failure to follow his suggestions will lead certain groups to attempt to impose their beliefs on the rest of society. It is most iron- ic that over time, the policies of Canadian multiculturalism may indeed take some credit for preventing a single group from imposing its cultures and values on others. http://montrealgazette.com/

anada in tightrope wal on terrorism

November 27, 2014

Canada is among the world’s freest, most democratic and liberal countries and Ca- nadians enjoy the rule of law and the charter of rights and freedoms. Yet such are the turbulent times we live in that even Canada is having difficulty balancing the need to protect Canadians while ensuring that Canadians continue to enjoy the blessings of freedom and security.

Even before the two terrorist incidents that recently killed two soldiers in Ottawa and Quebec, Canadian security had foiled terrorist attempts in Ottawa and Toronto by some Canadian Muslims. These were educated, well-settled youth, not drug- addicted, mentally ill or unstable loners who had embraced Islam to clean up the mess in their lives. So Canadian security remains alert, as it should. Some terrorist attempts were thwarted because Muslims tipped off the authorities. Two developments highlight the dilemma of the government and of Canadian citizens who want their country to be safe but who also wish to protect the freedoms with which Canadians are blessed. One is the iab case the other the Secret Trial 5.

r. Hassan iab is a Canadian academic who has been extradited to France to stand trial for an attack on a synagogue in Paris in 1980 that killed four people and injured more than 40. The chief suspect in that crime escaped but le behind a sam- ple of his handwriting in his hotel. rench authorities claim that the suspect’s writing resembles that of iab. France withdrew two handwriting reports that it had submitted a er iab’s lawyers asserted that the writing was not that of iab but of his former wife.

Five Canadian, American and European experts described the French handwriting report as awed and unreliable. Justice Robert Maranger of the Ontario Superior Court labelled the French report as very problematic, convoluted, very confus- ing, and suspect. But he ordered iab’s extradition to France saying that the federal extradition law admits foreign evidence even if it is so unreliable that it would be inadmissible in Canadian courts. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police asserted that iab’s fingerprints and palm prints do not match those of the suspect.

The Ontario Court of Appeal and the Canadian Supreme Court refused to overturn the Superior Court’s ruling. Ironically, Canadian provinces differ in their interpretation of the Canadian extradition law. If iab lived in British Columbia, he would not be extradited, but because he lived in Ontario, he was forcibly sent to France.

iab denies having anything to do with the bombing or being in France at the time of the explosion. However, the question is not whether iab’s denials are solid but whether there was enough reliable evidence to extradite him to France and whether he will get a fair trial there. The evidence against iab is imsy. The only hope is that the wide publicity the case has had will prod France to conduct a fair and speedy trial to uncover the truth.

The other case involves five Muslims who together spent 30 years under arrest without being charged or being shown evidence of any wrongdoing. Their plight is documented by the film The Secret Trial 5, which a team of Christian, Jewish and Muslim Canadians made on a shoestring budget because they value freedom and fairness.

When I saw the documentary in Ottawa, I was pleased that the theater was more than two-thirds full and that the mostly white audience clapped loudly to express their support for a free trial and the rule of law. The film has won the Honorable Mention Emerging Canadian Filmmaker Award Hot ocs in Toronto and the Magnus Isacsson Award in Montreal. It was in 1999 when Mahmoud Jaballah, a Scar- borough, Ontario, high school principal was detained without charge under the security certificate of the Canadian immigration law. The evidence was kept secret. In the next four years, Mohammad eki Mahjoub of Toronto, Hassan Almrei of Mississauga, Mohamed Harkat of Ottawa and Adil Charkaoui of Montreal were also arrested and held without charge. Mahjoub is still under house arrest. He is the only one who refused to appear in the Secret Trial 5 documentary. However, the Ca- nadian Security Intelligence Service, Canada Border Services Agency, Public Safety Canada, Immigration Canada, Correctional Services Canada and the epartment of Justice also declined the filmmakers’ request for interviews.

In 2007, the Supreme Court unanimously stuck down the security-certificate system as unconstitutional. But the government modified the law and the matter will again go to the highest court. Amar Wala, Noah Bingham and Madeleine Cohen produced the film.

Wala began working on the film in 2009 when he was 26. It took five years and a very difficult struggle to complete it. But he did so to uphold justice and human rights. Thankfully, Canadian security has foiled attempted terror several times. But people have also been wronged. The government had to pay Maher Arar millions for its role in his torture in Syria. Abdullah Al-Malki, Muayyed Nureddin and Ahmed Abou-Elmaati have sued the government for complicity in their arrest and torture in Syria and Egypt. Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci’s report and that of Justice ennis O’Connor criticized the government’s handling of these cases.

It is a thankless situation for the government and citizens alike.

France

Une étude dresse Les discours terroristes ont changé, les djihadistes aussi ovembre 2 4 le pro l des jeunes ran ais a ant basculé dans l'islam radical et tente de cerner les discours véhiculés par les vidéos qui les ont endoctrinées

Maxime Hauchard, djihadiste français de 22 ans sur une capture d'écran d'une vi- déo de l'Etat islamique Sipa

Les faits - Un premier Français a été identifié comme l'un des djihadistes qui déca- pitent des prisonniers syriens dans une vidéo de l'Etat islamique diffusée dimanche. il s'agit de Maxime Hauchard, un jeune homme de 22 ans originaire de l'Eure, en Normandie, qui s'est rendu en Syrie en août 2013. Connu des services de renseignement depuis 2011 pour son appartenance à la mouvance radicale de la région de Rouen, il s'est converti et autoradicalisé sur Internet. La présence d'un second Français devrait être confirmée ou infirmée dans la journée ou les jours qui viennent, a déclaré mardi Bernard Cazeneuve.

C’est un rapport qui apporte un éclairage neuf sur un phénomène encore mal ap- préhendé. Le Centre de prévention contre les dérives sectaires liées à l’islam (CP SI vient de publier une étude intitulée«La métamorphose opérée chez le jeune par les nouveaux discours terroristes». ous la direction de l ant ropologue ounia Bouzar, de Christophe Caupenne, ancien négociateur en chef du RAI et de l’éducateur Sulaym n Valsan, ce document entreprend de «rendre visible les mé- thodes et les processus des groupes radicaux » et en comprendre les mécanismes.

Un travail que ses auteurs estiment d’autant plus urgent que les dérives liées à l’islam dit «radical» ont pris une dimension inquiétante depuis que les départs de jeunes vers la Syrie se sont multipliés. Selon Sébastien Pietrasanta, rapporteur de la loi renforçant la lutte contre le terrorisme, ils seraient ainsi 1132 Français impliqués dans ces filières, qu'ils soient sur place, en transit ou revenus. Le rapport propose tout d’abord une typologie, forcément imparfaite, des personnes prises dans un processus d’endoctrinement et d’embrigadement dans l’islam fondamentaliste. Pour ce faire, les auteurs se sont basés sur un échantillon de 160 familles qui ont contacté le CP SI, inquiètes du changement de comporte- ment de leur enfant. Quel est le profil de ces jeunes ? Ils sont majoritairement Français, jeunes et issus de familles athées : ainsi, 63% des jeunes endoctrinés si- gnalés par leurs familles ont moins de 21 ans, 80% viennent de foyers sans religion et ils n’ont un grand-parent étranger que dans 10% des cas. Leur rapport «à l’exil ou à l’immigration n’est plus un indicateur déterminant» indique le rapport, con- trairement à ce qui prévalait jusqu’alors dans les milieux islamistes radicaux. Un profil d’un nouveau type qu’on retrouve également dans leurs origines sociales puisque ces jeunes viennent à 84% de classes sociales moyennes ou supérieures. Les auteurs font cependant l’hypothèse que les familles plus modestes sont moins informées et donc moins enclines à contacter des professionnels. Les «conversions au radicalisme» toucheraient donc désormais «toutes les classes sociales» et plus seulement les jeunes en difficulté, à l’image du parcours de Maxime Hauchard, un Normand de 22 ans identifié comme étant l’un des bourreaux dans une vidéo de l’Etat islamique.

S’il n’existe pas de profil type de jeune ayant basculé dans le djihadisme, Internet est en revanche désigné comme étant quasiment l’unique vecteur de radicalisation. L’endoctrinement passe essentiellement par les réseaux sociaux, en premier lieu Facebook, et par les vidéos qui permettent d'entrer en contact avec une «communauté de substitution virtuelle» qui va progressivement remplacer les cercles sociaux traditionnels (familles, amis, milieu scolaire ) et isoler le jeune. Ce processus de rupture est renforcé par l’adhésion à un concept central du djihadisme : l’aquida ou «vraie croyance», qui exclut évidemment tous les non- musulmans et l’immense majorité des musulmans, même traditionalistes, qui re- jettent le djihad. Les jeunes endoctrinés deviennent ainsi les «Véridiques», un groupe d’élus qui doivent se cloisonner de la société pour rester purs. L’étude des comptes Facebook de certains de ces jeunes le confirme. Beaucoup ont créé un deuxième profil afin d'y discuter en vase clos de la préparation de leur dé- part en Syrie, à l’insu de leurs familles. Comme pour signifier leur métamorphose, ces comptes sont ouverts sous un autre nom : «Abu» («père de») pour les garçons et «Umm» («mère de») pour les filles, des noms que se donnent les djihadistes une fois en Syrie. Ce dédoublement entre une identité numérique respectable et une autre clandestine «permet de plonger les endoctrinés dans une vision paranoïaque

qui renforce la fusion de groupe et leur isolement vis-à-vis de la société», estime le rapport en citant le chercheur en criminologie Jean-Claude Salomon.

L'étude se penche enfin sur le contenu des vidéos, notamment celles réalisées par Omar Omsen, ancien bra ueur reconverti dans le dji ad dont les clips ont eu un impact sur toute une génération de candidats à la «guerre sainte». «La force de ces vidéos consiste à arriver à convertir un internaute qui ne se posait aucune question spirituelle mais se trouvait au départ plutôt dans une démarche de bataille contre les injustices», soulignent les auteurs. Les premiers contenus visionnés font ainsi la part belle à diverses théories du complot, évoquent des sociétés secrètes qui domi- nent le monde et présentent l’islam comme le rempart de la vérité dans un monde de mensonge. Les références à la religion sont en réalité réduites à la portion con- grue et insistent avant tout sur ses aspects apocalyptiques et millénaristes, le tout enrobé de références esthétiques à des films comme Le eigneur des an neau et Matri ou encore des jeux vidéos à succès comme ssassin s reed et all of Duty. En conclusion, le rapport met en garde contre ces «nouveaux discours terroristes qui ont affiné leurs techniques d’embrigadement en maîtrisant l’outil Internet, à tel point qu’ils arrivent à proposer une individualisation de l’offre qui peut parler à des jeunes tout à fait différents». Voilà pour le constat. La réponse, elle, est encore à trouver. http://www.lopinion.fr/18-novembre-2014/discours-terroristes-ont-change- djihadistes-aussi-18522

jihadisme, nouveau totalitarisme 2 / / 4 eux Français ont été identifiés dans la morbide vidéo postée par aech dimanche novembre mettant en scène la mise à mort par décapitation de prisonniers syriens et de l’otage américain Peter Kassig. Mercredi 19 novembre, les experts de la police et du renseignement examinaient un nouveau film mis en ligne ce même jour par l’organisation terroriste, dans lequel trois djihadistes appellent, en fran- çais, leurs « frères musulmans » à les rejoindre et menacent leur pa s d origine d’attentats. Ces messages sont pris au sérieux par les services de l’État qui estiment que plus de 1 100 Français sont impliqués dans les filières djihadistes, dont 376 seraient actuellement en Syrie et en Irak. Les autorités craignent le retour de ces indi- vidus, souvent jeunes et désormais formés au maniement des armes. Ils pourraient vouloir exporter leur combat en commettant des attentats en France et en es- sayant de faire de nouveaux « disciples ». La réponse au défi djihadiste suppose de le saisir pour ce qu’il est vraiment : une idéologie athée qui se drape de religieux, une prétention entièrement humaine à construire une société qui se veut parfaite, quitte à en accélérer l’émergence en recourant aux pires des violences. La nouveauté par rapport aux totalitarismes du XXe siècle est ue le dji adisme instrumentalise l islam. Au grand dam des musulmans eux-mêmes, principales cibles des exactions, qui sont poussés à s’interroger sur ces dérives se revendiquant de leur tradition. À court terme, la résistance au poison djihadiste consiste à accompagner et à soutenir les familles des victimes et celles des meurtriers qui sont sous le choc après avoir découvert le combat dans lequel un fils, un frère, un cousin, s’est engagé. Elles portent des questions douloureuses : qu’est-ce qui a conduit tel proche à accepter des conditions de vie sordides, à risquer chaque jour sa peau dans une cause lointaine, à faire montre d’une cruauté absolue sous l’œil d’une caméra ? Ces inter- rogations n’ont pas nécessairement de réponse. Mais l’important est de ne laisser tomber personne dans une culpabilité mortifère. Pour que la vie l’emporte sur les messages de haine et de mort. ominique Greiner http://www.la-croix.com/

«L’Occidental qui veut quitter le califat signe son arrêt de mort» le 20.11.2014

La France est clairement dans le viseur du groupe Etat islamique. Mercredi, les Français apprenaient qu’en plus du Normand Maxime, un deuxième converti, le parisien Mickael, était parmi les bourreaux de la terrible vidéo de décapitation diffusée le week-end dernier. Mercredi encore, le groupe Etat islamique postait une autre vidéo, dans laquelle trois Français du groupe terroriste poussent leurs compatriotes à attaquer la France. Consultant international, auteur de deux livres remarqués ( ahelistan en 2 et l-Qaida en France en 2 4 , amuel Laurent connaît de l’intérieur la nébuleuse du terrorisme islamiste. Par ses contacts au sein d’Al-Qaida (le concurrent de l’Etat islamique), Samuel Lau- rent a pu rencontrer de nombreux protagonistes dans les zones de con it et notamment d’anciens membres de l’Etat islamique désormais passés du côté d’Al- Qaïda. Il publie cette semaine L’Etat islamique, une enquête qui explique le fonctionnement de ce véritable état de la terreur. ntre autres choses, vous dites que le nombre de ran ais enrôlés est sous- estimé? J’aimerais beaucoup me tromper. Mais quand vous allez sur place c’est une évi- dence. ans une ville comme Selma, qui n’est pourtant pas le bastion du groupe Etat islamique, j’en ai rencontré beaucoup. Je n’accorde aucun crédit à cette esti- mation. ’abord parce qu’elle est officielle. On parlait de 940 il y a quelques mois. Je pense qu’on doit plus proche des 2000 comme l’avance un chercheur de Lyon (ndlr: Fabrice Balanche, professeur à l’Université Lyon 2 . t quelle est leur motivation hormis l’exaltation de l’héroïsme guerrier et la dé- testation de l’Occident? La simplicité de l’argument du groupe Etat islamique fait sa force. Le vrai islam est celui du califat qui prône l’avènement de la vérité par la guerre sainte. Mettre en scène la barbarie des exécutions et les carnages leur permet d’attirer à eux des jeunes gens sans repères. Vous n’auriez jamais accroché un gamin de banlieue en lui expliquant le programme d’Al-Qaida. Parce qu’il est compliqué, long, théolo- gique avec des références érudites. Al-Qaida ne parle pas aux Européens: c’est un mouvement arabe, plus profond. Il est aussi détestable, soyons clairs. e groupe tire sa légitimité de ses victoires militaires? Oui. Chaque bataille gagnée est considérée comme un acte divin. C’est la preuve d’un aval d’Allah pour le califat qui lui donne davantage de légitimité. Et cette légiti- mité accrue fait venir à lui plus d’allégeances des brigades étrangères – en Algérie, en Tunisie, en Libye, au Yémen – et de candidats au djihad grandis en Europe. Vous révélez une information qui, selon vous, pourrait tarir le flux des volontaires

occidentaux? En effet, on ne sort pas du groupe Etat islamique. ans le califat, tout est mis en place pour verrouiller le territoire et les habitants. L’Occidental qui veut quitter le califat signe son arrêt de mort. Ses services de renseignements – l’Amni – sont sur- puissants et font régner la terreur. Celui qui fait mine de vouloir partir sera exécuté tout de suite. Pour ne pas tarir le ux des candidats, il sera ensuite répertorié comme «mort au combat». ais on évoque sans cesse le danger des djihadistes qui reviendraient? C’est un autre type. Ceux qui reviennent librement sont des gens en mission. C’est équivalent de l’espion du KGB qui pouvait sortir d’URSS. ans le chapitre «L’ tat islamique et la rance», vous fustigez le jeu trouble du Qatar… Le Qatar, comme Bahreïn ou l’Arabie saoudite sont des régimes extrêmement toxiques pour nos démocraties. L’Europe n’arrive pas à faire la différence entre op- portunité économique immédiate d’avoir de tels partenaires et le risque pour la sécurité nationale. u moment qu’ils achètent un club de foot ou des avions, on devient moins regardants sur leurs activités. Mais de fait, ce sont des talibans avec beaucoup d’argent, des voitures et du luxe. Mais il n’y a pas de différence idéolo- gique entre ces régimes salafistes qui prônent un islam radical et le groupe Etat islamique en Syrie et en Irak. omment en urope lutter contre cet endoctrinement? On est dans un piège insoluble. Il va falloir renoncer à un certain nombre de liber- tés, ou du moins accepter un peu plus de surveillance et de contrôle. Comme l’on fait les Etats-Unis avec le Patriot Act. Car il faudra circonvenir cette menace qui nous bouffe de l’intérieur. Nous ne sommes plus face à un con it externe avec 40 excités Occidentaux qui partent en Afghanistan crier «Allah Akbar!» dans des grottes, nous sommes désormais face à un problème de société. On commence à l’évoquer dans certains états-majors, mais selon vous, une intervention au sol de la coalition contre le groupe tat islamique serait une erreur? Cela fait très longtemps que des armées occidentales n’ont pas été face à une véri- table armée. En Afghanistan, les Talibans sont de fantastiques guérilleros qui peu- vent mener des actions coordonnées. En Libye, le tout aérien a suffi. L’armée de Kaddafhi s’est disloquée rapidement. La guerre contre Saddam Hussein, ce n’était pas grand-chose. Ses troupes ont déserté massivement. C’était des guerres, entre guillemets, faciles. Le groupe Etat islamique dispose d’une vraie armée. On parle de 5 ommes avec des armes lourdes. i on allait les combattre au sol ce serait une boucherie inimaginable. Car ses troupes sont extrêmement motivées, prêtes à tout! Vous insistez sur le fait que l’Occident et notamment la rance sont en guerre

contre un état structuré et non contre un groupuscule terroriste… Oui, c’est très important. Car le groupe Etat islamique s’appuie sur une bureaucra- tie super-efficace. Elle contrôle son territoire à tous les niveaux: il y a une administration, une armée, une justice, des services de renseignements très puissants et très agressifs. Elle tient le terrain en maintenant un climat de peur contrebalancé par un vrai confort. onfort? Le groupe tat islamique serait un état providence? Ce n’est pas le XVIe arrondissement de Paris, mais les gens qui partent là-bas ont une maison, un toit, de l’argent pour se nourrir et se vêtir. Il n’y a pas de pénurie. On vit plutôt de façon confortable si on reste dans le rang. Toute la structure du groupe Etat islamique repose sur ce mélange de séduction pour faire venir les gens et la récompense pour leur soumission. Car on l’oublie trop souvent il y a aussi des non-combattants et des familles entières qui émigrent vers ce Califat. L’Etat islamique, Samuel Laurent, 120 p. Seuil http://www.tdg.ch/monde/europe/occidental-veut-quitter-califat-arret-mort/story/13254647

Germany

'Read to die': ather and sons leave erman to fight S S November 22, 2014

Dramatic rescue as Yazidis flee ISIS

(CNN) -- Qassim Shesho stands on Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq, overlooking a vast mountain range that rises from the desert. The calm is deceptive. He worries about the village behind him. Sheref ad-Din holds one of the holiest shrines for the Yazidis. ISIS militants are only two miles away. "ISIS wants to exterminate us and they want to establish an Islamic caliphate, but Islam is not like what they are doing to us," Shesho says. He says he commands about 2,000 Yazidi fighters. Just months ago, he lived a peaceful life in Germany. "I came back because my people are here. ISIS are terrorists. I came to defend my land, my family and my religion," he tells CNN by phone, speaking in Arabic. He didn't come alone. Shesho's 26-year-old son, Yassir Qassim Khalaf, is with him. Yassir arrived in September, shortly after ISIS's initial attack on Yazidis left thousands stranded on the mountain without food, water or medical care. Their plight captured the world's attention. The Iraqi air force and fighters with the Kurdish fighting force -- the peshmerga -- rescued some families in a dramatic helicopter mission. U.S. airstrikes helped clear a path for thousands of Yazidis to escape the mountain into neighboring Syria and to Iraqi Kurdish territory. Yet the nightmare continues for thousands who remain on the mountain, surrounded by ISIS forces intent on eradicating anyone in their path.

"You can't just stay in Germany, live in luxury and leave your family and your people alone while you are watching it all on TV, thinking, 'It'll work itself out,'" Yassir says in German. Shesho's troops, in many ways, are fighting an existential fight. Yazidis are one of the oldest religious communities in the world, with a population estimated at only 700,000. They have suffered persecution through the ages. Many Muslims consider them devil worshipers. Yazidis captured by ISIS have been forced to convert to Islam. Gruesome reports have emerged of Yazidi women being enslaved, raped and sold off by ISIS members while men and boys are executed. The United Nations concluded that the actions of ISIS "may amount to an attempt to commit genocide." Who are the Yazidis and why does ISIS want to kill them? He came to 'defend,' not to 'fight' "I decided to defend Sinjar, not to fight. They decided to fight," Shesho says of ISIS. "We defend our land and our holy places. I have lived in Germany for 24 years and have always abhorred killing and fighting." Shesho's troops receive weapons and humanitarian aid from the Kurdish regional government. Kurdish forces airdrop food and weapons. U.S. airstrikes on ISIS also have helped, but Shesho says it's not enough. "ISIS wants to ruin the whole world. We want more American airstrikes between Sinjar and Dahouk so we can go back to our lands and live in peace." At one point, Shesho's five sons fought ISIS alongside him in the mountains. Three have returned to Germany. Yassir and an older brother, Haydar Qassim Shesho, remain. They keep in touch with friends and family in Germany as much as fighting and bad cellular reception allow. Yassir says his mother worries. They try to console her. "Three times a week, we try to send her pictures and messages to say that everything is OK here and that she doesn't need to worry," Yassir says. His mother and brothers are in a German town of 50,000 called Bad Oeynhausen, in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia. 'I just couldn't bear to witness the suffering' The family fled Iraq in 1990, when Saddam Hussein ruled the country. They went to Germany and eventually became citizens. Yassir was 2. "When I'm in Germany, I'm grateful that I'm able to be there. But if it comes to it, then I'm ready to die here," he says. Before coming to Iraq, Yassir worked part time in crafts services for companies and hotels around his hometown. "I actually wanted to be here from the beginning because I just couldn't bear to witness the suffering of the Yazidis. ... How our honor is tainted, how our families and

wives are being captured," Yassir says. "To go from luxury to war is not pleasant, but you gotta do what you gotta do." CNN's Yousuf Basil contributed to this report. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/21/world/meast/isis-yazidi-germany-mount-sinjar/ index.html?hpt=wo_c1

India

L' tat islamique, un casse-tête pour l' nde 2 ovembre 2 4

L’ sie du sud accueille un tiers de la population pauvre, analphabète et eune, un terrain fertile pour l EI «L'Islam a un point de vue idéologique particulier et un programme pratique qui vise à instaurer des réformes qui assureront le bien-être de l'humanité. L’Islam veut détruire tous les Etats et les gouvernements de la Terre qui sont opposés à son idéologie. Le but de l'Islam est de mettre en place un Etat sur la base de son idéolo- gie et de son programme, quel que soit le pays qui assumera le rôle de porte- étendard de l'Islam et de la nation qui sera mise à mal dans le processus de la mise en place d'un Etat islamique. L’Islam exige non seulement une partie de la Terre, mais l'ensemble de la planète, parce que l'humanité entière devrait bénéficier de l’Islam». Ces mots ont été prononcés en 1939 à Lahore, dans ce qui était encore alors l'Inde britannique indivisible, par Abul A'la Maududi, un érudit islamiste et philosophe politique, dont les adeptes et admirateurs incluent entre autres Hassan al Banna et Sayyid Qutb. Considéré comme le parrain du salafisme moderne, Maududi a fondé le Jamaat Islami, une puissante organisation du renouveau islamique présente dans tous les pays d'Asie du Sud. Maintenant, 75 ans plus tard, l'Etat islamique, dont il a épousé la cause, semble prendre forme avec l'Etat islamique (EI) et de son calife Al- Bagh- dadi.

Alors que la plupart des commentateurs occidentaux ont fait valoir que le wahhabisme constitue la pierre angulaire de l'EI, il serait peut-être plus juste de dire que l'organisation a habilement combiné wahhabisme (comme on le voit dans la destruction de sanctuaires vénérés par les sunnites et par l'antipathie affichée non seulement envers les non-Musulmans, mais aussi envers les chiites et les takfiris, etc) et l'Islam politique, tel qu’énoncé par Maududi (démantèlement des frontières politiques entre l'Irak et la Syrie et appel des Musulmans du monde entier à prêter allégeance au nouveau calife). Le fait que cet Islam politique se trouve un pilier en Asie du Sud ne devrait pas être une surprise, puisque le centre démographique du monde musulman s’est depuis longtemps déplacé du monde arabe - le centre religieux de l'Islam - vers l'Asie du sud. L’Asie du sud est le foyer d’un tiers de la population pauvre, analphabète et jeune du monde entier et fournit ainsi un terrain fertile de recrutement pour l'EI. À cela se combinent Ies souvenirs historiques de la gloire et de la puissance musulmane, qui ont atteint leur apogée dans l'Empire moghol. Et c’est aussi le lieu où le premier djihad du monde moderne a été mené: l’Afghanistan. Alors qu’est-ce que l’EI signifie pour notre région? Et plus spécifiquement pour l'Inde et sa population musulmane de loins la plus pacifiste du monde? Même si la carte du nouveau califat d’Al Baghdadi incluent des parties de l'Inde, il faut une imagination très fertile pour penser que l'État islamique pourrait un jour marcher triomphalement en Inde. Cependant, il y a des signes inquiétants qui doivent être considérés comme des signaux d'alerte précoces. L'EI s’est imposé à la conscience indienne en prenant en otage quelque 80 Indiens, dont 42 infirmières travaillant en Irak. Cet incident a constitué la première crise du gouvernement Modi nouvellement élu. Après une intense joute diplomatique et la coopération des services de renseignement de plusieurs pays, y compris Isra l, les infirmières ont été libérées. Les autres sont toujours prises en otage jusqu’à ce jour. Un autre signe inquiétant montrant que les Musulmans indiens ne sont plus isolés du djihad mondial vient de rapports de l'Agence nationale d'investigation de l'Inde, selon lesquels quelque 40 Indiens combattent auprès de l'EI. Certains ont été recru- tés alors qu’ils travaillaient dans les pays du Golfe, alors que d’autres l’ont été par l'endoctrinement internet. e nombreuses vidéos et des clips exhortant les Musul- mans indiens à se joindre au djihad pour établir le califat ont été téléchargées sur les médias sociaux par une organisation se faisant appeler "Ansar ut Tawhid Fi Bilad Al Hind" - les partisans du monothéisme en Inde. Chacune des vidéos de Baghdadi sont méticuleusement sous-titrées en différentes langues indiennes. Le wahhabisme/salafisme, généreusement financé par des dons en provenance des pays du Golfe, a longtemps été populaire en Inde, en particulier auprès de la classe moyenne urbaine et auprès de la jeune population musulmane, loin de l'Islam syn- crétique pratiqué dans le sous-continent. Les forces transfrontalières ont égale-

ment encouragées l'endoctrinement et la radicalisation de petites sections de la jeunesse musulmane. L'Inde a ainsi fait récemment face à des attaques de groupes terroristes locaux comme les Moudjahidin indiens. ans la même veine, l'EI a été accueilli avec ambiguïté par les Musulmans indiens. Sultan Shaheen, rédacteur en chef du New Age Islam, une institution musulmane libérale, a dit: «le silence avec lequel les Musulmans indiens ont accueilli l'appel du soi-disant Califat de Baghdadi est plutôt déroutant. On ne sait pas s’il est significatif et révélateur. On aurait pu penser que l’ouléma musulmane d’ici se serait soulevée contre les coups de feu de cette absurdité d'un califat médiéval du 21e siècle". Ainsi, par exemple, l’activisme frénétique des groupes musulmans en Inde contre l’opération israéliene à Gaza cet été, n’a pas eu son équivalment face aux atrocités commises contre les Yézidis. 'autre part, on a essayé de montrer le «visage humain» de l'EI après que l'une des infirmières prise en otage a vanté «l'humanité» de l'organisation à son retour en Inde. Une partie des médias ourdous s’est emparé de cette nouvelle et a gon é son importance. es drapeaux de l’EI sont apparus dans différentes régions de l'Inde, notamment au Cachemire. Peu de temps après qu'Al-Baghdadi a déclaré l’établissement d'un califat islamique, l’un des plus importants universitaires musulmans indiens, Maulana Salman Al- Husseini Nadwi, a écrit une lettre ouverte saluant Al-Baghdadi pour être devenu le calife des Musulmans. Il a ensuite promi au gouvernement saoudien qu'il allait mettre en place une armée de Musulmans (indiens) pour défendre les sunnites. Il enseigne dans un séminaire musulman in uent dans le nord de l'Inde et a de l’in uence. Il n'y a eu aucune condamnation publique de ses déclarations. Bien qu'il y ait eu une certaine condamnation des horribles décapitations publiques de journalistes occidentaux, un silence ambigu sur l'emmergence soudaine de l’EI et de ses objectifs s’est aussi fait remarquer. Les analystes estiment que cela s’explique par la montée du wahhabisme/salafisme au sein des communautés musul- manes à travers l'Inde, qui ne sentent plus le besoin de cacher leur allégence à cette idéologie. Et cela cause un malaise. L'EI a également trouvé des alliés dans le Pakistan voisin, au sein de divers groupes terroristes comme le Tehreek-e-Taliban qui a changé d’allégeance pour Baghdadi. L'objectif déclaré de ces groupes est, entre autres, de «faire saigner l'Inde de mille coupures» et de hisser le drapeau de l'Islam à elhi. Les médias pakistanais ont rapporté que la propagande de l’EI était ouvertement distribuée et des recrues cherchées dans des endroits comme le Baloutchistan. Un récent rapport de l’Agence nationale d'investigation dont les médias ont eu co- pie allègue que plus de 300 jeunes Indiens ont été recrutés par le TTP. Les agences de sécurité de l'Inde et son nouveau chef belliciste Ajit oval prennent ces menaces au sérieux. Le terrorisme est l'une des priorités de l'actuel gouverne-

ment. Mais pour l'instant, il a exclu la possibilité d'adhérer à la coalition militaire contre l’EI. Il ne veut pas, d'une part, mettre la vie des otages indiens de l’EI en pé- ril. Et d’autre part, l'Inde se méfie de la réaction de groupes musulmans radicaux contre les intérêts indiens. La région est importante pour l'Inde en raison de ses besoins en énergie et en raison de l'importante communauté d'expatriés indiens qui y réside. Et celà est sans mentionner la guerre contre l’EI qui manque encore de clarté et d’une stratégie claire avec les Etats comme la Turquie qui refusent de prendre une position claire contre l'organisation. Certains analystes ont fait valoir que dans son propre intérêt, l’Inde devrait jouer un rôle plus actif dans la région, dans le contexte d’une Amérique qui se retire et pour sécuriser la distribution énergétique. Bien que cet argument a du mérite, on peut aussi faire valoir que les exportateurs d'énergie pourraient tout aussi être in- téressés de sécuriser les lignes d'approvisionnement. Si les revenus principaux de l'EU sont issus de la vente de pétrole, on ne voudrait pas mettre cet enjeux en péril. Enfin, l'option que l’EI devienne un acteur qui perdure dans le temps, comme les Talibans en l'Afghanistan, ne doit pas être exclue. Et dans ce cas, l'Inde pourrait avoir à faire des affaires avec le groupe. Le danger pour l'Inde est qu'elle possède des ressources démographiques qui pourraient intéresser l’EI. Et son idéologie pernicieuse pourrait à son tour catalyser ses admirateurs à recourir à la violence contre d'autres sectes - les chiites, les Ah- mediyas- qui cohabitent toutes pacifiquement depuis des siècles. Même un petit groupe a le potentiel de déchaîner l'enfer dans un endroit déjà aux prises avec de nombreuses menaces terroristes. diti Bhaduri est une ournaliste indépendante et une chercheuse primée Elle écrit pour des médias indiens et internationau Elle est également consultante pour di verses organisations sur les questions de politique étrangère, de résolution des con its et de genre http://www.i24news.tv/

Syria

slamic State group recruits, exploits children November 23 2014 Associated Press= BEIRUT (AP) Teenagers carrying weapons stand at checkpoints and busy intersections in Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul. Patched onto the le arms of their black uniforms are the logos of the Islamic Police. In Raqqa, the Islamic State group's de facto capital in Syria, boys attend training camp and religious courses before heading off to fight. Others serve as cooks or guards at the extremists' headquarters or as spies, informing on people in their neighborhoods. Across the vast region under IS control, the group is actively conscripting children for battle and committing abuses against the most vulnerable at a young age, according to a growing body of evidence assembled from residents, activists, independent experts and human rights groups. In the northern Syrian town of Kobani, where ethnic Kurds have been resisting an IS onslaught for weeks, several activists told The Associated Press they observed children fighting alongside the militants. Mustafa Bali, a Kobani-based activist, said he saw the bodies of four boys, two of them younger than 14. And at least one 18 year old is said to have carried out a suicide attack. In Syria's Aleppo province, an activist affiliated with the rebel Free Syrian Army said its fighters encountered children in their late teens "fairly o en" in battles against the rival Islamic State group. It is difficult to determine just how widespread the exploitation of children is in the closed world of IS-controlled territory. There are no reliable figures on the number of minors the group employs. But a United Nations panel investigating war crimes in the Syrian con ict concluded that in its enlistment of children for active combat roles, the Islamic State group is perpetrating abuses and war crimes on a massive scale "in a systematic and organized manner." The group "prioritizes children as a vehicle for ensuring long-term loyalty, adher- ence to their ideology and a cadre of devoted fighters that will see violence as a way of life," it said in a recent report. The panel of experts, known as the Independ- ent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, conducted more than 300 interviews with people who ed or are living in IS-controlled areas, and examined video and photographic evidence. The use of children by armed groups in con ict is, of course, nothing new. In the Syrian civil war, the Free Syrian Army and Nusra Front rebel groups also recruit children for combat, said Leila errougui, the U.N. secretary-general's special repre- sentative for children and armed con ict.

But no other group comes close to IS in using children in such a systematic and organized way. And the effect is that much greater because IS commands large areas in which the militants inculcate the children with their radical and violent interpretation of Shariah law. "What is new is that ISIS seems to be quite transparent and vocal about their inten- tion and their practice of recruiting children," said Laurent Chapuis, UNICEF regional child protection adviser for the Middle East and North Africa, using an alternate acronym for the group. "Children as young as 10, 12 years old are being used in a variety of roles, as combatants as messengers, spies, guards, manning checkpoints but also for domestic purposes like cooking, cleaning, sometimes providing medical care to the wounded." "This is not a marginal phenomenon. This is something that is being observed and seems to be part of the strategy of the group," errougui said in a phone interview from New York. She said some children join voluntarily for various reasons but others are targeted. "They are abducting children and forcing them to join, they are brainwashing children and indoctrinating them to join their group. All the tools used to attract and recruit children are used by this group," she said, adding that children as young as 9 or 10 are used for "various roles." In areas of Syria and Iraq under their control, the Sunni extremists have closed schools or changed the curriculum to fit with their ideology. Their goal, according to the U.N., is to use education as a tool of indoctrination to foster a new generation of supporters. A video recently published by an IS media arm shows what it says is a graduation ceremony for boys, who appear to be in their teens. ressed in military uniforms, they are lined up to shake hands with a sheikh. Another scene shows the boys pos- ing with AK-47s, their faces hidden under black masks. The video touts the children as a "generation of lions, protectors of religion, dignity and land." Residents of IS-controlled areas said the militants are teaching children at school to become fighters. One resident in the Iraqi city of Fallujah described seeing his 6-year-old son playing with a water pistol in front of the house and screaming: "I am a fighter for the Is- lamic State!" "I waved him to come to me and I broke the gun in two pieces," said the man, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of his life. He also said he and his son recently stopped at an IS checkpoint. His son shouted, "We love the State!" and one of the fighters asked, "Which state?" When the son replied, "the Islamic State," the fighter "told him, 'Good boy,' and let us through," the resident said. The incident persuaded the man to move his family to the north-

ern city of Kirkuk, now in Kurdish hands. "The boys are studying, not to learn, but to become mujahedeen," he said. Earlier this year in Syria, the Islamic State group abducted more than 150 Kurdish boys, held them in a school in Aleppo province and showed them videos of behead- ings and attacks, while subjecting them to daily instruction on militant ideology for five months, the U.N. and Kurdish officials said. The boys were later released. In Raqqa province, an anti-IS activist collective has documented the presence of at least five known youth training camps, one specifically for children under 16 in the town of Tabqa. The collective, named Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, has released a video showing children crawling under barbed wire as part of their military training. The video could not be independently confirmed but is consistent with AP reporting on the subject. Residents in IS-controlled areas in Iraq, such as Mosul and Fallujah, say it is not uncommon to see gun-toting boys in their late teens standing at checkpoints and even younger ones riding in militant convoys, usually accompanying their fathers in parades. Another resident of Fallujah said many boys as young as 11 volunteer to join the group, but that IS o en seeks the parents' consent for those under 16. He said others join under pressure or in exchange for money. "Once they're done training, their skills and abilities are tested before they decide where to send them off. Many want to be on the front lines," said the man, who identified himself as Abu Abdullah al-Falluji. In a report released earlier this year, Human Rights Watch interviewed four former IS child fighters in Syria who described military training with the group. One, Bassem, who joined the group at 16, said he le a er being seriously wounded by shrapnel in battle. A 17 year old, Amr, told the group that children in his unit signed up for suicide missions and that he reluctantly did so as well under pressure. Thousands of foreign fighters have ocked to IS areas from all over the world, many of them with their families. A video emerged this month showing two boys, both speaking perfect French, holding guns alo and claiming to be in Raqqa. They stand on a dusty street a man walks by and takes no notice of their weapons. The boys, who look much younger than 10, say they're from Strasbourg and Toulouse. French prosecutors have opened a formal investigation to identify the children. "Over there, you're in a country of infidels. Here, we're mujahedeen. We're in Syria, we're in Raqqa here," one of the boys says in the video. "It's war here." http://www.theguardian.com/world/feedarticle/11655736

jihad 2.0 : la stratégie de communication de l' tat islamique et d'Al- Qaida sur internet

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Capture d'écran d'une vidéo de propagande de l'Etat Islamique sur YouTube, postée en juin.

FIGAROVOX/TRIBUNE - Micka l os Santos a annoncé, via Twitter, ne pas être pré- sent sur la vidéo de décapitation diffusée par l'Etat islamique. L'occasion pour Ma- thieu Slama de s'interroger sur la stratégie de communication numérique des terroristes. Face à l'horreur qu'inspirent les actes perpétrés depuis plusieurs mois par l'Etat Islamique, il est parfois difficile d'anal ser rationnellement la logi ue de communication qui les sous-tend. Et pourtant, ce travail est nécessaire si l'on veut comprendre à la fois l'effarante efficacité de la propagande de l'EIIL et ce qui le distingue d'une organisation comme Al-Qaida. L'utilisation des réseaux sociaux L'Etat Islamique mène une stratégie de communication digitale particulièrement sophistiquée. Le résultat est là. es milliers d'occidentaux partent rejoindre leur combat en Syrie. Premier constat: Al Qaïda comme l'Etat Islamique utilisent très largement les ré- seaux sociaux pour s'adresser à leurs futurs membres et pour promouvoir leur «marque» à travers le monde, notamment en Occident. Mais à ce jeu-là, l'EIIL est bien plus efficace, en particulier sur Twitter. Utilisation fine et stratégique des hash- tags en utilisant notamment l'anglais pour élargir son audience et en mobilisant à certains moments de la journée des milliers de militants sur Twitter, campagne

massive de retweets, lancement d'une application sur Android, «L'Aube des victoires» (qui a été depuis bannie par Google) L'Etat Islamique mène une stratégie de communication digitale particulièrement sophistiquée. Le résultat est là. es milliers d'occidentaux partent rejoindre leur combat en Syrie. Pour les seuls Fran- çais, plus d'un millier d'entre eux, comme l'a rappelé récemment le ministre de l'Intérieur, seraient partis rejoindre les rangs de l'organisation terroriste. Et s'ils l'ont fait, c'est d'abord parce qu'ils ont été séduits par le discours et l'imagerie véhi- culés par ISIS sur Twitter et Facebook. En regardant et partageant des images et vidéos de propagande souvent macabres (on reviendra sur ce point), ils s'éduquent à la «mystique» guerrière de l'EIIL, au pouvoir de séduction énorme sur une jeunesse occidentale désenchantée, musulmane comme non-musulmane. Al-QaÏda utilise également Facebook et Twitter dans leur propagande, mais de ma- nière moins efficace. L'expert américain J.-M. Berger, qui a beaucoup travaillé sur le sujet, notait récemment que le hashtag ISIS (EIIL en anglais) est beaucoup plus utilisé que celui du concurrent de l'EIIL en Syrie, le groupe affilié à Al-Qaïda Jabhat al-Nusra, alors même que les deux groupes ont sensiblement le même nombre de soutiens en ligne. Surtout, Al-Qaïda continue de s'appuyer sur les «vieux» outils que sont les blogs ou sites classiques, délaissés par les plus jeunes auprès desquels ils perdent du terrain. Comme l'expliquait récemment Romain Caillet, chercheur à l'Institut français du Proche-Orient et spécialiste du salafisme, «Al-Qaida se ringar- dise». La radicalité visuelle d' S S Les outils et leur utilisation diffèrent, les contenus aussi. Si les deux organisations s'appuient beaucoup sur la diffusion de vidéos YouTube, celles-ci n'ont finalement pas grand-chose à voir entre elles. Si on peut évidemment visionner des vidéos vio- lentes du groupe, Al-Qaïda privilégie des vidéos au format long, parfois dépassant les 60 minutes (!), où l'on voit des leaders de l'organisation prêcher devant la camé- ra, sans effet de mise en scène. Ces vidéos, souvent pompeuses voire ennuyeuses, peinent à marquer les esprits, notamment ceux des plus jeunes, face à la radicalité visuelle d'ISIS. L'Etat Islamique ont en effet recours à un tout autre style: viscérales, thé trales, hollywoodiennes, les vidéos d'ISIS sont souvent courtes et surtout d'une violence inouïe, comme les récentes vidéos de décapitation qui ont choqué le monde entier en témoignent. Elles trouvent une résonance particulière chez un public jeune, de plus en plus habitué aux images choquantes sur Internet et donc sensible à cette radicalité 2.0. Certes ce n'est pas un phénomène complètement nouveau: les terroristes tchétchènes ont recours depuis des années aux décapita- tions filmées de chrétiens ou de soldats russes. Mais pas à ce degré de systématisa- tion et de mise en scène. Et que dire du film-documentaire de 55 minutes «Flames of War», aux accents kitsch et hollywoodiens, minutieusement mis en scène, que l'EIIL a diffusé en septembre dernier après en avoir dévoilé une «pré-bande an-

nonce», un «teaser» sur YouTube? Une mét ode utilisée classi uement par les stu- dios américains pour promouvoir les dernières superproductions et créer le buzz Autant dire qu'on est assez loin des vidéos grainées de camps d'entrainements diffusés par Al-QaÏda et reprises en boucle par les chaînes d'information. On ne s'étonnera pas que l'organisation, à la manière d'une entreprise, ait embau- ché un « chargé de communication », Rafiq Abu-Moussab. C'est lui qui a orchestré le tournage et la diffusion de « Flames of War ». C'est aussi lui qui avait accepté de laisser le site internet américain Vice News tourner un reportage sur l'EIIL. es stratégies de communication qui reflètent deux logiques différentes En réalité, ces stratégies de communication renvoient à deux intentions très diffé- rentes, notamment vis-à-vis de l'occident. Comme le rappelait très justement Ro- main Caillet, «du point de vue du djihadiste», L'Etat Islamique a une «valeur ajou- tée par rapport à celui d'Al-Qaïda: Al-Qaïda, c'est une lutte globalisée, déterritoriali- sée, tandis que l'EIIL se voit comme un véritable Etat en fonctionnement». Et c'est là que se situe l'enjeu. Al-Qaïda vise des «loups solitaires», ISIS recherche des combattants prêts à les rejoindre pour gon er ses troupes. Al-Qaïda pousse au crime, là où l'EIIL recrute. Al-Qaïda s'attaque à l'occident et aux non musulmans, l'EIIL veut construire un Etat fort, quitte à s'attaquer aussi à des musulmans, et nargue l'occident en recrutant en son sein. On ne s'étonnera pas que l'organisation, à la manière d'une entreprise, ait embau- ché un «chargé de communication», Rafiq Abu-Moussab. C'est lui qui a orchestré le tournage et la diffusion de «Flames of War». C'est lui qui coordonne les efforts de l'EIIL sur les réseaux sociaux. C'est aussi lui qui avait accepté de laisser le site internet américain Vice News tourner un reportage sur l'EIIL, pendant trois semaines, en Syrie. Un reportage qui a connu un succès incroyable sur Internet, créant une importante polémique aux Etats-Unis. La communication est un art et une science: l'EIIL l'a très bien compris et c'est ce qui explique, aujourd'hui, son succès. Mathieu lama est spécialiste de la communication de crise chez Publicis onsul tants http://www.lefigaro.fr/

Pakistan

a istan’s counter-terrorism plan ma have created a monster November 19, 2014

Two killed in Kabul guesthouse attack Pakistan bombs militant hideouts a er airport attack Pakistan launches army’s toughest offensive against Taliban in years An emotional ceremony took place at the Wagah-Attari border post separating Pa- kistan and India on November 3, a day a er at least 60 lives were lost in a brutal suicide attack. The bomber struck when people were exiting the compound on the Pakistani side a er the daily military parade ended at dusk. An attack of this magni- tude was the first of its kind since the military began its offensive on June 15. The Pakistan army declared that 1,100 foreign and local militants forming the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) umbrella network had been killed by the end of October. It had been visibly successful in weakening the TTP core, led by Maulana Fazlullah. However, the suicide attack raises concerns about the army’s strategy and whether today’s fragmented TTP pose a greater threat to Pakistan. Even though the army officially began the military operation on June 15 in North Waziristan, there is anecdotal evidence of the military’s presence in the tribal areas surrounding the Taliban strongholds as early as February.

A Pakistani journalist revealed that Muhammad Ibrahim, one of the key members of the TTP-nominated committee responsible for negotiating with the Pakistan government, told him that he saw a number of tanks in North Waziristan in February. The army had already decided that they had to launch an operation and defeat the Taliban by the end of 2014, whether the negotiations were successful or not, the journalist said. Therefore, it is possible that the army stealthily surrounded the different groups that form the TTP in North Waziristan a few months before the ground offensive. Moreover, they reconciled with those who welcomed concessions and facilitated the split of the Pakistan Taliban into factions. The army’s counterterrorism strategy seems to be two-fold. First, use fighter jets, air artillery and ground forces to eliminate the Taliban. Second, simultaneously hold talks with the conciliatory TTP outfits and give concessions to some groups, reportedly including Khalid Mehsud aka Sajna’s independent Mehsud faction and the Punjabi Taliban. These two extremely important wings of the Pakistan Taliban cut themselves off from the core, enfeebling Fazlullah’s leadership. This may be the light at the end of the tunnel for Pakistan. But is this light at the end of the tunnel a speeding train? More noxious peripheries, such as the TTP Ja- maatul Ahrar have broken away to form independent splinters bent on more bloodshed. TTP-JA is believed to be behind the brutal Wagah attack, according to media and intelligence reports, and the group has threatened to attack India next. Six top Taliban commanders have also sworn allegiance to ISIL. This move was termed an embarrassment for the TTP. This is the first time committed Pakistan Taliban have openly disowned Mullah Omar. BBC Urdu reported how ISIL pamphlets were found in Afghanistan and Pakistan in Pashto and ari languages. According to the Washington Post, 330 Pakistanis le the country to fight for ISIL. The tentacles of the organisation are making their way into the country – and disgruntled Taliban members as well as breakaway groups are welcoming them with open arms. Observers claim that even though there is no ISIL base in Pakistan, they fear that a pro-ISIL mindset is prevalent. But as the Pakistan military expands its operation to Khyber Agency targeting Lash- kar-e-Islam militants, its counterterrorism mission spreads thin. Anti-Pakistan TTP militants of North Waziristan – many of whom escaped before the operation– continue to enjoy a safe haven in Afghanistan and therefore, can quickly regroup (many have also found refuge in Karachi). They can use their allegiance to ISIL as an effective recruitment and fund-raising tool. Meanwhile, if TTP-JA succeeds in attacking India or stirring fear of an attack, there are chances of crisis and an escalation of tensions between the rivals.

The Pakistan army’s divide-and-rule strategy may have created another monster, one that has more resources and resonance and causes more bloodshed. The worst -case scenario is extremist leaders and fighters of rival factions pitted against one another on Pakistan soil – with Pakistani citizens and its edgling democracy paying the heaviest price for this strategy. http://www.thenational.ae/

United Kingdom

Opinion: Strategies against terrorism aren't wor ing 18 November 2014 The Global Terrorism Index now published in London records an alarming rise in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide. Present strategies are not working, says W's Grahame Lucas.

The terrorist attacks by al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 triggered a US-led military campaign dubbed a "war on terror" by US Presi- dent George W Bush. Seen from today's perspective some 13 years later, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the war on terror has not ended terror at all. Rather, as the Global Terrorism Index notes, acts of terrorism are actually increasing alarmingly. In 2013 there were nearly 10,000 terrorist attacks worldwide - an increase of 44 percent compared to 2012. Moreover, nearly 18,000 people were killed in these acts, a rise of 61 percent. If anything the war on terror has created more terror. If we take a close look at the history of terrorism we see something quite clearly. In the past 50 years, the most effective way to end a terrorist campaign has been to draw the insurgents into a political process with the object of reaching a settle- ment. Northern Ireland is a classic example of this. As the report notes, 80 percent of the terrorist organizations that disbanded did so because an acceptable agree- ment had been brokered. uring this time only ten percent of terrorist organiza-

tions ended their campaign of terror because they had reached their goals. But what is really interesting is that only seven percent of terrorist campaigns were ended by military means. That is an alarmingly low figure considering the cost in human life.

W's Grahame Lucas This suggests very strongly indeed that negotiations and participation should be at the forefront when it comes to dealing with terrorists. But in many countries military or paramilitary action remains the gut reaction of governments. The only problem is that in the age of asymmetric warfare insurgents are able to fight well organized armies with a considerable degree of success by restricting themselves to well publicized terrorist attacks and avoiding pitched battles. Nothing shows this more clearly than the failure of the Western mission in Afghanistan to stamp out the Taliban and their poisonous Islamist ideology. In other words, the military option is highly unlikely to achieve the required goals. al or don't tal ? But the other significant finding in the report is that the countries most affected by terrorism, namely Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria, are for the most part plagued by Islamist terrorism. This kind of religiously inspired violence seeks to impose a strict Islamic state against the will of the majority of the respective population. It is totalitarian by nature. Thus, the dilemma is clear: negotiations will not lead any- where because pragmatic solutions have no chance in the face of Islamist ideology. And military action is unlikely to work. At best it can contain such movements, not defeat them. Against this background one must fear the worst and expect that 2015 will see a further deterioration of the situation worldwide, while groups like Islamic State, al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and the Taliban spread their message of fear and hatred through more atrocities. Most of the victims are likely to be Muslims, as Sunni extremists slaughter Shias, and Shias for their part kill Sunnis. There can only really be one course of action. The states most affected have failed to promote the participation of ordinary people in their own societies. They must

work to improve the economic situation of the disaffected, give them access to education, prevent death squads from carrying out extrajudicial killings, and strengthen democratic structures. In the long run, this is the only way run to deprive terrorists of the support they need, and to isolate them in the countries where they oper- ate. The West can foster this process but it has to start from within. http://www.dw.de/

Yemen

Al-Qaida in Yemen denounces slamic State

November 22nd 2014

Q P s spiritual leader condemns Islamic tate s Baghdadi for dividing ihadists

"Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's spiritual leader, Sheikh Harith al-Nadhari, in a video denouncing the Islamic State, November 2014"Youtube Screenshot

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) denounced the Islamic State (IS) on Fri- day in a video uploaded the official Twitter account belonging to the group. Yemen's al-Qaida branch is considered by the United States as the network's dead- liest franchise. In the video, AQAP's spiritual guide, Sheikh Harith al-Nadhari, criticized the IS for declaring a caliphate on seized territory in Syria and Iraq and for aggressively trying to expand it's sphere of in uence. Nadhari expressed harsh criticism towards the leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Nadhari said that Baghdadi, who claimed that various groups around North Africa had pledged allegiance to IS, was driving a wedge among jihadist groups. IS, he said, revoked the legitimacy of all the Islamic groups across the Islamic world .... and drove a wedge among Mujahedeen ranks by collecting allegiances from within the Jihadi groups, he said. They announced the expansion of their caliphate in a number of countries in which they have no mandate. "This is one of the absolutely forbidden matters in the religion of Allah," added

Nadhari According to a translation by the SITE monitoring service, which monitors jihadi websites, Nadhari stated that "We make them bear responsibility" for "going too far in interpretations in terms of spilling inviolable Muslim blood under the excuse of expanding and spreading the power of the Islamic State." Nadhari also renewed the groups pledge of loyalty to al- awahiri, and saying that the declaration is necessary as "campaigns of the enemy from among the apostates and Crusaders have intensified on all the fronts."

"Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi -- the self-declared "caliph" of the radical group that has seized large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria -- addresses worshippers in Mosul, on July 5, 2014"Al-Furqan Media/AFP

AQAP was born out of a 2009 merger of its franchises in Osama bin Laden's native Saudi Arabia and ancestral homeland Yemen. It is led by Nasser al-Wahishi, a onetime close associate to Osama bin Laden. The group has been linked to a string of attempted attacks on the United States in the past, including a botched bid to blow up a etroit-bound airliner on Christmas ay 2009. It has also been a major target of the U.S. "war on terror", sustaining repeated deadly drone strikes on its leadership since 2002, surpassed only by those on Af- ghanistan o evidence of reported slamic State-Qaida pact in S ria

"A fighter from the al-Qaeda group in the Levant, Al-Nusra Front, climbs down from a destroyed building in Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp, south of amascus on September 22, 2014"Rami Al-Sayed (AFP) US intelligence chief James Clapper said Friday analysts had not seen any evidence indicating Islamic State jihadists and Al-Qaeda had forged an alliance in Syria. Clapper, the irector of National Intelligence, told CBS television US experts were unaware of any pact between the two groups, which would potentially complicate the US-led military campaign in Syria. "We don't see that," Clapper said. "There have been tactical accommodations, on the battlefield, on occasion, where local groups have united in the interest of the tactical objective, but broadly, I don't see those two uniting, at least yet." The aily Beast reported earlier this week that veterans of the al-Qaida splinter group known as Khorasan -- which has been bombed repeatedly by US warplanes -- were trying to broker a deal between Islamic State fighters and members of the al- Nusra Front, al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate. "Khorasan sees its role now as securing an end to the internal con ict between Is- lamic State and Al-Nusra," a senior rebel source was quoted as saying. US officials expressed skepticism about the reported alliance however. "I findit hard to believe that Al-Nusra and Islamic State could sink their differences," an un- named former Obama administration official was quoted as telling the aily Beast. "The ri between them is very deep." http://www.i24news.tv/

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