Changes in Japan's Transport Market and JNR Privatization
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Japan Railwa Japan Railway History 13 Changes in Japan’s Transport Market and JNR Privatization Mitsuhide Imashiro Transport Market passenger congestion despite the to only 40% of the passenger market. It in Postwar Japan railway’s falling share. The railway’s managed to hold on to a larger share of monopoly collapsed with the growth of passengers because of the vast number The railway virtually monopolized the new automobile age. By 1970, its of commuters in large cities, and the Japan’s postwar transport market due to share was only 18% and 49% of the popular shinkansen between Tokyo and the lack of other means of transportation, freight and passenger markets—automo- Osaka. Despite the rising income levels representing 52% of freight and 92% of biles had 39% and 48%, respectively. and the popularity of car ownership, passenger transport in 1950(1). The people still used trains to commute, be- economy began to pick up during the cause of the shortage of parking spaces Korean War as a result of Japan’s role as Car Ownership and Rural Railways and traffic congestion in cities. Cars were a staging post for UN forces, and then mainly used for weekend outings. entered the rapid-growth period. The as- Private vehicle ownership was becom- As income rose, people in rural areas tonishing recovery was not entirely free ing common in the 1970s as typified by where there was no road congestion or of bottlenecks, such as freight backlog at the Japanized phrase ‘mai kaa’ (my car). shortage of parking spaces also bought railway stations because demand had ex- Soon after the war, the fledgling Japanese cars and many households even had two ceeded JNR’s capacity. auto industry was building vehicles un- or more cars. By 1980, private cars rep- To reduce the backlog, the government der the license of British and French resented 39% of the passenger market. started building expressways between automakers, but by the late 1960s, it had Nagoya and Kobe, and Tokyo and sufficient capacity to expand sales in both Nagoya. At that time, roads in Japan were the domestic and foreign markets, espe- Decline and Fall of JNR y generally unpaved and narrow. The cially North America. Private cars formed number of commercial trucks and buses 28% of the domestic passenger market, Although the Japanese transport market rose during the 1950s and, by 1960, the striking another blow to rural railways(2). was experiencing massive structural Histor railway’s share fell to 39% of the freight Private railway lines were quickly re- changes, JNR still continued making prof- market and 76% of the passenger mar- placed by private bus services but JNR its through the 1950s and early 1960s, ket. Conversely, automobiles grew to lines could not be closed due to local unlike the European railways which ran 15% and 39%, respectively. However, resistance, although their unprofitability deficits from the mid-1950s. This was the booming economy increased overall was obvious. because Japan was 10 years behind Eu- demand, so railway stations were still By 1980, the railway’s share of domestic rope in entering the new age of car own- backlogged with freight and suffered from freight was just 8% and had even fallen ership. JNR stunned the world by opening the Tokaido Shinkansen in 1964 to upgrade the old Tokaido trunk line which was unable to meet demand. At that time, railways were generally viewed as a declining industry and the plan to construct the Tokaido Shinkansen was criticized by some as a foolish investment on a par with the Great Wall of China (which did not stop the Mongol hordes) and the battleship Yamato (the largest battleship ever built but which was sunk y by aerial bombardment in WWII). The 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the Tokaido Shinkansen symbolized Japan’s postwar recovery and growth. Its suc- cess put an end to the criticism and the word shinkansen even became synony- mous with high-speed trains in the En- Birth of JRs at Shiodome Freight Terminal on 1 April 1987 (Transportation News) glish language. Although the Tokaido 50 Japan Railway & Transport Review • September 1997 Copyright © 1997 EJRCF. All rights reserved. Shinkansen was a technological marvel and grew to become JNR’s bread and butter, ironically, its opening marked the first year that JNR entered the red. Attempts were made to stem the losses mainly in three directions: by raising fares to increase revenues; by reducing staff through mechanization of labour- intensive operations and closure of lightly-used freight stations, rural lines, etc., to improve productivity; and by seeking more financial support from the government. A session of the Supervisory Committee for JNR Reconstruction taking evidence from JNR Chairman Fumio However, higher fares were of course Takagi (standing) (Transportation News) very unpopular, and as motor and air year-on-year and by the late-1970s, had der the existing system is no longer pos- transport grew rapidly through the 1960s reached ¥1 trillion. They were generated sible...’ urging privatization and division and 70s, fare hikes did not bring propor- both by the interest charges, as well as to solve its problems. The proposal rec- tionally increased revenues. In particu- by operating losses from the freight sec- ommended privatizing and dividing JNR lar, in 1976 when JNR raised passenger tor, rural trunk and branch lines, and JNR into six regional passenger railway com- fares by 50%, the traffic volume fell very bus and shipping operations. By 1987, panies (the JRs) and a freight company sharply, with many long- and medium- the deficit totalled ¥25 trillion, similar to (JR Freight), and a number of smaller distance passengers shifting from rail to the combined national debts of several other companies in the information, tele- road and air. developing countries(3). communications and R&D fields. It was Although no real labour dismissals were realized that JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, included in JNR’s productivity measures, Proposed JNR Division and JR Kyushu, as well as JR Freight, meaning only partial replacement of re- and Privatization would have problems maintaining prof- tiring employees, major trade unions itability due to their small customer base, stood firmly against the workforce reduc- The division and privatization of JNR was whereas JR East, JR Central, and JR West tion. Labour-management relations dete- first suggested in a proposal presented in would be profitable due to the large num- riorated year-by-year and there was an 1982 by the Ad Hoc Commission on Ad- ber of commuters and customers using endless series of disputes, including long ministrative Reform, and the powerful the shinkansen. For this reason, two mea- strikes from the late 1960s to early 80s. Supervisory Committee for JNR Recon- sures were proposed to adjust profits be- The government was always reluctant to struction was established in 1983. The tween the companies: formation of a ¥1.3 loosen the purse strings, and, to make committee announced a report in 1985 trillion Management Stabilization Fund matters worse, could no longer afford to Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni kansuru iken (Opin- (MSF) for the three island companies, and support the railways after tax revenues ions on the restructuring of JNR) which formation of a Shinkansen Holding Cor- fell as a result of the two world oil crises. said, ‘JNR’s finances collapsed because it poration (SHC) to lease the Tokaido, Although the government provided some failed to respond correctly to the changes Sanyo, Tohoku and Joetsu shinkansen to funding each year, it only covered part of the time by reforming its management of the huge deficit; most of the losses or increasing productivity to meet the were covered by private and government change in transportation structure. The loans, which later accumulated enor- cause of the failure to meet the change in mous interest charges. transportation structure correctly is found Despite the mounting problems, politi- in a structural issue contained in the style cal pressures forced the JNR to continue of management itself; JNR relied on cen- making huge investments in infrastruc- tralized management of all railways in the ture including new shinkansen financed country under the huge organization of a by loans. public corporation’(4). The 1966 Toyota Corolla fuelled the ‘My Car’ boom The annual losses continued growing The report also said, ‘reconstruction un- (Toyota Automobile Museum) Copyright © 1997 EJRCF. All rights reserved. Japan Railway & Transport Review • September 1997 51 Japan Railway History 13 after the privatization in two ways. First, the SHC system of leasing the shinkansen to the JRs was changed in 1991; JR East, JR Central and JR West were allowed to purchase the lines on deferred payment from the SHC. In fact, this idea had been proposed by the JRs originally because they feared that the leasing system would cause future problems with listing stocks. Purchasing the shinkansen lines, even by deferred payment, is imposing a heavier burden than the leasing programme, but was a wise choice from the longer per- spective. The original concept of the JNR Buses replaced rail services on the closed JNR Akaya Line (Transportation News) privatization of separating infrastructure from operations has still not been settled. the JRs. The details of the MSF and SHC JNR debt, 3. The positive business efforts Second, the plan for JNRSC to sell the as well as subsequent changes to the pro- of the JRs themselves, and 4. The reduced unused JNR land was delayed because posal have already been described in the labour costs. the government feared it would fuel sky- previous issues of JRTR(5),(6). A special As a result, unlike in the JNR days, the rocketing land prices. measure comprised of fees calculated on JRs have managed to avoid genuine fare The booming economy at the time of JNR the basis of avoidable costs was also in- increases for a long time after privatization was lucky for the JRs, but troduced to lighten the burden of JR privatization.