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LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR a DAILY PUBLICATION of the DIALOGUE Friday, April 3, 2020

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LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR a DAILY PUBLICATION of the DIALOGUE Friday, April 3, 2020 LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR A DAILY PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUE www.thedialogue.org Friday, April 3, 2020 BOARD OF ADVISORS FEATURED Q&A TODAY’S NEWS Diego Arria Director, Columbus Group POLITICAL Devry Boughner Vorwerk What Will Almagro Peru, Panama CEO, DevryBV Sustainable Strategies Limit Days Joyce Chang Global Head of Research, Prioritize in His Outside by Gender JPMorgan Chase & Co. Peru and Panama have limited by Paula Cifuentes gender the days that residents can Director of Economic & Fiscal Affairs, Second OAS Term? go outside to purchase essentials Latin America & Canada, Philip Morris International in an effort to slow the spread of Marlene Fernández Covid-19. Corporate Vice President for Page 2 Government Relations, Arcos Dorados Peter Hakim BUSINESS President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue Guyana Project Donna Hrinak Output Unaffected President, Boeing Latin America Jon E. Huenemann by Price Shock: Former Corporate and ExxonMobil Government Senior Executive The recent oil price shock has not James R. Jones Luis Almagro last month was re-elected secretary general of the Organization of American Chairman, affected production at the Liza States. // File Photo: Organization of American States. Monarch Global Strategies project in Guyana, according to a Craig A. Kelly spokeswoman for ExxonMobil. Director, Americas International Luis Almagro, who has been secretary general of the Page 3 Gov’t Relations, Exxon Mobil John Maisto Organization of American States since 2015, was re-elect- Director, U.S. Education ed on March 20 to a second five-year term heading the POLITICAL Finance Group Q organization, garnering 23 of the 33 votes cast by member Nicolás Mariscal Morgues at Chairman, states. What does Almagro’s victory mean for the organization and for Grupo Marhnos Capacity in Western Hemisphere relations? What will be Almagro’s priorities during Thomas F. McLarty III Guayaquil, Bodies Chairman, his second term, and are they the correct ones? What is the OAS’ role Lie in Streets McLarty Associates in the region during such challenging times, and to what extent has the Carlos Paz-Soldan Morgues in Ecuador’s largest city Partner, organization’s stature and credibility been affected by its part in recent have been overwhelmed amid the DTB Associates, LLP electoral controversies in countries such as Bolivia? coronavirus pandemic. Bodies lie Beatrice Rangel in the streets of Guayaquil as “no Director, one wants to recover them,” said AMLA Consulting LLC Ronald Sanders, ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda to the Mayor Cynthia Viteri, who herself Jaana Remes Partner, United States: “During Almagro’s first term, the OAS experi- has contracted the virus. McKinsey Global Institute enced bitter division, leaving the organization weak and lack- Page 2 Ernesto Revilla Head of Latin American ing a coherent way forward. Almagro was almost a ‘one item’ Economics, Citi A secretary general, consumed by events in Venezuela and acting in concert Gustavo Roosen Chairman of the Board, with countries that used the organization in furtherance of domestic polit- Envases Venezolanos ical agendas tied to removing the Maduro government. A majority of only Andrés Rozental 18 votes secured his control of the OAS. To operate based only on satisfy- President, Rozental & Asociados ing a majority, however achieved, neglects the interests of all others. The Shelly Shetty OAS will not survive in constant contention, vexation and division. Alma- Managing Director, Sovereigns Fitch Ratings gro’s second term provides him an opportunity to build bridges between member states and to lead a collective hemispheric agenda, which should include tackling climate change and a failing trading system; financing development; and addressing communicable diseases—all of which are integral to maintaining security, democracy and human rights. The latter Viteri // File Photo: City of Guayaquil. Continued on page 3 COPYRIGHT © 2020, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE PAGE 1 LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR Friday, April 3, 2020 POLITICAL NEWS that one.” Bukele has taken among the most NEWS BRIEFS aggressive measures in the region in an effort Morgues at Capacity to contain the virus. He closed the country’s Bank of America Expects borders and its international airport on March Larger Contraction in Guayaquil, Bodies 14, before the country had even confirmed its first case of Covid-19. “The world IS NOT for Brazil’s Economy Lie in Streets doing enough to stop the virus. Its advance is Bank of America on Thursday said it expected ruthless, and it has already brought the world’s a deeper economic contraction in Brazil than Guayaquil has emerged as among the Latin most powerful countries to their knees,” Bukele previously forecast because of the Covid-19 American cities hardest hit by the coronavirus tweeted last week. “We’re also not doing pandemic, Reuters reported. The bank said it pandemic, with morgues in Ecuador’s most enough. The worst part is that there are people now expects a 3.5 percent contraction in Latin populous city overwhelmed and bodies in complaining that we’re being too strict. They America’s largest economy, as opposed to the some cases left lying on sidewalks and in the don’t understand anything.” El Salvador has 46 previously expected 0.5 percent contraction. streets, UPI reported Thursday. Other corpses confirmed cases of the disease and two related Bank of America also said it expected Brazil’s have been left unclaimed in hospitals and deaths. currency to weaken to 5.2 reais per U.S. dollar. clinics as fatalities have happened faster than crews can bury the dead. “They’re leaving them Peru, Panama in the villages, they fall in front of hospitals,” Guatemalan Congress Mayor Cynthia Viteri said last week in a video Limit Days Outside message. “No one wants to recover them.” Approves $130 in Monthly Viteri herself is quarantined after she tested Home by Gender Aid to Families in Need positive for Covid-19. Ecuador has 3,163 Guatemala’s Congress early today approved confirmed cases of the disease and 120 deaths Peru and Panama on Thursday limited the monthly aid of 1,000 quetzals (about $130) for related to it. In the region, only Brazil and Chile times men and women can leave their homes families affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, have more confirmed cases. Authorities in as part of each country’s efforts to curb the Prensa Libre reported. The bill, which Pres- Guayaquil say they have collected at least 400 spread of coronavirus, Reuters reported. In ident Alejandro Giammattei proposed, had corpses in recent days, UPI reported. Images Peru, where President Martín Vizcarra has stalled due to problems with the wording after on social media show people coughing outside mandated a strict quarantine, men and women Congress approved it in an emergency session. of overcrowded hospitals in Guayaquil and will only be allowed to go outside on designat- In total, the economic package will give out six some slumped over on the streets, the Miami ed days divided by gender through April 12, billion quetzals per month to families in need. Herald reported. “What’s happened with our health care system?” Viteri said in a posting on Facebook. “Families are wandering the city, We have to get fewer knocking on doors hoping a hospital will take people to be on the Venezuelan Navy Vessel them in, but there are no more beds.” The city streets every day.” Sinks After Deliberately has raided a $10 million fund that was intended — Martín Vizcarra to celebrate Guayaquil’s bicentennial in order to Ramming German Ship buy 50,000 additional testing kits, 40 portable A Venezuelan Navy patrol boat deliberately ventilators and 20 ventilators for intensive care Vizcarra announced Thursday. On Mondays, rammed a German cruise ship in international units, the newspaper reported. Additionally, it Wednesday and Fridays, only men will be able waters and then sank off the South American has brought in four refrigerated trucks to store to leave their homes to stock up. Women can country just after midnight on March 30, Deut- bodies. Leaders elsewhere have taken notice of go out on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. sche Welle reported today. Hamburg-based the dire situation in Guayaquil and are using it No one can leave on Sundays. “We have to get Colombia Cruise Services said the Resolute as a warning. “They said the pandemic wouldn’t fewer people to be on the streets every day,” cruise ship, which was carrying a crew of 32 hit Latin America so hard because we’re used Vizcarra said. Peru has also resorted to calling people but no passengers, was the target of to illnesses, because it’s hot, because the up army reservists in order to enforce the quar- an “act of aggression.” The Venezuelan patrol population is young, etc, etc,” Salvadoran antine measures, given that many Peruvians vessel accused the cruise captain of violat- President Nayib Bukele wrote in a posting on continue to violate them. Vizcarra said earlier ing Venezuela’s territorial waters. After the Twitter. “Look at what’s happening in Ecuador. this week that some 36,000 people had been collision, the Navy boat began taking on water If you don’t see yourself reflected in the mirror arrested for not complying. The Andean nation and went down, but its 44-member crew was of Italy, Spain or New York, look at yourself in has 1,414 confirmed cases and 55 deaths. rescued by another vessel. The cruise ship sustained minor damage. COPYRIGHT © 2020, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE PAGE 2 LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR Friday, April 3, 2020 Meanwhile, Panama’s security minister, Juan FEATURED Q&A / Continued from page 1 Pino, announced that men and women would only be allowed to leave their house during should be strictly applied with no repetition success in his second term may depend less predetermined hours, Metro Libre reported.
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