John Rawls's Actual Contractualism William Thomas M Porter
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John Rawls’s Actual Contractualism William Thomas M Porter University College London PhD Degree in Philosophy 1 UMI Number: U592602 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U592602 Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract This thesis argues for an unorthodox interpretanon of ]ohn Rawls's egalitarianism as a hybrid of ‘actual contractualism’ and ‘modal contractualism’. It also offers a defence of the theory so understood. According to actual contractualism, a system of political institutions and norms is just only if each person over whom it claims authorin' actually accepts it in some sense. Actual contractualists stand in contrast with modal contractualists, who take justice to require that no one could reasonably reject the institutions and norms in question. Rawls is standardly read as a modal contractualist, but I argue that his view includes an significant element of actual contractualism. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part describes actual contractualism and contrasts it with modal contractualism. It goes on to consider the possibility of a hybrid theory, which appeals to modal contractualist reasons to justify an actual contractualist test for justice. I suggest that this is an attractive view. In the second part I go on to argue that a careful understanding of Rawls’s theory view reveals it to be hybrid contractualist. I elaborate Rawls’s strategy of ‘political constructivism’ in the light of this interpretation, and attempt to show that it is veiy much in the Lockean actual contractualist tradition. The final part of the thesis concerns the justification of specifically Rawls’s egalitarianism. I contend that Rawls’s argument for justice as fairness can be seen as a detailed effort to explain why his egalitarianism is, in the relevant sense, actually accepted by each person, and I argue that as such it succeeds. I then contrast the Rawlsian new with left-libertanamsm, another attempt to marry actual contractualism and egalitarianism. I argue that Rawls’s is the more thoroughgoing, unified view, and should be preferred on that basis. Table of Contents Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................................6 Introduction 1. Contractualism and the individualistic ideal of justification...............................................8 2. Rawls and hybrid contractualism.............................................................................................14 3. Hybrid contractualism and egalitarianism............................................................................18 PART I: CONTRACTUALIST FRAMEWORKS................................................................... 23 Chapter 1: Actual Contractualism 1. Actual contractualism................................................................................................................ 24 2. Actual contractualism and approaches to justice................................................................26 3. Two variables: scope and acceptance..................................................................................... 35 4. The shape of actual contractualism........................................................................................ 39 5. Hobbes, Locke, Nozick, and actual contractualism............................................................ 48 6. Autonomy and the appeal of actual contractualism............................................................ 62 Chapter 2: Modal Contractualism and Hvbnd Contractualism 1. Modal contractualism.................................................................................................................68 2. What’s distinctive about modal contractualism? - the question........................................77 3. What’s distinctive about modal contractualism? - the answers........................................75 4. First-order normative modal contractualism........................................................................ 89 5. Modal contractualism and actual contractualism................................................................ 94 6. Two puzzles for hybrid theorists................................................................................................99 7. Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 108 PART II: RAWLS AND HYBRID CONTRACTUALISM 111 Chapter 3: Rawlsian Contractualism 7. Introduction.................................................................................................................................772 2. Political Liberalism and hybrid contractualism................................................................ 114 3. The burdens of judgment as a basis for actual contractualism....................................... 727 4. The hybrid view’ and the actual contractualist motivation................................................140 5. The hybrid view' and acceptance.............................................................................................752 Chapter 4: Political Constructivism and the Hybrid View 7. Introduction.................................................................................................................................767 2. The problem o f practical conflict........................................................................................... 765 3. Shared premises and the priority ofjustice......................................................................... 168 4. Indoctrination............................................................................................................................. 180 5. False beliefs and loose beliefs................................................................................................ 182 6. Mistaken interests..................................................................................................................... 187 7. Wrong background.....................................................................................................................195 PART III: HYBRID CONTRACTUALISM AND EGALITARIANISM............................... 210 Chapter 5: Hvbnd Contractualism and Egalitarianism 7. Introduction................................................................................................................................ 277 2. The informal argument, stage 7; arbitrariness and the erosion of prior claims 215 3. The informal argument, stage 2: equality and the significance of cooperation 223 4. The informal argument, stage 3: from equality to the difference principle..................228 5. Reciprocity and impartiality....................................................................................................232 6. Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 243 4 Chapter 6: Rawlsian Contractualism. Actual Contractualism, and Le A Libertarianism 1. The hybrid view: an overview................................................................................................246 2. The hybrid view and the actual contractualist tradition...................................................253 3. The hybrid view and left-libertarianism...............................................................................258 4. Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 270 Bibliography Acknowledgments Many people— philosophers, friends, and philosopher friends alike— have helped me over the years that I have worked on this thesis, and I am grateful to them all. I would, however, like to single out the following among them for special thanks. My supervisors, Michael Otsuka and Yeromque Munoz-Darde, have been unfailingly patient, kind, and encouraging in manner as well as penetrating, constructive, and thorough in criticism and generous with their time. I have learned a huge amount from them and count myself unusually lucky to have been placed in their philosophical care. I am deeply grateful to both. I would also like to thank Jonathan Wolff and Mark Kalderon, under whose supervision I worked for a brief period, and each of whom contributed much to my understanding both of Rawls and of what I wanted to say about Rawls. The UCL philosophy department as a whole has provided me widi a highly supportive and intellectually stimulating environment in which to develop my thinking. I have the impression that the level of interest that the department takes in the philosophical and general well-being of its students is rare. I am grateful and proud to have spent my time as a postgraduate there. I would in addition like to thank my long-suffering yet uncomplaining partner Ella Heeks. She has supported me intellectually, emotionally, financially, and,