ETD Template
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
BICAMERAL POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF LAWMAKING IN BRAZIL by Taeko Hiroi BA in Political Science, The University of Montana, 1995 MA in International Studies, The Claremont Graduate University, 1997 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2005 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Taeko Hiroi It was defended on August 19, 2005 and approved by Christopher Jan Carman Mark Hallerberg William R. Keech Aníbal Pérez-Liñán Barry Ames Dissertation Director ii Copyright © by Taeko Hiroi 2005 iii BICAMERAL POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF LAWMAKING IN BRAZIL Taeko Hiroi, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2005 What accounts for legislative capacity? Legislative capacity is the efficiency and effectiveness of the executive and legislative branches in lawmaking. Much literature in political science has addressed this important question. I join the discussion by examining the impact of bicameralism on legislative capacity and outcomes. I argue that bicameralism affects legislative capacity but its effects are conditioned by the location of preferences, inter- chamber bargaining, and legislative rules. Using Brazil as a case, I uncover the ways in which the inter-chamber interplays and their interaction with the executive influence legislative processes and their outcomes. First, an event history analysis of Brazilian legislative data (1988-2004) examines legislative approval and rejection as well as their timing. Next, I conduct case studies of key legislative issues in post-authoritarian Brazil (pension reform, presidential decree authority, gun control, and political reform). Evidence provides support for the arguments of this dissertation. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEGEMENTS............................................................................................................... x 1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 1 1.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 1.2. BICAMERALISM AND LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY ................................................ 4 1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN.................................................................................................... 8 1.3.1. Why study Brazil?................................................................................................... 8 1.3.2. Methodology......................................................................................................... 13 1.4. PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION................................................................................ 15 2. CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BICAMERALISM AND DECISION-MAKING .................................................................................................................. 18 2.1. SPATIAL MODELS OF LAWMAKING IN A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE ...... 19 2.2. DYNAMIC MODELS OF LAWMAKING IN A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE: BICAMERAL POLITICS AS A TIMING GAME .................................................................. 25 2.2.1. Bargaining with Complete Information................................................................ 26 2.2.2. Bargaining with Incomplete Information.............................................................. 30 2.2.3. Informational Expertise and Sequential Moves in a Bicameral Legislature......... 33 2.3. TYPES OF BICAMERALISM AND LEGISLATIVE RULES .................................. 35 2.4. RECAPITULATION .................................................................................................... 38 3. CHAPTER 3: THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN BRAZIL.............................................. 41 3.1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 41 3.2. INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS ....................................................................................... 42 3.3. DECISION RULES AND PROCEDURES.................................................................. 48 3.3.1. Constitutional Amendment ................................................................................... 48 3.3.2. Statutory Bills ....................................................................................................... 53 3.3.3. Presidential Decree ............................................................................................... 60 3.4. DEPUTIES AND SENATORS CONTRASTED......................................................... 63 3.5. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 66 4. CHAPTER 4: BICAMERALISM AND THE DYNAMICS OF LAWMAKING IN THE BRAZILIAN CONGRESS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS................................................... 68 4.1. MEASURING LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY............................................................... 68 4.2. ESTIMATING LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY: THE MODEL ..................................... 73 4.3. DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION ...................................................................................................... 79 4.3.1. The Dependent Variable ....................................................................................... 79 4.3.2. The Independent Variables ................................................................................... 83 4.4. ESTIMATION RESULTS............................................................................................ 90 4.5. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 98 Appendix 4.1. Parties in the Presidential Coalition…………………………………….99 Appendix 4.2. Re-estimation of Cox Competing Risks Model…………...……………100 v 5. CHAPTER 5: THE REFORM THAT NEVER ENDS: PENSION REFORM IN BRAZIL ... ............................................................................................................................................. 101 5.1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 101 5.2. PROBLEMS WITH THE PENSION SYSTEM IN BRAZIL.................................... 103 5.3. PENSION REFORM UNDER CARDOSO: COOPERATIVE SENATE, RECALCITRANT CHAMBER ............................................................................................. 105 5.3.1. The Positions of the Chamber and Senate on Cardoso’s Proposal ..................... 105 5.3.2. The Government Meets Resistance: The First Round in the Chamber .............. 109 5.3.3. The Senate as a Savior of Pension Reform......................................................... 114 5.3.4. The Chamber Accepts Greater Reform............................................................... 115 5.4. PENSION REFORM UNDER LULA: FRIENDLY CHAMBER, TOUGH SENATE... ..................................................................................................................................... 121 5.4.1. The Positions of the Chamber and Senate on Lula’s Proposal ........................... 121 5.4.2. Examination in the Chamber .............................................................................. 125 5.4.3. Examination in the Senate: Emergence of “PEC Paralela” as a Solution to Stalemate ............................................................................................................................. 128 5.5. CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO HYPOTHESES IN LIGHT OF EVIDENCE ... 132 Appendix 5.1. Comparative Table of Pension Reform under Cardoso………………...138 Appendix 5.1. Comparative Table of Pension Reform under Lula…………………….140 6. CHAPTER 6: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME: THE CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE PRESIDENT ............................................................................................. 141 6.1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 141 6.2. THE PROBLEMS: THE 1988 CONSTITUTION AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AUTHORITY IN BRAZIL..................................................................................................... 143 6.3. CHALLENGING DECREE AUTHORITY UNDER COLLOR: THE JOBIM BILL .... ..................................................................................................................................... 150 6.3.1. The Jobim Bill and the Preferences of the Chamber, Senate, and President...... 150 6.3.2. The Deadlock of the Jobim Bill.......................................................................... 153 6.4. LIMITING DECREE AUTHORITY UNDER CARDOSO: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT....................................................................................................................... 157 6.4.1. Overview............................................................................................................. 157 6.4.2. The Senate’s Version—The First Round............................................................ 162 6.4.3. The Chamber’s Version—The Second Round ................................................... 166 6.4.4. The Senate’s Response—The Third Round........................................................ 169 6.4.5. Economic Crisis, Government Strategies, and the Chamber’s Response to the Senate—The Fourth Round ................................................................................................ 170 6.4.6. The Senate Accepts the