Australians in Mesopotamia
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APPENDIX No. 5 AUSTRALIANS IN MESOPOTAMIA CHAPTER I THE SIGNAL UNITS, 1916-17 THE most adventurous experience of any portion of the A.I.F. was probably that of the 670 Australians who, in scattered units or as individuals, took part in the operations of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force on the Upper Tigris and Euphrates and among the valleys and villages of Kurdistan, or who served with the “ Dunsterforce ” in Persia, Russia, and Armenia around the Caspian Sea. Very little has been heard of the work of Australians in Mesopotamia, less by reason of their small numbers than because they were, mainly technical troops. That indeed was the sole reason for their presence. India, in spite of its immense population, was astonishingly short of modern technical resources. For example, it contained only four aeroplanes at the beginning of the war, and the pilots and pupils of the local aviation school. from which an Indian flying corps was to have been recruited, were given up to the British War 0ffice.l When, therefore, the War Office, months later, was able to send out two aeroplanes for the Indian Government’s expedition in Mesopotamia, that Government had to borrow pilots and mechanics from Australia and New Zealand. It was a similar difficulty, in providing wireless apparatus and experts, that necessitated the presence of Australian signallers in Mesopotamia. As for the aeroplanes, the adventurous and tragic fate of the First Australian Half-Flight, sent in response to an appeal received in February, 1915, has been described in another 1 See Britrsh Oficral History: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, by Brig -Gen. F J. hloberly, Vol. I. pp. 63, 69. 703 704 AUSTRALIANS IN MESOPOTAMIA II915-I9 volume of this series.2 The first request for wireless personnel came on 27th December, 1915-fOr a troop of wireless signallersS (to be mounted on arrival in Mesopotamia). It was at once supplied, a similar unit going from New Zealand. Next, early in 1916, came an appeal for trained nurses for the military " station " hospitals in India-560 nurses were eventually as well as 43 dispensers and a small head- quarters. On 6th March, 1916, the Indian Government asked that the two Anzac wireless troops then serving in Mesopotamia should be expanded by a third troop and a headquarters (both from Australia) to form a squadron. On 15th January, 1917, Australia was asked for a signal squadron for the Indian cavalry division then being formed in Mesopotamia, New Zealand being at the same time requested to send a cable section. By that time, however, the Ne,w Zealand Government's policy was to concentrate its effort on the Western Front. Australia sent the signal squadron, and, in answer to a further request made in August, 1917, an additional wireless troop for service in Ford motor- cars. The New Zealand wireless troop was replaced by Australians, the 1st (Anzac) Wireless Signal Squadron thus finally becoming the 1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron. In all, 558 Australian signallers were sent to Mesopotamia although nothing like that number was ever there at one time. At most times during the campaign, so long as the troops were in settled country behind the lines, the network of military telegraph lines (generally known as " land lines ") carried most of the crowd of messages on which the control of the Mesopotamian army depended. But, whenever an expedition struck out in the enemy's country or into such wildernesses as Kurdistan or North-West Persia, the staff depended on aeroplanes and on the small mobile wireless stations for its communications; and seeing that from the end of 1916 the Anzac squadron took over nearly all the mobile wireless work (the British squadron, then the 2nd Volume VIII, The Australian Flying Corps, by F. M. Cutlack A fuller account (GUCS~Jo the Unspeakable) is given b one of its officers-now Lieut.-Colonel Hon. T. W. dhite, Minister for Trade ana Customs-who was eventually captured 5y the Turks 'One officer and 53 of other ranks. 4 The first fifty were sent from Eqypt to India, and thence later to England for which they had originally been destined An account of the service of these nurses and dispensers is included in Iieast Burke's IYith Horse and Morse ~n hfesopotamra. 191s-191 THE SIGNAL UNITS 705 IYireless Signal Squadron, undertaking most of the base and lines-of-communication duties), the Anzacs were a necessary part of nearly all the adventurous expeditions that marked the latter history of the campaign. Without unduly stressing the importance of these fifteen or twenty little sections in a force of over 200,000 men, it may truly be said that the formation of this wireless network was a basic condition of some of the most interesting operations of Generals Maude, Marshall, and Dunsterville. An admirable account of it is given in the regimental history of the Australian units In Mesopotamia5 by Keast Burke,s based on the official as well as upon private records; but it is due to them that at least some notion of their achievement and of the manner in which it fitted into the vast operations in the East should be given in the present work. For an account of their daily experiences -of the frizzling heat which for four months in the year caused all movement outside tents and billets-except the watering of horses-to be, forbidden in the four middle hours of the day, reducing the catnps of both sides to the semblance of cities of the dead; heat that could strike men down even inside the great “ Egyptian pattern ” tents, through canvas and mat ceilings; of the flies whose swarms exceeded those of Gallipoli ; of the mosquitoes, sandflies, and malaria, of the native camp-followers, the long monotonous ratiotiings, grooniings, waterings, and camp troubles, the short excitements of sightseeing in Ancient Babylonia and Persia and modern Baghdad-for an account of all these the reader must be referred to Keast Burke’s narrative. The description of the work of the wireless squadron here given is based largely OT. that book, the strategical background being sketched in mainly from the excellent British Official History of the Mesopotamian Campaign. When in December, 1915, the first request for a wireiess signal troop arrived in Australia, the operators were at once found from the Marconi school in Sydney and the signallers’ dBp6t at Broadmeadows in Victoria, and the drivers (nearly half the strength of the troop) from the army service corps 8 With Horse and Morse ;I Mesopotamia, one of the unit histories published under the Defence Department’s unit history scheme OSpr. E. K. Burke (No. 20555; 1st. Aust. Wireless Sig. Sqn ). University student; of Roseville. N.S.W.; b. Christchurch. N.Z.. 16 Jan, 1896. 706 AUSTRALIANS IN MESOPOTAMIA [ 1914-16 camp in New South Wales (Moore Park) and the artillery school in Victoria. The men were eager for this new service The unit-then known as the 1st Australian Pack Wireless Signal Troop-sailed on 5th February, 1916, from Melbourne, and, after transhipping at Colombo and B~mbay,~landed at Basra on the 19th of March, 1916. There it went into camp at Makina Masus (becoming “ C ” Troop of the 1st Wireless Signal Squadron, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force), and was organised in four sections, each forming a wireless station with 7 operators and 6 drivers (including the N.C.O’s in command) all mounted, with 5 horses additional to carry the gear. The sets were of half-a-kilowatt power, and were divided into five loads each carried on one horse-first, on a special frame, the small generator, petrol driven and air-cooled, with alternator ; second, the sending and receiving apparatus ; third, the rigging; fourth, the mast, in sections; and, fifth, the spare parts and petrol. The New Zealatid contingent, arriving in April, furnished another four sections for the same troop. “ A ’’ Troop-a British unit-was meanwhile carrying on the work at the front,* 150-200 miles away. At this time the Mesopotamian campaign had been brought to a standstill through the unfortunate results of the rush for Baghdad, attempted by the section of the origin of force on the River Tigris in November, Campaign 191.5. The expedition had originally been undertaken upon the entry of Turkey into the war, its object being, first to protect India by averting the chief dangers of Arab hostility and of German and Turkish attempts to stir I’ersians, Afghans, and Arabs into war ; second, the protection of the Anglo-Persian oil-supply at the head of the Persian Gulf. Of these, the defence of India was then the more important; when, in September, 1914, the staff at the Admiralty suggested that Indian troops should be sent to defend the oil works. Winston Churchill. then First Lord of ‘Here there was a difficulty over a messing allowance, which was first paid to the Australians in the same way as to British troops in India, and later demanded back from them. 8 ‘‘ B ” Troop was in India. 1914-191 THE SIGNAL UNITS 707 the Admiralty, advised against it. “ We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere,” he wrote. Steps were eventually taken to protect the works, but in the military plans of that time this was treated as a secondary duty. The chief danger to India lay in the fact that Persia, though neutral, afforded an altnost open avenue for Turkish and German agents to the Afghans and other mountain peoples on the north-west frontier to whom the plains and cities of India provide much the same temptation that those of ancient Italy furnished for the Goths and Vandals.