ISLAM AND POLITICS IN KUMASI

AN ANALYSIS OF DISPUTES OVER THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

ENID SCHILDKROUT

VOLUME 52: PART 2 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY NEW YORK :1974 9 116111- "f", 0,1

nN, P47-4:` 41:..'i,,e;. .4-4r, IF iWI ;0

R, los TI #6

MI"

P

'INI 7-f LAI P

Af. ir -W-4 A--

4 "J, V.w

"'SA, !ek

0A

X7,

SM _V4

p""m"

MNN 41,

*A.

ti"A Al ISLAM AND POLITICS IN KUMASI 0 AN ANALYSIS OF DISPUTES OVER THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

ENID SCHILDKROUT Assistant Curator, Department ofAnthropology The American Museum ofNatural History

VOLUME 52: PART 2 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY NEW YORK: 1974 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY Volume 52, part 2, pages 11 1-138, figures 1-3 Issued October 2, 1974 Price. $2.00 a copy

ISSN 0065-9452

Copyright © The American Museum of Natural History 1974 ABSTRACT The analysis of a dispute over leadership of reflects the changing position of northern Muslim the Central Mosque in Kumasi, Ghana, demon- strangers in a southern Ghanaian city and the strates how local and national politics are related. changing political significance of ethnicity and The actual dispute began in the 1 940s, more than nationality. I argue that the position of strangers a decade before Ghanaian independence, and and local political events must be viewed in the continued until the early 1 970s. The controversy context of national economic systems.

INTRODUCTION The object of the present paper is to show tional issues underlying the events in Kumasi, it through a particular case study' how national is- is necessary to sort out a considerable body of sues are reflected in local events. This would detailed and complicated data, and it is impor- hardly seem to require demonstration, were it not tant to bear in mind that this data makes sense that often national politics are believed to be di- only when the linkages between events on differ- vorced from local, apparently parochial, disputes. ent political levels are understood. The very complexity of many local disputes may In ethnically heterogeneous communities, be one reason for this situation: with every major such as the immigrant community in Kumasi, the issue, minor tangential problems arise; the com- traditional capital of the pre-colonial Asante plex relationships uniting and dividing the partic- kingdom and the administrative and commercial ipants can obscure the issues and their significant center of the modern Ashanti Region,2 it is com- links with events taking place outside the local mon for local politics to involve conflict between community. factions competing for overall power and for sig- A purely local interpretation could plausibly nificant symbols demonstrating the consensus of be given to the specific phases of the dispute over the entire community. Among the Muslim immi- the control of the Central Mosque in the city of grants in Kumasi, who come from many different Kumasi which is described here. But this would areas of northern Ghana and the surrounding obscure why certain issues, such as party affiliation countries, control over the Central Mosque, like and ethnic identity or citizenship, became impor- possession of royal and sacred regalia in some tant precisely when they did. To demonstrate the traditional African kingdoms, has come to significant relationships between local and na- symbolize the attainment of overall political power. From the time construction of the 'The research for the present paper was conducted in Mosque was started in the early 1950s disputes Ghana between 1965 and 1967 with subsequent visits in have been continuous. Yet the Mosque remains a 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1974. The research on the Mosque was supported by the United States National symbol of the integration (in Islamic terms of Institute of Mental Health and the Wenner Gren the brotherhood) of the Muslim community. Foundation for Anthropological Research. The 1974 This is one reason why disputes over it have been visit was supported by the American Museum of Natural so important to the participants. Those who con- History. This paper was originally prepared for a trol the are to seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Mosque able proclaim themselves University of London, in 1969. I have revised and representatives of the will of the whole commu- updated it with details up to June, 1971; in 1974 the nity, symbols of communal and religious har- Mosque was open, and the controversy over the mony. Opponents are chastised for bringing Imimate had died down. Muslim affairs in the country disintegration, "politics," and "tribalism" upon as whole were then supervised by a government sponsored council. the polity. I am very grateful to Dr. Barbara Callaway, Dr. The complicated historical background of Phyllis Ferguson, Dr. Jon Kraus, Dr. Charles Stewart, these disputes could easily bury from analysis the Ms. Elizabeth Stewart, and Dr. Ivor Wilks for reading earlier drafts and for their numerous and valuable 21 have used the spelling Asante to refer to both the criticisms and suggestions. Two members of the Kumasi Asante people and the area of the country known Zongo community have read this paper, Mr. Ibrahim traditionally as Asante. The administrative area known Abu and Mr. Yusuf Ibrahim, and I am most grateful for as the Ashanti Region is referred to as it appears on their encouragement and criticism. Ghanaian maps and documents. 113 114 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY important links between the local and national set this material in the historical context of the political levels. Yet through all the phases of the growth of the immigrant community in Kumasi. Mosque dispute the issues that arose at particular The first section describes this growth and at- times (for example political parties, ethnic loyal- tempts to set out the main actors and factions in ties, changing economic opportunities, citizen- the various phases of the dispute. It also attempts ship) were important in a larger context than to explain the historical background behind ma- that of Kumasi alone. Alliances and factions have jor cleavages in Kumasi between different immi- shifted in a kaleidoscopic fashion but there has grant groups, between factions within the local always been a pattern, sometimes reflecting Asante population (a branch of the Akan lin- mainly local arguments, and at other times, or guistic group, the largest group in southern even simultaneously, reflecting the participants' Ghana), between members of different political involvement in movements extending far beyond parties, and between Ghanaians and aliens. These activities in Kumasi. Personalities as well as issues alliances and divisions change and cut across one link the two political levels in such a way that another, but are related to developments in the the distinction between local and national levels Ghanaian political scene as a whole. is hard to maintain, except in an analytic sense. The next section of this study deals briefly Factions in this dispute have always attempted to with Islam and culture in the immigrant commu- legitimize their claims to power by gaining sup- nity and is meant to give some of the ethno- port from authorities outside the local communi- graphic background to the disputes. It shows ty. These authorities, including govemment offi- why the Muslims regard unity over the Mosque as cials, regard such disputes as purely local issues, so important, yet why disputes can still occur. yet the factions continually accuse each other, This section also describes the cultural and ideo- not without reason, of more or less successfully logical orientation of the Muslim associations, obtaining external aid. To the extent that these which were the main protagonists in the later accusations are justified they reflect the partici- phases of the dispute. A chronological account of pation, often covert, of nationally oriented poli- the dispute follows and leads to a conclusion that ticians in local events. deals with the links between the local disputes Although this paper focuses on a limited series and major themes in contemporary and past of disputes beginning in 1952, it is necessary to Ghanaian politics.

GROWTH OF KUMASI MUSLIM COMMUNITY now northern Ghana, from the northwestern area of Bandal and from the kingdoms of Gonja, Today the Muslim community in Kumasi is Dagomba, and Mamprusi, with a scattering of im- divided into two main sections, reflecting the his- migrants from what is now Nigeria (mainly torical pattern of the settlement in Asante of Hausas) and Upper Volta (mainly Mossis). Most immigrants from northern Ghana and the sur- of the Asante Muslims trace their origins to rounding countries. The oldest section of the Mande (now commonly called by the Hausa community, known as the Asante Nkramo (liter- term, Wangara) Muslims and today occasionally ally, Asante Muslim), consists mainly of descen- refer to their northern origins. But the group as a dants of Muslims from north of Kumasi who set- whole has been socially and politically incorpo- tled in the town from the mid-eighteenth cen- rated into Asante society. Within the context of tury, after the beginning of Asante expansion Asante society, however, they form a distinct into the north, until the British conquest in grouping on the basis of their religion, along with 1896. The origins of the second section, known many Asante converts to Islam who do not claim by the Hausa term Zongo (literally, stranger's northern, origin (see Wilks, 1966). quarter), can be traced to the beginning of the In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth colonial period. The northerners in the earliest centuries the Asante Nkramo were an ethnically Muslim settlement came from the area that is distinct "stranger" group in Kumasi (Asante) SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 115

-01 iloo' ( SONGHAI

M MAALL ~~~GAON,_N G E R ZABARAMA _rJ DO GON,t.-- ~~-w>---~~~ FULANI FULANI / __, UPPER VOLTA I,,-_HA I 100 Jr YADSI '' GURMA I( FULANI / MOSSI HAUSA I

WA NGARA GRUSI BUSANSI

GRUSI K . FRAFRA .>GllRMA'"DAHOMEY( 4- MAMPRUSI fyOTo- NUPE i DAGATI N WANGARA > DAGOMBAO I G E R I A iWALA \TOGTOW VORY HN I YORUPAYRBA )

ASHANTI

FANTI

CALABAR jf

o m iles 200 - N IBO Ethnic groups g-,---- < 0 kms. 200

FIG. 1. Map of Ghana and surrounding country showing origin of groups discussed in text. society. During this period the Muslim commu- placed on the movements of strangers, in metro- nity consisted of an undifferentiated group of politan Asante coastal traders were expelled, and strangers, that is, people from territories beyond northern traders were forbidden to come farther the limits of Asante authority, and provincials, south than Salaga, Asante's important northern people from Asante's northern hinterland. They trading town.2 In the aftermath of these prob- came to Kumasi as traders, religious men, and lems an institutional answer to the "stranger farmers (there was a community of yam growers problem" was sought. The Muslims were placed outside Kumasi) and remained in the area under under the authority of the Nsumankwahene, the the patronage of the king, the Asantehene, for Asantehene's medical advisor (for want of a whom they performed religious, economic, and better translation: his responsibilities included political services. By the early nineteenth century both the physical and spiritual health of the some of the original group of northern provin- king), and the Imamate was set up, giving the cials had been incorporated to the extent that Asante Muslims their own religious leader, the they identified themselves as Asantes, not as Asante Nkramo Imam, who was also an advisor strangers. Once this happened conflict developed to the king. between these Asante Muslims and the stranger The next influx of northern Muslims into Ku- Muslims (mainly Hausas) from outlying areas, masi occurred from the late 1870s to the early some of whom experienced conflicts of loyalty as Muslims and as clients of the Asante rulers.' hinterland (for description see Dupuis, 1824, p. 98 and Wilks, 1966, p. 335f; 1971, p. 391). As a result, in or about 1844, limitations were 21 am indebted to Dr. Ivor Wilks for much of this 'For example, when asked to give military service to information, most of which has been published in Wilks, the king to fight against Muslims in the Northwest 1971. 116 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

1880s when Asante sought recruits to her army. Asante-British conflict reached its peak. At this These recruits were of varied ethnic origin, but time northerners came to Asante under the aegis Hausa was the lingua franca and most were of the British as soldiers recruited to fight against identified as Hausas even though they were in the Asante, as camp followers, and later, after fact Mossi, Yoruba, and members of other north- the British conquest, as traders and laborers. This ern groups. Like the northern traders in Kumasi community, although internally complex in its in the early nineteenth century, these northern- ethnic composition, has remained distinct from ers lived in Asante under the control and pa- the local Asante population in terms of the tronage of the Asante government. Throughout persistence of "stranger" status in Kumasi, the the nineteenth century, but particularly after use of Hausa as a lingua franca, and the 1844, control of trade, together with control of preservation of customs associated with northern immigration, was largely in the hands of Asante cultures. Politically these strangers, those from authorities. The rise of an indigenous Asante northern Ghana and those from more distant merchant class was discouraged but a controlled territories, were under the patronage of the stranger group was allowed limited privileges in British who tended to encourage the growth of trade and religious, political, and even military the Zongo community for several reasons. First, affairs (see Wilks, 1966). Consequently, during the strangers, having no traditional rulers in the latter part of the nineteenth century north- Kumasi, were directly under the authority of the ern strangers continued to be incorporated into government; while the British were intent upon Asante society, so that during the British-Asante subduing the powers of traditional Asante chiefs, wars at the end of the last century some of them they had little hesitation in supporting strong allied with the Asantes and later identified with leaders in the Zongo. Second, the rapid growth the Asante Nkramo community. of the Zongo was a sign that trade was prosper- Despite their assimilation into Asante society ing; while these immigrants in Asante regniiied for some purposes, for example in situations in and expanded their control over almost all items which religious identification is of primary of long-distance trade, including cattle, kola nuts, importance, the Asante Nkramo identify them- manufactured goods, and other items, the British selves with the second, more recently established derived substantial revenue in the form of taxes Muslim community described below. And, as and tolls. Third, the strangers performed useful Ghanaian citizens, some of the Asante Nkramo services for the colonial authorities; the immi- feel an identification with the northern Ghanaian grant leaders, in return for political recognition, immigrants who form one part of this more promised to find jobs for new migrants while recent community. On Fridays and during special they offered their services to the government. Muslim festivals both the Asante Nkramo and the "Voluntary" labor of this type was largely Zongo residents worship together, after the responsible for sanitation, road building, and Asante Nkramo Im-am performs religious services much construction in Kumasi (see Schildkrout, for the king. The Asante Nkramo Imam also MS, 1970b). With the development of industry plays an important part in some Muslim associa- and commercial cocoa farming in Asante (after tions that include both northern Ghanaians and the introduction of cocoa in 1907), northerners non-Ghanaian immigrants who are part of the migrated south in large numbers. Many came as more recent Muslim community (the Zongo). seasonal farm workers to rural areas, but others Since 1935, when the Asantehene was restored settled in towns such as Kumasi, provided labor to office after nearly 40 years of exile, the and in some cases eventually became brokers for Asante Nkramo Imam has resumed his pre-colo- Asante and government employers seeking labor. nial role as intermediary between the king and According to the 1960 Ghana census, less the stranger Zongo Muslims. than half (42%) of the population in Kumasi at The origins of the second section of the Ku- the time were Asante, and no more than 26 per- masi Muslim community (the Zongo) coincide cent were "strangers," that is, non-Asantes, from with the next significant influx of northerners southern Ghana. At least one-third of the popula- into Asante, at the turn of the century when tion of Kumasi consisted of northerners, this SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 117 being a composite category used to describe both measures drastically affected the demographic people from northern Ghana including the Da- distribution of alien groups in Kumasi, because gomba, Mamprusi, Frafra (Tallensi), Dagati, Ku- many immigrants, particularly the Gao and Zaba- sasi and others, and those from the northern sa- rama (from Mali and Niger mainly) and the Yoru- vanna areas of the surrounding countries, includ- ba (from Nigeria) fled the country in large num- ing the Mossi, Hausa, Yoruba, Zabarama, and bers. Citizenship and the official policy toward others. According to the census classification, 20 aliens have direct relevance to local politics in percent of the Kumasi population in 1960 were areas like Kumasi having large immigrant popula- of "foreign origin." This included people defined tions. These issues are discussed below in refer- legally as aliens because they or one or both of ence to the Mosque dispute. their parents were born outside of Ghana.' Although the citizenship laws have changed Brief Political History of the Zongo several times during the greatest part of the post- Throughout the history of the Zongo commu- independence period, Ghanaian citizenship could nity, internal political life has been characterized only be conferred on people with Ghanaian par- by tensions created by opposing pulls of centrali- ents. meant many and third This that second zation and decentralization. This has involved were for citizen- generation immigrants ineligible continuous debate between the different ethnic ship, were controlled by laws governing aliens, communities over the question of Hausa political and were subject to all the pressures affecting became an issue aliens during the rise of nationalism. hegemony. Hausa dominance Within the immigrant Zongo community very soon after the Zongo was founded, that is, after the British in 1902 made special provisions northern Ghanaians and aliens are united by Is- for the immigrants by allotting them a section of lam and by their common status as strangers vis- a-vis the Asante; but recently, with the growing the town (which they have long since outgrown) known today as the "Old Zongo." Hausa hege- importance of national identity, a cleavage has mony, in remains a emerged between these two sections. This has established this early period, source of periodic conflict, even today. As I have been important on a number of occasions since already described this (Schildkrout, 1970b) I will but it was particularly accentu- independence, simply recapitulate the major issues here. ated in 1969 when the Busia government, in an The basis of Hausa dominance in the Zongo in attempt to "Ghanaianize" small capital enter- the early part of the century was largely econom- prises, enforced measures designed to rid the ic. Hausas controlled much of the long-distance country of alien competitors. Aliens were trade in kola and cattle, and the first important required to register and to obtain temporary resi- leaders in the Hausa community were successful dence and work permits. With these regulations traders and landlords (maigida; pl. masugida). to issue per- the government intended selectively This led to their political recognition by the colo- mits only to immigrants in "useful" occupations; nial authorities, and between 1896 and 1919 the alien traders, of whom there were tens of thou- British informally recognized a succession of sands, were not generally issued permits.2 These Hausa businessmen and religious leaders as heads of the heterogeneous Zongo community. 'That is, if the parent born outside was the one Although the Hausas have high prestige in the through whom a person traces ethnic affiliation. According to the 1960 Ghana census persons of Zongo, as so many are successful in business and "foreign origin" were not necessarily aliens, but relatively well educated in Arabic and Islamic according to the law of 1957 and the law written into law, this has not prevented resentment from the 1969 Ghana constitution the two categories are in developing over Hausa political authority. As most cases identical. Although there is a later (1970) early as 1910 members of other ethnic groups, Ghana census, it is unreliable with respect to aliens, as enumeration was undertaken very soon after the 1969 which were also expanding numerically and eco- decree requiring aliens to either register or leave the country. 2According to the 1960 census 12.3 percent of the one-third (35.2%) of these were born in Ghana. See total population were of foreign origin. More than Ghana, 1964, volume III; and Addo, 1968. 118 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

nomically, protested against the government's in- Asante leaders. To this end the Asantehene had stitutionalization of Hausa dominance. Conse- been exiled in 1896 and leaders without tradi- quently, after this date the leaders of other eth- tional claims to office, including leaders in the nic groups were informally recognized as head- immigrant community, were given greater au- men with jurisdiction to solve disputes and help thority. But with the acceptance of the idea of migrants within their own communities. Their Indirect Rule, the British began to heed Asante authority derived directly from the British and demands for the restoration of the power of the was theoretically equal to that of the Hausa Asantehene. Prempeh I returned from exile in headman. 1924 and was made Kumasihene in 1926. His In the 1920s the British became interested in successor, Prempeh II, was recognized as applying the principles of Indirect Rule, as de- Asantehene in 1935, when the British version of fined by Lord Lugard in northern Nigeria, to the the precolonial "confederacy" was set up. administration of local government in Ghana. In- By this time it was apparent that in the direct Rule meant, in theory, that the British Zongo, centralization of political authority in the would rule through "natural" leaders. In Kumasi hands of the Hausa headman could not work, Zongo, with its Islamic, Hausaized culture, this and the British were relieved to transfer some of meant to the British that the principles devel- the burden for Zongo affairs back to the oped by Lugard could be applied as if the Zongo Asantehene, who then became an intermediary were a miniature emirate and could be adminis- between the various headmen and the govern- tered through a hierarchy of rulers, in this case ment. While the Asantehene maintained a strict the tribal headmen. The Hausa headman known policy of noninterference in Zongo affairs, he as the Sarkin Zongo, or Chief of Zongo, was then consistently opposed re-centralizing power in the recognized as the apex of the "traditional" office of any one headman. The Asantehene was Zongo system and was given authority over all thus able to keep peace for many years-until non-Hausa immigrants. In 1927 an amendment party politics began in the late 1940s. to the 1924 Ashanti Administrative Ordinance Immediately prior to independence in 1957, formally defined the Sarkin Zongo's powers and while the Convention People's Party (CPP) was granted him a tribunal with jurisdiction over consolidating its rise to power, the relationship Muslims in the Zongo. The other headmen were between the central government and the Zongo ordered to disband their own unofficial courts seemed to repeat the pattern of the 1920s and and to serve as a jury on the Sarkin Zongo's tri- 1930s. The Asantehene found himself in opposi- bunal. tion to a strong national political force, this time This policy failed in the Zongo for the follow- not the British but rather Nkrumah and the CPP. ing reasons: many of the headmen resented the After independence, as after the British take-over diminution of their authority and the loss of rev- of Asante, the national government attempted to enue from court fees and fines; non-Hausa head- diminish the Asantehene's authority while pro- men resented being relegated to the lower ranks moting the rise of a strong leader in the Zongo. of a formalized hierarchy; and opportunities for This strategy coincided with an important advancement in prestige and power for non- split within the Zongo between two rising Hausa Hausa headmen were blocked by the govern- leaders: Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu. The ment's attempts at applying Indirect Rule. In Hausa headman Ahmadu Baba, supported by 1932 a series of riots marked the culmination of most of the other headmen in the Zongo, protests against the government's policy. The strongly supported the Asantehene in opposition office of Sarkin Zongo was formally abolished to the CPP. The Asantehene in 1954 had become and each headman was again allowed to hold his a leader in a predominantly Asante party, the own unofficial court. National Liberation Movement (NLM), which These developments reflected changes in the opposed Nkrumah's party. Ahmadu Baba and administration of Kumasi as a whole (see Schild- many of the other Zongo headmen had also krout 1970a). Until the 1920s the British had become involved with a party that opposed the attempted to break the power of traditional CPP, the Muslim Association Party (MAP), SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 119 formed in 1953, and closely aligned with the government intervened. Other Muslim leaders in NLM. In 1958 after regional, tribal, and religious Kumasi, members of the Muslim Council, a na- parties were banned by the CPP government, tionally organized CPP association, began to push these two parties joined with others to form the for Mutawakilu's removal as Sarkin Zongo on the United Party (UP).' specific grounds that he was governing the Ku- Mutawakilu, after unsuccessfully contesting masi Muslims autocratically. Many were also Ahmadu Baba for the office of headman, joined angered at Mutawakilu's self-protective denial of forces with the CPP. Therefore, while the Nkru- Nigerian identity, demonstrated by his refusal to mah government was determined to oppose the participate in celebrations of Nigeria's indepen- Asantehene, the NLM, and its support in the dence, and his refusal to cooperate with the newly Zongo, that is, the MAP, it supported the ambi- formed Nigerian Community, an organization tions of Mutawakilu, recognized him as joint con- which many Muslim Council leaders joined. stituency chairman of the Kumasi CPP, and sup- Under pressure from this powerful faction, Nkru- ported his attempts to obtain Ahmadu Baba's mah and his cabinet agreed to abolish the office office in the Hausa community. of Sarkin Zongo once again. Mutawakilu was still By independence in 1957 Mutawakilu's power recognized as the Hausa headman (after much in the CPP was strong enough to enable him to opposition from a powerful faction within the run local affairs in Kumasi Zongo with the back- Muslim Council) and as joint constituency chair- ing of important leaders in the national party man of the CPP, but once his powers as Sarkin organization. His power was directly rooted in Zongo were removed his blank check to rule the Accra, and therefore he was able to remove from Zongo disappeared. office, or recommend for deportation or deten- The abolition in the 1930s of the office of tion, many Zongo leaders who still had support Sarkin Zongo had given greater autonomy and but who refused to support the CPp.2 The most power to each headman, whereas in 1961 when important case of this kind was the deportation the office was abolished for the second time a of the Hausa headman, Ahmadu Baba, and a Yo- very powerful Muslim association, the Muslim ruba leader, Alfa Lardan. Both were prominent Council, controlled mainly but not entirely by religious and political leaders in the Zongo and Hausas rose to prominence. This group, like both were powerful organizers of the MAP. other Muslim associations which preceded and After these deportations early in 1958, Muta- followed it, was composed largely of second and wakilu was proclaimed Sarkin Zongo of Kumasi third generation immigrants who had consider- by a Cabinet ruling from Accra. With such a di- able wealth, Islamic education, and influence in rect line to the highest echelons of the CPP, the Zongo. The rise of the Muslim Council in Mutawakilu's powers were almost unlimited for a Kumasi Zongo marked a shift in the locus of short time. In his capacity as a CPP official and political authority from individual headmen, who as Sarkin Zongo, he placed CPP supporters in all were mainly first generation immigrants repre- Zongo headmanships and suppressed the activi- senting ethnic groups, to Kumasi-born immi- ties of all anti-CPP associations. grants whose status and prestige were based more Mutawakilu's rise to power and his intense on wealth and Islamic education than on ethnic effort to combine party office and chieftainship identity. From 1961 until the coup that over- did not last long. In little more than two years he threw Nkrumah in 1966, the Muslim Council, had provoked so much opposition in the Zongo, under the aegis of the CPP, was in control of even among Hausa CPP supporters, that the politics in Kumasi Zongo, and consistently attempted to diminish the political influence of 'The regional, tribal, and religious parties were the headmen whom Mutawakilu until 1961 had formally banned with the passage of the Avoidance of used for support. Discrimination Act of December, 1957. See Austin, It is important to note that in the years pre- 1964, p. 377. The rise of the MAP is described in Austin, 1964, passim; Jon Kraus, MS; and Price, 1956. ceding and immediately after independence the 2He was in close contact with the Minister of Interior CPP/MAP and later the CPP/UP factions in the who issued these orders. Zongo did not form primarily on the basis of 120 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY ethnic cleavages. Ethnic categories were often ''young men," or "action troopers," as the used to describe the factions,' but these were not youths on both sides were called. Both parties descriptively accurate stereotypes. All ethnic had significant support from young men, many groups were in actuality split along party lines.2 of whom were willing to take to the streets to In the late 1950s it was common for dis- fight party battles with intense religious fervor. appointed contestants for Zongo offices, includ- Although the MAP did ideologically stand for ing the headmanships, to join the CPP with "chiefs" and traditional authorities in general, hopes, usually justified, of ousting their earlier Mutawakilu was unable to link his appeal to opponents through party support. youth to an anti-chief stance, as was done by There was also a tendency in the Zongo, as CPP leaders in other areas of the country. He elsewhere in Ghana, for people to stereotype the drew heavily on aspirant Zongo headmen for sup- MAP/CPP struggle as "generational" associating port and he was deeply committed to becoming "youth" with the CPP. In the ideology of the Sarkin Zongo. CPP this appeal to youth went along with a In the Zongo, then, generation, age, ethnic strong anti-chief orientation. In the Zongo, this identity, and even party ideology were not so did not accurately reflect the reality of political important in drawing lines of cleavage as were cleavages. Mutawakilu did attempt to mobilize struggles for power based on contests between young men and the urban unemployed3 into a opposed personalities within ethnic communities pro-CPP organization called the Muslim Youth and within the Zongo community as a whole. Congress,4 but the MAP also had a section of Most of these conflicts began earlier but con- tinued into the CPP period (1952-1966), becom- 'For example, some Mossi MAP supporters claimed ing elaborated and intensified with the addition in the late 1960s that the only Mossi to support the CPP of party organization and resources. were those who had been "influenced" by Hausas. Despite all the moves toward centralization These individuars were well aware that major MAP that took place under the CPP, first in the office leaders were Hausa, but they were able to ignore this for in the sake of argument. of Sarkin Zongo under Mutawakilu and later 2One may, nevertheless, note two "ethnic" the Muslim Council, the overthrow of Nkrumah tendencies, although to these generalizations very in 1966 by the military and police marked the important exceptions must be cited. The first is that return to a period of decentralization that resem- tended to strongly Islamized, centralized groups support bled the situation in the years after Prempeh II the MAP in the early 19 50s. Groups that were less resumed the office of Asantehene in 1935. In centralized, less Islamized, tended to be more enthusiastic about the CPP. This split reflected, perhaps, 1966 the Asantehene again began to act as an prior economic and political competition within the intermediary between the Zongo leaders and offi- immigrant community between these two sectors. It is cials of the military/police government, the Na- worth noting that Mutawakilu, a key exception to this tional Liberation Council (NLC). Each ethnic generalization, drew much of his support from non-Hausas, including Frafras, Grusis, Kusasis, and community appointed its own headman and as- others who were often not Muslims and who had not serted its autonomy and its intention to govern been successfully integrated into Zongo political and its own internal affairs. Ahmadu Baba and many religious organizations. other deported and detained MAP leaders The second generalization is that the CPP drew support from itinerant migrants who tended to belong returned to Kumasi and resumed their traditional to certain ethnic categories (Gao, for example). Short offices as headmen and elders. Although the term migrants were also less well integrated into Zongo MAP no longer existed and no organization for- political and religious organizations, including the MAP. mally incorporated all these Muslim leaders, a But here too there are exceptions: in all these groups anti-CPP sentiment united the there were some long settled immigrants who took a strong Zongo prominent role in the MAP. The Gao headman, for leaders and their supporters for several months example, was deported by the CPP government in 1958, after the 1966 coup. and settled Gaos tended to support the MAP. Thus migration patterns were really more significant variables than ethnicity. Muslim Youth Association in 1949 (Kraus, MS, p. 759). 3School leavers were less of an issue in Zongo where This seems to have been absorbed into the MAP, and the few immigrants had attended any but Arabic schools. later youth organization, led by Mutawakilu, was called 4The CPP first created an organization called the the Muslim Youth Congress. SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 121

The ethnic communities, which emerged after uals in the Zongo from uniting into larger, multi- the coup, based both on traditional polities (such ethnic associations for other purposes. A number as the Mossi, Hausa, and Yoruba groups, for ex- of important, formally constituted, national asso- ample) or on nationality (such as the Upper ciations organized local branches after the coup, Volta Union, or the Nigerian Community) pro- although all of them had originated in an earlier claimed themselves to be a-political, complying period. These associations were seen as religious with the NCLs ban on political activities and the groups by their members, yet all were in fact general disgust with "politics"-an activity identi- actively engaged in secular politics, on the local fied with disunity and factionalism. These com- and national levels. The profusion of these munities performed two main functions. First, in groups both expressed underlying conflicts and many of them as soon as the most unpopular divisions in the Zongo and contributed to these leaders were ousted, numerous "civil" disputes conflicts. such as marriage and divorce cases, inheritance The first important Muslim association, which disputes and so forth, were brought to the rein- was active in the period relevant to a discussion stated headman for settlement. Second, ethnic of the Mosque (1952 onward), was the MAP. associations became forums where the needs of Later, when the CPP was firmly in power, the the membership were expressed. A-political as MAP was officially disbanded (in 1958),1 these ethnic communities were, it was not long although for some time it was merged with other before politicians outside the Zongo, anticipating minority parties in the UP. The CPP also had the return to civilan rule, began to seek support support from a nationally organized Muslim asso- from various groups in the Zongo. ciation, the Muslim Council, which, with CPP The ethnic communities which became active backing, controlled local Muslim affairs during the after the 1966 coup also had economic aspira- early 1 960s. The leadership of the Muslim Coun- tions. Because these issues enter into the Mosque cil, like that of the MAP, was predominantly of dispute it is necessary to mention them here. The non-Ghanaian origin, and the Council's primary economic and political goals of the various asso- role, as far as the government was concerned, ciations involved in general terms "making the seemed to be to keep political control in Muslim group strong." This meant securing jobs, market areas. This association was disbanded by the mili- stalls, and sectors of trade for their members. tary government in 1966, as it was affiliated with Soon after the coup a government official sug- the CPP. Its prominent position was then con- gested to some of the headmen of northern tested by two other groups, the Muslim Com- Ghanaian groups that they form a cooperative munity and the Muslim Mission, both of which trade association on the basis of their Ghanaian traced their history back to the years before the identity. It was suggested that such an associ- coup but which had remained inactive while the ation would consolidate the transport, kola, cat- MAP and the council were in control. tle, and livestock trade in northern Ghanaian The Muslim Community, like the council, was hands, to the disadvantage of the Hausa, Mossi, largely composed of non-Ghanaians of "foreign and other groups composed mainly of aliens. origin,"2 including second, third, and fourth Although this trade association never material- generation Hausa, Yoruba, Mossi, and other im- ized, the show of interest in northern Ghanaian migrants but also included some important indis- demands, or the stimulus to these demands, from putably Ghanaian citizens, in particular the politicians outside the Zongo encouraged the Asante Nkramo Im-am. It claimed to have been Ghanaians to see their own interests as opposed formed in the early 1930s,3 and after 1966 was to those of the aliens in the Zongo, with whom they had previously cooperated. This division be- 'With the passage of the Avoidance of came increasingly important in the years after Discrimination Act. Also, by this time the MAP's the coup and was clearly expressed in the 1969 vote-getting ability had suffered nationally, due to the fact that other parties were putting up Muslim candi- phase of the Mosque dispute. dates and getting Muslim votes (see Price, 1956). The reassertion of ethnic identity after the 2This is the Ghana census categorization and does coup, and the formation of groupings on an eth- not always coincide with citizenship. nic basis, did not stop many of the same individ- 3Price (1954, p. 108), mentioned an organization 122 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY reconstituted as a national organization with its were actually born in Kumasi, although this does main office in Accra. It included former mem- not necessarily confer citizenship upon them. bers of both the MAP and the Muslim Council. (3) There has been a progression of nationally The Muslim Mission was formed after inde- organized Muslim associations which played ma- pendence (in 1958) specifically as an organiza- jor roles in Kumasi politics in different periods. tion of Ghanaian Muslims. It opposed first the The MAP was most important in the 1950s when Muslim Council and later the Muslim Community factions, formed in Kumasi around two Hausa on a number of grounds, among them citizenship leaders-Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu, asso- and education. The Mission claimed that both ciated with the MAP and CPP, respectively- the Council and the Community were organiza- fought for local power and national influence. tions of aliens, and that they permitted and even The MAP was superseded by the Muslim Council encouraged superstition and ignorance as well as as the dominant organization in the Zongo, when illiteracy (in English) among their followers. The the CPP's position was secure nationally; but Community in turn claimed that the more Mutawakilu, in emphasizing his role as "chief" westernized Mission leaders were simply political and in failing to support the Nigerian Communi- opportunists who represented a very small ty, had failed to secure his position in the local power-hungry clique in Kumasi and perhaps in branch of the Muslim Council, and played only a the national arena as well. Although this study minor role in CPP affairs once the Council had deals mainly with events up to early spring of taken control. When the Council was disbanded 1970, it is necessary to add that in an effort to by the NLC in 1966, two other national associ- reconcile these factions, the Busia government ations with Kumasi branches became active-the proposed, in May, 1970, to form a national coun- Mission and the Community.2 While the Mission cil of Islamic affairs which was to take over the had tried to supersede the Council during the assets of the disbanded Muslim Council' and CPP period on the plea of nationalism, the Nkru- which, it was hoped, would reconcile the Mission mah government had been tolerant of Ghanaians and the Community. After the overthrow of the of "foreign origin" as long as they served the CPP Busia government, the National Redemption and controlled the dissident Muslims. After the Council set up another Muslim advisory council 1966 coup the government's policy toward these which was still functioning in 1974. It included people became more consistently xenophobic members of both communities: Glhanaian Mus- and the Mission was given a chance to assert it- lims and those of non-Ghanaian origin. self. Finally, it is useful to remember that the I believe it useful at this time to review some factions which formed in the Zongo in the period of the points that I have made in this summary of party conflict in the 1950s cut across ethnic that are relevant to the Mosque controversy. cleavages; after the coup, when formal political (1) There is a division between the Asante parties were banned, ethnic and national identity Nkramo community and the Zongo community, became more significant as bases for association and the Asante Nkramo Imam plays an impor- and political action. tant role as intermediary between the strangers and the traditional Asante authorities. Cultural Background: (2) The Zongo community consists of north- The Importance of Islam in Kumasi ern Ghanaians and aliens, and many of the aliens The importance of Islam in the Zongo is called the Gold Coast Muslim Association which was related to a pattern of Islamization that predates formed in 1932 and became active in politics in 1939 the colonial period in West Africa (see Wilks, when it allied itself with the Mambii party in the Accra 1968). Some of the early migrants in Kumasi Town Council elections. Price stated that this organiza- were Muslims before they left their homelands. tion later became the MAP. In the late 1960s, when These include the Hausa, Zabarama, and Fulani, Muslim Community members traced the origin of their association, some mentioned 1938 as the date of its inception. It is likely they were referring either to the 2Another group of Muslims in Kumasi were the Ah- same Muslim Association or to a Kumasi branch. madiyya, but they never took an active role in politics 'Ghanaian Times, May 29, 1970, p. 5. and are therefore not relevant to this discussion. SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 123 and others from Muslim groups of Dioula origin dominance of the Hausa as indicated above. Most which had been incorporated into the Voltaic second generation immigrants speak only Hausa, states of Mossi, Mamprusi, and Dagomba several and many immigrants of non-Hausa origin have centuries earlier. Many other migrants converted been assimilated into the Hausa group. It is diffi- to Islam when they settled in Kumasi. Among cult to say whether the Hausa have retained their other things conversion facilitated the establish- prestige and pre-eminence in some fields, Islamic ment of business relationships among traders in education for example, by admitting into their the Zongo; it made it easier for migrants to find group non-Hausas who gradually assume Hausa spouses and accommodation; and, when one was identity, or by excluding outsiders. In any case, able to acquire sufficient Islamic education to second and third generation immigrants of differ- prove one's orthodoxy, it conferred considerable ent ethnic groups are culturally indistinguishable; prestige. their customs and values are no longer associated Kumasi today is one of the most important with particular ethnic categories, they know little centers of Islamic education in Ghana. Many about their parents' traditional culture, and eth- orthodox Muslims run Arabic schools and until nic differences do not often affect daily social recently very few immigrants were willing to interaction. Although their way of life is similar send their children to government or mission in many respects to that associated with Hausa schools. Many immigrants regard English school- culture, it is preferable to speak of Zongo culture ing as a first step toward conversion to Christian- to indicate that the emerging way of life in Ku- ity and, as many Asante have become Christians, masi Zongo is the result of the social and cultural the immigrants fear that education in such integration of immigrants from many groups and schools will lead to assimilation into Asante soci- not simply the persistence of any one cultural ety and to a relative weakness in the Zongo com- tradition (see Schildkrout, 1974). munity. In contrast, conversion to Islam is Despite extensive social and cultural inte- regarded as a positive, even an upward, move by gration, an ideology of patrilineal descent contin- many migrants who abandon their traditional ues to segment the Zongo population into dis- cultural patterns as they become incorporated tinct ethnic communities based not upon persist- into the ethnically heterogeneous Zongo. In ing cultural differences, but upon the different adopting Islam, migrants facilitate their places of origin of tribal and national groups. assimilation into this community, for Islamic These differences are transmitted over genera- values, albeit a Hausa version, provide a highly tions through patrifiliation.1 They are only rele- valued cultural model for Muslim immigrants vant in certain situations, but they are poten- from many ethnic groups. tially of great political importance because they Islam has been so important as an integrating can provide the basis for the formation of politi- force in Kumasi Zongo that may of the immi- cal factions or economic interest groups, and grants feel that they are united by a common because they are regarded as status categories by body of law and custom that is distinctive to this most of the Muslims. community. The immigrants claim that Kumasi There is some economic specialization in the Zongo has its own "constitution," referring to a Zongo, but no single group has been able to body of laws and norms that govern the behavior monopolize any one sector of the economy. The of the immigrants. For some years a group of Yoruba provided most of the traders in manufac- Muslim leaders in the Zongo formed a committee tured goods until the 1969 government decree which specifically publicized and determined required them to obtain residence and work per- those rules of Maliki Muslim law which they mits, but they have always faced serious agreed should be regarded as "Kumasi custom." competition from the Zabarama and others. In many respects the version of Islam that is Many of the cattle traders are Hausa, but they found in the Zongo is a Hausa one; traditional compete with the Fulani, the Mossi, and certain Hausa customs are often described as Muslim cus- toms by the immigrants. This is due to the early 'Rights to membership in a social unit (category or numerical, economic, political, and religious group) through the father. 124 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY northern Ghanaian immigrant groups, particu- Zongo has meant that politics is rarely a matter larly the Gonja and the Dagomba. The domina- of simple interethnic competition. Leaders in the tion of most economic activities by several differ- Zongo are united and divided on issues of reli- ent groups at the same time has, on the one gious, economic, and political policy and do not hand, intensified economic competition within necessarily act as representives of ethnic com- the Zongo and, on the other, made it advanta- munities. In a sense we are dealing with two geous for traders to form alliances, partnerships, systems of leadership, one based on the pattern and patron-client relationships across ethnic of ethnic segmentation and symbolized by the lines. Only in recent years have such alliances tribal headmen, their officials, and their Imams, formed on the basis of national identity, with another based on more universalistic criteria of Ghanaians attempting to limit competition by recruitment to leadership roles, including Islamic ousting aliens. education, wealth, and length of residence in the Leadership patterns in the Zongo to some ex- town.2 A few leaders are able to work in both tent follow those of ethnic differentiation, in systems, at times as representatives of the inter- that each ethnic community has a headman and a ests of a particular ethnic community, at other group of titled elders. Each headman also times as leaders of the Zongo Muslims. appoints an Imam, or Chief Priest, who officiates The focal point of communal life among Ku- at "life-crisis" ceremonies, such as naming cere- masi Muslims is the Central Mosque. There are monies, marriages, and funerals, advises the head- also many neighborhood mosques which serve lo- man on points of Islamic law, and leads prayers cal, ethnically heterogeneous congregations, and on certain occasions. The headmen and their offi- there are two mosques known respectively as cials perform many services for their communi- Mossi and Yoruba mosques. These also serve eth- ties. They arbitrate internal disputes, help mi- nically mixed congregations but derive their grants adjust to urban life and perform the ritual names from the identities of their founders. services mentioned above. To some extent they When the Central Mosque is not closed, due to represent their communities to outsiders, that is, frequent disputes over its control, it stands as a to government officials or to non-immigrants. symbol of the unity of the entire heterogeneous The Ghanaian government, the traditional Asante Muslim community (in Arabic, the 'umma) in authorities, and many others usually pass Kumasi. It is used for Friday prayer, for Rama- through the headman in order to communicate dan celebrations, and for other Muslim festival with members of particular groups. The headmen occasions, and it is meant to be used by all Ku- have never been officially recognized as chiefs but masi Muslims, not only those of the Zongo. they have been informally recognized by govern- A distinction must be made here between the ment officials as representatives of their respec- Friday Imam, the Imam al-Jum'a, who is the tive communities.' Imam of the 'umma, the Muslim community as a With the exception of the Hausa headman whole, and the Imam al-Bilad, the king's Im-m, other headmen are first generation, that is, rural who in this case is the Asante Nkramo Imam. born immigrants. In recent years these leaders Until the 1968-1969 phase of the Central have been challenged by the growing number of Mosque dispute, which was over the succession educated urban born Muslim leaders who do not to the Friday Imamate, both the Friday Imam identify primarily with their ethnic groups. These and the Na'ib, his assistant, have always been leaders claim to speak for the Zongo as a whole, Hausas. The Hausa Imam has been recognized and regardless of ethnic identity, they cooperate over the years as Imam al-Jum'a, that is as ritual in the multi-ethnic associations mentioned ear- leader of the whole Zongo, even though he has lier. This shift in the leadership pattern in the no authority to intervene directly in the religious affairs of non-Hausa. In a sense he has two sepa- 'Chiefs had to be recognized by the Governor of the Gold Coast in the colonial period and, according to the 2Because of their Islamic education, wealth, and per- 1969 constitution, must be recognized by the National sonalities, some of the Muslim leaders are believed to House of Chiefs. The headman's position is more fully have considerable mystical power, a belief supported by described in Schildkrout, 1970a. a strong tradition of Islamic mysticism in West Africa. SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 125

FIG. 2. The Kumasi Central Mosque under repair in 1968. rate roles, that of Friday Im-am and that of Hausa leaders of the immigrant (Zongo) community as Im-am, just as the political head of the Hausa a whole. However, as the Central Mosque was community is known both as Hausa headman built for all Muslims in Kumasi, not only for the and as Sarkin Zongo. Even after the office of Zongo Muslims, the Friday Im-am's congregation Sarkin Zongo was officially abolished the Hausa is much more inclusive than the stranger com- headman continued to play certain ritual roles munity alone. that expressed his position as a leader of the en- tire Zongo. On the main Muslim festival days he The Central Mosque Controversy: 1952-1966 leads a procession of Muslims, including the other headmen, to greet the Asantehene and the It should be apparent that the Mosque dispute representatives of the national administration. He was in fact many disputes, or to express it differ- acts as an intermediary between the national ently, many phases in a single dispute. The issues government and the other headmen, and is often in each phase have varied but all have reflected asked to arbitrate disputes between non-Hausa continuous struggles for power within the groups in the Zongo. Non-Hausa headmen are Muslim community which were in one way or presented to him for recognition when they as- another indicative of changing issues in the sume office even though he has no authority in Ghanaian national political scene. National their election. The Hausa Im-am in his capacity as events gave different leaders at different times Im-am al-Jum'a and the Hausa headman in his opportunities to compete for power locally and capacity as Sarkin Zongo are then symbolic to express their success by demonstrating control 126 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY of the one symbol of consensus in the Muslim hearing had been postponed for a week. On this community-the Central Mosque. In the account day, the paper said, as the parties were leaving that follows, I describe the changing personali- the Asantehene's palace "some sort of guerilla ties, events, and issues. fighting started." Four people were wounded, 10 Soon after he was elected Hausa headman in were arrested. 1948, Ahmadu Baba sucessfully appealed to the During the Commission's recess Ahmadu Baba Asantehene for a plot of land on which to build a brought evidence showing that Mutawakilu had Mosque for all Muslims in Kumasi. Ahmadu Baba altered the Mosque accounts. The Ashanti Pio- was a wealthy transport-owner and landlord, and neer reported on November 253 that the Kumasi he contributed a sizable portion of the funds to State Council had said that "owing to doubt es- build the Mosque, but most of the money was tablished about the genuineness of the minute raised in a public campaign. In the next few years book tendered in evidence by Mutawakilu on party politics came into play and Ahmadu Baba's behalf of the Muslim Youth Congress, it did not opponents from earlier years, now aligned with desire to pursue any longer investigations of the the CPP, began to use the Mosque fund to attack objections raised by the Youth to the findings of his leadership. the Kyidomhene Commission of Enquiry." Significantly, Ahmadu Baba's former rival for Fighting between the two factions occurred the office of Hausa headman, Mutawakilu, led frequently, yet in January, 1954, Ahmadu Baba the campaign against him. By 1953 Mutawakilu and the Hausa Imam, Malam Chorumah, broke was persistently accusing Ahmadu Baba of em- ground for the Mosque. There was little pretense bezzling Mosque funds. After the MAP was about the "a-political" nature of the undertaking founded in 1953, the dispute over the funds was by this time. By June, MAP activities were orga- expressed as one between the MAP faction led by nized at the Mosque site. The Ashanti Pioneer Ahmadu Baba and others and the CPP faction led reported on June 14 that: "one hundred and by Mutawakilu. By the spring of 1953 the MAP thirty five members of the Kumasi Zongo CPP faction decided to take action against the slander who had resigned to join the MAP were admitted they believed the accusations to be. Ahmadu at a ceremony held yesterday at the site of the Baba sued a Hausa CPP member for slander and new Mosque near the Labour office, in the pres- succeeded in winning £200 in damages and costs ense of Alhaji Amadu Baba, Sarkin Zongo, and in the Kumasi Divisional Court. The magistrate the tribal heads, including the Imam Malam ruled that no misappropriation of funds had oc- Chorumah. Fifty-five of the resigned CPP mem- curred.' bers squatted before the Chiefs and made some This was hardly the end of the controversy. confessions.... Alhaji Amadu Baba urged the Mutawakilu, dissatisfied with the court's deci- people not to call the young ones who had now sion, decided to take the case to the Asantehene, come to them as converts 'tubas'. It was only a whose opposition to the CPP was not yet clear. misunderstanding that had made them stay away Under the auspices of the Muslim Youth Con- for a while . . . Prayers were said and the new con- gress, a CPP organization he was leading, Muta- verts were given a voluntary gift of £5.11.0 by wakilu brought a complaint against Ahmadu the gathering."4 Baba to the Asantehene's court. The Asantehene Ghanaian independence in March, 1957, solid- set up a commission of inquiry (the Kyidomhene ified the leadership of the CPP and gave Muta- Commission) to investigate, but it too ruled that wakilu confidence and support in his local cam- no misappropriation had been demonstrated. The paign. The CPP had begun to use its national Muslim Youth Congress appealed this judgment power to eliminate opposition from religious and and requested a further investigation. On Octo- regional factions, and in August, 1957, deporta- ber 9, 1953, The Ashanti Pioneer, a Kumasi tion orders were issued on the two major MAP newspaper, reported2 that the Commission's 3"Youth vs. Amadu Baba Case Closed." 4"Tuba" is an expression describing converts to the 'Ashanti Pioneer, June 17, 195 3. faith. It probably derives from the Arabic talib (pI. 2"Four Wounded in Muslim Clash." tulba), student or disciple. SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 127 leaders in Kumasi, Ahmadu Baba and Alfa Lar- to unify his congregation so that they can pray dan. Although they appealed against the orders together in peace. on the grounds that they were citizens of Ghana Given these attitudes Mutawakilu could not by birth, an act of parliament was passed (Act 1 very well pretend to be a legitimate political of 1957) during the court proceedings legalizing leader in the Zongo while the Mosque remained the deportations. Citizenship was thenceforth de- closed. He began to apply for weekly police per- fined so that birth alone did not confer Ghanaian mits to use the Mosque. Such permits were issued nationality, and the two MAP leaders were for several months in 1958, and the Hausa Im-am deported to Nigeria before their case was con- (the Imam al-Jum'a), Malam Chorumah, switched cluded in court. Although these measures were his allegiance from Ahmadu Baba to Mutawakilu, ultimately intended to keep peace in the most joined the CPP, and continued to lead Friday troubled areas, the government declared a state prayers. Although the police and the adminis- of emergency in Kumasi immediately after the tration in Kumasi seemed to believe that unity deportations. had been achieved, as violence had become less By this time the Mosque had been opened, frequent, many former supporters of the MAP, but hostility between the MAP and CPP factions now members of the UP, refused to worship with in the Zongo was so great that they refused to the CPP faction at the Central Mosque and used worship together. Whenever the two sides met at other small mosques. Occasional fighting oc- the Mosque, fighting broke out. The MAP faction curred at these sites, and by 1959 the most ar- felt that the Mosque had been built largely with dent opponents of the CPP prayed only in their their money and labor, and they were bitter homes. about the deportations and accusations of mis- By the end of the 1950s open conflict be- appropriation of funds. The CPP faction on the tween the CPP and its opponents had lessened other hand claimed that the Mosque was their because the CPP was firmly in control nationally rightful place of worship, for no matter which and locally. In his capacity as Sarkin Zongo, side had started the project the Mosque had been Mutawakilu had replaced those MAP headmen built for all Muslims in the town. who had refused to support the CPP.' Some MAP The question of which side had the right to supporters switched allegiances and actively sup- worship in the Mosque became academic when ported the CPP, whereas others attempted to be Mutawakilu was made Sarkin Zongo in 1958. As as a-political as possible. As all open opposition soon as his accession to office was announced, had been eliminated, the next phase of the the government declared the Mosque a "pro- Mosque dispute involved factions within the CPP tected place" (under the state of emergency regu- and reflected the growing shift in the Zongo lations). All gatherings, for prayer or other pur- from the leadership of single headmen to that of poses, were prohibited and individuals performed members of associations, in particular to the lo- their Friday prayers at the old Yoruba Mosque cal party members and to the local branch of the and at neighborhood Mosques, each faction tak- Muslim Council. The first dispute to develop ing care to avoid gathering where the "enemy" could be found. 'Among the deported headmen were the leaders of To the Muslims in Kumasi it is a matter of the Mossi and Gao communities. The Busansi headman great importance that Friday prayers be held and was served with a local deportation order; and the Mam- also that all Muslims in one town worship prusi, Dagomba, Kusasi, Zabarama, and other headmen on The provoked by were removed from office and replaced by CPP sup- together this day. disunity porters. Some, including the Yoruba and Fulani head- these political disputes was regarded as a serious men, eventually agreed to support Mutawakilu and religious matter, for although there are no specif- retained their offices. The only other period when a ic Qur'anic sanctions against communities that Sarkin Zongo had claimed the right to appoint headmen do not worship together, there is a general feeling was between 1927 and 1932, when the British pursued a strong policy of centralization in the Zongo. Then too that this bodes ill for the whole community, and the policy failed, as each community claimed that a also that any leader who claims legitimate au- Hausa leader had no authority to make these appoint- thority over the entire community should be able ments. (See Schildkrout, 1970b.) 128 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY after 1958 stemmed from a growing conflict be- the domination of religious groups by for- tween Mutawakilu and other Muslim leaders in eigners."2 Their plea to obtain control of the Kumasi. Mutawakilu's opponents within the "responsible positions" in the Muslim Council Hausa group attempted to oppose the power was unsuccessful, for Nkrumah was still prepared which chiefly office conferred on him by joining to support non-Ghanaians in key positions, but and working through the Muslim Council. The the sentiment that inspired the petition remained members of the Council in Kumasi opposed and reappeared in 1966 after Nkrumah was over- Mutawakilu's "iron rule" in the Zongo and thrown. demanded his dismissal as Sarkin Zongo and the abolition of the office.' They were successful in The Mosque Dispute: 1966-1970 1961: the office was abolished and Mutawakilu was therefore no longer Sarkin Zongo. Although The main cleavage to emerge after the coup, he tried in many ways to reassert his power, first once the Muslim Council was dissolved, was be- by becoming Hausa headman and later by trying tween the two Muslim associations-the Muslim to take over leadership of the Kumasi branch of Mission and the Muslim Community. The argu- the Council, Mutawakilu was never able to regain ment between these two factions goes back to his former position of authority. From 1961 the early years of independence and involves until 1966, leadership shifted among different many issues, all of which were later expressed in members of the Muslim Council, and it was this the dispute over the succession to the Friday group that obtained weekly permits to use the Imamate. I have mentioned the question of citi- Central Mosque. It also controlled a committee zenship and the way in which the Mission had known as the Mosque Building Committee, attacked the Council before 1966 for being an which handled the collection of funds for build- organization of aliens. Later the Mission had ing and maintaining the Mosque. attacked the Muslim Community on the same The Muslim Council faced opposition from grounds, but its claim was weakened by the fact another quarter, which, although it did not pro- that there was a split in the Asante community. voke a large dispute over the Mosque before 1966, The Asante Nkramo Imam not only supported pointed to the main cleavage that was to occur the Community, but was its vice president,3 and after Nkrumah's fall. In 1958 the Muslim Mission many of the so-called aliens were actually able to was formed, including in its membership only claim Ghanaian citizenship by virtue of ma- Muslims of Ghanaian nationality, both northern- ternal ties. ers and southerners. The Mission disagreed with The significance of the Asante Nkramo other Muslim groups, including the Muslim Coun- Imam's position opposing the Ghanaian domi- cil, on a number of ideological issues such as the nated Mission becomes clear in light of an on- need for more Western-type education and the going dispute within the Asante community. The need to purge Islam of numerous magical Asante regional branch of the Mission was led practices and superstitions, but its main opposi- mainly by Akans from the Brong (western) area tion was based on nationalist sentiment. In 1962 of the Ashanti region who had a long tradition of some "indigenous Muslims of Ghana," as they opposition to Asantes from the Kumasi region. called themselves, sent a petition to the Govern- In the period of party conflict, the Brong people ment objecting to what they regarded as the strongly supported the CPP, whereas the Kumasi domination of the Council by "alien" Hausas. people on the whole supported the NLM and They maintained that independence had been later the UP. This dispute can be traced farther gained to free the people of Ghana "from all forms of foreign yoke and domination, including 2Petition by Head Representatives of Ghanaian Muslims, dated May 3, 1962, Kumasi Regional Office, 'Letter dated March 10, 1960, from Secretary, File 2268. Ghana Muslim Council, Kumasi, to Regional Com- 3In August, 1970, he was elected president, replacing missioner, Kumasi. Kumasi Regional Office, File 2268, Ahmadu Baba who died -in September, 1968. The p. 100. Ghanaian Times, August 5, 1970. SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 129

FIG. 3. Men and women from Kumasi Zongo working as volunteers to repair the Central Mosque. The work is done on Sundays, to the accompaniment of drumming. back in the history of Asante; it goes back to the Muslims was directly continued from the pre- pre-colonial period, when Kumasi asserted con- colonial to the CPP to the post-coup periods, trol over the northwest, which continued right many Asantes actually did perceive a continuing through to the post-independence period (see dis- pattern of fission along these lines. The disagree- cussion in Austin, 1964, p. 293f; Tordoff, 1965; ment between the factions was brought into the and Busia, 1951). Although it is difficult to open in the late 1950s when the Asantehene arbi- claim that the Brong/Kumasi split among the trated a case between a leader of the Asante re- 130 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY gional branch of the mission and the Asante lim Community and opposed it in hopes of gain- Nkramo Im-m over the fees, ostensibly too high, ing economic and political power from groups of charged in a Mission school in Kumasi. In bring- alien origin. ing this case before the Asantehene the Asante Disputes around the Mosque started again Nkramo Imam implicitly asserted his right to con- very soon after the coup. The first one related to trol the Muslims in the Mission. The Asantehene the Mosque Building Committee. This committee ruled that he could not compel the leaders of the continued through the early 1960s under the Mission (who were predominantly Brongs) to fol- leadership of the Muslim Council but after the low the Imam's leadership. It was felt that the 1966 coup its composition was questioned. Asantehene tacitly gave his assent to the split Ahmadu Baba, who returned from Nigeria a few within the Asante Muslims at this time. months after the coup, had been reinstated as If the Asante Nkramo Imam was unable to Hausa headman and began accusing Malam assert his control over all Muslims in Asante, he Chorumah of trying to maintain a committee of was, on the other hand, still able to maintain that CPP sympathizers although the Party had been the aliens in the Muslim Community and in the disbanded. Ahmadu Baba brought this case to Zongo were "his strangers." At various times he the Asantehene, who ordered that the committee has stated that these strangers should be regarded be disbanded and a new one appointed to include as "Kumasi people" (Kumasifo), who had a members of both the CPP and UP factions. This long-standing right to live in Kumasi under the was done, and differences between Ahmadu Baba auspices of the traditional Kumasi authorities. In and the former CPP members seemed to be the role of a patron, the Imam supported the resolved. As the Mission had not yet become aliens in the Zongo and took their side in the active in the Mosque dispute, it appeared that Mosque dispute, thereby weakening the Mission's peace had finally been restored. major claim against the Community. It was not long before this newly constituted The present Muslim Community was orga- Mosque Building Committee became the focus of nized in 1966 although it claims to be the same a new wave of discontent, this time on an ethnic organization as one with the same name started basis. The headmen of some of the More-Dagbane in 1938. This is a matter of some controversy speaking groups complained that they were not because the lease to the land on which the sufficiently represented on a mainly Hausa body. Mosque is built is also in the name of the Muslim The committee then asked them to send repre- Community. The Mission claimed that the earlier sentatives to it, and each group elected two mem- use of the term "community" did not refer to a bers. The campaign to raise funds for the Mosque corporate body in any legal sense. In any case the continued, and labor (paid and voluntary) was Community that claimed control of the Mosque recruited to begin repairs and additions to the after the 1966 coup was formally organized in Mosque. Accra in 1966 and its Kumasi branch with This was a minor dispute over the constitution Ahmadu Baba as President and the Asante Nkra- of a committee determined to repair and use the mo Imalm as Vice-President, was founded soon Mosque; it was an internal dispute involving dif- after. Muslims in Kumasi who had formerly been ferent ethnic groups within the Zongo, all allied with the CPP and the UP (MAP) factions demanding an equal voice in Zongo affairs. This united in the new association abandoning their conflict was soon eclipsed by the much larger former party differences. In the months follow- conflict between the Muslim Mission and the ing the coup the Community drew support from Muslim Community. The Mission brought a for- almost all Muslims in the Zongo, at least to the mal complaint against the Community to the extent that the leaders faced no opposition there. NLC Political Committee. It claimed that leader- Northern Ghanaians and aliens in the Zongo were ship of Muslims in Ghana should be in the hands united in support of the Community, although of citizens and that the Muslim Community later, when the Muslim Mission became active in deviated from the teachings of the Qur'an and the Mosque dispute, many of the Ghanaians, encouraged superstition. An attempt at reconcili- particularly Dagombas and Gonjas, left the Mus- ation was made on the national level and the two SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 131 sides were asked to form a single Muslim council. munity followed its customary practice of elect- Unable to agree on the name of the new body or ing a new Im-m. The Hausa community, in con- the proportion of each side's representation, no sultation with the main Muslim "ulama" and the compromise was reached and the NLC was tribal headmen elected a successor to both the forced to recognize two independent organiza- offices of Friday Im-am and N-a'ib. The former tions, with the provision that both stay out of Na'ib was elected to the Im-mate and a new politics. Na'ib was appointed. There was no apparent op- These events occurred on the national level. position within the Zongo to the appointment of Leaders of the Kumasi branch of the Muslim a Hausa, or to the promotion of the former Community went to Accra to meet with the NLC Na-'ib. For more than 50 years the Friday leaders and with the delegates from the Mission, Imamate of Kumasi had been vested in a Hausa and they spoke with confidence as leaders of the and although there must be an election and the Zongo community as a whole. The Mission had office cannot be the property of a descent group, not yet become a factor in internal Zongo poli- there had never been any objection to the elec- tics in Kumasi, as there had been no occasion to tion of a Hausa who served both as Hausa Imam divide the immigrant community. and as Friday Imam. In this instance, however, On August 1, 1968, this occasion arose with the succession took place in a political climate the death of Im-am Chorumah, the Friday Im-am. which was increasingly xenophobic; politicians One-and-a-half years had passed since the coup, and the public were particularly sensitive to out- and aspiring politicians throughout the country cries against aliens because the press and certain were beginning to mobilize support wherever politicians were intent upon blaming them for they could. It is not possible to state precisely the country's ills. It is significant that opposition what role outsiders, that is, nationally oriented to the appointment of Hausas as Imam and N-a'ib politicians who were not members of the Kumasi did not generate in the Zongo even though it Zongo Community, played in this phase of the eventually gathered support there. Mosque controversy. In some instances inter- On the day the Asantehene was about to for- vention was clear, but in others it was covert. It mally recognize the new Imam, the Chairman of is well to point out again, however, that the Mis- the Regional Committee of Administration in sion's more westernized manner found favor with Kumasi intervened to stop the ceremony. Ac- politicians and administrators and that several cording to the accounts of the Chairman and the Muslims serving in the military government were Mission, the Mission had sent a letter to the Ad- also members of the Mission. The attempt to ministration stating that they had their own can- Ghanaianize the economy was also a crucial ele- didate for the office and that they had not been ment in this phase of the dispute, because this consulted about the decision to appoint a Hausa generated hostility to aliens and raised Gha- as Friday Im-am. At the same time, a member of naians' hopes of gaining economic and polit- the NLC government, reputedly a Mission mem- ical power, in the Zongo and in the country as a ber himself, advised the Regional Chairman to whole. National politicians are known to have delay the ceremony so that the Mission's objec- suggested to several leaders of Ghanaian groups tions could be investigated. in the Zongo that a cooperative trading associ- The Mission had been preparing to make a bid ation excluding aliens might be formed to ad- for the Im-amate even before Malam Chorumah vance the position of northern Ghanaians, partic- died. They had appealed to the Asante Nkramo ularly in long distance trade, an area where com- Imam to take the office himself but he refused. petition was still keen. Soon after the ban on According to the Chairman of the Regional Com- politics was lifted there were suggestions that a mittee of Administration the Asante Nkramo political party of northerners might be formed, Im-am was "selling his birthright to aliens." The although the subsequent ban on regional or eth- Asante Nkramo Im-am, on the other hand, nic parties by the NLC prevented this from devel- claimed that the two offices were distinct and oping. that the Friday Im-amate had traditionally been When Im-am Chorumah died the Zongo com- given to a Hausa (interview, February, 1969). He 132 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

disagreed on the significance of nationality and then proposed and accepted by the Mission, but cited passages of the Qur'an to show that Islam not by the Community. The solution was that did not recognize the validity of such qualifica- the Mission concede its claims to the Im-amate to tions. the Hausa candidate, and their candidate, a When the Regional Administrative Officer Dagomba, would become the Na'ib. In proposing intervened to stop the Asantehene from recogniz- this solution the chairman of the Regional Com- ing the Hausa Im-am, he also closed the Mosque mittee maintained that the Community had fol- supposedly to maintain peace. As the end of lowed a principle of succession from N-a'ib to Ramadan approached, the Chairman attempted Imam (interview February, 1969). The Commu- to find a neutral outsider to lead the prayers. nity denied that such a principle existed and Unable to find such a person in Kumasi he sum- claimed that it was only a coincidence that such moned the Imam of the Ghana army, a prom- a pattern had obtained in the past. The Commu- inent Muslim in Ghana. When this man arrived to nity suspected that the Administration was at- lead the prayers, the Community protested and tempting to formalize such a pattern in suggesting refused to pray under his leadership because, that the Mission appoint the Na-'ib, and they they claimed, he was a member of the Mission. feared that such a solution would be unstable At this point the Regional Committee recog- and even personally dangerous for the Hausa nized that an investigation into the dispute was Im-m. It did seem to be the case that the Ad- in order. The Administration agreed to examine ministration and the Mission were attempting to the Community's claim that the Hausas they had formalize a principle of succession: the Chairman nominated were, in fact, Ghanaian citizens. After of the Regional Administration explicitly noted considerable investigation they were convinced that many traditional kingdoms in West Africa that by virtue of these men's maternal ethnic had principles of rotating succession (interview affiliations, they were qualified for citizenship. February, 1969). The Mission counterclaimed that they were not After this arbitration the Administration again true citizens in the same way that Asantes or attempted to open the Mosque, but hostilities Dagombas were, but as this had become a legal were still too great to avoid the violent quarrels question they were unable to win their case. that followed. On one occasion many people Nevertheless, during this period many articles were arrested and several were injured. appeared in the Ghanaian press erroneously de- The Muslim Community then decided to fight scribing the Community as an organization of the case in court and based their suit against the aliens. The prevalent view was that all members Mission on their claim to ownership of the of certain ethnic groups, regardless of their place Mosque. The case centered around the distinc- of birth, were aliens. tion between the notion of community, as an While the Administration was attempting to unbounded, unincorporated-in the legal sense- arbitrate the dispute, the Muslim Community group, and the notion of a corporate body. The urged that the case be taken to the Asantehene. fact that a distinction between informal and for- The Chairman of the Regional Committee of Ad- mal organizations had not always been clear ministration refused to allow this and the determined the outcome of the case. Asantehene, known to be the traditional patron The Community sued the Mission for interfer- of strangers in Kumasi was strongly urged to stay ing with their property and maintained that the out of the matter. The Community then called Mission had caused them a serious loss of revenue for an election to determine the succession but in the form of Friday contributions. They the Mission, whose membership was com- demanded a court order for possession of the paratively small, refused on the grounds that Mosque and an injunction restraining the Mission their case rested on a question of principle. As members from entering or interfering with the the dispute became a matter of national debate, Mosque. The defense rested its case on the claim two NLC members alleged to be members of the that the Community did not exist as a corporate Mission and both northern Ghanaians, came to body until 1966 and that before then the Mission Kumasi to arbitrate. A compromise solution was and the Community were members of a general SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 133 community of Muslims in Kumasi who were col- in the early part of 1969 and elections were held lectively referred to as the Muslim or Moham- in August, giving Busia's Progress Party (PP) a madan community. The defense claimed that the clear victory. Although many of the Muslims two groups, the Mission and the Community, were aliens and as such were not eligible to vote, were formally constituted in 1958 and 1966, no questions about citizenship were asked during respectively. voter registration and politicians encouraged The question of the ownership of the Mosque Muslims to participate in the elections. Cam- rested on the interpretation of the meaning of paigning was active in the Zongo, and the Prog- the word community-whether or not the ress Party, still identified with opposition to the Muslim Community in whose name the lease of CPP, won a clear majority there. the Mosque ground was issued was the same At the end of 1969, however, the Busia group as the association that existed at the time government began its campaign against aliens and of the trial. The question of the ownership of the many of the immigrants who had worked for the Mosque plot first came up in the early 1960s victory of the PP believed that they had been when the Muslim Council was in competition betrayed. Many Zongo residents experienced a with Malam Mutawakilu. Each had applied for a loss of faith in the government in this period lease to the Mosque, and in 1965 a lease was because the protection and assistance they ex- executed between the government and the "Mus- pected their votes would bring was not forth- lim Community acting by Mohammad Chiroma coming. They felt that the general attitude in the (chief Im-m) and Mohammad Mutawakilu as its country and the government favored the Mission registered Trustee (sic) of the Community."' with its policy of Ghanaianization, and that given However, the judge found that there was no evi- these circumstances they were fighting a losing dence that the plaintiffs were a corporate body, as battle. this was legally defined by the Trustees (Incorpo- As a result of these developments, in the spring ration) Act of 1962. The judge ruled that title to of 1970 a new dispute developed within the the Central Mosque was in the Muslim Communi- ranks of the Muslim Community of Kumasi. ty, Kumasi, which comprised both parties in the Many of the younger men and a few of the elders dispute, because when the Mosque was started began to think that they should give in to the the two factions in the Zongo had not been sepa- Mission and the Administration on the issue of rated. the M'ib. For some time a faction within the At the end of the court proceedings, in Febru- Community held out against this position and ary, 1970, the dispute was still unresolved. The claimed that the events of the CPP years were court had clearly recognized that it was a politi- repeating themselves, that the same people who cal rather than a legal matter and that a solution had feared to oppose the CPP were giving way to would have to be found out of court. The Ad- pressure on this issue. ministration continued to urge acceptance of the Eventually most of the Community members compromise solution they had proposed, but for became convinced that given the government's some time the Community refused to accept the attitude toward strangers they could not win Dagomba candidate as N-a'ib. their case. They accepted the compromise on During the long court case many changes oc- condition that the Mission appoint another indi- curred on the national political scene and these vidual as N-a'ib.2 It seemed, then, that as the Prog- eventually affected the behavior of the parties in ress Party government stabilized itself, peace the Mosque dispute. Political parties were formed was at least temporarily restored in Kumasi. With power indisputably in the hands of one group on "'Judgement: Suit No. L.C. 73/68. Muslim com- the national level, the open expression of deep munity Kumasi per Alhaji Alhasan Melafia, Plaintiffs, v. local conflicts ceased. As in the pre-colonial peri- Muslim Mission Kumasi as represented by 1. Chief Gonja, 2. Chief Dagomba, 3. Secretary of Muslim 2This is indeed what occurred. On a revisit to Ghana Mission. Defendants, in the High Court of Ghana held at in 1974 I noted that the Mosque was being used under a Kumasi on Wednesday, the 18th day of February 1970 Hausa Imam and a Dagomba Na'ib, but not the same before Annan, J." individual who had been involved in the original dispute. 134 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY od after 1844 when the Asantehene took firm the national level, again appointing a Muslim control over the Muslim stranger community, council, including members of both the Ghanaian and as in the CPP period when the Nkrumah and non-Ghanaian communities. Thus, while ad- government did the same thing through the ministration is solidified and political activity is Muslim Council, the Progress Party government minimized at the national level, local disputes attempted to create a single national body to like those symbolized by the controversy over supervise Muslim affairs. The govemment that The Kumasi Central Mosque probably can be followed the Progress Party, the National expected to remain dormant. Redemption Council, maintained this control at

CONCLUSIONS What factors emerge in all these disputes as groups that can challenge Islamic ideals. Individ- the main reason for recurring factionalism in the uals have multiple identities, and identification Muslim community? The dispute over the with the most inclusive community may not Mosque has continued for almost 20 years, and always seem advantageous. In times of stress although the factions have changed and the spe- more particularistic loyalties emerge, even when cific issues have varied, it may be possible to find these directly contradict the most valued reli- some general themes underlying all these con- gious precepts. flicts. Certainly, it is not the Mosque itself that It would be wrong, however, to maintain that has caused conflict, but deeper issues that pre- conflicts over the Mosque have been entirely vent the realization of the ideal of unity which is based upon different ethnic groups' competition expressed in the Mosque. for political power. Economic factors also have The first point to emerge is the most obvi- been important, both in determining lines of ous-that the Mosque, as a symbol of unity for cleavage between ethnic groups within the the entire Muslim community, is a means Muslim community and in determining the rela- through which competition between groups may tionship between national policy and local events. be expressed. It is accepted as a symbol of com- Most of the people involved in this dispute are, munal unity, but precisely because of this, con- ethnically, strangers in Kumasi and some are flicts about authority, power, and leadership, aliens in Ghana. At least part of the dispute, which actually divide the community, can be fo- particularly the 1968-1969 phase of it, was a cused on it. Studies in other towns in West Africa matter of competition between Ghanaians and and elsewhere have revealed similar conflicts over aliens for scarce economic and political Mosques (see for example Proudfoot, 1959; and resources. Why is it that the issue of citizenship Behrman, 1970). This is, of course, nothing pe- was so important in this phase of the dispute, and culiar to Islam, but is similar to the problems how do economic and political factors interrelate surrounding chieftaincy or central authority in in earlier periods? many societies. It may be, however, that in eth- In the pre-colonial period, Muslims from the nically heterogeneous communities such disputes north were accepted in Kumasi as traders and reli- take a very special form, in that symbols of gious leaders, even though they were not Asante generalized authority may be dissociated from citizens. They remained in the capital under the any specific group. Thus the Mosque is supposed patronage and control of the king, who saw it in to represent the general community, not any Asante interest to encourage an alien and de- single ethnic group; its congregation is supposed pendent merchant class, while he thought it to be one in which consideration of ethnic iden- unwise to encourage the growth of a strong, inde- tity and nationality are subordinated to the prin- pendent trading community among Asantes. ciples of brotherhood and unity explicit in To some extent the Asante Nkramo Imam's Islamic ideology. Yet, when subordinate ethnic position in the dispute described here reflected identities both "tribal" and national persist, even this traditional attitude. He did not see the ques- in very restricted areas of social life, they may tion in terms of opposed nationalities but rather lead to the formation of factions and pressure in terms of the local relationship between the SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 135 strangers and the Asantes. He recognized that the cally at least, amenable to control; aliens could Hausa candidate for the Imamate had been easily be deported when they overstepped the shown legally to be a Ghanaian, but he main- privileges the government allowed them. Like the tained that even if this had not been the case, the Asantehene in the previous century, Nkrumah to Imamate of the Kumasi Mosque should have some extent discouraged the rise of an indige- gone to the Hausa candidate, because Islam specif- nous trading community while he developed ically disallowed considerations of nationality or state enterprises with the assistance of outsiders.2 descent in the selection of an Im7am.' The Asante After the 1966 coup the Government's eco- Nkramo Im-am said that the Hausa candidate was nomic policy changed abruptly and so did the a "Kumasi person"; he had been born in the position of strangers. While large-scale outside in- town and his people had a definite status there as vestments still occurred, with fewer state con- strangers. The Dagomba candidate was also a trols placed on these investments, foreign eco- stranger as far as the Asante Nkramo Imam was nomic competition to small-scale Ghanaian busi- concerned, but he was not even born in Kumasi ness was discouraged. The emphasis of the NLC and moreover was denying his position as a Ku- and of the Progress Party government was pre- masi stranger in basing his claim for the Friday cisely to encourage the rise of a Ghanaian middle Im-amate on Ghanaian nationality. The Hausa class. This meant that African aliens, who con- candidate, on the other hand, recognized that he trolled many small-scale business enterprises, had a right to this office as a stranger in Kumasi, were seen as a threat to the expansion of and he deferred to the Asante Nkramo Imam for Ghanaian economic interests. Aliens increasingly advice and protection. The Hausas were not became scapegoats for the "common man's" eco- denying this traditional status relationship, but nomic plight. In this period, then, the recogni- the Dagombas were. tion of Ghanaian demands for a more equitable During the colonial period, virtually no distribution of economic opportunities, led to a restrictions were placed on the activities of strang- rejection of the contribution of strangers. ers, and crucial sectors of the economy were in This new political climate created divisions alien (European) hands. The economic base of and alliances with the Zongo community that the African stranger community also developed were absent before nationality became a basis for without restriction in this period. Although com- political action. Competition between individual petition between Ghanaians and aliens occurred, ethnic groups within the Zongo existed, but no the government did nothing to restrict alien basis for an alliance among Ghanaian groups was activity in favor of Ghanaians. perceived before independence. This nationalistic In some ways the rise of nationalism in the idiom merely made it possible for certain aspects 1950s could have been expected to lead to the of economic competition to express themselves imposition of controls on alien activity, for once politically. It is highly significant that the the economy was theoretically in Ghanaian Ghanaian groups that supported the Mission in hands, one could expect competition for limited the Zongo in the late 1 960s were precisely those resources to begin. However, as Nkrumah's eco- groups that included a significant number of cat- nomic policy was aimed at placing crucial sectors tle and kola traders, namely the Gonja and Da- of the economy under public, or state, control gomba. These groups had the most to gain from (see Callaway and Card, 1971) he was able to the elimination of the competition of the Hausa, allow alien economic participation. Like the Mossi, and other predominantly alien groups.3 Asantehene in the late nineteenth century, Nkru- mah's policy encouraged the participation of 2In the pre-colonial period, state enterprises included aliens, both European and African, in the econo- gold mining, some farming, and the control of long- my. Because they were aliens they were, theoreti- distance trade. 3For a discussion of the participation of different ethnic groups in the Kumasi cattle trade, see Hill 1970, 'The contradiction here is clear, because there can be pp. 109-121. Although the proportion of Mamprusi no rule that the new Imrm must be a Hausa. This, how- traders is high, few reside permanently in Kumasi, and ever, was regarded as part of custom, a category of law as a result few were personally involved in the Mosque speciflcally allowed by Islam, i.e., ijma. dispute. 136 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

The Mamprusi, also northern Ghanaians, are 1819, pp. 92, 403). In the recent dispute we poorly represented in Kumasi (there were only again see immigrants from northern Ghana 500 according to the 1960 census, as compared becoming aware of their national identity, and with 2100 Gonjas and 3830 Dagombas) and they attempting to separate themselves from alien have fewer traders permanently resident there. Muslims on this basis. Northemers living in The Mamprusi seemed to see no advantage in southern Ghana, and in Asante, at times have felt breaking with Hausa ritual leadership in the disadvantaged in relation to the indigenous Zongo, and they rejected the overtures of the peoples, and it is not surprising that they should Mission. respond to suggestions that they improve their It can be argued that the same sort of issues position through their claims to citizenship. This were present in pre-colonial Asante. We know of is perhaps an inevitable consequence of na- a dispute in the late nineteenth century in which tionalism in whatever period it occurs. As the northern Muslims, long resident in Kumasi, op- history of strangers in Kumasi and more specif- posed the Hausas on the grounds that the latter ically the history of the Mosque dispute shows, were strangers, whereas the northerners had local conflicts are deeply affected by expanding already become politically incorporated into the and contracting opportunities in the largest Asante state (Wilks, 1966, p. 323; Bowdich, polity to which the participants belong.

LITERATURE CITED Addo, N. 0. Kraus, Jon 1968. Spatial distribution and ecological pat- [MS.] Cleavages, crises, parties and state terns among the foreign-origin popula- power in Ghana: The emergence of a tion in Ghana. Ghana Jour. Soc., vol. 4, single-party system. Unpublished doc- no. 1, pp. 19-35. toral dissertation, 1970, Johns Hopkins Austin, Dennis. School of Advanced International 1964. Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960. London, Studies. Oxford Univ. Press, 1964. Levtzion, N. Behrman, Lucy 1968. Muslims and chiefs in West Africa. Ox- 1970. Muslim brotherhoods and politics in ford, Clarendon Press. Senegal. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Price, J. Harvard Univ. Press. 1954. The role of Islam in Gold Coast poli- Bowdich, T. E. tics. Ibadan, University College, Proc. 1819. Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Third Ann. Conf. West African Inst. Ashantee. London. Soc. Econ. Res., pp. 104-1 11. Busia, K. A. 1956. The Muslim vote in the Accra Constit- 1951. The position of the chief in the modern uencies, 1954. Ibadan, University Col- political system of Ashanti. London, lege, Proc. Fourth Ann. Conf. West Oxford Univ. Press. African Inst. Soc. Econ. Res., pp. Callaway, B., and E. Card 160-167. 1971. Political constraints on economic devel- Proudfoot, L. opment in Ghana. In Lofchie, M. (ed.), 1959. Mosque building and tribal separatism State of the nations. Los Angeles, Univ. in Freetown East. Africa, vol. 29, no. 4, California Press. pp. 405-416. Dupuis, J. Schildkrout, Enid 1824. Journal of a residence in Ashantee. [MS.] Ethnicity, kinship and politics among London. Mossi immigrants in Kumasi. Unpub- Ghana lished doctoral dissertation, 1969, Cam- 1964. 1960 Census of Ghana. Accra, vol. III. bridge Univ. Hill, P. 1970a. Strangers and local government in Ku- 1970. Studies in rural capitalism in West masi. Jour. Modern African Studies, Africa. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 451-469. Press. 1970b. Government and chiefs in Kumasi SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE 137

Zongo. In Crowder, M., and 0. Ikime 1967. Ashanti government. In Forde, D., and (eds.), West African chiefs: their chang- P. Kaberry (eds.), West African king- ing status under colonial rule and inde- doms in the nineteenth century. Lon- pendence. Ile-Ife, Nigeria, University of don, Oxford University Press for the Ife Press, pp. 370-393. International African Institute, pp. 1974. Ethnicity and generational differences 206-238. among urban immigrants in Ghana. In 1968. The transmission of Islamic learning in Cohen, A. (ed.), Urban ethnicity. Lon- the Western Sudan. In Goody, J. (ed.), don: Tavistock, A.S.A. Monograph no. Literacy in traditional societies. Cam- 12,pp. 187-222. bridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. Tordoff, William 162-197. 1965. Ashanti under the Prempehs, 1888- 1971. Asante policy towards the Hausa trade 1935. London. in the nineteenth century. In Meillas- Wilks, Ivor soux, C. (ed.), The development of 1966. The position of Muslims in metropoli- indigenous trade and markets in West tan Ashanti in the early nineteenth cen- Africa. London, Oxford Univ. Press for tury. In Lewis, I. M. (ed.), Islam in the International African Institute, pp. tropical Africa. London, Oxford Univ. 380-397. Press for The International African In- stitute, pp. 318-342.

.47~~~~~

4O

4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M

4

/ I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S

4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U" 41-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-