sign in sign up
<<
Home , Ferdinand de Saussure, Semiotics, Sign

ISSN 1392-0561. INFORMACIJOS MOKSLAI. 2012 61

Semiotic Insights into ’s of Being: Definition and Model of

Algirdas Budrevičius Vilnius University, Faculty of , and Communication Department, Associate Professor, Doctor Vilniaus universiteto Komunikacijos fakulteto Informacijos ir komunikacijos katedros docentas Universiteto g. 3, LT-01513 Vilnius, Tel. (+370 5) 236 6119 E-mail: [email protected]

This paper is aimed to develop a model of the sign as homomorphism (i.e. similarity of form) as the initial part of a strict and fundamental theory of sign. Many various —photographs, pictures, sculptures, diagrams, surface maps, etc.—might be viewed in terms of homomorphism. The proposed model of sign as a homomorphism is derived using Aristotle’s theory of being. Two principles of Aristotle’s theory—form and matter—are used as elementary ideas in the model of sign. The main peculiarity of the undertaken approach to is treating a sign and a signified as derivative ideas; they are constructed as compounds of form and matter. To achieve more strictness, the model of sign is treated in terms of the system of Cartesian coordinates modified for the articulation of being. Intentionality is viewed as the key idea in the model of sign. The approach to the definition of sign presented in this paper can be viewed as an ontological alternative to Peirce’s one. Keywords: sign as homomorphism, Aristotle, hylomorphism, Cartesian coordinate system, .

1. Introduction derstanding”. He viewed semiotics as the doctrine of signs and noted: “It is aptly Greeks used the name semeiotike to denote enough termed also logike, ”. Its task the of medical signs—symptoms. —including and Aris- was “to consider the nature of signs, the totle—viewed the idea of sign in a wider makes use of for the understanding . Sign studies were a field of inter- of things, or conveying its knowledge to est also for the medieval and Renaissance others”. Signs are necessary “to commu- philosophers. Locke in 1690 cardinally ex- nicate our thoughts to one another, as well tended their scope. In his Essay concern- as to record them for our own use”, Locke ing human understanding, Locke divided claimed. science into three sorts—physica, practi- Locke’s semiotics took several forms ca, and semiotike—according to the “most during the last centuries. As logic, it be- general division of the objects of our un- came a flourishing domain of knowledge.

113 One of its branch—formal logic—made tools from logic. Greimas (1970), in par- a significant contribution to the informa- ticular, employed the square of opposi- tion revolution in the twentieth century. tions (the Boethian square)—a classical in the beginning tool in logic. simple means of logic of the twentieth century changed signifi- are applied for a semiotic interpretation cantly the shape of semiotics by proposing of texts. Peirce also used ideas of logic in a philosophical account of the sign, based his classification of signs. Overall, semiot- on the universal categories of being. He ics actually still does not possess its own preserved Locke’s idea to relate semiot- unique methods. ics with logic. , al- The current situation in semiotics most at the same time, proposed a different might be evaluated viewing it from at least approach to the study of signs, which he two different perspectives: as a domain of termed semiology. It became very popu- and as a science. lar among linguists, anthropologists and should be mentioned separately. Semiotics other researchers of various domains of as a philosophical study of signs has ac- humanities. The scope of semiology was cumulated many interesting ideas during limited to and its social environ- its long history. The current state of semi- ment. Saussure’s approach differs signifi- otics, from this perspective, is similar to cantly from that of Locke and Peirce; in many other directions in philosophy. The particular, it does not include logic as its situation of semiotics as a domain of hu- ingredient part; it is related to logic only to manities, if compared with such domains the extent the language is related to logic. as , , various cul- Saussure did not use the powerful methods tural studies, might seem even a flourish- developed in logic. ing domain of knowledge. The scope of in modern se- The evaluation of semiotics in terms of miotics ranges from the definition of its science, however, is not very optimistic. elementary ideas—including the idea of Semiotics as logic (according to Locke) to- sign—to semiotic accounts of mental, so- day is certainly a well-developed science. cial, cultural, political, and even computa- Its rest part—what is called semiotics in its tional phenomena. contemporary sense—should be analyzed In the middle of the twentieth century, in more detail. semiotics became very popular in aca- Locke placed semiotics next to phys- demic circles. The interest was provoked ics, what implied their implicit compari- mainly by the need and expectation to son as two . Physics was already a find methodological tools for humanities; rather well-established science in the times earlier, Dilthey (1889) related a similar of Locke; semiotics, however, was actu- hope to —the theory of in- ally only a domain of philosophy. Today, terpretation. The expectations, however, the gap between physics and semiotics as mostly failed; semiotics did not become a two sciences is much wider: in fact, it is an for humanities. abyss. Modern semiotics is a very young Strict and precise methods are rarely domain of knowledge. Even its name is used in semiotics. Some authors borrow not widely known beyond the academic

114 circles. Deely (2004) in the preface of his provide precise methods for the analysis of book has noted Basics of Semiotics: “The sign. Therefore, for more strictness, also image of the modern semiotic universe is the idea of the Cartesian coordinates is the same as that of astronomy in 1611”. employed. The latter is implicitly based in We should admit that semiotics, despite logic; therefore, in fact, I use the methods its long prehistory, still lacks a strict theo- of logic. I adapt the Cartesian system for retical ground similar to the one used in the articulation of being treated in terms of sciences. Only fragmentary, non-interre- Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The peculiar- lated exist. Semiotics still has not ity of my approach from the point of view reached the state when knowledge is being of semiotics is in viewing the basic semi- accumulated continuously to form a solid otic —the sign and the signified system of facts and theories. In terms of object—as derivative ideas; traditionally, Kuhn (1962), it did not reach the state of a they are viewed as primary ideas. The two normal science. Locke’s idea—rather ex- elementary ideas from Aristotle’s theory of pectation—to view semiotics as important being—form and matter (or content)—are as physics is far from fulfilment. used as primary ideas instead. The ideas of This paper is aimed to contribute to de- the signified object and sign are derived on veloping the theory of sign. The concrete their ground. Models of other related semi- purpose is to make a little step in this direc- otic phenomena may also be derived using tion and to develop a model of the sign as this approach. a homomorphism (i.e. similarity of form) A short remark on the interpretation of as the initial part of a strict and fundamen- the classical texts analyzed in this paper tal theory of sign. should be added. Texts of Aristotle, Aqui- Many various signs—images, pho- nas, Bonaventura and some other authors tographs, pictures, sculptures, diagrams, are used here. The purpose, however, is graphical schemes, surface maps, city not the analysis and interpretation of these plans, etc.—may be viewed in terms of texts. The purpose is to propose a theory homomorphism. Therefore, developing of sign, inspired by the insights into the a model of sign as a homomorphism is classical texts; therefore, in some places an important task. Ambrosio (2010) has I purposefully deviate from their ideas. claimed that Peirce’s might be viewed The problem of the interpretation of clas- as a homomorphism. sical texts is considered in hermeneutics. The main object of this paper, hence, The reader’s intention might differ from is the sign as a homomorphism, or, more that of the author; interpretation, therefore, precisely, an ontologically defined sign as might also differ. a homomorphism. The paper consists of nine chapters: in- The approach of this paper aims to troduction (Chapter 1), an overview of the ground the account of sign in the theory of conceptions of sign (Chapter 2), analysis being and, in particular, to base the sign on and grounding of the approach (Chapter 3), the insights into Aristotle’s theory—hylo- derivation of the model of sign as a homo- morphism. The theory of being, however, morphism (Chapters 4—7), description of is a domain of philosophy, and it does not the relation of sign as a homomorphism to

115 Peirce’s conception of sign (Chapter 8), of signs, e.g., that of Peirce). In the lin- and conclusions (Chapter 9). guistic tradition, the is the signi- The text and the reference list of the fied. From the point of view of the logic paper are aimed to be compliant with the (Peirce’s tradition), the object is the signi- rules of the APA Publication Style. fied.T he in the latter case is treat- ed as a separate component of the sign: the 2. Sign Idea and Being . It should be added that ac- cording to Peirce, sign refers to its object; Logically, semiotics should start from the the object, therefore, could be viewed as a account of sign as its primary idea. Sign is . a complex phenomenon; therefore, in the To avoid the confusion of terms and to history of semiotics, there were various combine both positions, I suggest using approaches to its explanation. Theories the term “signified” only as an adjective in of sign make the most elaborated part of a phrase: the signified meaning, signified the modern semiotics. In this chapter, the concept, signified object, etc. In this paper, main conceptions of sign are analyzed in I will mostly use the term signified object. relation to the ontological approach of this paper. Peirce’s ideas are described sepa- 2.2. Approaches rately in more detail, because his approach is closest to that of this paper. A detailed overview of the models and def- The terms defining the situation of sign initions of sign provide, for example, Nöth should be defined first. (1995) in his extensive Handbook of Semi- otics and Sebeok (1986) in the Encyclope- 2.1. Defining the Sign dic Dictionary of Semiotics. In the present paper, sign is viewed in relation to being; The situation of sign (and the sequence of therefore, different conceptions of sign sign correlates) is often presented as fol- will be evaluated in this respect. Accord- lows: a) signifier, b) signified, c) referent. ing to the approach of this paper, I should Unfortunately, as Eco (1988) and Hébert start from Aristotle1. (2006) have noticed, there is no full agree- Aristotle considered sign in On Inter- ment on this . One of the problems pretation shortly: is related to the treatment of the signified. “Spoken words are of mental Although most often it is treated as the experience, and written words are symbols signified meaning or the signified concept, of spoken words. Just as all men have not the some authors view it as the signified ob- same , so all men have not the same ject, i.e. as a referent. Peirce used the term sounds, but the mental experiences, signified in relation to object. which these directly symbolize, are the same The confusion of terms possibly for all, as also are the things of which our experiences are the images“ (I, 1). emerged due to different positions of au- thors. There are two basic positions in modern semiotics: the view of linguistics 1 Several sources for quotations from Aristotle are used in this paper. They all are provided in the list of (or literary, cultural, e.g. that, of Saussure) references. A source can be determined according to the and the view of logic (or the general theory title of the essay.

116 Indirectly, the above quotation might to being: a sign (both its components) is a be treated as Aristotle’s conception of sign. mental being. It should be noted, however, It presents a blend of physical (the things that Saussure did not ground his account of of which our experiences are the images) sign in being. and mental (mental experiences) being. Peirce, the founder of semiotics of the This quotation in modern semiotics is of- twentieth century, proposed a very original ten viewed as the description of the triadic theory of sign. I describe Peirce’s model in model of sign. Aristotle did not treat sign the next section separately in more detail. in terms of being directly. Overall, he did Behaviorists presented a cardinally not contribute significantly to semiotics. different tradition in defining sign. They Poinsot directly viewed sign in terms attempted to externalize the sign and ana- of being. In his Tractatus de signis (Deely lyzed it in empirical terms. Morris, for and Powell, 1985), he viewed sign as a example, gave the following definition of special mode of being. Sign depends on sign: something else; therefore, it is a relational If A is a preparatory-stimulus that, in being. To put it in other terms, sign is an the absence of stimulus objects initiating intentional being. Many other representa- response-sequences of a certain behavior- tives of medieval and modern semiotics family, causes in some organism a disposi- claimed that sign stands for something tion to respond by response-sequences of this behavior-family, then A is a sign (Mor- else, and thus they admitted that sign is a ris, 1946/1971, pp. 105—106). relational being. In modern semiotics, two basic concep- The definition is based on the classi- tions of sign—Saussure’s and Peirce’s— cal scheme of stimulus and response (or, are considered most often. F. de Saussure action and reaction, more generally) com- (1916/1972) viewed signs in terms of lin- mon to . George H. Mead guistics; therefore, there were no place for started in 1922 the behaviorist tradition in the physical signified objects in his model. his paper A behaviorist account of the sig- was a basis relating the sig- nificant . nifier and the signified concept; this was Jakob von Uexküll extended the behav- a peculiarity of Saussure’s approach. It iorist approach to the definition of sign in might be noted that Saussure actually only his Theory of Meaning (Bedeutungslehre) reintroduced the ideas known already from (1982/1940). He viewed sign in terms of antiquity. Already Plato noticed that names the functional circle which relates organ- are conventional signs in : “I (…) ism to its environment (). The cannot convince myself that there is any functional circle might be treated in terms principle of correctness in names other of the action and reaction scheme. than convention and agreement”. Part Behaviorists introduced an entirely of the above Aristotle’s quotation corre- new branch to the theory of sign; its im- sponds to Saussure’s idea of sign: “Spoken portance, therefore, is even greater than words are symbols of mental experience...” the one of Peirce, which only continued (On Interpretation, I, 1). An important pe- the mentalist tradition in semiotics. The culiarity of Saussure’s sign is its relation behaviorist approach—as a direction in

117 —tended to ignore the internal sign. Hence, semioticians acknowledge the (mental) being. Behaviorists’s models of complexity of the idea of sign. Some con- sign, therefore, also had this peculiarity; ceptions differ entirely, e.g., the behaviorist this was a kind of opposition to the Sau- one; others have a certain similarity. Be- ssure’s and Peirce’s models. It might be havioral and mentalist (cognitive) concep- noted, however, that Uexküll’s functional tions make a certain opposition. None of circle, applied to Umwelt of the human or- the considered conceptions of sign includes ganism, might include both internal (men- all the rest. It should also be concluded that tal) and external (physical) being. none of the proposed conceptions of sign Klinkenberg (1996, as cited in Hébert, has resulted in developing a strict scientific 2006) proposed a four-component model theory of sign. Peirce proposed the most consisting of the stimulus, signifier, signi- profound theory and grounded it in being. fied, and referent. He described stimulus as According to the approach of this paper, the “... the perceptible physical element (e.g., idea of sign is also grounded in the theory a sound) that serves as the substrate in of being; therefore, his approach should be which the signifier is manifested” (Hébert, analyzed in more detail. 2006). Hébert (2006) further extended Klin­ 2.3. Peirce’s Conception of Sign kenberg’s model and described an even 2.3.1. Approach to Being more detailed (six-component) speculative model of sign: Peirce viewed being from the perspective “The main terms that enter into the defi- of subjective experience and treated it in nition of the sign are the following: (1) the terms of universal categories. He intro- stimulus (the physical signal being used, duced the categories in his paper On a New such as a vocal sound), (2) the signifier (the List of Categories (1984) after analyzing model, e.g., a , of which the stimu- several other philosophical systems, in- lus is a manifestation), (3) the signified (the cluding those of Kant and Aristotle. Hoff- meaning or content of the sign), the concept (the mental of the signified), mann (2001) described Peirce’s categories which is either (4) logical or (5) psychologi- as follows: cal, and (6) the referent (what we are talk- “For Peirce, categories are not, as for ing about when we use a particular sign) Aristotle, “modes of ,” but phe- (Hébert, 2006, para. 1). nomenological modes. The three categories The conceptions of sign proposed designate all possible modes something may by Klinkenberg and Hébert presented a appear to us. Thus, they are absolutely basic for Peirce’s and his semiotics mixed perspective of sign in relation to as well. To avoid misunderstandings, Peirce being: the stimulus was a physical being, names his categories simply “Firstness,” and the signified meaning (concept) was “Secondness,” and “Thirdness.” Something a mental being. may appear to us either as a “First, a “Sec- The following conclusions might be ond,” or a “Third”, there is no other possibil- ity (Hoffmann, 2001, para. 9). drawn to summarize this short overview of the conceptions of sign. Currently, The experience of reality for Peirce there exist several basic conceptions of begins from Firstness considered only in

118 respect to the ground which is “... a pure ness. More specifically, he presented sign abstraction, reference to which constitutes as a “triple connection of sign, a thing a or general attribute ...” (Peirce, signified, and produced in the 1984). He related the Secondness and the mind” (Peirce, 1984, Vol. 1, p. 372). He Thirdness accordingly to the correlate and also often used other names for the sign the interpretant. The correlate is an equiv- components: representamen for sign, ob- alent of other: “An other is plainly equiva- ject for the thing signified, and interpretant lent to a correlate” (ibid.); “... interpretant for cognition produced in the mind; the lat- (...) fulfils the office of an interpreter, who ter now is often treated as meaning. says that a foreigner says the same thing Graphically, the Peirce model of sign may which he himself says” (ibid.). There ex- be presented as a triangle (see Figure 1). ists a strict order among categories as their numerical names indicate and “no one Interpretant of the categories can be prescinded from those above it” (ibid.). To summarize, the categories were presented as follows: Firstness is a reference to a ground, Secondness is a reference to a correlate, and Representamen Object Thirdness is a reference to an interpre- tant. Figure 1. Graphical presentation of Peirce’s model of sign Peirce used also other names for the categories, in particular, quality for First- ness, relation for Secondness, and repre- Peirce has noted, however, that a trian- sentation for Thirdness. The categories, gle does not express fully the idea of sign nevertheless, remained difficult to under- as Thirdness. It gives only its dyadically stand for his contemporaries and followers degenerated image. because of their extreme generality. Marty (1997) has collected and ana- lyzed 76 definitions of sign in Peirce’s 2.3.2. Definition of Sign . Nöth (1995, p. 42) singled out Peirce related sign with the idea of thing: the following definition as the more elabo- rated one: “There are three kinds of interest we may take in a thing. First, we may have a primary “A sign, or representamen, is something interest in it for itself. Second, we may have which stands to somebody for something in a secondary interest in it, on account of its some respect or capacity. It addresses some- reactions with other things. Third, we may body, that is, creates in the mind of that per- have a mediatory interest in it, in so far as it son an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more conveys to a mind an idea about a thing. In developed sign. That sign which it creates I so far as it does this, it is a sign, or represen- call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign tation (Peirce, 1998, para. 2). stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in refer- Peirce placed sign in the framework of ence to a sort of idea (Peirce, 1931, Vol. 2, being by viewing it as a category of Third- § 228).

119 2.3.3. Limitations of Peirce’s Theory nition and classification of signs. It pro- of Sign vides only a limited possibility to produce new semiotic constructions. Peirce’s account of sign, as any other theo- Despite its limitations, Peirce’s semi- ry, has certain limitations. otics remains the most significant modern Peirce’s account might not be viewed as contribution to the philosophical theory of a general theory of sign despite the fact that sign. It is probably the best project of this it is usually treated as the general one. Al- kind, proposed so far. though it is more general as compared, for example, with Saussure’s approach, over- 2.4. Sign as Ontological all it does not embrace all the complexity Homomorphism of the phenomenon of sign. In particular, it Homomorphism is the key idea and the does not give a behavioral account of sign main object of investigation of the present (as Morris and Uexküll treated it). Peirce’s paper. theory is essentially a mentalist one. Homomorphism is a term of the Greek Peirce’s theory provides only a triadic origin (homos means same, similar, and model of sign; however, there can be other morphê means shape). Sign as homomor- options, too. The triadicity is a ground of phism, therefore, etymologically is a sign Peirce’s semiotics. His model is the same defined as similarity, resemblance of form. for the whole variety of signs. Different Not all signs can be viewed as homomor- levels of sign complexity are ignored. Ad- phisms; therefore, the term should be used mitting the essentially triadic character to denote a of signs. of sign, different levels of its complexity The term of homomorphism is used in should be employed; the model, hence, various domains of science, and its defini- might be monadic, dyadic, triadic, etc. Hé- tion is not exactly the same. bert (2006), in particular, singled out up to provides its strictest definition. In semiot- six correlates of sign. ics, homomorphism can be defined in two Peirce did not provide a clear definition alternative ways (Figure 2): syntagmati- of sign in terms of being. He only claimed cally, when one sign is viewed as a homo- morphism of another one, and paradigmat- that sign should be viewed in terms of the ically, when a sign is viewed as a homo- category of Thirdness. The latter, however, morphism of the signified object. In this is a primary idea in his ontology and, there- paper, only the latter way is considered. fore, defined only in a descriptive way. The term of homomorphism is rarely Peirce’s classification of signs does not used in semiotics. Goguen (1999) and cover all the complexity of the idea of sign. Harrell (Goguen & Harrell, 2003), in par- The definitions of some types of signs are ticular, considered syntagmatic homomor- deficient. In particular, Peirce’s classifica- phism, whereas Reichardt (2003) viewed tion does not allow discriminating between paradigmatic homomorphism. the formal and the material signs. The term sign as a homomorphism I Peirce’s semiotics has only a limited will use interchangeably with the term ho- productivity. It ends, in fact, with the defi- momorphic sign.

120 Signified object

Paradigmatic axis Paradigmatic homomorphism

Syntagmatic axis Other sign Sign

Syntagmatic homomorphism Figure 2. Homomorphism in semiotics. Illustration of between paradigmatic and syntagmatic definition of the semiotic homomorphism

Roots of the modern idea of homomor- 3.1. On Application of Aristotle’s phism I back to Aristotle. I suggest Theory of Being grounding the idea of homomorphism in Aristotle considered being in two different his theory of being. Hence, I will consider ways. In Categories, he treated it linguisti- an ontologically defined homomorphism. cally and gave a list of ten categories—the I suggest shortly calling it an ontologi- most general predicates describing being. cal homomorphism. The latter, due to its In Metaphysics, he defined being ontologi- grounding in the theory of being, is the cally, that is, being as being. The latter he most fundamental conception of homo- accounted for in terms of two metaphysi- morphism as compared to its other concep- cal principles—matter and form. The two tions in sciences. terms cannot be strictly defined; Aristotle chose hulê (it means wood in Greek and 3. Sign and Aristotle’s corresponds to matter in ) to denote Theory of Being the first principle, and shape (morphê in Greek, form in Latin) to denote the second The theory of being is chosen in this one. His theory, accordingly, was denoted paper to ground the idea of sign. Its roots by a compound term hylomorphism—mat- descend to the antiquity when the know­ ter-formism (also spelled hylemorphism). ledge of reality was not split into thou- It should be noted that the meaning of the sands of directions. Aristotle proposed one form should not be limited to its geometri- of the most influential accounts of being. cal treatment as a shape. It may have many It allows accounting for cognition as an different interpretations; in particular, Ar- ingredient part of reality. In particular, he istotle treated it also as a function when provided an ontological account of the per- noting that vision is a form of the eye, as ception used in this paper to introduce the Green described (1998). The matter might sign as a homomorphism. also be treated as the content.

121 The form and matter as two primary as symmetric: I take matter and form as ideas might be viewed as a binary principle equally important parts in the individua- for the articulation of being. The universal- tion of an object. ity of the binary approach in the treatment Essays of Aristotle on being, as any of reality was also claimed by Leibnitz. other ancient texts, are a subject of inter- Later, in the twentieth century, the binary pretation. Now we have an opportunity principle was implemented in the funda- to compare the ideas of Aristotle with the mentals of information technologies. heritage of other philosophers and to place The doctrine of hylomorphism flour- them in the context of contemporary sci- ished until the Renaissance. A similar idea ence. From my point of view, Aristotle’s of treating things as a conjunction of form hylomorphism might be viewed as a binary and content is common in modern times. of being—and of reality on the Some skeptics, however, acknowledge whole. Form and matter are the two prin- now only the historical of hylomor- ciples applied for the articulation of being. phism. Leibnitz later provided the mathematical For description of sign as a homomor- description of the binary principle. In the phism, I take the basic idea of Aristotle to twentieth century, the binary principle was describe being in terms of form and matter. implemented in the idea of information. I do not consider deeper ideas—the pri- It might be added that in this paper Ar- mordial matter and the quantified matter istotle’s hylomorphism is used as an alter- (materia signata). I do not include paral- native to the Peirce’s approach to being. lel ideas—actuality (actus) and potential- ity (potentia)—in treating being; the latter 3.2. Aristotle’s Theory of Perception two, together with form and matter, make I will base the definition of sign in Aris- the four causes of being in the theory of totle’s theory of perception; therefore, this Aristotle. Actuality and potentiality allow theory should be described in brief. defining the dynamical aspect of being. Aristotle based his account of percep- Hence, I consider only the part of hylo- tion and cognition on his theory of being. morphism, necessary for the account of the According to Aristotle, in perception, the homomorphic sign. A fuller scope of hylo- form of a thing is abstracted (detached, morphism should be employed in further separated) from the thing perceived. The developments; analysis of actuality and perceiver in this way obtains ideas (forms) potentiality, in particular, might be used of things. The forms then are used in the for building dynamical models of sign and mind of the perceiver instead of things: its interpretation. “…. it is not the stone which is present in I do not follow Aristotle literally. Some the soul, but its form” (On the Soul, III, 8). ideas of this paper probably cannot be rec- This idea is sometimes termed as Aristo- onciled with Aristotle’s hylomorphism. tle’s theory of abstraction. The role of form and matter in treating in- Aristotle illustrated his account of per- dividuation makes one of the main differ- ception by comparing it with an impres- ences. My approach is closer to the one of sion of a signet ring in wax. In his essay Bonaventura and might be characterized On the Soul, he wrote:

122 “By “sense” is meant what has the power phism, might be a more appropriate one. of receiving into itself the sensible forms I start from describing the place of the ob- of things without matter. This must be con- ject in philosophy and semiotics. ceived as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without iron or gold; we say that 4.1. Object in Semiotics what produces the impression is a signet of and Philosophy bronze or gold, but its particular metallic substance makes no difference: in a similar The signified object in semiotics is often way, a sense is affected by what is coloured viewed as a primary idea requiring no defi- or flavoured, or sounding, but it is indiffer- nition. ent to what in each case the substance is; Pierce did not focus his attention on what only matters is the quality it has, i.e. the definition of the object and simply de- in what ratio its constituents are combined” (II, 12). scribed it as follows: “By an object, I mean anything that we can think of, i.e. anything Aristotle did not propose a full theory we can talk about.” (Peirce, not dated). of sign. Barnouw noticed that the theory Generally, the object in semiotics is might have been grounded in the account usually viewed in relation to the perceiver; of perception (Reynolds, 2006): then it might be termed a perceived object “Aristotle himself could have avoided the (see Figure 3). deficiency if he had developed more com- pletely his theory of sign and had connected Perceiver Perceived it to his analysis of perception (p. 99). object An attempt to ground the sign in Aris- totle’s theory of perception is made in this Perception paper. Figure 3. Object in the scheme of perception, viewed from the point of view of semiotics 4. Definition of theS ignified Object Semiotics usually starts with the definition The treatment of the object in semiotics of sign. The signified object, however, is a cannot be separated from its wider context. more primary idea, and therefore it should In the theory of knowledge, the object is be defined first. treated as an object known to its knower. The definition of the object is not a In phenomenology, the object is viewed in simple problem in philosophy. King (2000) relation to the intentional act; the latter is described the general problem of object- considered as directedness of the subject hood. He noted, in particular, that a great toward the object. part of modern science defines an object as a of properties. This mechanistic ap- 4.2. Hylomorphic Definition proach prevailed during the last centuries of the Object and provided a powerful tool for sciences; its usefulness for semiotics, however, is The object can be defined using the hylo- not evident. I will demonstrate here that an morphic approach as a conjunction of its alternative approach, based on hylomor- form and matter.

123 Considering the relation between form gives actual being (actum essendi) to the and matter, Aquinas in Summa Theologi- matter. Therefore, in the case of creatures, ca2 notes that matter in determining a par- individuation arises from a double principle (Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 3 pars 1 . 2 q. 3 ticular thing is made finite by form, and resp. (Vol. II, 109b—110a), as cited in King, vice versa: 2000). “Now matter is in a way made finite by Bonaventure’s idea on individuation form, and the form by matter. Matter, indeed, is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, visually might be presented as shown in before it receives its form, is in potentiality Figure 4. of many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by it. Again, form is made finite Something Particular by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in Form thing itself, is common to many objects; but when embodied in matter, a form is ascribed to this Matter particular thing” (ST, part 1, q.7, a. 1). I suggest viewing the object in terms of This individuation. Aristotle and Aquinas con- Figure 4. Visual presentation of sidered only one component (matter) as Bonaventure’s approach to the individuation the principle of individuation. According of a particular thing treated as a conjunction to the approach of this paper, I will fol- of its form (something) and matter (this) low Bonaventure’s approach based on two ideas—form and matter. He described how the individuality of a thing emerges from 5. The Cartesian System and the conjunction of its form and matter: Determination of the Signified “Individuation arises from the actual Object conjunction of matter with form, and from The described philosophical account of in- this conjunction each appropriates the other dividuation gives only general guidelines to itself—just as it is clear that when an im- pression or stamping of many seals on wax for the definition of the object. For its more which previously was one takes place, nei- detailed account, I suggest employing the ther the seals can be made many without the system of Cartesian coordinates. Further, I wax, nor is the wax enumerated except be- will also use it as the major tool in describ- cause diverse seals come about in it. Still, if ing models of sign in this paper. you were to ask from which [individuation] comes principally, it should be stated that an individual is a this-something. That it is 5.1. The Cartesian System for Being this, it has more principally from the matter, In on Method, Descartes (1637) by reason of which the form has a location in space and time. That it is something, it proposed a coordinate system for space has from the form. An individual has be- (see Figure 5). The system introduced ing (esse) and also has existence (existere). quantitative into geometry. It Matter gives existence to the form, but form proved to be a powerful tool for mathemat- ics, physics and other domains of science 2 An abbreviation ST for Summa Theologica is fur- ther used. Description of the works by Aquinas is pro- during the last few centuries. There were vided in the list of references. also attempts to use it in semiotics; Marti-

124 Y privation of form or matter, respectively. Individual, That is, they do not imply any quantitative point (x, y) relations, such as more or less of form and II I -X X matter. The numbering of the quadrants might III IV naturally start from the one determined by the presence of matter and the privation of -Y form (see Figure 6). Such order implies that matter is viewed as an initial mode in Figure 5. The Cartesian coordinate system determining being. Another order might for space also be used and grounded ontologically. The term privation needs an additional nelli (2008), in particular, used it to articu- explanation. Privation is not the same as late the idea of musical authenticity. absence. Aristotle gave the following ex- Royce (1951) suggested that a point in ample: a blind man has a privation of the the space might be treated in terms of in- ability to see. It cannot be said that a stone dividuation. The Cartesian system, hence, has the privation of vision, because it has might be viewed as a tool for the individu- no eyes. It should be noted that Aristo- ation of points in space. tle and Aquinas used it only in relation to I suggest applying the Cartesian sys- form, but not matter. Privation of matter is tem for the articulation of being. Matter also considered in this paper. and form might be viewed as two axes, The described system of coordinates and their intersection makes the system for being might also be called the system of coordinates (see Figure 6). The pair of of ontological or hylomorphic coordi- form and matter then makes an entity (be- nates. These terms further will be used in- ing). The system should be treated in terms terchangeably. of structure, and not quantity. The arrows on its axes indicate only the presence or 5.2. Determination of the Top-level Modes of Being Form The system of coordinates for being can be used to determine the most general modes of being and relations among them Privation III II (Budrevičius, 2006). The thing is one of of matter Matter them. It will be used further as a ground IV I for the definition of object. The intersection of matter and form axes in the system of ontological coordi- Privation nates creates four corresponding quadrants. of form Each of them is determined as a compound of form, matter or their corresponding pri- Figure 6. The coordinate system for being vations. Each quadrant can be interpreted

125 Form 5.3. Determination of the Object The above system of coordinates for being Some-thing Thing might be used for the determination of the immaterial object. Privation of Matter I suggest viewing the object as an indi- matter viduated thing. For this purpose, I suggest No-thing Some-thing applying the earlier described approach of material Bonaventura to individuation. A particular thing then can be defined as a conjunction Privation of concrete matter and concrete form cre- of form ating its individuality (see Figure 8). The Figure 7. Presentation of the top-level modes object then might be viewed as a particu- of being in the system of hylomorphic lar thing or, more generally, as a class of coordinates particular things. In the latter case, a set of matter and form pairs would be em- ployed. as a basic mode of being as shown in Figure 7. Form The first mode corresponds to the thing—a compound of form and matter. It occupies the first quadrant and presents Object a fully determined being. The other three modes are not fully determined (or fully Matter undetermined), because they lack either form or matter, or both. In our common Figure 8. Individuation of the object language, we denote the partly determined considered in terms of the system modes by the word something; its relation of ontological coordinates with the thing can be more clearly seen by spelling it as some-thing. The latter It should be noted that the system of is either an immaterial some-thing when ontological coordinates introduced in this it corresponds to the mode determined paper provides only a structural but not by the presence of form and privation of quantitative individuation of the object; matter, or a material some-thing when it the Cartesian system for space provides a is determined by the privation of form quantitative individuation. and presence of matter. The fully unde- The determination of the object might termined mode may be termed as nothing be viewed as a final result in the sequence (no-thing), because it is described in terms of determinations started from the two of the privation of both form and matter. It metaphysical principles—form and mat- should be noted that the words something ter. The latter might be viewed as deter- and nothing might also be interpreted in minants, or constituents, of determination. a different way; here, I gave only one of The sequence of determinations is summa- their natural meanings. rized in Table 1.

126 Table 1. Sequence of determination of being from indetermination to object No. Determinants Description Result 1. Form or matter Indetermination Material or formal indetermination 2. Form and matter Determination of being Thing, being in general generally 3. Substantial form and Individuation according Particular thing matter to Bonaventura Form, matter, and their Determination of Object, particular thing, and three corresponding privations being by means of the partially determined entities system of ontological coordinates

5.4. Evaluation of the System is more clearly defined, or rather determined, of Ontological Coordinates by the representative presence of additional notes or determining forms” (ibid.). The introduced system of ontological coor- This quotation also shows that forms dinates will be used as the main instrument can be a means for the determination of for developing the models of sign in this being. It might be added that, according paper; therefore, its peculiarities should be to the approach of present paper, matter is analyzed in more detail. also used as a determining factor. 5.4.1. Being as Transcendence and a System of Ontological Coordinates 5.4.2. Limitations of the System of Ontological Coordinates The introduced system of ontological co- ordinates discriminates among four modes The system of coordinates allows present- of being. The discrimination might seem ing only a static view of being. The latter to create a contradiction if being is treated might be termed Cartesian being, taking as a transcendental idea: the latter cannot into account its basis—the Cartesian sys- be logically divided. Harper (1879) puts tem of coordinates. Treated in terms of it as follows: “You can never escape from structure, the system gives only a logical being within the sphere of reality: yet be- projection of being. More profound logical ing cannot be its own divisor” (Chapter means should be used to treat being more II, Prolegomenon I). There is no contra- fully, including its dynamical aspect. Log- diction, however, because the coordinate ic, overall, cannot fully describe being; it system does not divide being; it only de- is incapable of treating being as a transcen- fines its different determinations. Harper dental idea. It should be noted that the Car- describes determinations of being in the tesian system of coordinates for space has following way: similar limitations: it does not fully present the idea of Space and gives only its logical “Nevertheless, Being admits of what may be called classifications; and these quasi (and quantitative) projection. classifications are called its determinations. The proposed system of coordinates But why? Because one and the same object is insufficient for the definition of sign,

127 because it allows determining only non- wax as the medium for presenting the sign, relational being; the latter is defined as a and the impress of the signet in the wax conjunction of form and matter and does as the sign itself. The model of sign will not depend on any other being. The sign, be viewed in terms of the superimposition however, stands for something else; there- of the signified object (i.e. the signet) on fore, it is a relational being. Further, I will the medium (i.e. the lump of wax). The demonstrate that for the definition of sign, system of hylomorphic coordinates will be three components (one form and two in- employed for considering the model. The stances of matter) are necessary. Corre- components of sign will be presented using spondingly, a more advanced system of separate systems of coordinates. The sign, coordinates should be used. however, is an indivisible being; therefore, Despite the described limitations, the all components of the sign further should proposed combination of Aristotle’s hylo- be presented in one system of coordinates. morphism and the Cartesian system of co- It will be shown that the homomor- ordinates gives a new and productive idea. phism under consideration should be The latter still might be viewed as an on- called indeterminate, because the relation tological construction. It partly retains the between the signified object and the sign is philosophical depth of Aristotle’s theory, not explicitly considered in its model. but also it possesses the logical strictness of the Cartesian system of coordinates. 6.2. Model of the Signified Object The signet and the lump of wax might be 6. Derivation of the Model of Sign viewed as two particular things (individual as Indeterminate Homomorphism entities). For concreteness, I will consider 6.1. Rationale a signet made of gold with the embossed image of a crown on it (see Figure 9). I suggest using the following rationale to derive the model of sign as homomor- phism. Form: crown Aristotle’s account of the perception described earlier in this paper will be em- Signet ployed. Aristotle compared perception (crown) with the process when “a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet ring” (On Matter: gold the Soul, II, 12). In terms of hylomorphism, the process might be described as follows: the wax takes on the form of the signet. Figure 9. The signet as an object presented in The signet ring is meant for making signs; the system of ontological coordinates therefore, it is natural to view its impress in the wax as a sign. Three related compo- nents of sign might be singled out in this The lump of wax is also a particular situation: the signet ring with an embossed thing, and it can be determined similarly, image as the signified object, the lump of as Figure 10 illustrates.

128 Form of the wax: lump while presenting the sign, but its matter re- mains the same. The wax, therefore, is a material medium used for the presentation Lump of wax of sign. The situation can be described more Matter: wax strictly in terms of the system of ontologi- cal coordinates. The relation of subordina- tion existing in the system might be em- Figure 10. The lump of wax as a particular ployed for this purpose. The relation, in thing presented in the system of ontological particular, exists between the first and the coordinates second quadrant: the second quadrant is subordinated to the first one, because the In the above situation of the sign, the second quadrant has a privation of matter, signet is the signified object, and the lump while the first one has both components of wax is the medium (or vehicle) for the (form and matter). On this ground, a thing, presentation of the sign; therefore, in terms technically, can be transformed into a me- of being, they should be treated differently. dium by means of moving it from the first quadrant into the second one. Graphically, 6.3. Model of the Sign Medium this transformation can be implemented by rotating the system of coordinates as I suggest viewing the difference between shown in Figure 11. the sign medium and the signified object in terms of subordination in being: the me- 6.4. Sign as a Superimposition of the dium should be viewed as a subordinate Signified Object on the Sign Medium being in relation to the signified object. It should be noted, however, that the medi- According to the earlier defined rationale, um—the lump of wax—is subordinated model of sign can be viewed in terms of to the signet in relation only to its form, superimposition of the system of ontologi- but not matter, because wax loses its form cal coordinates for the signified object (i.e.

Form Form

180º Wax as a Wax as a medium particular thing

a) b)

Matter Matter

Figure 11. Transformation of a thing into a medium by rotating the system of ontological coordinates; an example: a) wax as a particular thing; b) wax as a subordinate particular thing (the medium)

129 the signet) on the subordinated system Form for the medium (i.e. the lump of wax as medium). Graphically, the process of su- perimposition is illustrated in Figure 12. Impress Object (sign) Its result is a compound of two dissimilar instances of matter and one common form Matter Matter (see Figure 13). I suggest viewing the re- sult as a complex being. Some Aristotle’s Figure 13. Ontological diagram of commentators use the term conformity (or indeterminate homomorphism. Two opposite conformality) to denote the common form. arrows on the axis of abscissa indicate A complex being then might be called con- formism; this term, however, has another the dissimilarity of matter of the signified ; therefore, I propose using the object and of the sign term homomorphism, which has the Greek origin. I suggest calling its graphical pre- The following definition of sign can be sentation an ontological (or hylomorphic) formulated now, using the idea of homo- diagram of homomorphism. morphism: Sign is a being that has its own matter and the form of the signified object, Common (similar) form but it has no matter of the object.

Crown 7. Intentional Determination Crown of Being and Sign The described model of homomorphism is Impress Signet (sign) based on the idea of the similarity of form Gold and dissimilarity of matter. This basis, how- ever, does not provide a full determination of homomorphism, because the direction

Wax of representation is not explicitly defined. It should be noted that the terms signified Dissimilar matter object and sign, used in the description of Figure 12. Superimposition of the system sign as a homomorphism, naturally imply of ontological coordinates for the signified the existence of the direction of determi- object (signet) on the subordinated system of nation. To make the model of homomor- coordinates for the medium (wax) phism more precise, the direction should be made explicit. The described homomorphism should There can be two directions of deter- be called indeterminate, because the re- mination. I will analyze them, taking for lation between the signified object and illustration again Aristotle’s account of the sign is not explicitly considered in its perception. model.

130 7.1. Physical Determination physical world and sciences (Naturwissen- and the Sign schaften). It is not common to consider physical Aristotle compared perception with a phys- processes in semiotics. Nevertheless, I ical process when “a piece of wax takes on propose including the analysis of physical the impress of a signet ring” (On the Soul, sign into the scope of semiotics. Such type II, 12). The impress in the wax, hence, is of sign also might be called a mark. Here, made by exerting a physical force on the I have considered only one type of physi- signet. The force is directed from the sig- cal signs – a physical sign as a homomor- net (object) toward the wax; the result is phism. an impress in the wax—a sign. I suggest calling it a physical sign. Its ontological 7.2. Intentional Determination diagram is shown in Figure 14. of the Sign Form Generally, Aristotle viewed cognition as a process directed from the subject toward Force the object. The directedness from the sub- Sign Object ject toward the object in contemporary cog- nitive science and philosophy is viewed in Matter Matter terms of intentionality. Sense perception, as a lower grade of cognition, can also be viewed using the idea of intentionality. Figure 14. Ontological diagram of physical Sign as a homomorphism is based on the sign as homomorphism process of perception; therefore, it also can be viewed in terms of intentionality. Such a sign then should be called an intentional A physical sign is an objective sign sign; it implements intentionality as the causally related to the signified object. It directedness from the sign (perceiver) to- does not depend on its perceiver; therefore, ward the signified object (see Figure 15). the term of an objective perceiver or an ob- Form server is more suitable in this situation. A physical sign as a homomorphism might be also described in semantic terms. Sign Object In hermeneutics, Dilthey proposed dis- criminating between understanding (ver- stehen) and explanation (erklaeren) as two types of interpretation (Dilthey, 1989). Matter of sign Matter of object The physical sign then should be treated in terms of explanation. The phenomenon Figure 15. Ontological diagram of understanding belongs to the mental of intentional sign as homomorphism. world and humanities (Geisteswissen- The arrow from sign toward object indicates schaften), while explanation belongs to the intentionality as directedness

131 I suggest viewing intentionality as the Approaches to the treatment of being, how- key idea in defining sign as a homomor- ever, differ significantly. Peirce treats it in phism. It also determines the type of its terms of his universal categories; in this meaning: the latter may accordingly be paper, being is treated in terms of Aristo- termed as an immediate, direct, literal, ref- tle’s theory (more precisely, the latter has erential, partially deliberate, partially sub- been modified as described earlier in this jective, etc. paper). Peirce treats being and sign in terms 8. Sign as Homomorphism of subjective experience, as it can be con- in the Context of Peirce’s Semiotics cluded, for example, from his seminal pa- per What is a sign? Intentional sign as a In the beginning of this paper, I have pro- homomorphism in this paper is also viewed vided a short overview of semiotic re- in terms of subjectively treated being. The search related to the theories of sign. Now, physical sign as a homomorphism, however, approaching its end, I have a possibility to is viewed in terms of the objectively treated make the relation more concrete. being. Hence, the approach to the definition In this chapter, I shortly compare the of sign in this paper encompasses both its model of sign as a homomorphism with subjective and objective treatments. Pierce’s idea of sign. Sign as a homomorphism has no com- ponent corresponding to Peirce’s inter- 8.1. Differences from Peirce’s pretant. Strictly speaking, sign as a ho- Approach momorphism is a non-interpreted sign. It The described idea of sign as a homomor- encompasses only an immediate meaning; phism differs significantly from the one of the latter might be viewed as an interpreta- Pierce’s. Nevertheless, there are also cer- tion of the signified object. tain similarities. Here, I shortly analyze three aspects in the treatment of sign: rela- 8.2. Relation to Peirce’s tion to being, subjectivity objectiv- Classification of Signs ity, and interpretation of sign. Sign as a homomorphism is based on its Sign as a homomorphism, similarly as relation with the signified object; therefore, Peirce’s sign, is defined in terms of being. it might be compared to the sign viewed

Table 2. The place of sign as homomorphism in Peirce’s classification

Category II. Of relation to object Degree of Similarity of form: Similarity of matter: similarity homomorphism homomaterialism Firstness Highest Formal icon (e.g., photo) Material icon (e.g., idol) Secondness Medium Formal index (e.g., ‘M’ as Material index (e.g., size of dress) weathervane, smoke) Thirdness Lowest (no Formal symbol (e.g., @ ) Material symbol (e.g., similarity) wedding ring)

132 in relation to the object in Peirce’s clas- The following general definition of sification. Each sign in the classification sign as (ontological) homomorphism is should be split into a pair of the sign of proposed: form and the sign of matter; sign as a ho- 1. Sign is a complex mode of being, momorphism then might be compared (see resulting from the composition of Table 2) with the sign of form, and sign as two simple modes—the signified homomaterialism, accordingly, might be object and the sign medium, both viewed as its counterpart. Hence, instead consisting of their own form and of one index in the classification, there matter. should be a pair of the formal index and 2. Sign should be considered in terms the material index; similarly, there should of three ontological components: be pairs of the formal and material sym- two instances of dissimilar matter bols and icons, respectively. and one form which is common (similar) for the signified object and 9. Conclusions for the medium. A sign as a homomorphism is an inten- The present paper demonstrates that the tional being for its perceiver. Intentionality basic ideas of Aristotle’s theory of being should be viewed as one of the key ideas in and cognition can be used in developing the theory of sign. the theory of sign. The sign, as well as oth- The proposed model of sign has certain er aspects of reality, can be treated in terms limitations. Firstly, it considers sign only of form and matter (content). Aristotle’s in terms of form, leaving aside its alterna- theory of form and matter is further devel- tive—matter. A model of sign as a similar- oped and modified by means of merging it ity of matter should also be developed as with the logic of the system of Cartesian a counterpart for the sign as a homomor- coordinates. The latter introduces more phism. strictness in the articulation of being, treat- Another important limitation of the pro- ed in terms of hylomorphism. Limitations posed account of sign is related to the aspi- of the merging are discussed. A model of ration to treat the phenomenon of sign by the ontological diagram is proposed on the using only two principles of being—form basis of a conjunction of Aristotle’s and and matter. They present only the static Descartes’s ideas. It allows constructing aspect of Aristotle’s theory. Correspond- and presenting model of sign in a new way, ingly, they could explain only static phe- which is stricter than the graphical means nomena in semiotics. In particular, form traditionally used in semiotics (e.g., sign and matter directly are not applicable and triangle). insufficient as the basis for the account of The proposed account of sign shows the behavioral aspect of sign. Limitations that all its ingredients—the signified ob- related to statics, however, might be over- ject, the sign medium, and the sign itself— come by supplementing the theory with can be derived using elementary ontologi- two other principles of Aristotle’s hylo- cal ideas. No other theory in semiotics pro- morphism, namely the actus and potentia, vides such a possibility. implementing the dynamical aspect of be-

133 ing. It should be also noted that Aristotle’s toward developing a fundamental theory hylomorphism has its limitations. They of sign. The path is rooted in antiquity. In- were not analyzed, because the purpose of sights into Aristotle’s account of being and this paper is not the analysis and evalua- cognition allowed uncovering the path. tion of Aristotle’s theory. The undertaken approach, however, was The results of this paper might be re- not limited to philosophy. The application garded as a little step towards developing of the Cartesian system allowed describing a strict and precise general quantitative the sign in a stricter and more precise way. theory of sign. This paper, therefore, might be regarded as Overall, this paper might be considered an attempt to introduce the methodology as a description of an earlier unnoticed path of exact sciences into semiotics.

References AQUINAS (2008). The summa theologica of St. ten]. In Michael Neville (Trans.), R. A. Makkreel & . Second and revised edition. Liter- F. Rodi (eds.). Wilhelm Dilthey selected works. Vol. 1. ally translated by fathers of the English Dominican Princeton: Princeton University Press. Province. Online edition by Kevin Knight: http:// ECO, U. (1988). Le signe. Brussels: Labor. www.newadvent.org/summa/100701.htm GOGUEN, J. A. (1999). An introduction to al- AQUINAS. De anima. Aquinas’ commentary on gebraic semiotics, with applications to user interface Aristotle’s De anima [On the Soul] as In Libros De design. In C. Nehaniv (ed.). Computation for meta- Anima Expositio, c. 1268. phors, and agents. In Lecture Notes in Artifi- AMBROSIO, C. (2010). From similarity to ho- cial Intelligence, Vol. 1562, p. 242–291. momorphism: toward pragmatic account of repre- GOGUEN, J. A. & Harrell D. F. (2003). Infor- sentation in art and science, 1880–1914. University mation visualization and semiotic morphisms. Re- College London. Manuscript submitted for publica- trieved from http:// www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/goguen/ tion. Retrieved from http: http://philsci-archive.pitt. papers/sm/vzln.html edu/4825/1/Ambrosio_SPSP.pdf GREEN, C. D. (1998). The thoroughly modern ARISTOTLE (1941). On interpretation. In E.M. Aristotle: Was he really a functionalist? History of Edghill (trans.), R. McKeon (ed.). The basic works of Psychology, 1, 8–20. Aristotle. New York: Random House. GREIMAS, A. J. (1970). Du sens. Essais sémi- ARISTOTLE (1994). Metaphysics. Book Z and otique. Paris: Seuil. H, and commentary D. Bostock. Claren- HÉBERT, L. (2006). Sign Structures. The Sign don Aristotle series. Oxford: Clarendon Press. according to Klinkenberg. Signo. Retrieved from ARISTOTLE. On the soul. Retrieved from http:// http://www.signosemio.com psychclassics.yorku.ca/Aristotle/De-anima/index.htm HOFFMANN, M. H. G. (2001). The 1903 clas- BUDREVIČIUS, A. (2006). Informacija ir esa- sification of triadic sign-relations. In J. Queiroz (ed.). tis Aristotelio ir Tomo Akviniečio minčių kontekste. Digital encyclopedia of Ch. S. Peirce. Retrieved from [Information and being in the context of ideas of http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/hoffmann/ Aristotle and Aquinas]. Informacijos mokslai, 38, p-sighof.htm p. 122–134. [In Lithuanian]. HARPER, T. (1879). The metaphysics of the DEELY, J. (trans. and ed.) & POWELL, R. A. school. London: Macmillan and Co. Retrieved from (1985/1632). Tractatus de signis. The semiotic of http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/tmots012.htm John Poinsot (bilingual edition). Berkeley: Univer- KING, P. (2000). The problem of individuation sity of California Press. in the middle ages. Theoria, 66, 159–184. DEELY, J. (2004). Basics of semiotics. Bloom- KUHN, T. (1962). The structure of scientific rev- ington & Indianapolis: St. Augustine’s Press. olutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. DILTHEY, W. (1989/1883). Introduction to hu- LOCKE, J. Of the division of the sciences, man sciences [Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaf- Chapter XXI. In An essay concerning human un-

134 derstanding. Retrieved from http://carbon.cudenver. PEIRCE, Ch. S. (not dated). Reflections on real edu/~mryder/itc_data/locke.html and unreal objects. Manuscript MS 966. MARTY, R. (1997). 76 Definitions of the sign by PLATO. Cratylus. Retrieved from http:// C. S. Peirce (Department of Mathematics, University www.4literature.net/Plato/Cratylus/ of Perpignan). Retrieved from http://robert.marty. KLINKENBERG, J.-M. (1996). Le sens et sa de- perso.cegetel.net/semiotique/76defeng.htm scription, pp. 92–100. Précis de sémiotique générale. MORRIS, Ch. W. (1946). Signs, language and Paris: Seuil. behavior (pp. 73–398). In Writings on the general REICHARDT, J. (2003). Semiotic aspects of the theory of signs. The Hague: Mouton. grid calculus. Part I: Terminology and models. Tech. MARTINELLI, D. (2008). Music identity and Rep. Darmstadt: University of Applied Sciences, the strange case of authenticity. Lietuvos muzikologi- Department. ja [ in Lithuania], 9, 122–130. REYNOLDS, J. J. (2006, May 17). [Review of the NÖTH, W. (1995). Handbook of semiotics. book Propositional perception: Phantasia, predication Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University and sign in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, by Barnouw, Press. J.]. Bryn Mawr Classical Review. Retrieved from PEIRCE, Ch. S. (1931–1958). Collected papers http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2006/2006-05-17.html Vols. 1–8. Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. ROYCE, J. (1951). Individual. Chapter 4, PEIRCE, Ch. S. (1984–1868). On a new list of p. 139–145. In Daniel S. Robinson (Ed.), Royce’s categories. In The writings of Charles S. Peirce, Vols. Logical Essays: Collected logical essays of Josiah 1–2. Indiana University Press. Also available online Royce. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm C. Brown Co. [Original- http://www.peirce.org/writings/p32.html] ly published in J. M. Baldwin (Ed.), The dictionary of PEIRCE, Ch. S. (1998). What is a sign? In Peirce philosophy and psychology, New York: MacMillan Edition Project (ed.). The essential Peirce. Selected Company (1901)] philosophical writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913). Bloom- SAUSSURE, F. (1972). Cours de linguistique ington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. générale. Paris: Payot. Also available online http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/ SEBEOK, T. (Ed.). (1986). Encyclopedic dic- collier/308/Peirce/What%20Is%20a%20Sign_.pdf tionary of semiotics (Vols. 1–3).

Aristotelio esaties teorijos semiotinės įžvalgos Algirdas Budrevičius Santrauka Pagrindinis šio straipsnio tyrimo dalykas yra ženklas forma ir materija (medžiaga). Dėstomo požiūrio kaip žymimojo objekto homomorfizmas – tai yra žen- ypatumas semiotikos atžvilgiu yra tas, kad ženklas klas kaip formos panašumas. Pagrindinis tikslas – su- ir žymimasis objektas traktuojami kaip išvestinės kurti ženklo kaip homomorfizmo modelį, kuris būtų sąvokos; jos konstruojamos kaip formos ir materi- griežtos, pamatinės ženklo teorijos pradinė dalis. jos junginiai. Siekiant, kad modelis būtų griežtes- Daug įvairių ženklų gali būti nagrinėjami kaip ho- nis, jam sudaryti naudojama Dekarto koordinačių momorfizmai: fotografijos, paveikslai, skulptūros, sistema, pritaikyta esaties artikuliavimui. Homomor- diagramos, žemėlapiai ir kt. Pasiūlytas homomor- finio ženklo apibrėžimo kertine laikoma intenciona- finio ženklo modelis išvestas naudojant Aristotelio lumo sąvoka. Straipsnyje pateiktas požiūris į ženklo esaties teoriją. Kaip elementariosios sąvokos jame apibrėžimą gali būti laikomas ontologine alternatyva naudojami du Aristotelio esaties teorijos principai – Peirce’o požiūriui.

135