ISSN 1392-0561. INFORMACIJOS MOKSLAI. 2012 61 Semiotic Insights into Aristotle’s Theory of Being: Definition and Model of Sign Algirdas Budrevičius Vilnius University, Faculty of Communication, Information and Communication Department, Associate Professor, Doctor Vilniaus universiteto Komunikacijos fakulteto Informacijos ir komunikacijos katedros docentas Universiteto g. 3, LT-01513 Vilnius, Lithuania Tel. (+370 5) 236 6119 E-mail: [email protected] This paper is aimed to develop a model of the sign as homomorphism (i.e. similarity of form) as the initial part of a strict and fundamental theory of sign. Many various signs—photographs, pictures, sculptures, diagrams, surface maps, etc.—might be viewed in terms of homomorphism. The proposed model of sign as a homomorphism is derived using Aristotle’s theory of being. Two principles of Aristotle’s theory—form and matter—are used as elementary ideas in the model of sign. The main peculiarity of the undertaken approach to semiotics is treating a sign and a signified object as derivative ideas; they are constructed as compounds of form and matter. To achieve more strictness, the model of sign is treated in terms of the system of Cartesian coordinates modified for the articulation of being. Intentionality is viewed as the key idea in the model of sign. The approach to the definition of sign presented in this paper can be viewed as an ontological alternative to Peirce’s one. Keywords: sign as homomorphism, Aristotle, hylomorphism, Cartesian coordinate system, ontology. 1. Introduction derstanding”. He viewed semiotics as the doctrine of signs and noted: “It is aptly Greeks used the name semeiotike to denote enough termed also logike, logic”. Its task the science of medical signs—symptoms. Philosophers—including Plato and Aris- was “to consider the nature of signs, the totle—viewed the idea of sign in a wider mind makes use of for the understanding context. Sign studies were a field of inter- of things, or conveying its knowledge to est also for the medieval and Renaissance others”. Signs are necessary “to commu- philosophers. Locke in 1690 cardinally ex- nicate our thoughts to one another, as well tended their scope. In his Essay concern- as to record them for our own use”, Locke ing human understanding, Locke divided claimed. science into three sorts—physica, practi- Locke’s semiotics took several forms ca, and semiotike—according to the “most during the last centuries. As logic, it be- general division of the objects of our un- came a flourishing domain of knowledge. 113 One of its branch—formal logic—made tools from logic. Greimas (1970), in par- a significant contribution to the informa- ticular, employed the square of opposi- tion revolution in the twentieth century. tions (the Boethian square)—a classical Charles Sanders Peirce in the beginning tool in logic. Other simple means of logic of the twentieth century changed signifi- are applied for a semiotic interpretation cantly the shape of semiotics by proposing of texts. Peirce also used ideas of logic in a philosophical account of the sign, based his classification of signs. Overall, semiot- on the universal categories of being. He ics actually still does not possess its own preserved Locke’s idea to relate semiot- unique methods. ics with logic. Ferdinand de Saussure, al- The current situation in semiotics most at the same time, proposed a different might be evaluated viewing it from at least approach to the study of signs, which he two different perspectives: as a domain of termed semiology. It became very popu- humanities and as a science. Philosophy lar among linguists, anthropologists and should be mentioned separately. Semiotics other researchers of various domains of as a philosophical study of signs has ac- humanities. The scope of semiology was cumulated many interesting ideas during limited to language and its social environ- its long history. The current state of semi- ment. Saussure’s approach differs signifi- otics, from this perspective, is similar to cantly from that of Locke and Peirce; in many other directions in philosophy. The particular, it does not include logic as its situation of semiotics as a domain of hu- ingredient part; it is related to logic only to manities, if compared with such domains the extent the language is related to logic. as linguistics, anthropology, various cul- Saussure did not use the powerful methods tural studies, might seem even a flourish- developed in logic. ing domain of knowledge. The scope of research in modern se- The evaluation of semiotics in terms of miotics ranges from the definition of its science, however, is not very optimistic. elementary ideas—including the idea of Semiotics as logic (according to Locke) to- sign—to semiotic accounts of mental, so- day is certainly a well-developed science. cial, cultural, political, and even computa- Its rest part—what is called semiotics in its tional phenomena. contemporary sense—should be analyzed In the middle of the twentieth century, in more detail. semiotics became very popular in aca- Locke placed semiotics next to phys- demic circles. The interest was provoked ics, what implied their implicit compari- mainly by the need and expectation to son as two sciences. Physics was already a find methodological tools for humanities; rather well-established science in the times earlier, Dilthey (1889) related a similar of Locke; semiotics, however, was actu- hope to hermeneutics—the theory of in- ally only a domain of philosophy. Today, terpretation. The expectations, however, the gap between physics and semiotics as mostly failed; semiotics did not become a two sciences is much wider: in fact, it is an methodology for humanities. abyss. Modern semiotics is a very young Strict and precise methods are rarely domain of knowledge. Even its name is used in semiotics. Some authors borrow not widely known beyond the academic 114 circles. Deely (2004) in the preface of his provide precise methods for the analysis of book has noted Basics of Semiotics: “The sign. Therefore, for more strictness, also image of the modern semiotic universe is the idea of the Cartesian coordinates is the same as that of astronomy in 1611”. employed. The latter is implicitly based in We should admit that semiotics, despite logic; therefore, in fact, I use the methods its long prehistory, still lacks a strict theo- of logic. I adapt the Cartesian system for retical ground similar to the one used in the articulation of being treated in terms of sciences. Only fragmentary, non-interre- Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The peculiar- lated theories exist. Semiotics still has not ity of my approach from the point of view reached the state when knowledge is being of semiotics is in viewing the basic semi- accumulated continuously to form a solid otic concepts—the sign and the signified system of facts and theories. In terms of object—as derivative ideas; traditionally, Kuhn (1962), it did not reach the state of a they are viewed as primary ideas. The two normal science. Locke’s idea—rather ex- elementary ideas from Aristotle’s theory of pectation—to view semiotics as important being—form and matter (or content)—are as physics is far from fulfilment. used as primary ideas instead. The ideas of This paper is aimed to contribute to de- the signified object and sign are derived on veloping the theory of sign. The concrete their ground. Models of other related semi- purpose is to make a little step in this direc- otic phenomena may also be derived using tion and to develop a model of the sign as this approach. a homomorphism (i.e. similarity of form) A short remark on the interpretation of as the initial part of a strict and fundamen- the classical texts analyzed in this paper tal theory of sign. should be added. Texts of Aristotle, Aqui- Many various signs—images, pho- nas, Bonaventura and some other authors tographs, pictures, sculptures, diagrams, are used here. The purpose, however, is graphical schemes, surface maps, city not the analysis and interpretation of these plans, etc.—may be viewed in terms of texts. The purpose is to propose a theory homomorphism. Therefore, developing of sign, inspired by the insights into the a model of sign as a homomorphism is classical texts; therefore, in some places an important task. Ambrosio (2010) has I purposefully deviate from their ideas. claimed that Peirce’s icon might be viewed The problem of the interpretation of clas- as a homomorphism. sical texts is considered in hermeneutics. The main object of this paper, hence, The reader’s intention might differ from is the sign as a homomorphism, or, more that of the author; interpretation, therefore, precisely, an ontologically defined sign as might also differ. a homomorphism. The paper consists of nine chapters: in- The approach of this paper aims to troduction (Chapter 1), an overview of the ground the account of sign in the theory of conceptions of sign (Chapter 2), analysis being and, in particular, to base the sign on and grounding of the approach (Chapter 3), the insights into Aristotle’s theory—hylo- derivation of the model of sign as a homo- morphism. The theory of being, however, morphism (Chapters 4—7), description of is a domain of philosophy, and it does not the relation of sign as a homomorphism to 115 Peirce’s conception of sign (Chapter 8), of signs, e.g., that of Peirce). In the lin- and conclusions (Chapter 9). guistic tradition, the concept is the signi- The text and the reference list of the fied. From the point of view of the logic paper are aimed to be compliant with the (Peirce’s tradition), the object is the signi- rules of the APA Publication Style. fied.T he meaning in the latter case is treat- ed as a separate component of the sign: the 2.