DOCSLIB.ORG

Peace Watch June 2004

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Peace Watch June 2004 JUNE 2004 5 www.usip.org/iraq Vol. X, No. 2 6 Needed: A New Regional Security Arrangement UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE ■ WASHINGTON, DC ■ www.usip.org 7 The Devil’s Life- blood 8 How to Rebuild Iraq 10 The Missing Weapons 11 The Politics of Religion in Iraq 12 Afghanistan’s Constitution 13 Middle East Chil- dren’s Association 14 The Path to Peace in Kosovo 15 A War Averted Institute Launches Major New Initiative on Iraq Congressional appropriation aims to promote peace and stability. From left: recent congressional priation for the Institute over the congressional leaders of the rele- George Ward, appropriation autho- next three years. The bipartisan vance and value of our programs,” Institute Profes- rizes the Institute to congressional appropriation was said Institute president Richard sional Training bring the full range sponsored by Senator Tom Har- Solomon. “We are committed to director; Paul of its analytical kin (D-Iowa) and Senator Ted ensuring that these funds have a Bremer, CPA and operational Stevens (R-Alaska). The Institute meaningful impact on the situa- Administrator; experience to is using these funds to work with tion in Iraq.” Dan Serwer, bear on the Iraqis to prevent and reduce inter- Harriet Hentges, Institute Peace and Sta- complex chal- ethnic and interreligious violence, executive vice president, said, “the bility Operations A director; and lenges facing Iraq in the post– speed up stabilization and democ- Institute staff will draw on con- Saddam Hussein era. The Iraq ratization, and reduce the need for siderable knowledge of and expe- Ray Salvatore supplemental bill signed by Presi- a continuing U.S. presence in Iraq. rience in environments emerging Jennings, Insti- dent Bush in November 2003 “This appropriation constitutes from intense violence to develop tute chief of includes a $10 million appro- a tangible acknowledgment by See Initiative on Iraq, page 2 party in Iraq. 2 Initiative on Iraq continued from page 1 “We are committed to ensuring that these funds have a meaning- General David ful impact on the situation in Iraq.” —Richard Solomon Petraeus, former commander of the Army’s 101st of other organizations that have cials build their conflict manage- Airborne Divi- operated in hostile environments, ment skills to support the policies sion, spoke at an the Institute has developed a of their new democratic leader- Institute-spon- detailed security manual to guide ship—after decades of dictator- sored event in Institute staff on issues ranging ship that gravely damaged the March. from vehicle safety to kidnapping human infrastructure needed for and hostage situations. “Ensuring effective governance. “The success the safety of our staff is our high- of the political leadership of the est priority,” said Solomon. new government will depend on having top-quality, nonpolitical The Institute’s Activities civil servants who can carry out their professionalTraining responsibilities,” The Institute’s prospective said Ward. The first two work- projects for Iraq continue to be shops in this series were held in and implement projects in the defined as more information April in cooperation with the Lessonscontext learned of Iraq’s shifting political becomes available and as staff National Defense University, with circumstances.” The Institute’s are added, but several are already two more workshops planned for goals are clear, she said: prevent- underway. Led by George Ward, May and June. Later, the Institute ing interethnic and interreligious director of the Professional plans to conduct the program in violence, promoting the rule of Training Program, interviews Iraq. law, training and educating lead- were conducted to capture the The Professional Training Pro- ers for a democratic Iraq, and lessons learned by key U.S. per- gram is also preparing to launch training incoming U.S. civilian sonnel as they return from Iraq. and military leadership on lessons “There have been very few learned from former U.S. staff in lessons-learned projects under- Iraq. According to Hentges, the taken by civilian agencies,” said Institute is launching programs in Ward. “This project will debrief response to demands from Iraqis civilian and military personnel Peace Watch (ISSN 1080-9864) is published six times a year by the United States Institute while taking the security situation who have worked on a range of Peace, an independent, nonpartisan fed- eral institution created by Congress to pro- into account. of reconstruction projects.” mote the peaceful resolution of international The logistics of working in The interviews—recorded on conflicts. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect views of the Institute or its what remains a very dangerous video—have been packaged into a Board of Directors. To receive Peace Watch, visit our web site environment have necessitated briefing module along with other (www.usip.org); write to the United States an unusual degree of preparation relevant material for distribu- Institute of Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call 202- for Institute staff. Ray Salvatore tion via DVD to personnel newly 429-3832; or fax 202-429-6063. Jennings, a postwar development assigned to Iraq. The result will President: Richard H. Solomon specialist and former Institute be the effective transmission of Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges senior fellow, has been hired as lessons learned and best practices Publications Director: Mike Graham Reconciliation the Institute’s chief of party in from those returning from Iraq to Editor: David Aronson Production Manager: Marie Marr Jackson Iraq. He has been in Baghdad new personnel assigned to recon- conducting an assessment of struction efforts in that country Photo Credits: Staff, AP/ Wide World Photos security and logistical needs and and other conflict zones. Board of Directors Chairman: Chester A. Crocker. Vice Chair- making plans for activities on The Institute has also initiated man: Seymour Martin Lipset. Members: the ground. Jennings has estab- a training program for officials Betty F. Bumpers, Holly J. Burkhalter, Laurie S. Fulton, Charles Horner, Stephen D. Kras- lished an Institute presence in of the new Iraqi government ner, Mora L. McLean, María Otero, Daniel Pipes, Barbara W. Snelling, J. Robinson Baghdad—a combined office and charged with national security West. Members ex officio: Lorne W. Craner, residence provided by the Coali- responsibilities. Led by Ward and Department of State; Michael M. Dunn, National Defense University; Douglas J. tion Provisional Authority (CPA). program officer Michael Lekson, Feith, Department of Defense; Richard H. Benefiting from the experience the training will help Iraqi offi- Solomon, Institute president (nonvoting). Conflict management 3 Ayad Allawi (left), chairs his first meeting with the new Training Iraqi interim government in Baghdad, Iraq, on June 2, 2004. a multiphase project designed to reduce tensions among Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups by The Institute’s goals are clear: preventing interethnic and interreligious violence, training Iraqi facilitators to con- promoting the rule of law, training and educating leaders for a democratic Iraq, duct results-oriented dialogues among government and civil and training incoming U.S. civilian and military leadership on lessons learned society leaders. The first phase of from former U.S. staff in Iraq. —Harriet Hentges the project, which is being orga- nized by program officer Anne tive, in partnership with Coventry The Rule of Law Program, Henderson, took place in May, Cathedral, contributes to the led by Neil Kritz, held its first when the Institute conducted a establishment of an Iraqi Center seminar in April for high-rankingDialogue conflict management skills work- for Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Iraqis to help in the design and shop in Baghdad for forty Iraqis Peace. The religious landscape establishment of an Iraqi Special from the capital and outlying cit- of Iraq—with a long oppressed Tribunal to prosecute the per- ies, including Kirkuk. In July, the but fragmented Shiite majority, a petrators of atrocities under the Institute will conduct a follow-up once-privileged Sunni minority, former regime, including Saddam workshop for twenty alumni of a substantial Kurdish population Hussein himself. The seminar, the initial trainings, which will habituated to a deSpecial facto autonomy, whichtribunal was held in Amsterdam, complete their preparation as and a small Christian commu- brought together a broad range conflict management facilitators. nity—is the setting for an intense of international experts with Iraqi These Iraqi facilitators will then and sometimes violent competi- lawyers and judges, and focused organize and conduct dialogues tion for political dominance. on the legal and practical aspects Reconciliationamong leading civil society and “The successful transformation of of establishing a tribunal. Further government representatives of Iraq to a pluralistic and tolerant technical assistance will be pro- all ethnic and religious groups in democracy will require vigorous vided to Iraqis who will work on their governorates. The dialogues efforts to promote religious peace,” the tribunal. will help participants develop con- said Smock. Key religious lead- The Research and Studies structive approaches to governance ers in Iraq have already given the Program, in cooperation with the that transcend ethnic and religious center their blessing and indicated U.S. Army’s Center for Peace- divisions. a willingness
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
    1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction home | about | documents | news | publications | FOIA | research | internships | search | donate | mailing list Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80 Updated ­ February 11, 2004 Edited by Jeffrey Richelson Originally posted December 20, 2002 Previously updated February 26, 2003 Documents ­ Press release ­ Further reading Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the commencement of military ac绳on in January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one jus绳fica绳on for taking decisive ac绳on against Iraq. In the then‐classified Na绳onal Security Direc绳ve 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he iden绳fied Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruc绳on (WMD) against allied forces as an ac绳on that would lead the U.S. to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1) In the aermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.‐led U.N. coali绳on was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspec绳on and monitoring regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take ac绳ons to recons绳tute them. The means of implemen绳ng the relevant U.N. resolu绳ons was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspec绳on regime con绳nued un绳l December 16, 1998 ‐ although it involved interrup绳ons, confronta绳ons, and Iraqi aꬫempts at denial and decep绳on ‐ when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment. Subsequent to George W. Bush's assump绳on of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq's WMD Capability
    BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL BASIC SPECIAL REPORT Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq By David Isenberg and Ian Davis BASIC Special Report 2004.1 January 2004 1 The British American Security Information Council The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues. BASIC works to promote awareness of security issues among the public, policy makers and the media in order to foster informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. BASIC in the U.K. is a registered charity no. 1001081 BASIC in the U.S. is a non-profit organization constituted under Section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Code David Isenberg, Senior Analyst David Isenberg joined BASIC's Washington office in November 2002. He has a wide background in arms control and national security issues, and brings close to 20 years of experience in this field, including three years as a member of DynMeridian's Arms Control & Threat Reduction Division, and nine years as Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information. Ian Davis, Director Dr. Ian Davis is Executive Director of BASIC and has a rich background in government, academia, and the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector. He received both his Ph.D. and B.A. in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford. He was formerly Program Manager at Saferworld before being appointed as the new Executive Director of BASIC in October 2001. He has published widely on British defense and foreign policy, European security, the international arms trade, arms export controls, small arms and light weapons and defense diversification.
    [Show full text]
  • Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’S Posture Toward Afghanistan Since 2001
    Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’s Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001 Since the terrorist at- tacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has pursued a seemingly incongruous course of action in Afghanistan. It has participated in the U.S. and interna- tional intervention in Afghanistan both by allying itself with the military cam- paign against the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida and by serving as the primary transit route for international military forces and matériel into Afghanistan.1 At the same time, the Pakistani security establishment has permitted much of the Afghan Taliban’s political leadership and many of its military command- ers to visit or reside in Pakistani urban centers. Why has Pakistan adopted this posture of Afghan Taliban accommodation despite its nominal participa- tion in the Afghanistan intervention and its public commitment to peace and stability in Afghanistan?2 This incongruence is all the more puzzling in light of the expansion of insurgent violence directed against Islamabad by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant organizations that are independent of the Afghan Taliban but that nonetheless possess social and po- litical links with Afghan cadres of the Taliban movement. With violence against Pakistan growing increasingly indiscriminate and costly, it remains un- clear why Islamabad has opted to accommodate the Afghan Taliban through- out the post-2001 period. Despite a considerable body of academic and journalistic literature on Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan since 2001, the subject of Pakistani accommodation of the Afghan Taliban remains largely unaddressed. Much of the existing literature identiªes Pakistan’s security competition with India as the exclusive or predominant driver of Pakistani policy vis-à-vis the Afghan Khalid Homayun Nadiri is a Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions
    AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country, Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, Afghanistan, Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to be established pursuant to this agreement, Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and After: Taking the Right Lessons for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
    2005 May Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction2 Iraq and After: Taking the Right Lessons for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction by Michael Eisenstadt Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University Washington, D.C. occasional paper JOHN F. REICHART Director Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction STAFF National Defense University W. SETH CARUS Deputy Director Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of JOHN P. CAVES, JR. Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counterproliferation Senior Research Professor Research) has been at the forefront of research on the conse- REBECCA K.C. HERSMAN quences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American Senior Research Professor security. Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the RICHARD A. LOVE WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to Research Professor the challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, GEOFFREY D. KIEFER President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing Research Project Specialist “vital insight into the dangers of a new era.” CREIGHTON HOTTINGER Research Project Specialist The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, and outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the chal- General Editor: Geoffrey D. Kiefer lenge of fashioning effective responses to them. Education and outreach programs seek to enhance awareness in the next genera- RECENT PUBLICATIONS tion of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, Combating WMD: Challenges for the Next 10 Years and operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Final Agenda Citpax Oct 2007
    The Evolution of PRT Models: Towards the Pre-eminence of the Civilian Dimension? Meeting between Afghan Civil Society, PRT and International Organisations Representatives AGENDA Madrid 16 - 17 October 2007 Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales Plaza de la Marina Española, 9 Sponsored by With the support of Tuesday, 16 October 2007 9:00 – 9:30 Welcome remarks: Bernardino León, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Spain Juan Pablo de Laiglesia, Secretary General, Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) 10:00 – 14:00 The role of Civil Society consultation processes and fora in the PRT strategic and operational planning: short term and medium term prospects Introductory interventions: Fahim Hakim, Vice-President, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Kanishka Nawabi, Managing Director Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), Afghanistan Discussants: Hakan Abaci, former civilian coordinator of the Turkish PRT in Wardak Chair of the session: Clare Lockhart, Director, State Effectiveness Initiative o How can CS contribute to the work of PRTs? Are the existing civil society consultation fora effective? To what extent do PRT master plans reflect CS recommendations and therefore meet the expectations of the local population? o Wrap up session, conclusions and proposals. 14:00 - 15:30 Lunch 15:30 – 19:00 The civilian role of PRTs: towards a specialised delivery platform for the development and implementation of ANDS (Afghan National Development Strategy) Pilar 1 (Political and Security) Introductory remarks: Bernardo Álvarez del Manzano, Commander of Operations Command, Spain Aziz Rafiee, Managing Director, Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) Discussants: Gavin Buchan, former Political Director, Kandahar PRT; current Special Advisor to DG International Security Policy, Department of National Defence, Canada Colonel Norton, Head of UK PRT in Helmand Chair of the session: Jawed Ludin, Afghan Ambassador to Norway and former Chief of Staff to President Karzai o Short term vs.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Assessment
    AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT April 2005 Country Information & Policy Unit IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Afghanistan April 2005 CONTENTS 1 Scope Of Document 1.1 - 1.12 2 Geography General 2.1 – 2.2 Languages/Main ethnic groups/Religions 2.3 - 2.5 3.Economy 3.1 - 3.8 4 History Overview to December 2001 4.1 Post Taliban 4.2 – 4.13 January 2004 – December 2004 4.14 – 4.59 January 2005 onwards 4.60 – 4.66 5.State Structures The Constitution 5.1 - 5.8 The Constitutional Loya Jirga 5.9 – 5.13 Citizenship and Nationality 5.14 – 5.16 Political System Overview 5.17 – 5.26 Elections: - General 5.27 – 5.29 - Presidential Election 5.30 – 5.40 - Presidential Election Results 5.41 – 5.42 - Lead up to Parliamentary Elections 5.43 – 5.47 Political Situation in Herat 5.48 – 5.50 Judiciary 5.51 – 5.64 Land Court 5.65 – 5.66 Legal Rights/Detention 5.67 - 5.83 Death Penalty 5.84 - 5.86 Internal Security Developments following 11 September 2001 5.87 - 5.90 Security Sector Reform (SSR) 5.91 - 5.94 General security situation 5.95 – 5.112 Security situation in different regions: - Kabul 5.113 – 5.116 - Central 5.117 - South and Southeast 5.118 - 5.122 - North 5.123 – 5.124 Internal Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Provincial Reconstruction 5.125 – 5.150 Teams (PRTs) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDR) 5.151 – 5.166 National Security Directorate (Amniat) 5.167 – 5.170 Army 5.171 – 5.174 Police 5.175 – 5.184 Prisons and Prison Conditions 5.185 - 5.208 Military Service 5.209 - 5.212 Medical Services
    [Show full text]
  • Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn, Forsvarsudvalget, Udenrigsudvalget 2010-11 UPN Alm
    Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn, Forsvarsudvalget, Udenrigsudvalget 2010-11 UPN alm. del Bilag 56, FOU alm. del Bilag 54, URU alm. del Bilag 65 Offentligt The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have the pleasure of inviting you to a seminar on: Afghanistan: Perspectives for a Peaceful Solution Tuesday, 11 January 2011, 14.45-17.00 Danish Institute for International Studies Main Auditorium Strandgade 71, ground floor, 1401 Copenhagen K Background Afghanistan is facing a number of key challenges: The transition of security responsibilities from foreign forces to the Afghan National Security Forces, and at some stage the exit of foreign forces; a likely reconciliation and reintegration process with insurgents and the political consequences of that; the need for progress in governance and development; the relationship with its neighbors. All at the backdrop of a prolonged conflict, that has had dire human and developmental consequences for Afghanistan and has framed international relations for the last ten years. The debate on Afghanistan has become more and more polarized with those calling for a rapid exit of foreign troops arguing that the present military involvement is part of the problem rather than the solution; and those stating that international involvement (also military) in Afghanistan is a key requirement for peace and stability in the country, region and globally. What, in the view of the government of Afghanistan, are the perspectives for continued international involvement, the possible political solutions, and the overall benefit of the present international involvement in Afghanistan? And what can the international community in turn expect from the Afghan government in areas such as governance and development? Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Non-Proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change 7 Non-Proliferation and The
    Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change 7 Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Robert S. Litwak The Iraq war set an important historical precedent by being the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non- proliferation ends. In advocating this unique use of force, the Bush administration asserted that Iraq’s disarmament, mandated by the United Nations Security Council after the 1991 Gulf War, necessitated regime change because of Saddam Hussein’s unrelenting drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 Although the US and British governments endeavoured to make the case for war based on international law – the Iraqi dictator’s flouting of multiple Security Council resolutions – war was ultimately waged without a legitimising UN imprimatur because of the political deadlock over the inherently contentious issue of regime change. Instead the military action was widely characterised in the American media as a decisive, even paradigmatic, application of the Bush administration’s September 2002 National Security Strategy document, which had formally elevated preemption as a policy option against ‘rogue states’ and terrorist groups in the post-11 September era.2 Viewed through that political optic, the war’s successful ousting of Saddam Hussein from power in April 2003 immediately raised the question as to how this precedent-setting case would affect US non-proliferation policy in addressing other hard cases. President George W. Bush laid down an ambitious marker when he boldly declared that the United States would not ‘tolerate’ the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea – the other two charter members of his ‘axis of evil’ (now dubbed by one observer as the ‘axle of evil’).
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan October 2003
    AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT October 2003 Country Information & Policy Unit IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Afghanistan October 2003 CONTENTS 1 Scope Of Document 1.1 - 1.4 2 Geography 2.1 - 2.5 General 2.1 Languages 2.2 - 2.5 3.Economy 3.1 - 3.6 4 History 4.1 - 4.94 1992-1994: Mujahidin Government 4.1 - 4.4 Emergence of the Taliban 4.5 - 4.8 February 1995-June 1996 4.9 - 4.10 September 1996-June 1997 4.11 - 4.18 August 1997-December 1999 4.19 - 4.33 January 2000 - December 2000 4.34 - 4.39 January 2001 - December 2001 4.40 - 4.58 January 2002 – December 2002 4.59 - 4.79 January 2003 onwards 4.80 - 4.94 5.State Structures 5.1 - 5.137 The Constitution 5.1 - 5.4 Citizenship and Nationality 5.5 - 5.7 Political System 5.8 - 5.24 -Interim Administration 5.8 - 5.10 -The Emergency Loya Jirga and Transitional Administration 5.11 - 5.17 -Elections 5.18 - 5.19 -Situation in Herat 5.20 - 5.21 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.22 - 5.24 Judiciary 5.25 - 5.37 -Current Position 5.25 - 5.35 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.36 - 5.37 Legal Rights/Detention 5.38 - 5.53 -Current Situation 5.38 - 5.45 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.46 - 5.48 Death Penalty 5.49 - 5.53 -Current Situation 5.49 - 5.51 -1996 – 22 December 2001 5.52 - 5.53 Internal Security 5.54 - 5.94 -Current Situation 5.54 - 5.73 -National Security Directorate 5.74 - 5.76 -Accountability Department 5.77 -Army 5.78 - 5.80 -Police 5.81 - 5.84 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.85 - 5.91 -Religious Police 5.92 - 5.94 Prisons and Prison Conditions 5.95 - 5.110 -Current Situation 5.95 -
    [Show full text]
  • USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal #299
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 299, 30 October 2003 Articles & Other Documents: Weeklong delay on ricin threat draws scrutiny Congressional Trip To N. Korea Called Off Search In Iraq Fails To Find Nuclear Threat Pentagon Wants 'Mini-Nukes' To Fight Terrorists C.I.A. Disputes Accusations That Its Prewar Intelligence Veteran Faults Iraq Arms Data Conclusions On Iraq Arms Were Flawed U.S. Presses China On Arms, Quietly Report Cites Bioterror Concerns Scientist: Bioterror software should be marketed The yeast and the cockroach -- a spy tale Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538.
    [Show full text]
  • President Bush and the Invasion of Iraq: Presidential Leadership and Thwarted Goals
    From James McCormick, ed., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 6th ed. (Roman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 361-380. President Bush and the Invasion of Iraq: Presidential Leadership and Thwarted Goals James P. Pfiffner George Mason University The 2003 Iraq War is a case study in winning the military battle but losing the war. President George W. Bush demonstrated impressive political skills in taking the country to war, despite the reservations of former generals, members of his father’s administration and the doubts of contemporary military leaders. But President Bush’s political victory in taking the country to war and the quick military defeat of Saddam’s army were undercut by a long post-war insurgency in Iraq, the rise of Iran’s influence in the Middle East, and the establishment of ISIS in a broken Iraq. This case study will examine President Bush’s campaign for war, his use of intelligence to make his case, and the longer-term consequences of the war. Many factors determine a decision to go to war, and in the United States, the personality and character of the president as leader of the country and commander in chief of the armed forces, are particularly important. To be sure, Congress is constitutionally the institution that must “declare war,” but political and governmental dynamics most often favor the president. The president has the advantage of being a single decision maker directing the many bureaucracies that gather intelligence and prepare for war. Virtually all intelligence available to Congress originates in executive branch agencies. Publicly, the president can command the attention of the media and strongly shape public perceptions of the national security situation of the United States.
    [Show full text]