A top airpower analyst looks back at the greatest air war that never was.

How the West

Would Have Won By Christopher J. Bowie riving through Germany scattered across Europe. What was their Exactly what would cause the So- these days, one frequently purpose? The answer is that, in the viet Union to attack Western Europe encounters abandoned run- 1980s, those massive shelters housed was never clear. What was only too Dways surrounded by huge, and protected thousands of sleek fight- clear, however, was that the Soviet-led camouflaged, and “hardened” aircraft ers that lay at the core of United States Warsaw Pact had deployed powerful shelters. Their concrete walls and heavy Air Force strategy in Europe. offensive forces along the inner Ger- sliding doors typically are painted a Nuclear forces formed the backbone man border, held a huge numerical dark green, matching the colors of the of US deterrent power, but the tensest advantage, and kept improving its surrounding countryside. Cold War flashpoint was Europe—in capabilities. Future generations may well wonder particular the Central European re- The airpower community spent a lot how and why these relics came to be gion. of time in the 1980s planning for a war 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007 June 1, 1982: Inside a hardened the thrust close to the border (a German forces to conduct ground attack op- shelter in Europe, airmen prepare an priority) while keeping the conflict at erations aimed at blunting the Soviet F-15 fighter for an exercise. a conventional level. NATO reserved armored spearheads and reducing the the option to “go nuclear” to further flow of enemy forces to the front. In complicate Warsaw Pact decision-mak- addition, some elements of the airpower

DOD photo ing and bolster deterrence. fleet could be held in reserve to execute The greatest concern was the inner nuclear strikes should NATO choose German border. to escalate. Defending the border region was a In contrast, the Soviet and Warsaw daunting prospect. Land forces usually Pact air armies’ primary objective was to prefer to fall back and trade territory deny NATO control of the air by striking for time, but West Germany could not airfields, radar sites, and missile sites accept any strategy that accepted a while also shooting down air defense Soviet thrust—however brief—into its fighters and AWACS aircraft. national territory. By denying NATO control of the Many of the contemporary computer air, Warsaw Pact ground forces could combat simulations were based on a utilize their larger mass of armor to metric that used as its primary objec- smash through the outnumbered NATO tive the amount of friendly area lost or ground forces and drive to the English friendly area regained. Strategists rated Channel. positively those strategies and forces Allied air forces in the Central Re- that minimized the area lost. gion fielded a force of approximately 115 fighter squadrons, for a total of Vulnerable to Sheer Mass about 2,000 operational aircraft in the NATO forces arrayed along the border 1980s. USAF added approximately possessed very little operational depth, 20 squadrons, comprising 700 combat particularly after France withdrew from aircraft. Most were based in the Central the Allied military command in 1966. Region and Britain. In comparison, US The distance from the inner German Air Forces in Europe today maintains border to Belgium, Holland, and the a fleet with fewer than 200 fighter and English Channel was, at its shortest attack aircraft. points, only about 350 miles. The Central Region air forces were NATO ground forces, though they divided into two Allied Tactical Air were rated as superior to pact units in Forces or ATAFs, established in 1952: quality and capability, nonetheless were 2 ATAF in the northern half of West vulnerable to the sheer mass of the land Germany and 4 ATAF in the southern armies the East could generate. Soviet half. doctrine held that, in a conflict, waves The RAF dominated 2 ATAF, which of armored echelons would advance was always commanded by a British air across Eastern Europe, enter the main marshal. It featured the Royal Nether- battle area, and exploit weak spots to lands Air Force, the Belgian Air Force, break through and shatter the NATO elements of the German Air Force, and defenses. those USAF aircraft based in the 2 ATAF To help redress this imbalance of area. Meanwhile, 4 ATAF featured land forces, the United States pre- USAF, Canadian, and German forces How the West positioned huge masses of equipment and was commanded by an American and war materiel on the continent. and, later, a German general. Commercial airlifters would fly in The division of the airspace into troops to link up with this equipment. two zones might have made sense for Commanders planned to bolster the slow-moving ground operations, but By Christopher J. Bowie forward forces with three divisions in for air operations, it was a serious Would Have Won the first week, followed by a division weakness. A seam ran down the middle a week after that. between the two ATAFs, which one in Central Europe, because airpower Air forces, the most strategically senior commander characterized as would play the key role in the outcome agile forces, were to form the primary “a brick wall.” of an East-West conflict. In 1988-89, I tool for providing additional firepower Many commanders expressed the fear produced a classified study for RAND during these first critical weeks as the that the Warsaw Pact air armies would Corp. titled, “Basing Uncertainties in ground forces built up strength. The penetrate along this seam to sow confu- the NATO Theater.” It was recently first goal of the allied air forces was sion. Planners also believed the 2 ATAF declassified, and some of the material to gain control of the air, which would region would suffer the most violent presented here comes from it. enable military and civil airliners to thrusts by Warsaw Pact forces because NATO sought to deter an attack by bring reinforcements to the theater. of the nature of its terrain—flat plains maintaining powerful military forces Control of the air would also enable ideally suited for armor operations. that could, if deterrence failed, blunt airmen to re-role their flexible fighter But trying to vector 4 ATAF assets into AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007 61 defense. Passive defense comprised measures to reduce airbase vulner- ability. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the Israeli Air Force caught the Arab air forces on the ground in a well-coordinated attack, NATO air forces made the decision to “harden” their airfields. Concrete was deemed much cheaper than aircraft. The pace of this effort always lagged behind objectives, but, over time, NATO air forces devised a vast array of aircraft shelters at dozens of airfields across Europe. The Alliance added additional taxiways and runways, “toned down” buildings with camouflage paint, in- stalled air and ground crew shelters, and purchased rapid runway repair equipment. Planners feared Soviet use of tactical ballistic missiles to pin down air defense aircraft, followed by a wave of attack Soviet armor crews on parade in 1985 show off the 41-ton T-72 main battle tank, aircraft to wreak further havoc on the huge numbers of which faced NATO forces. airfields. Additional threats included chemical attacks and Soviet Special Forces. NATO believed the latter would the 2 ATAF region was rendered more The Air Force accordingly embraced be inserted before the Warsaw Pact difficult by the invisible line separating operations with integrated defense offensive to sow confusion and attack the two commands. suppression, and so 4 ATAF placed a key facilities on airfields. There were force imbalances as well. greater emphasis on centralization and Loss of Allied airpower was viewed USAF F-15s scheduled to reinforce coordination. as a recipe for disaster, and so, to reduce central Europe were dedicated to 2 The search for the right approach— the risk, NATO attempted to increase the ATAF, and, within 2 ATAF, they were low level, or medium altitude with number of sites that could be turned into concentrated in the Netherlands. defense suppression—sparked endless airfields in an emergency. Each nation The better solution would have been debates among Allied airmen around provided spaces for deploying USAF a single ATAF with a single area under the theater. aircraft at what were called co-located a single commander, but this ran afoul operating bases, or COBs. Over time, of interservice and Alliance politics. Passive and Active shelters and other passive defenses were American concern over the divided To stymie Warsaw Pact efforts to added to some of these fields. command of airpower led to creation cripple Allied airpower, NATO em- Every year, USAF conducted so- of a coordinating body, but the real braced a two-pronged strategy—use called “Rapid Reactor” exercises to power remained with the ATAFs. As a of passive defense and use of active familiarize US-based squadrons with result, the dangerous seam endured and would no doubt have been exploited by the adversary. Doctrinal differences were also pres- ent on both sides of the “brick wall.” DOD photos British airmen believed communica- tions channels would be disrupted very quickly in the opening phase of the war, and the individual air bases would have to operate independently. Aircraft would have to rely on low-level flying to evade defenses and reduce losses. As a result, 2 ATAF believed in a more decentralized approach and an operational style that required minimal coordination. The assumptions in 4 ATAF differed due to USAF experience in Vietnam. Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns had taken a terrible toll on fighters operating at low level, which led to an emphasis on medium-level penetration and unpleasant An F-15C (foreground) and F-15D prepare to take off in 1987 from Bitburg Air Base, encounters with surface-to-air missiles. in what was then West Germany, for Exercise Red Star ’87. 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007 wartime beddown locations. For ex- ample, F-15Cs from Eglin AFB, Fla., would proceed to Soesterberg Air Base DOD photo in the Netherlands, while the new F-15E Strike Eagles out of Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., would use Lahr AB, Ger- many, as their combat base. The RAF added an additional facet with its Harrier force, which during a mobilization would deploy to rapidly developed air bases to complicate en- emy targeting efforts. In terms of active defenses, NATO forces fielded thousands of short-range surface-to-air missile batteries and guns in the forward area with longer-ranged Patriot, Hawk, and other SAMs farther in the rear. Interspersed within the longer-range The Soviet Su-24 Fencer, such as this one shown on a 1989 training mission, was missile engagement zones were fighter equipped for heavy attacks on NATO airfields. engagement zones manned by both dedicated air superiority aircraft and multirole fighters. Seven hundred combat aircraft were nuclear riposte? NATO fighters were The general concept allowed the in the European Theater, and USAF armed with so-called “dual key” nu- forward missiles and guns to shoot at would reinforce this with an additional clear weapons provided by the United anything that flew, in a huge concen- 1,800 fighter aircraft. The Air Force States, while Britain, France, and the tration of firepower. Any incoming planned to move 1,600 of these fight- US maintained their own independent Warsaw Pact fighter would first have to ers in just 10 days—more than two nuclear forces. penetrate the dense forward defenses, wings per day. This would have been Would a responding nuclear strike evade Patriot shots, and then push past an aerial movement of unprecedented have hit Eastern Europe or extended to combat air patrols. It no doubt would proportions. These aircraft would be Soviet territory? Strategists and plan- have been an eventful sortie for any added to the 2,000 or so combat aircraft ners spent countless hours weighing the Warsaw Pact aircrew. that NATO Allies kept in the Central imponderables. But let’s assume that After a time, the air defense forces Region to fight the thousands of Warsaw nuclear deterrence held and the Soviets would be told to go “weapons tight” Pact aircraft. elected to conduct a conventional-force- to avoid shooting down any NATO The encounter would no doubt have only campaign. What then? aircraft that may have been streaming been the most epic air battle in his- across the border. A complex network tory. Whacking the Pact of corridors, altitudes, aircraft speeds, Looking back two decades later, what The Warsaw Pact air forces would and identification, friend or foe (IFF), conclusions can we draw from what have suffered grievous losses. Western electronic systems would be used to might have happened if “the balloon” air forces have consistently excelled at prevent so-called “friendly fire” inci- had gone up? air-to-air combat, and NATO believed dents. How well the forward forces’ The key unknowable was the open- its equipment and training were superior firing discipline would hold, however, ing move. Post-Cold War disclosures to the Soviets’ rigid procedures. was a major concern. of the details of Soviet war plans NATO’s ground-based missile sys- A similar problem would occur in reveal Soviet intent to launch an early tems were extremely effective — some trying to deconflict Patriot missile nuclear strike against Western Europe. aircraft would have gotten through the and fighter engagement zones. Patriot Typically, however, the plans show the missile defenses, but the toll on Soviet batteries had extremely lethal missiles Warsaw Pact assuming a NATO “first aircraft from Western guns, missiles, with a very high kill probability, and use” of nuclear weapons, meaning that and air defense fighters would have most fighter crews did not believe their the pact strike would be classified as been brutal. operators would hold back a missile retaliatory—and thus less controversial Warsaw Pact losses would not permit shot in case of a question regarding to include in a war plan. more than a few days of such operations. the true identify of an aircraft. Most Would the Soviets have actually No doubt the NATO air forces would airmen, in fact, thought that fratricide gone first—that is, have launched a have suffered attrition as well, from levels would be very high. surprise strike with nuclear weapons both enemy and friendly fire, but not to USAF planned to augment its for- as the opening move? If so, all the the same degree as that suffered by the ward-based forces with Stateside vast array of planning, force buildup, pact. NATO would likely have gained aircraft. In the plan, USAF’s total and so on for conventional conflict control of the air quite quickly. fighter force—approximately 3,700 could have been largely immaterial as Some enemy aircraft would have operational aircraft, or more than 50 nuclear weapons detonated across the penetrated successfully to hit air bases, wings—would be allocated to vari- European continent. as would Soviet ballistic missile strikes, ous regions in the event of a general If Moscow had gone nuclear, would and the result would have been serious European conflict. NATO have responded with its own indeed. The “Salty Demo” exercises in AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007 63 to improve the conventional balance in the Central Region. Airborne radar DOD photo carried by the E-8 Joint STARS battle- management aircraft would locate and characterize enemy forces deep within the Warsaw Pact. Commanders could then allocate long-range fires—missile systems and fighter aircraft equipped with precision guided weapons—to strike at key locations. By interdicting onrushing armor formations, pressure on NATO ground forces could be kept in check, enabling the Allies to defend the border. Ele- ments of these new systems were just being deployed when the Soviet Union collapsed. And in the end, if the NATO front lines had held—or at least minimized the penetrations—what then? What would Kremlin leaders do next? Our USAF F-15 maintainer is “buttoned up” for a 1982 training exercise in his hot and forces were never put to that test. bulky nuclear-biological-chemical protective suit. The analysis of the air campaign produced several lessons. First, control of the air was the the mid-1980s, in which USAF tried to what we have learned from later wars. linchpin of any successful strategy in a simulate the effect of strikes on its air In the Gulf War, for example, the real theater conflict. Without control of the bases, were scripted and artificial. The difference-makers were the aircraft air, NATO would have been defeated true damage was never really calculated. delivering precision weapons—F-117s because airpower could not have been Moreover, the Pentagon never provided and F-111s. Unfortunately, only a small brought to bear against Warsaw Pact resources sufficient for hardening bases portion of the USAF combat force in armored forces. The same will hold to ensure air base operability. Europe could deliver precision guided true for any future contingency. Although enemy strikes would cer- bombs, and the Allies possessed even Second, modern airpower was the tainly have disrupted NATO operations fewer. most strategically and operationally at several locations for a period, the agile element of US military power Warsaw Pact would have been unable The Dilemma and was the only element that could be to generate the weight of effort required Close-in delivery was the only way brought to bear quickly from American to cripple NATO air operations. to reliably hit targets with unguided territory. The Air Force planned to At this point, NATO air command- ordnance—and the loss rates would deploy 25 fighter wings in the same ers would have focused on offensive no doubt have been eye watering. By amount of time that its airlift force operations. Planners initially targeted trying to get close, the NATO forces moved only three United States Army Warsaw Pact airfields and air defense would lose aircraft, but, by trying to divisions. Once in theater, these aircraft sites in what was termed the offensive stand off, fighter effectiveness would could also be shifted from one bat- counterair mission. The goal was to have decreased. The dilemma was tlespace sector to another (providing seize control of the air. Commanders indeed great. that the 2 ATAF and 4 ATAF split did would have had to judge how much ef- The Western air strikes would still not get in the way). USAF’s airlift and fort to put against these targets and how have disrupted significant parts of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet also provided much to enemy ground force targets. Soviet follow-on armored echelons. strategic agility to the Army. When it came to ground targets, the From the battles of World War II to Third, airpower offered great flexibil- decision would be further complicated operations in Iraq, armored forces ity. Significant numbers of NATO fight- by issues concerning the depth of the that have come under air attack were ers could have shifted from air defense strike operation. Should NATO air- severely degraded. Actual tank losses to ground attack, to nuclear strike, and power strike deep to interdict enemy may not be high, but the disruption back, depending on the situation. forces approaching the battle area, caused by fear, road blockages, and Fortunately for all involved, the Al- or strike closer to the border against running for cover dislocates time tables lied military forces were never put to forces engaged with NATO’s ground severely and undermines morale. the test, but the odds of success prob- forces? In the 1980s, the United States be- ably were better than even, perhaps The allocation would also depend gan developing concepts and forces much better. ■ heavily on how well NATO’s land element was able to weather the initial onslaught. Christopher J. Bowie has held a variety of positions with RAND Corp., the aero- One has to question the actual ef- space industry, and the Air Force. He served recently as USAF’s deputy director for fectiveness of NATO air strikes against strategic planning and today is director of strategic studies for Northrop Grumman airfields and armored forces, given Integrated Systems. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine. 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007